


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
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# A TREATISE

ON THE LAW OF

# TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

BY

JAIRUS WARE PERRY

SECOND EDITION

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I.

BOSTON

LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY

1874

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TO THE HONORABLE

HORACE GRAY, JR.,

ONE OF THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF  
MASSACHUSETTS,

THIS WORK IS INSCRIBED IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE ASSISTANCE RECEIVED  
FROM HIS JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND FROM HIS PERSONAL INTEREST  
IN THE PROGRESS OF ITS CONSTRUCTION,

BY THE AUTHOR.





## ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE SECOND EDITION.

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THE rapid absorption of the first edition of this work into the hands of the profession has not left to the Author so much time as could have been desired for the preparation of a second edition; nor could the necessary work have been done at all, unless it had been constantly in his hands. Even before the first edition had been sent forth, work was done, and materials accumulated, to improve the second, if it should ever be called for. At no time has there been a relaxation of thought and study upon the subject. The new cases have been assimilated as the Reports came along, and old cases have been added as they fell under notice in business or study. The Author owes a debt of gratitude to his professional brethren in every part of the country, for many valuable criticisms, suggestions, and references to authorities. Thirty-three new sections upon the trusts that arise under power of sale mortgages, and deeds of trust in the nature of mortgages, have been added; and many new sections upon important questions are scattered through the work. The

numbers of the sections of the first edition are preserved, that there may be no confusion in the citations of the two editions.

The Author has been reluctant to swell the book into two volumes, but it was found impossible to compress the materials into a single volume of a form and size reasonably convenient for use. In sending forth this edition the Author hopes that it may do something to lighten the toils of a laborious profession, and that it may meet with the same kind indulgence which was so liberally bestowed upon the first.

SALEM, MASS., Sept. 15, 1874.

## P R E F A C E.

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AN American book upon the subject of Trusts has long been needed by the profession. At the solicitation of too partial friends, the writer was induced to undertake its preparation. The result is now given to the public.

The writer of a law-book would be inexcusable if he failed to use all the materials at his command, which could in any way enable him to state and illustrate the law. The treatises and opinions of eminent writers, as well as the reports of the decisions and opinions of judges, must all be studied and mastered. And where the book is intended for the daily use of the lawyer in busy practice, it must contain a notice and citation of the latest cases and authorities. To this end all the treatises and essays, as well as the reported decisions, upon the subject, have been used.

In addition to the original opinions of judges contained in the Reports, the excellent treatise on the Law of Trustees by Mr. Hill, and the notes and commentaries of the learned American editors, have been carefully considered upon all the subjects treated by them.

The most complete work upon the Law of Trusts is the fifth edition of Mr. Lewin's Treatise. This work, first printed more than thirty years ago, has received in

its various editions the most careful emendations, corrections, and additions by its author, until in the last edition it has grown into a remarkably full and clear exposition of the Law of Trusts, as administered in England.

It has been the constant object of the writer to cover all the ground embraced by the treatises of Mr. Lewin and Mr. Hill, so far as the same is important to the American lawyer ; and, in addition, to include such other subjects and matters, relating to the Law of Trusts, not treated fully in those works, as are useful and necessary in American practice.

Perhaps the accumulation of authorities upon the many topics discussed may call for some explanation. A large and increasing number of States and courts are yearly sending out a great number of volumes of Reports. Few lawyers can have access to the whole number, but all desire to see the cases in their own State Reports bearing upon each proposition of the text. It has therefore been the aim of the writer to cite the cases in all the States, although the citation of a few leading cases is always sufficient to sustain an elementary proposition. He cannot hope that he has cited all the cases upon the many matters treated ; but it has been his purpose to do so, and this has caused an accumulation of cases which to some may seem unnecessary.

Conscious of defects in the execution of his work, he trusts that a liberal profession will rather consider how much of a difficult task has been accomplished, than how much has been omitted or imperfectly done.

The writer cannot send this book forth to the public without acknowledging the constant kindness and encouragement which he has received from his friends



during the labor of its composition ; and it is his especial duty and pleasure to acknowledge his obligations to his friend and associate in business for nearly twenty years, WILLIAM CROWNINSHIELD ENDICOTT, Esquire, whose sound learning and clear judgment have been a never-failing resource in matters of doubt and difficulty, and whose refined and severe taste has been freely employed in pruning redundancies and softening asperities of manner and style.

SALEM, MASS., Nov. 1871.



# CONTENTS OF VOLUME I.

	PAGE
INDEX TO CASES CITED . . . . .	xxiii

## CHAPTER I.

### INTRODUCTION.

	SECTION
ORIGIN, HISTORY, DEFINITION, AND DIVISION OR CLASSIFICATION OF TRUSTS . . . . .	1-27

- § 1. The general nature of trusts.
- § 2. The technical nature of trusts, and their origin in the *fidei commissa* of the Roman law.
- § 3. The origin of uses.
- § 4. The inconveniences that arose from the prevalence of uses.
- § 5. The statute of uses.
- §§ 6, 7. The effect of the statute of uses, and the origin of trusts.
- §§ 8, 9, 10. Development of trusts in England and America.
- § 11. Advantage of the late adoption of trusts in America.
- § 12. Object of this treatise.
- §§ 13-17. Definition of trusts.
- § 18. Simple and special trusts.
- § 19. Ministerial and discretionary trusts.
- § 20. A mixed trust and power, and a power annexed to a trust.
- § 21. Legal and illegal trusts.
- § 22. Public and private trusts.
- § 23. Duration of a private trust and of a public trust.
- §§ 24-27. Express trusts, implied trusts, resulting trusts, and constructive trusts.

## CHAPTER II.

PARTIES TO TRUSTS ; AND WHAT PROPERTY MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF A TRUST . . . . .	28-72
---	-------

- I. §§ 28-37. Who may create a trust.
  - § 28. All persons competent to contract or make wills may create trusts.
  - § 29. The king may create trusts.
  - § 30. The State may create trusts; and so may all its officers.
  - § 31. Corporations may create trusts.

- § 32. The power of married women to create trusts.
  - § 33. Capacity and power of infants to create trusts.
  - § 34. The marriage settlements of infants.
  - § 35. Of the ability of lunatics to create trusts.
  - § 36. Of conveyances in trust by aliens.
  - § 37. Trusts by bankrupts and insolvents.
- II. §§ 38-59. Who may be a trustee.
- § 38. A person may convert himself into a trustee.
  - § 39. Any person capable of taking the legal title may take as trustee. Rules that govern courts in appointing trustees.
  - § 40. The sovereign may be trustee. Question as to remedy.
  - § 41. The United States and the several States may be trustees.
  - §§ 42-45. Corporations may be trustees.
  - § 46. Unincorporated societies may be trustees for charitable purposes.
  - § 47. Public officers as trustees.
  - §§ 48-51. Married women as trustees.
  - §§ 52-54. Infants as trustees.
  - § 55. Aliens as trustees.
  - § 56. Lunatics as trustees.
  - § 57. A religious person or nun as trustee.
  - § 58. A bankrupt as trustee.
  - § 59. *Cestui que trust* may be a trustee for himself and others.
- III. §§ 60-66. Who may be *cestui que trust*.
- § 60. All persons may be *cestuis que trust* who may take the legal title.
  - §§ 61, 62. The Crown and the State may be *cestuis que trust*.
  - § 63. Corporations as *cestuis que trust*.
  - § 64. Aliens as *cestuis que trust*.
  - § 65. Those who cannot take a legal interest cannot take an equitable interest.
  - § 66. Except in certain charitable trusts.
- IV. §§ 67-72. What property may be the subject of a trust.
- § 67. A trust may be created in every kind of valuable property.
  - § 68. Possibilities, *choses in action*, expectancies, and property not at the time *in esse* may be assigned in trust.
  - § 69. *Choses in action* and expectancies that cannot be assigned in trust.
  - §§ 71, 72. Trusts in land lying in a foreign jurisdiction, and their administration.

## CHAPTER III.

### EXPRESS TRUSTS, AND HOW EXPRESS TRUSTS ARE CREATED AT COMMON LAW, SINCE THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, AND IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, AND HEREIN OF VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES OR SETTLEMENTS IN TRUST . . . . . 73-111

- § 73. Division of trusts, according to the manner of their creation.
- § 74-77. Trusts at common law.
- § 74. At common law, a writing not necessary to convey land.
- § 75. Uses might also be created without writing, and so may trusts, in States where the statute of frauds is not in force.

- § 76. If a trust is created in writing, parol evidence cannot control it.
- § 77. Same rule as to trusts created by parol.
- § 78. The statute of frauds, and its form in various States.
- § 79. Effect of the statute upon the creation of express trusts.
- §§ 80, 81. Effect of the different forms of the words of the statutes in the several States.
- § 82. How express trusts may be proved or manifested under the statute.
- § 83. Certainty of the terms of the trust, and the person by whom it is to be declared.
- § 84, 85. Trusts declared or proved by answers in chancery.
- § 86. Trust in personal property may be created by parol.
- §§ 87, 88. Trusts arising from gifts *mortis causa* and for charitable uses.
- § 89. Statute of wills, and the execution of wills.
- § 90. Trust cannot be *created* in a will, unless it is properly executed, to pass the property.
- §§ 91, 92. But might be manifested by a recital in a will not properly executed.
- § 93. The effect of the necessity of probate of wills.
- § 94. Parol evidence cannot convert a bequest in a will into a trust. An executor is a trustee of the surplus.
- § 95. An agreement upon a valuable consideration will be carried into effect as a trust or a contract.
- §§ 96-98. If a complete trust is created without consideration, it will be carried into effect.
- § 97. But if any thing remains to be done to complete the trust, it will not be carried into effect, if without consideration.
- § 99. Whether a trust is completely created or not, a question of fact in each case.
- § 100. Trust for a stranger without consideration not completed without transfer of the legal title.
- § 101. But if the legal title cannot be transferred, a different rule will apply.
- § 102. If the subject of the proposed trust is an equitable interest, the legal title need not be transferred.
- § 103. The instrument of trust need not be delivered.
- § 104. If once perfected cannot be destroyed, though voluntary.
- § 105. Notice not necessary to trustee or *cestui que trust*.
- §§ 106, 107. Voluntary settlements upon wife and children.
- § 108. When they will not be enforced.
- § 109. Tendency of the rule in the United States.
- § 110. Marriage a valuable as well as meritorious consideration.
- § 111. Effect of a seal.

## CHAPTER IV.

### IMPLIED TRUSTS . . . . . 112-123

- § 112. The manner in which trusts are implied, and the words from which they are implied.
- § 113. Words from which a trust will not be implied.
- §§ 114-116. Rules by which trusts will or will not be implied.
- §§ 117, 118. Implied trusts from directions as to the maintenance of children or others.
- § 119. When trusts for maintenance are not implied.
- § 120. Rules that govern implied trusts.
- § 121. Trusts arising by implication from the provisions of a will.
- § 122. Implied trusts arising from contracts to sell or settle estates.
- § 123. A direction to employ certain persons does not raise an implied trust.



## CHAPTER V.

RESULTING TRUSTS . . . . . 124-165 *a*

- § 124. Creation and character of a resulting trust.
- § 125. Divisions of this kind of trust.
- § 126. Resulting trust where the purchase-money is paid by one, and deed is taken to another.
- § 127. Resulting trust where trust funds are used to purchase property, and title taken in the name of another.
- § 128. In what cases a trust results, and when a trust does not result.
- § 129. When a person uses his fiduciary relation to obtain an interest in, or affecting the trust property.
- § 130. Same rules apply to personal property unless it is of a perishable nature.
- § 131. Where a resulting trust will not be permitted as against law.
- § 132. Rules as to a resulting trust.
- §§ 133, 134. What circumstances are necessary to create a resulting trust.
- § 135. Parol evidence as to a purchase by an agent not admissible.
- § 136. No resulting trust in a joint purchase.
- §§ 137, 138. Resulting trusts may be established by parol.
- § 139. May be disproved by parol — the burden of proof.
- § 140. Cannot be changed by parol after they arise.
- § 141. Will not be enforced after a great lapse of time.
- § 142. Resulting trusts under the statutes of New York and other States.
- § 143. A resulting trust does not arise if the title is taken in the name of wife or child.
- § 144. What persons it embraces.
- § 145. Doubts and overruled cases.
- § 146. When it will be presumed to be an advancement.
- § 147. The presumption may be rebutted.
- § 148. Is rebutted by fraud in the wife or child.
- § 149. Creditors may avoid such advancements. When and how.
- § 150. A resulting trust from the conveyance of the legal title without the beneficial interest.
- § 151. Every case must depend upon its particular writing and circumstances.
- § 152. Instances and illustrations.
- §§ 153, 154. If there is an intention to benefit the donee, there is no resulting trust.
- § 155. Gifts to executors may create resulting trusts.
- § 156. Resulting trusts do not arise upon gifts to charitable uses.
- § 157. A gift upon trust or to a trustee and no trust declared.
- § 158. Always a matter of intention to be gathered from the whole instrument.
- § 159. Where a special trust fails, it will result.
- § 160. Where a special trust fails from illegality or lapses, it results.
- § 160 *a*. To whom it results.
- §§ 161, 162. Whether a trust results from a voluntary conveyance without consideration.
- § 163. Equity does not favor such conveyances; they may be void for fraud, but no trust results.
- § 164. Voluntary conveyances to wife or child.
- § 165. No trust results from a fraudulent transaction.
- § 165 *a*. How a resulting trust is executed.

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS . . . . . 166-230

- § 166. General nature of constructive trusts. They arise from fraud.
- § 167. Jurisdiction of equity over them, and the relief given by converting the offending party into a trustee.
- § 168. Classification of constructive trusts.
- § 169. General definition of a fraud in equity.
- § 170. Principles upon which equity gives relief against fraud.
- § 171. Actual fraud, or *suggestio falsi*.
- § 172. Illustrations of actual fraud.
- § 173. The misrepresentations and frauds that equity will relieve against.
- § 174. The misrepresentation must be of facts material to the contract.
- § 175. The misrepresentation must be of something peculiarly within the party's knowledge.
- § 176. The relief will depend upon the form in which it is sought.
- § 177. Fraud that arises from concealment, or *suppressio veri*.
- § 178. This kind of fraud depends much upon the relation of the parties.
- § 179. When a person may not be silent.
- § 180. *Suppressio veri* is generally in law an affirmative act.
- § 181. Courts will relieve where acts are fraudulently prevented from being done — illustrations.
- § 182. Trust established where a party fraudulently prevents a will from being made in another's favor.
- § 183. Trust established *in odium spoliatoris*.
- § 184. Trust established upon a conveyance made in ignorance or mistake.
- § 185. But if the conveyance is a compromise, courts will support it if possible.
- § 186. Trust established when a deed by mistake contains more land than was intended.
- § 187. Misrepresentation of the value of property and inadequacy of consideration.
- § 188. Catching bargains with young heirs and reversioners.
- § 189. Trust arising from mental incapacity or imbecility of parties.
- § 190. Mental weakness — old age.
- § 191. Drunkenness.
- § 192. Duress — oppression and distress.
- § 193. Where several of these circumstances are found combined.
- § 194. Frauds that arise by construction from the fiduciary relations of parties.
- § 195. Between trustee and *cestui que trust*.
- § 196. Renewal of leases in his own name by trustee.
- §§ 197, 198. Contracts prohibited between trustee and *cestui que trust*, but the *cestui que trust* alone can avoid them.
- § 199. Rule does not apply to dry trustees.
- § 200. Guardians and wards.
- § 201. Parents and children.
- §§ 202, 203. Attorney and client.
- § 204. Rule applies to all confidential advisers.
- § 205. Administrators and executors.
- § 206. Principal and agent.
- § 207. Directors of corporations.
- § 208. Trusts that arise out of inducements held out for marriage.
- § 209. Other fiduciary relations.
- § 210. Undefined fiduciary and friendly relations.
- § 211. Trusts arising from the frauds of third persons.

- § 212. Frauds upon third persons as creditors.
- § 213. Conveyances by man or woman on the point of marriage.
- § 214. Illegal and immoral contracts.
- § 215. Fraud by pretending to buy for another.
- § 216. Devises or conveyances upon secret illegal trusts.
- § 217. Purchases from trustees with knowledge of the trusts.
- § 218. Purchases without notice of the trust.
- § 219. The safeguards thrown around such purchases.
- § 220. The consideration in such cases.
- § 221. The consideration must have been actually paid.
- § 222. Notice of the trust — to whom it may be.
- § 223. Notice may be actual or constructive.
- § 224. Purchase of property from executors or administrators — real estate.
- § 225. Personal property.
- § 226. Constructive trusts may be proved by parol — statute of frauds does not apply.
- § 227. The right to set aside a conveyance for fraud is an equitable estate that may be conveyed and devised.
- §§ 228–230. Statute of frauds and the time within which steps must be taken to avoid a fraudulent conveyance.

## CHAPTER VII.

### TRUSTS THAT ARISE BY EQUITABLE CONSTRUCTION IN THE ABSENCE OF FRAUD . . . . . 231–247 *a*

- § 231. Trust by equitable construction. Illustration.
- § 232. Vendor's lien for the purchase-money of this description. States in which it exists.
- § 233. This lien does not contravene the statute of frauds.
- § 234. The nature of the interest of the vendor under this lien.
- §§ 235–237. When the lien exists and when not.
- §§ 238, 239. The parties between whom the lien exists.
- § 240. Trust by construction where a conveyance is made that cannot operate at law.
- § 241. Constructive trust where trust property is transferred by gift from the trustee.
- § 242. Constructive trust where a corporation distributes its capital stock without paying its debts.
- § 243. A person holding the legal title as security is a constructive trustee.
- § 244. Executor indebted to the testator's estate is a constructive trustee.
- § 245. A person may become a trustee *de son tort* by construction.
- § 246. An agent may become a constructive trustee.
- § 246 *a*. Other equitable trusts.
- § 247. A person holding deeds or papers or property belonging to another may be a constructive trustee.
- § 247 *a*. Other equitable trusts.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### TRUSTS THAT ARISE BY CONSTRUCTION FROM POWERS 248–258

- § 248. The nature of powers that imply a trust.
- § 249. Court will execute such powers as trusts.
- §§ 250, 251. Instances of powers which the court will execute as trusts.

- § 252. Instances of powers that are not trusts.
- § 253. Where the power is too uncertain.
- § 254. The power must be executed as given, or it will remain a trust to be executed by the court.
- §§ 255, 256. In what manner the court will execute a trust arising out of a power.
- § 257. Whether courts will distribute *per stirpes* or *per capita*.
- § 258. And whether to those living at the death of donor or of the donee.

## CHAPTER IX.

APPOINTMENT, ACCEPTANCE, DISCLAIMER, REMOVAL,  
RESIGNATION, SUBSTITUTION, AND NUMBER OF TRUS-  
TEES, AND APPOINTMENT UNDER A POWER . . . 259-297

- § 259. Acceptance of the trust — how and when it should be accepted.
- § 260. What is an acceptance, and its effect.
- § 261. How an acceptance may be shown.
- §§ 262, 263. Where an executor is also named as trustee.
- § 264. Of the executor of an executor, or the executor of a trustee.
- § 265. Trustee *de son tort*.
- § 266. No such thing as a passive trustee.
- § 267. Where a trustee may disclaim.
- § 268. Cannot disclaim after acceptance.
- § 269. Whether an heir can disclaim after the death of the trustee.
- §§ 270, 271. Parol disclaimer sufficient, but a writing more certain.
- § 272. Where a legacy or other benefit is given to the trustee or executor.
- § 273. Effect of a disclaimer.
- § 274. How a trustee may be removed or resign.
- § 275. For what causes may be removed.
- § 276. For what causes may be allowed to resign.
- §§ 277, 278. How the court proceeds in substituting trustees.
- § 279. Bankruptcy of trustee.
- § 280. The resignation of trustees.
- § 281. Where the same person is executor and trustee.
- § 282. The proceedings to remove and substitute trustees.
- § 283. Where all parties consent.
- § 284. Of the vesting of the property in the new trustees.
- § 285. Duty of trustee where all consent to his discharge.
- § 286. Of the number of trustees.
- § 287. Trustees cannot appoint their successors or new trustees unless power is given in the instrument of trust.
- § 288. Caution necessary in new appointments.
- § 289. Powers of appointment frequently matters of personal confidence.
- § 290. Occasions or events upon which new appointments may be made.
- § 291. An appointment may be made to fill a vacancy occurring before the death of the testator.
- § 292. Unfitness and incapacity.
- § 293. Power cannot be exercised if the trust is already in suit in court.
- § 294. By whom the power may be exercised.
- § 295. The power must be strictly followed.
- § 296. Where a married woman or an infant may exercise the power.
- § 297. Who may be appointed under a power.

## CHAPTER X.

## NATURE, EXTENT, AND DURATION OF THE ESTATE

## TAKEN BY TRUSTEES . . . . . 298-320

- § 298. Where trustees take and hold no estate, although an express gift is made to them. Statute of uses.
- § 299. Effect of the statute of uses upon conveyancing in the several States.
- § 300. Effect of the statute in the rise of trusts.
- §§ 301, 302. Rules of construction which gave rise to trusts.
- § 303. The word "seised."
- § 304. The primary use must be in the trustee to raise a trust.
- §§ 305, 306. Personal property not within the statute.
- §§ 307, 308. Where the statute executes trusts as uses, and where it does not.
- § 309. Where a charge upon an estate will vest an estate in trustees, and where not.
- § 310. Where the trust is for the sole use of a married woman.
- § 311. Trusts of personalty are not executed by the statute.
- § 312. The statute only executes the exact estate given to the trustee; but the trustee may take an estate commensurate with the purposes of the trust where it is unexecuted by the statute. Rules.
- §§ 313, 314. Courts may imply an estate in the trustee where none is given.
- §§ 315, 316. May enlarge the estate of the trustee for the purposes of the trust.
- § 317. Illustrations, explanations, and modifications of the rule.
- §§ 318, 319. Rule in respect to personal estate.
- § 320. Distinctions between deeds and wills in England and the United States.

## CHAPTER XI.

## PROPERTIES AND INCIDENTS OF THE LEGAL ESTATE

## IN THE HANDS OF TRUSTEES . . . . . 321-355

- § 321. Common-law properties attach to estates in trustees.
- § 322. Dower and curtesy in trust estates.
- §§ 323, 324. Dower and curtesy in equitable estates of *cestui que trust*.
- § 325. Forfeiture and escheat of trust estates.
- § 326. Trustees must perform duties of legal owners.
- § 327. Forfeiture and escheat of the equitable estates of *cestui que trust*.
- § 328. Suits concerning legal title must be in name of trustee.
- § 329. Who has possession and control of trust estates.
- §§ 330, 331. Who has possession of personal estate. Rights and privileges of trustees.
- § 332. Who proves debt against bankrupt.
- § 333. Who has the right of voting.
- § 334. Trustee may sell the legal estate.
- § 335. May devise the legal estate.
- § 336. By what words in a devise the trust estate passes.
- § 337. Where a trust estate passes by a devise, and where not.
- § 338. The interest of a mortgagee in fee.
- § 339. Propriety of devising a trust estate.
- § 340. Whether a devisee can execute the trust.
- § 341. Rule in New York, &c.



- § 342. Where a testator has contracted to sell an estate.
- §§ 343, 344. Rights of the last surviving trustee, and his heirs or executors.
- § 345. Trust property does not pass to bankrupt trustee's assignee.
- § 346. A disseisor of a trust estate is not bound by the trust.
- §§ 347, 348. Merger of the equitable and legal titles.
- §§ 349, 350. Presumption of a conveyance or surrender by trustee to *cestui que trust*.
- §§ 351-353. Where the presumption will be made, and where not.
- § 354. Must be some evidence on which to found the presumption.
- § 355. Is made in favor of an equitable title, not against it.

## CHAPTER XII.

### EXECUTORY TRUSTS . . . . . 357-376

- §§ 357-359. Nature of an executory trust. The rule in Shelley's case.
- § 360. Distinction between marriage articles and wills.
- § 361. Construction of marriage articles and their correction.
- § 362. Where strict settlements will not be ordered.
- §§ 363, 364. Settlement of personal property.
- § 365. Construction of marriage settlements.
- § 366. Executory trusts under wills.
- § 367. Who may enforce the execution of executory trusts.
- § 368. Inducements for marriage.
- §§ 369, 370. Construction of executory trusts under wills.
- § 371. The words "heirs of the body" and "issue."
- § 372. When courts will reform executory trusts.
- § 373. How courts will direct a settlement of personal chattels.
- § 374. Whether courts will order a settlement in joint-tenancy.
- § 375. What powers the court will order to be inserted in a settlement.
- § 376. Settlement will be ordered *cy près* the intention.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### PERPETUITIES AND ACCUMULATIONS . . . . . 377-400

- § 377. Definitions of a perpetuity.
- § 378. Executory devises — springing and shifting uses.
- § 379. Growth of the rule against perpetuities.
- § 380. Application of the rule. Indefinite failure of issue.
- § 381. Applies to the possible vesting of estates — not to the actual.
- § 382. Applies equally to trust and legal estates:
- § 383. An equitable interest that may not vest within the rule is void.
- § 384. Distinction between private trusts and charitable trusts.
- § 385. A proper trust to raise money to be applied contrary to the rule.
- § 386. Equitable estates cannot be made unalienable.
- §§ 386 *a*, 386 *b*. How they may be made inalienable.
- § 387. Exception in the case of married women.
- § 388. How trusts can be limited, so that *cestui que trust* cannot alienate.
- § 389. Limitation of personal estate to such tenant in tail as first attains twenty-one.
- § 390. When courts will alter trusts and when not.
- §§ 391, 392. Statutes of various States in relation to perpetuities.
- § 393. Rule respecting trusts for accumulations.

- § 394. In England the rule was altered by the Thellusson Act.
- § 395. Construction of the Thellusson Act.
- § 396. Rule against accumulations — when it applies and when not.
- § 397. Application of the income in cases of illegal directions to accumulate.
- § 398. Statutes in various States as to accumulations.
- § 399. Accumulations for charitable purposes.
- § 400. Accumulations in cases of life insurance.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### GENERAL PROPERTIES AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE OF

#### TRUSTEE . . . . . 401-437

- § 401. A trustee, having accepted the office, is bound to discharge its duties.
- § 402. He cannot delegate his authority.
- § 403. Not responsible if he follow directions in employing agents.
- § 404. Where agents must be employed.
- § 405. When responsible for agents and attorneys.
- § 406. When not responsible.
- § 407. Difference of liability in law and equity.
- § 408. Trustees responsible for all mischiefs arising from delegating discretionary powers.
- § 409. Employing agents or attorneys may not be a delegation of authority or discretion.
- § 410. A sale or devise of the trust estate not a delegation of the trust.
- § 411. Several trustees constitute but one collective trustee.
- §§ 412, 413. When they must all act and when not.
- § 414. As to the survivorship of the office of trustee.
- § 415. General rule as to liability for cotrustees.
- § 416. May make themselves liable, where otherwise they would not be.
- § 417. Trustees must use due diligence in all cases, or they will be liable for cotrustees.
- § 418. Cases of a want of due care and prudence.
- § 419. In case of collusion or gross negligence, a trustee will be liable for acts of cotrustees.
- § 420. When cotrustees are liable for others upon sales of real estate under a power.
- § 421. As to liability of coexecutors for the acts of each other.
- § 422. An executor must not enable his coexecutor to misapply the funds.
- § 423. When executors must all join they are not liable for each other's acts; but they must use due diligence.
- § 424. An executor must not allow money to remain under the sole control of his coexecutor.
- § 425. Executors and administrators governed by the same rules.
- § 426. Rule where coexecutors or cotrustees give joint bonds for security of the administration of the estate.
- § 427. Trustees can make no profit out of the office.
- § 428. Cannot buy up debts against the estate or *cestui que trust* at a profit.
- § 429. Cannot make a profit from the use of trust funds in business, trade, or speculation.
- § 430. All persons holding a fiduciary relation, subject to the same rule.
- § 431. All persons holding fiduciary relations to an estate, subject to the same rule.
- § 432. Can receive no profit for serving in their professional characters a trust estate.
- § 433. Trustees can set up no claim to the trust estate, and ought not to betray the title of the *cestui que trust*.

- § 434. In England, upon failure of heirs to the *cestui que trust*, trustee may hold real estate to his own use.
- § 435. Speculative questions.
- § 436. In the United States, the interest of the *cestui que trust* in real estate escheats.
- § 437. So it does in England and the United States in personalty.

## CHAPTER XV.

POSSESSION — CUSTODY — CONVERSION — INVESTMENT  
OF TRUST PROPERTY, AND INTEREST THAT TRUSTEES

MAY BE MADE TO PAY . . . . . 438-472

- § 438. Duty of trustee to reduce the trust property to possession.
- § 439. Time within which possession should be obtained.
- § 440. Diligence necessary in acquiring possession.
- § 441. The care necessary in the custody of trust property.
- § 442. In what manner certain property should be kept.
- § 443. Where the property may be deposited.
- §§ 444, 445. How money must be deposited in bank.
- § 446. Within what time trustee should wind up testator's establishment.
- § 447. Trustee must not mix trust property with his own.
- § 448. When a trustee is to convert trust property.
- § 449. General rule as to conversion.
- § 450. When a court presumes an intention that property is to be converted.
- § 451. When the court presumes that the property is to be enjoyed by *cestui que trust in specie*.
- § 452. Of investment.
- § 453. As to investment in personal securities.
- § 454. As to the employment of trust property in trade, business, or speculation.
- § 455. Rule as to investments in England.
- § 456. Rule in the United States.
- § 456 n. Confederate securities.
- §§ 457, 458. Rule as to real securities.
- § 459. Of investments in the different States.
- §§ 460, 461. Construction, where the instruments of trust direct how investments may be made.
- § 462. Within what time investments must be made.
- § 463. Trustees must not mingle their own money in investments.
- § 464. Must not use the trust money in business.
- § 465. Original investments and investments left by the testator.
- § 466. Changing investments.
- § 467. Acquiescence of *cestui que trust* in improper investments.
- § 468. Interest that trustees must pay upon trust funds for any dereliction of duty.
- § 469. Where he is directed to invest in a particular manner.
- § 470. When he improperly changes an investment.
- § 471. When compound interest will be imposed, and when other rules will apply.
- § 472. When an accumulation is directed.



# INDEX TO CASES CITED.

[All sections up to 473 are in Vol. I.; all after 472 are in Vol. II.]

A.		SECTION			SECTION
Abbey v. Dewey		215	Adams v. Claxton		443, 914
Abbott, <i>Ex parte</i>		649	v. Clifton	402, 466, 851,	900
v. Pet'r	282, 287, 334,	340	v. Cole		635, 706, 714
v. Amer. Hard Rubber			v. Gale		464
Co.		404	v. Gamble		656
v. Baltimore		918	v. Green		231
v. Bradstreet	891, 899, 903	a	v. Guerard		299
v. Geraghty		361	v. Lambert		718
v. Gibbs	795,	796	v. Lavender		639
v. Massie		272	v. Leavens		438
v. Reeves	832, 877, 884,	926	v. Mackey		661
Abby v. Dego		678	v. Paynter	274, 287,	288
Abeel v. Radcliff		83	v. Perry		305, 748
Abel v. Heathcote		769	v. St. Leger		873, 881
Abell v. Howe	221,	222	v. Taunton	270, 273,	806
Abercrombie v. Bradford		590	Adamson v. Armitage		648
Aberdeen v. Blaikie		206	Addams v. Hefferman		234
Abernaithy v. Abernaithy	275,	627	Addis v. Campbell	187,	188
Abney v. Kingsland		149	Addison v. Bowie		612
v. Miller		196	v. Dawson		189
Abraham v. Almon		112	v. Mascal		189
Abshire v. Carter		770	Adey v. Arnold		260
Acherley v. Roe		872	Adler v. Sewell		328
Acker v. Phoenix		97	Adlington v. Cann	75, 77, 83, 88, 90,	
Ackerman v. Emott	430, 456, 459,			92, 93, 215,	739
	460,	471	Adlum v. Yard		590, 596
Ackland v. Gaisford		122	Adye v. Feuilletau		453, 464
v. Lutley		317	Affleck v. James		499
Ackleston v. Heap		294	Agar v. Fairfax		871
Ackroyd v. Smithson		160	Agassiz v. Squire		511 a
Acton v. White		670	Aggas v. Pickerell	855,	862
v. Woodgate	585, 593,	596	Agnew v. Fetterman		559
Adair v. New River Co.		885	Aguilar v. Aguilar	634, 658,	659
v. Shaw	217, 847,	892	Ahearne v. Hogan		193, 204
Adams v. Adams		182, 312	Aiken v. Smith		318, 353
v. Brackett		562, 570	Ainsley v. Mead		680
v. Bradley		215	Ainslie v. Medlycott		34, 171
v. Broke	460,	778	Airey v. Hall	98, 100, 101,	821
v. Buckland		414	Aislabie v. Rice		518
v. Chaplin		380	Albany Ins. Co. v. Bay	655, 656,	660,
					768
			Albany's Case		765

	SECTION		SECTION
Albee v. Wyman	672	Allis v. Billings	35, 189
Albert v. Savings Bank	242	Allison v. Allison	183
v. Ware	14	v. Kurtz	162, 511 c
Alcock v. Sloper	451, 547	Alloway v. Braine	869
v. Sparhawk	570	Alsager v. Spaulding	212
Aldborough v. Frye	188	Alsop v. Bell	908
Alden v. Gregory	861	Alston v. Trollope	481
Aldersen, <i>Ex parte</i>	68	Alsworth v. Cordly	181
v. Temple	587	Altimus v. Elliott	915
Aldrich v. Cooper	567, 573	Alverson v. Jones	677
Aldridge v. Dunn	237, 239	Amand v. Bradbourne	894
v. Westbrooke	888, 898	Ambrose v. Ambrose	77, 82, 126, 137
Aleman v. Wensinger	820 a	Amer. Acad. v. Harvard College	700, 701, 724, 748
Alexander, <i>In re</i>	482	Amer. Bible Soc. v. Marsh	748
v. Alexander	112, 385, 408, 440, 510, 511 a, 811	v. Wetmore	748
v. Brame	103	Amer. Exch. Bank v. Inloes	590
v. Crittenden	639	Ames v. Armstrong	426
v. Crosbie	220	v. Browning	205
v. Kennedy	205	v. Downing	428, 526, 847, 910
v. McCulloch	634	v. Foster	686
v. McMurray	234, 559	v. Parkinson	440, 461, 469
v. Mills	784	v. Port Huron	194
v. Mullins	882	Amesbury v. Brown	571
v. Pendleton	218, 219	Ammont v. New Alexandria, &c., Turnpike Co.	757, 759
v. Saulsbury	635	Amory v. Green	460
v. Summey	456	v. Lord	391, 396
v. Warrance	140, 143, 144, 324	v. Lowell	552, 554
v. Wellington	29, 69	v. Meredith	387, 511 c
v. Williams	863	v. Reilly	239
Aleyn v. Belchier	511, 511 a	Amphlett v. Parke	151
Alger v. Fay	602 k	Ancaster v. Mayer	562, 567
Allen, <i>Ex parte</i>	189, 618	Anderson, <i>In re</i>	280
v. Addington	179	v. Anderson	646, 652, 672
v. Allen	629	v. Austin	602 n
v. Backhouse	581, 597	v. Baumgartner	602 n
v. Chambers	84	v. Burchell	228
v. Chatfield	199, 602 v	v. Burwell	229, 869
v. Coster	614, 615	v. Dawson	511 b, 655
v. De Witt	765	v. Fuller	591
v. Gaillard	458, 460	v. Holloman	602 i
v. Henderson	366, 380	v. Jones	126, 602 j
v. Hightower	678	v. Lemon	538
v. Imlett	17, 328	v. Mather	334, 603, 605, 610
v. Knight	218	v. Miller	426
v. Macpherson	182	v. Neff	918
v. Maddock	93	v. Stacher	873
v. Montgomery Railway	757	Anderton v. Yates	618
v. Papworth	654	Anding v. Davis	75, 91
v. Parkham	380	Andover v. Merrimack County	642
v. Rumph	361	Andres v. Miller	599
v. Sayer	621, 858	Andrew v. Andrew	547
v. Wilkins	640	v. Bible Society	45, 402
v. Worley	863	v. Ludlow	592
Allerton v. Knowell	634	v. Trinity Hall	272
Alley v. Lawrence	493, 511 b, 783, 784	v. Wrigley	228, 809, 810, 830, 865
Alleyne v. Darcy	246, 848, 876, 907		

	SECTION		SECTION
Andrews, <i>Ex parte</i>	427, 433, 487, 863	Armstrong v. Walkup	462
<i>v.</i> Bank of Cape Ann	117	Armstrong's Estate	892, 918
<i>v.</i> Bishop	561	Arnold v. Byard	918
<i>v.</i> Clark	154	<i>v.</i> Chapman	160
<i>v.</i> Essex Ins. Co.	186	<i>v.</i> Congreve	385
<i>v.</i> Hobson	98, 428	<i>v.</i> Cord	135, 172
<i>v.</i> Jones	200, 627, 632, 642, 645	<i>v.</i> Garner	431, 432, 904
<i>v.</i> Partington	117, 612, 615, 620	<i>v.</i> Gilbert	391, 511
<i>v.</i> Smithwick	864	<i>v.</i> Macungie Bank	247 <i>a</i>
<i>v.</i> Sparhawk	598, 795 798, 802	<i>v.</i> Ruggles	639, 640
Angell v. Dawson	476	Arnony v. Steinbrenner	891
Angerstein v. Martin	461, 550, 551	Arnot v. McClure	602 <i>v</i>
Angier v. Angier	672, 673	Arran v. Tyrawley	861
<i>v.</i> Stannard	351, 476 <i>a</i> , 901, 922, 927, 928	Arrington v. Yarborough	639
Angle, <i>Ex parte</i>	848, 876	Archer v. McDuffie	843
Angus v. Angus	72	Arthur v. Arthur	184, 665
Annesley v. Ashurst	474	<i>v.</i> Comm. Bank	31, 588, 590, 757
<i>v.</i> Simeon	330, 520	<i>v.</i> Marster	468
Annis's Case	693	Arundel v. Phillpot	248
Anon.	116, 126, 136, 144, 157, 192, 219, 226, 244, 255, 270, 275, 330, 402, 415, 416, 421, 428, 431, 432, 453, 463, 474, 511 <i>b</i> , 581, 596, 597, 600, 602 <i>q</i> , 618, 621, 649, 663, 695, 701, 710, 712, 725, 770, 782, 795, 796, 810, 815, 816, 818, 819, 827, 835, 839, 841, 903 <i>a</i> , 904	Asay v. Hoover	336, 768
Anstice v. Brown	863	Ashburnham v. Thompson	468, 900
Anthony v. Rees	805	Ashburton v. Ashburton	605, 610
Antones v. Eslava	730, 731, 748	Ashby v. Ashby	626, 641
Antrobus v. Smith	97, 100, 103, 107, 108, 367	<i>v.</i> Blackwell	929
Aplyn v. Brewer	416, 421	Ashcraft v. Little	647, 648, 649, 651
App v. Lutheran Congregation	733	Ashley, <i>In re</i>	615
Apple v. Allen	646	<i>v.</i> Bailey	222
Appleton v. Boyd	136	Ashton v. ———	581
Apreece v. Apreece	119	<i>v.</i> Ashton	371, 515
Arbuthnot v. Norton	69	<i>v.</i> Atlantic Bank	225, 814
Archer v. Hudson	201	<i>v.</i> Langdale	61, 86, 704
<i>v.</i> Moss	182	<i>v.</i> McDougall	213, 653
<i>v.</i> Preston	71	<i>v.</i> Wood	340, 695, 705
<i>v.</i> Rooke	647, 648, 652	Ashton's Char.	725
Archibald v. Wright	511 <i>b</i>	Ashurst v. Ashurst	780
Ardill v. Savage	274	<i>v.</i> Given	66, 299, 305, 555
Arglasse v. Muschamp	71	<i>v.</i> Martin	592
Arlin v. Brown	232, 235	<i>v.</i> Mill	185
Arms v. Ashley	83	Ashurst's App.	207, 230, 865, 866
Armstrong v. Armstrong	380	Aspinall v. Jones	529
<i>v.</i> Campbell	195, 602 <i>v</i> , 863	Aster v. Wells	222
<i>v.</i> Lane	892, 901	Astley v. Milles	347
<i>v.</i> Miller	462, 468	Astreen v. Flanagan	143, 144
<i>v.</i> Morrill	259, 264	Aston v. Aston	665
<i>v.</i> Park	500	<i>v.</i> Galloway	576
<i>v.</i> Ross	232	<i>v.</i> Wood	157
<i>v.</i> Stoval	661	Aston's Estate	462, 468, 918
		Atcherley v. Vernon	38, 231, 616, 648
		Atcheson v. Atcheson	637, 644
		<i>v.</i> Robertson	420, 894, 900
		Atchin's Trusts, <i>In re</i>	714
		Athenæum v. Pooley	831
		Atherton v. Mowell	634
		<i>v.</i> Worth	594
		Athey v. Knotts	632
		Athol v. Derly	71
		Atkin v. Lord	678
		Atkins v. Allen	545
		<i>v.</i> Kron	55, 64, 554
		<i>v.</i> Rowe	135

	SECTION
Atkinson, <i>In re</i>	438
v. Atkinson	242, 812
v. Jordan	592, 694
v. Marietta	757
Att'y-Gen. v. Alford	471
v. Andrew	700, 729
v. Andrews	478, 704
v. Arran	283
v. Aspinall	23, 31, 384
v. Bacchus	637
v. Bain	739
v. Baliol College	724, 725, 883
v. Baxter	702, 718, 724
v. Bedford	742
v. Beverley	725, 745
v. Biddulph	737
v. Black	743
v. Blizzard	698, 699, 733
v. Bolles	700
v. Boucherett	185
v. Boulton	721, 724, 725, 729, 730
v. Bourchette	733
v. Bovill	698, 699, 725, 733
v. Bowyer	693, 700, 730, 736, 739, 818
v. Brackenbury	511 c
v. Bradlee	715
v. Brandeth	698, 733
v. Brazen Nose College	745
v. Brentwood School	694, 695
v. Brereton	694, 701, 732, 746
v. Brettingham	737
v. Brewers' Co.	745, 863, 871, 900, 901
v. Brickdale	412
v. Bristol	156, 725, 745
v. Brown	707, 724, 879
v. Browne's Hospital	742
v. Buckland	255
v. Bucknall	699, 746
v. Buller	336, 337
v. Bunce	733
v. Burdett	739
v. Bushly	704
v. Caius College	42, 276, 900, 901
v. Calvert	733
v. Carroll	724
v. Chester	701, 736, 741
v. Chesterfield	907
v. Christ Church	725
v. Christ's Hosp.	745, 865, 900
v. Clack	282, 283, 293, 508
v. Clapham	733
v. Clare Hall	743

	SECTION
Att'y-Gen v. Clarendon	42, 209, 742, 743
v. Clark	474, 698, 699
v. Clergy Society	734, 748
v. Clifont	278
v. Clifton	733
v. Cock	701, 702
v. Columbine	724
v. Combe	730
v. Comber	699, 712
v. Coopers' Co.	276, 725
v. Cordwainers' Co.	725
v. Coventry	745
v. Cowper	278
v. Craven	704, 724, 725
v. Crook	742
v. Cullum	696, 747
v. Cumming	278, 413, 414, 490, 888, 894
v. Dallgars	848
v. Daugers	903
v. Daugous	278
v. Dedham School	742, 743
v. Dixie	725, 742
v. Dixon	441
v. Downing	38, 248, 249, 694, 701, 730, 736
v. Doyley	271, 273, 715, 721
v. Drapers' Co.	725, 900, 901
v. Drummond	275, 733, 901
v. Dublin	694, 724
v. Dudley	195, 230
v. Duley	867
v. Dulwich College	742
v. Dyson	283
v. Eastlake	478, 707
v. East Retford	844, 900
v. Exeter	698, 733, 745, 855, 863, 869
v. Federal St. Meeting-House	710, 712, 732, 734, 745, 860, 864
v. Fishmongers' Co.	718, 725, 745
v. Fletcher	721, 724, 729
v. Floyer	295, 414, 490
v. Forster	23, 384
v. Foster	746
v. Foundling Hospital	42, 742, 816
v. Galway	725, 746
v. Garrison	732, 734, 748
v. Gascoigne	725
v. Gaunt	742
v. Geary	477
v. Gibson	724
v. Gill	380, 736
v. Gladstone	701, 702, 721, 731



	SECTION
Atty-Gen. v. Glasgow College	724, 725, 733
v. Gleg	19, 408, 414, 699, 721, 733
v. Glyn	724, 725, 729
v. Goldsmiths' Co.	733
v. Gould	733
v. Goulding	725, 729
v. Green	724, 730
v. Greenhill	383
v. Greenhouse	847
v. Grocers' Co.	746, 747
v. Guardians of Poor	478
v. Guise	724, 725, 729
v. Haberdashers' Co.	119, 156, 710, 712, 725, 746
v. Hall	113, 116, 736
v. Hamilton	769
v. Hartley	735, 746, 747
v. Heelis	23, 884, 704, 707, 885
v. Heiner	732
v. Herrick	729
v. Hewer	710
v. Hickman	249, 701, 702
v. Hicks	724, 725
v. Higham	440
v. Hobert	900
v. Holland	419
v. Hungerford	737
v. Hurst	726, 903 a
v. Hutton	734
v. Ironmongers' Co.	42, 699, 723, 724, 725, 729
v. Jackson	710, 729, 746
v. Jeanes	732, 746
v. Johnson	699
v. Jolly	701, 724, 726, 728, 730, 731, 748
v. Kell	692, 733, 747
v. Kerr	737
v. Landerfield	42
v. Lawes	701, 702, 724, 725, 903 a
v. Leeds	325
v. Leicester	246, 846, 907
v. Lepine	741
v. Litchfield	295, 414, 490
v. Liverpool	816
v. Llandaff	725
v. Locke	414, 694, 742
v. London	276, 282, 701, 724, 725, 729, 741, 894
v. Lonsdale	700, 704
v. Magdalen College	742, 800
v. Manners	480
v. Mansfield	696, 733, 735
v. Marchant	725

	SECTION
Atty-Gen. v. Margaret & Regius Prof. Cambridge	700, 733
v. Master of Catharine Hall	725, 742, 745
v. Mathews	699, 719, 729
v. Mercers' Co.	747
v. Merchant Tailors' Co.	747
v. Merrimack Manuf. Co.	732
v. Middleton	694, 724, 732, 742, 746
v. Minshull	724, 725
v. Monro	432, 734, 745, 747, 863
v. Moor's Ex'rs	747
v. Moore	476 a, 694, 733, 742, 743, 866, 928
v. Moseley	511
v. Murdoch	733, 734
v. Newark	737
v. Newbury Corp.	875
v. Newcombe	23, 384
v. Newman	695, 724
v. Norwich	478, 890, 910, 915
v. Oakaver	701
v. Oglander	729, 730, 746
v. Old South Society	699, 743, 745, 748
v. Owen	484
v. Oxford	724, 728
v. Painters' Co.	699
v. Parker	701, 732, 746
v. Parnter	189, 190, 665
v. Payne	745
v. Peacock	699
v. Pearce	699, 720
v. Pearson	275, 290, 702, 733, 734, 746, 915
v. Pitter	451
v. Platt	693, 730, 733
v. Poulden	151, 395, 397
v. Power	718, 726
v. Price	256, 698, 699
v. Pyle	724
v. Rance	699, 729
v. Randell	416, 417, 443
v. Ref. Prot. Dutch Church	745
v. Rochester	425, 733, 734, 745
v. Ruper	701
v. Rye	739
v. Sands	3, 64, 327, 434
v. St. Cross Hospital	742
v. St. John's Hospital	42, 745
v. Scott	19, 301, 304, 323, 408, 409, 413, 490, 745
v. Shearman	413

	SECTION
Atty-Gen. <i>v.</i> Sherborne School	733
<i>v.</i> Shore	275, 287, 733
<i>v.</i> Shrewsbury	23, 384, 707
<i>v.</i> Skinners' Co.	694, 725, 745
<i>v.</i> Smart	732, 746
<i>v.</i> Solly	468
<i>v.</i> Sothen	192
<i>v.</i> South Molton	725
<i>v.</i> Speed	699
<i>v.</i> Stafford	42
<i>v.</i> Stamford	278, 748
<i>v.</i> Stephens	249, 282, 283
<i>v.</i> Stepney	701
<i>v.</i> Sturge	741
<i>v.</i> Syderfin	719, 724, 729
<i>v.</i> Tancred	694
<i>v.</i> Todd	718
<i>v.</i> Townsend	694
<i>v.</i> Trinity Church	699, 725, 746
<i>v.</i> Utica Ins. Co.	42
<i>v.</i> Vigor	511 <i>c</i>
<i>v.</i> Vint	699, 718, 724, 729
<i>v.</i> Vivian	701, 733, 746, 747
<i>v.</i> Wallace	694, 701, 728, 748
<i>v.</i> Wansay	730
<i>v.</i> Warren	737, 746
<i>v.</i> Warrick	724
<i>v.</i> Wax Chandlers' Co.	725, 744
<i>v.</i> Weymouth	160
<i>v.</i> Wharwood	42, 700, 729, 732
<i>v.</i> Whitechurch	709, 724
<i>v.</i> Whiteley	732, 746
<i>v.</i> Wilkinson	668, 698, 699, 733
<i>v.</i> William & Mary Coll.	785
<i>v.</i> Williams	700, 709
<i>v.</i> Wilson	31, 161, 848, 875, 879, 900
<i>v.</i> Winchelsea	287
<i>v.</i> Windsor	157, 745
<i>v.</i> Winsor	725
<i>v.</i> Wisbert	725
<i>v.</i> Wyville	888
<i>v.</i> York	742
Atwaters <i>v.</i> Burt	784
Atwood <i>v.</i> Small	171
<i>v.</i> Vincent	232
Aubrey <i>v.</i> Brown	636
<i>v.</i> Middleton	570
Aubuchon <i>v.</i> Bender	104
<i>v.</i> Lory	414
Auby <i>v.</i> Doyl	121
Austin <i>v.</i> Bank of England	242
<i>v.</i> Bell	591, 592, 593

	SECTION
Austin <i>v.</i> Brown	64, 131, 140
<i>v.</i> Halsey	569
<i>v.</i> Johnson	591
<i>v.</i> Martin	273, 804
<i>v.</i> Shaw	411
<i>v.</i> Taylor	298, 357, 359, 372
<i>v.</i> Wilson	810
Australian, &c., Co. <i>v.</i> Mounsey	486, 754
Aveline <i>v.</i> Melhuish	851
Aveling <i>v.</i> Knipe	133, 136
Averill <i>v.</i> Loucks	590, 602 <i>ff</i>
Avery <i>v.</i> Griffin	48
<i>v.</i> Osborne	900
<i>v.</i> Tyringham	734
Avison <i>v.</i> Holmes	338
Awdley <i>v.</i> Awdley	611
Aycenena <i>v.</i> Peries	843
Ayer <i>v.</i> Ayer	310
Ayliffe <i>v.</i> Murray	195, 347, 904
Aylward <i>v.</i> Kearne	200, 230
Aymar <i>v.</i> Roff	603
Aynsworth <i>v.</i> Halderman	828
Aynsworth <i>v.</i> Pratchett	615
Ayres <i>v.</i> Methodist Church	45, 748
<i>v.</i> Ward	270

## B.

Baal <i>v.</i> Morgher	647
Babb <i>v.</i> Reed	705, 710
Babcock <i>v.</i> Case	179
<i>v.</i> Hubbard	426
Back <i>v.</i> Andrew	144, 146
<i>v.</i> Gooch	537
Backhouse <i>v.</i> Middleton	581, 828
Bacon <i>v.</i> Bacon	404, 409, 417
<i>v.</i> Bronson	173
<i>v.</i> McIntire	856
<i>v.</i> Proctor	380, 396
<i>v.</i> Taylor	299
Bacon's App.	304, 311, 359
Baddam, <i>Ex parte</i>	555
Badham <i>v.</i> Mee	15, 118, 784
Badger <i>v.</i> Badger	869
Bægle <i>v.</i> Wentz	171, 172, 215
Bagenal <i>v.</i> Bage	584
Baggett <i>v.</i> Meux	647, 671
Baggot <i>v.</i> Baggot	900
Bagot <i>v.</i> Bagot	276
Bagshaw <i>v.</i> Newton	903 <i>a</i>
<i>v.</i> Spencer	305, 315, 358, 359, 366, 371
<i>v.</i> Winter	636, 645
Bailey <i>v.</i> Ætna Ins. Co.	199, 602 <i>bb</i>
<i>v.</i> Bailey	93
<i>v.</i> Brown	500
<i>v.</i> Ekins	260
<i>v.</i> Elkins	802
<i>v.</i> Gould	898, 902
<i>v.</i> Harris	75

	SECTION		SECTION
Bailey v. Hollister	331	Baldwin v. Porter	262
v. Inglee	838, 877	v. Tuttle	861
v. Jackson	654, 658	Baldy v. Brady	559
v. Lloy	511 c	Bale v. Coleman	357, 359, 360
v. Merritt	602 ff	Bales v. Perry	402, 409
v. Pearson	661, 675, 680	Balfie v. Lord	761
v. Robinson	205, 602 v	Balford v. Crane	147
v. Stiles	183	Balfour v. Welland	593, 596, 597, 793,
v. Watkins	206, 209		794
v. Wilson	217	Balguey v. Hamilton	835
v. Young	440	Ball v. Alexander	748
Bain v. Lescher	648	v. Ball	440
Bainbridge v. Ashburton	337	v. Coutts	633, 636
v. Blair	275, 279, 282, 432,	v. Harris	597, 768, 802, 809
	818, 820, 885, 895, 904	v. Maurice	189
Baines v. Dixon	581	v. Montgomery	213, 632, 633,
v. McGee	205, 225		634, 901
Baird v. Hall	456	Ballard v. Carter	336
Baird's Appeal	344	v. Taylor	647
Baker v. Barney	672	Ballew v. Clark	35
v. Biddle	843, 855	Balls v. Strutt	520, 816
v. Bliss	225, 814	Balsh v. Hyham	485, 909, 915
v. Bradley	201, 670	Balteel v. Plumer	254
v. Carter	849, 900	Baltimore v. Caldwell	195
v. Crookshank	598	Baltimore Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple	199
v. Dumaresque	72	Bampton v. Birchall	862
v. Dutton	701	Bancroft v. Ashhurst	602 bb, 603 h
v. Evans	98	v. Cousen	127, 814
v. Foster	202	v. Lepieur	920
v. Gregory	684	Bangs v. Smith	837
v. Hall	639	Bank v. Benning	602 aa
v. Hathaway	685	v. Macy	199
v. Hollabaugh	84	v. Payne	222
v. Leathers	143, 144, 147	v. Guttschlick	602 bb
v. Lee	293	v. Rutland	72
v. Lorillard	610	v. Tyrrell	202
v. Monk	189	Bank of America v. Pollock	127, 128,
v. Moseley	112		135
v. Paine	226	Bank of England v. Lunn	242
v. Read	205, 229	v. Moffat	242
v. Reel	118, 121	v. Parsons	242
v. Smith	724, 748	Bank of Mobile v. Clark	591
v. Sutton	705	Bank of Orleans v. Torrey	205, 206
v. Tucker	201	Bank of Republic v. Baxter	179
v. Vining	126, 132, 137, 139	Bank of Turkey v. Ottoman Co.	827
v. Washington	380	Bank of U. S. v. Beverley	308, 559,
v. Whiting	863, 864		571, 576
v. Wind	226	v. Biddle	229, 230
Bakewell v. Ogden	783	v. Carrington	75, 126
Balch v. Hallett	545	v. Daniels	855
Balbeck v. Donaldson	162	v. Davis	222
Balchen v. Scott	261, 262, 402	v. Hirst	918
Balckow v. Herne Bay Pier Co.	752	v. Housman	162
Baldrige v. Walton	602 g, 602 p,	v. Huth	588, 593
	602 t, 602 u	Bank of Virginia v. Adams	72
Baldwin v. Allison	602 n	v. Clegg	610
v. Baldwin	626	v. Craig	242
v. Bannister	243, 431	Bank of Wellsborough v. Bake	247 a
v. Campfield	131, 164	Banks v. Booth	750
v. Humphrey	95, 343	v. Judah	206
v. Johnston	127	v. Le Despencer	390

	SECTION		SECTION
Banks v. May	97	Barney v. Saunders	453, 462, 463, 468, 470, 918
v. Phelan	730, 748	Barnhart v. Greenshields	226
v. Sutton	323	Barnsley v. Powell	171, 182, 480
v. Wilkes	415, 421	Barnum v. Barnum	383
Banister v. McKenzie	460	v. Hampstead	590
Baptist Asso. v. Hart	46, 694, 724, 748	Barnwall v. Barnwall	871, 872
Baptist Soc. v. Hazen	17, 299, 312, 328	Barnwell v. Cawdor	566
Barber, <i>Ex parte</i>	338	Barr v. Cubbage	828
v. Barber	862	v. Weld	478
v. Cary	784	Barr's Trusts	438
v. Slade	639, 640	Barrack v. McCulloch	664, 665
Barbin v. Gasford	137	Barratt v. Wyatt	543
Barclay v. Maskelyne	699, 700	Barrell v. Joy	79, 82
v. Russell	327	v. Hawrick	226
v. Wainwright	544, 545	Barrett v. Buck	150
Bardstown, &c., R.R. Co. v. Met-		v. Buxton	191
calfe	754, 756	v. French	299
Bardwell v. Bardwell	572	v. Hartley	429, 904
Bardswell v. Bardswell	112, 113, 115	v. Reids	592
Barford v. Street	655	v. Whitney	202
arker, <i>In re</i>	381	Barribeau v. Brant	136
v. Barker	127, 401, 812, 843	Barrings v. Willing	404
v. Devonshire	795	Barrington v. Liddell	397, 584
v. Hall	586, 589, 591	v. Tristram	903 a
v. Hill	231	Barrington's Estate	452, 477
v. Greenwood	305, 306, 307, 312	Barron v. Barron	82, 127, 137, 627, 128, 629, 633, 634, 635, 636, 639, 647, 654, 673
v. Ins. Co.	206	v. Greenbough	181, 226
v. May	17	v. Wadkin	64, 327, 434
v. McAuley	456	Barrs v. Fewke	152, 157
v. Peile	232	Barry v. Ley	701
v. Richardson	330, 520	v. Marriott	457
v. Woods	645, 748	v. Merchant's Exch. Co.	31
Barkley v. Lane	226	v. Woodham	888
v. Reay	819	Barrymore v. Ellis	670
Barksdale v. Finney	428, 836	Barstow v. Kilvington	226
Barksworth v. Young	82, 84	Barter v. Wheeler	761
Barlow v. Grant	119, 615, 618, 915	Bartle v. Wilkins	891, 892
v. Heneage	103	Bartlett v. Bartlett	162, 602 b, 680, 826
Barnaby v. Griffin	361	v. Downes	352, 355
Barnard v. Bagshaw	418	v. Gage	602 ff
v. Duncan	780, 786	v. Gouge	352
v. Hunter	202, 831	v. Green	363
v. Jewett	133	v. Janeway	640
v. Minshull	112	v. Johnson	747
Barnardiston v. Lingwood	188	v. King	701, 709, 724, 748
v. Soame	17	v. Nye	724, 748
Barnes v. Addy	846	v. Pickersgill	76, 126, 133, 135, 137
v. Gay	324	v. Salmon	171
v. Grant	112, 117, 120	v. Southerland	499
v. Kirkland	272	Bartley v. Bartley	503, 807
v. McChristie	222	Barton v. Barton	514, 516
v. Pearson	641	v. Briscoe	652, 653
v. Robinson	634	v. Tunnell	414
Barnett v. Clarke	388	Barton's Estate	140, 459, 465, 467, 918
v. Dougherty	75	Trust	545
v. Lichtenstein	660	Bartram v. Whichcote	769
v. Spratt	187		
Barnett's Appeal	299, 305, 311		
Barney v. Douglas	438		
v. Griffin	590		

	SECTION		SECTION
Barwell v. Barwell	428, 869	Bayne v. Crowther	118
v. Parker	600	v. Wylie	592
Bascomb v. Albertson	384, 724, 738, 741, 748	Bawtree v. Watson	188
Basford v. Peirson	685	Baxter v. Costin	205, 428
Baskerville v. Baskerville	359	v. Wheeler	591
Bass v. Scott	299, 310	Beable v. Dodd	652
v. Williams	866	Beach v. Beach	17, 328, 330, 353, 520, 672
Bassett v. Nosworthy	218, 220	v. Fulton Bank	600
v. Fisher	602 <i>ee</i>	Beaches v. Dorwin	843
v. Spofford	128	Beadmore v. Gregory	889
Bassil v. Lister	400	Beal v. Beal	584
Bastard v. Proby	371	v. Burchstead	72
Basy v. Magrath	192	v. Harman	610
Bate v. Hooper	439, 449, 467, 902, 932	v. Symonds	435
Bateman v. Bateman	308	v. Warren	104, 108, 685
v. Davis	453, 460, 467, 784, 849, 851	Beale v. Coon	330
v. Hotchkiss	396	Beales v. Spencer	649
v. Margerison	885	Beall v. Fox	724
v. Ross	672	Beals v. Lee	189
Bates v. Coe	586	Bean v. Simpson	438
v. Dandy	633, 640, 641	Bear v. Bear	677
v. Heard	183	v. Whistler	232
v. Johnson	829	Beard v. Campbell	184
v. Mackinley	544, 545	v. Kimball	586
v. Norcross	241	v. Nutthall	111, 367
v. Scales	419, 462, 468	v. Westcott	379
Bath v. Abney	325	Beardsley v. Ontario Bank	759
v. Bradford	600, 764, 770, 915	Beasley v. Magrath	613, 618
Bath and Montague's Case	189, 509 <i>b</i>	v. Wilkinson	339, 494
Bathurst v. Murray	636	Beatson v. Beatson	102, 105
Baton v. Jacks	509 <i>c</i>	Beattie v. Butler	602 <i>g</i> , 602 <i>h</i> , 602 <i>r</i> , 602 <i>x</i>
Batteley v. Windle	158	v. Davis	591
Battinger v. Budenbecker	66	v. Johnston	877
Baud v. Fardell	455, 467	Beatty v. Clark	199, 475, 490
Baugh v. Price	187	v. Knowler	44
v. Reed	903 <i>a</i>	v. Kurtz	748
Bauerman v. Radenius	330	v. Marine Ins. Co.	44
Baum v. Grigsby	232, 237, 238	Beaubien v. Poupard	205
Baumgartner v. Guessfield	126, 132,	Beauclerk v. Asburnham	509
Bayard v. Farmers', &c., Bank	242, 225, 814	Beaudry v. Montreal	869
v. Colefax	602 <i>aa</i> , 602 <i>dd</i>	Beaufort v. Collier	646, 647, 653
Bayer v. Cockerill	299	Beauland v. Bradley	194
Bayles v. Baxter	126, 137, 139, 215	v. Halliwell	550
Bayley, <i>In re</i>	357	Beaumont v. Boulthbee	178, 863
v. Boulcott	75, 77, 86, 97	v. Bramley	186
v. Cumming	273, 502	v. Meredith	827
v. Greenleaf	232, 233, 234, 239	v. Oliveira	704
v. Mansett	277, 287	v. Salisbury	317, 319
v. Powell	900	Beavan v. Oxford	438
v. Williams	194	Beaver v. Filson	730
Baylies v. Baylies	329	Beck v. Graybill	126, 133
v. Payson	17, 82	Beckett v. Cordley	53
Baylis v. Newton	147, 151	Beckford v. Beckford	144
v. Staats	275	v. Close	862
Baynard v. Woolley	418, 848, 884, 931	v. Kemble	72
		v. Wade	228, 855, 863, 865
		Beckley v. Newland	68
		Beckwith v. Union Bank	438

	SECTION		SECTION
Beddoes v. Pugh	433, 926	Bendyshe, <i>In re</i>	630
Bedford v. Abercorn	375	Benett v. Wyndham	744, 914
v. Woodman	811	Benford v. Daniels	918
Bedford's Appeal	380	Benger v. Drew	137, 144
Charity	282, 697, 742	Bengough v. Edridge	379, 390
Bedilian v. Seaton	182	Benham v. Rowe	602 v
Bedwell v. Froome	144	Benjamin v. Gill	433
Beebe v. Debaun	602 p, 602 dd, 782	Benlow v. Townsend	98
Beech v. Keep	98, 100, 101	Benn v. Dixon	449, 451, 547
v. Vincent	584	Bennet v. Davis	88, 51, 121, 277, 322, 324
Beecher v. Major	130, 139	Bennett, <i>Ex parte</i>	197, 207, 209
Beeching v. Morphew	654	v. Atkins	892, 901
Beekman v. Bonsor	259, 384, 402, 748	v. Biddle	636, 899
v. People	748	v. Brundage	602 u
Beer v. Tapp	899	v. Colley	467, 532, 534, 535, 851, 863, 867
Beer's Goods	264	v. Denniston	602 s
Beere v. Hoffmister	511 a	v. Dillingham	627, 632, 639
Beery v. Trick	456	v. Foster	885
Beeson v. Beeson	195, 205, 207, 209, 428, 850, 853	v. Fulmer	77
Beever v. Partridge	119	v. Going	892, 901
Begbie v. Crook	270, 273	v. Hayter	714, 729
Belch v. Harvey	855	v. Honeywood	256, 276, 282
Belcher v. Belcher	191	v. Judson	172, 173
v. Parsons	411, 914	v. Lowe	380
v. Saunders	172	v. Lytton	924
Belchier, <i>Ex parte</i>	404, 406, 409, 411, 416, 421, 441, 443, 779	v. Mayhew	837
Belknap v. Belknap	279, 919	v. Merriman	185
v. Scaley	186	v. Merritt	813
Bell v. Bell	627, 631, 682, 639, 645, 828, 863	v. Oliver	636
v. Hallenback	149	v. Preston	843
v. Henderson	175	v. Robinson	514
v. Hyde	48	v. Union Bank	590, 602 d
v. Kellar	660	v. Vade	171, 182, 189
v. Phyn	380	v. Whitehead	871
v. Scammon	299	Bennington Iron Co. v. Isham	757
v. Webb	205, 229	Bensell v. Chancellor	189
Bell's Estate	918	Benson v. Benson	260, 653
Bellamy v. Bellamy	428	v. Bruce	918
v. Burrow	82	v. Hawthorne	207
v. Sabine	172	v. Heatham	206
Bellas v. McCarthy	211	v. Whittam	117, 119
Bellasis v. Compton	75, 77, 83, 86, 139	Bensusan v. Nehemias	852
Bellington v. Shaffer	606	Bentham v. Hincourt	243
Bellington's Appeal	458	v. Smith	254
Bellow v. Russell	202	v. Wiltshire	501, 803
Bellows v. Partridge	590, 600	Bentley v. Craven	427, 430
Beloved Wilkes' Charity, <i>Re</i>	511 a	v. Mackay	82, 96
Belmont v. Obrien	288, 294, 414	v. Phelps	226
Belote v. White	858	v. Shreve	468
Belt v. Ferguson	213	Benvoize v. Cooper	388
Beman v. Rafford	757	Benzien v. Lenvir	217
Bemis v. Call	684	Berchard v. Scott	781
Benbore v. Davies	901	Berdoe v. Dawson	291
Benbow v. Townsend	75, 77, 86, 139	Beresford, <i>In re</i>	635
Bench v. Biles	569, 570	v. Armagh	665
Bendall v. Bendall	894, 918	v. Beresford	845
Bender v. Reynolds	649, 651	v. Hobson	636
		Bergen v. Bennett	602 h, 602 i
		v. Rendall	765

	SECTION		SECTION
Berger v. Duff	402, 770, 779	Bingham v. Bingham	184
Beringer v. Beringer	182	v. Clanmorris	270
Berkeley v. King's College	69	v. Stewart	158, 814
v. Partington	117	v. Weiderwax	757
v. Ryder	512, 517	Bingham's Appeal	511 c
v. Swinburne	118, 620	Binion v. Stone	54, 145
Berkhamstead School, <i>Ex parte</i>	742	Binks v. Rokeby	597, 787, 792, 795,
Bernard v. Bongard	132, 133		796
v. Minshull	112	Binney v. Plumly	330
Berry v. Briant	117, 118	Binsse v. Page	432
v. Hamilton	511	Birch, <i>In re</i>	518
v. Norris	48, 86	v. Blaggrave	103, 147, 151, 165
v. Skinner	602 h	v. Ellames	217
v. Usher	244	v. Wade	112, 258
v. Williamson	276, 359	Bird v. Bird	456
Berryhill's Appeal	851, 912, 918	v. Graham	863
Berthold v. Holmes	602 g	v. Hunsden	516
Bertie v. Falkland	514	v. Johnson	386
Berwick v. Murray	468	v. Maybury	117
Besland v. Hewett	239	v. Pegram	668
Bessey v. Windham	587	v. Stride	511 b
Best v. Blackburn	173	Bird's Estate	918
v. Campbell	141, 865	Birdsall v. Hewlett	575, 903 a
v. Storr	173	Birdwell v. Cain	195
Bethea v. McColl	612, 615	Birkett v. Hibbert	636
Bethune v. Dougherty	259	Birkhamstead School Case	725
v. Kennedy	451, 547	Birks v. Micklethwait	848, 901
Bettle v. Wilson	673	Birley v. Birley	511 a
Betts v. Betts	678	Birls v. Betty	417, 848, 876
Betty v. Elliott	357	Birmingham v. Kirwin	572
Beverley v. Brooke	818	Birmingham School, <i>In re</i>	742
Beverleys v. Miller	463, 468	Biron v. Mount	593
Beverly's Case	191	Biscoe v. Kennedy	657
Bholen v. Cleveland	438	v. Perkins	805, 307
Bibb v. McKinley	639	Bishop v. Curtis	327
v. Pope	680	v. Halcomb	438
v. Smith	97	v. Talbot	216
Bibby v. Thompson	117	Bishop Gore's Charity	701, 714
Bick v. Matthews	423	Bishop of Oxford v. Leighton	294
v. Motley	423	Bittenger v. Railroad Co.	589
Bickam v. Crutwell	571	Bixler v. Taylor	260
Bickham v. Smith	900	Black v. Black	79, 137
Bickley v. Guest	765	v. Blakely	918
Bicknell v. Field	72	v. Creighton	827
v. Gouch	861	v. Irwin	402, 779
Biddle v. Perkins	506	v. Ligon	528, 529, 538
Biddles v. Biddles	117, 620	v. McCaulay	380
Bifield v. Taylor	678, 874	v. Ray	546
Bigelow v. Morang	903 a	Blackburne, <i>Ex parte</i>	276, 504
Bigler v. Walker	602 t	v. Edgeley	201
Bigbold's Settlement, <i>In re</i>	292	v. Gregson	232, 236, 237,
Bilbie v. Lumley	184		239
Bill v. Cureton	104, 593	v. Stables	359, 360, 366,
v. Kynaston	541		390
Billing v. Southee	204, 210	Blackley v. Fowler	199, 602 v
Billingham v. Lawthen	108	Blackeley v. Holton	109
Billings v. Billings	590	Blacket v. Langlands	219
Billingslea v. Moore	272	Blackford v. Christian	189
Billingsley v. Crichtett	613	Blackie v. Clarke	172, 204
v. Matthew	414	Blacklow v. Laws	649, 783
Billington's Appeal	607	Blackmore v. Shelby	200

	SECTION		SECTION
Blackstone v. Henworth Hospital	694	Bloodgood v. Bruen	785
Blackstone Bank v. Davis	386, 386 a, 555, 652	v. Sears	186
Blackville v. Ascott	511 b	Bloom v. Rensselaer	602 d, 602 x, 602 bb
Blackwood v. Burrows	419, 453, 778, 851	v. Waldron	581, 768, 774
Blagden, <i>Ex parte</i>	626, 632	Bloomar, <i>In re</i>	56
Blagge v. Miles	511 c	Bloomfield v. Eyre	245, 871
Blagrove v. Blagrove	309, 312, 315	v. Stowe Market	724
v. Hancock	376, 383, 390	Blound v. Bestland	639
v. Routh	202	Blount v. Burrow	900
Blair v. Bass	137	v. Carroway	602 g
v. Bromley	172, 236, 861	v. Robeson	863
v. Nugent	863	Blue v. Marshall	482, 528
v. Ormond	869	v. Patterson	182, 843, 863
v. Owles	222	Blumenthal v. Brainard	762
Blaisdell v. Stevens	836	Blundell, <i>In re</i>	702
Blake v. Allman	621	Blunder v. Barker	201
v. Blake	82	Blunt v. Blunt	72
v. Bunbury	329	v. Burrow	87
v. Foster	856	Blyholder v. Gilson	75, 137
v. Heyward	218	Boardman v. Halliday	586, 590
v. Hungerford	218	v. Mossman	419
Blakeley v. Brady	98, 101	Boaz v. Boaz	275
Blakeney v. Blakeney	117	Boazman v. Johnson	585, 596, 597
Blaker v. Cooper	672	Bochert v. McBride	770
Blanchard, <i>Re</i>	292	Boddington v. Castelli	345
v. Moore	226	Boddy v. Dawes	616
v. Tyler	221	v. Lefevre	244
Blanchet v. Foster	213	Boden v. Jaco	602 f
Bland v. Bland	113, 116, 160	Bodenham v. Hoskins	246, 813, 907
Blandford v. Thackerell	379, 710	Bodine v. Edwards	142, 143
Blaney v. Blaney	566	v. Moore	602 bb, 602 ff
Blann v. Bell	450, 461	Bodley v. Goodrich	590
Blasdel v. Locke	98	Boehm v. Clark	380
Blatch v. Wilder	121, 501, 787	Bogardus v. Trinity Church	45
Blatchford v. Woolley	658, 849	Bogert v. Hertell	501
Blauvelt v. Ackerman	429, 469, 918	v. Perry	132
Bledsoe v. Games	232	Boggs v. Varner	221, 222
Bleeker v. Bingham	367	Bogle v. Bogle	276, 280, 900
Blenkinsop v. Blenkinsop	213, 641	Bohannon v. Strespley	863
Blennerhasset v. Day	228, 229, 230, 782, 861, 867	Bold v. Hutchinson	359, 361
Blennon's Estate	748	Bolm v. Headley	639
Blevins v. Buch	573, 677, 862	Bolton v. Bolton	107, 108
Blight v. Bank	218, 219, 239	v. Deane	871
v. Ewing	765	v. Gardner	428
v. Schenck	404, 409, 591, 779	v. Jacks	493
Blin v. Pierce	330	v. Jenks	765
Blinkhorne v. Feast	54, 153	v. Powell	859
Bliss v. American Bible Society	701, 724, 747, 748, 903 a	v. Stannard	805
v. Bridgewater	260	v. Williams	658, 659
v. Matteson	207, 212	Bomar v. Mullins	836
v. Pierce	58	Bond, <i>Ex parte</i>	615
Blithe's Case	48, 489	v. Barksdale	225
Blithman, <i>In re</i>	927	v. Brown	228, 229
Blodgett v. Hildreth	81, 162	v. Hopkins	228, 855
Blogg v. Johnson	468, 472	v. McWatty	890
Blois v. Hereford	636	v. Nurse	17
Blood v. Blood	299	v. Simmonds	637
		v. Turner	918
		v. Ziegler	225, 814
		Bondfield v. Hassell	388



	SECTION		SECTION
Bondholders of York and Cum- berland R.R. Co., <i>In re</i>	753	Bostwick v. Atkins	200, 205
Bone v. Cook	417, 418	Bosvil v. Brander	627, 633, 640
v. Pollard	186, 144	Boswell v. Dillon	359
Boney v. Hollingsworth	201	v. Parker	585
Bonham v. Newcomb	107	Boteler v. Allington	13, 321, 347, 520
Bonifant v. Greenfield	270, 273, 499	Bothen v. McColl	918
Bonithon v. Hockmore	904	Bothomly v. Fairfax	600
Bonn v. Davant	918	Botsford v. Burr	126, 132, 133, 134, 137, 139, 161
Bonner v. Bonner	573	Boughton v. Boughton	103, 104, 162
Bonney v. Ridgard	225, 228, 809, 810, 811, 855, 865	v. James	160, 383, 393
Bonsall's Appeal	458, 606, 607, 836, 842	v. Langley	306
Bonser v. Kinnear	112, 258	Bouldin v. Alexander	277, 733
Booker v. Anderson	187, 770	Boulton, <i>Ex parte</i>	210
Bool v. Mix	33	v. Beard	438
Boon v. Barnes	239	v. Bead	901, 927
v. Murphy	237	Bourdillon v. Adair	633
Boone v. Baines	220	Bourne v. Buckton	397
v. Chiles	218, 219, 222, 229, 855, 863	v. Mole	826, 827
Booram v. Wells	490, 771, 783	Bourset v. Savage	334, 828
Booth, <i>Ex parte</i>	402	Bovey v. Smith	217, 222, 521, 828, 830
v. Alington	254	Bowden v. Bowden	451
v. Ammerman	47	v. Laing	117, 118
v. Booth	262, 419, 454, 460, 467, 508, 848, 849	Bowditch v. Andrew	118, 920
v. Clark	70, 72	v. Bannelos	280, 282, 297
v. Field	315	v. Soltyk	899, 903 a
v. McNair	590	Bowen v. Evans	218, 230
v. Purser	475	v. Idley	183
v. Sineath	613	Bowers v. Clark	673
v. Warrington	861	v. Heaf	188
Bootle v. Blundell	566, 768	v. Keesecker	324
Borden v. Sumner	592	v. Seeger	404, 412, 415
Boreham v. Bignall	476 a, 928	v. Toronto	207, 430
Borneman v. Sedlinger	87	Bowes, <i>Ex parte</i>	336, 337
Borough of Hertford v. Poor of Hertford	900	v. East London	484, 529, 851, 872
Borst v. Corey	234	v. Strathmore	526, 913
Borum v. King	98	Bowie v. Berry	324
Bos v. Ewing	237	Bowles v. Bowles	281
Bosanquet v. Dashwood	192	v. Drayton	472
Boschette v. Power	826, 827	v. Orr	72
Bosken v. Giles	647	v. Stewart	851
Boskerch v. Herrick	520	v. Weeks	277, 287
Boson v. Statham	88, 90, 93, 216	Bowling v. Bowling	632
Boss v. Goodsall	460	v. Cobb	918
Bostick v. Elliott	426	v. Winslow	632, 636
v. Wenton	254	Bowman v. Bates	180
Bostleman v. Bostleman	126	v. Wathen	756, 757, 855
Bostock v. Blakeney	475, 477, 552, 913	Bowman's Appeal	607
v. Floyer	402, 441, 444, 929	Bowra v. Wright	54
Bostock's Case	379	Boyce v. Corbally	502
Boston v. Boston	641	v. Grundy	171
Boston, &c., Co. v. Boston	761	v. Hanning	506
Boston Franklinit Co. v. Condit	499	Boycote v. Cotton	584
Bostwick Matter of	615, 617, 618	Boyd v. Boyd	415, 420, 426, 861
		v. Hawkins	195, 917, 918
		v. McLean	126, 137
		Boydell v. Golightly	390
		Boyer v. Cockerell	298
		Boykin v. Ciples	51, 240, 277, 647
		Boyne v. Crowther	119

	SECTION		SECTION
Boynton v. Brastow	195	Brathwaite v. Brathwaite	431
v. Dyer	468	Brawley v. Catron	233, 235
v. Hubbard	188	Braxton v. State	426
v. Rees	218, 222	Bray, <i>Ex parte</i>	910
v. Richardson	900	v. West	270, 271
Boys v. Boys	451	Braybrooke v. Inskip	274, 336, 337, 597, 801
Boyse v. Rossborough	189	Brazer v. Clark	417, 420, 426
Brabrook v. Boston Five Cts. Sav. Bank	98, 99, 100	Brech v. Cole	212
Brace v. Ormond	903 a	Breckenridge v. Brooks	918
Bracken v. Beatty	451	v. Ormsby	85, 189
v. Miller	218, 222	Bredin v. Kingland	918
Brackenbury v. Brackenbury	103, 104, 165	Breedon v. Breedon	582, 610, 798
Brackenridge v. Holland	195, 205	*Brenan v. Boyne	357
Brackett v. Baum	602 bb	Brendle p. German Ref. Con.	734, 748
Bradford v. Belfield	294, 344, 408, 494	Brennon's Estate	710
v. Greenway	655, 660	Brent v. Sandwich	734
v. Harper	39	Brereton v. Brereton	507, 508, 510, 511
v. Marvin	237	Brest v. Offley	112
v. Romney	186	Brett v. Cumberland	536
Bradish v. Gibbs	48, 367	v. Forcer	635
Bradley v. Chase	185	v. Greewell	636
v. Emerson	654	Brettell, <i>Ex parte</i>	337
v. McBride	230	Brevard v. Neely	602 e
v. Peixoto	386	Brewer v. Hardy	299
v. Phil. R.R. Co.	602 c	v. Swirls	467, 669, 849
Bradlin v. Hord	219, 222	v. Vanardsdale	851
Bradner v. Falkner	547	v. Winchester	602 h, 602 n
Bradshaw v. Bradshaw	414, 614	Brewerton's Case	693, 701
v. Ellis	308, 765	Brewster v. Angel	288, 375, 767
v. Fane	769	v. McCall	748
v. Skilbech	380	v. Power	142
v. Thompson	714	v. Striker	305, 308, 312, 315
Bradwell v. Catchpole	416, 419, 830	Brice v. Brice	189, 201
v. Weeks	64	v. Stokes	416, 418, 419, 421, 424, 466, 467, 508, 589, 849
Brady v. Dilley	910	Bride v. Smyth	312
v. McKosker	182	Bridenbecker v. Lowell	127, 135
Bragg v. Paulk	82	Bridge v. Beadon	438
Brainerd v. Dunning	597	v. Bridge	96, 98, 101, 102, 105, 108
Braman v. Oliver	195	v. Brown	477, 615, 618, 910, 913
v. Stiles	121, 555, 765	Bridger v. Rice	770
Bramhall v. Ferris	118, 386 a, 555	Bridges v. Longman	768
Bramlet v. Bates	380	v. Pleasants	701, 713, 748
Bran v. Marlborough	219	v. Wilkins	646
Brander v. Brander	544, 545	v. Wood	648
Brandon v. Aston	388, 555, 619	Bridget v. Himes	884
v. Brandon	347	Bridgman, <i>In re</i>	275, 279, 292
v. Hogart	468	v. Gill	246, 745, 859, 884
v. Robinson	386, 652	v. Green	71, 104, 189, 211
v. Woodthorpe	633	Briers v. Hackney	851
Brandt v. Gelston	359	Briggs v. Davis	334
Brandt's Appeal	569	v. French	72
Brannin v. Brannin	215	v. Hartley	700, 702, 718
Brashear v. Marcy	380	v. Hill	238
v. West	438, 585, 592, 593	v. Light-boats	40, 41
Brasier v. Hudson	792	v. Oxford	396, 540
Brassey v. Chalmers	493, 508, 769	v. Palmer	334
Brasswell v. Morehead	541	v. Penny	98, 112
Bratt v. Bratt	232	v. Planters' Bank	238

	SECTION		SECTION
Briggs v. Terrell	757	Broom v. Curry	540
v. Titus	681	v. Summers	734
v. Wilson	481	Broomfield, <i>Ex parte</i>	611
Brigham v. Henderson	72	Brophy v. Bellamy	612
Bright v. Bright	109	Broswell v. Downs	348
v. Egerton	864	Brothers v. Brothers	602 <i>w</i>
v. Larcher	570	v. Porter	182, 186, 886
v. Legerton	850	Brotherton v. Hutt	222
v. North	478, 915	Brough v. Higgins	553
Brinckerhoff v. Lansing	602 <i>ee</i>	Brougham v. Paulett	263, 908
Brinhurst v. Cuthbert	311	Broughton v. Broughton	482, 895, 904
Brinkerhoff v. Vanschoven	232	v. James	662
Brinkley v. Willis	863, 872	v. Langley	298
Brinton's Estate	900	Browell v. Reid	273, 818, 819
Brisbane v. Stoughton	602 <i>g</i> , 602 <i>bb</i>	Browsers v. Fromm	748
Briscoe v. Briscoe	361	Brown, <i>Ex parte</i>	282
v. Bronaugh	239	<i>In re</i>	773
v. State	919	v. Alden	668
Bristed v. Williams	242	v. Armistead	184, 500
Bristol v. Hungerford	152	v. Bamford	670
v. Whitton	737	v. Bartie	602 <i>i</i> , 602 <i>aa</i> , 602 <i>bb</i>
Bristow v. Bristow	699	v. Black	246 <i>a</i>
British Museum v. White	704	v. Blount	883
Brittle, <i>In re</i>	671	v. Bontee	347
Brittlebank v. Goodwin	863	v. Brown	77, 83, 98, 277, 287,
Britton v. Lewis	199, 414		315, 668, 672, 682
v. Twining	358	v. Budd	28
Broad v. Bevan	112	v. Campbell	465
Broadhurst v. Balguy	261, 417, 418,	v. Carter	201
419, 463, 466, 508, 509, 851		v. Casamajor	117, 612, 620
Brock v. Barnes	202	v. Cavendish	98, 593
v. Phillips	224	v. Chambers	511 <i>b</i>
Brocklebank v. Johnson	118	v. Cheney	126
Brocksopp v. Barnes	904, 906, 910	v. Cherry	874
Broderick v. Broderick	171	v. Clark	632, 633, 634, 636,
Brodie v. Barry	665, 818		649
v. St. Paul	747, 891, 892	v. Concord	724, 748
Brogden v. Walker	189	v. Cross	467, 850, 869
Brome v. Berkeley	578	v. De Tastet	430, 454, 470, 906
Bromfield, <i>Ex parte</i>	605	v. Dewey	226
v. Wytherley	464	v. Dysinger	215
Bromley v. Holland	873, 878	v. East	231
v. Kelley	460, 461, 467	v. Elton	627
v. Smith	885	v. Gallaty	551
Brompton v. Barker	219	v. Gilman	237
Bronson v. Kinsie	602 <i>c</i> , 602 <i>x</i>	v. Groombridge	908
Brooke v. Berry	172, 187, 189, 206	v. Guthrie	141
v. Brooke	32, 112, 116, 248,	v. Heathcote	239
	664	v. Hicks	556 <i>a</i>
v. Bulkeley	217, 828	v. Higgs	68, 112, 160, 248,
v. Turner	511 <i>c</i>		249, 251, 256, 257,
Brooker v. Brooker	890		258, 272, 507, 508, 714
Brookman v. Hales	157, 196	v. Hobson	499, 500
Brooks v. Brooks	51, 843	v. How	900
v. Burt	878	v. Hummell	742
v. Dent	127	v. Ingham	184
v. Fowle	133	v. Johnson	648
v. Hatch	68	v. Jones	151, 157, 158
v. Jones	312	v. Kelsey	263, 574, 748
v. Marbury	591, 593	v. Kemper	675
Brookshank v. Smith	857	v. Kennedy	202

	SECTION		SECTION
Brown v. Knox	592	Bryan v. Weems	312
v. Lake	670	Bryant v. Craige	471
v. Lamphear	186	v. Hendricks	137, 226
v. Litton	457, 464, 906	v. Mansfield	165
v. Lockhart	880, 891, 892, 900	v. Russell	594, 660, 914
v. Lutheran Church	784	Brydges v. Brydges	357, 358, 540
v. Lynch	215	v. Wotton	272
v. Lyon	592	Bryon v. Metropolitan, &c., Co.	752
v. Meeting Street Baptist Society	737, 743	Bryson v. Nichols	160
v. Minturn	593	Buchanan v. Deshon	55
v. Oakshott	823	v. Hamilton	30, 275, 282, 283
v. Paull	118, 612, 620	v. Harrison	13, 347
v. Petney	137	v. Hart	766
v. Pocock	250, 251, 252, 258, 652, 671	v. Matlock	183
v. Postall	661	v. Monroe	602 h
v. Pring	185	Buck v. Gibson	684
v. Ramsden	305	v. Pike	126, 133, 137
v. Ricketts	429, 464, 468	v. Swasey	132, 244
v. Sansome	468, 472	v. Uhrich	127
v. Selwyn	244	v. Warren	132
v. Southhouse	464, 472	Buckels v. Carter	891
v. Stead	347	Buckeridge v. Glasse	260, 275, 835, 467, 849, 851
v. Stoughton	160, 393	Buckford v. Wade	141
v. Temperly	616	Buckham v. Smith	910
v. Vanlier	232, 239	Buckinghamshire v. Drury	34, 53
v. Whiteway	309, 312	v. Hobart	348
v. Wood	218	Buckland v. Pocknell	235, 236
v. Wright	455, 456, 459, 843	Buckles v. Lafferty	205
v. Yeall	713, 719	Buckley v. Buckley	570
Brown's Case	610	v. Howell	774
Trusts	438, 668	v. Lanauze	196
Will, <i>Re</i>	119	v. Wells	678
Browne v. Stamp	137	Bucklin v. Bucklin	341
Browning v. Hart	590	Buckner v. Kingsbury	82
v. Headley	627, 632, 633, 636, 639	v. Calcott	863
Brownell v. Downs	259	Budd v. Basti	232
Bruce v. Child	229, 230	v. Hiler	275
v. Presbytery, &c.	698, 709	v. State	380
v. Roney	126, 135	Budge v. Gummon	458
v. Ruler	179	Buel v. Buckingham	195
Bruch v. Lantz	195, 205, 428, 598, 795, 853	v. Yelverton	272
Brudenell v. Boughton	92, 570	Buffalo R.R. Co. v. Lampson	127, 142, 207, 759
Bruen v. Hone	855	Buffalow v. Buffalow	189, 194, 203
Bruin v. Knott	613, 615	Buford v. Caldwell	172
Brumfield v. Palmer	238, 239	v. M'Kee	109
Brummell v. McPherson	61	Bugden v. Tylee	822
Brumridge v. Brumridge	417	Bugg v. Franklin	638
Brune v. Martyn	519	Buggins v. Yates	112, 113, 116, 151
Brunnenmayer v. Bukre	732, 742	Bulby, <i>Ex parte</i>	651
Brunsdon v. Wooldredge	255, 256, 699	Bulkley v. De Peyster	259
Brunsen v. Hunter	112, 115	v. Redmond	183
Brush v. Kinsley	238	v. Wilford	171, 178, 181, 182, 195
v. Ware	224	Bull, In matter of	499, 610
Bryan v. Bradley	299	v. Bull	112, 251, 254, 255, 559, 748
v. Bryan	627	v. Vardy	116, 248, 252
v. Duncan	195, 649		

	SECTION		SECTION
Bullin v. Dillage	636	Burnly v. Evelyn	385
Bullock v. Sadlier	220	Burns v. Taylor	285
v. Stones	379, 616, 622	Burnside v. Wayman	95
v. Knight	633	Burr v. McEwen	526, 527, 780, 894, 910
v. Menzies	634	v. Sherwood	640
Bulpin v. Clark	657, 652	v. Sims	308, 499, 769
Bumgarner v. Cogswell	412, 501	v. Smith	701, 724, 730, 748
Bumpus v. Platner	218	Burrill v. Boardman	382, 730, 732, 748
Bunbury v. Bunbury	71, 72	v. Sheil	411, 413, 417, 420, 460, 466
Bunce v. Reed	602 r, 602 s, 602 t, 602 v	Burritt v. Silliman	259
Bundy v. Bundy	38	Burrough v. Philcox	248, 250, 251, 258
Bunn v. Winthrop	98, 103, 104, 109, 162, 367	Burrows v. Alter	596
v. ———	331	v. Gore	863
Bunner v. Storm	511, 783	v. Greenwood	900
Bunnett v. Foster	885	v. Locke	171
Buntin v. French	232, 237	v. Ragland	182
Burbank v. Whitney	46, 724, 748	v. Walls	467, 851
Burch v. Breckenridge	659, 660	v. Williams	821
Burchett v. Durdant	306	Burson's Appeal	676
Burden v. Burden	904, 906	Burt v. Dennett	877
Burdett v. Willet	835	v. Freeman	800
v. Spilsbury	511 b	v. Herron	119
Burdick v. Garrick	468, 471	v. Sturt	397, 584
Burdon v. Burdon	665	Burting v. Stonard	809, 815
v. Dean	632, 633, 635	Burton, <i>Ex parte</i>	246, 848
Burge v. Brutton	432, 910	v. Cook	119
Burger v. Duff	402	v. Hastings	361
v. Potter	237	v. Mount	450, 451
Burges v. Lamb	540, 776	v. Pierpont	647
Burgess v. Burgess	272	v. Wookey	904
v. Knapp	763	Burton's Appeal	737
v. Smith	72	Burt's Est., <i>Re</i>	340, 495
v. Wheate	8, 15, 40, 64, 217, 282, 248, 301, 321, 323, 325, 327, 357, 427, 434, 747, 828, 891	Burt v. Wilson	232
Burgoigne v. Fox	577, 785	Bury v. Oppenheim	188, 201
Burham v. James	863	Bush v. Allen	310
Burke v. Chrisman	238	v. Bush	219, 221, 764, 836, 877
v. Gray	237	v. Stamps	602 p
v. Jones	600, 601	v. Marshall	232
v. Tuite	658	Bush's Appeal	299, 901
v. Valentine	119, 308	Bushby v. Munday	72
Burleigh v. Clough	316	Bushell v. Bushell	511 b
Burley v. Russell	170	Bushnell v. Parsons	118
Burlingame v. Robbins	239	Bust v. Wilson	162
Burlington University	90	Butcher v. Johnson	509 a
Burmester v. Norris	486	v. Musgrove	69
Burn v. Carvalho	68, 105	Buther, <i>Ex parte</i>	332
Burnet v. Brundage	782	Butler v. Bray	414, 505
Burnett v. Davis	647	v. Carter	863
v. Denniston	602 g, 602 x, 602 bb	v. Duncomb	578, 579, 768
v. Kinnaston	641	v. Godley	347
v. Preston	17	v. Haskell	187
Burney v. McDonald	64	v. Hildreth	596
v. Spear	918	v. Ladue	602 gg
Burnham v. Bennett	639	v. Merchants' Ins. Co.	58, 143, 146, 147
v. Dalling	900	v. Portarlington	82
		v. Prendergast	873, 878
		v. Robertson	680
		v. Rutledge	133
		v. Van Wyck	591

	SECTION		SECTION
Butler & Baker's Case	270	Calloway v. Wetherspoon	191
Buttanshaw v. Martin	520	Calmes, <i>Ex parte</i>	458
Buttrick v. Holden	814	Calvert v. Eden	299
Butts v. Wood	207	v. Godfrey	605
Buxton v. Buxton	439	Calvin v. Currier	677
Byam v. Byam 294, 364, 508, 505,	807	Cambridge v. Rous	160
Byant v. Pickett	918	Camden v. Anderson	131
Bybee v. Thorp	618	v. Benson	118
Byers v. Danley	139	v. Vail	237, 685
v. Wackman	137	Cameron v. Irwin	602 i, 602 x
Byne v. Blackburn	113, 117, 612	v. Mason	232
Byrchall v. Bradford	263, 462, 469,	Campan v. Campan	247 a
	574, 844, 849	Campbell v. Baldwin	232, 237
Byrd v. Bradley	590	v. Campbell	126, 129, 228
Byrne v. Frere	857, 861, 867	v. Campbell	441, 456, 554, 905
v. Norcott	463, 472, 900	v. Carter	184
v. Van Hoesen	608	v. Day	438
Byron v. Rayner	199	v. Dearborn	226, 602 b
		v. Drake	128, 135
		v. French	630
		v. Graham	869
		v. Hamilton	330
		v. Harding	380
		v. Hooper	35
		v. Horne	476 a, 511 a, 901,
		v. Johnston	922, 928
		v. Leach	195, 205, 786
		v. McLain	530
		v. Miller	209, 851
		v. Moulton	456, 914
		v. Prestons	210
		v. Radnor	321, 329
		v. Sheldon	741
		v. Walker	93
		v. Wallace	128, 195, 197,
		v. Williams	770, 869
		Campbell's Estate	93
		Trusts, <i>In re</i>	468
			109
			51
		Canal Bank v. Cox	591, 592
		Canby v. Lawson	367
		Candler v. Tillett	419, 421, 422, 424, 440
		Candy v. Marcy	186
		Cane v. Allen	197, 202
		v. Roberts	437
		Caney v. Bond	438, 440
		Canfield v. Bostwick	570, 918
		Cann v. Cann	185
		Cannel v. Buckle	34
		Canning v. Kensworthy	122
		Cannings v. Flower	616, 619
		v. Hicks	13
		Canoy v. Troutman	17, 328, 334
		Cantley, <i>In re</i>	338
		Cape v. Bent	284, 293, 294, 450, 474,
		v. Cape	508
		Capehart v. Huey	118, 647
		Capel v. Wood	891, 894
		Caperton v. Callson	533
			891

## C.

Cadbury v. Duvall	559, 598, 795, 797
Cadell v. Palmer	379, 380
Cadman v. Horner	176
Cadogan v. Essex	460
v. Ewart	308, 315, 499
v. Kennett	542
Cadwalader's App.	195, 774
Cafe v. Bent	293, 294, 450, 474, 508
Caffey v. McMichael	618
Caffrey v. Darby	438, 847, 900, 910
Cage v. Cassidy	72
Cahoun v. Robinson	232
Cairns v. Chaubert	547, 554, 918
v. Colburn	147
v. Grant	136
Calais Steamboat Co. v. Van Pelt	814
Caldecott v. Brown	475, 477, 552, 913
v. Caldecott	551
Caldwell v. Brown	783
v. Caldwell	137
v. Carrington	217
v. Chapline	602 dd
v. Lowden	328
v. Williams	97, 109, 111, 591
Calhoun v. Burnett	223, 843
v. Calhoun	655
v. Ferguson	546, 547
v. King	818
Calkins v. Ishell	602 bb, 602 ff
v. Lockwood	68
v. Long	672
Call v. Ewing	421
v. Gibbons	188
Callaghan v. Hall	891, 918
Callahan v. Patterson	675
Callender v. Calgrove	230
v. Keystone	891
Callis v. Folsom	863
Callow v. Howle	654, 657, 659

	SECTION		SECTION
Caple v. McCollum	126	Carson v. O'Bannon	644
Caplin's Will	510	Carter v. Abshire	774
Caplinger v. Stokes	127, 200	v. Balfour	570, 724, 726, 748
v. Sullivan	633	v. Bank of Georgia	239
Capron v. Attleborough Bank	199	v. Bennett	863
Cardigan v. Montague	530	v. Bernadiston	317
Care v. Ormond	821	v. Carter	218, 228, 261, 262, 627, 628, 633, 672, 673, 676, 829
Carew v. Johnson	904	v. Cutting	424, 462, 468
Carew's Case	178, 179	v. Horne	428, 431
Carey v. Callan	137	v. McManus	204
v. Goodinge	244	v. Rolland	618
v. Rawson	226	v. Taggart	645
Carleton v. Bank	627, 628	v. Wolf	748
v. Dorset	213	Carteret v. Carteret	351
Carmichael v. Hughes	615	Cartledge v. Cutliff	471
v. Trustees	43	Cartwright v. Pettus	72
v. Wilson	615, 618	v. Wise	143, 144, 147
Carne v. Long	704, 712	Carver v. Bowles	511 a
Carnes v. Colburn	162	v. Richards	511 a, 808
v. Hubbard	239	Carvill v. Carvill	121
v. Polk	783, 786 a	Carwardine v. Carwardine	298, 379
Carow v. Mowatt	891	Cary v. Abbott	718, 724, 729
Carpenter v. Am. Ins. Co.	171	v. Cary	112, 116
v. Cameron	765	v. Eyre	217
v. Elliott	192	v. Mansfield	200
v. Heriot	201	v. Whitney	328
v. Leonard	680	Casaday v. Bosler	602 ee
v. Marnell	58, 345	Casborn v. English	322
v. Miller	748	Casborne v. Scarfe	324, 336
v. Mitchell	686	Casburne v. Casburne	323
Carpenter's Appeal	900	Case v. Coddling	126, 132
Carr, <i>Ex parte</i>	171	v. Gerrish	212, 591
v. Atkinson	254	v. James	217
v. Bedford	256, 510	Casey v. Wiggin	640
v. Bob	863	Casey's Estate	891
v. Burlington	585, 597, 600	Cassamajor v. Pearson	550
v. Eastabrook	633	Cassard v. Hinman	172
v. Ellison	326	Cassell, <i>Ex parte</i>	910, 914
v. Erroll	373	v. Ross	782, 783
v. Goddin	602 aa	Cassell's Appeal	748
v. Halliday	35	Cassidy v. McDaniel	881
v. Hilton	225, 814, 861	Castle v. Castle	118, 620
v. Hobbs	232	Cater v. Eveleigh	661, 675
v. Houser	209	Cater's Trust	922, 925
v. Laird	468	Cathorpe, <i>Ex parte</i>	457
v. Living	117, 118	Catlin v. Eagle Bank	31, 588
v. Taylor	632, 635, 640	Caton v. Caton	208
Carrick v. Errington	160	v. Pembroke	239, 837
Carrington v. Abbott	559	v. Rideout	665
v. Goddin	602 aa	Cattlin v. Brown	385
Carroll v. Connett	880	Caulfield v. Maguire	554
v. Farmers' Bank	72	Cave v. Cave	34
v. Lee	647	Cavendish v. Fleming	918
v. Moore	918	v. Mercer	616, 619
v. Renick	361	Coverly v. Philp	873
v. Stewart	501	Cawood v. Thompson	159
v. Van Renselaer	232	Cecil v. Butcher	103, 104, 105, 161, 162, 165
Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren	72	Cecil Bank v. Snively	126
Carsey v. Barshaw	416		
Carson v. Carson	66, 250, 254, 262, 511		
v. Murray	672, 673		

	SECTION		SECTION
Central Bridge v. Baily	754	Chapin v. Weed	209
Chadwick v. Heatley	922	Chaplin, <i>Ex parte</i>	461
Chadwin, <i>Ex parte</i>	574	v. Chaplin	151, 165, 323
Chaffees v. Risk	589	v. Givens	261, 262, 264, 268, 914
Chahoon v. Hollenback	330	v. McAfee	126
Chaigneau v. Bryan	260	v. Moore	612
Chaires v. Brady	187	v. Young	430
Chalfant v. Williams	226	Chapman v. Beardsley	232, 235
Challen v. Shippam	462, 463	v. Blissett	298, 305, 312
Chalmers v. Bradley	228, 230, 274, 287, 401, 863, 867	v. Butler	855
v. Hack	72	v. Foster	686
Chamberlain v. Agar	84, 181, 216	v. Gibson	108
v. Brackett	728, 737	v. Gray	672
v. Chamberlain	181, 182, 741, 748	v. Tanner	282, 239
v. Crane	299	v. Wilbur	77
v. Dummer	540	Charity Corp. v. Sutton	402, 879, 904
v. Temple	165	Charles v. Dubois	428
v. Thompson	305, 312, 315, 318	Charlton v. Durham	421
Chambers, <i>Ex parte</i>	616, 617, 618	v. Low	218
v. Atkins	117	v. Rendall	375
v. Caulfield	672	Charter v. Trevelyan	923
v. Chambers	362, 451	Chase v. Chase	70, 71, 112, 117, 118, 386 a, 623
v. Crabbe	851	v. Lockerman	243, 462, 468, 562, 565, 566, 571, 918
v. Goldwin	615	v. Palmer	627
v. Goodwin	905	v. Parker	602 ff
v. Howell	430	v. Roberts	843
v. Kerns	462	Chassaing v. Parsonage	636
v. Manchester, &c., Railway	752	Chastain v. Smith	127
v. Mauldin	330	Chatham v. Audley	905
v. Minchin	402, 404, 411, 416, 419, 421, 423	v. Brainard	748
v. Perry	631	Chauncy v. Graydon	515
v. St. Louis	694, 699, 724	Chauvete v. Mason	678
v. Taylor	312	Chawner's Will, <i>In re</i>	768
Chambersburg Ins. Co. v. Smith	520	Chedworth v. Edwards	446, 835, 837, 863
Chamness v. Crutchfield	226	Cheever v. Wilson	684
Champion v. Brown	232, 239	Chelmsford's Case	694
v. Rigby	202, 228, 229	Cheney v. Watkins	290
v. Smith	699	Cheney's Case	701
Champlin v. Champlin	672, 783	Cherry v. Jarratt	918
v. Haight	810	v. Mott	724, 726
v. Laytin	171	Chertsey Market, <i>In re</i>	419, 742, 745, 770, 816, 848, 849, 875
Chance v. McWharther	282, 239	Cheshire v. Cheshire	544, 836
Chancellor v. Windham	299	v. Payne	213
Chandler, <i>In re</i>	846	Chesley v. Chesley	770
v. Hill	600	Cheslyn v. Dalby	202
Chandos v. Brownlow	230	Chesson v. Chesson	554
v. Talbot	641	Chester v. Grier	199
Chanet v. Villeponteaux	499	v. Pratt	658
Chaney v. May	885	v. Rolfe	480, 487, 915
v. Smallwood	245	Chesterfield v. Janssen	167, 169, 171, 185, 187, 189, 194, 195, 212, 851
Chapin v. School District	45, 730, 744, 748	Chew v. Beall	660
v. Universalist Society	17, 299, 305, 328	v. Chew	308, 511
v. Vermont, &c., Railway	758, 761	Chew's App.	827
		Chibnal v. Whitton	993
		Chidgley v. Harris	261



	SECTION		SECTION
Child v. Bruce	195	Clack v. Holland	438, 440, 831, 845
v. Child	453, 667	Cladfield v. Cox	438
v. Gibson	464	Claffin v. Van Wagoner	660
v. Stephens	596, 597	Clagett v. Hall	76, 420
Childers v. Childers	76, 82, 84, 131, 151, 165, 226	Clairborne v. Henderson	324
Childs v. Gramold	137	Clairhorn v. Crockett	238
v. Jordan	86, 343	Clamer v. Rawlings	237
v. Woodson	75	Clanricarde v. Henning	202, 850, 855
Chilton v. Braiden	232	Clapper v. House	227
Chion, <i>Ex parte</i>	835	Clapton v. Bulmer	256
Chipchase v. Simpson	649, 651	Clare v. Bedford	53
Chippendale, <i>Ex parte</i>	486, 907, 909	Clark v. Burgh	633
Chisholm v. Chisholm	615, 616	v. Burnham	140
v. Gadsden	171	v. Cantwell	129
v. Newton	330	v. Chamberlain	142
v. Starke	541	v. Clark	126, 132, 147, 417, 418, 419, 423, 547
Chism v. Williams	380	v. Cook	633
Chitwood v. Brittain	84	v. Cordis	482
Choice v. Marshall	359	v. Crego	341
Cholmeley v. Paxton	774, 776	v. Everhart	174, 178
Cholmondeley v. Cholmondeley	112	v. Fuller	590
v. Clinton	228, 855, 856, 857, 865, 867	v. Garfield	453, 459
Chowning v. Cox	602 <i>dd</i>	v. Hornthal	511 <i>c</i>
Chrichton's Trust	927	v. Hunt	237, 239
Christ's Church, <i>In re</i>	742	v. Lee	206
Christ's Coll., Cambridge	700, 739	v. Maguire	647
Christ's Hospital v. Budgin	144, 149, 151	v. Makenna	647, 661
v. Diefenbach	226	v. Malpas	189, 194
v. Grainger	23, 884, 736	v. Martin	246 <i>a</i>
v. Hames	739	v. Peatridge	226
Christian v. Foster	903 <i>a</i>	v. Platt	383, 917, 918
v. Yancey	261, 602 <i>aa</i>	v. Riddle	766
Christie v. Bishop	221	v. Royle	236
Christopher v. Covington	590, 591	v. Seymour	773
Christophers v. White	432, 904	v. Taylor	724, 726
Christy v. Courtney	143, 146, 147	v. Tennison	347
v. Flemington	601	v. Ward	189
v. Pulliam	254	v. Washington Corp.	757
Church v. Church	748	Clark's Appeal	417, 418
v. Cole	126	Clarke, <i>In re</i>	618
v. Jaques	27	v. Berkely	513, 517
v. Marine Ins. Co.	206	v. Blount	421
v. Ruland	181, 222	v. Boyce	235
v. Sterling	127	v. Danvers	126, 144
v. Stewart	328	v. Deveau	539, 816, 922
v. Wood	127	v. Hackerthorne	217
Church on Brattle St. v. Grant	736	v. Hart	869
Church of Donington-on-Baine, <i>In re</i>	701	v. Jenkins	421
Churchill v. Churchill	254	v. Lott	97
v. Corker	320	v. McCreary	639
v. Dibben	664	v. Parker	262, 413, 502, 507, 508, 511, 514, 517, 518, 519
v. Hobson	261, 402, 411, 416, 421	v. Quackenboss	137
v. Marks	388, 555	v. Royal Panopticon	19, 768
City Council v. Paige	218	v. Sawyer	182
Clack v. Carlon	432	v. Saxon	48, 50, 540, 541
		v. State	426
		v. Turner	257, 510
		v. Windham	648, 652, 653
		Clarkson v. Clarkson	545

	SECTION		SECTION
Clarkson v. Creely	770	Coates v. Williams	591
v. De Peyster	654	v. Woodsworth	133
v. Hanway	187, 189	Cobb v. Biddle	765
Claussen v. La Franz	48, 126	v. Stewart	246 a
Clavering v. Clavering	103, 104, 162	Cochran v. Cochran	554
Clay v. Hart	499	v. Paris	508, 511
v. Sharpe	602 c, 602 b	Cock v. Goodfellow	453, 454
v. Willis	602 c	Cockburn v. Thompson	815
Clayton v. Glengall	580, 584	Cockell v. Taylor	187, 831
v. Gresham	544, 545	Cocker v. Quayle	453, 460, 467, 509, 549, 847
Clegg v. Edmondson	141, 196	Cockerell v. Barber	272
v. Fishwick	196	v. Cholmeley	776, 851
v. Rowland	528, 530	Cocking v. Pratt	178, 184, 201
Cleland v. Cleland	635	Cocksedge v. Cocksedge	672
Clemens v. Caldwell	275, 276	Coddington v. Foley	578, 579
v. Clemens	273	Coder v. Haling	127
Clemenston v. Williams	866	Codwise v. Gelston	594, 596
Clemson v. Davidson	68	Coe v. Bradley	215
Clenestine's Appeal	649	v. Columbus, &c., Railway	754, 756, 759
Clennell v. Lewthwaite	94	v. Knox County Bank	759
Clergy Society, <i>In re</i>	724	v. McBrown	759
Cler's Case	511 c	v. Peacock	754, 759
Clerk v. Miller	654	v. Pennock	759
Clerkson v. Bower	13	Coe's Trust	510
Clermont v. Tasburgh	71, 176	Coffee v. Ruffin	195
Clerg's Appeal	571	Coffin v. Cooper	517
Cleve's Case	161	v. Fernyhough	196
Cleveland v. Hallett	312, 315, 320	v. Morrill	642
v. Pollard	915	Cofford v. Allen	848
Click v. Click	126	Coggeshall v. Pelton	697, 704, 748
Clifford v. Francis	729	Cogswell v. Cogswell	227, 462, 468, 544, 545, 552, 554, 826
v. Frasers	719	Coit v. Fougere	237
Clifton v. Davis	191	Colburn v. Morton	195, 205
v. Haig	55	Colchester v. Lowten	31
v. Lombe	112	Colcord v. Scamonds	238
Clinefetter v. Ayers	562	Coldwell v. Home	725
Clinton v. Seymour	578	Cole v. Gibbons	188
v. Willes	658	v. Gibson	214
Clippenger v. Hipbaugh	214	v. Jessup	591
Clive v. Carew	654, 669, 671, 849	v. Littlefield	112, 117, 386 a
v. Clive	544, 545	v. McNeill	213
Clogett v. Hill	826	v. Miles	225
Cloud v. Ivie	132	v. Moffitt	602 u
v. Martin	118, 511	v. Moore	828
Cloudsley v. Pelham	112	v. Robins	191
Clough v. Bond	402, 404, 409, 417, 419, 440, 444, 453, 455, 462, 465, 847	v. Savage	602 ee
v. Dixon	417, 422, 444, 445	v. Scott	221, 232
v. Lambert	672	v. Turner	570
Cloyne v. Yound	157	v. Wade	19, 20, 258, 273, 280, 294, 344, 491, 496, 499, 503, 504, 508, 714, 721
Clulow's Trust	397	Colebrook's Case	285
Clute v. Bool	118, 386 a	Colegrave v. Manby	532, 534, 535
Clutton, <i>Ex parte</i>	59, 277, 297	Coleman v. Columbia Oil Co.	545, 556
Clyde v. Simpson	794, 800	v. McKinney	785
Coape v. Arnold	358, 359, 369	v. Ross	892
Coard v. Holderness	157	v. Woolley	655, 660
Coate's Appeal	113, 119	Coles v. Forrest	873
Coates v. Robinson	655, 660		

	SECTION		SECTION
Coles v. Trecothick	183, 187, 188, 195, 199, 206, 428	Comr's, &c. v. De Clifford	380, 736
Coleson v. Blanton	330	v. Forney	500
Colgate v. Colgate	205	v. Mateer	270
Collard v. Hare	228, 865	v. Sullivan	699, 729
v. Sampson	511 c	v. Walker	30, 39
College of Charleston v. Wel-		v. Wybrants	802, 831
lington	919	Commonwealth v. Duffield	511 c
Collett v. Collett	903 a	v. Martin	64
Collier v. Carey	432	v. McAlister	418
v. Collier	226, 620	v. Shelby	564
v. Fallon	69	v. Smith	756, 757
v. Harkness	239	v. Stauffer	514, 555
v. McBean	308, 316, 358, 361, 829	v. Tenth Mass. Turnp.	757
v. Slaughter	514	Company of Pewterers v. Christ's	
v. Walter	315	Hospital	736
Collin v. Blackburn	616	Compton v. Barnes	918
Collins v. Carey	904	v. Collinson	48, 52, 672, 673
v. Carlyle	112, 251	v. Oxenden	347, 348
v. Collins	166, 450	Cong. Church v. Southwick	411, 413
v. Hopkins	602 h, 602 n	Condy v. Adrian	541
v. Hoxie	66, 891	v. Campbell	380
v. Lavenberg	655, 660	Conkey v. Dickinson	263, 571
v. Rudolph	648	Conklin v. Conklin	380
v. Townley	892	v. Egerton	500
v. Wakeman	157	Connah v. Sedgwick	590, 591
v. Will	511 c	Connecticut v. Bradish	218
Collinson v. Collinson	146, 147	Conningham v. Conningham	261, 262, 268
v. Lister	225, 455, 458, 810, 909	v. Mellish	151, 153, 158
v. Patrick	98, 102	v. Plunkett	100
Collinson's Case	693, 704, 739	Connolly v. Connolly	515
Collis v. Collis	453, 826, 827	v. Farrell	117, 118
v. Robins	558	v. Howe	236
Collomore v. Tyndall	319	v. Pardon	891
Collyer v. Burnett	741	v. Parsons	770, 782
v. Collins	602 bb	Connor, <i>In re</i>	66
Colman v. Lord	897	v. Lewis	133
v. Lyne	228	v. New Albany	328
v. Sarel	97, 100, 109, 111, 367	v. Ogle	396, 612
v. Satterfield	678, 681	Conoy v. Troutman	602 aa
Colmer v. Colmer	628, 634	Conover v. Warren	233, 237
Colsten v. Chandos	493	Conrad v. Shomo	684
Colt v. Lasoriere	225	Conroe v. Birdsall	170
Columbia Bridge Co. v. Kline	42	Conron v. Conron	573
Colvin v. Currier	645	Conry v. Caulfield	433, 863, 876
v. Mennefee	866	Consistory v. Brandon	748
Colyer v. Dudley	900	Constant v. Metteson	918
v. Finch	800, 802, 803	v. Schuyler	87
Com. v. Nase	160	Constantein v. Bleache	585
Comar's Trust, <i>In re</i>		Consterdine v. Consterdine	417
Combe v. Brasier	733, 748	Contee v. Dawson	417, 420, 466, 826
v. Combe	580	Conway, <i>Ex parte</i>	588
v. Hughes	397	v. Alexander	226
Combry v. McMichael	312, 318	v. Conway	578
Commeys v. United Ger. Church	55	v. Cutting	82, 438
Commissioner of Roads v. McPher-		v. Green	205
son	43	v. Kensworthy	82, 231
Commissioners v. Archibald	275	v. Smith	680
Com'rs, &c. v. Archbold	275, 276	Conybeare's Settlement, <i>Ex parte</i>	277, 297

	SECTION		SECTION
Cood v. Cood	71	Cope v. Clark	849
v. Pollard	236	v. Cope	564
Cook v. Addison	447, 468	Copeland v. Ins. Co.	206
v. Arnham	862, 872	Copeley v. O'Neil	606
v. Barr	81	Copeman v. Gallant	58
v. Bremond	147	Copis v. Middleton	197
v. Bronaugh	133, 221	Coppage v. Barnett	133
v. Burtchaell	206	Coppard v. Allen	876
v. Cholmondeley	427	Copper Mining Co. v. Beach	786
v. Clayworth	191	Copperthwaite v. Tuite	654
v. Collinridge	454, 470	Coppin v. Coppin	236
v. Cook	215	v. Fernyhough	538, 834
v. Crawford	273, 284, 290, 294, 339, 340, 344, 492, 494, 495, 502	v. Gray	657
v. Dawson	566, 802, 803	Copping v. Cooke	243
v. Dealy	150	Corbally v. Grainger	665
v. Dillon	602 i, 602 ff	Corbett v. Barker	856
v. Dunkenfield	156, 699, 729	v. Laurens	552
v. Ellington	112	v. Maydwell	578, 579
v. Fountain	104, 121, 162, 167	Corbin v. Wilson	615, 616
v. Fryer	260	Cordell's Case	217
v. Gwavas	152	Corder v. Morgan	602 c, 602 bb
v. Husbands	50	Cordwell v. Mackrill	833, 834
v. Hutchinson	150, 151, 153, 158	Corgell v. Dunton	667
v. Ingoldsby	290	Corie v. Bertie	694
v. Kennedy	647	Corkers v. Minons	516
v. Lamotte	104, 194, 201, 210	Corley v. Corley	627, 629
v. Lawrence	292	v. Stafford	202, 203
v. Nathan	184	Corlies v. Corlies	276, 459
v. Parsons	476, 915	Cormerais v. Genella	602 gg
v. Soltan	219, 352	Cormick v. Holbrook	680
v. Stationers' Co.	152, 160	Corn Exchange v. Babcock	660
v. Trimble	232	Cornell v. Lovett	514
v. Tullis	831	Corning v. White	594
v. Wiggins	672, 674	v. Lewis	680
Cookson v. Reay	461	Cornfoot v. Fowke	172
Cooley v. Rankin	191	Cornish v. Wilson	558, 570
v. Scarlett	71	Cornwise v. Bourgum	618
Coombs v. Jordan	598, 797, 798	Corp. of Carlisle v. Wilson	871
v. Read	676	Corp. of Reading v. Lane	699
Coon v. Brook	660	Corp. of Sons of Clergy v. Mose	743
Coonrod v. Coonrod	475, 794	Corrie v. Byron	286
Coope v. Carter	889, 890	Corse v. Leggett	81, 82
Cooper v. Cartwright	347	Corser v. Craig	438
v. Cooper	254, 347, 516, 890	Cory v. Cory	185, 191, 201
v. Day	275, 282	v. Gertcken	53, 624
v. Douglas	480	Coryell v. Dunton	511 c, 654
v. Kynock	317, 319, 320	Coryton v. Hilyan	7
v. Martin	254	Cosser v. Radford	600
v. McClun	257	Costabadie v. Costabadie	117, 511
v. Reilly	369	Costeker v. Horrox	827
v. Skeele	137	Coster v. Coster	636
v. Spotiswood	236	v. Griswold	72, 187
v. Stevens	602 ee	v. Murray	863
v. Thornton	117, 118, 624	Cotham v. West	615
v. Whitney	322, 585	Cottam v. East Counties R.R. Co.	416,
v. Wyatt	388, 555		418
Cooth v. Jackson	137	Cotteen v. Missing	97, 102
Cope v. Barry	873	Cotter v. Burchard	843
		Cotterel v. Hampson	30
		v. Purchase	226, 861
		Cotterell v. Long	602 d

	SECTION		SECTION
Cottingham v. Shrewsbury	876	Craig v. Craig	274, 280, 281, 393,
Cottingham v. Fletcher	82, 84, 137,		396, 398, 766
	151, 152, 165, 216	v. Hone	277, 381
Cotton v. Clark	898, 900, 902	v. Leslie	64
v. Cotton	450, 547	v. Radford	55
v. King	103	v. Wheeler	450, 451
v. Penrose	903 a	Craigdallie v. Aikman	734
v. Wood	134, 137	Craig v. Holmes	191
Cottrell v. Cottrell	787	Crallan v. Oughton	601
v. Hughes	218, 354	Cram v. Mitchell	195, 206, 586, 590
Cough v. Bond	914	Cranch v. Cranch	449
Coulson v. Walton	855	Crane v. Caldwell	238
County Att'y v. May	724	v. Conklin	187, 191
Court v. Jeffrey	812, 881	v. Crane	17, 328
Course v. Humphrey	888	v. Drake	225, 810, 815
Courtenay v. Courtenay	280, 401	v. Gough	110
v. Taylor	260	v. Inglehart	459
Cousett v. Bell	877, 907	v. Kelley	680
Coutts v. Acworth	104	v. Palmer	239
Covenhoven v. Shuler	541, 546,	v. Reeder	780
	547	v. Ruder	327
Coventry v. Coventry	52, 108, 276,	Cranston v. Crane	602 w, 602 x, 779
	280, 282, 884, 899, 901,	v. Plumb	674
	908, 924	Cranstown v. Johnston	71, 72
v. Hall	872	Crawford v. Bertholf	38, 231
v. Higgs	513, 517	v. North Eastern Rail- way	545, 556
Coverdale v. Eastwood	208	v. Patterson	612
Covington v. McEntire	546	Crawford's Appeal	96
Cowdery v. Way	654	Crawley v. Crawley	397, 449, 551
Cowdry v. Day	203	v. Dixon	551
Cowell v. Gatcombe	402, 417	Crawshaw v. Collins	906
Cowgill v. Oxmantown	539, 777	Crawshay v. Collins	480, 454, 470
Cowing v. Howard	918	Creagh v. Blood	13, 269, 347
Cowley v. Hartstonge	461, 511	v. Wilson	514, 515
v. Wellesley	546	Creaton v. Creaton	305, 308, 315
Cowles v. Brown	511	Credlant's Estate	310 a
Cowman v. Hall	322	Creed v. Creed	876
v. Harrison	113, 117	v. Lancaster Bank	126, 130,
Cowper v. Cowper	183, 357		139, 149
v. Mantell	119, 256	Creigh v. Henson	863, 866
Cowstad v. Cely	878	Creighton v. Ringle	225, 456
Cox v. Bassett	714	Creney v. Dupree	75
v. Bateman	137, 260, 837	Cresop v. McLean	602 dd
v. Chamberlain	785	Cressman's Appeal	82, 101, 109
v. Coleman	668	Cresson v. Ferree	498, 506, 783
v. Cox	556 a, 794, 799	Cresson's Appeal	704
v. Dolman	863	Creswell v. Dewell	849, 851, 926
v. Edwards	299	Creuze v. Hunter	600
v. Fenwick	232, 237	Crewe v. Dicken	271, 273, 408, 411,
v. Halstead	602 r, 602 u		497, 502, 503, 806
v. Parker	160, 434	Cribbins v. Barkwood	188
v. Sprigg	98, 109	Crichton v. Grierson	712
v. Walker	17, 328, 411, 520	Cripps v. Jee	82, 151
v. Wood	232	Crisp v. Spranger	246, 408
Coykendall v. Rutherford	499	Crispell v. Dubois	201, 204, 210
Cozine v. Graham	84	Crissman v. Crissman	86
Crabb v. Crabb	75, 77, 147	Critchfield v. Haynes	602 v
Crackett v. Bethune	466, 468, 900	Critton v. Fairchild	334
Cradock v. Owen	327, 437	Crocheron v. Jaques	38
v. Piper	432, 895	Crocker v. Robertson	602 d, 602 q
Crafton v. Frith	699		

	SECTION		SECTION
Crockett v. Crockett	112, 117, 118, 386 a, 620	Cruwys v. Colman	112, 248, 266, 285
v. McGuire	241	Cryder's Appeal	795, 798
Croft v. Adam	249, 251	Cuddy v. Waldron	886
v. Arthur	149	Cuff v. Hall	490, 771
v. Lathrop	72	Culpepper v. Aston	152, 597, 764, 770, 785, 789, 795, 796
v. Powell	602 c	Culver v. Culver	205
v. Slee	152, 655	Cumberland v. Codrington	98, 562
Crofton v. Davies	360	Cumberland Coal Co. v. Hoffman	
v. Ormsby	217, 828	Coal Co.	206
Crofts v. Evett	718	Cumberland Coal Co. v. Sherman	207
v. Middleton	184, 667	Cumick v. Tucker	118
Croker v. Hertford	93	Cumings v. Boswell	544, 545
Crommelin v. Crommelin	513, 514, 517	Cumins v. Broomfield	888
Crompton v. Vaser	97	Cummings v. Cummins	260, 261, 262, 264, 429, 454
Cronnin v. Louisville, &c., Soc.	715, 748	v. Fullam	438
Crook v. Brooking	82, 86	v. Miller	680
v. De Vandes	380	v. Williamson	660, 768
v. Glen	858	v. Sharp	662
v. Ingoldsby	259	Cunliffe v. Cunliffe	112
v. Turpin	626, 628, 630, 632	Cunningham v. Antrobus	633
Crop v. Norton	126, 132, 133, 196	v. Freeborn	585, 593
Cropper v. Griffith	52	v. Gray	577
Crosby v. Church	658, 669	v. McKinley	863, 864, 865
v. Hillyer	593, 596	v. Moody	323
v. Huston	284, 602 d, 602 p	v. Pell	876, 879
v. Mann	928	v. Schley	589
v. Mason	476 a	Cureton v. Watson	456
Croskill v. Bower	195, 432, 461	Curling v. Curling	724, 728
Cross v. Beavan	617	v. Shuttleworth	602 c, 602 p
v. Cross	380	Currant v. Jago	144
v. Kennington	570	Currer v. Walkley	795
v. Norton	82	Currie v. Hart	590
v. Petree	438	v. Pye	747
v. Smith	407	v. Steele	185
Cross's Estate, <i>Re</i>	150	v. White	82, 122, 281
Crossling v. Crossling	252, 507	Curry v. Allen	861
Croton, &c., Co. v. Ryder	761	v. Shrader	675
Crowe v. Ballard	192, 206	Curteis v. Candler	280, 476 a, 894, 899, 922, 923
v. Crisford	451	Curtis v. Brown	728
Crowther v. Crowther	858, 871	v. Buckingham	602 ee
Croxall v. Shererd	6, 301, 321	v. Curtis	871
Croxton, <i>Ex parte</i>	891	v. Daniel	864
Crozier v. Crozier	371	v. Engel	660
v. Young	149	v. Fullbrook	501
Cruger v. Cruger	660, 667	v. Hutton	709, 741
v. Halliday	268, 274, 280, 285, 401, 901	v. Lanier	218
v. Heywood	612	v. Leavitt	592
v. Jones	384	v. Luken	160, 381, 385, 398, 532, 535
Cruikshanks v. Roberts	72	v. Mason	417, 419
Cruise v. Christopher	189	v. Perry	165
Crump, <i>In re</i>	654	v. Price	305, 319
v. Baker	913	v. Ripon	112, 113, 116
v. Gerack	468	v. Smith	71, 275, 280, 615, 843
Cruse v. Barley	152, 160	Curton v. Jellicoe	797
v. McKee	251, 254, 255		
Crutcher v. Hord	215		
Crutchfield, <i>Ex parte</i>	606		

	SECTION
Cusack v. Cusack	361
v. White	214
Cushney v. Henry	38, 240
Custance v. Cunningham	151
Cuthbert v. Baker	793
v. Rolf	648
Cutler v. Griswold	149
v. Tuttle	126, 131, 132, 133, 187, 149, 165
Cutler's Trusts	633, 636
Cuyler v. Bradt	82, 136, 865

D.

Dabney v. Manning	308
Da Costa v. Da Pas	702, 715, 718, 724, 729
Dagley v. Tolferry	624
D'Aguilar v. Drinkwater	511, 517, 518
Dakin v. Beresford	649
v. Demming	918
Daland v. Williams	545
Dale v. Hamilton	82
Daley v. Desbouvierie	512, 517, 518, 519
Dalheguey v. Tabor	246 a
Dallam v. Fidler	591
v. Wampole	667, 679
D'Almaine v. Anderson	286
Dalrymple v. Taneyhill	610
Dalston v. Coatsworth	183
Dalton v. Hewen	795
v. Young	802
Dalton's Settlement	612
Daly v. Beckett	530
Dalzell v. Crawford	598, 794, 795, 796, 798
Dame v. Annas	784
Damon's Case	739
Dan v. McKnight	218
Dana v. Bank of United States	31, 588, 590, 592
v. Davenport	602 aa
v. Farrington	602 g, 602 r, 602 t, 602 u, 602 x
v. Lull	591
v. Newhall	218
v. Petersham	231
Dance v. Goldingham	786
Dandridge v. Minge	562
Daniel v. Daniel	330
v. Davidson	217, 828
v. Hollingshead	218
v. Newton	623
v. Robinson	660
v. Uhley	50
v. Warren	451
Darby v. Calligan	686
D'Arcy v. Blake	323, 871
v. Croft	487, 649

	SECTION
D'Arcy v. Hall	428, 431
Dare v. Allen	639
Dargan v. Richardson	589, 593
Darke v. Martyn	443, 453
v. Williamson	476, 907
Darkin v. Darkin	127
Darley v. Darley	107, 310, 612, 647, 648, 651
Darling v. Hammer	469
Darlington, <i>Ex parte</i>	615
v. McCooke	97
D'Arny v. Chesneau	345
Darrah v. McNair	94, 327, 436
Dartmouth College v. Woodward	30, 44, 737, 742
Darwell v. Darwell	421
Darwin v. Hanley	591
Dashell v. Earle	639
Dashiel v. Att'y Gen.	160, 724, 748
Dashwood v. Bulkeley	511, 512, 515, 517, 518, 519
Daubigny v. Duval	243
Daubrey v. Cockburn	511 a
Daughady v. Payne	232, 237
Davall v. New River Co.	434
Davant v. Guerard	330
Davenport v. Coltman	160
v. Davenport	680
v. Farrar	324
v. Frewett	633
v. Stafford	440
Davey v. Durant	768, 780
David v. Froud	924
Davidson v. Foley	152
v. Gardner	654
v. Little	187, 188
Davie v. Beardsham	38, 231
Davies v. Austen	618, 624
v. Bush	784
v. Davies	160, 361, 618, 834
v. Hodgson	53, 671
v. Lee	540
v. Speed	379
v. Thornycroft	646, 652, 671
v. Topp	563
v. Westcombe	776
Davis, <i>Ex parte</i>	286
v. Barrett	431
v. Cain	647, 648
v. Charles River R. Co.	17, 323
v. Cotton	865
v. Davis	127, 639, 891
v. Dendy	912
v. Gardner	569
v. Harkness	618
v. Harman	456
v. Hayden	302
v. Hodgson	849
v. Howcote	783
v. Johannot	610
v. Lamb	232

	SECTION		SECTION
Davis v. Marlborough	69, 188	Deffenderfer v. Winder	463
v. McNally	192	De Forrest v. Bacon	593
v. McNeil	411	Deg v. Deg	82, 187, 511 c, 837
v. Newton	627, 629, 632	De Garcin v. Lawson	718, 726, 741
v. Otty	84, 226	De Graffenreid v. Green	541
v. Prout	648	Dehon v. Foster	72
v. Rhodes	521	Deihl v. King	380
v. Roberts	618	De Jarnette v. De Jarnette	453, 461
v. Simpson	195	Deklyn v. Watkins	71
v. Spurling	246, 402, 403,	Delafield v. Anderson	187
	404, 417	v. Calden	891
v. Tingle	170, 849	Delagarde v. Lampriere	630, 645
v. Vincent	511 c	Delane v. Delane	141
v. Wetherell	133	Delaplane v. Lawrence	774
Davis, Petitioner	610	Delaplane v. Lewis	259
Davis's App.	786 a	Delassus v. Poston	232
Estate	590	Delavante, <i>In re</i>	890
Davoue v. Fanning	195, 197, 205, 294,	Dellinger's App.	672
	428, 499, 501	Deloney v. Hutcheson	136
Davy v. Hooper	250, 251, 255	Delorane v. Brown	855, 862, 868
v. Seys	892	Delouche v. Savetier	863
Dawes v. Betts	787	De Manneville v. Crompton	171, 213,
Dawson v. Clarke	152, 157, 158, 160,		460, 466, 508, 509
	416, 910	v. De Manneville	603
v. Dawson	38, 98, 97, 98, 104,	Demall v. Morgan	602 g
	240, 280	Demaree v. Driskill	149
v. Hearne	119	Demarest v. Wynkoop	218, 602 t,
v. Jay	603		602 bb, 680, 855
v. Lawes	210	De Montmorency v. Devereaux	202
v. Massey	200, 468	Demott v. Muller	680
v. Parrot	901	Den v. Crawford	299
Day v. Arundel	219	v. Hanks	299
v. Croft	818	Dening v. Ware	100, 111
v. Day	891, 894	Denn v. McKnight	217
v. Roth	86, 126, 127, 135	Denne v. Judge	263, 273
v. Thwaites	511 b	Dennett v. Dennett	299
Deaderick v. Cantrell	404, 416, 418,	Dennis v. Badd	611
	420, 421, 466	v. Dennis	528
v. Watkins	187	v. McCagg	215
Dean v. Adler	104	v. McCoy	206
v. Dean	75, 76, 84, 85, 126, 232, 855	Dennison v. Goehring	98, 104, 109,
v. Home for Aged Women	903 a		111, 140, 143, 359, 361
v. Mitchell	322	v. Nigh	642
v. Sandford	277	Denny v. Allen	918
Deans v. Scriba	918	Dent v. Allcroft	709
Dearin v. Fitzpatrick	627, 629	v. Bennett	189, 190, 204, 210
Dearle v. Hall	438	v. Dent	477, 552
Deatly v. Murphy	189	Denton v. Davis	83, 841, 844, 965
De Barante v. Gott	38	v. Denton	329
Debenham v. Ox	214	v. Donner	187, 188
De Bevoise v. Sandford	128, 195, 921	v. McKenzie	167
De Biel v. Thompson	208	Denyer v. Druce	722, 729, 731
De Bouchout v. Goldsmid	243	De Peyster v. Clarkson	463, 468
De Caters v. Chaumont	195, 593	v. Clendinning	240, 259,
Decouche v. Lavetier	228		262, 263, 275, 280, 541
Dedham Bank v. Richards	593	v. Ferrars	343, 411, 414
Deen v. Cozzens	275, 619, 620	v. Gould	126, 137, 138
Deering v. Adams	262, 308, 312, 315	v. Michael	537
v. Tucker	920	De Peyster's Case	918
Deerhurst v. St. Albans	339, 360, 373	Derbshire v. Home	671, 846, 849
	390	Derby v. Derby	699, 720, 724, 743



	SECTION		SECTION
Derush v. Brown	322	Dillaye v. Commercial Bank	218, 225
De Ruyter v. St. Peter's Church	588,	v. Greenough	95, 158
	764	Dillard v. Crocker	126, 219, 221
Desbody v. Boyville	513	v. Dillard	149
Desborough v. Harris	792	v. Tomlinson	462, 468
De Silver's Estate	189	Diller v. Brabaker	851
De Themmines v. De Bonneval	702,	Dillinger v. Llewellyn	97
	715, 718, 726, 741	Dillon v. Bone	100
Devaynes v. Robinson	768, 800, 822,	v. Coppin	97, 98, 100, 103,
	823, 846, 878		107, 111
Devenish v. Baines	169, 181, 182	v. Grace	656
Devey v. Thornton	901, 927	Dimes v. Scott	402, 422, 450, 467, 547,
Devin v. Henderchott	321		548, 549, 551, 847
DeVinney v. Norris	202	Dinn v. Grant	231
v. Reynolds	788	Dinsmore v. Biggert	318, 319
De Visne, <i>In re</i>	144	v. Racine	757
Devo v. Devo	144, 147	D'Invernois v. Leavitt	590
Dewall v. Covenhoven	629, 654	Dinwiddie v. Bailey	871
Dewdney, <i>Ex parte</i>	228, 481, 855	Dipple v. Corles	86, 97
De Weever v. Rockport	623	Disher v. Disher	97
Dewey v. Adams	591	Dismukes v. Terry	137
v. Littlejohn	591	Dix v. Akers	874
v. Long	126	Dix v. Burford	263, 417, 419
De Witt v. Eldred	648	v. Cobb	438
De Wolf v. Chapin	585	v. Read	272
Dexter v. Arnold	228	Dixon v. Caldwell	211, 218
v. Gardner	705, 706, 724, 737,	v. Dixon	238, 640
	748	v. Gayfere	235
v. Stewart	231	v. Hill	221
Deys v. Van Valkenberg	602 i	v. Homer	275, 918
Dial v. Dial	518, 890	v. Horner	272
Dias v. Brunell	843	v. McCue	456
Dibble v. Mitchell	237	v. Miller	661, 675
Dibbs v. Goren	931	v. Olmius	181, 648
Dick v. Pitchford	555, 646, 652, 653,	v. Saville	323
	921	v. Smith	817
Dickenson v. Davis	143	Dobbins v. Stevens	202
Dickerman v. Abrahams	660	Dobson v. Land	431, 437
Dickinson, <i>Ex parte</i>	332	v. Leadbeater	219
v. Chase	238	v. Pearce	72
v. Codwise	127, 129	v. Racey	195, 197, 199, 206,
v. Dickinson	76, 582,		228
	772	Docker v. Sones	427, 429, 430, 454,
v. Hoomes	71		464, 470
v. Player	454	Dockey v. McDonald	914
v. Shaw	145	v. McDowell	456
v. Teasdale	863	Docksey v. Docksey	150
Dickson v. Lockyer	225	Dod v. Dod	361
v. Montgomery	724, 728, 731,	Dodd v. Geiger	642
	748	v. Wake	380, 383
Dickson's Trust	555, 930	Dodds v. Hills	829
Diefendorf v. Spraker	258, 401, 921	Dodge v. Essex Ins. Co.	855
Dietterich v. Heft	471	v. Hollinshead	685
Diffenderffer v. Wind	468, 471,	v. Manning	576
	472, 918	v. Pond	748
Digby v. Irvine	658	v. Woolsey	816
Digges's Case	511 b	Dodkin v. Brunt	38, 240
Diggs v. Walcott	72	Dodson v. Ball	304, 311, 652
Dike v. Ricks	785, 789	v. Dodson	366
Dilkes v. Broadmead	932	v. Hay	323, 324, 371
Dill v. McGehee	843	v. Samnell	455

	SECTION		SECTION
Dodson <i>v.</i> Simpson	225, 810	Doebler's App.	358
Doe <i>v.</i> Aldridge	703	D'Oeschener <i>v.</i> Scott	670
<i>v.</i> Bennett	388	<i>v.</i> Emerson	171, 230
<i>v.</i> Biggs	297, 305, 306	Doggett <i>v.</i> Hart	17, 328
<i>v.</i> Cafe	308, 315, 357	<i>v.</i> Lane	204
<i>v.</i> Cavan	511 <i>b</i>	Dolan <i>v.</i> McDermot	705
<i>v.</i> Claridge	308, 310, 312, 317	Dolbiac <i>v.</i> Dolbiac	665
<i>v.</i> Collier	298	Dold <i>v.</i> Geiger	628
<i>v.</i> Cook	355	Dolder <i>v.</i> Bank of England	826
<i>v.</i> Copesteak	703	Dole <i>v.</i> Lincoln	87
<i>v.</i> Duval	602 <i>h</i>	Dollinger's Appeal	77
<i>v.</i> Edlin	305	Dolman <i>v.</i> Nokes	179
<i>v.</i> Ewart	305	Dominick <i>v.</i> Michael	34
<i>v.</i> Field	304, 312	<i>v.</i> Sayre	250, 414
<i>v.</i> Godwin	414, 505	Dommett <i>v.</i> Bedford	388, 555
<i>v.</i> Halcombe	530	Donahoe <i>v.</i> Conrahy	83
<i>v.</i> Hardwicke	530	Donalds <i>v.</i> Plumb	347, 660
<i>v.</i> Harris	261, 267, 270	Donaldson <i>v.</i> American Tract Soc.	
<i>v.</i> Hawthorne	702	<i>v.</i> Donaldson	98, 100, 102, 105
<i>v.</i> Hicks	312, 319	<i>v.</i> Pusey	918
<i>v.</i> Hilder	349	<i>v.</i> West Bank	640
<i>v.</i> Hole	530	Doncaster <i>v.</i> Doncaster	359, 372, 373
<i>v.</i> Homfray	305, 313	Doniphan <i>v.</i> Paxton	602 <i>ff</i>
<i>v.</i> Howells	698, 699	Donisthorpe <i>v.</i> Porter	348
<i>v.</i> Howland	315	Donne <i>v.</i> Hart	633
<i>v.</i> Hughes	501, 597, 802, 803, 805	<i>v.</i> Lewis	563
<i>v.</i> Ironmonger	305	Donegal's Case	189
<i>v.</i> Keen	871	Doolan <i>v.</i> Blake	670
<i>v.</i> Keir	511 <i>b</i>	Doolittle <i>v.</i> Lewis	500, 602 <i>g</i> , 602 <i>n</i> , 602 <i>ee</i>
<i>v.</i> Langdon	349	Doran <i>v.</i> Simpson	225
<i>v.</i> Lightfoot	338	<i>v.</i> Wiltshire	597, 776, 794, 796
<i>v.</i> Lloyd	354	Dorance <i>v.</i> Scott	661
<i>v.</i> Martin	785	Dorchester <i>v.</i> Effingham	390, 443
<i>v.</i> Nichols	311	Doremus <i>v.</i> Lewis	591
<i>v.</i> Passingham	301, 304	Dorland <i>v.</i> Dorland	501
<i>v.</i> Phillips	866	Dormer <i>v.</i> Fortescue	871, 872
<i>v.</i> Pitcher	706	<i>v.</i> Thurland	511 <i>b</i>
<i>v.</i> Pratt	570	Dornford <i>v.</i> Dornford	468, 472, 847
<i>v.</i> Price	346	Dorr <i>v.</i> Wainwright	262, 263, 574
<i>v.</i> Read	350	Dorsett <i>v.</i> Dorsett	555
<i>v.</i> Roake	511 <i>c</i>	Dorsey <i>v.</i> Clarke	126, 133, 135
<i>v.</i> Robinson	408, 602 <i>k</i> , 602 <i>aa</i>	<i>v.</i> Dorsey	209, 918
<i>v.</i> Roe	490	<i>v.</i> Garcey	16, 843
<i>v.</i> Routledge	165, 303	<i>v.</i> Gilbert	610
<i>v.</i> Scott	305	<i>v.</i> Thompson	275
<i>v.</i> Scribner	592	Doswell <i>v.</i> Anderson	118, 386 <i>a</i>
<i>v.</i> Simpson	308, 313	<i>v.</i> Buchanan	221
<i>v.</i> Smeddle	312	Doty <i>v.</i> Mitchell	655, 661
<i>v.</i> Smith	270	<i>v.</i> Wilson	100
<i>v.</i> Stace	809	Dougars <i>v.</i> Rivaz	742
<i>v.</i> Steaple	353	Douglass <i>v.</i> Allen	597
<i>v.</i> Stephens	529, 530	<i>v.</i> Andrews	613
<i>v.</i> Sybourn	349, 350, 351, 352, 355	<i>v.</i> Archbutt	432
<i>v.</i> Thorley	511 <i>b</i>	<i>v.</i> Browne	402
<i>v.</i> Vincent	511 <i>c</i>	<i>v.</i> Congreve	359, 551
<i>v.</i> Walbank	308	<i>v.</i> Culverwell	202
<i>v.</i> Walker	93	<i>v.</i> Horsefall	874
<i>v.</i> Willan	308, 312, 318	<i>v.</i> Lucas	141
<i>v.</i> Williams	530		
<i>v.</i> Woodhouse	313		
<i>v.</i> Wright	352, 355		

	SECTION		SECTION
Douglass <i>v.</i> Price	143	Drohan <i>v.</i> Drohan	484, 809
<i>v.</i> Russell	68	Druce <i>v.</i> Denison	635
<i>v.</i> Satterlee	421	Drummond <i>v.</i> St. Albans	872
Dove <i>v.</i> Everard	261	<i>v.</i> Tracy	49, 50
Dover, <i>Ex parte</i>	263, 281	Drury <i>v.</i> Connor	245
<i>v.</i> Gregory	570	<i>v.</i> Cross	207
<i>v.</i> Kennedy	780	<i>v.</i> Drury	34
Dow <i>v.</i> Dawson	438	<i>v.</i> Hook	214
<i>v.</i> Jewell	126, 182, 140, 141	<i>v.</i> Natick	500, 700, 724, 748
<i>v.</i> Platner	590	<i>v.</i> Scott	668
Dow's Petition	610	<i>v.</i> Smith	87
Dowell <i>v.</i> Dew	656	Drusadow <i>v.</i> Wilde	511 c, 783
Dowling <i>v.</i> Belton	611	Dryden <i>v.</i> Frost	238
<i>v.</i> Hudson	795	<i>v.</i> Hanaway	133
<i>v.</i> Maguire	653, 657, 658	Drysdale's Appeal	205, 918
Dowman <i>v.</i> Rust	569, 570, 796	Duberly <i>v.</i> Day	633
Down <i>v.</i> Morris	827, 435	Dubless <i>v.</i> Flint	820, 827
<i>v.</i> Worrall	714, 721, 731	Dublin Case	42, 732, 733, 734, 744, 745, 748
Downer <i>v.</i> Church	152	Dubois, <i>Ex parte</i>	332
<i>v.</i> Downer	507	<i>v.</i> Hall	232
Downes <i>v.</i> Bullock	851, 932	Dubose <i>v.</i> Dubose	602
<i>v.</i> Grazebrook	128, 195, 847, 770, 786	Dubs <i>v.</i> Dubs	823, 824, 652
<i>v.</i> Hodgson	931	Duckett <i>v.</i> Skinner	610
<i>v.</i> Jennings	183, 208	Dudgeon <i>v.</i> Connley	988
<i>v.</i> Thomas	883	Dudley, <i>Ex parte</i>	613
<i>v.</i> Timperon	656	<i>v.</i> Batchelder	133
Downey <i>v.</i> Bullock	618	<i>v.</i> Bosworth	139, 143, 146, 147
Downing <i>v.</i> Marshall	894	Duff <i>v.</i> Wilson	211
<i>v.</i> Townsend	109	Duffy <i>v.</i> Calvert	284, 598, 602 m, 787, 791, 796, 797
Doyle <i>v.</i> Blake	259, 261, 262, 264, 268, 401, 403, 421, 422, 914, 927	<i>v.</i> Duncan	468, 918
<i>v.</i> Peerless	246 a	<i>v.</i> Masterson	134
<i>v.</i> Sleeper	126, 149	Duffy's Trust, <i>In re</i>	634
Doyley <i>v.</i> Att'y-Gen.	249, 255, 258, 503	Dugan <i>v.</i> Vattier	221
D'Oyley <i>v.</i> Loveland	598	Dugas <i>v.</i> Gilbeau	204, 205
Doyl <i>v.</i> Sherratt	411	Dugdale <i>v.</i> Dugdale	903 a
Drake <i>v.</i> Moore	602 dd	Duggam <i>v.</i> Kelly	515
<i>v.</i> Pywall	17	Du Hourmelin <i>v.</i> Sheldon	64
<i>v.</i> Rogers	592	Duke <i>v.</i> Fuller	705, 710, 730, 748
<i>v.</i> Whitmore	768	Duke of Norfolk <i>v.</i> Brown	161
Drakeford <i>v.</i> Wilks	226	Duke of Norfolk's Case	377, 379, 382, 383
Drane <i>v.</i> Dayliss	500	Dumas, <i>Ex parte</i>	345
<i>v.</i> Gunter	268, 274, 336, 602 m	Dummer <i>v.</i> Chippenham	42, 511 a
Draper <i>v.</i> Minor	275	<i>v.</i> Pitcher	144, 146, 162
Drapers' Company <i>v.</i> Davis	203	Dumoncel <i>v.</i> Dumoncel	64
Drasier <i>v.</i> Brereton	96, 417, 457	Dumond <i>v.</i> Magee	627, 629
Drayton <i>v.</i> Drayton	501	Dunbar, <i>In re</i>	77, 83
<i>v.</i> Grimke	500	<i>v.</i> Meyer	680, 686
<i>v.</i> Pocock	764, 770, 787, 807	<i>v.</i> Treddenick	206, 217, 828
Drennen <i>v.</i> Walker	215	<i>v.</i> Woodcock	451
Dresser <i>v.</i> Dresser	112	Duncan <i>v.</i> Campbell	634
Drever <i>v.</i> Mawdesley	600	<i>v.</i> Camberlayne	438
Drew <i>v.</i> Martin	144	<i>v.</i> Findlater	744, 914
<i>v.</i> Norbury	223	<i>v.</i> Forrer	136
<i>v.</i> Wakefield	891, 899	<i>v.</i> Jaudon	225, 814
Dring <i>v.</i> Greetham	481	<i>v.</i> Johnson	221
Drinkwater <i>v.</i> Combe	348	<i>v.</i> McCalmont	72
Driver <i>v.</i> Fortner	602 o, 602 cc	Duncan's Appeal	213

	SECTION		SECTION
Dunch v. Kent	428, 585, 593, 597, 795, 796	Dupre v. Thompson	98
Duncombe v. Alston	480, 487	Dwight v. Pomroy	226
Duncommer's Appeal	417, 419	Dyer v. Dyer	126, 143, 145, 146, 161, 162, 611
Dundas v. Biddle	48, 511 <i>b</i>	v. Potter	891
v. Blake	559	v. Shurtleff	199
Dungannon v. Smith	385, 389	Dyett v. Coal Co.	655, 660
Dunham v. Chatham	75	Dyott's Estate	468, 468, 918
v. Isett	757		
v. Waterman	590		
Dunkley v. Dunkley	626, 632, 635, 636	E.	
Dunklin v. Wilkins	69		
Dunlap v. Harrison	65	Eade v. Eade	112, 113, 116
v. Mitchell	195, 205, 428	Eager v. Barnes	418, 846
v. Plumb	655	Eagle Fire Company v. Lent	33
Dunlop v. Burnett	232, 239	Eales v. England	112, 116, 325
v. Dunlop	85	Eames v. Wheeler	98
v. Hepburn	55	Earl of Bath's Case	171, 180
v. Hubbard	891	Earl of Bute v. Short	112
Dunman, <i>Ex parte</i>	780	Earl of Darlington v. Putney	511 <i>b</i>
Dunn v. Chambers	187, 188, 189	Earl v. Huntingdon	858
v. Dunn	453, 460, 655, 847	Earle v. Wood	705, 724, 733, 748
v. Sargeant	639	Earle's Trusts, <i>In re</i>	93
v. Seymour	873	Earlom v. Saunders	461
Dunnage v. White	157, 184, 185	Early v. Doe	602 <i>r</i>
Dunne v. Dunne	457, 552	Earp's Appeal	545
Dunnica v. Coy	164	Will	556
Dunning v. National Bank	500, 501	Ease v. Howard	298
v. Pike	686	East v. East	440
Dunscomb v. Dunscomb	240, 462, 468, 900	v. Lowndes	395
v. Greenacre	629, 633	v. Ryall	747, 901
Dunster v. Glengall	438	v. Twyford	359, 372
Dunwoodie v. Reed	523	East Greenstead's Case	830
Durand v. Durand	672	Easterbrooks v. Tillinghast	160, 724, 748
Durant v. Fitley	672	Eastman v. Cooper	814
v. Lalley	639	Easton v. Carter	262
v. Ritchie	32, 299, 301	Eaton v. Eaton	75, 77
Durfee, <i>In re</i>	276	v. George	685
Durham v. Crackles	633	v. Green	226
Durling v. Hammer	429	v. Smith	273, 284, 290, 294, 497, 507, 508, 721
Durnford v. Lane	34	v. Wason	680
Durour v. Motteux	701, 706	v. Witts	115
Durpee v. Pavitt	142	v. Whiting	602 <i>d</i> , 602 <i>bb</i>
Durr v. Bowyer	627, 632	Eaves v. Hickson	402, 851, 929, 931
Dustan v. Dustan	901	Eberts v. Eberts	200
Dutch Church v. Mott	349, 351	Ebberts's App.	127
Dutch Reformed Church v. Bandon	393	Ebrand v. Dancer	54, 130, 144
Dutton v. Cotton	602 <i>p</i> , 602 <i>q</i>	Eccleston v. Skelmersdale	876
v. Morrison	587, 590	Echliff v. Baldwin	602 <i>ee</i>
v. Poole	181, 182	Echols v. Dimik	602 <i>dd</i>
Duval v. Getting	110	Eckels v. Stewart	304
Duval v. Bibb	232, 239, 299	Eckford v. De Kay	458, 606
v. Covenhoven	843	Eddleston v. Collins	52
v. Farmers' Bank	627, 632	Eddowes, <i>In re</i>	252
v. Graves	647	Eddy v. Smith	602 <i>ff</i>
Dupont, <i>Ex parte</i>	55	v. Traver	238
v. Johnson	612	Edie v. Applegate	818
Duplex v. Roe	295	Edelen v. Edelen	679

	SECTION		SECTION
Eden v. Foster	734, 742	Ellice, <i>Ex parte</i>	457
Edgar v. Donnally	127	Ellicombe v. Gompertz	380
Edge v. Salisbury	256	Ellicott v. Welch	239
Edgell v. Haywood	570	Elling v. Naglee	918
Edgington v. Williams	149	Elliot v. Ince	35
Edmonds v. Bird	189	Elliott v. Armstrong	126, 137, 139, 347
v. Crenshaw	205, 418, 422, 432, 918	v. Boaz	174
v. Dennington	653	v. Connell	226
v. Peake	444, 786	v. Cordell	626, 634
v. Townshend	630	v. Edwards	236, 239
Edmeston v. Lyde	594	v. Elliott 54, 143, 145, 146, 147, 151, 161, 851	
Edmondson v. Dyson	359, 370	v. Hancock	569, 570
v. Walsh	602 t, 602 w	v. Hart	149
Edmund's App.	310 a	v. Lewis	880
Edowes v. Edowes	901	v. Merriman	597, 598, 795, 796, 798, 802, 810, 814, 867
Edwards v. Bates	843	v. Pool	195
v. Bohannon	238	v. Waring	632
v. Burt	188	v. Wood	199, 602 d, 602 g, 602 p, 602 v
v. Edwards	126, 133, 144	Elliott's Executors, Appeal of	101
v. Fashion	136	Ellis v. Amason	438
v. Field	144	v. Atkinson	670
v. Freeman	17, 577	v. Baldwin	639
v. Graves	17, 249	v. Barker	427, 433, 900
v. Grove	615	v. Boston, Hartford, & Erie R.R. Co.	273, 284
v. Hall	709	v. Ellis	113, 253, 901, 908
v. Harvey	747, 774, 891	v. Essex Merrimack Bridge	98
v. Jones	97, 98, 101	v. Fisher	312, 315
v. Lewis	196	v. Guavas	243
v. Lowndes	17	v. Kenyon	680
v. Meyrick	197, 202	v. Maxwell	395, 397
v. Millbank	529	v. Nimmo	107, 108, 109
v. Morgan	871, 872	v. Selby	151, 159, 711, 712
v. Pike	216	v. Woods	648
v. Roberts	228	Ellison v. Airey	569
v. Sheridan	639	v. Ellison	98, 100, 104, 107, 367
v. Tuck	397, 584	v. Elwin	626
v. Warwick	367	v. Woody	546
Eedes v. Eedes	633, 634	Ellison's Trust, <i>In re</i>	270, 271
Egbert v. Brooks	910, 916	Ells v. Lynch	385
v. Butler	419, 424, 440	Ellsworth v. Hinds	640
v. Schultz	380	Elmendorf v. Lansing	418
Egerton v. Brownlow	359, 380	v. Taylor	228, 855
v. Egerton	900	Elmer v. Scott	694, 724
Eglin v. Sanderson	900	Elmie v. McAulay	225
Eichelberger v. Barnitz	380, 541, 547	Elmore's Trusts	451
Eidsforth v. Armistead	802, 803, 805	Elms v. Hughes	639
Eland v. Baker	768	Elmsley v. Young	257
v. Eland	597, 795, 800, 801, 802, 810	Elsee, <i>Ex parte</i>	910
Elborne v. Goode	307, 903 a	Elsey v. Lutyens	747, 891
Elder, <i>Ex parte</i>	665	Elthan Parish v. Warreyn	704
Eldredge v. Heard	248, 510, 511	Elton v. Elton	375
v. Knott	866	v. Harrison	501, 802
v. Preble	676, 677	v. Shepherd	318, 655
v. Smith	195, 199	Elwell v. Chamberlain	172
Elibank v. Montolieu	629, 635	Elworthy v. Bird	672, 673
Elijah v. Taylor	679		
Elkins v. Tresham	173		
Ellenborough v. Canterbury	891, 894		
Ellett v. Paxson	780		



	SECTION		SECTION
Fairman v. Green	616, 618	Fay v. Petis	757
Fairtitle v. Gilbert	750	v. Slaughter	739
Falk v. Turner	204, 210	v. Taft	121
Falkland v. Bertie	871	Fearns v. Young	449, 450, 547, 549, 910
Falkner v. Equitable Society	786	Fearon v. Desbrisay	511 <i>a</i>
v. O'Brien	192	v. Webb	28, 384
v. Wynford	248, 250	Fears v. Brooks	646, 647, 649, 655, 660
Fall v. Simmons	471, 918	Featherstonaugh v. Fenwick	196, 453, 470, 538
Fallen, in Matter of	54	Feedey's App.	313
Fambro v. Gantt	225	Feistal v. King's College	69
Fane v. Devonshire	189	Fell v. Brown	71, 72, 883
v. Fane	94	v. Lutwidge	900
Fanning v. Ker	602 <i>d</i>	Fellows v. Gwydyr	172
Fansler v. Jones	138	v. Heermans	95, 318, 334
Farie's Appeal	652, 668	v. Mitchell	411, 416, 446, 809, 849
Faris v. Dunn	137	v. Tann	646
Farley v. Blood	127	Feltham v. Clark	438
v. Bryant	184, 186	v. Turner	511
v. Shippen	64, 71, 131, 136	Felton v. Deal	757
Farmer v. Compton	517	Fendall v. Nash	619
v. Farmer	192	Fenner v. Tucker	602 <i>r</i>
v. Lesley	591	Fennimore v. Fennimore	421
v. Martin	511 <i>a</i>	Fenno v. Sayre	231
Farmer's Bank v. Douglass	187, 590	Fenwick v. Chapman	571
v. King	127, 128	v. Greenwell	248, 250, 260, 417, 845
v. Wayman	242	Ferday's Appeal	313
Farmer's Loan, &c., Co. v. Commercial Bank	759	Ferebere v. Proctor	765
v. Hendrickson	759	Ferguson v. Ferguson	184
v. Maltby	221	Fergus v. Gove	601
Farnam v. Brooks	178, 195, 206, 210, 230, 855, 863	Ferguson v. Franklin	55
Farneyhough v. Dickerson	918	v. Hass	226
Farnsworth v. Child	223	v. Livingston	862
Farquharson v. Eichelberger	314	v. Sutphen	133
v. Seton	876	v. Tadman	122
Farr v. Farr	229, 230	Ferraby v. Hobson	528
v. Sherriffe	886, 888, 903 <i>a</i>	Ferraria v. Vasconcellos	738
Farrance v. Viley	624	Ferraris v. Hertford	93
Farrant v. Blanchford	851	Ferrars v. Cherry	217, 828, 830
Barrar v. Barraclough	457, 467	Ferres v. Ferres	189
v. Farley	205	Ferris v. Gibson	380
Farrell v. Lloyd	137, 142	v. Henderson	229, 230
v. Smith	294, 928	Ferson v. Sanger	173
Farrelly v. Ladd	343, 843	Festing v. Allen	385
Farrier v. Cames	891	Fettiplace v. Gorges	655, 668
Farringer v. Ramsey	126, 137	Feversham v. Ryder	704, 709
Farrington v. Barr	162	Fiddler v. Higgins	611
v. Knightly	17, 154	Field v. Arrowsmith	195, 240, 260, 280, 602 <i>e</i> , 602 <i>v</i>
Farris v. Dunn	223	v. Brown	611
Fassit v. Phillips	592	v. Donoughmore	593, 600, 927
Fatheree v. Fletcher	143	v. Evans	20, 670
Faucett v. Faucett	195	v. Field	738
Faulkner v. Daniel	347	v. Girard College	734
v. Davis	249	v. Lonsdale	144, 165
Fawcett v. Gere	212	v. Mayor of New York	68
v. Lowther	327	v. Moore	34
Fawell v. Heelis	236, 239	v. Pickett	439, 479, 570
Fawknor v. Watts	612		
Fay v. Fay	75, 308		
v. Howe	471		

	SECTION		SECTION
Field v. Schieffelin	225, 608, 610, 809, 812, 814	Fitch v. Fitch	188
v. Sowle	658, 661	Fitler v. Maitland	591
v. Wilson	229, 230	Fitzer v. Fitzer	673
Field's Mortgage	338	Fitzgerald v. Fauconberge	511 c
Filby v. Miller	218	v. Field	580
Filch v. Weber	157	v. Fitzgerald	901
Fillman v. Divers	127	v. Jervoise	771
Fillmer v. Gott	189	v. Jones	908
Finch v. Finch	126, 143, 145, 146, 147	v. O'Flaherty	901
v. Hollinsworth	250, 258	v. Peck	184
v. Raynad	918	v. Pringle	453, 460, 461, 898, 901, 902
v. Shaw	222	v. Rainsford	192, 538
v. Winchelsea	108, 122	v. Topping	334
Finch's Case	13, 14, 76, 241, 346, 347	v. Vestal	68
Finden v. Stephens	123, 907	Fitzgibbon v. Blake	657, 671
Findlay v. Riddle	359, 370	v. Scanlan	538
Findley v. Patterson	201	Fitzpatrick v. Fitzgerald	17, 328
Finlay v. Howard	275, 282	v. Fitzpatrick	602 r
Finley v. Hunter	715	Fitzroy v. Howard	533
v. Jones	891	Fitzsimmons v. Joslin	172, 179
Finn v. Hohn	328	Flack v. Holm	72
Finney v. Cochran	863	Flagg v. Ely	454
Finney's Estate, <i>In re</i>	337	v. Mann	135, 218, 221, 226, 602 d, 843, 844
Fink v. Fink	748	Flanagan v. Nolan	462, 900, 901
Firmin v. Pulham	900	Flanders v. Clark	249, 505, 510
First Baptist Society in Andover		Flarty v. Odium	249, 505, 510
v. Hazen	312, 520	Flavett v. Foster	423
First Constitutional Presbyterian Church v. Cong. Soc.	733	Fleming v. Armstrong	671
First Congregational Society of Southington v. Atwater	43, 46, 714	v. Buchanan	573
First National Bank v. Owen	918	v. Cuthbert	863
First Parish in Sutton v. Cole	43	v. Donohoe	75, 143
First Mortgage Bondholders v. Maysville, &c., Railway	759	v. Gilmer	858
Fish v. Howland	232, 237	v. McHale	133
v. Miller	851	v. Page	828
v. Wilson	863	v. Teran	205
Fischili v. Dumaresley	134	v. Wilson	918
Fishbourne, <i>In re</i>	806	Fletcher v. Ashburner	150
Fisher v. Bassett	602 ee	v. Ashley	213
v. Boody	172	v. Fletcher	98, 103, 111, 672
v. Filbert	648	v. Green	461, 847, 848, 849, 876
v. Fields	82, 312, 315, 320	v. Peck	218, 222
v. Fisher	556	v. Stephenson	551, 924
v. Fobes	142	v. Walker	448, 463, 900
v. Johnson	238, 239	v. Willard	226
v. Knox	438	Flint v. Clinton Co.	260, 262, 264, 602 e
v. Smart	918	v. Hughes	116
v. Taylor	555	v. Sheldon	302
v. Webster	380	v. Steadman	66
v. Wigg	920	v. Warren	157
v. Worth	594	Flory v. Becker	640
Fisher's Will, <i>In re</i>	284	Florentine v. Wilson	672
Fisk v. Att'y-Gen.	698, 706, 726	Flournoy v. Johnson	349, 353
v. Keen	380	Flowers v. Franklin	546
v. Sarber	205, 209, 538	Floyd v. Barker	160
v. Stubbs	275	v. Floyd	918
Fiske v. White	748	Floyer v. Bankes	383
Fitch v. Ayer	649	v. Gilliam	262



	SECTION		SECTION
Floyer v. Sherrard	183, 187	Foss v. Crisp	55
Flud v. Rumsey	244	v. Foss	665
Fluke v. Fluke	766, 768	Foster v. Athenæum Trustees	126,
Fogarty v. Sawyer	602 c, 602 d, 602 g		183, 237
Foden v. Finney	633	v. Charles	171
Fogg v. Middleton	98	v. Coe	318
Foley v. Burnell	373, 541	v. Craige	501
v. Hill	855	v. Crenshaw	562
v. Parry	112	v. Davies	276, 441
v. Wontner	284, 414, 490, 505	v. Dawber	270, 271
Foljambe v. Willoughby	615	v. Deacon	122
Follansbee v. Kilbreth	127, 135	v. Dennison	299
Follett v. Follett	511 b	v. Durant	142
v. Tyrer	324	v. Foster	144
Fonda v. Penfield	383	v. Goree	602 p
Fontain v. Ravenell	499, 687, 721,	v. Gover	602 dd
	724, 729, 731	v. Hodgson	862
Foot v. Bryant	137, 142	v. Kerr	649
v. Colvin	126	v. Marriott	538
v. Foote	179	v. McMahon	928
Foote's App.	545, 556	v. Mix	438
Forbes v. Ball	112, 248, 256	v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co.	645
v. Forbes	704	v. Roberts	188
v. Hall	223	v. Saco Manufacturing Co.	591
v. Halsey	205	Fothergill v. Fothergill	107
v. Linwood	593	Fountaine v. Pellett	526, 554, 912,
v. Moffatt	347		913, 915
v. Peacock	501, 597, 765, 786,	Fourdrin v. Gowdy	64
	790, 795, 796, 800, 801,	Fournier v. Ingraham	918
	802, 812	Fouvergue v. New Orleans	182
v. Phillips	639	Fowey's Charities	282
v. Ross	453, 461, 462, 468	Fowke v. Slaughter	133, 135
Ford v. Battey	119	Fowle v. Merrill	199
v. Belmont	765	Fowler, <i>In re</i>	275
v. Hopkins	837	v. Fowler	665
v. Lewis	131	v. Garlike	112, 159, 711, 712
v. Ryan	794	v. Hunter	117, 251
Forde v. Herron	187, 602 z	v. Jones	308
Fordham v. Wallis	932	v. Reynall	453, 461, 466, 875
Fordyce v. Bridges	248, 251, 255,	v. Rust	232, 237
	503	v. Willoughby	571
v. Willis	29, 75, 76, 77, 86,	v. Wyatt	922, 923
	102	Fox v. Adams	592
Forest v. Forest	100	v. Cook	863
Forman v. Marsh	610, 611	v. Dougherty	127
Forrest v. Elwes	466, 905	v. Fox	112, 113, 119, 144, 146
v. Robinson	660	v. Jones	679
Forshaw v. Higginson	476, 482, 786	v. Mackreth	180, 189, 195, 197,
Forster v. Blackstone	438		205, 206
v. Cockerell	438	v. Phelps	583
v. Hale	79, 81, 82, 83, 86	v. Wright	188
v. Hoggart	602 c	Fozier v. Andrews	900, 901
v. Ridley	906	Frail v. Ellis	236, 239
Forsythe v. Clark	126, 133, 226	Frampton v. Frampton	509 c, 672, 673
Fort v. Fort	639	France v. Woods	443
Fortescue v. Barnett	98, 101, 247 a,	Francis v. Brooking	636
	438	v. Clemon	570
Forward v. Armstead	97	v. Francis	453, 461, 904
Fosbrook v. Balguy	196, 428	v. Gower	558
Foscue v. Foscue	863	v. Hazelrigg's Executors	237
Fosdick v. Fosdick	893	v. Wigzell	658, 662

	SECTION		SECTION
Franciscus v. Reigart	299, 310	Frier v. Peacock	730
Franco v. Bolton	214	Frith v. Cartland	433, 463, 835, 837, 863
v. Franco	419, 633, 884	Frost v. Beekman	220, 221
Frank v. Frank	185	v. Belmont	214
Frank's App.	429	Frothingham v. March	602 r
Franklin v. Armfield	694, 737, 748	Fry v. Capper	671
v. Bank of England	242	v. Fry	487, 629, 771
v. Firth	468	Frye v. Porter	357, 514, 517
v. Green	602 t, 602 dd, 615, 618, 619, 915	v. Shelbourne	580
v. Hayes	275	Fullager v. Clark	167
v. Osgood	411, 499, 602 m	Fuller v. Bennett	222
Franklin Bank v. Cooper	179	v. Dame	214
Franklyn, <i>Ex parte</i>	456	v. Knight	770, 877, 884
Franks v. Price	372	v. Redman	481
Frary v. Booth	660	v. Wilson	172
Frauenfeldt's Estate	640	Fulton v. Gilmore	922
Frazer v. Bailie	633	Fulton Bank v. New York Coal Co.	222
v. Beville	541	Furgerson v. Smith	654
v. Moore	862	v. Williamson	172
v. Palmer	432	Furiam v. Saunders	521
Frazier v. Brownlow	660	Furman v. Coe	624, 914
v. Center	32, 661	v. Fisher	82, 259
v. Frazier	65, 160, 251, 255	Furness v. Caterham Railway	752
v. Smart	918	Furrin v. Newcombe	160
v. Vaux	918	Fursaker v. Robinson	109, 111
Freake v. Cranefeldt	558, 559	Fust, <i>Ex parte</i>	457
Frederic v. Haas	126, 132	Fussell v. Dowding	920
v. Hatwell	667	Futter v. Jackson	826, 827
Freeland v. Pearson	254, 258	Fyler v. Fyler	246, 466, 847, 849, 907
Freeman v. Cook	184, 540, 541, 843, 844	v. Pole	862
v. Curtis	184		
v. Fairlee	463, 821, 826, 827, 905		
v. Flood	670, 671		
v. Freeman	75, 77, 647		
v. Harwood	195		
v. Kelly	127, 133, 137, 138		
v. Mebane	238		
v. Moore	667		
v. Parsley	632, 633		
v. Tatham	85		
v. Thompkins	915		
Freemoult v. Dedire	122		
Freeport v. Bartol	88		
Freke v. Lord Carbery	395		
Frelick v. Turner	618		
Freme v. Woods	443, 914		
French v. Barron	904		
v. Davidson	507, 508, 511		
v. French	191, 299		
v. Harrison	835		
v. Hobson	419, 454, 851		
v. St. George	533		
Freto v. Brown	613		
Frey v. Frey	462, 900		
Freyer, <i>In re</i>	415, 416, 418, 890		
Freyvogel v. Hughes	304, 310 a, 311, 652		
Frickett v. Durham	133		

G.

Gabb v. Prendergast	66
Gabee v. Sneed	232
Gabril v. Sturgis	901
Gadsden, <i>Ex parte</i>	312
Gaffee, <i>In re</i>	653, 670, 671
Gage v. Dauchy	679
v. Rogers	891
Gaillard v. Pardon	361
Gaines v. Chew	126, 142, 182, 188
v. Hennen	183
v. Poor	672
Galbraith v. Elder	538
Gale v. Coburn	299
v. Gale	169
v. Mensing	602 aa
Gale's Petition	275
Gallagher's Appeal	570
Gallatian v. Cunningham	200
v. Erwin	218
Gallego v. Att'y-Gen.	724, 743
v. Gallego	627, 643
Galliers v. Moss	337
Gallion v. McCaslin	218
Galloway v. Finley	232
v. Hamilton	234

	SECTION		SECTION
Galway v. Butler	888	Garth v. Townsend	254
Gamber v. Gamber	677	Gartland v. Mayatt	294
Gambriel v. Gambriel	552, 554	Gartside v. Isherwood	178, 189
v. Roberts	553	v. Radcliffe	183, 187
Gann v. Chester	238, 239	Garvin v. Williams	200
Gannon v. White	102	Garwood v. Eldridge	226
Gardenhire v. Hinds	312, 648	Gary v. Colgin	782
Gardiner v. Tyler	918	v. May	601
Gardner v. Adams	69	v. Whittingham	889
v. Astor	347	Gascoigne v. Thwing	137
v. Barker	118	Gaskell v. Chambers	206, 207
v. Downes	276, 476 a, 922, 928	v. Gaskell	165, 262
v. Fell	871	Gasque v. Small	187
v. Gardner	347, 560, 598, 647, 660, 666, 678, 680, 795, 797	Gass v. Gass	126
v. Heyes	66	v. Mason	194
v. Hooper	324	v. Porter	783
v. Marshall	636	v. Ross	748
v. Merritt	97	v. Willhite	884, 705, 715, 724, 728, 730, 748
v. Ogden	203	Gassett v. Grout	627, 632
v. Rowe	58, 77, 82, 86	Gaston v. Frankum	657
v. Stevens	360	Gate v. Debrett	602 e
v. Walker	629	Gatens v. Madderly	640
v. Weeks	277	Gates v. Jones	718
Gardner Bank v. Wheaton	137	Gault v. Saffin	677
Garey v. Whittingham	903 a	Gaunt v. Taylor	886, 888
Garfield v. Hatmaker	144	Gause v. Hale	361
Garfoot v. Garfoot	121	Gaves v. Hickson	441
Garforth v. Bradley	635, 640	Gay v. Ballou	613
Garland v. Harrington	438	v. Edwards	863
v. Loring	610	Gayden v. Gayden	426
Garner v. Garner	38, 95, 109, 240, 359, 370	Gaylords v. Kelshaw	896
v. Moore	438, 474	Gazzam v. Poyntz	590, 592
v. Stroude	891	Geary v. Bearcroft	325
Garnett v. Armstrong	347	Geddes v. Pennington	174
v. Macon	225, 562, 598, 794, 795, 800, 801	Geddings v. Geddings	129
Garniss v. Gardner	462, 463, 468, 471	Gee v. Gee	133
Garnistone v. Gaunt	581, 605	Genet v. Beekman	386 a
Garnous v. Knight	103	v. Talmadge	608, 611
Garnsey v. Gardner	247 a	Gent v. Harris	636
v. Mundy	104	Gentry v. Law	172
Garr v. Drake	603	v. McReynolds	664
Garrard v. Fanchell	186	George v. Bank of England	86
v. Lauderdale	98, 100, 585, 593, 596, 597	v. Goldsby	639
v. Railroad Co.	225, 810	v. Howard	151
v. Tuck	354, 866	v. Lansley	511 c
Garrett v. Carr	468	Georges v. Pye	886
v. Garrett	126, 127, 836	Gerard Ins. Co. v. Chambers	305
v. Noble	771	German v. Gabbald	75
v. Pretty	512, 513	German, &c., Assoc.	730
v. Wilkinson	144	German, &c., Congregation v. Repler	732
Garrick v. Taylor	130, 139	Geroe v. Winter	501
Garrow v. Davis	69	Gerrard v. Gerrard	578
Garson v. Green	232, 236, 237, 239	v. Lauderdale	108
Garth v. Baldwin	305, 315, 357, 358	Gerry v. Stimson	78, 133, 162
v. Cotton	871	Getman v. Beardsley	891
		v. Getman	133
		Gevers v. Wright	367
		Geyer v. Branch Bank	649, 651
		Gheen v. Osborn	556

	SECTION		SECTION
Ghiselin v. Ferguson	232, 238, 239	Gilman v. Brown	232, 234, 235, 236, 237
Ghost v. Waller	402, 444, 463, 806	Gilmore v. Johnson	172
Gibbons v. Baddall	236, 239	Girard Ins. Co. v. Chambers	555
v. Caunt	185	Girard Will Case	697
v. Maltyard	693, 700, 701	Girard, &c. v. Philadelphia	742, 748
v. Taylor	445, 847	Gist v. Frazier	187, 192
Gibbs v. Cunningham	602 s, 780, 782	Gitting v. Steel	571
v. Guignard	262	Gladding v. Yapp	150
v. Harding	672	Gladdon v. Stoneman	816, 818
v. Herring	421	Gladstone v. Hadwen	58
v. Marsh	38, 248, 253, 284, 499, 602 m	Glaister v. Hewer	144, 626, 628, 639
v. Rumsey	158, 159, 160, 507, 711	Glanys, <i>Ex parte</i>	58
v. Smith	276	Glass v. Gilbert	863
Gibson v. Armstrong	161	v. Hulbert	167
v. Bott	551, 915	v. Oxenham	877
v. Crehore	918	v. Ramsey	894
v. Foote	79, 147	v. Warwick	662
v. Jeyes	187, 195, 202	Glasscock v. Glasscock	238
v. Jones	602 t, 602 x, 602 aa, 602 ee, 782	v. Minor	175
v. McCall	720, 748	Glaze v. Drayton	231
v. McCormick	562	Gleaves v. Paine	633
v. Montford	308, 812, 815, 817	Glegg v. Edmondson	869
v. Russell	189, 204, 210	Glen v. Fisher	575, 576, 627
v. Scudmore	605	v. McKim	415, 419, 420
v. Winter	328	Glengall v. Barnard	547
Gibson's Case	240, 277, 780, 918	Glenn v. Hill	869
Giddings v. Giddings	196, 538	v. Randall	126
v. Palmer	82	Glenorchy v. Bosville	357, 359, 369
Gifford v. Hort	856	Glidden v. Taylor	678
v. Manley	260	Glidewell v. Shaugh	126
Gift v. Anderson	602 dd	Glissen v. Ogdin	201
Gilbert v. Bennett	117	Gloucester v. Wood	112, 157
v. Chapin	113, 251	Glover v. Alcott	678
v. Colt	72	v. Hare	648
v. Cooley	602 bb	v. Monckton	815
v. Gilbert	142, 184	Glyn v. Locke	597, 794
v. Lewis	648, 649	Gochenauer v. Froelick	511
v. Overton	101, 102, 105	Goddard v. Carlisle	202
v. Sutliff	918	v. Hapgood	592
Gilbertson v. Gilbertson	908	v. Pomeroy	748
Gilchrist v. Cator	634	v. Snow	213
v. Stevenson	100, 104, 921	Godden v. Crowhurst	386 b, 555
Gill v. Att'y-Gen.	417, 422	Godfrey v. Dixon	64
v. Logan	812	v. Walker	733
v. Lyon	602 ee	Goding, <i>Ex parte</i>	780
Gillbrand v. Alexander	924	Godolphin v. Godolphin	48, 248, 489
v. Goold	582, 772	Godsall v. Webb	102, 105
Gillespie v. Burleson	648, 649	Godwin v. Younge	262
v. Moore	186	Goepp's Appeal	128
v. Smith	591, 774, 779	Going v. Emery	694, 701, 720, 724, 748, 766
v. Somerville	324	Gold v. Death	222
Gillett v. Peppercorne	206	Golding v. Yapp	94
v. Stanley	38	Goldsmid v. Goldsmid	519
v. Wray	514	Goldsmith v. Osborne	602 o, 602 cc
Gillman v. Hamilton	694, 724, 728, 733, 748	Goleborn v. Alcock	218
		Gomez v. Tradesman's Bank	82, 126, 133, 322
		Gomley v. Wood	432, 904
		Goochenaur's Estate	628, 639

	SECTION		SECTION
Good v. Cheesman	593	Gough v. Boulton	256, 863
v. Harris	648, 651	v. Butte	119
v. McPherson	744	v. Crane	110
Goode v. Comfort	769	v. Offley	822
Goodell v. Freed	226	Gould v. Gould	182, 228
Goodenough v. Goodenough	871	v. Harris	918
v. Tremanondo	451	v. Hayes	918
Goodere v. Lloyd	157	v. Hill	648
Goodhill v. Brigham	511 b	v. Lamb	812, 320, 598
Goodhue v. Barnwell	245, 863	v. Okeden	192
v. Clark	476 a, 928	Goulden v. Buckelew	602 ff
Gooding v. Gooding	256	Goulder v. Camm	648
Goodman v. Goodright	879	Gouldsworth v. Knight	412, 413
v. Sayers	185	Gouverneur v. Elmendorf	226
Goodrich v. Downes	591, 592	v. Titus	891
v. Milwaukee	304	Gove v. Brazier	562
v. Pendleton	863	v. Knight	664
v. Proctor	593, 595, 602 g	Govenor v. Gridley	43
Goodright v. Hodges	126, 137, 139, 148	Governesses' Institute v. Rus- bridger	824, 908 a
v. Swymmer	354	Governor, &c. v. Campbell	593
v. Wells	13, 300, 302, 347	Gower v. Eyre	477, 552
Goods of Lady Truro	93	v. Grosvenor	359, 364, 373
Goodson v. Ellison	269, 349, 351, 354, 476 a, 883, 900, 901, 921, 922, 928	v. Mainwaring	19, 20, 255, 507, 510
Goodtitle v. Cummings	218	v. Mead	564
v. Funucan	530	v. Sternes	226
v. Jones	17, 328, 349, 350, 355, 520	Gowing v. Rich	149
v. Knott	308	Gowland v. De Faria	188, 867
v. Woods	379	Grabowski's Settlement	556 a
Goodwin v. Gosnell	846	Grace, <i>Ex parte</i>	196
v. Mix	786	v. Phillips	508
v. Moore	633	v. Webb	555
Goodyear v. Rumbeaugh	676, 677	Gracey v. Davis	594
Gordon v. Adolphus	516	Graff v. Bonnett	386 a, 555
v. Frail	910	v. Castleman	225
v. Gordon	107, 178, 185	v. De Turk	254
v. Green	86	v. Rohrer	143, 144, 162
v. Preston	754	Graham v. Austin	419
v. West	918	v. Birkenhead Railway	870
Gore v. Bowser	260	v. Davidson	418, 419, 863
v. Gibson	191	v. Dyster	243
v. Gore	379	v. Donaldson	141
Gorge v. Chansey	452	v. Fitch	654
Gorge's Case	144, 146	v. Graham	867
Gorham v. Daniels	299	v. King	602 f, 602 bb, 602 ff
Goring v. Bickerstaff	379	v. Lambert	82, 98
v. Nash	107, 108, 111, 367	v. Lee	388
Gort v. Att'y-Gen.	704	v. Little	92, 194, 785
Gosling v. Carter	501, 795, 801, 802, 803, 805, 808	v. Londonderry	532
v. Gosling	389	v. Long	49
Goss v. Cahill	678	v. Maxwell	72
v. Singleton	259, 273, 284, 602 m, 858	v. Pancoast	194
v. Tracy	182	v. Stewart	359
Gossmour v. Pigge	184	v. Torrance	863
Gott v. Cook	391, 508, 620	Gram v. Prussia	737
Gough v. Andrews	579	Granberry v. Granberry	272, 918
		Grandon's Estate	699
		Grange v. Tiving	52
		Granger <i>Ex parte</i>	228
		v. Bassett	545, 556

	SECTION		SECTION
Grangier v. Arden	98	Greedy v. Lavender	629, 633, 903 a
Grant, <i>In re</i>	37	Green, <i>Ex parte</i>	332, 616, 618
v. Campbell	905	v. Allen	713, 721, 781, 748
v. Dyer	518	v. Beatty	330
v. Grant	72, 647	v. Belcher	581
v. Hook	598, 795, 798	v. Borland	286
v. Lunam	256, 507	v. Cook	134
v. Mills	217, 236, 239, 828	v. Crockett	238
v. Quick	72	v. Demoss	238, 239
Grantham v. Hawley	67	v. Dennis	42, 748
Granville v. McNeale	294, 499, 502	v. Drummond	134
Grapengether v. Fejervary	232, 239	v. Ekins	362, 616, 622
Gratwick's Trust, <i>In re</i>	254, 668	v. Folgham	67
Gratz v. Cohen	190	v. Green	322, 672, 784
Gravenor v. Hallam	706	v. Howard	255, 257, 699
Graver's Appeal	891, 894	v. Lowe	560
Graves v. Allen	65	v. Marsden	112, 113
v. Dolphin	386	v. McBeth	511
v. Dugan	133	v. Morris	186
v. Graves	116, 137, 162	v. Morse	600
v. McCall	232, 239	v. Mumford	331
v. Spier	211	v. Otte	636
v. Strahan	266, 453	v. Pigot	480
v. Ward	135	v. Pledger	827
v. White	171	v. Putney	918
Graves's Appeal	463, 468, 471	v. Rutherford	42, 743
Gray, <i>Ex parte</i>	332	v. Scrannage	680
v. Bridgeforth	380	v. Smith	38, 238
v. Chaplin	885	v. Spicer	386, 555
v. Dougherty	892	v. Stephens	372
v. Fox	453, 459	v. Thompson	187, 189
v. Gray	96, 112, 255, 564	v. Trieber	592
v. Haig	440, 821	v. Winter	206, 428, 526, 910, 916
v. Henderson	501	Green's Estate	918
v. Hill	593	Greenfield's Estate	77, 98, 194, 202, 210
v. Howard	602 p, 602 q, 602 r, 602 y	Greenhill v. Willis	438
v. Lynch	343, 459, 914	Greenhouse, <i>Ex parte</i>	275, 733
v. Mansfield	204, 206	Greening v. Fox	918
v. Mathias	214	Greenlaw v. Kent	129
v. Portland Bank	545	Greenleaf v. Queen	602 i, 602 m, 602 p, 602 dd, 780, 782
v. Shaw	774	Greenough v. Welles	248, 500
v. Thompson	468	Greenslade v. Dare	35
v. Ulrich	831	Greenville Academy	42
v. Viers	780	Greenwell v. Greenwell	613, 616, 619
v. Woods	180	Greenwood v. Coleman	312, 320
Gray's Estate	628, 639	v. Roberts	385
Grayburn v. Clarkson	439	v. Wakeford	276, 280, 282, 460, 509, 848, 884, 901, 924
Graydon v. Graydon	518	Greer v. Baughman	137
v. Hicks	513, 518	v. McBeth	783
Greason v. Keteltas	528, 530	Greetham v. Colton	789, 802, 803
Great Eastern Railway Co. v. Turner	65	Greeville v. Browne	570
Great Falls v. Worster	72	Gregg v. Coates	121, 477, 540, 552
Great Luxembourg R. Co. v. Matguay	207, 430	v. Currier	414
Great Northern Railw. Co., <i>Ex parte</i>	455	Gregory v. Gregory	228, 229, 416, 418, 421
Greatly v. Noble	658, 835	v. Henderson	298, 306, 307
Greaves, <i>Ex parte</i>	267	v. Lockyer	663
v. Simpson	358		

	SECTION		SECTION
Gregory v. Marks	689	Grosvenor v. Sherratt	194
Greisley v. Chesterfield	550	Groton v. Ruggles	262
Grenfell v. Dean	69	Grout v. Van Schoonhover	365
v. Girdlestone	866	Grover v. Wakeman	590
Gresley v. Mousley	202, 869	Grovenor v. Day	602 <i>bb</i>
Greswold v. Marsham	347	Groverman v. Diffenderffer	627, 645
Grey v. Grey	54, 126, 143, 145, 146, 147, 151, 161	Groves v. Clark	145
Gridley v. Andrews	569, 570	v. Groves	126, 131, 137, 140, 141
Grierson v. Eyre	871	v. Perkins	185, 645
Grieves v. Case	701	v. Price	438
Grievson v. Kirsopp	248, 249, 250, 258	v. Wright	547
Griffin, <i>Ex parte</i>	404, 411, 417, 441	Grovesnor v. Cartright	464
v. Barney	591, 918	Growing v. Behn	239
v. Blanchard	237	Grumbles v. Grumbles	864
v. Camack	232, 238	Grute v. Locroft	637
v. De Veulle	189, 193	Gubbins v. Creed	427
v. Doe	602 <i>f</i>	Gude v. Worthington	249
v. Graham	384, 700, 724, 731, 748	Guerrant v. Fowler	71
v. Griffin	196, 538	Guerreiro v. Peile	243
v. Macauley	416, 420, 526	Guest v. Farley	299
v. Marine Co.	602 <i>p</i> , 602 <i>v</i> , 782	Guibert's Trust	297
v. Nanson	181	Guiddy's Case	694
Griffith v. Buckle	361	Guild v. Guild	71, 627, 631
v. Chew	244	Guillam v. Holland	584
v. Evans	112, 251	Guion v. Doherty	680
v. Griffith	51, 218, 222, 223, 240, 277, 648	v. Melvin	282
v. Morrison	550	v. Pickett	248, 290, 473
v. Pownall	385	Gullin v. Gullin	630
v. Robins	189, 190, 210	Gullwer v. Wicket	379
v. Spratley	183, 187, 188, 192	v. Ray	324
Griffith Flood's Case	739	Gully v. Cregoe	112, 117
Griffiths v. Cape	748	v. Hall	646
v. Porter	402, 418, 849, 931	Gunn v. Barrow	330
v. Pruen	272	Gunnell v. Whitear	433
v. Ricketts	593	Gunter v. Gunter	348
v. Vanheythuysen	884	v. Thomas	184
v. Vere	395	v. Jones	602 <i>p</i> , 602 <i>v</i>
Grigby v. Cox	654, 667	Guphill v. Isbell	330
v. Hair	238	Guth v. Guth	672, 673
Griggs v. Staples	213	Guthrie v. Gardner	126, 143, 144, 149
Grimes v. Harmon	694, 713, 728, 729, 730	Gutzwiller v. Lackman	596
Grimke v. Grimke	248	Guy v. Dormer	511 <i>c</i>
Grimshaw v. Walker	592	v. Hancock	602 <i>ee</i>
Grimstone, <i>Ex parte</i>	605, 611	v. McIlree	589
Grinell v. Adams	590	Guyer v. Maynard	308, 765
Grisby v. Mousley	229	Guyton v. Shane	411, 900
Grissom v. Hill	737, 748	Gwilliams v. Rowell	121, 414
Griswold v. Chandler	463, 468	Gwinn v. Williams	200
v. Penniman	639	Gwynn v. Heaton	187, 188
v. Perry	784, 785	Gyett v. Williams	570
Groesbeck v. Seeley	126, 136, 142		
Grolick v. Ward	214		
Groom v. Booth	884		
Grooves v. Rush	75		
Groschen v. Page	592		
Gross v. Reddig	678		

H.

Haberdashers' Co. v. Att'y-Gen.	900
Habergham v. Vincent	13, 93, 151, 347, 511 <i>b</i>
Habershon v. Vardon	701, 710
Hackney v. Brooman	86, 99
Haddelsey v. Adams	371
Hadden v. Chorn	748

	SECTION		SECTION
Hadley, <i>In re</i>	272, 291	Hall v. Waterhouse	666
v. Hopkins Academy	700, 743, 744, 748	v. Wilson	918
v. Latimer	189	v. Young	126, 132, 639
v. Pickett	287	Hallack v. Smith	236, 238, 239
Hadow v. Hadow	112, 117, 118, 612, 620	Hallett v. Collins	228, 230
Haffey v. Birchetts	238	v. Hallett	576
Hafner v. Irwin	590, 592	v. Thompson	555, 682
Hagell v. Currie	827	Halliburton v. Leslie	52
Hagler v. McCombs	918	Halliday v. Hudson	151, 152
Hahn v. Pindell	782	v. Overton	357
Haigh v. Kay	85, 162, 165, 226	v. Summerville	571
Haigood v. Wells	618	Halmon's Appeal	900
Haines v. Ellis	645	Halsey v. Halsey	636
v. O'Connor	141	v. Tate	864
Hake v. Fink	639	v. Whitney	592, 593
Halcott v. Morkant	137	Halstead v. Bank of Kentucky	218, 219
Haldenby v. Spofford	768, 877	Haly v. Bannister	395
Hale v. Burrowdale	451	Hamberlin v. Terry	160, 182
v. Horne	152	Hambrooke v. Simmons	87
v. Lamb	107, 110, 111	Hamer v. Tilsley	477, 552
v. Layton	75	Hamersley v. De Biel	208, 368
v. Penn	390	v. Lambert	64
v. Stone	647	v. Smith	310 a, 646, 652, 653
Haley v. Bannister	613, 619	Hamerton v. Whitton	367
v. Bennett	232	Hamet v. Dundass	187
Haleyburton v. Kershaw	562	Hamilton v. Bishop	647, 651
Halford v. Stains	150, 397, 584	v. Buckminster	766
Hall, <i>In re</i>	846	v. Crosby	511 c, 785
v. Bumstead	559	v. Fowlkes	239
v. Carter	416, 421, 578, 580, 584	v. Frye	276, 280
v. Coventry	872	v. Grant	865
v. Culver	490	v. Hector	672
v. Cushing	262, 263, 272, 574	v. Houghton	585, 594, 595, 597, 600
v. Denison	591, 602	v. Lubukee	602 p
v. Dewes	344, 414, 492	v. Mills	626
v. Doran	141, 148	v. Royce	222
v. Franck	412	v. Watson	179
v. Hall	84, 104, 147, 636	v. Wright	197, 427, 904
v. Hallett	202, 894	Hamley v. Gilbert	612, 620
v. Harris	602 dd, 843, 877	Hamlin v. Hamlin	324
v. Hill	632	Hammatt v. Emerson	171
v. Hugonin	633	Hammerston's Case	298
v. Irwin	500	Hammond v. Hammond	459
v. Jones	232, 414	v. Hicks	863
v. Laver	894, 907	v. Messenger	859
v. Lock	884	v. Neame	117, 118, 612, 620
v. Maccubbin	238	v. Walker	826
v. May	294, 340, 495, 505	Hamnett's Appeal	127
v. McLain	639	Hampden v. Hampden	183
v. Palmer	103	v. Miller	232
v. Read	184	v. Rice	704, 748
v. Sayre	649	Hampshire v. Bradley	900
v. Sullivan R.R. Co.	756, 757, 758, 761	Hampson v. Bramwood	901, 903 a
v. Sprigg	126	Hampstead v. Johnson	592
v. Timmons	170, 849	Hampton v. Spencer	82, 84, 85
v. Towne	602 p, 602 v	Hanbury v. Kirkland	261, 417, 418, 419, 466, 509
v. Vanness	129	v. Spooner	272



	SECTION		SECTION.
Hanby v. Roberts	573	Harinckell v. Orndorff	602 n
Hanchett v. Briscoe	669, 850	Harkin v. Darby	432
Hancock v. Minott	562, 571	Harkkader v. Leily	589
v. Titus	127	Harlan v. Brown	788
Hancom v. Allen	444, 455	Harland v. Binks	593
Handick v. Wilkes	361	v. Trigg	112, 113, 116
Handley v. Lyons	232	Harland's Account	918
v. Davies	903 a	Harley v. Harley	626
v. Snodgrass	462, 468	v. Platts	311
Hands v. Hands	250, 258	Harmon v. Carver	602 r
Hane v. Vandeusen	237	Harmood v. Oglander	13, 347, 563, 866, 872
Hanley v. Downing	680, 662	Harnard v. Webster	847
Hannah v. Carrington	602 h, 602 i, 602 m, 602 dd	Harnett v. Maitland	477, 552
v. Hodgson	201	v. McDougall	670
Hanne v. Stevens	881	Harpending v. Dutch Church	45
Hannum v. Spear	598, 795	Harper v. Archer	127
Hanson v. Beverly	799, 808	v. Harper	75
v. Chapman	618	v. Hayes	770, 780
v. Edgerly	179	v. Munday	901
v. First Pres. Church	137	v. Phelps	113, 116, 251, 253
v. Jacks	891	v. Straws	275
v. Keating	633	v. Williams	239
v. Miller	639, 643	Harrington v. Brown	195, 205, 428
v. Worthington	261, 262, 869, 877	v. Duchattel	214
Hapgood v. Perkins	441, 444	Harris v. Amer. Bible Society	715, 748
Happy v. Morton	733	v. Barnett	76, 77, 83
Harbison v. Lemon	191	v. Carter	171
Harcourt v. Harcourt	601	v. Dole	680
v. Knowle	218	v. Fly	569, 570, 576
v. White	869	v. Haines	109
Hardcastle v. Fisher	590, 600	v. Harlan	237
Harden v. Parsons	416, 421, 441, 453, 850	v. Harris	58, 275, 279, 460, 602 aa, 660, 931
Harder v. Harder	126, 137, 138	v. Ingledew	539, 595
Hardin v. Baird	82, 98	v. Martin	918
Harding v. Glyn	112, 248, 249, 250, 251, 256, 258, 699, 714	v. McBane	873
v. Handy	189, 190	v. Mott	654, 656
v. Hardrett	220, 828	v. Norton	221
v. Larned	453, 610	v. Pepperell	186
v. Randall	171	v. Poyner	451, 552
Hardingham v. Nichols	219	v. Pugh	304
Hardman v. Ellamer	219	v. Roop	214
Hardwick v. Mynd	402, 495, 503, 779, 795, 804, 806, 867	v. Slaght	715, 716
v. Vernon	821, 863	v. Sumner	591
Hardy v. Boaz	677	v. Taylor	642
v. Caley	246, 907	v. Tremenhoe	202, 206
v. Call	891	v. Tyson	180
v. Metropolitan Land Co.	444	v. Union Bank	126
v. Reeves	837, 862	v. Williamson	171
v. Simpson	590	Harrisburgh Bank v. Tyler	127, 133, 137, 138
v. Skinner	590, 591	Harrison v. Andrews	640
Hare v. Sherewood	226	v. Asher	929
Harford v. Baker	680	v. Battle	602 j, 602 l, 602 ff
v. Lloyd	835	v. Boswell	862
v. Purrier	122	v. Brolaskey	652, 653, 864
Hargreaves v. Mitchell	601, 863	v. Forth	222
Hargthorpe v. Milforth	421	v. Foster	451

	SECTION		SECTION
Harrison v. Graham	261, 402, 416, 419, 421	Hastings v. Ord	104
v. Guest	187, 195	Hatch v. Hatch	195, 200
v. Gurney	72	v. Smith	585
v. Harrison	94, 248, 251, 255, 379, 380	Hatchell v. Eggleso	633
v. Hollins	855	Hatcher v. Hatcher	232
v. Howard	226	Hatchett v. McNamara	769
v. McMennomy	77	Hatfield v. Montgomery	228
v. Mock	209, 596, 890	Hathorne v. Root	920
v. Naylor	366, 372	Hathornthwaite v. Russell	816, 819
v. Prise	877, 929	Hatton v. Weems	910
v. Randall	476	Haughton v. Haughton	515
v. Rowan	475	Hauser v. Lehman	420, 421
v. Rowley	272	v. Shore	598, 794, 795, 797, 798
v. Stewardson	873, 885	Havers v. Havers	818, 819
v. Thexton	440	Haviland v. Bloom	627
v. Warner	891	v. Myers	631, 632
Harrison's Trusts, <i>Re</i>	275	Hawes v. Wyatt	192
Harrod v. Fountleroy	229	Hawken v. Bourne	486
Harrold v. Lane	126, 129, 206	Hawker v. Hawker	308, 315
Harrop v. Howard	670	Hawkins v. Barney	855
Harshman v. Lowe	588	v. Chapman	814, 866, 869
Hart v. East Union Railway	752	v. Chappell	427, 771
v. McFarland	590	v. Gordon	86
v. Middlehurst	361	v. Hawkins	843
v. Stephens	640	v. Kemp	273, 290, 502, 511 b, 602 p, 800
v. Ten Eyck	847	v. Luscombe	309, 310
v. Tribe	112, 117, 620, 623	v. May	602 f, 602 m, 602 p
Hart's App.	863	v. Obeen	335
Hartga v. Bank of England	242	v. Obin	641
Hartley v. Hurie	310, 649	Hawkin's Appeal	200
Hartman v. Dowdell	640, 641	Hawkin's Trust, <i>In re</i>	272
Hartopp v. Hartopp	201	Hawksley v. Barrow	668
Hartshorne v. Nichols	714	Hawley v. Cramer	195, 197, 202, 205, 228, 480
v. Nicholson	700, 729	v. James	72, 117, 160, 240, 312, 324, 380, 396, 397, 398, 404, 409, 511, 562, 583, 779, 910
Hartwell v. Hartwell	214	v. Ross	282, 341
Hartzell v. Brown	900	Hawtayne v. Bourne	486
Harvard College v. Soc. for Pro- moting Theol. Educa.	724, 735, 739	Hawthorne v. Browne	128
Harvey v. Alexander	109	Haxall v. Shippen	553
v. Ashley	84	Haxton v. Corse	396, 398
v. Aston	512, 514, 515, 517, 518	Hay v. Master	112
v. Cook	185	v. Palmer	556
v. Harvey	451, 532, 614, 616, 647, 885	Hayden v. Bucklin	855
v. Ledbetter	123	v. Stuart	238
v. Mix	589	Haydon v. Stone	863, 865
v. Mount	187, 189, 192	Haye v. Brewer	562
Harwood v. Fisher	640	Hayes, <i>Ex parte</i>	617, 618, 623
v. West	112	v. Bayley	584
Hasell, <i>Ex parte</i>	865	v. Doane	590
v. House	765	v. Goode	229, 863
Haskill v. Freeman	95	v. Hayes	380
Haslen v. Kean	254	v. Heidelberg	596
Hassanclever v. Tucker	570, 571	v. Hollis	139
Hassard v. Rowe	606	v. Horine	232
Hassel v. Hassel	570	v. Jackson	94, 562
Hastings v. Baldwin	602	v. Kershaw	97, 98, 109
v. Belknap	592		

	SECTION		SECTION
Hayes v. Kindersley	146, 147	Hedges v. Ricker	528, 769
v. Kingdome	136, 146, 151,	Hefferman v. Addams	511 c
v. Otelly	161	Heighington v. Grant	471, 902
v. Tabor	921	Heighton v. Grant	903 a
v. Ward	299	Heilner v. Imbrie	218
Hayne v. Hayne	72, 210	Heist v. Baker	232
Haynes v. Forshaw	183	Helan v. Russell	701
v. Redington	809, 811	Heltensteine v. Garrard	299
Haynesworth v. Cox	455	Hellegas v. Hellegas	602 t
Hays v. Quay	511 a	Hellman's Will	927
Hayter v. Trego	82, 139	Helmey v. Heitcamp	602 ff
Hayton v. Wolfe	722, 731	Helms v. Franciscus	627, 631, 636,
Hayward v. Cope	264		645
v. Hayward	179	Hem v. Rushowski	602 bb
v. Ovey	639, 642, 644	Hemmer v. Cooper	173
Haywood v. Craven	878	Hemmings v. Muncly	514, 515, 517
v. Ensley	748	Hemingway v. Mathews	640
Hazard v. Irwin	75	Hempfield R.R. Co. v. Thornbury	232
Hazel v. Hogan	171	Hemphill's Appeal	440, 456, 459, 460,
v. Woods	505		465, 918
Heacock v. Coatesworth	505	Estate	918
v. Fly	135	Hempstead v. Hempstead	126
Head v. Egerton	184	Henchman v. Att'y-Gen.	329
v. Head	219	Henderson v. Atkins	576
v. Providence Ins. Co.	672, 673	v. Burton	232
v. Teynham	44	v. Cross	152
Heager's Ex'rs	878	v. Downing	590, 591
Healey, <i>In re</i>	538	v. Henderson	100
Healy v. Alston	636	v. Hunter	312, 744, 748
v. Rowan	347	v. Hoke	126, 133
Heap v. Tongue	34	v. Kennicott	580
Heard v. Eldredge	185	v. McIver	912
Heardson v. Williamson	545, 918	v. Vaulx	541
Hearle v. Botelers	312, 317	v. Warmack	127
v. Greenbank	239	Henderson's Appeal	589
Hearn v. Crutcher	33, 48, 52, 324,	Hendley v. Westmeath	672
v. Hearn	489, 615	Hendrick v. Hopkins	191
Hearns v. Savage	602	Hendricks v. Robinson	428
Heath v. Bishop	843	Hendrickson v. Decow	730, 733
v. Erie R.R. Co.	918	Hengst's Appeal	416, 417
v. Heath	555	Henkle v. Royal Ins. Co.	226
v. Henly	876, 877	Henley v. Axe	188
v. Knapp	628, 632	v. Cook	185
v. Lears	863	v. Phillips	900
v. Lewis	336, 337	v. Stone	873
v. Page	555	Hennessy's Estate	154
v. Percival	516	Hennessey v. Bray	265, 846
Heathcote v. Hulme	129	v. Western	591, 592, 599
v. Paignon	878	Henry v. Dilley	676
Heathman v. Hall	468, 470	v. Morgan	222, 330
Heatley v. Finster	187	v. Raiman	202
v. Thomas	647, 648	v. Smith	660
Heaton, <i>Ex parte</i>	221	Henry County v. Winnebago	230,
Matter of	657, 662		728
v. Hassell	454	Henshaw v. Morpeth	694
v. Marriott	610	v. Sumner	586
Hebblethwait v. Cartwright	635	Hensman v. Hackney	724
Heck v. Clippenger	416	Henson v. Kinard	98
Heckert's Appeal	578	Hentley v. Thomas	511 b
	647, 648, 651	Henvell v. Whittaker	570
	918	Hepburn v. Dunlop	173

	SECTION		SECTION
Hepburn v. Snyder	232	Higginson v. Barneby	275
Hepburn's Appeal	652, 899	High v. Batte	218, 221, 239
Herbergham v. Vincent	92	Highway v. Bauner	362
Herbert v. Blunden	359	Hildreth v. Eliot	104
v. Hanrick	782	Hileman v. Bouslaugh	358
v. Lownes	182	Hill, <i>Ex parte</i>	207, 555
v. Scofield	232	v. Anderson	53
v. Smith	195	v. Atkinson	480
Hercy v. Dinwoody	867, 869	v. Brown	431
Hereford v. Adams	698, 699, 725	v. Buckley	770
v. Ravenhill	461	v. Burns	705, 724
Heriot's Hospital v. Ross	744, 907, 910, 914	v. Chapman	614
Hermstead's Appeal	918	v. Cook	152
Herndon v. Pratt	858	v. Davis	426
Herne v. Meeres	187, 195, 428	v. Edmonds	633
Heron v. Heron	187, 201	v. Fogg	242
Herr's Appeal	647	v. Gomme	846
Estate	195, 428	v. Gray	173
Hertell v. Bogert	225, 814	v. Hill	87, 94, 375, 627, 645, 767
Hervey v. Audland	111	v. Josselyn	411
Hess's Est.	468	v. London	116, 151, 152, 158
Hester v. Hester	602 v. 500, 894	v. Magan	891, 907
v. Wilkinson	438, 439, 618	v. Manchester Water Works	752
Heth v. Richmond	458, 836, 847	v. Morgan	747, 891
Heugh v. Jones	680	v. Paul	69
Heuser v. Harris	699, 748	v. Pine River Bank	143
Hewes v. Dehon	562, 566	v. Reardon	70
Hewett v. Foster	419, 424, 902	v. Simpson	225, 810, 811, 814, 815
v. Hewett	249, 255, 492	v. Tierney	845
v. Watton	693	v. Walker	481
Hewit v. Hewit	508, 510	Hillary v. Waller	349, 351, 352, 354, 866, 867
Hewitt v. Crane	201	Hilleglass v. Hilleglass	782
v. Loosemore	236	Hilliard, <i>Ex parte</i>	463, 464
v. Morris	550, 551	Hillier v. Jones	578
Heyer v. Burger	674	Hillman v. Westwood	286
Heysham v. Heysham	614	Hilton v. Girard	86
Heyter v. Trego	729	v. Kenworthy	308
Heywood v. Buffalo	660	Hillyard v. Miller	398, 399, 738, 748, 765
Hibbard v. Lamb	19, 275, 497, 503, 504, 721	Hillyer v. Bennett	53
Hibbert v. Cook	477, 552, 913	Hinchel v. Daley	905
v. Hibbert	128, 907	Hinchenbroke v. Seymour	511 a
Hichens v. Kelly	873	Hinchmal v. Emans	184
Hickens v. Congreve	885	Hinckley v. Maclaerns	257
Hickey v. Burt	330	Hind v. Poole	414, 495
v. Young	137	v. Selly	451
Hickley v. Farmers', &c., Bank	585	Hinds v. Mooers	602 n
Hicklins v. Boyer	552	Hind's Estate	639
Hicks v. Hicks	851	Hinde v. Blake	585, 593, 826, 827
v. Sallitt	871, 872	Hindman v. Dill	590, 591
v. Wrench	899	Hindmarsh v. Southgate	53
Hickson v. Fitzgerald	271, 898	Hindson v. Weatherill	199, 202
Hidden v. Hidden	448	Hines v. Spruill	559
v. Jordon	75, 134	Hinkle v. Wanzer	68
Hide v. Haywood	900, 910	Hinney v. Phillips	679
Hieronymous v. Mayhall	861	Hinnings v. Hinnings	930
Higbee v. Rice	302	Hinton, <i>Ex parte</i>	888
Higginbottom v. Hulme	555	v. Hinton	192, 322
v. Peyton	86		
Higgins v. Joyce	178		

	SECTION		SECTION
Hinton v. Kennedy	456	Holden v. Crawford	137
Hintze v. Stingel	781	Holder v. Durbin	277, 287
Hinves v. Hinves	450, 451, 554	v. Nunnelley	137
Hinxman v. Poynder	112	Holdridge v. Gillespie	588
Hipkins v. Bernard	918	Holdsworth v. Goose	784
Hipp v. Hutchell	602 e	Holford v. Phipps	901, 921
Hitch v. Leworthy	408, 508	v. Wood	571
Hitchcock v. Bank of United States	263	Holgate v. Hayworth	900
Hitchens v. Hitchens	317	v. Jennings	451, 551
Hite v. Hite	229, 575, 918	Holland v. Baker	873, 874, 885
Hitner's Appeal	672	v. Holland	260
Hoag v. Kenney	250	v. Hughes	467
Hoare v. Hoare	672	v. Peck	713, 724, 748
v. Osborne	706, 714	Holland's Case	17
v. Parker	542	Hollenbeck v. Pixley	672
v. Peck	862	Holliday v. Coleman	541
Hoare's Case	486	Hollinshed v. Allen	82
Hobart v. Andrews	595	Hollis v. Hollis	126
v. Suffolk	152, 153	Hollis's Case	863
Hobday v. Peters	203, 440, 845, 848, 849	Hollis-street Meeting House v. Pierpont	734
Hobbs v. Hull	672	Holloway v. Headington	170, 108, 367
v. Parker	175	Holman, <i>Ex parte</i>	352
Hobson v. Bell	602 o, 786	v. Loynes	202
v. Blackburn	573	Holman's Appeal	562
v. Staneer	873	Holme v. Williams	768
v. Trevor	68, 872	Holmes v. Bell	883
Hockenbury v. Carlisle	202	v. Campbell	129
Hockley v. Bantock	469	v. Coghill	108, 511 b
v. Mawley	250, 251	v. Dring	453, 621
Hodgdon v. Shannon	275	v. Fresh	187
Hodge v. Attorney-General	40	v. Joslin	618
v. Hawkins	471, 472, 918	v. Lysight	514
v. Wyatt	590	v. Mead	748
Hodgens v. Hodgens	636	v. Mitchell	546
Hodges v. Blagrove	786	v. Penney	386 b
v. Cobb	678	v. Stone	218
v. New England Screw Co.	207	Holroyd v. Marshall	68
Hodgson v. Bibby	850	Holt v. Hogan	254
v. Bussey	363	v. Holt	129, 196, 538
v. Hodgson	613	Homan v. Hague	886
Hodgson's Settlement	297	Home v. Patrick	654
Hodkinson v. Quinn	802, 803	Homer v. Homer	82, 127
Hodle v. Healey	862	v. Shelton	547
Hodson v. Ball	385	Hone v. Van Schaick	380
Hoes v. Van Hoesen	569, 571	Honner v. Morton	626, 639
Hoffman v. Anthony	602 q	Honor v. Honor	361, 362
v. Canow	128	Honore v. Bakewell	237, 238, 239
Hogan v. Jaques	162	v. Bridport	606
v. Lepretre	602 k	v. Hutchins	133
v. Staghorn	150	Hood v. Clapham	451, 467, 931
v. Wyman	58	v. Fahnestock	217, 222
Hoge v. Hoge	181, 185, 206	v. Oglander	113, 116, 386
Hoghton v. Hoghton	185, 194, 201	v. Phillips	348
Holbrook v. Allen	585	Hook v. Dyer	341, 464
v. Comstock	672	v. Dundas	512, 555
v. Waters	629, 642	v. Kinnear	874
Holcomb v. Coryell	275	Hooper v. Eyles	137
v. Holcomb	411, 419, 510, 910	v. Holmes	86
		v. Hooper	393, 737

	SECTION		SECTION
Hooper v. Rossitter	544, 545	Hosea v. Jacobs	881, 748
v. Savage	462	Hosford v. Merwin	98
v. Scheimer	328	Hosking v. Nichols	468, 887
v. Tuckerman	590	Hotchkiss v. Gallatin Turnpike	588
Hoot v. Sorrell	664	Hotchkiss v. Fortson	191
Hoover v. Hoover	571, 796	Hotz's Estate	514
v. Samaritan Society	667	Houck v. Houck	501
Hope v. Carnegie	71	Hough, <i>In re</i>	309
v. Clifden	580	v. Blythe	685
v. Fox	889	v. Richardson	171, 173, 174, 175, 228
v. Gloucester	869	Hougham v. Sandys	511 c, 785
v. Harman	108	Houghton, <i>Ex parte</i>	126, 130, 131
v. Hayley	68	v. Davis	595
v. Hope	603	v. Hapgood	324
v. Johnson	308	House v. Way	449
v. Liddell	245, 337, 806, 846	Houston v. Embry	649, 651
v. Stone	246 a	v. Nowland	593
Hopkins v. Hopkins	151, 299, 301, 304, 308, 385, 863	Hovenden v. Annesley	40, 228, 229, 325, 855, 857, 858, 861, 862, 865
v. Myall	460, 467, 655	Hovey v. Blakeman	417, 421, 422, 423, 670
v. Ray	590	v. Blanchard	222
v. Turnpike Co.	31	How v. Bishop	142
v. Upshur	748	v. Camp	216, 585
v. Ward	17, 328	v. Godfrey	904, 910
Hopkinson v. Burghly	821	v. Hutch	299
v. Dumas	126, 322, 347	v. Sherewood	226
v. Ellis	903 a	v. Weldon	171, 187, 188
v. Roe	912	Howard v. Aiken	863
Hopper v. Adee	414	v. American Peace So- ciety	262, 699, 724, 748
v. Conyers	837, 839, 842	v. Ames	602 o
Hoppes v. Check	770	v. Chaffers	576, 805
Hora v. Hora	118	v. Digby	665
Hord v. Hord	632	v. Duncom	787
Horde v. Suffolk	705, 712	v. Edgell	187
Hore v. Beecher	184, 633	v. Gilbert	282, 881
v. Wouffe	639	v. Hatch	602 r
Horn v. Barton	767	v. Hooker	213, 653
v. Horn	796	v. Jemmet	837
Hornbeck v. American Bible So- ciety	730	v. Moffatt	545
Horne v. Barton	361, 371, 375	v. Morton	627
v. Lyeth	359, 370	v. Papera	816, 818, 819
Horner v. Swann	765	v. Rhodes	276, 280, 282, 283, 901
Horney v. Askham	511 a	v. Savings Bank	98
Hornsby v. Lee	639	v. Thornton	402
Horrey v. Glover	540, 546, 547	v. Waters	275
Horrock v. Ledsam	878, 892	v. Whitfield	495
Horseley v. Chaloner	171, 443	Howard Ins. Co. v. Halsey	222
v. Fawcett	884	Howarth v. Mills	66
Horsey v. Hough	187, 602 z	Howden v. Haight	212
Horsfall, <i>In re</i>	837	v. Rogers	72
Horton v. Brocklehurst	440, 821	Howe, <i>In matter of</i>	43, 44
v. Horner	238	v. Dartmouth	440, 444, 450, 455, 467, 541, 547, 548, 549, 848
v. Horton	309, 310	v. Freeman	759
v. Riley	212	v. Howe	126, 450, 451, 547
v. Sledge	299	v. Medcraft	572
v. Smith	347, 348	v. School District	734
Hortopp v. Hortopp	172		
Horwitz v. Norris	254		
Horwood v. West	112		
Hosack v. Rogers	593, 826, 894, 918		

	SECTION		SECTION
Howe v. Waldron	920	Hughson v. Mandeville	218
Howell v. Ashmore	218	Huguenin v. Baseley	104, 171, 181, 184, 187, 189, 192, 204, 206, 210, 211, 511 a
v. Baker	135	Hulkes v. Barrow	532, 533
v. Barnes	493, 765	Hull v. Hull	397, 398
v. Edgar	592	Hullman v. Honcomp	707, 748
v. Hanforth	556	Hulls v. Jeffrey	586
v. Howell	126, 362, 541, 633, 865, 872	Hulme v. Hulme	285, 286, 402
v. Price	564	v. Tenant	654, 655, 657, 662, 670
v. Ransom	202	Hulse v. Wright	594
v. Whitchurch	182	Humberstone v. Chase	242, 875
Hower v. Geesaman	330	v. Humberstone	376, 383, 390
Howgrave v. Cartier	580	Humbert v. Trinity Church	45, 855
Howman v. Currie	640	Humble v. Bill	796, 809, 815
Howorth v. Dewell	116	Hume v. Richardson	551
Howse v. Chapman	704, 903 a	Hummer v. Schott	232
Hoxie v. Carr	126, 137, 814	Humph v. Morse	892
v. Hoxie	121	Humphrey v. Richards	664, 667
Hoy v. Master	113, 115	Humphrey v. Hollis	874
Hoyle v. Jones	861	v. Morse	269
v. Stowe	530	Hungate v. Hungate	126
Hoyt v. Hilton	624	Hungerford v. Earle	590
Hubbard v. Fisher	918	Hunnewell v. Lane	86
v. German Cath. Cong.	730, 768	Hunt v. Ball	602 o
v. Goodwin	64, 131	v. Bass	205, 602 v, 602 ee, 771
v. Lloyd	263, 574	v. Bateman	558
v. Young	451	v. Booth	647
Hubbell v. Hubbell	876	v. Bullock	759
v. Medbury	864	v. Crawford	328
Hubble v. Osborne	147	v. Fisher	786 a
Huckabee v. Billingsly	498, 602 k, 921	v. Hamilton	182
Hudson v. Carmichael	667	v. Holden	500
v. Hudson	205, 414, 425, 863	v. Hunt	299, 347, 672
v. Maze	590, 600	v. Mathews	183, 208, 213
v. Wadsworth	541	v. Moore	140, 171, 189
Huff, <i>Ex parte</i>	461	v. Peacock	882
v. Earle	602 v	v. Rousmaniere	184, 226, 499
v. Wright	684	v. Scott	451
Huger v. Huger	610, 780	v. Townshend	783
Hugh v. Smith	471	v. Watkins	546
Hughes, <i>Ex parte</i>	209, 285	Hunter v. Atkins	190, 195, 202, 210
v. Caldwell	336	v. Baxter	481
v. Edwards	55, 226, 228	v. Gibson	282
v. Empson	489, 462	v. Hallett	639
v. Evans	150, 158, 159	v. Hubbard	864
v. Garner	220	v. Hunter	98
v. Garth	219	v. Lawrence	225
v. Hall	71	v. Marlboro'	187
v. Hughes	612, 613	v. Simrall	219, 221
v. Kearney	232, 235, 236	v. Stembridge	112, 117
v. Key	884, 888	Hunter's Will	182
v. Mills	669	Huntington v. Huntington	621
v. Peters	681	Huntley v. Buckner	602 aa
v. Turner	511 c	Huntly v. Huntly	38, 95, 240, 674, 863
v. Wells	40, 240, 325, 667	Hunton v. Davies	869
v. Williams	243	Hurd v. Silsbee	592
v. Wynne	600, 601	Hurley, <i>Ex parte</i>	780
Hughlett v. Hughlett	418, 426	Hurst v. McNeil	77, 299, 301
Hughson v. Cookson	882		

	SECTION		SECTION
Husband v. Davis	412	Inge v. Forrester	651
v. Pollard	111	Ingersoll v. Cooper	330
Huskisson v. Bridge	112, 115	Ingle v. Partridge	402, 443, 445, 827
Hussey, <i>Ex parte</i>	282	Inglefield v. Coghlan	648
v. Markham	271, 503	Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbor	46, 47, 709, 722, 730, 731, 736, 748
Huston v. Cassidy	205	Ingraham v. Baldwin	33
Hutcheson v. Hammond	160, 476, 480, 574, 915	v. Meade	251
Hutchins v. Baldwin	499	v. Wheeler	592
v. Colby	678	Ingram v. Kirkpatrick	900, 918
v. Heywood	142, 165, 298, 299, 301, 305	Inloes v. American Exchange Bank	592
v. Lee	82, 86, 151, 162, 226	Insurance Company v. Smith	330
v. State Bank	814	Inwood v. Twyne	476, 605, 915
Hutchings v. Smith	641	Iorr v. Hodges	311
Hutchinson v. Brown	175, 191	Irby v. Irby	474
v. Hutchinson	127, 256, 258	Iredell v. Langston	915
v. Lord	590	Irnham v. Child	76, 226
v. Morritt	427	Irvine v. Campbell	232
v. Patrick	239	v. Irvine	38
v. Reid	877	v. Kirkpatrick	173, 180
v. Tindall	76, 79, 82, 85, 162, 189, 191	v. Robertson	228
v. Townsend	882	v. Sullivan	112
v. Underwood	680	Irving v. De Kay	894, 903 a
Hutt v. Fletcher	869	Irwin v. Keen	590, 600
Hutton v. Duey	672, 673	v. Rogers	900
v. Simpson	871	Irwin's Appeal	416
v. Weems	476, 915	Isaac v. Defriez	256, 699
Huyler v. Kingsland	766	v. Gompertz	718
Hyde v. Price	672, 674	Isaacs v. Weatherstone	824
v. Warren	602 c, 602 g, 602 h	Isabella Denby, <i>In re</i>	272
Hylton v. Hylton	195, 200, 851	Isham v. Delaware, &c., R.R. Co.	771
Hyman v. Devereux	602 g, 602 ee	Isherwood v. Oldknow	529
Hyndman v. Hyndman	602 v	Ithell v. Beane	367, 795, 796
Hynshaw v. Morpeth	700	Ives v. Allyn	93
Hyslop v. Clarke	592	v. Davenport	786 a

## I.

Iddings v. Bruen	199, 428, 853
Idle v. Cook	312
Iglehart v. Armiger	234, 238
Ihmsen's Appeal	459, 460, 469
Ilminster School, <i>In re</i>	733
Imboden v. Atkinson	199
Imlay v. Huntington	359, 365, 655, 660
Imperial Mer. Cred. Ass'n v. Coleman	207
Inches v. Hill	920
Inchiquin v. French	86, 93, 566
Inclendon v. Northcote	616, 633
Incorporated Society v. Price	724, 729
v. Richards	694, 733, 745
Indianapolis v. Grand Master	705, 710, 748
Inge, <i>Ex parte</i>	743

## J.

Jackman v. Hallock	238
v. Ringland	126, 134, 135
Jackson v. Bateman	132
v. Billinger	380
v. Blount	602 d
v. Bowen	602 bb
v. Brown	754
v. Burr	765
v. Burtes	499
v. Cadwell	162, 221, 299
v. Calden	602 v
v. Cary	299
v. Cator	226
v. Clark	602 t, 602 u, 602 aa
v. Cleveland	162
v. Cornell	599
v. Delancy	336
v. Dunsbagh	299



	SECTION		SECTION
Jackson v. Dutton	165	James v. Greaves	171
v. Feller	139, 144	v. Holmes	127, 210
v. Ferris	499	v. Johnson	347
v. Fish	298, 299, 312	v. Mayrant	661
v. Forrest	142	v. Morey	347
v. Garnsey	162	v. Morgan	187
v. Given	499	James's App.	262
v. Hampton	602 f	Jameson v. Shelly	463, 468
v. Hartwell	42, 43, 44	v. Smith	308
v. Haworth	654	Jamison v. Brady	51, 277, 647, 648
v. Hobhouse	670	v. Lindsey	891
v. Hurlack	162	Jane v. Kennedy	768
v. Jackson	136, 606, 612, 918	Janey v. Latane	748
v. Jansen	783, 785	Jansen v. Ostrander	43
v. Leek	222	January v. Poyntz	468
v. Lignon	783	Jaques v. Methodist Church	667
v. Matsdorf	126, 143	Jarmon v. Wilkinson	660
v. Mills	126	Jarnagan v. Conway	254
v. Moore	82, 83, 180, 133, 349, 351	Jarvis v. Duke	171
v. Morse	126	v. Prentice	648
v. Myers	299	Jasper v. Howard	651
v. Parker	591	Jaudon v. National City Bank	814
v. Pierce	349	Jay v. Long Island R.R.	684
v. Phillips	690, 694, 697, 700, 701, 705, 709, 710, 715, 719, 724, 728, 748	Jeafferson's Trusts, <i>In re</i>	256
v. Potters	500	Jeans v. Cooke	147
v. Robins	315	Jecko v. Lansing	251
v. Root	299	Jee v. Audley	385
v. Rowe	219	v. Thurlow	672
v. Sackett	866	Jefferies v. Harrison	892
v. Schaubert	308, 765	Jeffersonville Assoc. v. Fisher	602 v
v. Sharp	222	Jefferys v. Jefferys	97, 107, 108, 111, 162, 367
v. Sternberg	126	v. Marshall	900
v. Sublett	633	Jeffreys v. Small	136
v. Welch	196, 869	Jeffries v. Lawson	426
v. West	660	Jemmit v. Verrel	705, 712
v. Winslow	222	Jencks v. Alexander	142, 144, 149, 602 l, 602 o, 602 g, 602 s, 602 x
v. Woods	126	Jenckes v. Cook	215
v. Woolly	474	Jenison v. Groves	126, 137
Jackson's Case	828	Jenks v. Backhouse	343
Jacob v. Lucas	414, 438, 505, 848, 884	Jenkins, <i>In re</i>	639, 642
Jacobs v. Amyatt	634, 636, 649	<i>Ex parte</i>	17
v. Lake	231	v. Eldredge	81, 173, 181, 206, 226, 918
v. Pou	863	v. Fickling	432
Jacomb v. Harwood	225	v. Frink	126, 127, 129
Jacot v. Corbett	592	v. Hiles	597, 802
v. Emmett	463, 468	v. Jenkins	314
Jacques v. Hall	81	v. Jones	782, 816
Jail v. Mills	248	v. Milford	329
James, <i>Ex parte</i>	197, 907	v. Pye	188, 201
v. Allen	159, 711, 712	v. Robertson	260, 847, 876
v. Bird	235	v. Row	761
v. Dean	195, 538	v. Walter	463
v. Everly	685	Jenner v. Hooper	739
v. Frearson	261, 262, 267, 419	Jenness v. Howard	191
v. Gibbs	602 ee, 627, 642	Jennings v. Broughton	230
		v. Davis	262, 639, 678
		v. Moore	217
		v. Selleck	144, 151

	SECTION		SECTION
Jennison v. Hapgood	195, 205	Johnson v. Matsdorf	146, 147
Jenny v. Gray	676, 678, 681	v. Mayne	748
Jenour v. Jenour	903 a	v. Medlicott	191
Jernegan v. Baxter	630	v. Milksopp	564
Jerrard v. Saunders	218	v. Miller	471
Jervis v. Wolferstan	932	v. Moore	551
Jervoise v. Duke	511, 515	v. Newton	443, 446, 462, 463
v. Northumberland	357, 359, 360, 366, 372, 390	v. Prendergast	462
v. Silk	614, 615	v. Quarles	126
Jesse v. Barnett	884	v. Richey	847
Jessup v. Hulse	590	v. Ronald	79
Jesus' College v. Bloom	871	v. Rowlands	112
Jesus' College Case	700	v. Runyan	677
Jevon v. Bush	17, 54, 482	v. Simpson	275
Jewett, <i>Ex parte</i>	610	v. Smith	34, 855, 863
v. Davis	685	v. Swire	845
v. Miller	205	v. Telford	910
v. Palmer	221	v. Thweatt	590
v. Woodward	596, 894, 918	v. Turner	602 s, 602 bb
Jewson v. Moulson	239, 629, 632, 633, 636, 641	v. Vail	678
Jodrell v. Jodrell	32, 118, 185, 620, 672	v. Webster	347, 348
Joel v. Mills	388, 555	v. Williams	602 y, 602 ee
John v. Bennett	197	Johnson's Appeal	262, 459, 817
Johnes v. Lockhart	648, 649	Johnston v. Eason	771, 787
Johns v. Sergeant	779	v. Johnston	679
Johnson, <i>Ex parte</i>	457	v. Swan	704, 705, 712
v. Aston	826	v. Todd	903 a
v. Ball	93	Johnstone v. Baker	773
v. Barber	427	v. Lumb	668
v. Beattie	603	Joice v. Taylor	171
v. Bennett	195, 205	Joliffe, <i>Ex parte</i>	929
v. Blackman	195	v. East	903 a
v. Bridgewater Co.	545, 556	v. Jolland	432
v. Cary	301	Jollands v. Burdett	670, 671
v. Cawthorn	239	Jones, <i>In re</i>	280, 401, 929
v. Chisson	686	v. Bradley	157
v. Clark	602 d	v. Bush	301
v. Clarkson	93, 160, 715	v. Cole	330
v. Currin	380	v. Dawson	552, 554, 602 v, 910, 913
v. Delaney	82	v. Dougherty	275, 818
v. Dorsey	602 s, 782	v. Foxall	468, 470, 471
v. Dougherty	126, 137	v. Geddes	72
v. Eason	602 o, 602 g, 602 u, 602 x, 602 ee	v. Gibbons	438, 633
v. Fesemeyer	202	v. Goodchild	157, 434
v. Freeth	671	v. Greatwood	117
v. Gallagher	658, 659, 663	v. Harris	659, 662
v. Glasscock	182	v. Higgins	365, 849
v. Harvey	591	v. Jones	218, 330, 580, 766, 876
v. Henry	602 ee	v. Kearney	170, 196
v. Humphrey	863	v. Langton	361
v. Johnson	144, 160, 200, 225, 299, 421, 449, 544, 545, 639, 641, 851, 921	v. Lewis	407, 441, 443, 457, 520, 900, 901, 914
v. Kelly	160	v. Lock	97, 99
v. Kennett	597, 795, 796, 801, 802	v. Lord Saye and Seale	301, 305, 308, 810
v. Lewis	847	v. Maggs	397, 584
v. Longmire	748	v. McKee	181
		v. Miller	380
		v. Mitchell	160
		v. Morgan	347, 358, 85

	SECTION		SECTION
Jones v. Morley	108	Judd v. Moseley	226
v. Morrall	468	Judge v. Boozey	780
v. Nabbe	86	v. Wilkins	187
v. Neale	602 z	Judice v. Prevost	264
v. Obincham	95, 100, 103, 109	Judson v. Corcoran	438
v. Parsons	863	v. Gibbons	259, 261, 262, 270
v. Powell	474, 538, 918	v. National City Bank	225
v. Powles	218, 219	Juler v. Juler	94
v. Price	492, 505, 597, 795	Julian v. Reynolds	195, 205
v. Reeder	212	Junction Railw. v. Ruggles	754, 758
v. Ricketts	188	Justices v. Haygood	891
v. Roberts	203	Justin v. Wynne	829
v. Salter	652, 653, 671	Juvenal v. Jackson	221
v. Scott	558, 559, 601	Juzan v. Toulmin	175, 187, 230
v. Selby	569		
v. Shaddock	217, 334, 828	K.	
v. Sherrard	554	Kahn v. Gunherts	212
v. Slubey	82, 85	Kampf v. Jones	380, 390
v. Smith	428, 814	Kane, In re	612
v. Stanley	221	v. Bloodgood	228, 855, 863, 864
v. Stockett	268, 274, 280, 901,	Kane County v. Herrington	227, 246 a
	918	Kantowitz v. Prater	680
v. Strong	330	Karr v. Karr	471, 472
v. Suffolk	518	Kates v. Burton	507
v. Torin	248, 250, 251	Kator v. Pembroke	828
v. Tripp	209	Kauffelt v. Bower	232
v. Tucker	511 c	Kaufman v. Crawford	458, 607, 836,
v. Turberville	866		842
v. Ward	468	Kay v. Crook	208
v. Waste	672	v. Scates	299
v. Whitebread	591	v. Smith	851
v. Williams	697, 704, 724,	Kaye, In re	51, 275
	814	v. Powell	549
v. Winwood	784	Keane v. Robarts	246, 403, 789, 809,
v. Zollicoffer	218		810, 811, 907
Jones's Appeal	404, 415, 416, 417,	Kearnan v. Fitzsimon	260
	418, 420, 421, 501	Kearney v. Kearney	476 a
Case	918	Kearsley v. Woodcock	386 b, 388, 555
Joor v. Hodges	303	Keates v. Burton	508, 510
v. Williams	610, 828	v. Cadogan	173, 179
Jordan v. Holkam	516	Keating v. Keating	769
v. Hudson	238	Keaton v. Cobb	132, 144
v. Jordan	843	v. Greenwood	863
v. Money	208	v. McGwier	864
v. Roach	380, 392	v. Scott	680
Jorden v. Morey	870	Kebble, Ex parte	616, 619
Jordon v. Hunt	468	Keble v. Thompson	419, 453
Jortin, Ex parte	725	Kee v. Kee	918
Josling v. Karr	881	v. Vasser	664
Josselyn v. Josselyn	615	Keech v. Sandford	196, 538
Jowitt v. Lewis	754	Keefer v. Schwartz	511 c
Joy v. Campbell	404, 419, 421, 828,	Keeler v. Keeler	894
	837	Keen v. Walbank	315
v. J. & M. Plank R. Co.	754	Keene v. Deardon	305, 307, 309, 315,
Joyce v. Gunnels	282, 540		349, 353, 354
v. Hutton	108	Keep v. Sanderson	590
v. Joyce	277, 287	Keiley v. Keily	511 a
Joyner v. Conyers	810	Keily v. Fowler	379
Jubber v. Jubber	112, 117, 620	v. Monck	515
Judah v. Judd	438		
Judd v. Haseley	137		

	SECTION		SECTION
Keisselbrock v. Livingston	226	Keogh v. Cathcart	654
Keith v. Horner	238	Keon v. Magawley	787, 874
Kekewich v. Manning	68, 98, 101, 102, 104, 105, 111, 438	Kep v. Bank of New York	58
Kellaway v. Johnson	460, 467, 509, 847, 849	Ker v. Buxton	624, 672
Keller v. Auble	211	v. Snead	471
v. Nutz	241	Kerlin v. Campbell	151, 158
v. Ruiz	680	Kern v. Hazlerigg	238
Kellett v. Kellett	151	Kerr v. Day	38, 231
v. Rathbun	463, 468	v. Dungannon	195, 206, 380
Kelley v. Babcock	82, 594	v. Kirkpatrick	421
v. Jenness	126, 130, 182, 246 a	v. Laird	463
Kellogg v. Carrico	774	v. Verner	248, 473
v. Slauson	590	v. Water	421
v. Wood	126	Ketchum v. Ketchum	891
Kellogg's Case	918	Ketrick v. Barnsly	182
Kellum v. Smith	215	Kettle v. Hammond	587
Kelly v. Drew	678	Kettleby v. Atwood	367
v. Johnson	126, 133	Kevan v. Branch	591, 592
v. Lank	591	Keyes v. Wood	602 n
Kelsal v. Bennett	219	Keyser's App.	304
Kelsey v. Western	562	Kiah v. Grenier	371, 391
Kelso v. Tabor	660	Kibbee v. Hamilton Ins. Co.	172
Kemp v. Burn	900	Kibbett v. Lee	511 b
v. Burr	821	Kiddill v. Farnell	100, 929
v. Kemp	8, 251, 507, 570, 511	Kildney v. Coussmaker	556, 570, 867, 872
v. McPherson	576, 796	Kightley v. Kightley	569
Kempf v. James	888	Kilbee v. Sneyd	402, 403, 422, 424, 445, 851, 914
Kempton v. Packman	190	Kildare v. Eustace	40, 71
Kenan v. Hall	471	Killam v. Allen	313, 393, 398
v. Paul	918	Killar v. Beclor	639
Kendall v. Granger	159, 711	Killeran v. Brown	226
v. Mann	126, 133	Killett v. Killett	151, 152, 154
v. Micfeild	13	Killick, <i>Ex parte</i>	648
v. New England, &c.	918	v. Flexney	196, 538
Kenge v. Delavall	662	Kilpatrick v. Johnson	396, 398, 738
Kennedy v. Daley	122, 216, 433, 828, 850, 863	v. Kilpatrick	239
v. Fury	17, 328	Kilpin v. Kilpin	75, 77, 86, 144, 146, 147
v. Hammond	602 ff	Kilvert's Trusts, <i>In re</i>	714
v. Keating	129, 135	Kilvington v. Gray	550
v. Kennedy	189, 226	Kimball v. Ives	863
v. Kingston	251, 255	v. Johnson	396, 398, 738
v. Strong	463	v. Morton	86
v. Turnley	293	v. Reading	440, 459, 465
v. Ware	109, 111	v. Universalist Society in Sweden	748
Kennedy's Appeal	912	Kime v. Welpitt	616
Kennell v. Abbott	182	Kimm v. Weippert	680
Kenney v. Udall	631, 632, 636	Kimmel v. McKnight	144, 149
Kenrick v. Beauclerk	305, 308	Kinard v. Hiers	25, 215
Kensington v. Bouverie	554	Kineaird's Trusts, <i>In re</i>	633, 636
v. Dolland	647, 649, 651	Kincell v. Feldman	226
Kenson's Case	739	Kinch v. Ward	297
Kent, <i>Ex parte</i>	617	Kinchant v. Kinchant	201
v. Chalfant	197	Kinder v. Miller	137
v. Hutchins	900	v. Shaw	243
v. Jackson	870	King, <i>In re</i>	901, 902
v. Mehaffey	227	v. Akerman	312
Kentish v. Kentish	569	v. Bellord	19, 52
v. Newman	364	v. Boston	126

	SECTION		SECTION
King v. Coggan	484 a	Kirkland v. Narramore	272
v. Cotton	213	Kirkman v. Booth	433, 454, 877, 904
v. Cushman	129, 428, 915	Kirkpatrick v. Beauford	678
v. Denison	54, 151, 152, 153	v. Davidson	86, 126
v. Donnelly	188, 240, 259, 280	v. McDonald	77, 98, 127, 133, 330
v. Duntz	602 x, 602 aa	v. Rogers	570
v. Eggington	837	Kirwan v. Daniels	593
v. Hake	580	Kirwin v. Weippert	655
v. Hamlet	188	Kirwood v. Thompson	199
v. Holland	64	Kisler v. Kisler	126, 127, 134, 215
v. Jenkins	17	Kissam v. Dierkes	602 g, 784
v. King	441, 898, 914	v. Edmundson	591
v. Lawrence	264, 343	Kitchen v. Bradford	828
v. Leach	343	Kittleby v. Lamb	928
v. Merchants' Exchange Co.	299, 602 i	Kittredge v. Fulsome	93
v. Mildmay	325	Clapp v. Shurk	591, 593
v. Mitchell	153	Kleberg v. Bond	456
v. Mullins	922	Kleiser v. Scott	238
v. Parker	312, 320, 705, 737	Klepner v. Laverty	371
v. Phillips	269	Kline's Appeal	127, 144
v. Roe	474	Estate	213
v. Rundle	748	Klock v. Cronkhite	602 s
v. Savery	201, 202	Knapp v. Noyes	513
v. Stone	411	v. Smith	678, 686
v. Strong	903 a	Knatchbull v. Fearnhead	846, 848, 877, 924
v. St. Catharine's Hall	743	Kneeling v. Brown	569
v. Taylor	903 a	Knight v. Boughton	112, 114, 116
v. Talbott	441, 454, 455, 459, 460, 468	v. Bowyer	745, 850, 863
v. Whitley	367	v. Brawneer	639
v. Wilson	434, 696	v. Cameron	514
v. Wise	209	v. Garborough	254
v. Woodhull	160, 272, 748	v. Hunt	212
King's Mortgage	338	v. Knight	114, 116, 653, 654
Kingdom v. Bridges	144, 146	v. Leak	633
Kingham v. Lee	49, 121	v. Loomis	262, 500
Kingsbury v. Burnside	82	v. Majoribanks	199
Kingland v. Rapelye	359	v. Martin	476 a, 901, 922, 928
Kingston v. Lorton	112, 855	v. Packer	590
Kinmouth v. Brigham	545, 547	v. Plymouth	406, 457, 465, 914
Kinnard v. Kinnard	541	v. Robinson	338
v. Thompson	593	v. Selby	357
Kinner v. Walsh	680	v. Whitehead	667
Kinney v. Harvey	238	Knight's Trust	927
Kinsler v. Clark	299	Kniskern v. Lutheran Churches	733, 748
Kinsley v. Ames	602 bb	Knott, <i>Ex parte</i>	218, 618
v. Boyd	136	v. Cottee	115, 116, 461, 468, 471, 472, 898, 902, 907
Kintzinger Estate	639	v. Hill	188
Kinzie v. Penrose	84	Knottman v. Peyton	213
Kip v. Bank of New York	463	Knouff v. Thompson	143, 149
v. Deniston	416, 420	Knowles v. McCamley	660
Kirby v. Masly	900	v. Spence	855
v. Schoonmaker	599	Knowlton v. Brady	453, 468
v. Taylor	851	Knox v. Bigelow	891
Kiricke v. Bransbey	152	v. Hotham	119
Kirk v. Clark	874, 878	v. Jenks	302
v. Paulin	310, 648	v. Jones	382, 391
v. Webb	137, 841		
Kirkbank v. Hudson	700		
Kirkham v. Smith	348		



	SECTION		SECTION
Larkin v. Mason	576	Leavitt v. Beirne	508, 511, 655, 660
Larkins v. Biddle	184	v. Peel	680, 768
v. Rhoades	182, 187	v. Wooster	562, 571, 796
Larod v. Douglass	418	Leaycraft v. Hedden	655
Larrow v. Beam	218	Leazure v. Hillegas	45
Lasley v. Lasley	275	Lechmere v. Brotheridge	656
Lassence v. Tierney	380, 511 a	v. Carlisle	98, 367, 858
Lassiter v. Dawson	627	v. Charlton	577
La Terrière v. Bulmer	551	v. Lavie	112, 113, 116
Latham v. Henderson	126	Ledge v. Morse	139
Lathrop v. Bampton	828, 885, 843	Ledlie v. Vrooman	680
v. Gilbert	127	Ledyard v. Chapin	602 x
v. Hoyt	134, 135	Lee v. Alston	871
v. Smalley	276, 459, 472, 900, 903, 918	v. Balcarras	530
Latimer v. Hanson	262, 264, 268, 492	v. Brown	476, 615, 618, 619, 624, 915
Latouch v. Lacom	593	v. Delane	476 a, 928
Latouche v. Dunsany	876	v. Egremont	632
Latourette v. Williams	640	v. Fernie	511 a
Latrobe v. Baltimore	331	v. Ferris	77, 83, 93
v. Tiernan	411, 415	v. Fox	127
Laughlin v. Fairbanks	438	v. Huntton	77, 83
Laurens v. Jenney	299, 306, 309	v. Lee	464
v. Lucas	795	v. Prideaux	647, 648
Lavender v. Stanton	582, 610; 793	v. Randolph	240, 280
Laver v. Fielder	208	v. Stuart	34
Law v. Barchard	183	v. Young	276, 508, 509, 510, 511
v. Mills	586	Leech v. Leech	107, 584
v. Skinner	590	Leed v. Beene	863
Lawless v. Shaw	120	Leedham v. Chawmer	907, 909, 910
Lawley v. Hooper	169	Leedom v. Plymouth Railway	757
Lawrence v. Bowle	848, 876	Leeds v. Amherst	446, 540, 869, 870
v. Davis	593	v. Munday	336, 337
v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co.	602 c, 602 q	v. Wakefield	493, 734
v. Maggs	533	Leeds Banking Co.	654, 659
v. Stratton	222	Leeke v. Bennett	541
v. Trustees, &c.	855	Lees v. Nuttall	206
Lawrie v. Banks	311	v. Sanderson	422
Lawry v. McGee	97	Leferve v. Leferve	748
Lawson v. Campion	185	Leffler v. Armstrong	260, 602 r
v. Copeland	900	Le Fort v. Delafield	245
v. Lawson	511 c	Lefroy v. Flood	112, 116
v. Morton	324	Legard v. Hodges	82, 122
Lawton v. Ford	863	v. Johnson	673
Lay v. Brown	627	Legare v. Ashe	183
v. Duckett	812	Legatt v. Sewell	366
Layton v. Layton	631, 636	Legg v. Goldwire	361
Lazarus v. Bryson	205	v. Legg	639
Lea v. Grundy	665	v. Mackrell	271
Lea's Appeal	586	Legge v. Asgill	699, 705, 712
Leach v. Ausbacher	814	Leggett v. Dubois	64, 131, 140
v. Farr	104	v. Hunter	273, 281, 404, 414
v. Leach	112, 117, 118, 119, 620	v. Perkins	305
Leadman v. Harris	591	Legh v. Legh	330
Leake v. Leake	15, 321	Leicester v. Foxcroft	182
v. Robinson	160, 383, 616, 622	v. Rose	212
Leakey v. Gunter	75	Leichrist's Appeal	135
Lear v. Leggett	388, 555	Leigh v. Ashburton	769
Learned v. Welton	412	v. Barry	411, 415, 416, 417, 421
		v. Leigh	117

	SECTION		SECTION
Leigh v. Lloyd	768	Lewis v. Maddocks	122, 887, 841,
Leiper v. Hoffman	65, 126, 181		842
Leisenring v. Black	202	v. McLemore	171
Leitch v. Wells	223, 814	v. Mathews	272, 337, 648, 649,
Leith v. Irwin	905		651
Leith Banking Co. v. Bell	179	v. Nelson	21, 71
Le Jeune v. Budd	517	v. Pead	190
Leland v. Hayden	545	v. Phillips	221
Le Maitre v. Bannister	118, 116	v. Price	689
Leman v. Whitley	76, 83, 162, 226,	v. Reed	404, 409
	232	v. Rees	319
Lemmond v. People	160, 900	v. Robinson	141
Lenaghan v. Smith	882	v. Scaperton	286
Lench v. Lench	127, 128, 187, 138,	v. Starke	847
	836, 839	v. Thornton	562
Le Neve v. Le Neve	217, 222, 223	v. Yale	660
Lengenfitter v. Ritching	210	Library Company of Philadelphia	
Lennard v. Curzon	876	v. Williams	511 a
Leonard v. Bell	391, 748	Liddard v. Liddard	112
v. Diamond	309	Lidderdale v. Montrose	69
v. Ford	602 b	Life Assoc. v. Siddall	265, 337, 476,
v. Leonard	185		846, 849, 850, 853, 860, 863, 869
v. Sussex	369	Liffler v. Armstrong	602 e
v. Powell	915	Liggett v. Wall	217
Le Page v. MacNamara	724, 748	Lignon v. Alexander	234
Le Prince v. Guillemont	592, 594	Like v. Bearsford	636
Lerow v. Wilmarth	487, 553	Liley v. Hey	113, 255, 710, 732
Leslie v. Baillie	927	Lill v. Neafie	275
v. Devonshire	159	Lillard v. Turner	660
v. Guthrie	68, 345	Lillia v. Ayre	655, 657
Lester v. Frazer	34	Linch v. Cappey	464
v. Garland	395	v. Thomas	874
L'Estrange v. L'Estrange	69	Lincoln v. Allen	468
Letch v. Hollister	159	v. Newcastle	359, 360, 373,
Letcher v. Letcher	126, 132, 137		389, 390
Le Vasseux v. Scratton	641	v. Winsor	432, 895, 904
Lever v. Andrews	126	v. Wright	226, 418, 419, 424,
Levering v. Heighe	84		848
v. Levering	84	Lindenberger v. Metlock	765
Levet v. Needham	150, 152	Lindley v. Cross	680
Levy v. Commonwealth	748	Lindo v. Lindo	186
v. Horne	750	Lindow v. Fleetwood	288, 375
v. Levy	41, 45, 384, 716, 738,	Lindsay v. Harrison	646, 653
	741, 748	v. Lindsay	863
Lewellin v. Cobbold	213, 826	Lindsell v. Thacker	336, 337, 648
Lewes v. Lewes	119, 388, 555	Lines v. Darden	116, 253
Lewin's Trusts, <i>In re</i>	633	Lingan v. Henderson	84, 234
Lewis, <i>Ex parte</i>	774	Lingard v. Bromley	848, 876, 879
v. Adams	647	Lingenfelter v. Richey	226
v. Baird	259, 261	Lining v. Peyton	598, 794
v. Beacon	559	Linker v. Smith	213
v. Beall	299	Linley v. Taylor	908
v. Bradford	221	Linsley v. Sinclair	142
v. Castleman	864	Linton v. Boley	598, 602 g
v. Covillaud	288	Linville v. Golding	299
v. Darling	570, 571	Lippincott v. Barber	592
v. Hill	475	v. Lippincott	501
v. Hillman	202, 206	v. Ridgway	254
v. James	324	v. Warder	541
v. Johns	678	Liptrot v. Holmes	320
v. Lewis	76	Lister v. Hodgson	97, 98, 102



	SECTION		SECTION
Lister v. Lister	195, 198, 635	Lockwood v. Stockholm	576
v. Peckford	864	Lockyer v. Savage	388, 555
Litchfield v. Baker	449, 451, 547	Locton v. Locton	121
v. Pickering	547	Lodding v. Kline	597
v. White	417, 590, 914	Lodge v. Hamilton	639
Litt v. Randall	385	Logan v. Birkett	672
Little v. Bennett	234	v. Deshay	569
v. Brown	237	v. Fairlee	623
Littlefield v. Cole	511	v. Fontaine	918
v. Smith	438	v. Logan	918
Littlehales v. Gascoigne	468	v. Simmons	213
Litton v. Baldwin	655, 661, 900	Lomax v. Lomax	616, 619
Livermore v. Aldrich	126, 137, 138	v. Pendleton	462, 468
v. Jenckes	592	v. Ripley	77, 83, 84, 93, 159, 511 a
Livesay v. Livesay	931	Londenschlager v. Benton	759
Livingston, <i>In re</i>	232	Londesborough v. Somerville	544
Pet'r	232	London v. Garway	157
v. Ball	592	v. Richmond	885
v. Livingston	38, 48, 51, 95, 277, 562, 564, 565, 566	London Bridge, <i>In re</i>	787
v. Newkirk	562, 566	London Gas Light Co. v. Spottis-	
v. Stickles	537	wood	877
Livingston's Case	918	London R. Co. v. Winter	226
Llewellyn v. Mackworth	858, 863	Long v. Blackall	379
Llewellyn's Trusts	451, 551	v. Cason	621, 863
Lloyd v. Attwood	851	v. Clapton	431
v. Baldwin	597, 795, 796, 800	v. Dennis	512, 515
v. Banks	438	v. Israel	891
v. Branton	512, 513, 514	v. Long	615, 796
v. Brooks	97	v. Mathieson	752
v. Carew	379	v. Norcom	618
v. Carter	126, 137	v. Rankin	784
v. Currin	215	v. Ricketts	514, 517
v. Goad	112, 487	v. Serger	126
v. Griffiths	787	v. White	647, 660, 855
v. Hart	605, 611	Longford v. Eyre	511 b
v. Inglis	76	Longley v. Hall	918
v. Lloyd	388, 555, 706	v. Longley	157
v. Loaring	885	Longman v. Brown	714
v. Lynch	137	Longmate v. Ledger	189
v. Read	130, 144, 145, 146, 147	Longmore v. Broom	251, 255, 258, 468, 507
v. Rowe	918	v. Elcum	112, 116, 117, 118, 620
v. Spillett	88, 125, 126, 138, 151, 152, 162, 900	Longwith v. Butler	602 c, 602 x
v. Taylor	501	Longworth v. Goforth	205
v. Williams	600, 645	Longworth's Estate	556
Lobdell v. Hayes	324	Lonsdale v. Beckett	291
Lock v. Lock	532, 533	v. Berchtoldt	119
Locke v. Lomas	475, 597, 794, 799, 806	Lonsdale's Estate	100
Lockey v. Lockey	871	Loomis v. Lift	212
Lockhart v. Canfield	328	v. Loomis	134, 438
v. Hardy	119	v. McClintock	783
v. Northington	501	v. Spencer	56
v. Reilly	260, 457, 467, 848, 876	Loomis's Appeal	573
v. Wyatt	590, 591	Lord v. Bunn	386 b, 555, 807
Lockridge v. Foster	171	v. Brooks	545
Lockwood v. Abdy	246, 907	v. Fisher	589
v. Canfield	75	v. Godfrey	451, 508, 509, 547
v. Fenton	623	Lord Antrim v. Buckingham	48
		Lord Paget's Case	585

	SECTION		SECTION
Lord Sandwich's Case	511 a	Luckett v. White	570
Lorillard v. Coster	380	Luckin v. Rushworth	196
Loring, <i>Ex parte</i>	236	Lucknow v. Brown	613
v. Blake	381, 490, 507, 508	Ludlam v. High	733
v. Elliott	152	Ludlow v. Greenhouse	698, 724, 732, 896
v. Hunter	359, 370	v. Hurd	159
v. Loring	117, 386 a, 620	Ludwig v. Highley	58, 334
v. Steinman	476 a, 928	Luke v. Kelmoresy	119
v. United States Co.	588	Luken's Appeal	463, 468, 851, 918, 919
Lorings v. Marsh	499, 721, 724, 731	Lumb v. Milnes	634, 649
Lorman v. Clarke	855	Lund v. Blanshard	877
Loscombe v. Wintringham	705, 725, 729	v. Lund	463, 468
Losley v. Losley	817	Lunham v. Blundell	443
Loss v. Obry	186	Lupton v. Lupton	562, 569, 570, 796
Lothrop v. King	212, 591	v. White	447
Louch, <i>Ex parte</i>	587	Luscomb v. Ballard	262, 812
Lounsbury v. Purdy	58, 126, 133, 142	Lush v. Wilkinson	149
Lovatt v. Leeds	527	Lush's Trusts	634
Lovatt v. Knipe	194	Lusk v. Lewis	715
Love v. Gaze	94, 150	Luther v. Bianconi	8, 440, 532, 845
v. Morris	910	Lutheran Cong. v. St. Michael's Church	733
v. Robertson	676	Luttrell v. Olmius	181, 211
Lovegrove, <i>Ex parte</i>	910	Lyddon v. Ellison	376
Lovell v. Minot	456	v. Moss	869
Loveridge v. Cooper	488, 926	Lyford v. Thurston	137, 217, 828
Lovering v. Minot	551	Lygon v. Lord	615
v. Worthington	382	Lyles v. Hattan	468
Low v. Barchard	187	Lyman v. Parsons	508
v. Brinnan	764	Lyn v. Ashton	679
v. Carter	846, 924	Lynch v. Cox	126
v. Manners	514	v. Dearth	237
Lowden v. Lowden	841	Lyne, <i>Ex parte</i>	414
Lowe v. Morgan	873	v. —	648, 652
v. Morris	918	v. Crouse	661
v. Peers	516	v. Guardian	182
Lowell v. North	602 o	Lyne's Ex'rs v. Crouse	652
Lowell's Appeal	700	Lynn v. Beaver	94
Lowndes v. Garnett & Mosely Co.	752	v. Bradley	639
v. Lane	178, 176	v. Lynn	134
v. Lowndes	616	Lynn's Appeal	540
Lowrie's Appeal	891, 918	Lyon v. Baker	432, 904
Lowry v. Commercial Bank	242	v. Lyon	195, 205, 428
v. Commercial & Farmer's Bank	814	v. Marclay	863
v. Farmers' Bank	225	v. Richmond	184, 226
v. Fulton	259, 261, 401, 463	v. Saunders	184
v. Houston	641	v. Swayne	680
Lowson v. Copeland	438, 440, 465	Lyons v. Beard	918
Lowther v. Charlton	222	v. Bodenhamer	217
v. Lowther	206	v. Jones	602 v
Lucas v. Atwood	594	Lypet v. Carter	569, 670
v. Brandreth	357	Lysaght v. Royse	511 a
v. Doe	500	Lyse v. Kingdom	457, 462, 520, 818, 876, 877, 900
v. Harris	602 n	Lyster v. Burroughs	122
v. Lockhart	112, 117, 248	Lytle's Appeal	680
v. Oliver	602 v		
v. Putney	754		
v. Sanbury & Erie R.R. Co.	589		

M.		SECTION
Maberly v. Turton	249, 255, 615	
Macartney v. Blackwood	872	
Macaulay v. Phillips	630, 632, 633, 639, 645	
MacCubbin v. Cromwell	79, 82, 84, 85, 259, 261, 262, 404, 416, 420, 890	
Macdonnell v. Harding	417	
Macey v. Shurmer	112	
Mackason's Appeal	555	
Mackay v. Coates	328	
v. Douglass	108	
v. Green	562	
v. Martin	215	
Macken v. Hogan	438	
Mackenzie v. Mackenzie	585	
v. Taylor	900	
Mackey v. Maturin	665	
Mackie v. Cairnes	591	
v. Mackie	439, 450, 551	
Mackintosh v. Ogilvie	72	
v. Townsend	741	
Mackreth v. Symmons	38, 217, 232, 233, 235, 236, 239	
Mackworth v. Hinxman	380	
Maclaren v. Stainton	72	
Maclay v. Love	662, 676, 685	
Macleod v. Annesley	457	
Macnab v. Whitbread	112	
Macomb v. Kearney	766	
Macon, &c., Railway v. Parker	757	
Macpherson v. Macpherson	550	
Maddeford v. Austwick	178, 210	
Maddison v. Andrew	139, 144, 251, 507, 510	
Maddocks v. Wren	248	
Maddox v. Allen	858	
v. Maddox	512, 515, 555	
v. Staine	379	
Madox v. Jackson	250, 878	
Maennel v. Murdock	590, 591	
Maffitt v. Rynd	86	
Magdalen College v. Att'y-Gen.	737, 866	
Magdalena Steam Nav. Co. <i>In re</i>	754	
Magee v. Carpenter	602 d	
v. Cowperthwaite	918	
Magill v. Brown	46, 696, 699, 700, 701, 704, 715, 721, 730, 748	
Magruder v. Peter	232, 238, 501	
Maguiac v. Thompson	184	
Maguire v. Scully	360, 361	
Magwood v. Johnston	661	
Mahan v. Mahan	109, 111	
Mahar v. O'Hara	576	
Mahlor v. Lees	228	
Mahon v. Savage	255, 256, 699	
v. Stanhope	539, 777	
Mahony v. Hunler	262	
Mahorner v. Harrison	128	
Mais, <i>In re</i>	275	
Maitland v. Backhouse	201	
v. Bateman	440	
v. Irving	201	
v. Wilson	219	
Major v. Lansley	647, 656	
v. Sommes	680, 685	
Makepeace v. Rogers	863	
Malcolm v. O'Callaghan	513, 514, 517, 910	
Malin v. Barker	112	
v. Keighley	112, 116	
v. Malin	38, 82, 137, 189, 227	
Malins, <i>In re</i>	774	
Mallabar v. Mallabar	150, 151, 900	
Mallalieu v. Hodgson	212	
Mallet v. Smith	499	
Mallory v. Mallory	127	
Malone v. Geraghty	845, 878	
v. O'Connor	112	
Maloney v. Kennedy	664, 668	
v. Kernan	217	
v. L'Estrange	229, 230	
Maltby's Case	179	
Malzy v. Edge	261, 267	
Man v. Warner	559	
Manahan v. Gibbons	416	
Manby v. Bewicke	863	
Manchester v. Bonham	903 a	
v. Manchester	328	
v. Mathewson	855	
v. Sahler	680	
Manchester School Case	725	
Mandeville v. Solomon	211	
Manice v. Manice	305	
Manes v. Durant	213	
Mangles v. Dixon	438, 831	
Manion v. Tittsworth	641, 863, 865	
Manly v. Slason	232, 233, 236, 237, 239	
Mann v. Ballott	733	
v. Betterly	187, 189	
v. Darlington	212	
v. Ricketts	863	
Manners v. Furze	818	
Manning v. Albee	173	
v. Cox	330, 520	
v. Manning	429, 462, 464, 468, 900, 916	
v. Spooner	563	
v. Thesiger	881, 885	
v. Wopp	118	
Mannings v. Randolph	556	
Mannsell v. Hedges	208	
v. Mansell	217, 241, 344, 509 b, 784, 828, 844	
Mansell v. Vaughn	414, 491, 505	
Manser v. Dix	768	
Mansfield v. Mansfield	602 h, 672	

	SECTION		SECTION
Mansfield <i>v.</i> Shaw	816, 818	Marshall <i>v.</i> Frank	219
Mansfield's Case	189	<i>v.</i> Gibbings	632
Manson <i>v.</i> Baillie	401, 432	<i>v.</i> Holloway	160, 393, 395, 619, 906, 918
Mant <i>v.</i> Leith	458, 460, 467, 655	<i>v.</i> Lovell	55
Manuf. & Mech. Bank <i>v.</i> Bank of Penn.	589	<i>v.</i> Miller	680
Mapp <i>v.</i> Elcock	152, 157	<i>v.</i> Sladden	282, 297, 329, 539, 769, 777
Mapps <i>v.</i> Sharpe	199, 602 <i>v.</i>	<i>v.</i> Stevens	195, 655, 661, 782
<i>v.</i> Tyler	766	Marsteller's Appeal	918
Mara <i>v.</i> Manning	669	Martelli <i>v.</i> Holloway	381
March <i>v.</i> Berrier	611	Martidall <i>v.</i> Martin	693
<i>v.</i> Eastern R.R. Co.	545	Martin <i>v.</i> Bell	648, 649
<i>v.</i> Head	633, 636	<i>v.</i> Blight	172
<i>v.</i> Russell	467, 846, 851, 867	<i>v.</i> Coles	243
Mare <i>v.</i> Sandford	591	<i>v.</i> Frye	562, 563
Marfield <i>v.</i> Ross	602 <i>z</i>	<i>v.</i> Graves	167
Margetts <i>v.</i> Barringer	648	<i>v.</i> Greer	127, 886
<i>v.</i> Perks	418	<i>v.</i> Jackson	863
Marigny <i>v.</i> Remy	593	<i>v.</i> Joliffe	830
Marine Fire Ins. Co. <i>v.</i> Early	232	<i>v.</i> Margham	388, 396, 399, 709, 725, 738
Marker <i>v.</i> Marker	540, 851	<i>v.</i> Martin 71, 72,	142, 364, 427, 629, 631, 635
Markley <i>v.</i> Singletary	648	<i>v.</i> McCord	748
Marks <i>v.</i> Morris	602 <i>ee</i>	<i>v.</i> Mitchell	645
Markwell <i>v.</i> Markwell	104	<i>v.</i> Morgan	178, 179
Marlborough <i>v.</i> Godolphin	93, 252,	<i>v.</i> Persse	898
<i>v.</i> St. John	883, 507, 508, 714	<i>v.</i> Ramsey	109
	477, 552	<i>v.</i> Rayborn	454, 468
Marles <i>v.</i> Cooper	218	<i>v.</i> Read	873
Marlow <i>v.</i> Johnson	602 <i>ff</i>	<i>v.</i> Sedgwick	488
Marples <i>v.</i> Bainbridge	512, 516	<i>v.</i> Sherman	645
Marr <i>v.</i> Gilman	351	<i>v.</i> Smith	334, 861
<i>v.</i> Peay	270	<i>v.</i> Swannell	248
Marrett <i>v.</i> Paske	428	Martin's Appeal	552, 618
Marrick <i>v.</i> Grice	667	Martindale <i>v.</i> Picquot	416
Marriott <i>v.</i> Kinnersley	402, 845	Martzell <i>v.</i> Stauffer	843
<i>v.</i> Marriott	182	Marwood <i>v.</i> Darell	301
Marryatt <i>v.</i> Marryatt	260, 826	Maryland Ins. Co. <i>v.</i> Dalrymple	199
<i>v.</i> Townley	359, 861, 364, 366, 371, 374	Mason <i>v.</i> Baker	165
Marsden's Trusts, <i>In re</i>	511 <i>a</i>	<i>v.</i> Chambers	70
Marsh <i>v.</i> Alford	680	<i>v.</i> Crosby	171, 230
<i>v.</i> Att'y-General	724	<i>v.</i> Dry	611
<i>v.</i> Hunter	469	<i>v.</i> Jones	508, 620
<i>v.</i> Marsh	562, 647, 666, 684	<i>v.</i> Limburg	112
<i>v.</i> Means	700, 724, 726	<i>v.</i> Martin	428, 785
<i>v.</i> Oliver	863	<i>v.</i> Mason	347, 508, 511, 611, 858, 859
<i>v.</i> Putnam	72	<i>v.</i> McNeill	639, 640
<i>v.</i> Renton	721, 725	<i>v.</i> Morgan	640
<i>v.</i> Turner	232	<i>v.</i> Morley	446
<i>v.</i> Wells	586	<i>v.</i> Roosevelt	918
<i>v.</i> Wheeler	160, 765	<i>v.</i> Smallwood	299
Marshall, <i>Ex parte</i>	337	<i>v.</i> Wait	404, 409, 606, 609
<i>v.</i> Baltimore & Ohio Railway	214	<i>v.</i> Whitehorn	443, 444
<i>v.</i> Blew	542	<i>v.</i> Williams	189
<i>v.</i> Bousley	366	Mass. Gen. Hosp. <i>v.</i> Amory	275, 286
<i>v.</i> Brenner	451	Massenburgh <i>v.</i> Ash	379, 382
<i>v.</i> Christmas	232, 237	Massett <i>v.</i> Pocock	894
<i>v.</i> Collett	184		
<i>v.</i> Fisk	299, 302		
<i>v.</i> Fowler	633, 636		

	SECTION		SECTION
Massey v. Banner	406, 441, 443, 444, 463, 901, 914	May's Heirs v. Frazer	779
v. Davies	206	Mayberry v. Neely	649
v. McIlwaine	217	Maybury v. Brien	323
v. O'Dell	863	Mayer v. Galluchat	432, 661, 895
v. Parker	646, 647, 648, 652, 653, 671	v. Gould	848
v. Sherman	112	v. Montreon	509, 826, 827, 877, 884
Massie v. Watts	71, 72	v. Pullam	602 e
Master v. DeCroismar	64, 364	v. Townsend	360
v. Fuller	657, 658	Mayfield v. Clifton	639
Masters v. Masters	572, 573	v. Kegour	329
Mastin v. Barnard	262	Mayham v. Coombs	232, 236
Mather v. Bennett	863	Mayhew v. Crickett	210
v. Norton	796, 801	Maynard v. Williams	676
v. Thomas	338	Maynel v. Massey	581
Mathers v. Prestman	780	Mayor v. Williams	223
Mathes v. Bennett	463	Mayor of Coventry v. Att'y-Gen.	42, 275
Mathew v. Hanbury	171	Mayor of London's Case	694, 699
Mathews v. Bliss	178, 180	Mayor of Lyons v. East India Co.	741
v. Brise	443, 444, 461, 463	Mayor of South Molton v. Att'y- Gen.	745
v. Guess	639	Maywood v. Lubcock	218
v. Heyward	458	Mazyck v. Vanderhost	380
v. Keble	393	McAdam v. Logan	294
v. Masters	706	McAfee v. Ferguson	213
v. Mathews	421	McAllister v. Barry	171
Mathias v. Mathias	841	v. Commonwealth	463
Mathis v. Mathis	918	v. Marshall	591
Mathison v. Clarke	431, 432, 904	v. Montgomery	136
Mattex v. Weand	237	McAlpin v. Burnett	232, 238, 239
Matthew v. Brise	871	McArtee v. Engart	187
v. Marow	724	McAuley v. Wilson	724, 726
Matthews v. Bagshaw	905	McBee v. Loftes	221
v. Dragand	195, 915	McBride v. Porter	733
v. McPherson	328, 329	v. Smyth	310 a, 652
v. Ward	6, 17, 299, 301, 321, 327, 328, 349, 436, 520	McCahan's Appeal	459, 918
Matthie v. Edwards	602 o, 602 s, 602 ee, 770, 782	McCall v. Coover	231
Mattox v. Eberhart	780	v. Harrison	244
Maud v. Maud	112	v. Hinkley	592
Maul v. Reder	210, 223, 851	v. Parker	33
v. Rider	851	v. Peachy	460, 918
Mauldin v. Armstead	343, 602 e, 602 m	McCall's Estate	471
Maundrell v. Maundrell	511 c	McCalmont v. Rankin	226
Maundy v. Maundy	182	McCammon v. Pettitt	138
Maunsell v. Hedges	208	McCampbell v. McCampbell	562
Maupin v. Delany	618	McCandless's Estate	863
Maverick, &c., Soc. v. Lovejoy	243	McCandlish v. Keen	235
Mavor v. Davenport	260	McCants v. Bee	199
v. Nixon	732	McCarogher v. Whieldon	773, 806
Maw v. Pearson	246	McCartee v. Orph. Asy. Soc.	38, 748
Maxwell v. Finnie	275	v. Teller	34
v. Kennedy	229, 230	McCarter v. Cornel	855
v. Pittinger	191	McCarthy v. Decaix	184, 851,
v. Wettenhall	600	v. Gould	69
May v. Armstrong	900	v. Tyle	861
v. Frazer	404, 500	McCartney v. Bostwick	17, 126, 142, 149, 240
v. Selby	884	v. Calhoun	195
v. Steele	126	McCarty v. Blevins	67
v. Taylor	328	v. Pruet	282
		McCaskey v. Graff	215

	SECTION		SECTION
McCauly v. Givens	757	McElhenny's Appeal	469, 471, 891, 910
McCauseland's Appeal	918	McFadden v. Jenkyns	86, 96, 102, 105
McCaw v. Blunt	918	McFarland's Appeal	511 a
v. Galbraith	64, 131, 305, 327, 436	McFerrin v. White	680
McClanahan v. Henderson	538	McGachen v. Dew	438, 467, 878, 885
McClane v. Shepherd	865	McGar v. Nixon	456
McClintie v. Ochiltree	655	McGill, <i>In re</i>	238
McClintock v. Irvine	357	v. Doe	328
McClug v. Lecky	591	McGinity v. McGinity	137
McClure v. Miller	98, 213	McGinn v. Shaeffer	890
v. Purcell	165	McGirr v. Aaron	731, 748
McClurg v. Wilson	520	McGlaughlin v. McGlaughlin	570
McColgham v. Hopkins	585	McGlinsey's Appeal	665, 666
McCollough v. Sommerville	585	McGovern v. Knox	82, 126, 144
McCombie v. Davis	243	McGregor v. Gardner	206
McCord v. O'Chiltree	701, 724, 748	v. Hall	602 d, 602 j, 602 l
McCormick v. Garnett	632	v. McGregor	884
v. Grogan	181	McGowan v. Gowan	126, 132, 133, 181
v. Malin	187	McGuire v. McGowan	126, 139
McCosker v. Brady	280, 305, 341	v. Ramsey	126
v. Golden	668	McHardy v. Hitchcock	826, 827
McCown v. Jones	237	McIlvaine v. Gether	512
McCoy v. Scott	245	McIntire v. Agricultural Bank	602 l
McCrahen v. McCrahen	918	v. Hughes	109, 111
McCraw v. Davis	189	v. Janesville	38
McCrea v. Purmont	843, 855	v. Knowlton	678
McCreery v. Hamlin	780	v. Lanesville	724
McCrocklin v. McCrocklin	672	v. Skinner	75
McCroory v. Foster	127, 640	McIntire Poor School v. Zanes-	
McCue v. Gallagher	139	ville Canal Co.	38, 43, 121, 240, 460, 698, 700, 742
McCulloch v. Cowher	172	McKay v. Carrington	38, 231
v. Hutchinson	591	McKee v. Judd	69
McCullough's Appeal	514	McKenna, <i>In re</i>	122, 850
McCullum v. Cox	330	McKenna v. Phillips	240, 668, 672
McDermott v. Kealy	616	McKenney v. Burns	162
v. Lorillard	782	McKern v. Handy	891, 894
v. Strong	594	McKey, <i>Ex parte</i>	618
McDonald v. Black	118	McKillip v. McKillip	235
v. Bryce	160, 397	McKim v. Duncan	918
v. Hanson	774	v. Handy	294
v. King	500	v. Voorhies	72
v. May	230	McKinley v. Irvine	195, 881
v. McDonald	132, 863	McKinney v. Pinkard	187
v. Neilson	187	v. Rhoades	593
v. Richardson	430	McKissick v. Pickle	227
v. Sims	863	McKnight v. Brady	232, 239
v. Walgrove	546	v. Taylor	228, 869
v. Walker	339, 340, 494	v. Walsh	468, 471, 472, 612, 613, 614, 616, 918
McDonnell v. Harding	443, 463	McKonkey's Appeal	113, 119
v. Hesilridge	213	McLain v. School Directors	732, 748
McDonough v. McDonough	736	McLanahan v. McLanahan	75
v. Murdoch	41, 42, 43, 126, 142	v. Wyant	570
McDougald v. Cary	341	McLane v. Johnson	166
v. Dougherty	594	v. McDonald	546
McDowell v. Caldwell	618, 911, 918	McLaren v. Stainton	545, 556 a
v. Goldsmith	229, 230, 863	McLarren v. Brewer	127, 128
v. Lawless	562	McLaurie v. Parthlow	82, 84
v. Peyton	182	McLaurin v. Fairly	75, 832, 840
v. Potter	639		

	SECTION		SECTION
McLaughlin v. Detroit	545	Meek v. Kettlewell	98, 100, 101, 102, 105, 111
McLean v. Wade	715, 748	Meeting St. Bapt. Soc. v. Hail	312, 734, 748
McLearn v. McLellan	232	Megargal v. Saul	232
McLemore v. Good	541, 556	Megargel v. Naglie	310 a, 652
McLennan v. Sullivan	126	Meggison v. Moore	112, 114, 116
McLeod v. Drummond	225, 809, 810, 811, 814, 815	Meggott v. Meggott	871
v. First National Bank	828, 836	Megod's Case	17
McCloud v. Roberts	562	Mehrtens v. Andrews	467, 869
v. Burchall	682	Meigs v. Dimock	232
McMahon v. Harrison	292	Meinertzhagen v. Davis	55, 286, 297
McMeekin v. Edmonds	594	Melery v. Cooper	238
McMullen v. Beatty	304	Melick v. Voorhees	845
v. O'Reilly	810	Mellick v. Asylum	706
v. Scott	918	Melling v. Leak	866
McMurray v. Montgomery	416, 418, 421	Mellingen v. Bausmann	642
McNair's Appeal	225, 421	Mellish v. Robertson	184
McNamara v. Jones	910	Mellish's Estate	850
McNeil v. McDonald	539	Meloney, <i>In re</i>	280
McNeillage v. Holloway	640	Mence v. Mence	157
McNeille v. Acton	50, 225, 454, 800, 810	Mendes v. Guedella	412, 418, 442
McNeilledge v. Galbrath	251, 255	Mendon v. Merrill	98
McNish v. Guerard	299, 305, 310	Mennard v. Welford	275, 284, 292
McPherson v. Snowdon	357, 366, 371, 374	Mer. Man. Co. v. Smith	586
McQueen v. Farquhar	511 a, 769, 830	Mercein v. People	672
McRaeny v. Johnson	330	Mercur v. Hall	517
McRarey v. Huff	215	v. Stock	77, 140
McRee v. Means	112, 380	Mercers' Co. v. Att'y-Gen.	725
McRemmon v. Martin	239	Merchant Tailor's Co. v. Att'y-Gen.	725
McTighe v. Dean	827	Merchants' Bank, <i>In re</i>	275, 280
McVey v. Boggs	636	Meredith v. Heneage	112, 113, 115, 116, 153
McWhorter v. Agnew	498	Merest v. James	13, 347
v. Benson	919	Merlin v. Blaggrave	385, 476 a, 922, 928
v. Wright	586	Merriam v. Harsen	667
McWilliams v. Nisby	68	v. Hassam	860, 864
Meacham v. Sternes	590, 918	Merrick's Estate	462, 463, 468
Meachey v. Young	612	Merrill v. Fowle	602 s
Mead v. Langdon	183	v. Moore	918
v. Merritt	72	v. Neill	599
v. Orrery	217, 225, 809, 810, 811, 815	v. Smith	127
v. Phillips	591	v. Swift	593
Meakings v. Cromwell	64, 501	Merriott v. Givens	602 qq
Meason v. Kaine	134	Merritt v. Farmer's Ins. Co.	336, 337
Mechanics' Bank, <i>In re</i>	411, 413, 760	v. Lambert	202
v. DeBolt	816	v. Lyon	664
v. Edwards	347	v. Wells	232, 239
v. Gorman	592	v. Wilson	599
v. Seton	242	Merriweather v. Booker	633
Meconkey's Appeal	511 c	Merry v. Abney	277
Medbury v. Watson	173	v. Ryves	517, 519
Medecai v. Parker	520	Mersey Docks, &c. v. Gibbs	744, 914
Medley v. Davis	232	Mesgrett v. Mesgrett	511, 517, 518, 519
v. Horton	347, 670	Messena v. Carr	547
Medlicott v. O'Donnell	228, 861	Messenger v. Clark	664
Medworth v. Pope	66	v. Gloucester	694
		Mestaer v. Gillespie	181

	SECTION		SECTION
Metcalf v. Cook	655, 661	Miller v. Congdon	263, 574
Metford School	156	v. Conklin	592
Metham v. Devon	86, 93	v. Cotton	226
Methodist Church v. Jaques	655,	v. Davis	165
	660, 665	v. Evans	774, 779
v. Remington	46,	v. Franciscus	230
	715, 724, 728,	v. Gable	733, 734, 748
	731, 748	v. Harwell	562, 573
v. Stewart	413	v. Hine	685
v. Warren	748	v. Hull	602 t, 602 u, 602 aa
Methodist Soc. of Georgetown v.		v. Knight	282
Bennett	518	v. Lerch	42, 45
Methold v. Turner	615	v. Macomb	380
Meure v. Meure	366, 371, 372	v. McIntire	228, 855
Meux v. Bell	105	v. Meetch	248, 262, 308, 499
v. Howell	590	v. Miller	547, 672
v. Maltby	71, 72, 885	v. Pearce	181
Mews v. Mews	664	v. Porter	697, 715, 731, 748
Meyer v. Simonson	547, 548, 551	v. Priddon	284, 806, 808
Meyer's Appeal	918	v. Proctor	441, 458, 927
Michael v. Baker	32	v. Race	837
Michigan State Bank v. Gardner	243	v. Rowan	705, 712
Michoud v. Girod	195, 197, 205, 207,	v. Rutland, &c., Railway	757
	229, 230, 745, 855	v. Scammon	167
Middlebrook v. Merchants' Bank	331	v. Stanley	538
Middleton v. Clithrow	701	v. Stokely	137
v. Dodswell	484, 818, 819	v. Stump	324
v. Middleton	169, 181, 183	v. Thatcher	75
v. Reay	293	v. Welles	178
v. Spicer	61, 327, 427,	v. Wetherby	685
	437, 701	v. Whittier	911
Midland Counties Railw. Co. v.		v. Williams	664
Westcombe	494	v. Williamson	655, 660, 810
Midland Great Western Railw. v.		v. Wilson	162
Johnson	184	Miller's Case	17
Midlicott v. O'Donel	855	Estate	606, 609, 639, 918
Mikel v. Mikel	914	Millett v. Rowse	636
Milbank v. Collier	885	Milligan v. Mitchell	734, 816
Mildmay v. Mildmay	220	Milliken v. Ham	126
Miles v. Bacon	596, 891, 910	Milling v. Leak	860
v. Durnford	225, 809, 810, 811	Millinger v. Bausman	676
v. Ervin	202	Mills v. Argall	599
v. Fisher	320	v. Banks	578, 581, 597, 768
v. Knight	765	v. Dugmore	773
v. Leigh	569	v. Farmer	156, 693, 705, 708,
v. Neave	270		714, 719, 724, 725,
v. Wheeler	205, 865		729, 539
Miles's Will, <i>In re</i>	455	v. Mills	440, 451, 455, 467, 547
Millar v. Craig	923	v. Osborne	438, 453
Millard v. Eyre	275, 282, 283, 293	v. Robarts	616
v. Hathaway	126, 137, 863	v. Taylor	783
Millard's Case	219, 521, 828	Millsbaugh v. Putnam	98
Milledge v. Lamar	546	Milner v. Colmer	633
Miller v. Atkinson	700, 720, 748	v. Turner	35
v. Antle	215	Milnes v. Slater	563
v. Argyle	602 ee	Milroy v. Lord	100, 102
v. Beverleys	324, 464, 468,	Milington v. Mulgrave	508, 532, 534
	910, 912, 918	Minchin v. Nance	122
v. Bingham	646, 652, 653	Mines v. Lockett	232, 237
v. Brown	680	v. Macon, &c., R.R.	232, 237
v. Chittenden	384, 748	Minet v. Hyde	630



	SECTION		SECTION
Minet v. Vulliamy	741	Monell v. Monell	416, 419, 421
Minor v. Wicksteed	569	Money v. Herrick	75, 182, 183, 187, 181
Minot v. Amory	551	Moneyvenny v. Bristow	871
v. Boston Asylum	730	v. Dering	376, 385, 390
v. Mitchell	135, 172, 215	Monk v. Mawdesley	511 c
v. Paine	545	Monks v. Monks	908 u
v. Prescott	783, 785	Monro v. Allaire	195, 199
v. Thompson	547	Monroe v. James	262
Minturn v. Seymour	97, 98, 367	Montacute v. Maxwell	226
Minuse v. Cox	462, 468, 780, 782, 894	Montague v. Dawes	199, 495, 602 w, 602 x, 602 qq
Mirehouse v. Scaife	569, 570, 573	v. Hayes	82
Missionary Society	730, 748	Montefiore, <i>Ex parte</i>	886
Mitchell v. Adams	264	v. Behrens	630
v. Beal	590	v. Browne	784
v. Bower	584	Montesquieu v. Sandys	188, 202
v. Bunch	72	Montford v. Cadogan	260, 261, 467, 532, 534, 847, 848, 849, 877
v. Corbett	769	Montgomery v. Agricultural Bank	661
v. Gates	647	v. Bath	873, 882
v. Gazzam	586	v. Commercial Bank	588
v. Holmes	918	v. Dorion	55
v. Kingman	35	v. Eveleigh	661
v. Mitchell	578, 584, 684	v. Hobson	230
v. Nixon	291	v. Johnson	261
v. O'Neil	137	v. McElroy	569
v. Otey	677	v. McEwen	602 qq
v. Pitner	282	v. Milliken	500
v. Rice	262	Montpelier v. E. Montpelier	275
v. Sevier	628	Moody v. Farr	328
v. Stiles	590	v. Fulmer	500, 518
v. Winslow	68	v. Gay	72
Mitchelson v. Piper	474	v. Vandyke	195, 205, 500
Mitchum v. Mitchum	205	Moons v. DeBernales	464, 847
Mitford v. Mitford	239, 633, 635, 641	Moor's Appeal	924
v. Reynolds	41, 47, 61, 697, 704, 706, 712, 720, 741	Moorcroft v. Dowding	82, 400
Mittenberger v. Schlegel	576	Moore v. Black	871
Mix v. King	181	v. Blake	877
Mobile, &c., Railw. v. Tolman	754, 757	v. Brackin	203
Mocatta v. Murgatroyd	347	v. Burnet	17, 328, 520
Moddewell v. Keever	599	v. Burrows	231
Moffatt v. Bingham	864	v. Clay	219
v. McDonald	127, 836	v. Cleghorn	357
v. McDowall	585	v. Crofton	107, 108, 109
Mogg v. Hodges	57	v. Darton	87
v. Mogg	385, 390	v. Dimond	254, 511 b
Moggeridge v. Grey	275	v. Ellis	673
v. Thackwell	156, 690, 693, 705, 714, 719, 722, 724, 729, 739	v. Frowd	432, 894, 895, 904
Mohun v. Mohun	747	v. Green	135
Moir v. Brown	273	v. Halcombe	233, 239
Mole v. Mole	616	v. Hamilton	453
v. Smith	347	v. Harris	653
Mollan v. Griffith	562, 573	v. Henderson	880
Molony, <i>In re</i>	901	v. Hilton	205
v. Kernan	206, 219	v. Hussey	48
Molton v. Camroux	189	v. Jackson	349
v. Morton	684	v. Jones	649
Molum v. Molum	891, 894, 896	v. Lockett	766
Monahan v. Gibbons	421		

	SECTION		SECTION
Moore v. Moore	187, 381, 606, 627, 629, 632, 665, 670, 671, 721, 724, 728, 731, 748, 981	Morris v. Thompson	748
v. Morris	647, 668	v. Wallace	456, 459
v. Prance	900	v. Way	44, 602 i
v. Raymond	288	Morris's Appeal	600
v. Read	191	Morris Canal v. Emmet	174
v. Scarborough	665	Morrison, <i>In re</i>	623
v. Sheppard	863	v. Bean	602 <i>gg</i>
v. Shultz	298, 310, 498	v. Beirer	781, 748
v. Tandy	421	v. McLeod	189, 191
v. Thornton	633	v. Moat	67
v. Vinten	878	v. Morrison	432
v. Zabriskie	918	Morrow v. Peyton	426
Mora v. Manning	849	Morse v. Crofoot	600
Moravian v. Soc. <i>In re</i>	284	v. Mason	680
Moorhouse v. Calvin	208	v. Royal 195, 197, 209, 228,	428, 861, 869
Mordecai v. Parker	17, 328	Mortimer v. Ireland 294, 340, 494,	495
Morden v. Chase	299	v. Moffatt	541
More v. Freeman	672	v. Picton	455
v. Mayhow	219, 220, 221	v. Shortall	226
Morehead v. Brown	918	v. Watts	508, 532
Moreton v. Harrison	232, 234, 238	Mortimore v. Mortimore	460
Morey v. Herrick	133, 181, 215	Mortlock v. Buller 169, 176, 498, 507, 539, 770, 775, 777, 779, 781, 784, 787	
Morgan, <i>Ex parte</i>	209, 336, 337, 870	Morton v. Adams	458, 910
v. Elam	661	v. Barrett 305, 891, 894,	910
v. Halford	227	v. Naylor	68
v. Hannas	918	v. Southgate	511
v. Higgins	202	v. Tewart	82, 83
v. Homans	432	Mory v. Michael	32
v. Mallson	96, 97, 101	Mosby v. Steele	37
v. Morgan	324, 897, 450, 451, 547, 551, 584, 871	Moseley v. Eastern R.R. Co.	556
v. Otey	456	v. Marshall 329, 539, 540,	547
v. Stephens	907	v. Moseley	249, 257
Moriarty v. Martin	112, 254	Mosely v. Garrett	232
Morice v. Durham 116, 150, 157, 159, 507, 697, 703, 711, 712		Moser v. Lebenguth	184
Morison v. Morison	907, 910	Moses v. Levi	419, 422, 423
Morley v. Bird	136	v. Murgatroyd 98, 343, 414, 593, 594, 602 <i>ff</i> , 891	
v. Hawke	849	Moshier v. Knox College	246 a
v. Morley	347, 441, 914	Mosley v. Ward	900
v. Rennoldson	515	Moss v. Bainbridge	202
Morley's Trusts	337	v. McCall	647
Mornington v. Keane	122	Moth v. Atwood	183, 187, 188
v. Selby	183	Mott v. Buxton	305
Morony v. Vincent	892	v. Clark	218, 222
Morrell v. Dickey	891	v. Harrington	202
Morret v. Paske	206, 430, 431	Moulton v. De M'Carty	614
Morrill v. Harford	417	Mounce v. Byars	232, 239
v. Lawson	878, 881	Mountford, <i>Ex parte</i>	613, 617
Morrinan's Trusts	633	v. Scott	222
Morris v. Burroughs	201	Mousley v. Carr	468, 901
v. Joseph	206	Movan v. Hays	76, 79, 162, 226
v. Kent	272	Mower v. Hanford	590
v. McCulloch	214	Moyle v. Moyle	259, 417, 443, 462, 463
v. Morris	162, 540, 610, 771	Moyse v. Gyles	136
v. Mowatt	562	Mucholland v. Belfast	770
v. Nixon	206, 226	Muckenfoss v. Heath	918
v. Preston	290		
v. Remington	72		

	SECTION
Muckleston v. Brown	84, 90, 93, 151, 160, 165, 216
v. Tuller	262, 416, 419, 488, 440
Mudge v. Brown	672
Muggeridge's Trusts	388, 555
Muir v. Cross	232
v. Schenck	438
v. Trustees	182
Mulcahy v. Kennedy	861
Muldrow v. Fox	499
Mulford v. Shurk	591
v. Winch	205
Mulhallen v. Murum	200, 229, 230
Mullen v. Bowman	152
Mulligan v. Mitchell	745
Mulvaney v. Dillon	196
Mumford v. Murray	418, 419, 463, 468, 594, 626, 632, 645
Mumma v. Mumma	54, 143, 146
v. Potomac Co.	242
Mumper's Appeal	891
Munch v. Cockerell	404, 417, 454, 463, 467, 847, 851, 875, 878, 881
Mundine v. Pitts	218
Mundy v. Howe	612
v. Mundy	871
v. Vattier	598, 602g
Muntorff v. Muntorff	891
Murdoch v. Finney	438
v. Hughes	863, 865
Murdoch's Case	199
Murdock v. Johnson	783
Murless v. Franklin	126, 143, 145, 146, 147
Murphy, <i>In re</i>	555
v. Abraham	555
v. Bell	590
v. Bright	685
v. Dallam	748
v. Grice	626
v. Hubert	75
v. Moore	330
v. Nathans	144
Murray v. Able	238
v. Addenbrook	380, 381
v. Ballou	217, 221
v. Barlee	657, 658, 662, 663
v. Blatchford	425
v. Coster	228
v. Dehon	503
v. DeRottenham	915
v. Elibank	626, 627, 630, 645
v. Feinour	459, 465, 466, 467
v. Glass	82, 454, 544, 545, 551
v. Lylburn	836, 842
v. Murphy	182
v. Palmer	171, 187, 230
v. Pinkett	835
v. Vanderbilt	199, 207

	SECTION
Murrell v. Cox	416, 421, 423, 809
Murthwaite v. Jenkinson	305, 308
Muskerry v. Chinnery	530
Musselman v. Eshelman	205
Mussey v. Mussey	863
v. Noyes	590
Myatt v. St Helen's, &c., Railw.	750
Myercough, <i>Ex parte</i>	617
Myers v. McBride	511 c
v. Myers	189, 471, 612, 627, 910
v. Perigal	86
v. Wade	618
v. Zetelle	456
Myers's Appeal	206, 918
Myetsky v. Goery	685
Myler v. Fitzpatrick	246, 907

N.

Nab v. Nab	82, 84, 85, 86, 90
Nace v. Boyer	194
Nagle v. Bayler	191
Nagle's Est.	297, 506, 769
Naglee v. Ingersoll	665
Nail v. Punter	467, 849
Nairn v. Majoribanks	477, 552, 913
v. Prowse	236
Naldred v. Gilham	103
Nance v. Cox	541
v. Nance	457, 460
Nanney v. Martin	639
v. Williams	181, 182
Nantes v. Corrock	189, 662, 663
Nantz v. McPherson	219
Napier v. Howard	627, 632, 636, 645
v. Napier	626, 632, 636
Nash v. Allen	310
v. Coates	312
v. Morely	699, 711, 712
v. Nash	640
v. Preston	322
v. Spofford	246 a
Nathans v. Morris	918
National Bank, &c. v. Lake Shore, &c., R.R. Co.	242
National Exch. Co. v. Drew	172
Naylor v. Arnitt	305, 307, 329, 484, 528
v. Wynch	185, 199
Nazareth, &c. v. Lowe	239
Neal v. Maxwell	932
Neale, <i>In re</i>	613
v. Davies	433
v. Haythrop	126
v. Neale	185
Neally v. Ambrose	590
Nedby v. Nedby	667
Needham, <i>In re</i>	259
Needler's Case	849

	SECTION		SECTION
Needles v. Martin	748	Newman v. Jackson	602 i, 602 q, 602 r, 602 aa, 762, 782
v. Needles	188, 639	v. James	648
v. Winchester	48	v. Johnson	569
Neel v. McElhenny	864	v. Jones	849
Neeley v. Anderson	206	v. Meek	188
Neely v. Steele	783	v. Montgomery	380
Neeson v. Clarkson	231	v. Payne	202, 203
Neeves v. Burrage	474	v. Warner	273, 503
Neff's Appeal	438, 441, 914, 921	v. Williams	574
Negroes v. Palmer	114	New Market v. Smart	748
Neil v. Kinney	232, 239	Newmeyer's App.	733
Neill v. Keese	127, 138	New Orleans v. McDonogh	748
Neilson v. Blight	98, 598	Newport v. Bryan	260
v. Cook	914	v. Cook	615, 616
v. Lagow	62, 64, 312, 320	Newsome v. Flowers	433, 863
Neimawicz v. Gahn	554, 667	Newson v. Buffalo	226
Nelson v. Bridport	74	v. Thornton	243
v. Callow	506	Newstead v. Searles	222
v. Cornwall	863	Newton v. Askew	104, 111, 821
v. Davis	299, 305, 312, 357	v. Bennett	464, 468, 501, 901, 902
v. Duncombe	915	v. Bronson	71, 402, 409, 779
v. Hagerstown Bank	468, 869	v. Egmont	885
v. Lee	610	v. Hunt	188
v. Oldfield	182	v. Marsden	514
v. Seaman	878	v. Metropolitan R. Co.	812
v. Stocker	930	v. Pelham	84
v. Warrall	137	v. Porter	128, 135, 211
Nesbitt v. Berridge	188	v. Preston	137
v. Tredennick	129, 196, 538	v. Reid	652
Nettle's Charity, <i>In re</i>	735	v. Swazey	84, 231
Nettleship v. Nettleship	665	New York, &c. v. Stillman	334
Nettleson v. Stephenson	395, 397	New York Ins. Co. v. Ely	44
Neustadt v. Joel	596	v. Roulet	843
Nevare v. Rutton	863	Nice's App.	652
Neves v. Scott	359, 361, 367, 370	Nicholls v. Nicholls	192
Nevil v. Saunders	305, 310	v. Peak	598, 794
Nevill v. Nevill	119	Nichols v. Baxter	602 v
Neville v. Fortescue	451	v. Campbell	343
v. Wilkinson	171	v. Hodges	918
Nevitt v. Gibson	171	v. McEwen	590
New v. Bonaker	47, 741	v. Palmer	672
v. Jones	904	v. Postlethwaite	570
Newberg, &c. Co. v. Miller	761	Nicholson v. Faulkner	888
Newburgh v. Bickerstaffe	871	v. Halsey	347
Newcastle v. Lincoln	364, 373	v. Leavitt	586, 590, 591
Newcomb v. Keteltas	528	v. Tutin	593
v. St. Peter's Church	748	Nickell v. Handley	305, 652
v. Williams	263, 272, 426, 574	Nickerson v. Buck	891
Newcomen v. Hassard	658	Nickolls v. Gould	188
Newdigate v. Newdigate	540	Nickols v. McEwen	918
Newells v. Morgan	126, 149	v. Thornton	126
New England Bank v. Lewis	593, 594	Nickolson v. Knowles	246
Newhall, <i>Ex parte</i>	87	Nicoll v. Miller	259
v. Wheeler	299, 312, 848	v. Mumford	598, 594
Newill v. Newill	380	v. Ogden	259
Newland v. Att'y-Gen.	704	v. Walworth	17, 312, 318, 328
v. Champion	225	Nicolson v. Wordsworth	270, 271, 273, 503
Newlands v. Paynter	647, 648, 653	Niell v. Morley	35
Newlin v. Freeman	655, 660		
Newman v. Barton	244		

	SECTION		SECTION
Nightingale v. Burrell	380	Northcroft v. Martin	172
v. Goulbourn	41, 47, 61, 704, 720	Northen v. Carnegie	152
v. Harris	592	Northern Central R.R. Co. v. Keighton	918
v. Hidden	299, 324, 647	North Shore Ferry Co.	331
v. Lawson	533	Norton v. Frecker	871
v. Lockman	639	v. Gillison	918
Niles v. Stevens	402, 499	v. Ladd	863
Nimmo v. Davis	188	v. Leonard	299, 302, 305
Nims v. Bigelow	684	v. Norton	312
Nisbett v. Murray	903 a	v. Turvill	657, 663, 668, 863
Nivlon v. Douglass	585, 592	Norton's Estate	471
Nix v. Bradley	646, 650, 655	Norvell v. Johnson	232
Nixon v. Rose	647, 660	Norway v. Norway	270, 271, 898
Nixon's App.	126, 133, 137	Norwich Yarn Co.	907
Noad v. Backhouse	818	Nostrand v. Atwood	592
Noble v. Andrews	317, 357, 358, 841	Nottige v. Prince	189, 192
v. Brett	932	Nottingham v. Jennings	380
v. McFarland	676	Nourse v. Finch	150
v. Meymott	267, 291, 884	v. Merriam	738, 748
v. Morris	82	Nowland v. Nelligan	112
Noel v. Bewley	349, 351, 355	Noyes v. Blakeman	660, 680
v. Henley	550, 571	Nugent v. Gifford	809, 810, 811, 815
v. Jevon	322	v. Vetzera	603
v. Jones	119	Nunn v. Graham	680
v. Robinson	244	v. Harvey	618
Noke v. Seppings	826, 827	v. Wilsmore	600
Nolen's Appeal	639, 642	Nurse v. Yerwarth	347
Norbury v. Calbeck	900	Nurton v. Nurton	809
v. Norbury	457, 604	Nyce's Appeal	418, 453, 456, 467
Norçum v. D'Oench	511, 734	Estate	459, 914
Norfolk's Case	737	Nyssen v. Gretton	570
Norman v. Cunningham	843, 844, 847		
v. Hill	602 p, 602 aa		
Norris v. Chambers	71		O.
v. Clymer	610	Oakes v. Strachay	117, 449
v. Frazer	181	Oakley, <i>In re</i>	428
v. Harrison	544, 545	Oates v. Cooke	312, 313, 314
v. Johnston	555	O'Bannon v. Musselman	511
v. Le Neve	206, 228, 869	Obee v. Bishop	850
v. Norris	460, 894, 897	Obert v. Bordine	17, 328
v. Thompson	694, 711, 720, 765, 920	Oberthier v. Strand	126
v. Wright	457, 889	O'Brien v. Grierson	928
Norris's App.	229, 464, 470, 471, 901, 918	v. Lewis	202
North v. Barnum	863	O'Callaghan v. Cooper	517, 518, 901
v. Crompton	150, 151	Ocean Nat. Bank v. Alcott	142
v. Curtis	609	Ochiltree v. Wright	415, 417, 421
v. Pardon	154	Ockeston v. Heap	340, 494, 495
v. Philbrook	320	O'Connell v. O'Callaghan	890
v. Turner	593	O'Connor v. Haslam	601
North Adams Univ. Soc. v. Fitch		v. Spaight	871
	705, 748	Oddie v. Brown	396, 397
North Amer. Coal Co. v. Dyett	554	Odell v. Odell	384, 399, 687, 724, 737, 738, 748
North Baltimore, &c., Ass. v. Cald- well	195	Oden v. Windley	918
North British Ins. Co. v. Lloyd	179	Oeslager v. Fisher	458
North Hampton Bank v. Ballitt	438	O'Ferrall, <i>Ex parte</i>	632
v. Whiting	299	O'Ferrall v. O'Ferrall	533
North Hempstead v. Hempstead	43	Offley v. Offley	581
		Ogden v. Astor	178



	SECTION		SECTION
Page <i>v.</i> Cooper	768	Parker <i>v.</i> Gillian	225
<i>v.</i> Estes	627, 632	<i>v.</i> Hall	858
<i>v.</i> Leapingwell	160, 574	<i>v.</i> Kane	680
<i>v.</i> Lever	219	<i>v.</i> Kelly	330
<i>v.</i> Olcott	590	<i>v.</i> May	723, 748
<i>v.</i> Page	126, 133, 187, 139, 143	<i>v.</i> Nichols	299
<i>v.</i> Stevens	330	<i>v.</i> Sewell	237
<i>v.</i> Trufant	672	<i>v.</i> White	199, 521
<i>v.</i> Way	386 <i>b</i> , 555	Parke's Charity, <i>In re</i>	737
Pahlman <i>v.</i> Shumway	602 <i>bb</i> , 602 <i>ff</i>	Parkes <i>v.</i> White	646, 665, 667, 669, 670, 849, 869
Paice <i>v.</i> Canterbury	150, 699, 719, 722	Parkhurst <i>v.</i> Van Cortlandt	226
Paige <i>v.</i> Smith	762	Parkinson <i>v.</i> Hanbury	199
Pailon <i>v.</i> Martin	195	Parkinson's Trust	113
Paine <i>v.</i> Hall	216	Parkist <i>v.</i> Alexander	206
<i>v.</i> Miller	122	Parks <i>v.</i> Hall	226
<i>v.</i> Wilcox	137	<i>v.</i> Parks	298, 306
Painter, <i>Ex parte</i>	58	Parmenter <i>v.</i> Walker	602 <i>v</i> , 602 <i>w</i>
<i>v.</i> Henderson	195	Parnlee <i>v.</i> Sloan	137
Pairo <i>v.</i> Vickery	195	Parnell <i>v.</i> Hingston	100, 101, 162
Paisley's App.	117, 119	<i>v.</i> Lyon	513, 517
Paker <i>v.</i> Simonds	680	Parnham <i>v.</i> Hurst	345
Palairot <i>v.</i> Carew	770	Parris <i>v.</i> Cobb	863
Palmer <i>v.</i> Bate	69	Parrish <i>v.</i> Rhodes	149
<i>v.</i> Carlisle	873	Parrott <i>v.</i> Palmer	871
<i>v.</i> Davis	633	<i>v.</i> Pawlett	694, 724
<i>v.</i> Forbes	759	<i>v.</i> Sweetland	235, 236
<i>v.</i> Holford	380, 395	<i>v.</i> Treby	900
<i>v.</i> Jones	847	Parry <i>v.</i> Warrington	462, 508, 550
<i>v.</i> Mitchell	464	<i>v.</i> Wright	347
<i>v.</i> Simmonds	112, 113	Parshall's App.	209, 427
<i>v.</i> Wakeford	880	Parson <i>v.</i> Snook	335
<i>v.</i> Wilkins	334	Parsons <i>v.</i> Baker	112
<i>v.</i> Williams	221, 788	<i>v.</i> Boyd	330, 414, 602 <i>m</i>
<i>v.</i> Yarborough	602 <i>ff</i>	<i>v.</i> Dunne	630
<i>v.</i> Young	196, 538	<i>v.</i> Hayward	430
Palmes <i>v.</i> Danby	611	<i>v.</i> Jones	275
Pannell <i>v.</i> Hurley	246, 813, 907	<i>v.</i> Jury	218
Papillon <i>v.</i> Voice	359, 369	<i>v.</i> Lyman	262, 281
Paramore <i>v.</i> Greenslade	122	<i>v.</i> Parsons	629, 639, 641
Parcher <i>v.</i> Daniel	511 <i>c</i>	<i>v.</i> Winslow	458, 516, 552, 817
Pardoe <i>v.</i> Price	751	Partington <i>v.</i> Reynolds	890
Parfitt <i>v.</i> Hember	376, 383, 390	Partridge <i>v.</i> Havens	126, 143
Paris <i>v.</i> Paris	543, 545	<i>v.</i> Messer	212, 591
Parish of St. Dunstan <i>v.</i> Beau-		<i>v.</i> Pawlett	136
champ	695	<i>v.</i> Stocker	660
Parkam <i>v.</i> McCrary	230	<i>v.</i> Walker	693
Parke <i>v.</i> Kleeber	680	Paschall <i>v.</i> Acklin	694, 737, 748
Parker, <i>Ex parte</i>	236	Pascoag Bank <i>v.</i> Hunt	128, 135
<i>v.</i> Bloxam	429	Pascoe <i>v.</i> Swan	871, 872
<i>v.</i> Bodley	75	Passingham <i>v.</i> Sherborne	277, 297
<i>v.</i> Bolton	112	Pattenden <i>v.</i> Hobson	771, 890
<i>v.</i> Brooke	538, 647, 648, 665, 833, 834	Patterson <i>v.</i> Devlin	541, 546, 547
<i>v.</i> Brown	724	<i>v.</i> Flanagan	681
<i>v.</i> Calcroft	242	<i>v.</i> High	546
<i>v.</i> Carter	324	<i>v.</i> Linder	232
<i>v.</i> Converse	284, 320, 653, 671, 921	<i>v.</i> Murphy	82, 86, 96, 104
<i>v.</i> Crittenden	219, 221, 222	<i>v.</i> Scott	569, 573
<i>v.</i> Fearnley	570, 571	Pattison <i>v.</i> Hawsworth	866
		Patton <i>v.</i> Moore	220, 221

	SECTION		SECTION
Patton v. Randall	501	Pearson v. Morgan	171
v. Thompson	428	v. Pearson	903 a
Paul v. Chouteau	126	v. Pulley	855, 862
v. Compton	112, 116	v. Rockhill	585, 591, 594
v. Fulton	82, 221	Pease v. Pilot Knob Co.	511 c
v. Heweston	511 b	Peat v. Crane	455
v. Squibb	205	Peatfield v. Benn	293, 297
v. Wilkins	231	Peay v. Peay	324
Paules v. Dilley	275	Pechel v. Fowler	539, 770, 782, 816
Paulet v. Delavel	679	Peck v. Brown	521
Paup v. Mingo	94	v. Hendershott	678
Pawcey v. Bowen	529	v. Peck	602 ee
Pawlett v. Att'y-Gen.	40, 217, 325	v. Walton	676
v. Clark	743	v. Whiting	591
v. Herbett	466	Peckham v. Taylor	86, 100
Paxon v. Potts	569, 570	Peebles v. Reading	134, 135, 137, 141, 172, 217, 228
Payne, <i>Ex parte</i>	112, 116	Peebles's Appeal	262
v. Atterbury	231	Peek v. Henderson	765
v. Ballard	863	Peer v. Peer	147, 148
v. Collier	460, 884	Peercy v. Roberts	386, 555
v. Compton	828	Peers v. Ceeley	910, 927
v. Little	665, 894	Peiffer v. Lytle	137
v. Low	613	Peillow v. Brooking	671
v. Parker	876	Peirce v. McKeehan	137
v. Rogers	330	Pelham v. Anderson	699
v. Sale	312, 317	Pell v. Ball	900
Payne's Case	694	v. Cole	681
Peabody v. Eastern Meth. Soc.	730	v. De Winton	476, 792, 806
v. Tarbell	126, 137	Pelley v. Bascombe	863
Peacham v. Daw	827	Pells v. Brown	379
Peacock v. Black	228	Pelly v. Maddin	126
v. Evans	187, 188	Pember v. Knighton	701
v. Monk	654, 655, 656, 657, 665	v. Mathers	226
v. Pembroke	640, 642	Pemberton v. McGill	669
v. Tompkins	591	v. Johnson	686
Peake, <i>Ex parte</i>	236, 239	Pembroke v. Allenstown	126
v. Ledger	884	Pendleton v. Fay	225, 810, 811
v. Penlington	375, 767	Penfield v. Public Adm'r	98
Pearce v. Crutchfield	636	v. Skinner	748
v. Gardner	490, 771, 783	v. Sumner	710
v. Loman	515	Penfold v. Bouch	157, 520, 900
v. McClenaghan	312	v. Mould	97
v. Newlyn	230, 828	Penn v. Lord Baltimore	40, 71, 172, 325
v. Olney	72	Penne v. Peacock	489
v. Pearce	265, 274, 288, 846	Pennell v. Deffell	443, 463, 837
v. Slocombe	597, 599, 600	v. Home	869
Peard v. Kekewich	376	Pennell's Appeal	910, 918
Pearle v. McDowell	35	Pennney v. Avison	471
Pearly v. Smith	556	Penniman v. Sanderson	785
Pearse v. Baron	528	Pennington v. Beechey	219
v. Green	821	v. Buckley	701, 903 a
v. Hewitt	877	v. Giddington	109
Pearson v. Amicable Office	101	Pennock v. Coe	68, 769
v. Bank of England	242	Pennock's Appeal	195, 205, 428
v. Belchier	869	Estate	113, 119
v. Benson	202	Pennoyer v. Shelden	765
v. Crosby	592	Penn. Ins. Co. v. Austin	768, 809
v. East	185, 172	Penny v. Allen	8, 869, 871
v. Jamison	402, 408, 779	v. Cook	781, 785



	SECTION		SECTION
Penny v. Davis	259, 261	Peter v. Kendall	756
v. Penny	877	Peters v. Beverly	415, 421, 499, 501, 602 m, 765
v. Turner	248, 251, 255, 258, 714	v. Goodrich	186
Pennypacker's Appeal	471	v. Grote	637
Penobscot R.R. Co. v. Mayo	843, 923	Petersham v. Tash	243
Penrhyn v. Hughes	554	Peterson v. Grover	226
Pensonneau v. Bleakley	218	Peti. of Baptist Church	476 a, 928
Penstred v. Payer	701	Petit v. Smith	17, 150
Pentland v. Stokes	621, 858	Petit's Appeal	618
Pentz v. Simonson	685	Peto v. Gardner	605
People v. Everest	855	Petre, <i>Ex parte</i>	613, 614
v. Houghtaling	245	v. Espinasse	104
v. Jansen	210	v. Petre	614
v. Kendall	170	Petrie v. Clark	225, 809, 812, 814
v. Morton	341	Petriken v. Davis	593
v. Moores	33	Pettibone v. Perkins	602 v
v. Norton	275	Petteward v. Prescott	872
v. Steele	734, 748	Pettus v. Clawson	468
v. Tebbets	331	Petty v. Booth	648
v. Utica Ins. Co.	44	v. Petty	213
v. Webster	49	v. Styward	136
Pepper v. Tuckey	277	Peyton v. Alcorn	610
Peppercorn v. Wayman	270, 273	v. Bury	344, 414, 505, 511, 518, 519
Peralta v. Castro	84	v. Enos	205
Percy v. Milladon	207	v. McDowell	891
Perfect v. Lane	188	v. Rawlins	191
Perham v. Randolph	172	v. Smith	463, 468, 918
Perin v. Cary	45, 697, 724, 737, 748	Phalen v. Clarke	230
Perine v. Swaine	654	Pharis v. Leachman	841, 877
Perkins v. Boynton	468	Phayre v. Perce	217, 828
v. Cartwell	855, 863	Phelps, <i>Ex parte</i>	275
v. Cottrell	676	v. Conover	237
v. Elliott	660	v. Phelps	748
v. Kershaw	910	v. Pond	396
v. Lewis	262, 281	v. Seeley	82, 137
v. McGavock	268, 274	Phené v. Gillon	245, 909
v. Moore	262, 263	Philadelphia, Matter of	529
v. Nichols	146, 148	v. Fox	710, 743, 748
v. Pritchard	752	v. Girard	45, 384, 396, 399, 724, 728, 738, 748
Perkinson v. Hanna	221	v. Wills	748
Perrin v. Applegate	892	Philanthropic Society v. Kemp	573
v. Lyon	515	Philbrooke v. Delano	162, 232, 233
v. McMicken	43	Philippo v. Munnings	263, 574, 827, 863
Perry, Goods of	264	Philips v. Brydges	8, 13, 347
v. Boileau	647	v. Crammond	64, 126, 127, 131, 139
v. Craig	229, 230	Phillips, <i>Ex parte</i>	412, 605, 611
v. Head	126	v. Bank of Lewiston	438
v. Knott	848, 874, 877, 882	v. Belden	229, 230
v. McEwen	733	v. Buckingham	883
v. McHenry	132	v. Bucks	172, 174
v. Pearson	226	v. Bury	742, 743
v. Phelps	841	v. Bustard	918
v. Shipway	413	v. Eastwood	487
Perry Herrick v. Attwood	108	v. Edwards	778
Perryclear v. Jacobs	628, 632	v. Everard	786
Persch v. Quiggle	128, 206, 851	v. Garth	250, 257
Person v. Warren	56		
Personneau v. Personneau	466		
Persse v. Persse	185		
Petch v. Tutin	67		

	SECTION		SECTION
Phillips <i>v.</i> Gutteridge	576	Pierson <i>v.</i> Thompson	744
<i>v.</i> Hessel	630, 632	Pieschel <i>v.</i> Paris	714, 729
<i>v.</i> James	361	Piety <i>v.</i> Stace	464, 468, 900
<i>v.</i> Janes	361	Pigott <i>v.</i> Penrice	248
<i>v.</i> Medbury	514	Piggott <i>v.</i> Green	272
<i>v.</i> Moore	191	Pike <i>v.</i> Bacon	591
<i>v.</i> Mullings	104	<i>v.</i> Collins	639, 644
<i>v.</i> Paget	624	Pilcher <i>v.</i> Flinn	230, 861, 867
<i>v.</i> Phillips 151, 226, 244, 444,	444,	<i>v.</i> Randall	117
	930	<i>v.</i> Rawlins	223
<i>v.</i> Rogers	855	Pilkington <i>v.</i> Bailey	76
<i>v.</i> Sargent	547	<i>v.</i> Boughey	112, 160
<i>v.</i> Saunderson	237	Pillow <i>v.</i> Brown	166
<i>v.</i> Thompson	918	<i>v.</i> Shannon	219
<i>v.</i> Ward	328	Pilmore <i>v.</i> Hood	173
<i>v.</i> Winslow	759	Pim <i>v.</i> Downing	418, 419
Phillips Academy <i>v.</i> King	42, 44	Pinchain <i>v.</i> Collard	232, 237
Phillipson <i>v.</i> Gatty 457, 462, 467, 469,	870, 881	Pine St. Soc. <i>v.</i> Weld	737
<i>v.</i> Kerry	104	Pingree <i>v.</i> Coffin	82, 122
Phillpots <i>v.</i> Phillpots	131	<i>v.</i> Comstock	594
Philpot <i>v.</i> St. George Hospital	709	Pingry <i>v.</i> Washburn	214
Phipps <i>v.</i> Annesley	571	Pink <i>v.</i> De Thuissey	507, 508, 511
<i>v.</i> Kelynge	381, 390, 396	Pinkard <i>v.</i> Pinkard	97
Phoenix Bank <i>v.</i> Sullivan	593	Pinkston <i>v.</i> Brewster	863, 867
Phoenix Life Assurance Co., <i>In re</i>	331	Pinnell <i>v.</i> Hallett	475
Phyfe <i>v.</i> Wardwell	588	Pinney <i>v.</i> Fellows	79, 82, 126, 127, 182, 189, 161, 647
Piatt <i>v.</i> Oliver	127, 206, 881, 882	Pinnock <i>v.</i> Clough	81, 133, 135
<i>v.</i> Vattier 88, 228, 230, 855, 869	869	Pinson <i>v.</i> McGehee	82
Pickard <i>v.</i> Anderson	453	Pinston <i>v.</i> Ivey	863
Pickering <i>v.</i> Pickering	185, 450, 451, 467, 547	Pintard <i>v.</i> Goodloe	239
<i>v.</i> Shotwell	46, 700, 701, 730, 748	Piper's Appeal	275
<i>v.</i> Staniford	861, 867, 869	Pipkin <i>v.</i> Casey	814
<i>v.</i> Vowles 196, 336, 532, 538	538	Pitcher <i>v.</i> Rigby	203
Pickett <i>v.</i> Everett	639	<i>v.</i> Toovey	536
<i>v.</i> Johns	672, 673	Pitt <i>v.</i> Jackson	324
<i>v.</i> Loggan	187, 192, 230, 872	<i>v.</i> Pitnay	602 <i>w</i>
Pickslock <i>v.</i> Lyster	590	Pitts <i>v.</i> Bonner	848, 876
Pickup <i>v.</i> Atkinson	451, 547	<i>v.</i> Cottingham	171
Picquet <i>v.</i> Swan	32, 51, 277	<i>v.</i> Edelfph	830
Pidcock <i>v.</i> Bishop	171, 178, 179	<i>v.</i> James	701
Pidgeley <i>v.</i> Pidgeley	511 <i>c</i>	<i>v.</i> Pelham	121
Pierce <i>v.</i> Brady	438	<i>v.</i> Pitt	348
<i>v.</i> Brewster	590	Pitts's Case	165
<i>v.</i> Emery	757, 758, 759	Planck <i>v.</i> Schermerhorn	287, 590, 598
<i>v.</i> Gates	239	Platel <i>v.</i> Craddock	438
<i>v.</i> McKeehan	836	Platmone <i>v.</i> Staple	103
<i>v.</i> Pierce	132	Platt <i>v.</i> McClure	602 <i>ee</i>
<i>v.</i> Robinson	602 <i>f</i>	<i>v.</i> New York Railway	757
<i>v.</i> Scott	789, 812	<i>v.</i> St. John's College	700
<i>v.</i> Thompson	639	Player <i>v.</i> Nicholls	312
<i>v.</i> Thornley	639	Plowman <i>v.</i> Riddle	236
<i>v.</i> Waring	200	Plumb <i>v.</i> Fluitt	223
Pierpont <i>v.</i> Cheney	614	Plumbe <i>v.</i> Neild	544, 545
<i>v.</i> Graham	592, 593	Pluman <i>v.</i> Slocum	429
Pierson <i>v.</i> Armstrong	299	Plume <i>v.</i> Beale	182
<i>v.</i> David	232, 238, 239	Plumer <i>v.</i> Reed	206, 215
<i>v.</i> Garnet	112, 116, 249	Plymouth <i>v.</i> Hickman	82
<i>v.</i> Shore	196, 605, 611	Plympton <i>v.</i> Boston Dispensary	554
		<i>v.</i> Fuller	566
		<i>v.</i> Plympton	466

# INDEX TO CASES CITED.

ci

	SECTION		SECTION
Poage v. Bell	330	Portlock v. Gardner	228, 246, 745,
Pocock v. Reddington	453, 457, 460,		864, 865, 907, 923
	468, 508, 844, 902	Portmore v. Morris	226
Podmore v. Gunning	82, 181, 216	v. Taylor	188
Poillon v. Martin	203, 438	Portsmouth v. Fellows	275, 282
Poindexter v. Blackburn	546, 639	Posey v. Cook	305
v. Jeffries	627, 629	Postell v. Postell	380
Pole v. Pole	54, 143, 145, 147	Potter v. Chapin	748
Polk v. Robinson	814	v. Chapman	19, 505, 507
Pollard, <i>Ex parte</i>	71		510, 511
v. Cleveland	680	v. Gardner	598, 794, 795, 800
v. Downes	907	v. McDowall	243
v. Doyle	432	v. Pearson	205
v. Greenville	585	v. Saunders	217
v. Maddox	757	v. Thornton	733, 736, 748
v. Merrill	647, 649	v. Thurston	724
Pollard's Trusts	152	Pottow v. Fricker	319
Pollexfen v. Moore	38, 231, 272	Potts, <i>Ex parte</i>	275, 280, 282, 618
Pollock v. Croft	514, 517	v. Potts	372
v. Kasley	602 <i>dd</i>	v. Philadelphia Assoc.	710
Pomfret v. Winsor	433, 584, 863, 869	v. Richards	555
Pond v. Hine	261	Potts's Appeal	652
Ponder v. McGruder	328	Powell v. Att'y-Gen.	699
Pontet v. Basingstoke Canal Co.	752	v. Brandon	380
Pool v. Bate	512	v. Cleaver	455
v. Cummings	240	v. Cobb	194
v. Harrison	65, 160	v. Evans	438, 440, 444, 465
v. Lloyd	167	v. Glen	312
v. Morris	628	v. Glover	430
Poole v. Franks	820	v. Hankey	665
v. Glover	602 <i>j</i>	v. Knox	343, 414
v. Munday	407, 454, 467	v. Merritt	327, 437
v. Pass	243, 330, 602, 901,	v. Monson, &c., Manuf.	
	910	Co.	126, 132, 137
Pooley v. Quilter	195, 199, 428	v. Murray	199, 228, 229, 230,
Poor v. Hazelton	188, 639, 641		666
Poor of Chelmsford v. Mildmay	742	v. Powell	126, 468, 918
Pope v. Brandon	602 <i>e</i>	v. Price	361, 362, 828
v. Durant	602 <i>g</i>	v. Tuttle	409, 411
v. Elliott	555	v. Wright	885
v. Jackson	610	Power v. Lester	684
v. Pope	113, 114	Powers v. Bergen	610
v. Whitcomb	250, 255, 257,	v. Hale	187
	258	Powerscourt v. Powerscourt	701, 729
Popham v. Bamfield	308	Powis v. Burdett	580
v. Brooke	178, 210	v. Corbett	568
Popkin v. Sargent	723	Powlett v. Herbert	419, 844, 900
Pprcher v. Reid	655	Powys v. Blagrove	477, 540, 552
v. Daniel	668	v. Capron	506
Porey v. Juxon	94	v. Mansfield	144
Portarlington v. Soulby	71, 72	Poythress v. Poythress	819
Porter v. Bank of Rutland	86, 242	France v. Simpson	862
v. Doby	305, 359, 370	Prandley v. Fielder	668
v. Dubuque	237	Prankerd v. Prankerd	126, 146, 147
v. Morris	330	Prather v. McDowell	765
v. Tournay	547	Pratt v. Adams	596, 597, 600
v. Watts	901	v. Ayer	81
v. Williams	590	v. Barker	190, 204, 210
Porter's Case	698, 700	v. Beaupre	158, 814
Portington v. Eglington	189	v. Church	117
Portington's Case, Lady	94	v. Flamer	66

	SECTION		SECTION
Pratt v. Jenner	671	Primrose, <i>In re</i>	922, 928
v. Mathew	66	v. Bromley	260
v. Oliver	768	Prince v. Heylin	862
v. Philbrook	171, 175	v. Hine	618, 915
v. Pond	167	v. Logan	618
v. Rice	499	v. Sisson	299
v. Sladden	157, 158	Princeton v. Adams	733
v. Thornton	195	Pring v. Pring	216
v. Vanwyck	232	Pringle v. Allen	541
Pray v. Pierce	299, 302	Prior v. Talbot	263, 574
Pray's Appeal	440, 465	Prise v. Sisson	304, 357
Preachers' Aid Soc. v. Rich	724, 730,	Pritchard v. Brown	137, 165, 299
	748	v. Juinchant	253
Prendergast v. Lushington	439	v. Wallace	127
v. Prendergast	450, 451,	Probate Court v. Niles	689
	509, 510, 511, 547, 548	Proctor v. Thrall	184
Prentiss v. Hall	920	Proof v. Hines	192, 203
Presant v. Goodwin	119	Prop. of Brattle Sq. Church v.	
Presbyterian Cong. v. Johnston	17, 328	Grant	380, 385
Prescott v. Pitts	262	Prosens v. McIntire	131, 143
v. Walker	322	Prosser v. Edmonds	69
v. Ward	843	Proudfoot v. Hume	827
v. Wright	171	Provost of Edinburgh v. Aubrey	735,
Presley v. Davis	615, 863		741
v. Stribling	330	Pryn v. Byrne	229
Preston v. Grand	885	Pryor v. Hill	632, 633
v. Melville	544, 545	Pugh, <i>Ex parte</i>	636, 657
v. Tubbin	222	v. Bell	137, 195, 217
Prevo v. Walters	126	v. Currie	127, 136
Prevost v. Clarke	112, 251	v. Pugh	127, 135
v. Gratz	82, 197, 205, 228, 596,	v. Vaughn	329
	745, 850, 863, 865, 918	Puleston v. Puleston	90
Prewett v. Buckingham	863	Pullen v. Ready	184, 513
v. Coopwood	194	Pulpress v. African Church	511, 511 a,
v. Laud	602 o, 661		720
Price, <i>Ex parte</i>	480	Pulteney v. Warren	871, 872
v. Anderson	440, 544, 545	Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft	98, 100, 108,
v. Berrington	35, 189		367
v. Blakemore	775, 837, 841, 842	Purcell v. MacNamara	206, 230
v. Byrn	228, 229, 869	Purdew v. Jackson	626, 639, 641
v. Cutts	918	Purdie v. Whitney	598, 602 g
v. Dewhurst	182	Purdy v. Purdy	132
v. Gibson	348	Purefoy v. Purefoy	585, 597, 602
v. Great Western Railway	752	Puryear v. Beard	660
v. Hewitt	170	v. Puryear	660
v. Huey	766	Pusey v. Clemson	244, 918
v. Loaden	907	v. Desbouvrie	184
v. Lovett	69	Pushman v. Filliter	112, 113, 116
v. Maxwell	697, 700, 730, 748	Pussnell v. Landers	602 ff
v. Minot	17, 82	Putnam Free School v. Fisher	499,
v. Pickett	556		501
v. Price	98, 100, 219	Pybus v. Smith	306, 655, 667, 670, 847
v. Reeves	82	Pye, <i>Ex parte</i>	96, 98
Price's App.	860, 869, 999	v. George	217, 241, 828
Prichard v. Ames	647, 648	Pym v. Blackburn	226
Priddy v. Rose	69	v. Lockyer	388
Pride v. Fooks	397, 417, 457, 462, 472,	Pyncent v. Pyncent	881
	844, 894, 902	Pyron v. Mood	263, 303
Prideaux v. Lonsdale	104, 194		
Priestley v. Lamb	636		
Priestman v. Tindall	848, 876		

Q.		SECTION			SECTION
Quackenboss v. Southwick		281	Randolph v. Wendel		380
Quackenbush v. Leonard	132, 428, 770		Rankin v. Duryer		593
Quarles v. Lacy	602 <i>o</i> , 602 <i>y</i> , 771		v. Harper		126
Quarrell v. Beckford		915	v. Lodor	585, 593	
Quayle v. Davidson	112, 123		v. Porter		206
Queen v. Abrahams		17	v. Rankin		766
v. Commissioners		328	Ransome v. Burgess	612, 615	
v. Norfolk Comm'rs		478	Rapalge v. Hall	468, 918	
v. Orton		17	Raphael v. Bank of England		837
Queen's College, <i>In re</i>		743	v. Boehm	471, 472, 847, 901	
Queen's College Case		743	Rashleigh v. Master	556, 747, 891,	
Quigley v. Graham		676		894	
Quinn v. Marblehead Social Ins. Co.		98	Rastel v. Hutchinson		135
R.			Ratcliffe v. Dougherty		676
Raby v. Ridehalgh	457, 467, 848		v. Ellison		226
Rachfield v. Careless		94, 150	v. Graves		464
Rackham v. Siddall	245, 265, 304,		v. Huntley		674
	315, 337, 846		v. Winch	440, 482	
Radburn v. Jervis		572	Rathburn v. Clark		602 <i>r</i>
Radcliffe, <i>In re</i>		243	v. Platner		596
Radsall v. Radsall		162	v. Rathburn		162
Raffety v. King		856	Ravises v. Allston		591
Ragan v. Walker		127	Rawe v. Chichester		196
Rahn v. McElrath	591, 602		Rawleigh's Case		147
Rahn v. Rahn		82	Rawlings v. Adams		324
Raiford v. Raiford		918	v. Fuller		874
Raikes v. Ward	112, 117, 118, 386 <i>a</i> ,		Rawlins v. Goldfrap		615
	620		Rawson v. Lampeman		299
Railton v. Matthews		178	v. Nicholls		682
Railway v. Barker		810	Ray, <i>Ex parte</i>	647, 648	
Rainsford v. Rainsford	612, 847		v. Adams		112
Rakestraw v. Hamilton	232, 238		v. Doughty	415, 417, 418	
Ralston v. Telfair	150, 159, 891, 900		v. Pung		322
Ramey v. Green		541	Raybold v. Raybold	82, 127, 900, 918	
Ramsay v. Joyce		213	Raymond v. Holden		17, 328
v. Marsh	298, 299, 301, 306		v. Webb		764, 770
Ramsborger v. Ingram		680	Rayner v. Mowbray	250, 257	
Ramsbottom v. Parker		192	v. Pearsall		225
Ramsdall v. Craighill		640	Rea v. Williams		186
Ramsdell v. Edgarton	212, 291		Reach v. Kennegate	181, 226	
v. Sigerson		592	Read v. Devaynes		272
Ramsden v. Hylton	184, 186		v. Head	544, 545	
Ramsey v. Merriam	602 <i>s</i> , 602 <i>v</i>		v. Lichfield		571
v. Ramsey		918	v. Robinson	97, 259, 593	
Randal v. Hearle		112	v. Snell	359, 363, 369	
v. Randal		111	v. Steadman	94, 152, 437	
Randall v. Borkey	151, 154		v. Truelove	261, 264, 268, 401	
v. Errington	195, 851, 867		Reade v. Livingstone		647
v. Morgan		79, 208	v. Reade	342, 871, 872	
v. Payne		515	v. Silles		724
v. Phillips	186, 162		v. Sparkes	886, 888, 900	
v. Russell	538, 547		Ready v. Kearsley		75, 299
Randle v. Gould		672	Rearich v. Swineheart		226
Randolph v. Russell	538, 547		Rede v. Oakes		786
			Redenour v. Wherritt	260, 261	
			Redfern v. Middleton		299
			Redford v. Catron		235
			v. Gibson	232, 235, 237,	
				289	
			Redheimer v. Pyron	598, 794, 798,	
				800	

	SECTION		SECTION
Redington v. Redington	126, 131, 139, 143, 145, 146, 147, 347	Rendlesham v. Meux	768, 784
Redwick, <i>In re</i>	275	Rene v. Oakes	773
Redwood v. Riddick	863, 880	Renew v. Butler	195
Reece v. Allen	17, 328, 602 <i>aa</i>	Rennecker v. Scott	675
v. Frye	433, 863	Rennie v. Ritchie	275, 670
Reech v. Kennegal	900	v. Young	870
Reed v. Beazley	672, 673	Renwick v. Renwick	631
v. Dickey	217	Repp v. Repp	232, 239
v. Gordon	301	Reresby v. Newland	578
v. Johnson	601	Resor v. Resor	127
v. Lukens	82, 122, 231	Revel v. Revel	639
v. Marble	438	Revell v. Hussey	122
v. Norris	206	Revett v. Harvey	204
v. O'Brien	102, 878	Reynell v. Sprye	171, 173, 187, 214
v. Warner	206	Reynish v. Martin	512, 514, 517
v. Whitney	324, 342	Reynolds, <i>Ex parte</i>	198, 209, 275
Reede v. Emery	590	v. Bank of Virginia	594
Reeder v. Barr	242	v. Brandon	476 <i>a</i>
Rees, <i>Ex parte</i>	282	v. Bristow	715
v. Keith	633, 640	v. Jones	240, 346, 871
v. Livingston	82	v. Morris	132
v. Waters	627, 628, 631	v. Stark County	31
v. Williams	315, 358, 469	v. Waker	468
Reese v. Holmes	633	v. Waller	191
v. Wyman	171	Reynold's Settlement, <i>In re</i>	275
Reeside v. Peter	764, 770, 782	Rex v. Anstrey	511 <i>b</i>
Reeve v. Att'y-Gen.	40, 308, 325, 705, 721, 722, 729, 731	v. Commissioners	910
v. Parkins	816	v. Essex	910
v. Rocher	632	v. Flockwood	414
v. Strawn	133	v. Lexdale	236
Reeves v. Baker	112, 113	v. Netherseal	98
v. Brymer	615	v. Newman	700
v. Dougherty	855	v. Northwingfield	214
v. Herne	514	v. Partington	718, 724
Reformed Dutch Church v. Mott	744	v. Wallace	270
Reggs v. Swan	82	Rham v. North	205
Regina v. Fletcher	846	Rhett v. Mason	119, 250
v. Shee	328	Rhineland v. Barrow	229
Rehden v. Wesley	417, 446, 848, 876	Rhoades v. Rhoades	615, 616
Reid v. Blackstone	112	Rhodes v. Bates	104, 204
v. Fitch	82, 88, 127, 142, 143	v. Green	126, 221
v. Gordon	6, 321, 765	v. Sanderson	199
v. Lamar	655, 661	Rice v. Burnett	303, 310, 311
v. Morrison	324	v. Clegborn	195, 198
v. Mullins	433, 782	v. Gordon	187
v. Reid	79, 82, 248, 277, 297	v. Rice	226
v. Shergold	511 <i>b</i>	v. Satterwhite	380
v. Vanarsdale	97	v. Thompson	639
Reil v. Baker	602 <i>bb</i>	v. Tonnele	615, 617
Reilly v. Whipple	95	Rich v. Beaumont	656
Reinhard v. Bank of Kentucky	593	v. Cockell	647, 666, 668
Relf v. Eberly	861	v. Jackson	226
Remick v. Butterfield	602 <i>v</i>	Richards v. Baker	516
Relfe v. Relfe	234	v. Chambers	633, 655
Remnant v. Hood	903 <i>a</i>	v. Delbridge	99
Ren v. Bulkeley	784	v. Hazzards	591
Renard v. Graydon	592	v. Holmes	602 <i>o</i> , 602 <i>p</i> , 602 <i>u</i> , 602 <i>v</i> , 782
		v. Leaming	238
		v. Lewis	213
		v. Manson	127

	SECTION		SECTION
Richards v. Merrimack, &c., Rail- way	754, 757, 758	Ringgold v. Bryan	239
v. Perkins	818	v. Malott	436
v. Richards	79, 640	v. Ringgold	418, 419, 420, 458, 463, 468, 471, 475, 602 v., 769, 770, 851, 918
Richardson, <i>Ex parte</i>	585	Ringo v. Binns	206
v. Adams	181	v. R. E. Band	588
v. Baker	232	Ripley v. Waterworth	242
v. Bank of England	826, 827	Rippen v. Priest	338
v. Bleight	186	Ripperdone v. Cozine	239
v. Chapman	116, 259	Ripple v. Ripple	569
v. Cole	921	Rippon v. Dawding	656
v. Eyton	185	v. Norton	386 b
v. Hulbert	271, 503, 876	Rippy v. Gant	189, 190
v. Jenkins	260, 848, 876, 877	Rishton v. Cobb	515, 637
v. Jones	195, 230	Ritchie v. Broadbent	633
v. Larpent	885	Rittson v. Stordy	64, 327
v. Linney	200	Rives v. Lawrence	172
v. Richardson	97, 98, 101	Rivers v. Thayer	644
v. Ridgely	237	Rivett's Case	739
v. Rusbridge	903 a	Roach v. Gavan	614
v. Spencer	430	v. Haynes	511 c
v. Stodder	310, 312, 647, 666, 677	v. Hudson	215
v. Thompson	226	v. Jelks	468
v. Woodbury	336, 338	Roarty v. Mitchell	602 p
Richen v. White	645	Robards v. Wortham	564
Richeson v. Ryan	343	Robb's App.	127
Richmond v. Hughes	602 g	Robbins v. Bates	602 w
v. Tayloe	748	Robenett's Appeal	918
Richwine v. Keim	641	Roberdeau v. Rouse	71, 871
Rickett's Trusts	784	Robert, <i>Ex parte</i>	277
Ricketts v. Bennett	486	v. West	646, 653, 660
Riddle v. Emerson	86	Roberts, Matter of	918
v. Mandeville	244	— v.	280, 282, 283, 293
Rideout v. Dowding	151, 158	v. Broom	841
v. Lewis	665	v. Collett	633
Rider v. Bickerton	230	v. Dixwell	324, 358, 359, 369
v. Hulse	645	v. Kingsley	361
v. Kidder	126, 137, 139, 242	v. Moseley	310
v. Mason	555	v. Opp	127
v. Maul	230	v. Roberts	100, 103, 104, 165, 195, 214
v. Rider	130	v. Rose	239
v. Sisson	458, 768	v. Spicer	649
Ridgeley v. Johnson	274, 411, 412	v. Tunstall	229, 230, 869
Ridgeway, <i>Ex parte</i>	195, 457	v. Ware	133
Ridgway v. Wharton	84	v. Wynne	182
Ridley v. Hetman	855	Robertson v. Bullions	733, 748
Rife v. Geyer	118, 307, 311, 386 a	v. Collier	546, 547
Rigby, <i>Ex parte</i>	404, 409, 411	v. Gaines	262, 499, 501, 602 m
Rigden v. Vallier	136, 364	v. Johnson	366, 662
v. Walker	132	v. Macklin	141
Rigges v. Swann	75	v. Norris	633, 861
Riggs v. Murray	590, 591	v. Paul	602 h
Right v. Cathill	263	v. Robertson	215
v. Smith	298, 306	v. Scott	826
Riley v. Garnett	308	v. Skelton	122
Rindle, Matter of	54	v. Sublett	593, 594, 602 e
Ring v. Hardwick	380, 509 a	v. Wendell	901
Ringham v. Lee	243	v. Wood	864

	SECTION		SECTION
Robinet's Appeal	470	Rodney v. Chambers	672
Robins v. Deshon	343	Rodriquez v. Heffernan	243
v. Embry	287, 588, 590, 592	Roe v. Jeffery	380
Robinson, Matter of	259, 277, 282	v. Read	336, 337
v. Allen	253	v. Tranmer	379
v. Bishop	381	Rogan v. Walker	602 d
v. Briggs	202	Roger's Trust	556
v. Butler	602 v	Rogers v. Acaster	633
v. Comyns	304	v. Bumpass	639
v. Cox	214	v. Daniel	843
v. Cudwin	199	v. Dill	610
v. Cullum	602 v	v. Earl	226, 361
v. Cumming	13, 347	v. Fales	664
v. Dart	661	v. Jones	223
v. Gee	214	v. Linton	883
v. Geldard	573	v. Ludlow	810, 660
v. Grey	298, 305, 310	v. Murray	133
v. Hardcastle	383	v. Paterson	606
v. Hook	855	v. Rogers	151, 153, 205, 559, 562, 600, 672, 698, 826
v. Huffman	678	v. Simmons	134, 215
v. King	216	v. Skillicorne	795, 796, 800
v. Lowater	597, 795, 802, 803, 805	v. Smith	661
v. Macdonald	68	v. Soutten	616
v. Maulden	67, 330	v. Vail	591
v. Miller	324	v. Ward	661, 680
v. Pett	259, 428, 904, 916, 918	v. Wheeler	762
v. Preston	136	v. White	330, 668
v. Robinson	127, 164, 187, 398, 440, 457, 458, 462, 468, 469, 551, 607	Rogers' Appeal	891, 900
v. Smith	112, 207, 507	Rolfe v. Budder	647
v. Taylor	151, 152	v. Gregory	166, 828, 840, 861, 865
v. Tickell	117, 118, 620, 624	Roller v. Spilmore	172
v. Townshend	583	Rolt's Case	693
v. Wheelwright	671	Ronald v. Buckley	607
v. Woelper	642	Roofer v. Harrison	438
Robinson's Trust, <i>In re</i>	117	Rook v. Worth	605, 611
Robison v. Codman	322, 324	Rooke v. Worrell	572
Robles v. Clarke	140, 518	Roome v. Phillips	500, 766
Robson v. Flight	19, 273, 530, 803	Roosevelt v. Ellithorp	891
v. Harwell	86, 226	v. Mark	559
Roby v. Boswald	676	Root v. Blake	126
Roch v. Callen	862	Roper v. Halifax	597, 785
Rochdale Canal Co. v. King	869	v. Holland	17
Roche, <i>In re</i>	275, 279, 290, 291, 292	v. McCook	282, 238
v. Farnsworth	199	v. Radcliffe	152
v. Hart	463, 464, 468, 894	v. Roper	679
v. O'Brien	851, 861, 867	Roscommon v. Fowke	511 c
Rochell v. Tompkins	661	Rose v. Crockett	275
Rochester v. Attorney-General	746	v. Cunningham	93
Rochford v. Hackman	388, 555	v. Rose	747, 891
Rochfort v. Fitzmaurice	359, 360, 361, 362, 369, 371, 372, 374	Roseberry v. Taylor	584
Rockwood v. Rockwood	182	Roseboom v. Mosheer	262, 270, 735
Roden v. Jaco	602 p	Rosenberger's Appeal	852
v. Murphy	330	Rosevelt v. Fulton	171, 187
Rodgers v. Marshall	107, 108	Rose Will Case	724
v. Rodgers	541	Roshi's Appeal	730, 733
Rodman v. Munson	783	Ross v. Barclay	499, 500
		v. Duncan	65
		v. Ewer	655
		v. Gill	608
		v. Goodsall	509



	SECTION		SECTION
Ross v. Hegeman	132, 136	Russell v. Clark	244
v. Horton	222	v. Clowes	437
v. Morton	639	v. Coffin	299, 302
v. Ross	826	v. Dickson	652
v. Whitson	237	v. Dufon	602 ff
v. Willoughby	672	v. Jackson	77, 83, 93, 116, 126, 128, 133, 714
Ross's Trust	670	v. Kellett	624, 699, 726
Rossett v. Fisher	602 v	v. Kennedy	251
Rossiter v. Trafalgar Life Assur- ance Co.	779	v. Lasher	594
Rosslyn's Trust	395	v. Lode	126
Rothmaler v. Myers	272	v. Loring	544
Rothwell v. Dewes	126, 135, 215	v. Plaice	225, 768, 809
v. Rothwell	826, 827	v. Russell	768, 769
Roupe v. Atkinson	633	v. Southard	226
Routh v. Howell	406, 443, 465, 914	v. Woodward	593
v. Kinder	595, 877	Russell's Case	52, 53
Routledge v. Dorrill	379	Russell's Patent	67
Row v. Dawson	68	Ruston v. Ruston	562, 565, 571
v. Jackson	645	Rutgers v. Kingsland	218
Rowan v. Chute	122	Rutherford v. Ruff	191
v. Lamb	199, 602 aa	Rutland v. Rutland	154
Rowe v. Beckett	490	Rutledge, <i>Ex parte</i>	556
v. Chichester	538	v. Smith	79, 83, 320, 598, 798
v. Lewis	490	Ryall v. Rolle	68, 345, 438, 835, 837
v. Rowe	451, 666	v. Ryall	82, 835, 839
Rowell v. Freese	137	Ryan v. Bibb	328, 330
Rowland v. Best	468	v. Dox	215, 226
v. Morgan	373, 390, 476 a, 928	v. Doyle	217
v. Witherden	444, 463	v. Spruill	639
Rowletts v. Daniel	299	Rycroft v. Christy	102, 104, 105, 649
Rowley v. Adams	438, 476, 535, 536	Ryder, Matter of	616
v. Rowley	511 a	v. Bickerton	453, 460, 462, 467, 848
v. Union	665, 671, 849	v. French	849
Rowton v. Rowton	84, 324	v. Hulse	676, 678
Roy v. Beauforts	192	Ryland v. Smith	639, 640
v. Gibbon	825, 827		
Royall v. McKenzie	415		S.
Royds v. Royds	901		
Royer's Appeal	458, 463, 606, 607	Saagar v. Wilson	197
Rucker v. Abell	149	Sabin v. Heape	785, 800, 801, 802, 803, 805
Rudisell v. Watson	647, 649, 651	v. Stickney	602 o, 602 v
Rudland v. Crozier	119	Sacia v. Berthoud	225, 810
Rudyard v. Neirin	635	Sadd, <i>In re</i>	907
Ruff v. Summers	918	Sadler v. Hobbs	261, 416, 417, 419, 421, 422
Rugby School	700	v. Houston	660
Rumboll v. Rumboll	144, 145, 146	v. Lee	543
Rumfelt v. Clemens	680, 685	v. Pratt	511 a
Rumph v. Abercrombie	187, 189	Safford v. Hind	142, 206
Rundle v. Rundle	139	v. Rantoul	79
Rundlett v. Dale	590	Sale v. Moore	112, 113, 116
Runkle v. Gaylord	602 z	v. Saunders	633
Runyan v. Coster's Lessee	45	Salem Mill Dam v. Ropes	757
Rush v. Vought	173, 664	Salisbury, <i>In re</i>	605, 610
Rush's Estate	459, 460	v. Bigelow	498, 602 k
Rushloy v. Mansfield	189	Salmon v. Cutts	195, 199, 202
Rushworth, <i>Ex parte</i>	210		
Rushworth's Case	196		
Russell v. Allen	133, 138, 142		

	SECTION		SECTION
Salmon v. Hoffman	232	Saunders v. Webber	401, 410
Salomans v. Laing	877	Saunderson v. Stearns	262
Saloway v. Strawbridge	340, 494, 495	Savage v. Benham	639
Salsbury v. Bagott	830	v. Brocksopp	176
Salt v. Chattaway	160	v. Carroll	842
Salter, <i>Ex parte</i>	617	v. Dickson	891
v. Bradshaw	188	v. Foster	53
v. Cavanagh	151, 855	v. O'Neil	676
Saltern v. Melhuish	183	v. Tyers	859
Saltmarsh v. Barrett	152, 158, 468, 470, 471	v. Williams	204
v. Bean	209	Savery v. King	202
v. Burn	602 v	Saville v. Tancred	246
Saltonstall v. Sanders	687, 699, 705, 709, 712, 720, 724, 748	Savings Bank v. Bates	588
Salton v. Hanston	260	Sawyer v. Baldwin	903 a
Salisbury v. Denton	248, 251, 255, 256, 714	v. Birchmore	924
Salway v. Salway	443, 635	v. Hovey	186
Sammes v. Richmond	894	Sawyer's Appeal	262
Sampay v. Gould	287, 288, 375, 509	Saxon v. Barksdale	225
Sample v. Coulson	134, 137	Saxon Life Ass. Co., <i>In re</i>	851
Sanders v. Richards	809	Say v. Barnes	851, 918
Sanders v. Deligne	218	v. Barwich	171, 191
v. Miller	903 a	Saye & Sele v. Jones	312
v. Page	633, 653	Sayer's Trusts	385
v. Rodney	672	Sayers, <i>Ex parte</i>	345, 885, 887
v. Rogers	460, 847	Sayles v. Smith	602 u
Sanderson v. Walker	128, 195, 198, 902	Sayre v. Flourney	639, 642
v. White	724, 736, 744, 748	v. Frederick	137
Sanderson's Trust	119, 152, 886, 886 b	v. Townsends	132
Sandford v. Flint	602 ee	Scales v. Baker	842
v. Jodrell	882	v. Maude	98, 99, 101
Sandon v. Hooper	915	Scarborough v. Borman	646, 648, 652, 653
Sands v. Nugee	502	v. Parker	900
Sandys v. Sandys	578, 892	Scarisbrick v. Skelmersdale	160, 393
v. Watson	900	Scarpellini v. Acheson	640
Sanford v. Irby	305	Scarsdale v. Curzon	364, 373, 389
Sanford Charity	282	Scattergood v. Edge	377, 379
Sangston v. Gaither	592	v. Harrison	432
Sangster v. Love	602 n	Scawen v. Scawen	146, 147
Sansom v. Rumsey	183	Schaffer v. Wadsworth	920
Sargent v. Bourne	118	Schaffner v. Grutzmacher	127
v. Franklin Ins. Co.	98	Schafroth v. Ambs	652, 680
v. Howe	602 d, 602 i, 602 n	Schanck v. Arrowsmith	576
v. Sargent	551, 899	Schell, <i>In re</i>	918
Sartill v. Robeson	324	Schemerhorn v. Barhydt	238, 562, 566
Satterwhite v. Littlefield	918	Schenck v. Ellenwood	782
Saulsbury v. Denton	112	Schermerhorne v. Schenck	264, 344, 419
Saunders v. Bournford	347	v. Schermerhorne	581
v. Collin	855	Schieffelin v. Stewart	462, 471
v. Cramer	208	Schlaeper v. Corson	127
v. Dehew	217, 218, 828	Schley v. Lyon	311, 330
v. Gregory	456	Schnebly v. Ragan	234
v. Houghton	546, 547	Schnure's Appeal	559
v. Leslie	235, 236	Scholefield v. Redfern	544, 551
v. Miller	908	v. Templar	172
v. Saunders	891, 896	Scholey v. Goodman	672
v. Vautier	396, 509 a, 622	School v. Dunkleberger	117, 328
		v. Kirwan	463
		School Dis. Greenfield v. First National Bank	443

	SECTION		SECTION
School Trustees v. Wright	84	Sear v. Ashwell	103, 107
Schoonmaker v. Sheely	359	Searing v. Searing	639, 643, 647
v. Van Wyke	428	Searle v. Law	96, 100
Schoonoven v. Pratt	602 x	Sears v. Livermore	782
Schroder v. Schroder	872	v. Putnam	381, 382
Schutt v. Large	222	v. Russell	312, 380, 383
Schutter v. Smith	382, 391	v. Shafer	194, 201, 230
Schuyler v. Hoyle	639, 640, 641	v. Smith	232, 237
Schwartz v. Sears	602 cc	Seaver v. Lewis	562, 566
Schwartz's Estate	245, 765	Seaving v. Brinkerhoff	592
Scoby v. Blanchard	137, 165	Second Cong. Soc. North Bridge-	
Score v. Ford	825	water v. Waring	328
Scott v. Atchison	456	Second Cong. Soc. v. First Cong.	
v. Becher	816, 818, 827	Soc.	714, 724, 748
v. Colburn	754	Second, &c., Church v. Desbrow	116
v. Davis	195, 428, 670	Seddon v. Connell	878, 879
v. Depeyster	207	Sedgwick v. Stanton	214
v. Dobson	546	Seeley v. Jago	108
v. Dorsey	918	Seeling v. Crawley	672
v. Freeland	195, 205, 602 w,	Seers v. Hind	900
v. Gamble	602 v	Segond v. Garland	660
v. Haddock	850, 864	Segrave v. Kirwan	181, 182
v. Hastings	438	Selbert's Appeal	616
v. Hollingworth	551	Seichrist's Appeal	206, 215
v. James	633	Seidler's Estate	459
v. Knox	866	Selatter v. Cottam	904
v. Mann	199	Selby v. Alston	13, 347
v. Moore	361	v. Bowie	770
v. Nesbitt	71	v. Cooling	768
v. Nicoll	873	v. Stanley	237, 239
v. Orbinson	232, 237, 239	Selden v. Vermilyea	286
v. Perkins	546	Selden's Appeal	82
v. Scott	683	Sellew's Appeal	764
v. Spashett	629, 632, 636	Selph v. Howland	681
v. Steward	375, 766	Selsey v. Rhoades	206, 228, 229
v. Surnam	58, 239, 345	Selyard v. Harris	877
v. Thompson	210	Semphill v. Hayley	512
v. Thorpe	55	Semple v. Bird	232
v. Tyler	225, 512, 514, 516,	Senhouse v. Earle	834
	809, 810, 811, 815	Sergeant v. Ingersoll	218
Scott's Estate	891, 894	Sergison, <i>Ex parte</i>	54, 336
Scounden v. Hawley	325	v. Sealey	605
Scriven v. Tapley	645	Servis v. Beatty	232
Scroggins v. McDougald	195	Seton's Decrees	283
Scroggs v. Scroggs	511 a	Settembre v. Putnam	126, 127, 129
Scroope v. Scroope	54, 146	Sewall v. Boston Water Power	
Scrope's Case	511 c	Co.	814
Scruggs v. Driver	41	Sewell v. Baxter	139
Scudder v. Crocker	918	v. Denn	150
Scul v. Reeves	602 e, 602 m	v. Moxsy	101
Scully v. Delany	262, 419, 424, 440	Seymour v. Bull	769
v. Scully	878	v. Delancey	187
Sculthorpe v. Burgess	161	v. Freer	82, 863
v. Tiffer	439	v. Milford, &c., Rail-	
Scurfield v. Howes	416, 419, 421, 423,	way	757
	424, 847	Seys v. Price	611
Seaburn v. Seaburn	748	Shackleford v. Bank of Mobile	590,
v. Seagrave	674		591
Seale v. Seale	366	Shaeffer v. Sleade	173, 187
Seaman v. Cook	126, 127, 128, 132	Shafer v. Davis	184
v. Wood	355	Shaffer v. Watkins	591

	SECTION		SECTION
Shakeshaft, <i>Ex parte</i>	848, 876	Sheldon v. Dodge	590
Shales v. Shales	146, 147	<i>v. Dormer</i>	581, 597
Shall v. Biscoe	232, 238	<i>v. Easton</i>	734
Shallcross v. Oldham	204, 210	<i>v. Harding</i>	183
Shalter's Appeal	490	<i>v. Wildman</i>	863
Shankland's Appeal	299, 305	Shelley v. Nash	88
Shanley v. Baker	160	Shelley's Case	357, 370
Shannon v. Canney	680	Shelly v. Eldin	315
Shapland v. Smith	298, 305, 312	Shelton v. Homer	195, 308, 499
Shapleigh v. Pillsbury	299, 748	<i>v. Shelton</i>	75
Sharp v. Leach	104	<i>v. Watson</i>	369, 371
<i>v. Long</i>	134, 215	Shelthar v. Gregory	672
<i>v. Maxwell</i>	676	Shepard v. Pratt	137
<i>v. Pratt</i>	499	Shephard v. Stark	468
<i>v. Sharp</i>	271, 273, 290, 294, 337, 344, 503	Shepherd v. Bevin	109
<i>v. Toy</i>	634	<i>v. Mauls</i>	469
<i>v. Wright</i>	869	<i>v. McEvers</i>	88, 98, 261, 268, 274, 401, 594
Sharpe v. Cossent	388, 555	<i>v. Nottidge</i>	112, 116
Sharpless v. Adams	829	<i>v. Philbrick</i>	602 <i>bb</i>
<i>v. Welch</i>	438	<i>v. White</i>	143
Sharpsteen v. Tillow	783, 785	Sheppard, <i>In re</i>	282
Sharshaw v. Gibbs	552, 554	<i>v. Smith</i>	900
Shatter's App.	771	Sheppard's Trusts, <i>In re</i>	275
Shattock v. Shattock	658, 659, 663, 849	Sheppards v. Turpin	865
Shattuck v. Cassidy	71	Sheratz v. Nicodemus	234, 235, 237, 238, 239
<i>v. Freeman</i>	591, 593	Sheridan v. Jones	926
Shaw, <i>Ex parte</i>	386, 337	<i>v. Joyce</i>	808, 832, 835, 859
<i>v. Borrer</i>	476, 597, 789, 802, 915	<i>v. Welch</i>	602 <i>h</i>
<i>v. Boyd</i>	34	Sheriff v. Axe	432, 904
<i>v. Bunney</i>	199	<i>v. Butler</i>	671
<i>v. Burney</i>	97	<i>v. Neal</i>	206, 215
<i>v. Conway</i>	891	Sheril v. Shuford	918
<i>v. Delaware</i>	104	Sherman v. Burnham	654
<i>v. Galbraith</i>	320	<i>v. Dodge</i>	299
<i>v. Huzzey</i>	546	<i>v. Parish</i>	467, 602 <i>x</i>
<i>v. Lawless</i>	112, 123, 907	<i>v. Sherman</i>	569
<i>v. Mitchell</i>	626, 641	<i>v. Turpin</i>	655
<i>v. Norfolk Co. Railway</i>	758, 761	Sherrard v. Carlisle	632
<i>v. Pickthall</i>	903 <i>a</i>	<i>v. Harbrough</i>	152, 427
<i>v. Read</i>	143	Sherratt v. Bentley	270, 271, 898
<i>v. Rhodes</i>	395	Sherrington v. Yates	640
<i>v. Spencer</i>	157, 158, 225, 800, 809, 810, 814, 846	Sherwin v. Kenny	305
<i>v. Thackray</i>	191	Sherwood, <i>In re</i>	432, 923
<i>v. Turbett</i>	890	<i>v. Amer. Bible Soc.</i>	748
<i>v. Weigh</i>	314, 315	<i>v. Andrews</i>	98
<i>v. Wright</i>	312	<i>v. Read</i>	411, 602 <i>aa</i>
Shay v. Sessamon	641	<i>v. Smith</i>	615
Shearer v. Lofton	602 <i>e</i>	<i>v. Sutton</i>	228
Shearin v. Eaton	863	Shewell v. Dwaris	648
Sheatfield v. Sheatfield	361	Shewen v. Vanderhorst	474, 481
Shree v. Hale	388, 555	Shibley v. Ely	540, 863
Sheener v. Lautzerbeizer	590	Shields v. Atkins	433, 863
Sheet's Estate	81, 262	Shiers v. Higgons	191
Sheffield v. Buckingham	182	Shine v. Gough	218
<i>v. Orrery</i>	379, 516	<i>v. Hill</i>	781
Sheidle v. Weishlee	667	Shingley, <i>In re</i>	121
Shelborne v. Inchquin	226	Ship v. Hettrick	462
Shelby v. Perrin	237	Ship Warre, <i>In re</i>	68

	SECTION		SECTION
Shipbrook v. Hinchinbrook	416, 419, 421, 423, 424, 444	Simond v. Hilbert	239
Shipp v. Bowmar	655, 656	Simons v. S. W. Railway Bank	242
Shipton v. Rawlins	876	Simpson v. Chapman	430
Shirley, <i>Ex parte</i>	656	v. Gutteridge	244
v. Shattuck	918	v. Jones	605
v. Shirley	51, 277, 646, 647, 649, 653, 666	v. Moore	545
v. Sugar Refinery	232, 239	v. Munder	232
Shirly v. Ferrers	585, 600	v. Sikes	587
Shirras v. Caig	219	v. Simpson	672, 673
Shoemaker v. Comm'rs	41	Simpson's Appeal	262
v. Smith	132	Sims v. Huntley	602 <i>bb</i>
v. Walker	324	v. Lively	598, 794, 795
Shoofstall v. Adams	75	v. Marryal	67
Shook v. Shook	343, 411, 414, 884	v. Sims	562
Shoolbred v. Drayton	501	Simon v. Jones	34
Shore v. Shore	820	Simon's Trusts	455
v. Wilson	733	Sinclair v. Jackson	349, 402, 404, 409, 411, 412, 415, 528, 529, 779
Short v. Moore	627, 639	Singleton v. Scott	254, 408, 602 <i>o</i> , 602 <i>q</i> , 602 <i>x</i> , 602 <i>y</i> , 602 <i>z</i> , 602 <i>aa</i>
v. Wilson	920	Sisson v. Shaw	615, 618
Shortell's App.	851	Siter v. McClanachan	640
Shortz v. Unangst	334, 343	Siter's Case	633, 640, 641, 643
Shotwell v. Mott	699, 730, 737, 748	Sitwell v. Bernard	480, 550, 551
v. Murray	184	Skeats v. Skeats	143, 146, 147
Shouk v. Brown	652	Skeggs v. Nelson	238
Shovelton v. Shovelton	112, 120, 888	Skett v. Whitmore	86, 137
Shrewsbury v. Hornbury	705	Skillman v. Skillman	147
v. Shrewsbury	348, 581, 597	Skingley, <i>In re</i>	121, 477, 552
Shrewsbury, &c., Railway v. London & N. W. Railway	757	Skinner v. Dodge	243
Shrewsbury School, <i>In re</i>	427	v. McDonall	84
Shryock v. Waggoner	58, 279	v. Skinner	863
Shubar v. Winding	589, 593	Skinner's Appeal	641, 642
Shuman v. Reigart	641	Skinner's Trusts, <i>Re</i>	119
Shumway v. Cooper	611	Skipwith v. Cunningham	591, 592, 593, 602 <i>e</i> , 602 <i>aa</i>
Shunk's Appeal	918	Skirwing v. Williams	451
Shurtleff v. Witherspoon	918	Skrine v. Simmons	226
Siddon v. Charrells	218	v. Walker	65
Sidle v. Walters	77, 137	Skrymsner v. Northcote	157, 160, 397
Sidmouth v. Sidmouth	130, 143, 144, 146, 147	Slack v. Slack	146, 147
Sidney v. Shelley	157	Slade v. Rigg	761, 878
Sieman v. Austin	142	v. Van Vechten	197, 428
v. Schunck	142	Slaney v. Witney	272
Siggers v. Evans	270, 593, 596	Slanning v. Style	541
Sigourney v. Munn	136	Slater v. Wheeler	414, 877
Silcox v. Harper	732, 741	Slaymaker v. Bank	641
Silk v. Prime	567	v. St. Johns	75
Sillibourne v. Newport	511	Slee v. Manhattan Co.	602 <i>c</i> , 602 <i>n</i>
Silsbury v. McCoon	128	Sleech v. Thornton	637
Silverthorn v. McKinister	205, 501, 785	Sleight v. Lawson	862
Sime v. Howard	82	v. Read	676
Simes v. Eyre	877	Slemon v. Schurch	142
Simmonds v. Borland	586	Slevin v. Brown	311, 312, 475
v. Palles	593	Sloan v. Cadogan	98, 101, 102
Simmons v. Drury	569	v. Coolhaugh	602 <i>ee</i>
v. Horwood	648	Slocombe v. Glubb	213
Simms v. Smith	76, 86, 863	Slocum v. Barry	918
Simon v. Barker	714, 729	v. Marshall	77, 137, 201
		v. Slocum	733
		Sloman v. Bank of England	929

	SECTION		SECTION
Sloo v. Law	276, 413, 427, 822	Smith v. King	54, 151
Sloper v. Cottrell	17, 105	v. Kinney	490, 771, 783
Small v. Atwood	173, 639, 841, 849, 851, 874	v. Knowles	259, 260, 261
v. Ayleswood	260	v. Lansing	428
v. Ludlow	590	v. Leavitt	598
v. Marwood	270, 273, 585, 593	v. Lowell	591
Smart v. Bradstock	885	v. Lyne	104
v. Prujean	93, 108	v. Matthews	79, 83, 633
Smedley v. Varley	202	v. Maxwell	361
Smee v. Martin	613	v. McConnell	414
Smiley v. Dixon	538	v. McCrary	500
v. Wright	324	v. Metcalf	312
Smilie v. Biffie	621	v. Mitchell	171
Smilie's Estate	633, 641	v. Oliver	275, 724
Smith, <i>Ex parte</i>	412	v. Phillips	347
<i>In re Hay</i>	178	v. Pincombe	185
v. Acton	863	v. Porter	559
v. Anders	602 <i>bb</i>	v. Provin	199, 602 <i>p</i>
v. Atkins	759	v. Ramsey	127
v. Attersoll	86	v. Rickards	171
v. Atwood	630	v. Sackett	126, 133, 137
v. Aykwell	214	v. Smith	49, 117, 118, 134, 213, 270, 284, 305, 438, 453, 459, 465, 591, 603, 818, 890, 903 <i>a</i> , 924
v. Babcock	171	v. Snow	882
v. Baker	126	v. Starr	310 <i>a</i> , 652, 653
v. Bank of Scotland	171, 178, 179	v. Stowell	739
v. Barnes	821	v. Thompson	318
v. Bolden	900, 926	v. Tome	82
v. Bowen	217, 828	v. Townshend	195
v. Brotherline	202, 203	v. Walter	217
v. Bruning	214	v. Wheeler	270, 273, 806
v. Burnham	79, 127, 133, 137	v. Wildman	117, 118, 411, 511
v. Calloway	863, 869	v. Wilkinson	82
v. Camelford	126, 665	v. Wright	206
v. Clay	228, 229, 855	v. Wyckoff	573
v. Colvin	602 <i>bb</i>	v. Young	57
v. Cowdery	513, 517	v. Zaner	55
v. Cuff	212	Smith's Settlement, <i>In re</i>	282
v. Death	765	Smith v. Gray	126
v. Doe	602 <i>d</i>	Smyth v. Burns	459
v. Drake	195, 205	v. Carlysle	243
v. Dresser	907	Smythe v. Smythe	540
v. Dunwoody	380	Snape v. Turton	511 <i>c</i>
v. Evans	578	Sneesby v. Thorne	770, 809
v. Everett	809	Snelgrove v. Snelgrove	218
v. Foley	578	Snell v. Elam	127
v. French	849	Snelling v. McCreary	456
v. Guyon	795, 796	v. Utterback	137
v. Harrington	699, 920	Snow v. Booth	863
v. Henry	677	v. Callum	918
v. Hewett	677	v. Cutler	879
v. Hollenback	134	v. Teed	256
v. Howe	680	Snowden v. Dunlavy	35
v. Howell	82, 83, 85, 139	Snowdon v. Dales	386, 555
v. Isaac	428	Snowhill v. Snowhill	610, 611, 639, 641
v. Jameson	17	Snyder v. Snyder	648, 652, 676
v. Kane	627	v. Sponable	222
v. Kay	210		
v. Kennard	471		

	SECTION		SECTION
Soames v. Martin	118	Spear v. Tucker	541
Soar v. Foster	144	v. Ward	680
Soc., &c. v. Hartland	299	Speer v. Haddock	602 p
Soc. for Propagating the Gospel		Speiglemyer v. Crawford	173
v. Att'y-Gen.	701, 731, 736, 741	Spence v. Duren	171
Soc. of Orphan Boys v. New Orleans	748	v. Spence	305, 358
v. New Orleans	748	v. Whitaker	918
Socket v. Wray	52, 630, 633, 655	Spencer v. Anon.	602 s, 602 x
Soggins v. Heard	172, 863	v. Ford	602 e
Solier v. Eldredge	476 a, 551, 556	v. Hawkins	598
v. Mass. Gen. Hosp.	724	v. Smith	420
v. St. Peter's Church	748	v. Spencer	901
v. Trinity Church	121, 737	Sperling v. Rochfort	630
v. Williams	784	Spessard v. Rohner	315
Sollee v. Croft	836, 842, 864, 914, 918	Spicer v. Ayres	164
Soller v. Chandler	428	Spickernell v. Hotham	859, 863
Solliday v. Bissett	918	Spindler v. Atkinson	205, 428
v. Gruver	575	Spink v. Lewis	160
Somers v. Craig	647	Spinning v. Blackburn	681
Somes v. Skinner	246 a	Spirrett v. Willows	164, 635, 649
v. Stokes	200	Spooner v. Whiston	212
Sonley v. Clockmakers' Co.	38, 45, 240	Spotswood v. Pendleton	610
Sooan v. Philadelphia	748	Spottiswoode v. Stockdale	585, 593
Soresby v. Hollins	709	Sprague v. Smith	762
Sothron, <i>In re</i>	93	v. Tyson	660, 873
Sotone v. Scott	843	v. Woods	162, 299
South, <i>Ex parte</i>	68	Sprange v. Barnard	113, 116
v. Alleyne	310	Sprigg v. Bank of Mount Pleasant	226
v. Hay	426	v. Sprigg	162
South Scituate Savings Bank v. Ross	766	Spring v. Biles	256
South Sea Co v. Wymondsell	861, 862	v. Pride	195, 202, 670
South Yorkshire, &c., Railway v. Great Northern Railway	757	v. South Carolina Ins. Co.	585
Southampton v. Hertford	160, 393, 395	v. Woodworth	603
Southard v. Plummer	676, 678	Springe v. Berry	688
Southcomb v. Exeter	869	Springer v. Arundel	310 a, 652
Southeastern Railw. Co. v. Jortin	751	v. Walters	232
Southouse v. Bate	152, 157	Springett v. Dashwood	821, 900
Southwell v. Ward	277, 287	Spurgeon v. Collier	828
Souverbye v. Arden	103, 104, 161	Spurr v. Scoville	71, 72
Sowarsby v. Lacy	582, 610, 787, 793	Spurrier v. Hancock	122
Sowerby v. Clayton	461	Spurway v. Glynn	571
Spalding v. Shalmer	416, 597, 789, 796	Squire v. Dean	665
Spangler's Appeal	918	v. Harder	139, 162
Sparhawk v. Buell	418, 422, 426, 612, 618, 624	v. Whitton	173, 179
Spark's Estate	262	Squire's Appeal	76, 135, 205, 206, 226
Sparks v. Hess	232	Squires v. Ashford	634
v. Kearney	602 p	St. Albyn v. Harding	188
Sparling v. Parker	439, 551	St. Aubin v. St. Aubin	556
Speakman v. Speakman	380	St. George v. Wake	213
Spear v. Grant	242	St. James Church v. Church of the Redeemer	207
v. Spear	453, 612	St. John v. St. John	214, 672, 673
v. Tinkham	463, 468, 541, 547	v. Turner	869
		St. John's Church, <i>In re</i>	725
		St. John's College v. State	742
		St. Mary's Church v. Stockton	797
		St. Paul v. Dudley	347
		Staats v. Bergen	195
		v. Bingen	847

	SECTION		SECTION
Stacey v. Elph	261, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 273	State v. Holloway	171
Stackhouse v. Barnston	228, 229, 851, 872	v. Kock	348
Stackpole v. Arnold	226	v. Krebs	628
v. Beaumont	512, 513, 514, 515, 635, 636	v. Lord	413
v. Dameron	867, 872	v. Macalester	774
v. Howell	272	v. Mayor of Mobile	44
v. Stackpole	471, 472, 900, 912	v. McGowen	700, 748
Stafford v. Buckley	765	v. Mexican Gulf Railway	757, 759
v. Stafford	851, 870	v. Nicols	262
v. Van Renselaer	232	v. Northern Railway	759
Stafford Charities, <i>In re</i>	733	v. Paup	184
Stagg v. Beekman	555	v. Platt	916
Stahlschmidt v. Lett	481	v. Prewett	694, 748
Staines v. Morris	786	v. Real Estate Bank	588
Stainton v. Carson Co.	185	v. Reigart	632
Stair v. Macgill	550	v. Robertson	639
Stall v. Cincinnati	137	v. Rush	47
Stallings v. Foreman	195, 205	v. Simpson	456
Stamford v. Hobart	359	v. Somerville, &c., Railway	759
Stamp v. Cooke	257	v. Stebbins	44
Stamper v. Barker	34	v. Tolan	892
v. Millar	414	State Bank v. Marsh	918
Stanes v. Parker	902	State of Maryland v. Bank of Maryland	31, 588
Stanford v. Marshall	657, 662, 667	States v. Rives	757
Stanhope v. Toppe	187	Stacey v. Rice	658
Stanforth v. Staniforth	578	Stead v. Clay	668
Stanley v. Brannon	143	v. Culley	637
v. Colt	121, 737	v. Nelson	654, 658
v. Jackman	369	Stearnes v. Hubbard	84, 85
v. Leigh	364, 377	Stearns v. Brown	463
v. Lennard	305, 359	v. Mathews	676
v. Stanley	359, 578	v. Palmer	17, 302, 312, 320, 328
Stanley's Appeal	459, 851	Stebbins v. Eddy	174
Stansell v. Roberts	238	Steel v. Cobham	818
Stanton v. Hall	388, 626, 647, 648, 649	v. Steel	647, 648
v. Kirsch	677	Steele v. Kinkle	167, 228
Stanwood v. Stanwood	639, 640	v. Levisay	794
Stapleton v. Langstaffe	610	v. Waller	96
v. Stapleton	96, 185, 373	v. Worthington	165
Stark v. Canady	126	Steere v. Steere	20, 76, 79, 82, 83, 120, 133, 139
Starke p. Starke	643, 863	Stehman's Appeal	918
Starkey v. Brooks	151, 154	Steinberger v. Potter	364
Starkie, <i>Ex parte</i>	617	Steinman v. Ewing	680
Starr v. Ellis	347	Steinmetz v. Haltkin	645
v. Starr	75, 76	Stell's Appeal	415, 421
v. Wright	83	Stent v. Bailis	122
State v. Adams	742	Stephen v. Swann	55
v. Boston, &c., Railway Co.	756	Stephens v. Bateman	183, 187
v. Bryce	80	v. Hotham	786
v. Cincinnati	766, 795	v. James	888, 555
v. Commercial Bank	757	v. Lawry	612, 615
v. Digges	843	v. Stephens	379
v. Fay	847	v. Trueman	111, 367
v. Gerard	699, 781, 738, 748	v. Venables	438
v. Guilford	404, 415, 417, 418	v. Yandle	918
v. Hearst	262	Stephenson v. Hayward	585
v. Hollingworth	550	v. Heathcote	566



	SECTION		SECTION
Stephenson v. January	782	Stockbridge v. Stockbridge	309, 766
v. Stephenson	918	Stocken v. Dawson	904, 906
v. Taylor	171	v. Stocken	612
Stephenson's Estate	918	Stocker v. Whitlock	660, 685
Sterling v. Sterling	672	Stockley v. Stockley	185
Sterrett's Appeal	416, 418, 421	Stocks v. Dobson	438
Stevens v. Austen	340, 495, 770	Stockton v. Ford	202
v. Bagwell	29, 69	Stoddart v. Allen	593, 597
v. Beals	640	Stoker v. Yelby	330
v. Bell	585, 593	Stokes Trusts, <i>In re</i>	286
v. Buffalo and New York		v. Cheek	119
Railway	709	Stone v. Denny	172, 173
v. Dethick	578	v. Framingham	735, 743
v. Earles	602	v. Godfrey	185, 433, 863, 867
v. Ely	160	v. Grantham	590
v. Gregg	562, 568, 569, 570	v. Griffin	240, 748
v. Olive	672, 673	v. Hackett	98, 104, 338
v. Savage	636	v. Hinton	786 a
v. South Devon R. Co.	478	v. Keyes	602 <i>bb</i>
v. Stevens	438	v. Lidderdale	69
v. Wilson	126	v. Stone	109, 110, 147
Steven-son, <i>In matter of</i>	602 <i>m</i>	v. Theed	533
v. Agry	585	v. Welling	221
v. Brown	627	Stoner v. Commonwealth	642
v. Maxwell	918	Stonor v. Curwen	861, 869, 871
v. Phillips	918	Stoolfoos v. Jenkins	170, 849
Stevenson's Appeal	277	Storrs v. Barker	184
Estate	918	v. Benbow	385
Steward's Estate	547	Storry v. Walsh	802, 803, 805, 811
Stewart, <i>Re</i>	275	Story v. Gape	260, 869
v. Ball	677	v. Winsor	219, 221
v. Brown	126, 132	Story's University Gift	735
v. Dailey	165	Stouffer v. Holeman	232
v. Hall	593	Stout v. Higbee	594
v. Hatton	234	v. Levan	640
v. Hubbard	192	Stover v. Flack	134, 142
v. Iglehart	165	Stow v. Kimball	127
v. Ives	232, 239	Strafford v. Powell	360
v. Jenkins	686	Strange v. Fooks	851
v. Kirkland	68, 438	v. Smith	517, 519
v. McMinn	910	Strathmore v. Bowes	213
v. Noble	600	Stratton v. Dialogue	126, 127
v. Pettus	343, 414	v. Grimes	511, 514
v. Sanderson	467	Strauss v. Goldsmid	699, 702
v. Stewart	185, 668	Strauss's Appeal	232
Stewart's Appeal	643	Stretch v. Watkins	615, 616
Stickland v. Aldridge	84, 90, 93, 216	Stretton v. Ashmail	457
Stickney v. Sewell	297, 453, 457, 461	Striker v. Mott	305
Stiffle v. Everitt	626	Strimpfner v. Roberts	126, 137, 141, 865
Stikeman v. Dawson	53	Stringer v. Harper	918
Stile v. Griffin	232	Stringham v. Brown	602 <i>ee</i>
v. Thompson	496	Strode v. Russell	336
Stileman v. Ashdown	54, 145, 146, 149	Strong v. Brewer	546
Still v. Ruly	49	v. Carrier	591
Stilwell v. Wilkinson	187	v. Glasgow	76
Stimpson v. Fries	602 <i>h</i> , 602 <i>aa</i>	v. Ingraham	571
Stine v. Wilkon	602 <i>p</i> , 602 <i>r</i> , 782	v. Perkins	93
Stiner v. Stiner	1:2	v. Skinner	590, 591
Stock v. Moyse	122	v. Smith	642
v. Vining	903 <i>a</i>	v. Willis	268

	SECTION		SECTION
Strother v. Law	602 <i>n</i>	Sutton Colefield's Case	830
Stroud v. Burnett	562, 566	Suydam v. Martin	217
v. Grozer	671	Swaine v. Perine	554
v. Gwyer	430, 551	Swale v. Swale	418, 818
v. Norman	511 <i>a</i>	Swallow v. Binns	580
Stroughill v. Anstey	597, 768, 783, 785, 795, 797, 800, 801, 810, 812	Swan, <i>In re</i>	630
v. Gulliver	208	v. Frick	97
Stuart v. Bruere	550	v. Ligan	220, 541
v. Bute	603	Swarez v. Pumpelly	287
v. Carson	562	Swarr's Appeal	733
v. Kirkwall	657, 658, 662	Swartswalter's Account	918
v. Kissam	195, 428, 647, 648, 654	Swartwout v. Burr	56
v. Stuart	539	Swartz v. Swartz	206
Stubbs v. Gargan	630	Swasey v. Amer. Bible Soc.	699, 700, 706, 748
v. Roth	196	v. Little	796
v. Sargon	112, 159, 253, 712, 715	Swearingin v. Slicer	592
Studholme v. Hodgson	622, 903 <i>a</i>	Swedesborough Church v. Shivers	733
Stulz Trusts, <i>In re</i>	388, 555	Sweeney v. Sampson	694, 700, 748
Stump v. Gaby	199, 202, 227, 852	v. Smith	680
Sturges v. Dimsdale	573	Sweet v. Jacocks	206
v. Knapp	280, 749	v. Southcote	222
Sturgis v. Champneys	626, 629, 632, 633, 634	Sweetapple v. Bindon	323, 324, 366
v. Corp	655, 670	Sweeting v. Sweeting	327
v. Morse	863, 865, 872	Sweezy v. Thayer	611
Sturt v. Mellish	17	Sweigart v. Berks	556, 733
Sturtevant v. Jaques	157, 158, 159, 814	Swift, <i>Ex parte</i>	613, 618
Stuyvesant, <i>In re</i>	283	v. ———	920
v. Hall	241	v. Davis	147
Styan, <i>In re</i>	438	v. Gregson	256
Styer v. Freas	783	Swinburne v. Swinburne	137, 142
Styles v. Guy	262, 419, 424, 440, 453, 870	Swindall v. Swindall	471
Succession of Wilder	34	Swinfen v. Swinfen	348, 443, 446
Suir Island Charity School, <i>In re</i>	737	Swink v. Snodgrass	225
Sugden v. Crossland	274, 427	Swinnock v. Crisp	618
Sugg v. Tillman	591	Swinton v. Egleston	160
Suidam v. Martin	591	Swissholm's Appeal	204, 209
Sumner v. Marcy	72	Switzer v. Skiles	84, 401
Sumrall v. Chaffin	774	Swoyer's Appeal	453, 590, 786 <i>a</i>
Sunderland v. Sunderland	141, 147	Syester v. Brewer	864
Supple v. Lawson	256	Sykes v. Hastings	432
Susquehanna Bridge Co. v. Gen- eral Ins. Co.	754	v. Sheard	493, 778, 784
Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Bon- ham	757	Sykes's Trust	657, 658
Sussex v. Worth	528	Sylvester v. Jarman	337
Sutcliffe v. Cole	152	v. Wilson	305
Sutherland v. Brush	421	Symes v. Hughes	214
v. Cook	449, 451, 551	Symon's Case	724
Sutphen v. Fowler	780	Symson v. Turner	303, 305, 309
Sutton v. Cradock	541	Synge v. Hales	357, 360, 377
v. Hanford	590	Synnot v. Simpson	593
v. Jewke	515	Sypher v. McHenry	197
v. Jones	199, 432, 530		
v. Sharp	464, 468		

## T.

Tabb v. Archer	34
v. Baird	299, 303
Tabele v. Tabele	602 <i>f</i>
Tabor v. Grover	13
Taft v. Providence, &c., Railway	545

	SECTION		SECTION
Taggart v. Baldwin	640	Taylor v. Benham	64, 131, 336, 415,
v. Taggart	364		441, 602 m, 765, 855
Tainter v. Clark	499, 500, 700, 748,	v. Biddal	379
	765, 921	v. Boardman	215
Tait v. Jenkins	819	v. Bond	547
v. Northwick	600	v. Clark	550, 551
v. Lathbury	766	v. Crompton	871
Taite v. Swinslead	498	v. Dickinson	413
Talbot v. Bowen	84	v. Galloway	769
v. Calvert	652	v. George	112
v. Cook	438	v. Glanville	280, 476 a, 667,
v. Dennis	640		894, 901, 922, 928
v. Mansfield	822, 823, 826	v. Gooche	865
v. Marshfield	474	v. Hawkins	811
v. Radnor	272, 476 a, 922, 928	v. Haygarth	157, 327, 434, 437
v. Scott	818	v. Hibbert	550, 551
v. Staniforth	188	v. Hopkins	402
Taliaferro v. Minor	918	v. Huber	920
v. Taliaferro	126, 133, 135	v. Hunter	232, 237, 239
Talley v. Starke	610	v. James	109, 143
Tally v. Thompson	676	v. King	17, 328, 602 i,
Tanaux v. Ball	918		602 aa
Taner v. Ivie	800	v. Lucas	160
Tann v. Tann	903 a	v. Luther	226
Tanner v. Dancy	892	v. McKinney	232
v. Elworthy	129, 196, 588	v. Meads	656
v. Hicks	232	v. Millington	267
Tapley v. Butterfield	814	v. Mitchell	715
Tappan v. Deblois	694, 705, 724, 780,	v. Morris	499
	748	v. Phillips	605
Tappenden v. Burgess	587	v. Plumer	345, 835, 837, 842
Tarback v. Marbury	590	v. Pownal	82, 95, 122
Tardiff v. Robinson	535	v. Pugh	213
Targus v. Puget	364	v. Radd	226
Tarleton v. Hornby	848, 875	v. Roberts	415
v. Vietes	84	v. Root	892
Tarpley v. Poaze	126	v. Salmon	206, 885
Tarr v. Williams	655, 660	v. Shelton	678
Tarsley's Trust, <i>In re</i>	648	v. Shum	536
Tarver v. Tarver	182	v. Stibbert	217, 828
Tasburgh's Case	630	v. Tabrum	781, 848, 876, 901
Tasker v. Small	122, 874	v. Taylor	54, 109, 139, 146,
Tassey's Trust	652		147, 162, 194, 201, 654,
Tastor v. Marriott	196		667
Tatam v. Williams	869	v. Weld	226
Tate v. Connor	863	Taylor's Case	697
v. Leithhead	87, 105	Tayman v. Mitchell	171
Tatham v. Drummond	668, 709	Teague v. Dendy	618
v. Vernon	357, 359	Teakle v. Bailey	206
Tatlock v. Smith	585	Teas's Appeal	573
Tator v. Tator	380	Tebbetts v. Tilton	126, 133
Tavener v. Robinson	921	Tebbitt v. Tebbitt	364
Taylor, <i>Ex parte</i>	587	Tebbs v. Carpenter	438, 440, 444, 464,
<i>In re</i>	895, 904		465, 468, 471, 527, 900, 902
v. Allen	816, 818	Tee v. Ferris	511 a
v. Alloway	232	Telford v. Barrey	404, 779
v. Alston	144, 147	Teller v. Bishop	678
v. Ashton	171	Tempest, <i>In re</i>	89, 55, 59, 277
v. Atkins	602 p	Temple v. Hawley	34, 365
v. Austen	633	Tenant v. Brown	121
v. Bacon	117	Tendrill v. Smith	201

	SECTION		SECTION
Teneick v. Simpson	88, 231	Thompson v. Gaillard	765
Tennant v. Stoney	598, 649	v. Galloupe	518
Tennent v. Tennent	390	v. Garwood	511 c
Tenny v. Jones	355	v. Gibson	299
Terhune v. Colton	576	v. Grant	337
Terrell v. Matthews	416, 423	v. Griffin	612
Terrett v. Crombie	218, 222	v. Harrison	'851
v. Taylor	743	v. Houze	602 <i>qq</i>
Terry v. Brunson	683, 639	v. Judge	202
v. Collier	298	v. Leach	259, 270
v. Hopkins	213	v. Lediard	750
v. Terry 453, 476, 605, 610, 621,	915	v. McDonald	918
	562	v. McGaw	869
Tessier v. Wyse	254	v. McKissick	113, 253
Thacker v. Kay	380	v. Meek	270
Thackery v. Sampson	68	v. Murray	48
Thalheimer v. Brinckerhoff	274, 921	v. Norris	251
Thatcher v. Candee	268	v. Parker	128
v. Corder	298, 299, 302	v. Quimly	93
v. Omans	849	v. Shakespear	710
Thayer v. Gould	88, 90, 93, 272	v. Simpson	361, 833, 860,
v. Wellington	511 b		867
v. Thayer	693	v. Spiers	438
The Skinners' Case	363	v. Thompson	75, 109, 134,
Theebridge v. Kilburn	379, 394, 737		143, 146, 166, 275, 324,
Thelluson v. Woodford	693, 725		526; 699, 700, 712
Thetford School	136	v. Wheatley	195
Thicknesse v. Vernon	665	Thompson's Appeal	127, 128
Thomas v. Bennett	863	Thong v. Bedford	317
v. Brinsfield	433	Thorby v. Yates	654, 667, 889, 900,
v. Bowman	143, 144		901
v. Chicago	878	Thorn v. Newman	347
v. Dunning	704, 706, 710	Thornber v. Wilson	701
v. Ellmaker	661	Thornborough v. Baker	226
v. Folwell	282	Thorndike v. Hunt	828
v. Higham	257	v. Loring	393, 737
v. Hole	586, 591, 592	Thorner v. Thorner	134
v. Jenks	641	Thornhill v. Gilmer	602 i
v. Kelsoe	627, 632	Thornton v. Boyden	782
v. Kennedy	171, 172	v. Ellis	450, 451
v. McCann	162	v. Henry	84
v. McCormack	871	v. Howe	700
v. Oakley	404, 420	v. Irwin	602 v
v. Scruggs	189, 627, 628	v. Jarvin	199
v. Sheppard	221	v. Knox	235, 237, 239
v. Stone	858, 863, 871, 872	v. Stokill	842
v. Thomas	774	v. Wilson	703
v. Townsend	126	v. Winston	270
v. Walker	213	Thorp, <i>In re</i>	429, 462, 463, 464, 468
v. Williams	511 b	v. Fleming	737
Thomlinson v. Dighton	654	v. Jackson	878
Thompson v. Beaseley	770, 787	v. McCallum	195, 198, 430
v. Blackstone	229, 230, 863	v. Owen	117
v. Blair	184	Thorpe v. Owen	86, 96, 118, 119
v. Branch	465	Thrupp v. Collett	715
v. Brown	699	v. Harmon	665
v. Corby	639	Thrupton v. Att'y-Gen.	75, 509 b
v. Ellsworth	402, 418, 850	Thurston v. Dickinson	562
v. Finch	359	v. Essington	620
v. Fisher	330	v. Prentiss	602 f, 602 p
v. Ford		v. Thurston	562

	SECTION		SECTION
Thynn v. Thynn	181, 182, 226	Torrey v. Buck	171, 180
Tibbits v. Tibbits	112, 113, 116, 123	Totham v. Vernon	100
Tidd v. Lister	329, 526, 540, 626, 634,	Tottenham, <i>In re</i>	196
	818	Tourney v. Sinclair	673
Tiernan v. Bean	232, 238	Tourville v. Naish	221
v. Poor	97	Tower v. Bank of River Raisin	588
v. Rescaniere	855	Towers v. Hagner	664, 665
v. Roland	231	v. Moore	226
v. Thurman	237, 239	Towle v. Mack	910
Tierney v. Moody	305	v. Swasey	899
v. Wood	83, 105	Towne v. Ammidown	262, 417, 420,
Tiffany v. Clark	197, 205		426
Tiffin v. Longman	258	Townend v. Townend	429, 430, 464
Tilbury v. Barbut	380	Townley v. Bidwell	704
Tilley v. Bridges	871	v. Bond	267
Tillinghast v. Champlin	814	v. Sherborne	334, 412, 415,
v. Coggeshall	324, 361,		416, 417, 419
	476 a, 928	Townsend, <i>Ex parte</i>	402, 405
Tilton v. Hunter	241	v. Barber	422
v. Tilton	84, 186	v. Carns	701
Timbers v. Katz	639	v. Early	388
Timson v. Ramsbottom	438	v. Wilson	344, 414, 492,
Tindall v. Harkinson	175		505
Tinnen v. McCane	863	v. Windham	68, 665
Tippetts v. Walker	757	Townshend v. Brooke	891, 894
Tipping v. Power	892	v. Champenown	349
Tipton v. Powell	151, 165	v. Stangroom	176, 185, 226
Titcomb v. Currier	786 a	v. Townshend	855, 861,
v. Morrill	81, 162		863, 865
Titley v. Durant	672	v. Westacott	149
v. Wolstenholme	294, 339, 340,	Townson v. Tickell	259, 270, 273
	494, 495	Tracy v. Keith	680
Toby v. McAllister	232, 237	v. Sackett	189
Todd v. Buckman	592, 602	v. Strong	556
v. Lee	660	v. Tracy	570
v. Moore	205	Trafford v. Boehm	380, 455, 460, 462,
v. Todd	562		848, 877
v. Wilson	904	v. Trafford	373
Toder v. Sansom	395	Tramp's Case	486
Toker v. Toker	98, 104	Trans. University v. Clay	466
Tolar v. Tolar	98, 104, 109, 161	Trapnal v. Brown	85
Tollemache v. Coventry	373	Trask v. Donaghue	259, 262
Toller v. Carteret	71	Travell v. Danvers	275
Toman v. Dunlop	523	Travers v. Townshend	901
Tombs v. Rock	573	Travinger v. McBurney	214
Tomkyns v. Ladbroke	635	Travis v. Illingworth	290, 291
Tomlin v. Hatfield	413	Treadwell v. Cordis	499
Tomlinson v. Dighton	657	v. Salisbury Mills	757
v. Steers	347	Treat's Appeal	38, 720, 724, 748
Tompkins v. Mitchell	136, 238, 337	Treats v. Stanton	330
v. Powell	218	Tregonwell v. Sydenham	151, 152,
v. Tompkins	569		160, 380, 385, 390, 396
v. Wheeler	585, 593	Trembles v. Harrison	55
v. Willan	315	Tremper v. Burton	143, 147
Tompkyn v. Sandys	248	Trench v. Harrison	126, 127, 138, 842
Tongue v. Nutwell	380	Trent v. Hanning	312
Topham v. Duke of Portland	511,	v. Harding	309
	511 a	v. Trent	569
Toppan v. Ricomio	816	Trenton Banking Co. v. Woodruff	647
Torbett v. Twining	649	Trevanion v. Morse	219
Torrey v. Bank of Orleans	129, 206	v. Vivian	622

	SECTION		SECTION
Trevelle v. Coke	536	Tudor v. Samyne	653
Trevelyan v. Charter	204, 229, 230	Tuffnell v. Page	739
Treves v. Townshend	464, 468	Tullett v. Armstrong	646, 648, 652, 653, 657, 658, 670, 671
Trevor v. Trevor	347, 361, 369, 371, 390, 828, 834	v. Tullett	605, 611
Trexler v. Miller	182	Tullock v. Hartley	71
Trezavant v. Howard	64	Tunnard v. Littell	133
Tribble v. Oldham	235	Tunno, <i>Ex parte</i>	275, 282, 297
Trickey v. Trickey	397	Tunstall v. Boothby	69
Trimbletown v. Colt	584	v. Trappes	222
v. Hammil	468	Tupper v. Fuller	554
Trimmer v. Bayne	150	Tupple v. Viers	232
Trimmer Church v. Watson	559	Turnage v. Green	918
Trinity College v. Brown	326	Turnbull v. Gadsden	171, 174
Triplett v. Jamson	918	Turner, <i>Ex parte</i>	240, 795, 802
Tripp v. Frazier	160, 575	<i>In re</i>	309
Tritt v. Colwell	640	v. Buck	346
v. Crotzer	75, 77, 83	v. Corney	402, 821, 912
Trollop v. Linton	34, 511 c	v. Davis	633
Trot v. Vernon	112, 569, 570	v. Frampton	476 a, 928
v. Dawson	907	v. Harvey	177, 180, 770
Trotter v. Blocker	60, 65	v. Hill	196
v. Erwin	232, 234	v. Hoole	212
Trower v. Knightley	498	v. Jaycox	585
Troy v. Haskell	45	v. Johnson	602 g, 602 n, 602 y, 602 bb
v. Troy	610	v. Maule	279, 292, 927
Troy, &c., Railway v. Kerr	757	v. Newport	556 a
Troy City Bank v. Wilcox	246 a	v. Ogden	701
Truebody v. Jacobson	232, 237	v. Pettigrew	127, 836
Truell v. Tysson	788	v. Russell	160
Truesdell v. Calloway	217	v. Sargent	360, 369, 375
Trull v. Bigelow	218, 222	v. Smith	864
v. Eastman	188	v. Turner	184, 456, 616, 619
v. Trull	814	v. Wardle	260
Truluck v. Peoples	222	Turner's Case	633, 653
Trustees v. Wright	232	Turney v. Williams	468
Trustees, &c. v. Chambers	748	Turnley v. Kelley	647
v. Clay	466	Turpin v. Sanson	456
v. Prentiss	602 n	Turquand v. Marshall	467
Trustees of Phillips Academy v. King	42	Turvin v. Newcome	393
Trustees of Smith's Char. v. Northampton	508, 724	Tuthill v. Tracy	602 bb
Trustees of Theol. Sem. v. Kellogg	748	Tuttle v. Fowler	641
Trutch v. Lamprell	402	v. Robinson	918
Tryon, <i>In re</i>	270, 901	Twaddell's Appeal	458, 459, 914
v. Sutton	640	Tweddell v. Tweddell	201, 614
Tucker v. Andrews	213, 627	Tweedy v. Urquhart	277, 296
v. Boswell	550, 551	Twisden v. Wise	639, 640
v. Burrow	144, 147	Twisleton v. Thelwell	747, 892
v. Gordon	641	Twitchell v. Drury	247 a
v. Guest	680	Twopenny v. Peyton	119, 555
v. Horneman	476 a, 928	Twynne's Case	590
v. Johnson	309	Twypont v. Warcup	174
v. Kayess	152	Tyford v. Thurston	926
v. Moreland	33	Tylden v. Hyde	501, 787, 803
v. Phipps	183	Tylee v. Tylee	818
v. Seamen's Aid Soc.	46, 93, 780, 748	Tyler v. Black	171, 173, 184
v. Tucker	330, 863	v. Lake	348, 648, 649
		v. Webb	222
		Tyree v. Williams	780
		Tyrrell v. Hope	810, 648

	SECTION
Tyrrell v. Marsh	784
v. Morris	225, 809
Tyrrell's Case	161, 301
Tyrson v. Mattair	676
Tyrwhitt v. Tyrwhitt	347, 348
Tyson v. Blake	546
v. Jackson	574
v. Mickle	780, 784
v. Passmore	38, 231
Tyte v. Willis	380

U.

Udal v. Udal	511 c
Udell v. Kenny	628, 630, 645
Uhrich v. Beek	221
Ulman v. Barnard	243
Underhill v. Horwood	186, 187, 192
v. Morgan	843
Underwood v. Hatton	846, 924
v. Stevens	417, 419, 423, 424, 444, 466, 467, 849
Uniacke, <i>In re</i>	259
v. Giles	103
Union Bank v. Baker	130
v. Jacobs	754, 757
Union Bank of Tennessee v. Elliott	588
Union College v. Wheeler	126, 132
Unitarian Society v. Woodbury	79, 82, 138
United States v. Vaughn	438
United States Ins. Co. v. Schriver	222
Univ. Soc. v. Fitch	724
University v. Fay	743
University College, <i>In re</i>	743
University College of London v. Yarrow	704, 738
Updegraph v. Commonwealth	697
Upham v. Varney	297, 299, 312
v. Wyman	859
Uppington v. Buller	202
Upshaw v. Hargrove	220, 232, 239
Upson v. Badeau	407
Urann v. Coates	82, 103
Urch v. Walker	261, 264, 271, 401, 503, 927
Urkett v. Coryell	60
Urmry's Ex'rs v. Wooden	694, 699, 724, 748
Utica Ins. Co. v. Lynch	471
Uttersen v. Maire	225
Uvedale v. Patrick	276
v. Uvedale	747, 892
Uzzell v. Mack	232
Uzzle v. Wood	104

V.

	SECTION
Vachell v. Roberts	451
Vail v. Knapp	72
v. Vail	305
Valentine v. Valentine	918
Vallance v. Miners' Life Ins. Co.	589
Valle v. Bryan	127
Valliant v. Diodmede	536
Van Amringe v. Peabody	243
Van Berghen v. Demarest	602 <i>ee</i>
Van Buskirk v. Ins. Co.	438
Vance v. E. Lancaster R. Co.	478
v. McLaughlin	642
v. Vance	929
Vandebende v. Livingston	872, 877
Vandenberg v. Palmer	96, 165
Vanderheyden v. Crandall	305, 807, 523
v. Mallory	660
v. Vanderheyden	468, 918
Vanderplank v. King	376, 385, 390
Vanderstegen v. Witham	17
Vander Volgen v. Yates	162, 705, 710
Vandervoot, <i>In re</i>	783
Vandever v. Freeman	137
Vandever's Appeal	273, 411, 412, 415
Van Doren v. Olden	545
v. Todd	232
Van Duyne v. Van Duyne	115
Van Duzer v. Van Duzer	603, 627, 628, 631
Van Epps v. Van Deusen	627, 628, 629, 631, 632, 641
v. Van Epps	129, 195, 205, 206, 430
Van Horn v. Fonda	205, 262, 264, 401, 538
Vanhorn v. Harrison	312
Van Horne v. Everson	680
Van Houten v. First Reformed Dutch Church	742
Van Kirk v. Skillman	680
Vann v. Barnett	816
Vanness v. Jacobs	928
Van Rensalaer v. Stafford	438
Van Rensselaer v. Dunkin	652
Van Saudan v. Moore	886
Van Sittart v. Van Sittart	654
Van Vechten v. Van Vechten	380, 391, 619, 620
Van Vronker v. Eastman	554
Van Weckle v. Malla	205
Van Winkle v. Van Houten	569, 570
Van Wyck, <i>In re</i>	282, 411, 499
Vane v. Dungannon	511 <i>a</i>
Varick v. Briggs	218
v. Edwards	68, 188, 863
Varney v. Stevens	554
Varnum v. Meserve	199, 602 <i>m</i> , 602 <i>ff</i>

	SECTION		
Varrell v. Wendell	254	W.	
Vartie v. Underwood	680		
Vattier v. Hinde	218, 219, 221		
Vaughan v. Barclay	71	Wackerbath, <i>Ex parte</i>	SECTION 416
v. Buck	451, 547, 634, 686	v. Powell	404
v. Burslem	373	Waddingham v. Loker	82
v. Evans	593	Waddington v. Banks	38, 231
v. Thurston	900	Waddy v. Hawkins	918
v. Vanderslegen	170, 658, 848, 849	Wade v. Amer. Colonization Soc.	748
v. Walker	663	v. Fisher	647, 648
Vaux v. Parke	305, 555	v. Greenwood	239
Veasey v. Doton	173	v. Harper	199, 209, 602 v, 602 x
Veasie v. Williams	228	v. Paget	13, 347
Venables v. Coffman	725, 748	v. Pettibone	135
v. East Ind. Co.	262	v. Pope	912
v. Foyle	243, 402	Wadham v. Society, &c.	660
v. Morris	319	Wadsworth, <i>In re</i>	275, 411
Verner's Estate	891	v. Wendell	95
Verney v. Carding	828, 887	Wagner v. Baird	228
v. Verney	532, 578	Wagstaffe v. Lowerre	918
Vernon, <i>Ex parte</i>	126	v. Read	219, 220
v. Blackerly	874	v. Smith	806, 648, 655, 670
v. Board, &c.	831	v. Wagstaff	98, 301
v. Keys	173	Wailles v. Cooper	218
v. Morton	585, 591, 593, 602	Wain v. Egmont	600
v. Vawdry	260, 844	Wainwright v. Elwell	13
v. Vernon	111, 112, 367, 611	v. Waterman	249, 508, 510
Vernon's Case	94	Wait v. Day	143
Verplanck v. Ins. Co.	207	v. Maxwell	35
Verplank v. Caines	137	Waite v. Whorwood	835, 837
Verulam v. Bathurst	869	Wake v. Tinkler	380, 520
Vesey v. Jamson	159, 711, 712	Wakeman v. Grover	590, 592, 594, 600
Vestry, &c. v. Barksdale	918	v. Rutland	787, 874
Vez v. Emery	465, 901	Walburn v. Ingilby	879
Vick v. McDaniel	160	Walcott v. Cady	541
Vickers v. Cowell	136	Waldo v. Caley	699, 705
v. Scott	550, 551, 771	v. Cummings	541
Vidal v. Girard	42, 43, 45, 46, 240, 694, 700, 724, 748	v. Waldo	540, 776
Vigor v. Harwood	550	Waldron v. Chastney	602 p, 602 aa
Vigrass v. Binfield	453, 825, 826, 827	v. McComb	768, 786 a
Villard v. Chovin	618	v. Sloper	438
Villers v. Beaumont	104, 108	Wales v. Newbould	679
Villiers v. Villiers	315, 319	Waley's Trusts, <i>In re</i>	388
Villines v. Norfleet	850	Walford v. Gray	208
Vincent v. Beshopre	511 b	v. Liddel	862
v. Ennys	784	Walker, <i>In re</i>	633, 636, 904
v. Godson	260	v. Beal	920
v. Newcombe	451	v. Brungard	134, 135, 199, 288, 292, 598, 602 p, 602 v
Viney v. Abbott	104	v. Brungbad	602 g
Vizoneau v. Peagram	655, 656	v. Burngood	126
Volans v. Carr	623	v. Bynam	468
Volgen v. Yates	730	v. Crowder	602 h, 612
Von Hurter v. Spergeman	433	v. Dean	327
Voorhees v. Church	206	v. Drury	636
v. Stoothorp	918	v. Dunlop	171
Vose v. Grant	242	v. Fawcett	328
Voyle v. Hughes	68, 101, 102, 438	v. Locke	84, 162
Vreeland v. Van Horn	849	v. Maunde	257, 509
Vyvyan v. Vyvyan	851	v. Mower	883



	SECTION		SECTION
Walker v. Ogden	72	Walsh v. Wason	645
v. Page	456	Walter v. Klock	215
v. Perkins	214	v. Logan	501
v. Preswick	239, 876	v. Saunders	633
v. Richardson	23, 384	v. Walter	805
v. Sedgwick	282, 237	Waltham's Case	169, 181
v. Sharp	920	Walton v. Avery	918
v. Shore	500, 613, 771	v. Walton	94, 150, 151, 152
v. Smallwood	474, 764, 770,	Walworth v. Holt	885
	789, 795	Walwyn v. Coutts	367, 585, 593
v. Symonds	402, 412, 418,	v. Lee	218, 219
	419, 421, 440, 453,	Wamble v. Battle	232
	467, 821, 830, 847,	Wamburzee v. Kennedy	863
	848, 851, 875, 923	Wankford v. Wankford	264
v. Taylor	814	Warburton v. Farn	784
v. Walker	226, 229, 230, 507,	v. Sandys	414, 505
	508, 610, 672, 694,	v. Warburton	510, 581
	748, 863, 918	Ward v. Amory	312, 627
v. Wetherell	618	v. Arch	863
v. Whiting	121	v. Arredondo	71
v. Williams	238	v. Audland	101
v. Woodward	471	v. Bakkelen	229
—— v.	297, 453, 461	v. Barrows	788, 785
Walker's Estate	918	v. Butler	262, 264
Wall v. Bright	38, 122, 231, 337, 342	v. Devon	501
v. Cockerell	202	v. Dorch	277
v. Stubbs	176	v. Hipwell	413, 733
v. Tomlinson	639, 640	v. Lant	161
v. Town	199	v. Lenthal	511 b
Wallace v. Anderson	386 b	v. Lewis	593, 594
v. Auld	627, 645	v. Morgan	250
v. Bowens	144	v. Morrison	438
v. Coster	652, 661	v. Smith	205
v. Duffield	75, 126, 127, 128	v. Trotter	590
v. Marshall	133	v. Ward	476, 809
v. McCullough	127, 128	v. Webber	183
v. Taliaferro	639	v. Yates	903 a
v. Wallace	201	Ward's Settlement	455
Waller v. Armistead	213, 851	Warden v. Richards	499
v. Barrett	846, 924	Wardlaw v. Gray	627, 628, 639
v. Childs	701, 702, 714	Wardle v. Claxton	648, 649
v. Harris	602 ff	v. Hargreaves	282
Walley v. Whalley	196, 828, 878	Wardour v. Beresford	183
Wallgrave v. Tebbs	77, 83, 93, 181,	Wardwell v. McDowell	270, 499
	216, 511 a	Ware v. Cann	386
Wallingford v. Heard	856	v. Horwood	187
Wallington v. Taylor	576	v. Mallard	112, 117
Wallington's Estate	205	v. McCandlish	544, 545
Wallis v. Freestone	506	v. Polhill	605
v. Loubat	202	v. Richardson	310, 312
v. Thornton	416, 420, 602 g	v. Sharp	660
v. Wallis	299	v. Van Bakkelen	230
Walmesley v. Booth	188, 202, 203	Wareham v. Brown	510
Walraven v. Lock	75	Warfield, <i>Ex parte</i>	630
Walrond v. Walrond	107, 471	v. Ross	187
Walsh v. Dillon	888	Waring, <i>In re</i>	84
v. Gladstone	273, 291, 731	v. Coventry	506
v. Stille	242	v. Darnall	488, 439, 786 a
v. Wallinger	248, 250, 258, 507,	v. Purcell	556
	511 b	v. Waring	438, 457, 562,
v. Walsh	618, 623		672

	SECTION		SECTION
Warley v. Warley	564, 566	Watson v. Marshall	630
Warnan v. Seaman	161	v. Mayrant	121
Warneford v. Thompson	765	v. Pearson	312, 315, 414, 499, 501
Warner v. Bates	112, 114, 115, 116	v. Saul	576, 745, 863
v. Daniels	167, 171, 173, 230	v. Stone	456, 914
v. Martin	243	v. Thurber	680
v. Van Alstyne	232, 239	v. Toone	861
v. Whittaker	221	v. Wells	232
v. Winslow	221	Watt v. Ball	323
Warrall v. Morlar	239	v. Creyke	511 a
Warren v. Copelin	488	Watton v. Penfold	750
v. Davies	571	Watts v. Bullas	107, 108
v. Fenn	232	v. Cresswell	53
v. Haley	648	v. Girdlestone	453, 462, 466, 469, 509, 539, 777
v. Rudall	272	v. Kancie	809
v. Warrick	861	v. Symes	347
Warriner v. Rogers	97, 98	v. Turner	520
Warter v. Anderson	922	Watts' Settlement	292
v. Hutchinson	306, 312, 315, 581	Waugh v. Riley	55
Wartman v. Wartman	474	v. Wyche	921
Wartram v. Wartram	825	Way v. Patty	237
Warwick v. Edwards	665	Way's Settlement	101, 102
v. Hawkins	648, 651	Trust, <i>In re</i>	103, 104
v. Warwick	222, 834	Wayman v. Jones	418, 419
Wasby v. Foreman	246 a	Wayne v. Hanham	761
Washborne v. Downes	377	Weale v. Ollive	100
Washburn v. Burn	681	Wearing v. Wearing	451
v. Sewell	46, 699, 724, 730, 741, 748	Weatherby v. St. Giorgio	790
Washington, &c., R.R. Co. v. Alexander, &c., R.R. Co.	282	Webb v. Claverden	182
Watchman, The	592	v. Daggett	586, 590, 600
Waterhouse v. Stansfield	72	v. De Beauvoisin	908
Waterman v. Cochran	891, 900	v. Deitrich	56, 276
v. Spaulding	780, 781, 783	v. Grace	516
Waters v. Bailey	129, 196	v. Jones	566
v. Conolly	590	v. Kelley	119
v. Groom	199	v. Ledsam	404, 411, 412
v. Marjoram	500	v. Lugar	196
v. Stickney	182	v. Neal	43, 276, 698
v. Tazewell	515, 653	v. Robinson	238, 239
v. Thorn	199, 202	v. Sadler	254
Watertown v. White	757	v. Shaftesbury	275, 280, 282, 293, 358, 427, 458, 508, 912, 913
Watkins, <i>Ex parte</i>	65	v. Webb	395, 569, 888, 913
v. Check	795, 800, 810	v. Wools	112, 113, 115, 118, 620
v. Holman	41	Webb's Appeal	633, 641
v. Jones	277	Webber v. Webber	480
v. Quarles	380	Webster v. Boddington	385, 508
v. Specht	312, 316, 343, 858	v. Cooper	299, 307, 312, 315, 317
v. Stockett	226	v. King	203
v. Weston	357	v. Newbold	863
Watkyns v. Watkyns	628, 633, 637, 673	v. Vandeventer	274, 343, 921
Watson v. Bagaley	589	v. Webster	438, 672, 674
v. Bane	238	Wedderburn v. Wedderburn	200, 429, 430, 454, 470, 745, 851, 863, 864, 865, 923
v. Bothwell	182	Wedgewood v. Adams	787
v. Brickwood	566		
v. James	768		
v. Knight	593		
v. Le Row	142, 149, 218		

	SECTION		SECTION
Weekham v. Berry	329	West v. Raymond	202
Weeks v. Lego	660	v. Shuttleworth	160, 701, 702,
v. Weeks	633		726
Weigand's Appeal	417, 420	v. Sloan	863
Weir v. Tannehill	594	v. Smith	918
Weisbrod v. Chicago	678	v. Snodgrass	592
Weiss v. Dill	912	v. West	647
Welborn v. Rogers	864	Westbroke, <i>In re</i>	904
Welby v. Welby	189	Westbrook v. Harbeson	226, 230
Welch, <i>In re</i>	618	Westcott v. Cady	541
v. Allen	320	v. Culliford	476 a
v. Greenalge	783	v. Edmands	810, 811
v. Mandeville	330	Wester's Appeal	194
v. Parran	238	Westerfield v. Janssen	188
v. Welch	647, 649	Western v. Cartwright	861
Weld v. Bonham	885	Western R.R. Co. v. Nolan	328, 330,
Welford v. Beazeley	82		877
v. Chancellor	178	Westervelt v. Hoff	222
Welhelm v. Falmer	58	v. Matheson	187
Well v. Thornagh	182	Westgate v. Handlin	602 u
Well Beloved Weeks, <i>In re</i>	700	v. Monroe	680
Wellbeloved v. Jones	702, 732	Westley v. Clarke	416, 421
Wellborn v. Williams	238	v. Williamson	891
Weller v. Fitzhugh	433	Westmacott v. Robins	231
v. Ker	508, 517	Westmeath v. Salisbury	672
v. Weller	508	v. Westmeath	672, 673
Welles v. Ely	555	Weston v. Barker	98, 593, 843
v. Lewis	502	Westover v. Chapman	297, 461, 468
v. Middleton	202	Westvelt v. Gregg	676
v. Yates	186	Wetherell v. Collins	873, 892
Wellesley v. Beaufort	613	v. Hamilton	75
v. Wellesley	122, 672	v. Wetherell	511 c
Wellman v. Lawrence	602 r	v. Wilson	117
Wells v. Chapman	330	Wetherhed v. Wetherhed	68
v. Doane	705, 720, 724, 748	Wetmore v. Brown	918
v. Foster	69	v. Parker	43, 738
v. Heath	736, 737, 748	v. Truslow	386 a
v. Lewis	499	Wetzel v. Chaplin	98
v. Malbon	920, 926	Whale v. Booth	810, 811
v. McCall	118, 310 a, 386 a, 652,	Whaler v. Cox	571
	671	Whaley v. Eliot	186
v. Price	636	v. Drummond	511 b
v. Prince	856	Whalley v. Whalley	861
v. Stout	672	Whallon v. Scott	590, 592
v. Thorman	655, 660	Wham v. Love	900
v. Wells	602 q	Wharf v. Howell	226
Welsh v. Foster	380, 381	Whatford v. Moore	580
Welston v. Hildreth	678	Wheate v. Hall	375, 498, 511 a
Welt v. Franklin	299	Wheatley v. Badger	262
Welton v. Devine	143, 144	v. Boyd	343
Wendell v. French	463, 918	v. Purr	86, 98
Wentworth v. Tubb	480	Wheaton v. Wheaton	226
West v. Berry	765	Wheeler v. Bingham	512
v. Biscoe	299	c. Bowen	629, 642
v. Erissey	361, 367, 834	v. Howell	570
v. Jones	419	v. Kirtland	133
v. Kerr	516	v. Lane	232
v. Knight	695, 699	v. Moore	642
v. Moore	170	v. Newhall	305
v. Palmer	693	v. Perry	262, 455, 928
v. Ray	511 c	v. Smith	117, 253

	SECTION		SECTION
Wheeler v. Stone	602 p	White v. Selden	843
v. Sumner	593	v. Sheldon	140
v. Warner	757	v. Simpson	317
Wheelock v. Moulton	757	v. Sprague	873
Whelan v. Reilly	117, 287	v. St. Barbe	511 a
v. Whelan	83, 189, 201	v. Story	680
Whelpdale v. Cookson	195	v. Stover	238
Whetham v. Clyde	184	v. University	748
Whetstone v. Sts. Bury	301, 309	v. Watkins	411, 602 ff
Whitchcote v. Lawrence	195, 867	v. Weldon	137
v. Lyle	84, 299	v. White 71, 72, 118, 240, 256,	
Whicker v. Hume	700, 709, 741	277, 287, 386 a, 532, 533,	
Whipple v. Adam	115, 116	564, 690, 699, 719, 729,	
v. Clure	189	730, 849, 868, 864, 874	
Whistler v. Newman	658, 669, 900	v. Whitney	602 i, 602 j
v. Webb	873	v. Williams	94, 150, 232, 237,
Whiston v. Rochester	742		238
Whitall v. Clark	667	v. Wilson	248
Whitcomb v. Cardell	82	White's Trust, <i>In re</i>	250, 251
v. Jacob	835, 887	White School House v. Post	244, 245
v. Minichin	195	Whiteacre, <i>Ex parte</i>	337
White v. Albertson	330	Whitehead, <i>Ex parte</i>	619
v. Att'y-Gen.	730, 748	Whitehorn v. Hines	189, 204
v. Barton	261, 827	Whitehurst v. Harper	251, 255, 639
v. Baugh	443	Whitesides v. Carman	660
v. Baylor	311, 312	v. Dorris	627, 628
v. Briggs	112, 118, 390	v. Greenlee	191
v. Brutton	113	Whitfield v. Burnett	540
v. Bullock	421, 918	v. Prickett	388, 555
v. Callinan	679	v. Whitfield	617
v. Carmarthen, &c., Rail-		Whithead v. Lord	864
way	752, 754	Whiting v. Gould	84, 85
v. Carpenter	126, 132, 133, 139	v. Whiting	112, 117, 343, 366
v. Carter	369	Whitlock's Case	530
v. Casanave	232	Whitman's Appeal	200
v. Commonwealth	877	Whitmarsh v. Robertson	826, 894, 901
v. Cuddon	770	Whitmore v. Turquand	826
v. Damon	183, 187	v. Weld	53
v. Dougherty	237	Whitney v. Krows	590
v. Drew	127	Whittaker, <i>In re</i>	603
v. Evans	94, 150	Whittemore v. Cowell	167
v. Ewer	855	Whitten v. Whitten	143
v. Fisk	713, 720	Whittenden Mills v. Upton	757
v. Flora	187	Whittick v. Kane	218
v. Foljambe	774, 786	Whittle v. Halliday	878
v. Grane	612	v. Henning	633
v. Hale	384, 730, 737	Whitton v. Whitton	162
v. Hall	748	Whitworth v. Carter	686
v. Hampton	38, 240, 721	v. Davis	231
v. Haynes	873	Whorwood v. University Coll.	718
v. Hicks	509 c	Whyte v. Arthur	85
v. Hildreth	678	Wickes v. Clarke	628
v. Howard	393, 715, 748, 765	Wickesham v. Savage	254
v. Leavitt	864	Wickham v. Berry	305, 526
v. Lincoln	446, 821	v. New Brunswick &	
v. Malcomb	602 r	Canada Railway	750
v. McNutt	660, 680	Wickliffe v. Lexington	863, 864
v. Montserratt	590	Wickman v. Robinson	231
v. Nutts	122	Widdowson v. Duck	457, 474
v. Parker	305, 307	Widgery v. Haskell	593
v. Patten	246 a	Widmore v. Woodroffe	255, 701

	SECTION		SECTION
Wiener v. Davis	586	Willard v. Fenn	425
Wigg v. Wigg	121, 217, 221	v. Ware	388
Wiggin v. Swett	556	v. Willard	77, 82, 147
Wigglesworth v. Steers	191	Willard's Appeal	119
Wight v. Leigh	359	Willats v. Busby	883
Wightman v. Doe	602 t, 782	Willett v. Blanford	429, 430
Wightwick v. Lord	450, 551, 771	v. Sandford	7
Wigsell v. Wigsell	348	William v. Mosher	918
Wike's Case	40, 325, 633	William's Case	554, 610, 618
Wilbur v. Spofford	602 h	Estate, <i>In re</i>	787
Wilcocks v. Hannington	96, 101, 102	Settlement	291
Wilcox v. Calloway	239	Williams, <i>Ex parte</i>	511 b, 614
v. Kellogg	586	v. Allen	543, 877
v. Morris	602 d	v. Bailey	672
v. Wilcox	312	v. Branch Bank	810
Wild v. Wells	871	v. Brown	126, 585
Wilde v. Davis	397	v. Callow	634, 637
v. Gibson	172, 180	v. Carle	213
Wilderman v. Baltimore	748	v. Carter	375, 767
Wilding v. Bolder	59, 277, 297	v. Chitty	34, 569
v. Richards	593	v. Clairborne	647
Wiles v. Cooper	888	v. Coade	160
v. Gresham	438, 440, 460, 482,	v. Conrad	262
	847	v. Corbett	123, 907
v. Greshon	185	v. Cork	863
v. Wiles	627, 628, 629	v. Cushing	262
Wiley v. Collins	593	v. Donaldson	660
v. Smith	359, 370	v. First Pres. Soc.	299,
Wilhelm v. Folmer	127		312, 320, 860, 864
Wilkes v. Ferris	585	v. Fitch	182
v. Holmes	511 b	v. Harrington	610
v. Steward	453, 460	v. Headland	924
v. Wilkes	672	v. Hollingworth	126, 127
Wilkins v. Anderson	217	v. Jones	150, 153
v. Frye	786	v. Kershaw	159, 573, 712, 748
v. Gordon	602 ee	v. Lewis	396
v. Hogg	417	v. Lonsdale	325, 484
v. Hunt	892	v. Maitland	421
v. Stevens	137	v. Mans	72
Wilkinson, <i>Ex parte</i>	263	v. Marshall	205
<i>In re</i>	455	v. Massey	812
v. Bewick	443	v. Mattocks	891
v. Bradfield	189, 226	v. Maull	648, 649
v. Charlesworth	641	v. McConico	305
v. Cheatham	647	v. Moslyn	593
v. Duncan	450	v. Munroe	782
v. Getty	248	v. Nixon	262, 412, 417, 419,
v. Gibson	920		421, 423, 424, 466
v. Lindgren	903 a	v. Otey	598, 602 g, 602 m,
v. Malin	413, 725		621, 795
v. Parry	285, 286, 402	v. Owen	226
v. Stafford	465	v. Parry	274
v. Stewart	243	v. Pearson	694, 721, 722,
v. Wilkinson	66, 162, 189,		730, 748
	388, 555, 678, 912	v. Powell	200, 468, 471, 851
v. Wright	682	v. Roberts	232, 237
Wilkinson's Estate	863	v. Salmond	885
Wilks v. Fitzpatrick	627	v. Stevens	427, 429
v. Groome	443, 446	v. Teal	376
Willan v. Willan	171, 184, 189	v. Van Tuyl	126
Willard v. Eastman	661	v. Waters	298, 301, 310

	SECTION		SECTION
Williams v. Wentworth	480	Wilson v. Goodman	848
<i>v.</i> Williams	112, 113, 114, 146, 147, 396, 398, 493, 687, 694, 709, 728, 737, 738, 748	<i>v.</i> Graham	237
<i>v.</i> Wood	239	<i>v.</i> Gray	590
<i>v.</i> Woodward	768	<i>v.</i> Halliley	597
<i>v.</i> Young	234, 238	<i>v.</i> Harman	556
Williamson v. Beckham	655, 660	<i>v.</i> Hoare	326
<i>v.</i> Berry	603, 610	<i>v.</i> Lynt	738, 748
<i>v.</i> Branch Bank	225	<i>v.</i> Maddison	117
<i>v.</i> Coddington	111, 367	<i>v.</i> Major	113, 116
<i>v.</i> Curtis	597, 795	<i>v.</i> McAuley	748
<i>v.</i> Field	230	<i>v.</i> McCullough	34
<i>v.</i> Gihon	214	<i>v.</i> Moore	245, 848, 863, 875, 876
<i>v.</i> Morton	225, 794, 800, 810	<i>v.</i> Mushet	672
<i>v.</i> New Albany, &c., Railw. Co.	759, 760	<i>v.</i> Peake	472
<i>v.</i> Suydam	282, 766	<i>v.</i> Pennock	273
<i>v.</i> Wickersham	282	<i>v.</i> Squire	903 a
<i>v.</i> Williamson	462, 468, 547, 548, 551, 660	<i>v.</i> Tappan	93
<i>v.</i> Woodard	768	<i>v.</i> Towle	240, 287, 294
Williard v. Williard	133, 134, 215	<i>v.</i> Troup	602 d, 602 g, 602 h, 602 n, 853
Willie v. Ellice	875	<i>v.</i> Wilson	94, 282, 385, 395, 397, 654, 672, 673, 900, 918
Williman v. Holmes	310, 312	Wilson's Appeal	910
Willington v. Adam	93	Estate	68, 262
Willink v. Morris Canal, &c., Co.	759	Wilt v. Franklin	259, 590, 593
<i>v.</i> Vanderveer	142	Wiltbank's Appeal	545
Willis v. Brown	706	Wilton v. Devine	143
<i>v.</i> Cadenhead	677	<i>v.</i> Hill	654, 671, 826, 849
<i>v.</i> Hiscox	520, 900, 901	<i>v.</i> Jones	873
<i>v.</i> Willis	126, 137	Winch v. Bruton	112
<i>v.</i> Yernegan	187, 189	<i>v.</i> James	686
Williston v. Michigan, &c., Railw.	545	<i>v.</i> Keeley	345
Willmot v. Jenkins	263, 574	<i>v.</i> Railway Co.	757
Willoughby v. Willoughby	218	<i>v.</i> Winch	615
Wills v. Cooper	347	<i>v.</i> Winchester	174
<i>v.</i> Cowper	500	Winchelsea v. Garrety	206
<i>v.</i> Sayers	647, 649	<i>v.</i> Nordcliff	458, 605, 611
Wills's Appeal	440, 453	Winchester v. Baltimore R.R. Co.	222
Wilmerding v. Russ	865	<i>v.</i> Knight	871
Wilmot v. Pike	438	Winchester, &c., Turnpike Co.	157
Wilson, <i>In re</i>	610, 910	Winder v. Diffenderffer	842
<i>v.</i> Allen	349, 351, 354, 355	Winebrenner v. Colder	733
<i>v.</i> Ball	113, 117	<i>v.</i> Weisiger	214
<i>v.</i> Bennett	339, 340, 494, 495, 503, 504	Wing v. Cooper	602 g
<i>v.</i> Brownsmith	903 a	Winged v. Lefebury	217, 231
<i>v.</i> Castro	126	Wingfield's Case	701
<i>v.</i> Cheshire	165, 301	Winn v. Dillon	206
<i>v.</i> Clapham	122	<i>v.</i> Fenwick	258
<i>v.</i> Daniel	213	Winnall, <i>Ex parte</i>	402
<i>v.</i> Davison	239, 598, 797, 798	Winslow v. Ancrum	600
<i>v.</i> Day	587, 590	<i>v.</i> Cummings	701, 724, 730, 748
<i>v.</i> Dennison	408, 413	<i>v.</i> Tighe	196
<i>v.</i> Dent	77, 82	<i>v.</i> Trowbridge	724
<i>v.</i> Doster	810	Winston v. Gwathmey	174
<i>v.</i> Eden	511 c	<i>v.</i> Jones	766
<i>v.</i> Edmonds	540	Winter v. Anson	235, 236, 239
<i>v.</i> Forsyth	591	<i>v.</i> Geroe	205, 602 v
		<i>v.</i> Rudge	291
		<i>v.</i> Walters	677

	SECTION		SECTION
Wintermute v. Snyder	184	Wood v. Richardson	117, 511, 770, 787
Wise, <i>In re</i>	803	v. Snow	602 <i>n</i>
v. Wise	259	v. Sparks	262, 499
Wisden v. Wisden	511 <i>c</i>	v. Stane	275
Wiseman v. Beake	188	v. Vanderburg	891
v. Roper	111	v. White	498, 766, 802
Wistar's Appeal	468, 911	v. Wood	256, 805, 391, 411, 417, 420, 460, 466
Wiswall v. Ross	602 <i>e</i> , 602 <i>h</i> , 602 <i>r</i> , 602 <i>bb</i>	Woodbridge v. Perkins	438
v. Stewart	428	Woodburn v. Mosher	590
v. Ticknor	592	Woodbury v. Obear	891
Wiswell v. First Cong. Church	476 <i>a</i> , 928	Woodcock v. Dorset	580
Withers v. Allgood	358	v. Renneck	250, 258
v. Hichman	618	Woodford v. Charnley	101, 102
v. Withers	126	v. Parkhurst	699
v. Yeadon	38, 117, 121, 248, 251, 254, 255	v. Stevens	127
Witherspoon, <i>Ex parte</i>	918	Woodgate v. Flint	817
Withey v. Mangles	257	Woodhead v. Marriott	900
Withington v. Withington	292	Woodhouse v. Haskins	359
Witman v. Lex	701, 724, 728, 731, 748	v. Meredith	206
v. Norton	570	Woodhull v. Osborne	135
Witman's Appeal	918	Woodin, <i>Ex parte</i>	246, 907
Witter v. Duley	263	Woodlee v. Burch	199
v. Witter	17, 466, 521, 605	Woodliffe v. Drury	161
Witts v. Boddington	248, 250, 251, 258	Woodman v. Good	540, 541
v. Dawkins	655, 670	v. Morrel	126, 143, 144, 146, 147, 161
v. Steere	544, 545	v. Neal	678
Woelper's Appeal	633	Woodmeston v. Walker	652, 671
Wolf v. Corley	75	Woodroff v. Burton	183
v. Eichelberger	606	Woodruff v. Cook	205, 218, 476 <i>a</i> , 928
v. Hill	776	v. Orange	328
Wolfe v. McDowell	602 <i>d</i>	v. Robb	602 <i>d</i>
v. Washburn	488, 440	Woodrum v. Kirkpatrick	648
Wolff v. Van Meter	680	Woods v. Axton	907
Wollaston v. Tribe	104	v. Bailey	232
Wolley v. Jenkins	498	v. Dille	84
Wolstoncraft v. Long	597	v. Farmene	241
Womack v. Austin	847	v. Sullivan	546, 547
Wood v. Abrey	183, 187, 192	v. Tombs	456
v. Bank of Kentucky	237	v. Williams	873
v. Brown	281, 884	v. Woods	118, 117, 118, 620, 886
v. Burnham	330, 359, 370	Woodson v. McClelland	109
v. Colvin	602 <i>i</i>	v. Perkins	660
v. Cox	112, 114, 152, 153	Woodward v. Halsey	511 <i>b</i>
v. Downes	200, 201, 202, 827	v. Schatzell	72
v. Dudley	571	v. Seaver	685
v. Dummer	242	v. Woodward	239
v. Garnett	468	Woodward's Appeal	458
v. Goodridge	768	Wooldredge v. Stone	119
v. Hardisty	260	Wooldridge v. Planters' Bank	284, 602 <i>m</i> , 621
v. Harman	509, 794, 799	v. Watkins	499, 500
v. Lee	918	Wooll v. Bate	330
v. Mann	221	Woollam v. Hearne	38, 76, 226
v. Mather	305, 610	Woollands v. Crowcher	633
v. McCann	214	Woollett v. Harris	157, 158
v. Midgeley	84	Woolmer's Estate	160
v. Partridge	488	Woolmore v. Burrows	366, 375, 390





## cxxxix

	SECTION		SECTION
Young v. Brush	468	Younghusband v. Gisborne	119, 386,
v. Bumpass	180		555
v. Comb	468	Youse v. Martin	221
v. Frost	187	Yundt's Appeal	468
v. Graff	32, 602 f		
v. Jones	664		
v. Keogh	610		
v. Mackall	863		
v. Martin	112, 113, 115		
v. Miles	329		
v. Peachy	104, 151, 162, 201,		
	225		
v. Scott	888		
v. Swiggs	769		
v. Waterpark	863, 866		
v. Williams	238		
v. Wilton	558		
v. Wood	287		
v. Young	283, 648, 649, 655		
Younge v. Graff	680		
Younger v. Welham	413		



# LAW OF TRUSTS.

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## CHAPTER I.

### INTRODUCTION.

#### ORIGIN, HISTORY, DEFINITION, AND DIVISION OR CLASSIFICATION OF TRUSTS.

- § 1. The general nature of trusts.
- § 2. The technical nature of trusts, and their origin in the *fidei commissa* of the Roman law
- § 3. The origin of uses.
- § 4. The inconveniences that arose from the prevalence of uses.
- § 5. The statute of uses.
- §§ 6, 7. The effect of the statute of uses, and the origin of trusts.
- §§ 8, 9, 10. Development of trusts in England and America.
- § 11. Advantage of the late adoption of trusts in America.
- § 12. Object of this treatise.
- §§ 13-17. Definition of trusts.
- § 18. Simple and special trusts.
- § 19. Ministerial and discretionary trusts.
- § 20. A mixed trust and power, and a power annexed to a trust.
- § 21. Legal and illegal trusts.
- § 22. Public and private trusts.
- § 23. Duration of a private trust and of a public trust.
- §§ 24-27. Express trusts, implied trusts, resulting trusts, and constructive trusts.

§ 1. In the earlier states of society the rules that govern the ownership, disposition, and use of property, are simple and of easy application. But as states increase, as property accumulates, and the business and relations of life become more complex, the rules of law which the new complications demand become themselves complicated, and sometimes difficult to understand and apply. The law, doctrine, and learning of

trusts thus had a late origin and a slow and gradual development. The word "trust," in its popular and broadest sense, embraces a multitude of relations, duties, and responsibilities. Thus, executors and administrators, guardians of infants and lunatics, assignees in insolvency and bankruptcy, bailees, factors, agents, commission merchants, and common carriers, as well as the officers of public and private corporations, all exercise a kind of trust. Indeed, one definition of a trustee is "a person in whom some estate, interest, or power in or affecting property of any description is vested for the benefit of another." This definition embraces all the trusts and offices above named, but the law in relation to many, if not all of them, is or may be administered in the common-law courts. It is not of the law of such trusts that this treatise concerns itself.

§ 2. The trusts here treated are defined to be "an obligation upon a person arising out of a confidence reposed in him to apply property faithfully and according to such confidence."<sup>1</sup> Another author says that "a trust is in the nature of a deposition by which a proprietor transfers to another the property of the subject intrusted, not that it should remain with him, but that it should be applied to certain uses for the behoof of a third party."<sup>2</sup> Such trusts originated, and were first defined and reduced to practice under the jurisdiction of courts by the civil law. It was a rule of that law that a testator could not name a devisee to succeed the first devisee of property, but the first devisee took the absolute legal and beneficial ownership of the property; that is, a testator could not direct and control the use of his property after his death. This rule was modified so far that a testator might name an heir to succeed, if the first heir died too young to make a will, but in all other cases the testator could only rely upon the good faith of the first

<sup>1</sup> Stair's Institutions of the Laws of Scotland, B. IV. tit. 6, § 2, p. 591; § 3, pp. 592-594.

<sup>2</sup> Erskine's Institutes of the Laws of Scotland, B. III. p. 454.

taker of his property, to bestow the use according to his directions. This trust or confidence was called *fidei commissum*, but there were no means whereby the performance of the commission could be compelled. It was called *infirum* or *precarium*, because it depended upon the personal inclination, integrity, and good faith of the person trusted. There were many of these *imperfect* trusts, where in conscience the first taker was bound to give the beneficial use, or to transfer the property itself, to a third person. Such third persons had an equitable, moral claim or right, but no legal remedy. Under these circumstances, application was made to the Emperor Augustus, and he directed the consuls to interpose their authority, and compel the execution of such trusts. Finally a prætor was appointed, called *fidei commissarius*, who had jurisdiction over all *fidei commissa*, and full power to give adequate relief in all proper cases.<sup>1</sup>

§ 3. It is supposed that these *fidei commissa* were the models of uses which were afterwards introduced into England by the clergy to elude and avoid the operation of the statutes of mortmain. After the passing of those statutes, which were intended to forbid and prevent the accumulation of the lands of the kingdom in the hands of religious houses and corporations, it became the practice to convey lands to one person for the use of another, or for the use of a corporation. Thus the legal title was in one individual, but the beneficial use was in another. At this time the writ of subpœna was contrived which issued out of chancery, and compelled a person who held a legal title to another's use to answer in chancery, and to perform and execute the use. Thus uses were introduced in England to circumvent the public policy of the kingdom and to avoid the statutes of mortmain, and the writ of subpœna was introduced after the model of the jurisdiction of the *prætor commissarius*

<sup>1</sup> Ulpianus, tit. 25; Inst. Lib. II. tit. 23, § 2; 2 Fonb. Eq. p. 2; 1 Cruise, Dig. p. 398; and see Willis on Trustees, pp. 1-8, and notes; Bacon, Readings upon the Stat. of Uses, Vol. XIV. pp. 301, 302, Boston ed. 1861.

to prevent those persons who were trusted to execute a use, from committing a fraud in refusing to perform it.<sup>1</sup> These contrivances, originating in evasions of the law, were laid hold of during the civil wars of York and Lancaster to facilitate family settlements, and to prevent the forfeiture of estates for treason during those unhappy strifes. Thus conveyances to uses became the common form of transferring land.

§ 4. Under this practice a very refined system grew up. The legal estate was in one person, and the use and enjoyment was in another. There were two titles and estates in the same land,—that of the feoffee, who was the legal owner, and yet had nothing, and that of the *cestui que use*, who had the whole beneficial right and interest, and yet had no legal right or title. He had nevertheless a substantial interest and estate which he could convey, devise, and otherwise deal with, as with tangible property. Great inconveniences arose from this double system. Bacon's Abridgment, Uses and Trusts, sums them up as follows: "By this course of putting lands into uses there were many inconveniences, as this use, which grew first from a reasonable cause, namely, to give men the power and liberty to dispose of their own, was turned to deceive many of their just and reasonable rights, as, namely, a man that had cause to sue for his land knew not against whom to bring his action nor who was owner of it. The wife was defrauded of her thirds, the husband of being tenant by curtesy, the lord of his wardship, relief, heriot, and escheat, the creditor of his extent for debt, the poor tenant of his lease; for these rights and duties were given by law from him that was owner of the land, and none other, which was now the feoffee of the trust."

§ 5. Many statutes were passed during a series of years to cure or to prevent these mischiefs or hardships. At last the statute of uses, 27 Hen. VIII. c. 10, was enacted, which con-

<sup>1</sup> Attorney-General v. Sands, Hard. 491. "The parents of trusts were fraud and fear, and a court of conscience was the nurse."

verted the beneficial use into the legal ownership; that is to say, if lands were conveyed to A. to the use of B., the statute executed or converted the use into a legal estate in B., and divested all title out of A. By the operation of this statute the Court of Chancery lost for a time much of its business; for after the statute the legal title as well as the beneficial use was in the *cestui que use*, and he could deal with his estate as his own in every respect; he was no longer compelled to appeal to the conscience of the feoffee to uses, nor to the equity powers of the court.

§ 6. But there were certain gifts, grants, or estates to uses which the statute did not touch, and which remained as before the statute. Thus, if A. enfeoffed B. to the use of C., in trust for D., the statute immediately transferred the legal estate to C., and extinguished all interest in B., but it did not touch or effect the use or trust for D. It had been settled before the statute, as a rule of property, that a use could not be raised upon a use. At law such use raised upon a use was simply void. And at law it was held that the statute extended only to execute the first use by transferring the legal estate from B. to C., and that all its powers were exhausted in that act, and thus C. held a legal title in trust or for the use of D., which the statute did not execute.<sup>1</sup> And although C. was bound in equity and good conscience to give to D. the use and enjoyment of the estate, there was no remedy for D. at law, and he could only proceed as before the statute by subpœna in chancery to compel C. to perform the trust. Again, if A. conveyed land to B. for a term of years for the use of C., the statute did not execute the legal title in C., for it was held, under the words of the statute, that it only executed the legal titles of estates of which the first taker was *seised*, and that, according to the use of words in the law, no one could be said to be *seised* of a term

<sup>1</sup> Reid v. Gordon, 35 Md. 183; Croxall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. 268; Matthews v. Ward, 10 G. & J. 443.

of years. Thus in this last case C. could have relief only by subpœna in chancery. And, again, the statute did not execute the legal title to the *cestui que use*, if the first taker was to perform any active duties in regard to the estate; as if he was to hold the same for a certain time, or if he was to improve or lease the same and pay over the rents and profits to the use of C., the statute left the estate where it was before, and C. had no redress for any abuse of the trust or use except by subpœna in chancery. And, further, the statute did not apply at all to personal chattels given to one for the use and benefit of another. In these four cases the parties beneficially interested in the property, and equitably owning the whole of it, had no remedy at law for any withholding of their rights. The Court of Chancery laid hold of these four instances of a want of redress at law, and by its writ of subpœna compelled the performance of these four *uses* under the name of *trusts*. The legislation of our States now recognizes trusts, and provisions and rules are made for their creation, regulation, and duration, and in some States for their administration; but they are still left to the exclusive cognizance and jurisdiction of courts of equity, or to the equity powers of the common-law courts.

§ 7. Thus, interests in land became of three kinds: first, the estate in the land itself, the *old common-law fee*; secondly, the *use*, which was originally a creature of equity, but after the statute of uses it drew the estate in the land to itself, so that the fee and use were joined and made but one legal estate, not differing from the old common-law fee except in the manner of its creation; and, thirdly, the trust of which the common law takes no notice, but which in a court of equity carried the beneficial interest and profits, and is still a creature of that court, as the use was before the statute.<sup>1</sup> The statute of uses has never been repealed, and is still in force in many of the

<sup>1</sup> Per Lord Hardwicke, in *Willet v. Sandford*, 1 Ves. 186; *Coryton v. Helyar*, 2 Cox, 342.



United States, so that if a trust should now be created in such form that the statute would have executed it if it had been a use, the statute will now execute the trust by giving the *cestui que trust* the legal title as well as the equitable without any action on the part of the trustee.<sup>1</sup>

§ 8. It is thus seen that our present trusts are almost identical with the old uses.<sup>2</sup> Of course the growth of this system of jurisprudence has been slow and gradual, and it has sometimes fallen into inconsistencies and absurdities; but the abilities of upright and wise chancellors, aided by a learned and watchful profession, have finally given a regular and simple form to the administration of trusts. Lord Chief Justice Mansfield observed that in his opinion "trusts were not on a true foundation until Lord Nottingham held the great seal. By steadily pursuing from plain principles trusts in all their consequences, and by some assistance from the legislature, a noble, rational, and uniform system of law has since been raised. Trusts are made to answer the exigencies of families, and all other purposes, without producing one of the inconveniences, frauds, or private mischiefs which the statute of Henry VIII. c. 10, was intended to avoid. The forum where they are adjudged is the only difference between trusts and legal estates."<sup>3</sup> During the development of this system a vast number of distinctions and subtleties have been established and exploded. It is not necessary to follow them, as many of them never obtained a foothold in America.<sup>4</sup>

§ 9. Lord Nottingham became chancellor in 1673; consequently, when America was first settled, the doctrine of trusts had not been reduced to a system. Nor was there occasion for

<sup>1</sup> Shep. Touch. 508; *post*, § 296.

<sup>2</sup> Penny v. Allen, 7 De G., M. & G. 422.

<sup>3</sup> Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Ed. 223; Philips v. Brydges, 3 Ves. 127; Kemp v. Kemp, 5 Ves. 858.

<sup>4</sup> See them stated in Lewin on Trusts, pp. 2-17.

many years to apply the doctrine to the affairs of the colonists. Lands were abundant and cheap, and could be had by the taking ; personal property had not accumulated ; habits of life were simple and industrious ; and there was little occasion for family or other settlements that rendered the intervention of a trustee either convenient or necessary. The statute of uses was passed before the colonists left England, and it became a part of the law of many, if not all the colonies. The system of trusts which grew upon the statute of uses was adopted in America much later. Even in England the development of the equitable jurisdiction of chancery met with great opposition, upon the ground, among others, that it subjected the laws of the realm to the arbitrary discretion of one man, or "made the rights of the subject depend upon the length of the chancellor's foot." Considering this opposition to the equity jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery in England, considering that trusts were not established upon a reasonable foundation when the colonists left England, and considering the pecuniary condition of America, it is not surprising that it was long before the system received any countenance here.

§ 10. Mr. Story says that there was no equity jurisdiction in any State prior to the Revolution, or at least a very imperfect and irregular administration of it.<sup>1</sup> There was an attempt to create such a jurisdiction in the province of New York in the governor and council ; but it was so unpopular<sup>2</sup> that it did little or no business. A court was established in Massachusetts in 1692, with full equity powers ; but the act failed to receive the approval of the king in council.<sup>3</sup> In 1720 a Court of Chancery was established in Pennsylvania, and continued to administer a jurisdiction in equity in a separate court until 1736. And it is probable that some of the principles of equity

<sup>1</sup> 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 56 ; 1 Dane, Ab. c. 1, art. 7, § 51 ; 7 Dane, Ab. c. 225, arts. 1, 2 ; 2 Swift's Dig. 15 ; 3 Tuck. Black. App. 7.

<sup>2</sup> 1 John. Ch., Preface.

<sup>3</sup> Ancient Char. c. 222 ; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 56.

were administered in the common-law courts of all the colonies, in order to relieve suitors from hardships which the stricter rules of the common law were unable to effect. In New York, New Jersey, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, the governor of the province was clothed with the power and duty of the chancellor.<sup>1</sup> Since the Revolution, equity jurisdiction as a system has been of slow growth, and it is only since the beginning of this century that it has received its present development in America. As property has increased, and pecuniary affairs have become complex, and it has become necessary or convenient to make marriage settlements, or settlements upon families, children, relations, or dependants, and upon charities, the English system of trusts, fully grown, has been introduced into most of the States, and they have conferred full equity powers either upon their common-law courts, or they have established separate courts with an equity jurisdiction very similar to the jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor in the High Court of Chancery in England.<sup>2</sup>

§ 11. Mr. Story further observes that it is a favorable circumstance that jurisdiction in equity was conferred upon the courts in America at so late a period, and therefore they did not become acquainted with the system until it had been settled upon a broad and rational foundation;<sup>3</sup> thus they were saved from crude and unintelligent opinions and judgments, which must have been given in the then condition of the law in England, and of the profession in America. These judgments must of necessity have formed a body of precedents which would have continued to plague the profession and the courts, and would have marred the symmetry of the system. As now established, the doctrine of equity and of trusts in the United States is a well-formed system; and Mr. Story thinks it even more symmetrical than the original system in England.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *Equity in Pennsylvania*, a Lecture by William H. Rawle, Esq., McKay & Brother, Philadelphia, 1869.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 56, and notes.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 58.

§ 12. It is not the purpose of this treatise to trace the rise and growth of the law of trusts in each one of the States. It is, on the other hand, its purpose to state the general principles which prevail in all the States. It is not possible to know or to state the legislation of so many States upon the various matters connected with the administration of trusts. The intelligent lawyer must do this for himself, when the questions before him depend upon the statutes of his State rather than upon the general principles common to all the States.<sup>1</sup>

§ 13. Sir Edward Coke's definition of a *use* has been adopted as an accurate legal description and definition of a *trust*. In his words applied to a use, "a trust is a confidence reposed in some other, not issuing out of the land, but as a thing collateral, annexed in privity to the estate of the land, and to the person touching the land, for which *cestui que trust* has no remedy but by subpoena in chancery."<sup>2</sup> The *confidence* here spoken of need not be *expressly* reposed by one party in another, for the law frequently *implies* or *construes* it to arise out of transactions between parties, when neither party supposed at the time that a trust was created between them. The trust or confidence is a thing distinguished from *legal* property, or *legal right* to property. It is neither *jus in re* nor *jus ad rem*,<sup>3</sup> and so the confidence may not always be reposed by a person other than the trustee, for any person may convert himself into a trustee, and give from his own acts an equitable right to another person, as *cestui que trust*. But no person can be both trustee and *cestui que trust* at the same time, for no person can sue a subpoena against himself. Therefore, if an equitable estate and a legal estate meet in the same person, the trust or confidence is extinguished, for the equitable estate merges in

<sup>1</sup> See 4 Kent, Com. 163, and notes. See Preface to Campbell and Cambreleng's Amer. Chan. Dig. (1828); 1 Fonb. Eq. 11-20, by Laussat, 1831; 1 Amer. Jurist, 314.

<sup>2</sup> Co. Lit. 272 b.

<sup>3</sup> Wainwright v. Elwell, 1 Mad. 336, Bac. Uses, 5.

the legal estate. . As when a father holds the legal title to land in trust for an only child, and the father dies, such legal title descends to the child as only heir, and thus both estates meet in the same person.<sup>1</sup> But both estates must be commensurate with each other, otherwise there can be no merger.<sup>2</sup>

§ 14. Again, a trust or confidence is something collateral to the land, and not part or parcel of it. Thus a charge, an incumbrance, or a term of years is a legal title in, or issuing out of, the land itself, and binds every person, however he may come into possession of the estate. The trust or confidence is an incident to the land, and so far collateral that it does not go inseparably with it. Thus it only charges those who are privy in the estate. If the trustee is disseized, or if he is turned out of the possession by a person holding a paramount title, the disseizor is not bound by the trust or confidence, because there is no privity of estate between a disseizor and disseizee. And so there must be privity between the persons to be bound by the trust; as, if a trustee dies, the legal estate will descend to his heir, who will be bound by the trust, because there is both privity of estate and of person in such a case. And so if the trustee sell the estate to a purchaser with full notice of the trust or confidence, or if he transfer the estate to a volunteer without consideration, the estate and the persons to whom it comes in such manner will be bound by the trust, because there is both privity of estate and of persons. But if the trustee sells the estate to a third person for a valuable consideration,

<sup>1</sup> *Goodright v. Wells*, Doug. 771; *Selby v. Alston*, 3 Ves. 339; *Harwood v. Oglander*, 8 Ves. 127; *Philips v. Brydges*, 3 Ves. 126; *Wade v. Paget*, 1 Bro. Ch. 363, 1 Cox, 76; *Finch's Case*, 4 Inst. 85, 3d Res.; *Creaigh v. Blood*, 3 Jo. & La. 133.

<sup>2</sup> *Philips v. Brydges*, 3 Ves. 125; *Robinson v. Cuming*, T. Talb. 164, 1 Atk. 473; *Boteler v. Allington*, 1 Bro. Ch. 72; *Kendal v. Micfeild*, Barn. 47; *Buchanan v. Harrison*, 1 John. & Hem. 662; *Habergham v. Vincent*, 2 Ves. Jr. 204; *Merest v. James*, 6 Mad. 118; *Canning v. Hicks*, 2 Ch. Ca. 187, 1 Vern. 412; *Tabor v. Grover*, 2 Vern. 367, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 328; *Clerkson v. Bowyer*, 2 Vern. 66, 193.

without notice of the trust, neither the estate nor the purchaser for value and without notice will be bound by the trust, for there is in such case no privity between the persons.<sup>1</sup>

§ 15. All those persons who take under the trustee by operation of law are privies, both in estate and in person, to the trustee. Thus those who take as heirs under the trustee, or as tenants in dower or curtesy, or by extent of an execution,<sup>2</sup> or by an assignment in insolvency or bankruptcy, are bound by the trust. It has been thought that a lord, who takes by an escheat or by a title paramount, would not be bound by the trust; but the point has not been adjudged.<sup>3</sup>

§ 16. The doctrines of trusts are equally applicable to real and personal estate, and the same rules will govern trusts in both kinds of property.

§ 17. The *cestui que trust* has no remedy except by *subpoena in chancery*; that is, in some court with an equity jurisdiction, adequate to decree relief.<sup>4</sup> The *cestui que trust* cannot maintain a real action upon his equitable title, but such action must be brought in the name of the trustee.<sup>5</sup> There is, however,

<sup>1</sup> Finch's Case, 4 Inst. 85, 1st Res.; Gilbert on Uses, 429.

<sup>2</sup> Leake v. Leake, 5 Ir. Eq. 366.

<sup>3</sup> Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden, 203.

<sup>4</sup> Sturt v. Mellish, 2 Atk. 612; Allen v. Imlett, Holt, 641; Holland's Case, Styl. 41; Queen v. Orton, 14 Q. B. 139; Vanderstegen v. Witham, 6 M. & W. 457; Bond v. Nurse, 10 Q. B. 244; Edwards v. Lowndes, 1 El. & Bl. 81; Drake v. Pywall, 1 H. & C. 78; Miller's Case, Freem. 283; Witter v. Witter, 3 P. Wms. 102; King v. Jenkins, 3 Dow. & R. 41; Edwards v. Graves, Hob. 265; Farrington v. Knightly, 1 P. Wms. 549; McCartney v. Bostwick, 32 N. Y. 33; Dorsey v. Garcey, 30 Md. 489.

<sup>5</sup> Davis v. Charles River R. Co. 11 Cush. 506; Raymond v. Holden, 2 Cush. 268; Chapin v. Universalist Soc. 8 Gray, 581; Crane v. Crane, 4 Gray, 323; Fitzpatrick v. Fitzgerald, 13 Gray, 400; Baptist Soc. v. Hazen, 100 Mass. 322; Mordecai v. Parker, 3 Dev. 425; Cox v. Walker, 26 Me. 504; Matthews v. Ward, 10 G. & J. 443; Beach v. Beach, 14 Vt. 28; Wright v. Douglass, 3 Barb. S. C. 559; Moore v. Burnet, 11 Ohio, 334;

this exception, the *cestui que trust* may maintain a real action upon his equitable title against a stranger who shows no title, or no title under the trustee.<sup>1</sup> But the trustee may successfully defend the legal title against a suit at common law by the *cestui que trust* unless the trust has ceased, or the trustee is enjoined by a court of equity.<sup>2</sup> And so the grantee of the trustee can defend such action, even though the grant may be a breach of trust.<sup>3</sup> At one time the common-law courts attempted to punish trustees for a breach of trust in damages, as upon an implied contract,<sup>4</sup> but the exercise of such an authority was soon abandoned.<sup>5</sup> And the rule of confining the administration of trusts to the courts of equity has been carried so far that the Court of King's Bench may issue prohibitions, forbidding spiritual courts from intermeddling with a trust.<sup>6</sup> But a bill in equity cannot be maintained simply to establish the fact of a trust, no other relief being sought, even where its existence is denied; if, however, the supposed trustee is about to leave the jurisdiction, so that no relief could be obtained, the court will entertain the bill, and declare the trust if proved, and retain the bill for further action.<sup>7</sup> In Pennsylvania ejectment is an equitable action, and may be maintained by the *cestui que*

Hopkins v. Ward, 6 Munf. 38; Daggett v. Hart, 5 Fla. 215; Goodtitle v. Jones, 7 T. R. 47.

<sup>1</sup> Stearns v. Palmer, 10 Met. 35; Queen v. Abrahams, 4 Q. B. 157; Roper v. Holland, 3 Ad. & El. 99; Sloper v. Cottrell, 2 Jur. N. S. 1046.

<sup>2</sup> Obert v. Bordine, 1 Spencer, 394; Nicoll v. Walworth, 4 Denio, 385; Stearns v. Palmer, 10 Met. 35.

<sup>3</sup> Stearns v. Palmer, 10 Met. 35; Canoy v. Troutman, 7 Ired. 155; Taylor v. King, 6 Munf. 358; Reece v. Allen, 5 Gilm. 241.

<sup>4</sup> Megod's Case, Godb. 64; Jevon v. Bush, 1 Vern. 344; Smith v. Jameson, 5 T. R. 603, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 384, D. A.

<sup>5</sup> Barnadiston v. Soame, 7 St. Trials, 443; Sturt v. Mellish, 2 Atk. 612; Holland's Case, Styl. 41; Allen v. Imlett, Holt, 14; Burnett v. Preston, 17 Ind. 291.

<sup>6</sup> Petit v. Smith, 1 P. Wms. 7; Edwards v. Freeman, 2 P. Wms. 441; Barker v. May, 4 M. & R. 386; *Ex parte Jenkins*, 1 B. & C. 655.

<sup>7</sup> Baylies v. Payson, 5 Allen, 473; Price v. Minot, 107 Mass. 62.

*trust*, even against the trustee, when the former is entitled to the possession.<sup>1</sup>

§ 18. Trusts are divided into *simple* and *special* trusts. A *simple* trust is a simple conveyance of property to one upon trust for another, without further specifications or directions. In such case the law regulates the trust, and the *cestui que trust* has the right of possession and of disposing of the property, and he may call upon the trustee to execute such conveyances of the legal estate as are necessary. A *special* trust is where special and particular duties are pointed out to be performed by the trustee. In such cases he is not a mere passive agent, but he has active duties to perform, as when an estate is given to a person to sell, and from the proceeds to pay the debts of the settlor.

§ 19. Trusts have been further divided into *ministerial* and *discretionary* trusts. A trust to do a simple act, as to convey to the *cestui que trust*, at his request, is a ministerial trust, as it is a mere ministerial or instrumental act requiring the exercise of no judgment or discretion; but if a choice of time, manner, or place is given to the trustee, or if he must use his best judgment in the execution of the trust, it is a *discretionary* trust.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Fearne contends that a trust to sell is a ministerial trust, for the price is not arbitrary, nor at the trustee's discretion, but is to be the best that can be obtained;<sup>3</sup> but Mr. Lewin insists that it is a discretionary trust, as there is much room for judgment in the proceeding,<sup>4</sup> and it may be added that

<sup>1</sup> Kennedy v. Fury, 1 Dall. 76; Presbyterian Cong. v. Johnston, 1 W. & S. 56; School, &c. v. Dunkleberger, 6 Barr, 29.

<sup>2</sup> Attorney-General v. Gleg, 1 Atk. 356; Cole v. Wade, 16 Ves. 27; Gower v. Mainwaring, 2 Ves. 87; Hibbard v. Lamb, Amb. 309; Potter v. Chapman, Amb. 98; Attorney-General v. Scott, 1 Ves. 413, 4 Kent, Com. 304, 305.

<sup>3</sup> Fearne's P. W. 313.

<sup>4</sup> Lewin on Trusts, 19; King v. Bellord, 1 Hem. & Mil. 343; Robson



there is room for skill in procuring the best possible price. But the distinction is not very important, as the duties of a trustee for sale are the same, whether the trust is called ministerial or discretionary.

§ 20. There is a mixed *trust and power*, as where the settlor sketches the outline of a trust and leaves the details to be settled and carried into effect, according to the best judgment of his trustees. The power joined to the trust in such case is *imperative* and must be exercised; but the mode of its execution is a matter of judgment and *discretionary*. But this kind of trust and power is not to be confounded *with a trust to which a power is annexed*. In this case the trust is complete in itself, and the power is a simple addition, which may or may not be exercised, as the trustee shall choose, as where lands are given to trustees for a particular purpose, and a power of sale, or of changing the securities, is added; the power is no part of the trust, but it is something collateral, which the court cannot compel the trustee to perform. But a trust to distribute the trust fund, according to the discretion of the trustee, is an imperative trust and power.<sup>1</sup>

§ 21. Trusts are also said to be *legal* or *illegal*. Trusts are legal when they are for some honest purpose, as to pay debts or make a provision for families. They are illegal when they are for purposes of immorality, or vice, or of defrauding creditors, or contravene some statute, or are contrary to public policy. In such case a court of equity will not give its aid in carrying them into execution.<sup>2</sup>

§ 22. Again, trusts are either *public* or *private*. Private trusts concern only individuals or families, for private conven-

*v. Flight*, 5 N. R. 344; 4 De G., J. & S. 608; *Clarke v. Royal Panopticon*, 4 Drew. 29.

<sup>1</sup> *Cole v. Wade*, 16 Ves. 43; *Gower v. Mainwaring*, 2 Ves. 89; *Steere v. Steere*, 5 John. Ch. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Bacon on Uses*, 9; *Lewis v. Nelson*, 1 McCarter, 94.

ience and support. *Public trusts* are for public charities or for the general public good. They concern the general and indefinite public.

§ 23. Private trusts which concern individuals are limited in their duration. Being for individuals, they must be certain, and the individual or individuals must be identified within a limited period. They can endure only for a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years in addition. On the other hand, public trusts or charities, existing for the general and indefinite public, may continue for an indefinite period.<sup>1</sup>

§ 24. Trusts are divided in reference to their creation into express trusts, implied trusts, resulting trusts, and constructive trusts. Express trusts are also called direct trusts. They are generally created by instruments that point out directly and expressly the property, persons, and purposes of the trust; hence they are called direct or express trusts in contradistinction from those trusts that are implied, presumed, or construed by law to arise out of the transactions of parties. As express trusts are directly declared by the parties, there can never be a controversy whether they exist or not. In such trusts these questions arise, Are they legal or illegal, and what is the construction of the various terms and provisions which they contain?

§ 25. Implied trusts are trusts that the courts imply from the words of an instrument, where no express trust is declared, but such words are used that the court infers or implies that it was the purpose or intention of the parties to create a trust.

<sup>1</sup> *Christ's Hospital v. Grainger*, 1 Mac. & G. 460; *Attorney-General v. Aspinall*, 2 M. & Cr. 622; *Attorney-General v. Heelis*, 2 S. & S. 76; *Attorney-General v. Shrewsbury*, 6 Beav. 220; *Walker v. Richardson*, 2 M. & W. 892. See *Attorney-General v. Forster*, 10 Ves. 344; *Attorney-General v. Newcombe*, 14 Ves. 1; *Fearon v. Webb*, 14 Ves. 19.

§ 26. Resulting trusts are trusts that the courts presume to arise out of the transactions of parties, as if one man pays the purchase-money for an estate, and the deed is taken in the name of another. Courts presume that a trust is intended for the person who pays the money.

§ 27. A constructive trust is one that arises when a person, clothed with some fiduciary character, by fraud or otherwise gains some advantage to himself. Courts construe this to be an advantage for the *cestui que trust* or a constructive trust.

## CHAPTER II.

PARTIES TO TRUSTS ; AND WHAT PROPERTY MAY BE THE SUBJECT  
OF A TRUST.

- I. §§ 28-37. Who may create a trust.
- § 28. All persons competent to contract or make wills may create trusts.
  - § 29. The king may create trusts.
  - § 30. The State may create trusts; and so may all its officers.
  - § 31. Corporations may create trusts.
  - § 32. The power of married women to create trusts.
  - § 33. Capacity and power of infants to create trusts.
  - § 34. The marriage settlements of infants.
  - § 35. Of the ability of lunatics to create trusts.
  - § 36. Of conveyances in trust by aliens.
  - § 37. Trusts by bankrupts and insolvents.
- II. §§ 38-59. Who may be a trustee.
- § 38. A person may convert himself into a trustee.
  - § 39. Any person capable of taking the legal title may take as trustee. Rules that govern courts in appointing trustees.
  - § 40. The sovereign may be trustee. Question as to remedy.
  - § 41. The United States and the several States may be trustees.
  - §§ 42-45. Corporations may be trustees.
  - § 46. Unincorporated societies may be trustees for charitable purposes.
  - § 47. Public officers as trustees.
  - §§ 48-51. Married women as trustees.
  - § 52-54. Infants as trustees.
  - § 55. Aliens as trustees.
  - § 56. Lunatics as trustees.
  - § 57. A religious person or nun as trustee.
  - § 58. A bankrupt as trustee.
  - § 59. *Cestui que trust* may be a trustee for himself and others.
- III. §§ 60-66. Who may be *cestui que trust*.
- § 60. All persons may be *cestuis que trust* who may take the legal title.
  - §§ 61, 62. The Crown and the State may be *cestuis que trust*.
  - § 63. Corporations as *cestuis que trust*.
  - § 64. Aliens as *cestuis que trust*.
  - § 65. Those who cannot take a legal interest cannot take an equitable interest.
  - § 66. Except in certain charitable trusts.
- IV. §§ 67-72. What property may be the subject of a trust.
- § 67. A trust may be created in every kind of valuable property.

§ 68. Possibilities, *choses in action*, expectancies, and property not at the time *in esse* may be assigned in trust.

§ 69. *Choses in action* and expectancies that cannot be assigned in trust.

§§ 71, 72. Trusts in land lying in a foreign jurisdiction, and their administration.

### I. *Who may create a Trust.*

§ 28. It may be stated, as a general proposition, that every one competent to enter into a contract, or to make a will, or to deal with the legal title to property, may make such disposition of it as he pleases; and he may annex such conditions and limitations to the enjoyment of it as he sees fit; and he may vest it in trustees for the purpose of carrying out his intention. All persons, *sui juris*, have the same power to create trusts that they have to make a disposition of their property. A conveyance or disposition of property by persons not *sui juris* is valid to the extent of their legal capacity.

§ 29. The king may, by charter, grant his private property to one person upon trust for another.<sup>1</sup> But the trust must appear upon the face of the patent, and cannot be proved by parol.<sup>2</sup> He can also by will in writing under the sign-manual bequeath his private personal property to trustees for the use of another.<sup>3</sup> He may by warrant grant prizes taken in war to trustees, to be distributed among the captors,<sup>4</sup> and by statute he is authorized to convey trust property which has escheated to the Crown to trustees to execute the trust.<sup>5</sup>

§ 30. In the United States the sovereignty resides in the organized people; and all public officers are subjects and citizens, and they can convey their private property to trustees in the same manner as private individuals. The State itself by

<sup>1</sup> Bac. Uses, 66.

<sup>2</sup> *Fordyce v. Willis*, 3 Bro. Ch. 577.

<sup>3</sup> 39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 88. But it is said that probate of his will cannot be granted. *Williams' Ex'rs*, 13.

<sup>4</sup> *Alexander v. Duke of Wellington*, 2 R. & M. 35; *Stevens v. Bagwell*, 15 Ves. 140. But it is said that the *cestui que trust* cannot maintain a suit against the trustees in such cases.

<sup>5</sup> 39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 88.

its legislation, or by its public officers duly authorized, can create a trust, convey property, and appoint trustees;<sup>1</sup> and such trustees are equally amenable to the jurisdiction of chancery.<sup>2</sup> But a State cannot remove the trustees of a private corporation and appoint others in their stead.<sup>3</sup>

§ 31. All corporations, subject to the terms of the charters and laws under which they exist, may alienate their property; and their power to appoint trustees, and to declare in what manner the property shall be enjoyed, is coextensive with the right of alienation.<sup>4</sup>

§ 32. By the civil law married women could alienate their property and dispose of it by will. By the common law they were almost wholly incapacitated from dealing with their estates. The tendency of modern legislation is to remove these disabilities, and to enable them to make contracts and wills, as if they were sole, in relation to property held by them in their own right. By joining their husbands in fines and recoveries in England,<sup>5</sup> and in deeds in America executed according to the prescribed formalities, they can, as a general rule, convey their property to trustees.<sup>6</sup> In those States where

<sup>1</sup> *Commissioners v. Walker*, 6 How. (Miss.) 143.

<sup>2</sup> *Cotterel v. Hampson*, 2 Vern. 5; *Buchanan v. Hamilton*, 5 Ves. 722.

<sup>3</sup> *State v. Bryce*, 7 Ohio, 414; *Dart. Coll. v. Woodward*, 4 Wheat. 518.

<sup>4</sup> *Colchester v. Lowten*, 1 V. & B. 226; *Attorney-General v. Aspinall*, 2 M. & Cr. 613; *Attorney-General v. Wilson*, 1 Cr. & Ph. 1; *Catlin v. Eagle Bank*, 6 Conn. 233; *State of Maryland v. Bank of Maryland*, 6 Gill & J. 205; *Dana v. Bank of United States*, 5 W. & S. 224; *Arthur v. Comm. Bank*, 9 S. & M. 394; *Barry v. Merchants' Exch. Co.* 1 Sand. Ch. 280; *Hopkins v. Turnpike Co.* 4 Humph. 403; *Reynolds v. Stark County*, 5 Ham. 204; *Angell on Corp.* § 191. In England, municipal corporations are declared by statute to be trustees of their real and personal estate, and they are debarred from alienating it without the consent of the Lords of the Treasury. 5 & 6 Wm. IV. c. 76, § 94.

<sup>5</sup> 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 74.

<sup>6</sup> *Durant v. Ritchie*, 4 Mason, 45. And they can make mortgages of their property with powers of sale. *Young v. Graff*, 28 Ill. 20.

a married woman can convey her real and personal property without joining her husband, she can convey it to trustees to such uses as she may appoint; and where statutes have given her a testamentary capacity, she can create trusts and appoint trustees by her will.<sup>1</sup> A married woman is considered in all respects as a *feme sole* in regard to property settled to her separate use;<sup>2</sup> as if real estate is conveyed to a trustee and his heirs, or if personal estate is assigned to a trustee and his executors, for her sole and separate use, the absolute interest to be at her sole disposal, she has the entire control, and may exercise her ownership or implied power of appointment by creating a trust extending even beyond her coverture.<sup>3</sup> If she is tenant for life, to her sole use, she can make a settlement of her life-estate. But if the power of anticipation is restrained, she can make no disposition except of the annual produce, which has actually accrued or become due. A married woman will be treated as a *feme sole* only in regard to property *settled* upon her, and her power of disposing of property thus *settled* will be governed by a strict interpretation of the instrument of settlement. If the deed of settlement points out the manner in which she may dispose of her interest, she must follow that particular manner; as if the power is given her to convey or appoint by deed, she cannot convey or appoint by will; and if by will, she cannot convey by deed. If the instrument is silent as to her power to convey, she may devise the property by will.<sup>4</sup> Savings by a wife out of an allowance made by her husband for her separate maintenance are treated in equity as her separate estate, which she may dispose of;<sup>5</sup> and so are the accumula-

<sup>1</sup> 1 Redfield on Wills, pp. 21-28.

<sup>2</sup> Lewin on Trusts, p. 23 (5th London ed.); Hill on Trustees, p. 421 (4th Amer. ed.).

<sup>3</sup> The English rule is stated in the text. The courts in some of the United States follow the same rule; in others, a different rule is established. All the distinctions are stated, and the authorities collected in the chapter upon Trusts for Married Women.

<sup>4</sup> Mory v. Michael, 18 Md. 227.

<sup>5</sup> Brooke v. Brooke, 25 Beav. 342.

tions and savings from the income of a trust for her sole benefit.<sup>1</sup> But savings from pin-money allowed by the husband for the personal expenses, clothing, and adornment of the wife, revert to the husband, and the wife cannot dispose of them.<sup>2</sup>

§ 33. Infants can create trusts which are good until they are avoided.<sup>3</sup> The tendency of modern decisions is to hold that the acts and contracts of infants are voidable only, and subject to their election when of age either to avoid or confirm them.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Greenleaf says that "it may be safely stated as the result of the American authorities, that the act or contract of an infant is in no case to be held purely void, unless from its nature and solemnity, as well as from the operation of the instrument, it was manifestly and necessarily prejudicial to him. Wherever it *may be* for his benefit, it is at most but voidable; and if it be an act which it was either his duty<sup>5</sup> to do, or was manifestly for his benefit, it shall bind him."<sup>6</sup> But a court of equity would not allow an equitable interest to be enforced against an infant to his prejudice, and would give him the same power of avoidance over the equitable, as over the legal estate. And if the infant died without having avoided the trust, the court will still investigate the transaction and see that no unfair advantage was taken.<sup>7</sup> But if

<sup>1</sup> Story, Eq. Jur. § 1375; *Frazier v. Center*, 1 McCord, Eq. 270; *Picquet v. Swan*, 4 Mason, 455.

<sup>2</sup> *Jodrell v. Jodrell*, 9 Beav. 45; Story, Eq. Jur. § 1375 a.

<sup>3</sup> Co. Litt. 248 a; *Hearle v. Greenbank*, 1 Ves. 304; *Ownes v. Ownes*, 8 C. E. Green, 60; *Zouch v. Parsons*, 3 Burr. 1794; *Bool v. Mix*, 17 Wend. 119; *Eagle F. Ins. Co. v. Lent*, 6 Paige, 635; *Tucker v. Moreland*, 10 Pet. 71, 2 Kent, 234; *Gillett v. Stanley*, 1 Hill, 121.

<sup>4</sup> 2 Kent, 235; *Tucker v. Moreland*, 10 Pet. 58, 71; *Irvine v. Irvine*, 9 Wall. 617.

<sup>5</sup> *Zouch v. Parsons*, 3 Burr. 1794, 2 Kent, 234-236; *People v. Moores*, 4 Denio, 518; *McCall v. Parker*, 13 Met. 372.

<sup>6</sup> 4 Cruise, Dig. by Greenleaf, p. 15, note, and authorities cited; *Eagle Fire Co. v. Lent*, 1 Edw. Ch. 301; 6 Paige, 635.

<sup>7</sup> *Lewin on Trusts*, p. 25; 4 Cruise, Dig. p. 130; *Starr v. Wright*, 20 Ohio St. 97.



the infant is still alive, no one but himself can object to his deed.<sup>1</sup>

§ 34. The effect of a marriage settlement by a female infant, by which her real and personal estate is conveyed to trustees, has been frequently mooted in courts. It has been decided that as infants may contract marriage, a settlement made by the consent of their parents and guardians in consideration of a marriage to be afterwards solemnized, should be binding, inasmuch as if the marriage afterwards takes place, the situation of the parties is altered, and the interests of third persons, or children born of the marriage, may be affected. Lord Macclesfield and Lord Hardwicke upon these considerations refused to disturb such settlements.<sup>2</sup> But Lord Thurlow dissented from these opinions;<sup>3</sup> and the law is now settled, that a deed, executed by a female infant in consideration of marriage, does not bind her real estate, unless, having come of age, she assents to it after the death of her husband.<sup>4</sup> There is no reason why the marriage settlement of a male infant should not be governed by the same rule, except that he could confirm the same after he became of age, and before the death of his wife. The settlement will bind the husband if he is of full age.<sup>5</sup> It has been settled, however, after considerable conflict, that a female infant may bar herself of dower and of a dis-

<sup>1</sup> *Ingraham v. Baldwin*, 12 Barb. 9, 19.

<sup>2</sup> *Cannel v. Buckle*, 2 P. Wms. 243; *Harvey v. Ashley*, 3 Atk. 607; *Tabb v. Archer*, 3 Hen. & M. 399; *Healy v. Rowan*, 5 Grat. 414; *Lester v. Frazer*, Riley, Ch. 76; 2 Hill, Ch. 529.

<sup>3</sup> *Durnford v. Lane*, 1 Bro. Ch. 106.

<sup>4</sup> *Milner v. Lord Harewood*, 18 Ves. 259; *Trollope v. Linton*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 477; *Simson v. Jones*, 2 Russ. & My. 365; *Temple v. Hawley*, 1 Sand. Ch. 153; *Dominick v. Michael*, 4 Sand. 374; *Levering v. Levering*, 3 Md. Ch. 365; *Shaw v. Boyd*, 5 S. & R. 312; *Wilson v. McCullogh*, 19 Penn. St. 77; *Healy v. Rowan*, 5 Grat. 414; *In re Waring*, 12 Eng. L. & Eq. 351; *Cave v. Cave*, 15 Beav. 227, 19 Eng. L. & Eq. 280; *Field v. Moore*, 7 De G., M. & G. 691; 35 Eng. L. & Eq. 498; *Lee v. Stuart*, 2 Leigh, 76.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*; *Whicote v. Lyle's Ex'rs*, 28 Penn. St. 73; *Levering v. Heighe*, 2 Md. Ch. 81.

tributive share in her husband's estate, by accepting a jointure before marriage.<sup>1</sup> And she may, before marriage, make a binding settlement of her personal estate, for such a settlement will be for her benefit, as otherwise it would vest in the husband, and it would in effect be his settlement and not hers;<sup>2</sup> but such settlement is not good of chattels that would not go to the husband. It is now settled in England by statute that a male infant over twenty years of age and a female over seventeen may make a valid marriage settlement of their real and personal estates, under the sanction of the Court of Chancery.<sup>3</sup>

§ 35. It was a maxim of the common law, that no man of full age could be allowed to stultify himself; hence the acts, deeds, and feofments of idiots and lunatics were held to be binding, and not voidable by the party himself, though they could be avoided by his heirs, executors, or administrators.<sup>4</sup> This maxim never prevailed in the United States, and is not now the law of England. The conveyance of a lunatic is not, however, absolutely void, but only voidable by himself as well as by his friends and representatives.<sup>5</sup> But after inquisition declaring him incompetent, all contracts made by him, until restored to the control of his property, are void.<sup>6</sup> It follows

<sup>1</sup> *Drury v. Drury*, 2 Eden, 39; *Buckinghamshire v. Drury*, 2 Eden, 60-75; *McCartee v. Teller*, 2 Paige, 511.

<sup>2</sup> *Durnford v. Lane*, 1 Bro. Ch. 111; *Levering v. Levering*, 3 Md. Ch. 365; *Field v. Moore*, 7 De G., M. & G. 691; *Ainslie v. Medycott*, 9 Ves. 19; *Stamper v. Barker*, 5 Mad. 134; *Williams v. Chitty*, 3 Ves. 551; *Johnson v. Smith*, 1 Ves. 315; *Simson v. Jones*, 2 Russ. & My. 365; *Succession of Wilder*, 22 La. An. 219.

<sup>3</sup> 18 & 19 Vict. c. 43. 1855.

<sup>4</sup> Co. Litt. 247 b.

<sup>5</sup> *Allis v. Billings*, 6 Met, 415; *Breckenridge v. Ormsby*, 1 J. J. Marsh. 239; *Price v. Berrington*, 3 Mac. & G. 486; *Moulton v. Camroux*, 2 Exch. 487, 4 Exch. 17; *Milner v. Turner*, 4 Monr. 245; *Ballew v. Clark*, 2 Ired. 23; *Owing's Case*, 1 Bland, 370; *Elliot v. Ince*, 7 De G., M. & G. 488; *Campbell v. Hooper*, 3 Sm. & Giff. 153; *Wait v. Maxwell*, 5 Pick. 217; *Mitchell v. Kingman*, ib. 431; *Snowden v. Dunlavey*, 11 Penn. St. 522.

<sup>6</sup> *L'Amoureux v. Crosby*, 2 Paige, 422; *Pearl v. McDowell*, 3 J. J. Marsh. 658.

that a conveyance by a lunatic upon a trust will be good until it is avoided, and a court of equity would not set it aside, if it was fair and reasonable,<sup>1</sup> and if the parties could not be restored to their original condition; nor would the court interfere against *bond fide* purchasers without notice of the lunacy.<sup>2</sup>

§ 36. An alien may take real estate by devise or purchase, though he cannot take by operation of law, as by descent, or as tenant by curtesy. If an alien takes land by purchase, he may hold it until office found; and if he conveys it in trust or otherwise, his grantee will hold it until office found. An alien can therefore create a trust of real estate only until the State interposes. An alien may exercise all rights of ownership over personal property, consequently he can create a valid trust in it.<sup>3</sup>

§ 37. By the bankrupt law of England all the property which the bankrupt is entitled to up to the date of the certificate of his discharge vests in his assignees;<sup>4</sup> and he can create no trust in it, except in the surplus that may remain after the payment of all his debts.<sup>5</sup> Under the bankrupt laws of the United States and the insolvent laws of the various States, only the interests of the bankrupt existing at the date of the assignments vest in his assignees;<sup>6</sup> he may, therefore, create a valid trust in property acquired after the assignment and before the certificate.

<sup>1</sup> *Niell v. Morley*, 9 Ves. 478; Story, Eq. Jur. § 228.

<sup>2</sup> *Carr v. Halliday*, 1 Dev. & Batt. 344; *Price v. Berrington*, 3 Mac. & G. 486; *Greenslade v. Dare*, 20 Beav. 285.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Kent, pp. 1-36; Lewin on Trusts, p. 25; Hill on Trustees, p. 47.

<sup>4</sup> 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, §§ 141, 142.

<sup>5</sup> Lewin on Trusts, p. 26; Hill on Trustees, p. 47.

<sup>6</sup> In *Matter of Grant*, 2 Story, 312; *Mosby v. Steele*, 7 Ala. 299; *Ex parte Newhall*, 2 Story, 360.

## II. *Who may be a Trustee.*

§ 38. It is a rule that admits of no exception, that equity never wants a trustee, or, in other words, that if a trust is once properly created, the incompetency, disability, death, or non-appointment of a trustee shall not defeat it.<sup>1</sup> Thus, if property has been bequeathed in trust, and no trustee, or a trustee disabled from taking, or one who is dead, or refuses to take, is appointed, the court will decree the execution of the trust by the personal representatives, if it is personal property, and by the heirs or devisees, if it is real estate.<sup>2</sup> Property once charged with a valid trust will be followed in equity into whose-soever hands it comes, and he will be charged with the execution of the trust, unless he is a purchaser for value, and without notice.<sup>3</sup> The holder of the legal title and the absolute interest in property may convert himself into a trustee by making a valid declaration of trust upon good consideration;<sup>4</sup> or if he conveyed the property by some conveyance which was inoperative in law, equity would hold him to be a trustee;<sup>5</sup> as if a

<sup>1</sup> Co. Litt. 290 b, 113 a, Butler's note (1); Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 98, 976; *McCartee v. Orph. Asy. Soc.* 9 Cow. 437; *Crocheron v. Jaques*, 3 Edw. 207; *Bundy v. Bundy*, 28 N. Y. 410; *Dodkin v. Brunt*, L. R. 6 Eq. 580.

<sup>2</sup> *Piatt v. Vattier*, 9 Pet. 405; *Gibbs v. Marsh*, 2 Met. 243; *Withers v. Yeadon*, 1 Rich. Eq. 325; *King v. Donnelly*, 5 Paige, 46; *Dawson v. Dawson*, Rice, Eq. 243; *Cushney v. Henry*, 4 Paige, 345; *De Barante v. Gott*, 6 Barb. 492; *Malin v. Malin*, 1 Wend. 625; *McIntire v. Zanesville*, C. & M. Co. 9 Ham. 203; *Kerr v. Day*, 14 Penn. St. 114; *Attorney-General v. Downing*, Amb. 550; *Bennet v. Davis*, 2 P. Wms. 316; *Sonley v. Clockmakers' Co.* 1 Bro. Ch. 81; *Treat's App.* 30 Conn. 43; *White v. Hampton*, 13 Io. 259.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*; *Shepherd v. McEvers*, 4 John. Ch. 136.

<sup>4</sup> See notes to *Woollam v. Hearne*, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 404; *Mackreth v. Simmons*, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 235.

<sup>5</sup> *McKay v. Carrington*, 1 McLean, 50; *Kerr v. Day*, 14 Penn. St. 114; *Crawford v. Bertholf*, Saxt. Ch. 458; *Malin v. Malin*, 1 Wend. 625; *Tyson v. Passmore*, 2 Barr, 122; *Ten Eick v. Simpson*, 1 Sand. Ch. 244; *Waddington v. Banks*, 1 Brock. 97; *Atcherley v. Vernon*, 10 Mod. 518; *Davie v. Beardsham*, 1 Ch. Ca. 39; *Green v. Smith*, 1 Atk. 572; *Pollexfen v. Moore*, 3 Atk. 272; *Wall v. Bright*, 1 J. & W. 474.

man conveys property directly to his wife, a transaction inoperative in most of the States, equity would uphold the act, and decree the husband to be a trustee.<sup>1</sup>

§ 39. It may be stated, in general terms, that whoever is capable of taking the legal title or beneficial interest in property, may take the same in trust for others.<sup>2</sup> Whatever persons or corporations are capable of having the legal title or beneficial interest cast upon them by gift, grant, bequest, descent, or operation of law, may take the same subject to a trust, and they will become trustees. But it does not follow that whoever is capable of taking in trust, is capable of performing or executing it. The inquiry, then, is not so much who may take in trust, as it is who may execute and perform a trust. If a trust is cast upon a person incapable of taking and executing it, courts of equity will execute the trust by decree, or they will appoint some person capable of performing the requirements of the trust. Mr. Lewin says that "in general terms, a person to be appointed trustee should be a person capable of taking and holding the legal estate, and possessed of natural capacity and legal ability to execute the trust, and domiciled within the jurisdiction of the court."<sup>3</sup> Sir George J. Turner, L. J., laid down the general rules which govern courts in making appointments of trustees as follows:—

"First, the court will have regard to the wishes of the persons by whom the trust has been created, if expressed in the instrument creating the trust or clearly to be collected from it. I think this rule may be safely laid down, because if the author of the trust has in terms declared that a particular person, or a person filling a particular character, should not be trustee of the instrument, there cannot, as I apprehend, be the least

<sup>1</sup> *Huntly v. Huntly*, 8 Ired. Eq. 250; *Livingston v. Livingston*, 2 John. Ch. 537; *Garner v. Garner*, 1 Busb. Eq. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Fonb. Eq.* 139, n.; *Hill on Trustees*, 48; *Commissioners v. Walker* 6 How. (Miss.) 146.

<sup>3</sup> *Lewin on Trusts*, 27.

doubt that the court would not appoint to the office a person whose appointment was so prohibited ; and I do not think that upon a question of this description any distinction can be drawn between express declaration and demonstrated intention. The analogy of the course which the court pursues in the appointment of guardians affords, I think, some support to this rule. The court in those cases attends to the wishes of the parents, however informally they may be expressed.

“ Another rule which may, I think, safely be laid down, is this, — that the court will not appoint a person to be trustee with a view to the interest of some of the persons interested under the trust, in opposition either to the wishes of the testator, or to the interests of other of the *cestuis que trust*. I think so for this reason, that it is of the essence of the duty of every trustee to hold an even hand between the parties interested in the trust. Every trustee is in duty bound to look after the interests of all, and not of any particular member or class of members of his *cestuis que trust*.

“ A third rule which may be safely laid down is that the court, in appointing a trustee, will have regard to the question whether his appointment will promote or impede the execution of the trust, for the very purpose of the appointment is that the trust may be better carried into execution.” <sup>1</sup>

§ 40. The sovereign may sustain the character of a trustee. He has a legal capacity to take and hold the estate, and to execute the trust,<sup>2</sup> but there is a difficulty in every country in executing the judgments and decrees of a court against the sovereign power of the country. In England it is said that the Court of Chancery has no jurisdiction over the king's conscience, for the Lord Chancellor only exercises the equitable authority of the king himself in judging between his subjects. But the greater difficulty is in enforcing the decrees of a court

<sup>1</sup> *In re Tempest*, L. R. 1 Ch. 487.

<sup>2</sup> *Lewin on Trusts*, 27.

against the sovereign power ; for “the arms of equity are very short against the prerogative.”<sup>1</sup> The subject may have a clear right, but no remedy either at law or equity against the Crown ; in such case his only resource is an appeal to the king by a petition of right, and it cannot be supposed that he would be refused. The question is now of less importance ; for by statute, if trust property vests in the Crown by escheat, the king is enabled to grant it to trustees for the purpose of executing the trust.<sup>2</sup> And by an amendment, it is further provided that property held in trust shall not escheat or be forfeited to the Crown by the failure or forfeiture of the trustee ;<sup>3</sup> and it is still further provided, that in such cases trust property shall be under the control of the Court of Chancery for the use of the parties beneficially interested, and that new trustees shall be appointed.<sup>4</sup> Under these statutes it is said that an equity will be enforced against the Crown.<sup>5</sup> The only cases where the question is still open, whether a trust can be enforced against the Crown, is where the person of the sovereign takes by descent as heir, or by representation, or where he may have held as trustee previously to his acquiring the crown, or where a grant or bequest is made to him as a trustee.<sup>6</sup>

§ 41. The United States, and each one of the separate States, may sustain the character of trustee. They have legal capacities to take and execute trusts for every purpose.<sup>7</sup> But a court

<sup>1</sup> *Pawlett v. Attorney-General*, Hard. 467 ; *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 Ed. 255 ; *Kildare v. Eustace*, 1 Vern. 439 ; *Wike's Case*, Lane, 54 ; *Penn v. Lord Baltimore*, 1 Ves. 453 ; *Reeve v. Attorney-General*, 2 Atk. 224 ; *Hovenden v. Lord Annesley*, 2 Sch. & L. 617 ; *Hodge v. Attorney-General*, 3 Yo. & Col. 342 ; *Briggs v. Light-boats*, 11 Allen (Mass.), 157, where all the authorities are commented on.

<sup>2</sup> 39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 88.

<sup>3</sup> 4 & 5 Wm. IV. c. 23.

<sup>4</sup> 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, §§ 15, 46, 47.

<sup>5</sup> *Hughes v. Wells*, 9 Hare, 749 ; 13 Eng. L. & Eq. 389.

<sup>6</sup> *Hill on Trustees*, 50.

<sup>7</sup> See *Mitford v. Reynolds*, 1 Phill. 185 ; *Nightingale v. Goulbourn*, 2 Phill. 594 ; 5 Hare, 484. It was denied, however, that the United States

cannot execute its judgments and decrees against a sovereign State with any more effect than the courts of England can enforce their orders against the king. The arms of equity in America are as short against the sovereign power as they are in England against the prerogative. Mr. Justice Gray has clearly shown that a State cannot be sued in law or equity against its consent, or unless there is some general or special statute authorizing the suit.<sup>1</sup> A subject may have a clear right, but no remedy; in such case he must petition the legislative power, and there is no reason to suppose that his right would be refused. If a State accepts a trust by grant or bequest, it must act through its legislative powers in administering the trust, or in creating and appointing agents or officers to perform the duties which it assumes; as the United States acted in relation to the bequest of James Smithson in trust for the establishment of the Smithsonian Institution for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men.<sup>2</sup> A limitation over of a charitable devise to the States of Maryland and Louisiana in case of forfeiture by the first takers was held not to vitiate the bequest.<sup>3</sup>

§ 42. It was formerly laid down that corporations could not be seised of lands to the use of another, and could not be trustees.<sup>4</sup> The reason assigned for this rule was that no trust or confidence could be reposed in them; that they could not be compelled to execute a use or perform a trust, for courts of equity, in decreeing the execution of a trust, lay hold upon the conscience;<sup>5</sup> and it is impossible to attach any demand upon

could take in trust in *Levy v. Levy*, 33 N. Y. 97; *Shoemaker v. Commrs.* 36 Ind. 176.

<sup>1</sup> *Briggs v. Light-boats*, 11 Allen, 157.

<sup>2</sup> U. S. Stat. 1836, c. 252, Vol. V. p. 64 (L. & Bro. ed.); also, Stat. 1846, c. 178, Vol. IX. p. 102.

<sup>3</sup> *McDonogh's Ex'rs v. Murdoch*, 15 How. 367.

<sup>4</sup> Bacon on Uses, 57; 1 Cruise, Dig. p. 340.

<sup>5</sup> Sugd. V. & P. p. 417.



the conscience of a body so artificially created that it cannot in the nature of things have a conscience. Again it was said that they could not be imprisoned, if they refused to obey the decrees of the court. But the technical rules upon which it was held that corporations could not be trustees have ceased to operate; and at the present day corporations of every description may take and hold estates, as trustees, for purposes not foreign to the purposes of their own existence; and they may be compelled by courts of equity to carry the trusts into execution.<sup>1</sup> If they misapply the trust fund, or refuse to obey the decrees of the court the proper remedy is by distringas, sequestration, or injunction, or by removal and appointment of new trustees.<sup>2</sup>

§ 43. It must be understood, however, that corporations are the creatures of the law, and that as a general rule they cannot exercise powers not given to them by their charters or acts of incorporation.<sup>3</sup> For this reason they cannot act as trustees in a matter in which they have no interest, or in a matter that is inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the purposes for which they were created.<sup>4</sup> Nor can they act as trustees if they are forbidden to take and hold lands, as by the statutes of mortmain, nor if they are not empowered to take the property. But if the

<sup>1</sup> *Attorney-General v. St. John's Hosp.* 2 De G., J. & Sm. 621; *Attorney-General v. Landerfield*, 9 Mod. 286; *Dummer v. Chippenham*, 14 Ves. 252; *Green v. Rutherford*, 1 Ves. 468; *Attorney-General v. Whorwood*, 1 Ves. 536; *Attorney-General v. Stafford*, Barn. 33; *Attorney-General v. Found. Hosp.* 2 Ves. Jr. 46; *Attorney-General v. Clarendon*, 17 Ves. 499; *Attorney-General v. Caius Coll.* 2 Keen, 165; *Attorney-General v. Ironmongers' Co.* 2 Beav. 313; *Jackson v. Hartwell*, 8 John. 422; *Trustees Phillips Academy v. King*, 12 Mass. 546; *Attorney-General v. Utica Ins. Co.* 2 Johns. Ch. 384; *Vidal v. Girard*, 2 How. 187; *Miller v. Lerch*, 1 Wal. Jr. 210; *Columbia Bridge Co. v. Kline*, Bright. N. P. 320; *Greenville Acad.* 7 Rich. Eq. 476; *McDonogh v. Murdoch*, 15 How. 367; *Green v. Dennis*, 6 Cow. 304; *Dublin Case*, 38 N. H. 577.

<sup>2</sup> *Mayor of Coventry v. Attorney-General*, 7 Bro. P. C. 235; 3 Mad. Ch. 77, 209.

<sup>3</sup> *In Matter of Howe*, 1 Paige, 214.

<sup>4</sup> *In Matter of Howe*, 1 Paige, 214; *Jackson v. Hartwell*, 8 Johns. 422.

trusts are within the general scope of the purposes of the institution of the corporation, or if they are collateral to its general purposes, but germane to them, as if the trusts relate to matters which will promote and aid the general purposes of the corporation, it may take and hold, and be compelled to execute them,<sup>1</sup> if it accepts them. Thus towns, cities, and parishes may take and hold property in trust for the establishment of colleges,<sup>2</sup> for the purpose of educating the poor,<sup>3</sup> for the relief of the poor, though not paupers, by furnishing them fuel at a low price,<sup>4</sup> and for the support of schools.<sup>5</sup> So also overseers of the poor, supervisors of a county,<sup>6</sup> commissioners of roads in South Carolina,<sup>7</sup> trustees of the poor in Mississippi, and also trustees of the school fund,<sup>8</sup> are corporations *sub modo*; and they may take and execute trusts within the scope of their official duties.

§ 44. A bank may receive a deed, and hold land in trust to receive a debt due to it.<sup>9</sup> One corporation may take and hold in trust for another, or for a stranger,<sup>10</sup> or for an individual; as where one gave a legacy to a church corporation in trust to pay the income to his housekeeper for life, and after her death to apply it to church purposes, it was held that the corporation

<sup>1</sup> Story, J., *Vidal v. Girard*, 2 How. 188-190; *McDonogh v. Murdoch*, 15 How. 367; *First Cong. Soc. of Southington v. Atwater*, 23 Conn. 34; *Wetmore v. Parker*, 7 Lansing, 121.

<sup>2</sup> *Vidal v. Girard*, *ut supra*. But see *Perin v. McMicken*, 15 La. An. 154.

<sup>3</sup> *McDonogh v. Murdoch*, *ut supra*.

<sup>4</sup> *Webb v. Neal*, 5 Allen, 575; *McIntire Poor School v. Zanesville Canal Co.* 9 Ohio, 217.

<sup>5</sup> *First Parish in Sutton v. Cole*, 3 Pick. 232.

<sup>6</sup> *North Hempstead v. Hempstead*, 2 Wend. 109; *Jansen v. Ostrander*, 1 Cow. 670.

<sup>7</sup> *Com. Roads v. McPherson*, 1 Spear, 218.

<sup>8</sup> *Govenor v. Gridley*, Walk. 328; *Carmichael v. Trustees, &c.*, 3 How. (Miss.) 84.

<sup>9</sup> *Morris v. Way*, 16 Ohio, 478.

<sup>10</sup> *Phillips Academy v. King*, 12 Mass. 546.

might well execute the trust, on the principle that when property is given to a corporation partly for its own use and partly for the use of another, the power of the corporation to take and hold for its own use carries with it, as a necessary incident, the power to execute that part of the trust which relates to others.<sup>1</sup> The supervisors of a county cannot take in trust for a town or village or for individuals, but only for the body which they represent.<sup>2</sup> Whether a particular corporation can hold as trustee for any specific purpose must generally be determined by the construction of its charter and of the laws of the State in which it acts.<sup>3</sup>

§ 45. If a corporation takes land by grant or bequest in trust or otherwise, which by its charter it cannot hold, its title is good as against third persons and strangers; the State only can interfere.<sup>4</sup> A corporation cannot be compelled to execute a trust in property, the legal title to which it has no power to take and hold;<sup>5</sup> but the trust, if otherwise valid, is not for that reason void, and the court will appoint a competent trustee and direct a conveyance of the property to him; as where a testator gave land to a corporation that could not take by reason of the statute of mortmain, in trust to sell and apply the proceeds to persons competent to take, it was held

<sup>1</sup> In *Matter of Howe*, 1 Paige, 214.

<sup>2</sup> *Jackson v. Hartwell*, 8 John. 422.

<sup>3</sup> *Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward*, 4 Wheat. 636; *Head v. Providence Ins. Co.* 2 Cranch, 127; *State v. Stebbins*, 1 Stew. 299; *Beaty v. Knowler*, 4 Pet. 152; *Beaty v. Marine Ins. Co.* 2 John. 109; *People v. Utica Ins. Co.* 15 John. 358; *New York Fire Ins. Co. v. Ely*, 2 Cow. 678; *State v. Mayor of Mobile*, 5 Porter, 279.

<sup>4</sup> *Runyan v. Coster's Lessee*, 14 Pet. 122; *Miller v. Lerch*, 1 Wal. Jr. 210; *Leazure v. Hillegas*, 7 S. & R. 321; *Perin v. Cary*, 24 How. 465; *Chapin v. School Dist.* 35 N. H. 445; *Troy v. Haskell*, 33 N. H. 533; *Philadelphia v. Girard*, 45 Penn. St. 9; *Humbert v. Trinity Church*, 24 Wend. 587; *Harpending v. Dutch Church*, 16 Pet. 492; *Bogardus v. Trinity Church*, 4 Sand. Ch. 758; *Angell & Ames, Corp.* §§ 151-155.

<sup>5</sup> *Sonley v. Clockmakers' Co.* 1 Bro. Ch. 81; *Vidal v. Girard*, 2 How. 188.

that though the devise was void at law, yet in equity it was a valid trust, and that the heir was a trustee to the uses declared in the will.<sup>1</sup>

§ 46. Grants or gifts to an unincorporated association in trust for a charitable purpose are sustained in equity, as a legacy to the Seamen's Aid Society, to go to their treasurer for the time being for the purposes of such society ;<sup>2</sup> a bequest over to several unincorporated societies, some of them not in the State, was held good,<sup>3</sup> and if the members are too numerous to administer the trust, the court will appoint a trustee.<sup>4</sup> So a bequest to "The Marine Bible Society," for certain purposes, was held to establish a charitable trust, although the society was a voluntary association, and had been disbanded, and the court appointed a trustee to carry the trust into effect.<sup>5</sup> In Pennsylvania substantially the same doctrine has been held.<sup>6</sup> A different doctrine was held in the Supreme Court of the United States ;<sup>7</sup> but the case was decided upon the law of Virginia, and may be considered as settling a local rather than a general

<sup>1</sup> *Sonley v. Clockmakers' Co.* 1 Bro. Ch. 81, and *Vidal v. Girard*, 2 How. 188; *Winslow v. Cummings*, 3 Cush. 358. This is denied to be the law in the courts of New York, in relation to charitable bequests. See *Ayres v. Methodist Church*, 3 Sand. 351; *Andrew v. Bible Soc.* 4 Sand. 156; *Levy v. Levy*, 40 Barb. 585; 33 N. Y. 97. These cases are governed by a statute, as is said, and would not probably be followed outside of that State; nor are they fully concurred in by their own courts, as there was a strong dissent in the Court of Appeals, the court of last resort.

<sup>2</sup> *Tucker v. Seamen's Aid Soc.* 7 Met. 188; *First Cong. Soc. of South-ington v. Atwater*, 23 Conn. 56.

<sup>3</sup> *Burbank v. Whitney*, 24 Pick. 146; *Washburn v. Sewall*, 9 Met. 280. But see *Methodist Church v. Remington*, 1 Watts, 218.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Winslow v. Cummings*, 3 Cush. 358.

<sup>6</sup> *Pickering v. Shotwell*, 10 Barr, 27; and see the able opinion of Baldwin, J., in *Magill v. Brown*, Bright. N. P. 350. See also *Methodist Church v. Remington*, 1 Watts, 218.

<sup>7</sup> *Baptist Asso. v. Hart*, 4 Wheat. 1; *Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor*, 3 Pet. 114.

question.<sup>1</sup> The later cases in the same court hold the general rule to be otherwise.<sup>2</sup>

§ 47. A trust to a board of officers in their official capacity for purposes within the scope of their official duties may be executed by them.<sup>3</sup> Where a bequest was to the chancellor of the State of New York, the mayor and recorder of the city of New York and several other persons by their official description only, and their successors in office, to build and maintain a hospital, and if this could not be done legally, they were to apply for an act of incorporation, and at all events the estate should be held by an heir charged with the trusts, it was held that the designation of the trustees by their official character was equivalent to naming them by their proper names; that the trust was not to be executed by them in their official character, but in their private and individual capacity; and that if the trust had been to the officers named and their successors to execute, and no other provisions had been made, it would have fallen within the case of *Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors*, and would have been void. It was further held, that it was a good executory devise to a corporation to be created *in futuro*, and in the mean time that the estates in the hands of the heir would be held charged with the trusts.<sup>4</sup> A bequest to the chancellor of the exchequer for the time being for the benefit of Great Britain was held good.<sup>5</sup> And the Governor-General of India may take in trust for the benefit of the city of Decca.<sup>6</sup> Where a British subject bequeathed funds to the President and Vice-President of the United States and the Governor of Pennsylvania for the time being to establish a college in the State of Pennsylvania, and directed that moral

<sup>1</sup> Baldwin, J., in *Magill v. Brown*, Bright. N. P. 354.

<sup>2</sup> *Vidal v. Girard*, 2 How. 187. See chapter on Charitable Trusts, *post*.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, § 30.

<sup>4</sup> *Inglis v. Trustees of the Sailors' Snug Harbor*, 3 Pet. 99.

<sup>5</sup> *Nightingale v. Goulbourn*, 2 Phill. 594, 5 Hare, 484.

<sup>6</sup> *Mitford v. Reynolds*, 1 Phill. 185.

philosophy should be taught, and that a professor should inculcate the rights of the black people of every clime, until they were restored to an equality of rights throughout the Union, the Court of Chancery directed an inquiry to be made whether the President, Vice-President, and Governor would accept the trust, and it appearing that they declined to act, it was held that the trust failed; and as it could not be carried into effect, *cy pres*, in a foreign country, that the gift fell into the residue.<sup>1</sup> A bank comptroller is a trustee of the various securities held by him for the several banks; but the State itself is not liable as a trustee for his acts.<sup>2</sup>

§ 48. Married women may become trustees by deed, gift, bequest, appointment, or by operation of law.<sup>3</sup> If an estate comes to a married woman in any way, charged with a trust, her coverture cannot be pleaded in bar of the trust;<sup>4</sup> and a court of equity will enforce its execution; as when the legal title to land in trust was cast by descent upon a married woman, and the law required that a deed executed by her should be acknowledged, as executed voluntarily, and she refused so to acknowledge it, the court compelled her by decree.<sup>5</sup> But specific performance will not be enforced against a *feme covert* trustee for sale upon her contract as trustee to convey.<sup>6</sup> There is no less judgment and discretion in a woman after marriage than before. Sir John Trevor thought she rather improved by her husband's teaching.<sup>7</sup> The reasons for her disabilities are

<sup>1</sup> *New v. Bonaker*, L. R. 4 Eq. Ca. 655.

<sup>2</sup> *State v. Rush*, 20 Wis. 212.

<sup>3</sup> *Lake v. DeLambert*, 4 Ves. 595; *Compton v. Collinson*, 2 Bro. Ch. 377; *Hearle v. Greenbank*, 1 Ves. 305; *Bell v. Hyde*, Pr. Ch. 350; *Moore v. Hussey*, Hob. 95; *Needles v. Bish. of Winchester*, Hob. 225; *Clarke v. Saxon*, 1 Hill, Ch. 69; *Bradish v. Gibbs*, 3 John. Ch. 523; *Livingston v. Livingston*, 2 John. Ch. 541; *Dundas v. Biddle*, 2 Barr, 160; *Claussen v. La Franz*, 1 Clark (Io.), 226.

<sup>4</sup> *Clarke v. Saxon*, 1 Hill, Ch. 69; *Berry v. Norris*, 1 Duv. 302.

<sup>5</sup> *Dundas v. Biddle*, 2 Barr, 160.

<sup>6</sup> *Berry v. Norris*, 1 Duv. 302; *Avery v. Griffin*, L. R. 6 Eq. 606.

<sup>7</sup> *Bell v. Hyde*, Pr. Ch. 350.

founded upon her own interests, or her husband's, or both ;<sup>1</sup> or rather upon the broader policy of the law which, for the purpose of domestic peace and happiness, merges the proprietary interests of the wife during coverture in her husband, and will not permit her to hold interests separate from, and independent of, and possibly antagonistic to him. The policy of the law has, however, been very much modified by legislation in later years. But where such interests are not concerned, she possesses the same legal capacity as if she were *sui juris*. Thus, she may execute any kind of power, whether simply collateral, appendant, or in gross ; and it is immaterial whether it is given to her while sole or married.<sup>2</sup>

§ 49. In equity the absolute interest in the trust fund is vested in the *cestui que trust*, the trustee is a mere instrument, and any power or authority in the trustee must have the character of a power simply collateral ;<sup>3</sup> therefore there is nothing, as respects legal capacity, to prevent a married woman from administering a discretionary trust.<sup>4</sup> But she cannot create a trust in her absolute property except by joining her husband in conveying it, or in executing a declaration of trust.<sup>5</sup>

§ 50. At the same time a husband must always have a large influence over a *feme covert* trustee ; indeed, as he would be answerable for her acts, and liable for her breaches of trust, he must, for his own protection, look to the manner in which she administers the fund. And she must join her husband in

<sup>1</sup> *Compton v. Collinson*, 2 Bro. Ch. 377.

<sup>2</sup> *Co. Litt.* 112 a, 187 b ; *Lord Antrim v. Buckingham*, 2 Freeman, 168 ; *Blithe's Case*, *ib.* 91 ; *Godolphin v. Godolphin*, 1 Ves. 23 ; *Sugden on Powers*, 144-155, 4 Kent, 324 ; *Thompson v. Murray*, 2 Hill, Ch. 214 ; *Bradish v. Gibbs*, 3 Johns. Ch. 523.

<sup>3</sup> *Smith v. Smith*, 21 Beav. 385 ; *Drummond v. Tracy*, 1 John. 608 ; *Kingham v. Lee*, 15 Sim. 401 ; *People v. Webster*, 10 Wend. 554.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Graham v. Long*, 65 Penn. St. 383.

suits in relation to the trust property.<sup>1</sup> Again, if land is conveyed to a married woman upon a declared trust without powers of sale, and it becomes necessary to sell and convey the land, is the husband to join or not in the conveyance? and to whom is the purchase-money to be paid, and upon whose receipt? <sup>2</sup> Mr. Lewin thinks that the joint receipt of the husband and wife should be taken; but that the safest way would be to pay the money into some bank upon their joint receipt, to remain until wanted for the purposes of the trust, and that if the husband took it out for any other purpose, he would be liable as for a breach of trust.<sup>3</sup> Another inconvenience arises in probate and other trusts, where the trustee may be required to give bonds for the faithful administration of the trust. A court of equity may require the trustee to give security for the property, even though the trust arises by operation of law.<sup>4</sup> A married woman can enter into contracts only in relation to her sole and separate estate; and how far she can bind herself, or her estate, by a bond to execute a trust in property, the beneficial interests in which belong to another, would always be a perplexing question, although the sureties in such a bond might be liable.<sup>5</sup>

§ 51. Subject to these inconveniences, a married woman can always be a trustee; and she may even be a trustee for her husband,<sup>6</sup> as well as her husband for her,<sup>7</sup> and courts will find means to enforce the trusts; but they will not appoint

<sup>1</sup> *Still v. Ruby*, 35 Penn. St. 373.

<sup>2</sup> See *Daniel v. Uhley*, Wm. Jones, 137; Co. Litt. 112 a, Hargrave's note (6); 1 Fonb. Eq. 92; *McNeille v. Acton*, 2 Eq. R. 25.

<sup>3</sup> *Lewin on Trusts*, 24-25; *Drummond v. Tracy*, John. 611; 4 Cruise, Dig. 143; Co. Litt. 112 a, Hargrave's note (6).

<sup>4</sup> *Clarke v. Saxon*, 1 Hill, Ch. 69.

<sup>5</sup> In Massachusetts married women may now be appointed guardians.

<sup>6</sup> *Livingston v. Livingston*, 2 John. Ch. 541.

<sup>7</sup> *Bennet v. Davis*, 2 P. Wms. 316; *Shirley v. Shirley*, 9 Paige, 363; *Jamison v. Brady*, 6 S. & R. 467; *Boykin v. Ciples*, 2 Hill, Ch. 200; *Picquet v. Swan*, 4 Mason, 455; *Griffith v. Griffith*, 5 B. Monr. 113.



married women to such offices, nor will they appoint them to be guardians of minors;<sup>1</sup> a woman, on the contrary, will be removed from the office, if she is appointed while sole and afterwards marries.<sup>2</sup> For the same reason it is undesirable to appoint a *feme sole* trustee, for should she marry, her husband, being liable for her breaches of trust, ought to have control of her acts, and the character of the trust is changed. On these grounds the courts at one time refused to appoint a *feme sole* trustee;<sup>3</sup> but it is a matter of sound discretion in the court, and in a more recent case a *feme sole* was appointed.<sup>4</sup>

§ 52. Infants labor under still greater disabilities than married women, for a married woman has judgment, discretion, and capacity, though she cannot in all cases freely exercise them; but an infant wants judgment and capacity.<sup>5</sup> From this want of judgment and capacity an infant can do nothing that requires the exercise of discretion. It is true that his acts are voidable only and not void;<sup>6</sup> but every act, not simply ministerial, is at least voidable; but where he signs an acquittance without receipt of the money, it is an exercise of discretion, and is actually void.<sup>7</sup> An infant is capable of

<sup>1</sup> *Re Kaye*, L. R. 1 Ch. 387. In Massachusetts, by Stat. c. 409 of the acts of 1869, married women may be appointed guardians, trustees, or administratrixes with the assent of their husbands; and if holding such offices they afterwards marry, they do not lose their authority.

<sup>2</sup> *Lake v. DeLambert*, 4 Ves. 595. The trustee in this case had married a foreigner, but Lord Chancellor Loughborough simply remarked "that it was very inconvenient for a married woman to be trustee."

<sup>3</sup> *Brooks v. Brooks*, 1 Beav. 531.

<sup>4</sup> *Re Campbell's Trusts*, 31 Beav. 176.

<sup>5</sup> *Hearle v. Greenbank*, 3 Atk. 712; 1 Ves. 305; *Grange v. Tiving*, O. Bridg. 108; *Compton v. Collinson*, 2 Bro. Ch. 377; *Sockett v. Wray*, 4 Bro. Ch. 486. See Co. Litt. 3 b, 128 a, 88 b, 172 a, 264 b, Hargrave's note (4); 1 Watk. on Copyh. 24; *Eddleston v. Collins*, 3 De G., M. & G. 1; *Toller's Ex'rs*, 31; *Halliburton v. Leslie*, 2 Hog. 252.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, § 33; Lewin on Trusts, 32.

<sup>7</sup> *Russell's Case*, 5 Rep. 27 a; Co. Litt. 172 a, 264 b; 1 Roll. Ab. 730, F. 2; *Cropster v. Griffith*, 2 Bland, 5.

executing a naked power unaccompanied with any interest, or not requiring any discretion.<sup>1</sup> If a power is given to an infant relating to his own estate, it must be inserted in the deed, that he may execute it during his infancy, or his execution of it will have no effect.<sup>2</sup> As was shown before, trustees generally exercise powers over the trust fund simply collateral;<sup>3</sup> but if the exercise of these powers require the application of any prudence or discretion, an infant is incapable of executing them.<sup>4</sup>

§ 53. From these inconveniences and incapacities attending the administration of a trust by an infant, he never would be appointed by a court to such an office. He could not give a valid security or bond for the safety of the trust fund, nor could a court decree him to make satisfaction for a breach of the trust.<sup>5</sup> But an infant has no privilege to cheat,<sup>6</sup> and he will not be protected in cunning and contrived frauds.<sup>7</sup>

§ 54. But an infant may still be a trustee; he may be actually named as trustee in any instrument, and the estate will pass to him; and if such an appointment is made, he cannot set up any claim to the beneficial interest in the estate;<sup>8</sup> but a

<sup>1</sup> 4 Kent, 324.

<sup>2</sup> *Coventry v. Coventry*, 2 P. Wms. 229; 1 Sug. on Powers, 213-220 (6th ed.).

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, § 14.

<sup>4</sup> *King v. Bellord*, 1 Hem. & M. 343; *Hearle v. Greenbank*, 3 Atk. 695; 1 Ves. 298; *Grange v. Tiving*, O. Bridg. 109.

<sup>5</sup> *Whitmore v. Weld*, 1 Vern. 328; *Russell's Case*, 5 Rep. 27 a; *Hindmarsh v. Southgate*, 3 Russ. 324.

<sup>6</sup> *Evroy v. Nickolas*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 489.

<sup>7</sup> *Cory v. Gertoken*, 2 Mad. 40; *Buckingham v. Drury*, 2 Ed. 71, 72; *Clare v. Bedford*, 13 Vin. 536; *Watts v. Cresswell*, 9 Vin. 415; *Beckett v. Cordley*, 1 Bro. Ch. 358; *Savage v. Foster*, 9 Mod. 37; *Overton v. Banister*, 3 Hare, 503; *Stikeman v. Dawson*, 1 De G. & Sm. 503; *Wright v. Snowe*, 2 De G. & Sm. 321; *Davies v. Hodgson*, 25 Beav. 117; *Hillyer v. Bennett*, 3 Edw. Ch. 544; *Hill v. Anderson*, 5 S. & M. 216.

<sup>8</sup> *King v. Denison*, 1 Ves. & B. 275; *Jevon v. Bush*, 1 Vern. 343; *Lake v. DeLambert*, 4 Ves. 596, n.

court of equity would direct the execution of the trust by himself or guardian,<sup>1</sup> or would remove him and appoint some one competent to act. So an estate charged with a trust may be cast upon an infant by descent, or by operation of law; as where a father bought and paid for land, but took the conveyance in the name of a son five years old, the court held that the land in the hands of the son was charged with a resulting trust for the father.<sup>2</sup> In another case, where the father had purchased land in the name of an infant son, it was presumed to have been an advancement, rather than to make the infant a trustee.<sup>3</sup> From the great inconvenience attending the appointment of an infant as trustee, a strong presumption arises that property conveyed to an infant is intended for his benefit, as an advancement or otherwise, and the court will not infer an intention that he is to take it in trust, unless it distinctly appears.<sup>4</sup>

§ 55. Aliens can take and hold real estate by grant in trust to the same extent as they can take and hold the legal title;<sup>5</sup> that is, until office found; though it is said that they cannot take by act of law as by descent.<sup>6</sup> There is a conflict of deci-

<sup>1</sup> *Ex parte Sergison*, 4 Ves. 149, and n.; *In Matter of Fallen*, 1 McCarter, 147.

<sup>2</sup> *Binion v. Stone*, 2 Freem. 169; see *Bowra v. Wright*, 4 De G. & Sm. 265.

<sup>3</sup> *Lamplugh v. Lamplugh*, 1 P. Wms. 112; *Matter of Rindle*, 2 Edw. 585.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*; *Blinkhorne v. Feast*, 2 Ves. 30; *Mumma v. Mumma*, 2 Vern. 19; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 1 Atk. 386; *Smith v. King*, 16 East, 283. See also *Grey v. Grey*, Finch, 338; 1 Ch. Ca. 296; *Elliott v. Elliott*, 2 Ch. Ca. 231; *Stileman v. Ashdown*, 2 Atk. 480; *Ebrand v. Dancer*, 2 Ch. Ca. 26; *Scoope v. Scoope*, 1 Ch. Ca. 27; *Pole v. Pole*, 1 Ves. 76.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, § 36; *Marshall v. Lovelass*, Cam. & Nor. 217.

<sup>6</sup> *Orr v. Hodgson*, 4 Wheat. 453; *Wright v. Trust. Meth. Ep. Church*, 1 Hoff. Ch. 202; *Buchanan v. Deshon*, 1 Har. & G. 280; *Ex parte Dupont*, 1 Harp. Ch. 5; *Trembles v. Harrison*, 1 B. Monr. 140; *Montgomery v. Dorion*, 7 N. H. 475; *Foss v. Crisp*, 20 Pick. 121; *Smith v. Zaner*, 4 Ala. 99.

sions, whether they can take by devise or not.<sup>1</sup> But an alien cannot plead his alienage to defeat any trust that may be charged upon the lands that come to him, nor in bar of any contract made by him in relation to the purchase of lands.<sup>2</sup> If lands in the hands of an alien charged with a trust escheat to the State, the State as a general rule takes only the title that the alien had; and there are statutes in many States that provide for carrying the trust into execution. It has been held that an alien may be a corporator and trustee for a corporation,<sup>3</sup> and that if an alien trustee sold and conveyed the trust estate, equity would not set the sale aside.<sup>4</sup> As to personal property aliens have the same rights and privileges as citizens, and they can execute trusts of personal chattels to the same extent as citizens. An alien may take a mortgage of land as security for debt, and he may have a decree of foreclosure or sale of the land for the payment of the debt.<sup>5</sup> But if the alien is domiciled abroad, it is an objection to his fitness for the office, as he is not within the jurisdiction of the court.<sup>6</sup>

§ 56: Lunatics can take a legal title by descent or by devise, and they can take by purchase or grant, although they have not mind enough to accept the conveyance. A valid acceptance will be presumed after long acquiescence by all parties, or if the *cestui que trust* accept the deed, it will be sufficient.<sup>7</sup> But

<sup>1</sup> In *Craig v. Radford*, 3 Wheat. 594; *Atkins v. Kron*, 2 Ired. Ch. 58, it was held that a devise to an alien would not vest the title in him; but in *Vaux v. Nesbit*, 1 McC. Ch. 352; *Clifton v. Haig*, 4 Des. 330; *Stephen v. Swann*, 9 Leigh, 404, it was held that a devise would vest the title in him subject to escheat on office found.

<sup>2</sup> *Dunlop v. Hepburn*, 1 Wheat. 179; 3 Wheat. 231; *Scott v. Thorpe*, 1 Edw. Ch. 512; *Waugh v. Riley*, 8 Met. 290.

<sup>3</sup> *Commey v. United German Churches*, 2 Sand. Ch. 186.

<sup>4</sup> *Ferguson v. Franklin*, 6 Munf. 305; *Escheator v. Smith*, 4 McC. 452.

<sup>5</sup> *Hughes v. Edwards*, 9 Wheat. 489.

<sup>6</sup> *Meintzhagen v. Davis*, 1 Coll. 335; *In re Tempest*, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 485.

<sup>7</sup> *Eyrick v. Hetrick*, 13 Penn. St. 494; *Re Bloomar*, 2 De G. & Jon. 88.

lunatics cannot execute a trust that requires judgment and discretion, as they are incapable of giving a valid assent that will bind themselves, the estate, or the *cestui que trust*.<sup>1</sup> Whenever a trust estate is vested in a lunatic, it must be administered by his guardian, or by the court, or he will be removed and a competent person appointed. An habitual or common drunkard may be a trustee, but he may be removed.<sup>2</sup>

§ 57. A religious person, who by vows has renounced the world, as a nun or monk, may be a trustee or guardian. It is a matter for their own consciences, whether they will take such an office, and courts cannot regard their religious associations.<sup>3</sup>

§ 58. A bankrupt or insolvent is competent to take, hold, and execute a trust. The trust estate does not pass to his assignees, nor does his certificate discharge him from any fiduciary debts or obligations. As he holds only for the *cestui que trust* he cannot charge or incumber the estate otherwise than for the beneficiary.<sup>4</sup> A witness to a will who is incapable of taking a legacy to himself may yet take a legacy in trust in which he has no interest.<sup>5</sup>

§ 59. *Cestuis que trust* are not incapable of taking in trust for themselves and others, but they are not altogether fit per-

<sup>1</sup> *Loomis v. Spencer*, 2 Paige, 153; *Swartwout v. Burr*, 1 Barb. 495; *Person v. Warren*, 14 Barb. 488.

<sup>2</sup> *Webb v. Deitrich*, 7 W. & S. 401.

<sup>3</sup> *Smith v. Young*, 5 Gill, 197.

<sup>4</sup> *Scott v. Surnam*, Willes, 402; *Carpenter v. Marnell*, 3 B. & P. 41; *Gladstone v. Hadwen*, 1 M. & S. 526; *Ex parte Glanys*, 1 Mont. & Mac. 258; *Ex parte Painter*, 2 Deac. & Ch. 584; *Butler v. Merchants Ins. Co.* 14 Ala. 798; *Shryock v. Waggoner*, 28 Penn. St. 431; *Harris v. Harris*, 29 Beav. 107; *Copeman v. Gallant*, 1 P. Wms. 314; *Gardner v. Rowe*, 2 Sim. & St. 346; *Lounsbury v. Purdy*, 11 Barb. 490; *Ludwig v. Highley*, 5 Barr, 132; *Welhelm v. Falmer*, 6 Barr, 296; *Kep v. Bank of N. Y.* 10 John. 63; *Bliss v. Pierce*, 20 Vt. 25; *Ontario Bank v. Mumford*, 2 Barb. Ch. 596.

<sup>5</sup> *Hogan v. Wyman*, 2 Oregon, 302.

sons to be appointed, by reason of a possible conflict between their duty and interest. Near relatives and connections, like husband and wife, are also objectionable as trustees, as by reason of affection and influence frequent breaches of trust may happen, and other irregular proceedings are always to be feared; but there is no absolute rule of law that forbids such appointments, and they are sometimes inevitable<sup>1</sup> or necessary.

### III. *Who may be Cestuis que trust.*

§ 60. As a general rule, equity follows the law, and all persons who are capable of taking the legal title to property may take the equitable title as *cestuis que trust*, through the medium of a trustee.<sup>2</sup>

§ 61. A trust may be declared in favor of the Crown. By the old law the King could take the use of real estate only by matter found of record;<sup>3</sup> but Mr. Hill says that it has never been decided that a court of chancery would refuse to execute a trust in land in favor of the Crown, if found otherwise than by matter of record.<sup>4</sup> The King can take personal property as *cestui que trust*, in the same manner as a private person.<sup>5</sup>

§ 62. The State may be a *cestui que trust*, and when there are no statutes to forbid it, property may be given to trustees for the use of the State or the United States in the same manner as for the use of individuals. A deed to a trustee and his heirs in trust for the State of South Carolina was held to

<sup>1</sup> Wilding v. Bolder, 21 Beav. 222; *Ex parte Clutton*, 17 Jur. 988. See also *In re Tempest*, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 485.

<sup>2</sup> Sand. on Uses, 370; Lewin on Trusts, 35; Hill on Trustees, 52; Trotter v. Blocker, Porter, 269.

<sup>3</sup> Bac. on Uses, 60; Gilbert on Uses, 44, 204.

<sup>4</sup> Hill on Trustees, 52.

<sup>5</sup> Middleton v. Spicer, 1 Bro. Ch. 201; Brummel v. McPherson, 5 Russ. 264; Nightingale v. Goulbourne, 5 Hare, 484; 2 Phil. 594; Mitford v. Reynolds, 1 Phill. 185; Ashton v. Langdale, 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 80.

vest, by the statute of uses, the whole legal title in the State.<sup>1</sup> And a deed to trustees in trust to sell and apply the proceeds to pay a debt due to the United States from the grantor is valid, notwithstanding the statute which forbids the purchase of any land on account of the United States, unless authorized by act of Congress.<sup>2</sup>

§ 63. If there are statutes, like the statutes of mortmain, which prevent corporations from taking the legal title to lands, they cannot evade the statutes by taking the legal title to trustees and the beneficial interest to themselves; thus they cannot be *cestuis que trust* in lands the legal title to which they are not licensed or enabled to take.<sup>3</sup> They can be the *cestuis que trust* of personal property to the same extent as individuals.<sup>3</sup> So voluntary associations may be *cestuis que trust* of personal property, and if such associations have an authorized agent, treasurer, or secretary, the trustees may act under his directions in performing the trust.<sup>4</sup>

§ 64. If an alien is made the *cestui que trust* of land he may enjoy it as against all but the State, but the State can at any time claim the equitable interest.<sup>5</sup> This rule applies where a mere naked trust is created in a trustee for the benefit of an alien. But if the trustee is to do any thing with the land, that is, if the trust is executory, the court will do nothing to transfer the right of the alien to the State. As where a testa-

<sup>1</sup> Lamar v. Simpson, 1 Rich. Ch. 71.

<sup>2</sup> Neilson v. Lagow, 12 How. 107; 3 Stat. at Large, 568, May 1, 1820.

<sup>3</sup> Hill on Trustees, 52; Lewin on Trusts, 36.

<sup>4</sup> Langston v. Gordon, 26 Gratt. 755.

<sup>5</sup> Dumoncel v. Dumoncel, 13 Ir. Eq. 92; Vin. Ab. Alien, A. 8; Godfrey v. Dixon, Godb. 275; Barrow v. Wadkin, 24 Beav. 1; King v. Holland, Al. 16; Styl. 21; Burney v. Macdonald, 15 Sim. 6; Rittson v. Stordy, 3 Sm. & Gif. 230; Attorney-General v. Sands, Hard. 495; Fourdrin v. Gowdy, 3 M. & K. 383; Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden, 188; Du Hourmelin v. Sheldon, 1 Beav. 79; 4 My. & Cr. 525; Master v. De Croismar, 11 Beav. 184.

tor directed lands to be sold and the proceeds divided among certain persons, some of whom were aliens, the court considered that as done at the time of the death which was ordered to be done, and that it was a devise of mere personalty, and it refused to allow the Crown to elect to keep the funds in land in order to work a forfeiture.<sup>1</sup> So where an agent to collect a debt for an alien took a deed of real estate in trust to sell and pay the proceeds to the alien creditor, the heirs of the agent were ordered, having sold the land, to pay the proceeds to the principal.<sup>2</sup> But where an alien paid the money for lands, and took the deed in the name of a citizen as trustee, the trustee was adjudged to hold the land in trust for the commonwealth.<sup>3</sup> Equity will not raise a resulting trust in favor of an alien.<sup>4</sup> Nor will it allow a legacy given to an alien to be charged upon real estate,<sup>5</sup> nor lands liable to escheat to be sold for the payment of debts in order that aliens may take their legacies out of the personalty.<sup>6</sup> Aliens may be the *cestuis que trust* of personal property without objection;<sup>7</sup> and trustees for aliens, and alien *cestuis que trust* may maintain actions in our courts to maintain their rights in the trust property.<sup>8</sup>

§ 65. There is another class of cases that illustrates the principle, that the beneficial donee of property cannot take as

<sup>1</sup> Burney v. Macdonald, 15 Sim. 14; Rittson v. Stordy, 3 Sm. & Gif. 240; Du Hourmelin v. Sheldon, 1 Beav. 79; 4 My. & Cr. 525. And see Master v. De Croismar, 11 Beav. 184; Barrow v. Wadkin, 24 Beav. 1; Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. 563; Austin v. Brown, 6 Paige, 448; Neilson v. Lagow, 12 How. 107; Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 Munf. 117; Meakings v. Cromwell, 1 Selden, 136.

<sup>2</sup> Austin v. Brown, 6 Paige, 448; McCaw v. Galbrath, 7 Rich. (Law) 74.

<sup>3</sup> Hubbard v. Goodwin, 3 Leigh, 492.

<sup>4</sup> Leggett v. Dubois, 5 Paige, Ch. 114; Phillips v. Crammond, 2 Wash. C. C. 441. See Taylor v. Benham, 5 How. 270, and Farley v. Shippen, Wythe, 135.

<sup>5</sup> Atkins v. Kron, 2 Ired. Eq. 423.

<sup>6</sup> Trezavant v. Howard, 5 Des. 87.

<sup>7</sup> Bradwell v. Weeks, 1 John. Ch. 206.

<sup>8</sup> Hamersley v. Lambert, 2 John. Ch. 508.



*cestui que trust*, if he is prohibited from taking the legal title to that property, as where a slave is prohibited from holding property, he cannot be made a *cestui que trust* of property.<sup>1</sup> In Virginia a free negro was prohibited from holding slaves, and it was held that he could not be a *cestui que trust* of slaves.<sup>2</sup> So where emancipation was forbidden, a slave could not be the *cestui que trust* of his own freedom.<sup>3</sup> But in Mississippi it was held that land purchased with money furnished by a slave with the acquiescence of her master, and the title taken in the name of a freeman, was held in trust for the slave after her actual emancipation by living in Ohio, and that the trust could be enforced against all persons who took the land with notice of the facts.<sup>4</sup> So where an individual took stock in trust for a corporation that had no right to hold shares in another corporation, it was held that such shares did not go to the assignees upon the bankruptcy of the individual, but that they must be disposed of as the corporation, as *cestui que trust*, should direct.<sup>5</sup>

§ 66. But in charitable trusts the *cestuis que trust* are not, and need not be, capable of taking the legal title, as when property is given in trust for the poor of a parish, or for the education of youth, or for pious uses, or for any charitable purpose, the beneficiaries are generally unknown, uncertain, changing, and incapable of taking or dealing with the legal title; but such trusts are valid in equity, and courts of equity will administer them and protect the rights of the *cestuis que trust*.<sup>6</sup> And in trusts not charitable it is not always necessary that the *cestui*

<sup>1</sup> *Skrine v. Walker*, 3 Rich. Eq. 262; *Pool v. Harrison*, 18 Ala. 514.

<sup>2</sup> *Dunlap v. Harrison*, 14 Grat. 251.

<sup>3</sup> *Trotter v. Blocker*, Port. 269; *Graves v. Allen*, 13 B. Monr. 190.

<sup>4</sup> *Leiper v. Hoffman*, 26 Miss. 615; and see *Frazier v. Frazier*, 2 Hill, Ch. 305; *Ross v. Duncan*, Freem. Ch. 603; *Osterman v. Baldwin*, 6 Wal. 116.

<sup>5</sup> *Great Eastern Railw. Co. v. Turner*, L. R. 8 Ch. 149; *Ex parte Watkins*, 2 Mont. & A. 348.

<sup>6</sup> *Post*, chapter on Charitable Trusts.

*que trust* should be in existence at the time of the creation of the trust, as a devise to a father in trust for accumulation for his children lawfully begotten at the time of his death was held to be good, although the father had no children at the time of the vesting of the funds in him as trustee.<sup>1</sup> So an illegitimate child born, or in *ventre sa mere*, may be a *cestui que trust*;<sup>2</sup> but a trust for illegitimate children to be thereafter begotten will not be enforced, as being against good morals.<sup>3</sup> Nor will a court of equity establish or execute a trust that is founded upon a consideration that is fraudulent, or *malum in se*, or *malum prohibitum*, or immoral, or corrupt, or contrary to public policy.<sup>4</sup> But a trust not charitable created *in presenti* for *cestuis que trust* does not take effect until the *cestuis que trust* are identified; as where land was conveyed under articles of agreement in trust for the subscribers thereto, the title of the grantor was not divested until there were subscribers.<sup>5</sup> In some cases a person is capable of taking an equitable interest, in a manner in which the legal interest could not be limited. Thus at law no property can be so limited to a married woman as to exclude the legal rights of the husband; but, by way of trust, property can be so given to her use as to place it entirely beyond the right of enjoyment by the husband.<sup>6</sup> A trust for the heirs of A is valid as a trust for the children of A.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ashurst v. Given*, 5 Watts & S. 329; *Carson v. Carson*, 1 Wins. N. C. 24.

<sup>2</sup> *Gabb v. Prendergast*, 3 Eq. R. 648; *Pratt v. Flamer*, 7 Har. & J. 10; *Gardner v. Heyer*, 2 Paige, 11; *Collins v. Hoxie*, 9 Paige, 81; *In re Connor*, 2 Jones & Lat. 456; *Evans v. Davies*, 7 Hare, 498; *Owen v. Bryant*, 21 L. J. Ch. 860.

<sup>3</sup> *Medworth v. Pope*, 27 Beav. 21; *Wilkinson v. Wilkinson*, 1 Younge & C. Ch. Ca. 657; *Pratt v. Mathew*, 22 Beav. 528; *Howarth v. Mills*, L. R. 2 Eq. 389.

<sup>4</sup> *Ownes v. Ownes*, 8 C. E. Green, 60; *Battinger v. Budenbecker*, 63 Barb. 404, 69 Barb. 395.

<sup>5</sup> *Urket v. Coryell*, 5 W. & S. 61.

<sup>6</sup> Lewin on Trusts, 37.

<sup>7</sup> *Flint v. Steadman*, 36 Vt. 210.

IV.—*What Property may be the Subject of a Trust.*

§ 67. Every kind of valuable property, both real and personal, that can be assigned at law may be the subject-matter of a trust. Every kind of vested right which the law recognizes as valuable may be transferred in trust, as a receipt for a medicine,<sup>1</sup> the copyright of a book,<sup>2</sup> a patent right,<sup>3</sup> a trade secret,<sup>4</sup> or growing crops.<sup>5</sup>

§ 68. At common law no possibility, right, title, nor *choses in action* could be granted or assigned to strangers.<sup>6</sup> But in equity the rule is different, and *choses in actions*,<sup>7</sup> expectancies,<sup>8</sup> contingent interests,<sup>9</sup> and even possibilities<sup>10</sup> may be assigned, and a valid trust created in them. Equitable reversionary interests stand upon the same ground.<sup>11</sup> Property not owned by the assignor at the time, and not even *in esse*, may be assigned in equity;<sup>12</sup> and a valid trust may be created in a naked power or authority.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Green v. Folgham*, 1 Sim. & St. 398.

<sup>2</sup> *Sims v. Marryal*, 17 Q. B. 281.

<sup>3</sup> *Russell's Patent*, 2 De G. & Jon. 180.

<sup>4</sup> *Morrison v. Moat*, 6 Eng. L. & Eq. 14; 9 Hare, 241.

<sup>5</sup> *Robinson v. Maulden*, 11 Ala. 908; *Grantham v. Hawley*, Hob. 132; *Petch v. Tutin*, 15 M. & W. 110; *McCarty v. Blevins*, 5 Yerg. 195.

<sup>6</sup> *Lampet's Case*, 10 Coke, 48; *Thalhimer v. Brinckerhoff*, 3 Cow. 623.

<sup>7</sup> *Row v. Dawson*, 1 Ves. 322; *Ryall v. Rolles*, 1 Ves. 348; *Townsend v. Windham*, 2 Ves. 6; *Ex parte Alderson*, 1 Mad. 53; *Burn v. Carvalho*, 4 My. & Cr. 690; *Yeates v. Grover*, 1 Ves. Jr. 280; *Ex parte South*, 3 Swans. 393; *Morton v. Naylor*, 1 Hill, 583; *Clemson v. Davidson*, 5 Binn. 392.

<sup>8</sup> *Fitzgerald v. Vestal*, 4 Sneed, 258; *Hobson v. Trevor*, 2 P. Wms. 191; *Beckley v. Newland*, ib. 182; *Wetherhed v. Wetherhed*, 2 Sim. 183; *Douglass v. Russell*, 4 Sim. 184; *Langton v. Horton*, 1 Hare, 549.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*; *Varish v. Edwards*, 1 Hoff. Ch. 382.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*; *Voyle v. Hughes*, 2 Sm. & Gif. 18; *Kekewich v. Manning*, 1 De G., M. & G. 187.

<sup>12</sup> *Pennock v. Coe*, 23 How. 117; *Mitchell v. Winslow*, 2 Story, 630; 6 Law Rep. 347; *Holroyd v. Marshall*, 2 Gif. 382; 2 De G., F. & J. 596; 9

<sup>13</sup> *Brown v. Higgs*, 8 Ves. 570.

§ 69. But there are some *choses in action*, rights, claims, and interests that cannot be assigned in equity; either because some statute prohibits, or because it is against public policy to allow assignments of them to strangers. Thus an officer in the army cannot assign or pledge his commission,<sup>1</sup> nor his full or half pay.<sup>2</sup> A judge cannot assign his salary;<sup>3</sup> nor can a pension given for the honorable support of the dignity of a title be assigned.<sup>4</sup> The principle seems to be that when a salary, annuity, or pension is given by the State for the support of its own dignity and the administration of its affairs, it is not becoming that its officers should deprive themselves of the means of support which it gives to them; but a pension or annuity for past services may be assigned.<sup>5</sup> The mere right to file a bill in equity for a fraud committed upon the assignor, or to sue for a tort, cannot be assigned and a trust created in

Jur. n. s. 213; 33 L. J. Ch. 193; *Hope v. Hayley*, 5 El. & Bl. 845; *Calkins v. Lockwood*, 17 Conn. 154; *Langton v. Horton*, 1 Hare, 549; *Brooks v. Hatch*, 6 Leigh, 534; *Leslie v. Guthrie*, 1 Bing. N. C. 697; *Field v. Mayor of N. Y.* 2 Selden, 179; *Robinson v. Macdonald*, 5 M. & S. 228; *In re Ship Warre*, 8 Price, 269; *Stewart v. Kirkland*, 19 Ala. 162; *Hinkle v. Wanzer*, 17 How. 353; *McWilliams v. Nisby*, 2 S. & R. 509; *Wilson's Estate*, 2 Barr, 325.

<sup>1</sup> *Collier v. Fallon*, 1 Turn. & Rus. 459; and see *L'Estrange v. L'Estrange*, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 153.

<sup>2</sup> *Stone v. Lidderdale*, 2 Anst. 533; *Priddy v. Rose*, 3 Mer. 102; *Tunstall v. Boothby*, 10 Sim. 540; *Flarty v. Odum*, 3 T. R. 681; *Lidderdale v. Montrose*, 4 T. R. 248.

<sup>3</sup> *Arbuthnot v. Norton*, 5 Moore, P. C. C. 219; *Cooper v. Reilly*, 2 Sim. 560; *Palmer v. Bate*, 6 Moore, 28; 2 Brod. & Bing. 673; *Hill v. Paul*, 8 Cl. & Fin. 295. But in *State Bank v. Hastings*, 15 Wis. 75, it was held that a judge could assign his salary.

<sup>4</sup> *Davis v. Marlborough*, 1 Swanst. 79; *McCarthy v. Gould*, 1 Ball & Beatt. 387; *Price v. Lovett*, 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 110; *Grenfell v. Dean, &c.* 2 Beav. 550. See also *Wells v. Foster*, 8 M. & W. 149; *Spooner v. Payne*, 10 Eng. L. & Eq. 207.

<sup>5</sup> *Alexander v. Wellington*, 2 Rus. & My. 35; *Tunstall v. Boothby*, 10 Sim. 452; *Feistal v. King's College*, 10 Beav. 491; and see *Berkley v. King's College*, 10 Beav. 499, and *Butcher v. Musgrove*, 2 Beav. 550; *Stevens v. Bagwell*, 15 Ves. 139.

such rights.<sup>1</sup> A mere naked expectancy arising from a peculiar position, such a position as that a person expects to make a favorable bargain and purchase (and he employs an agent to negotiate the purchase, and such agent purchases for another), is not such property that a trust can be created in it.<sup>2</sup>

§ 70. The question has been frequently mooted in courts, how far a trust could be engrafted and enforced upon foreign property, or property beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the court where the suit is pending. In regard to personal property there is no difficulty, for it follows the person; and if the court has jurisdiction over the parties, it has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and can enforce a trust or any other equity.<sup>3</sup> If the personal property is, however, in fact beyond the jurisdiction of the court, there may arise some practical obstructions to the execution of the decrees of the court.<sup>4</sup>

§ 71. As to lands lying in a foreign jurisdiction, the court will enforce natural equities and compel the specific performance of contracts, if the parties are within its jurisdiction. Thus Lord Eldon allowed a lien to a consignor for advances upon estates in the West Indies;<sup>5</sup> and a specific performance of articles between parties for the settlement of their boundaries was enforced;<sup>6</sup> effect was given to an equitable mortgage

<sup>1</sup> *Prosser v. Edmonds*, 1 Yo. & Col. 481; *Gardner v. Adams*, 12 Wend. 297; *Dunklin v. Wilkins*, 5 Ala. 199; *McKee v. Judd*, 2 Ker. 622. It is not intended to enter into all the niceties of the law of assignments. An exhaustive statement of the law and a collection of all the cases will be found in *Story's Eq. Jur.* §§ 1040-1055, and 3 *Lead. Ca. in Eq.* pp. 279-380 (3d Am. ed.).

<sup>2</sup> *Garrow v. Davis*, 15 How. 277.

<sup>3</sup> *Hill v. Reardon*, 2 Russ. 608; *Hill on Trustees*, 44; *Lewin on Trusts*, 39; *Chase v. Chase*, 2 Allen, 101; *Mason v. Chambers*, 4 J. J. Marsh. 401.

<sup>4</sup> *Booth v. Clark*, 17 How. 327.

<sup>5</sup> *Scott v. Nesbitt*, 14 Ves. 438.

<sup>6</sup> *Penn v. Lord Baltimore*, 1 Ves. 444 and *Belt's Sup.*; *Roberdeau v. Rous*, 1 Atk. 543, West, 23; *Tullock v. Hartley*, 1 Yo. & Col. 114; *Cood*

by deposit of the title-deeds to land in Scotland, though by the law of Scotland such deposit created no lien;<sup>1</sup> an account was ordered of the rents and profits of lands abroad;<sup>2</sup> and an absolute sale<sup>3</sup> or a foreclosure of a mortgage<sup>4</sup> decreed; a fraudulent conveyance was relieved against,<sup>5</sup> and injunction granted against taking possession.<sup>6</sup> Chief-Justice Marshall said: "Upon the authority of these cases and others which are to be found in the books, as well as upon general principles, this court is of opinion that in case of fraud, of trust, or of contract, the jurisdiction of a Court of Chancery is sustainable wherever the person be found, although lands not within the jurisdiction of that court may be affected by the decree."<sup>7</sup> But if the person is not within the jurisdiction of the court, and the land is, the court cannot decree a specific performance of an agreement for a sale.<sup>8</sup> If a trust is created by the will of a citizen of a particular State, and his will is allowed by the Probate Court of that State, and a trustee is appointed by the Probate Court, courts of equity will have jurisdiction over the trust, although

*v. Cood*, 33 Beav. 314; *Portarlington v. Soulby*, 3 My. & K. 104; *Athol v. Derby*, 1 Ch. Ca. 221.

<sup>1</sup> *Ex parte Pollard*, 3 Mont. & Ayr. 340; *Mont. & Chit.* 239; *Norris v. Chambers*, 29 Beav. 246; *Martin v. Martin*, 2 R. & M. 507.

<sup>2</sup> *Roberdeau v. Rous*, 1 Atk. 543.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Toller v. Carteret*, 2 Vern. 494.

<sup>5</sup> *Arglasse v. Muschamp*, 1 Vern. 75; *Archer v. Preston*, 1 Vern. 77, 1 Eq. Abr. 133.

<sup>6</sup> *Cranstown v. Johnston*, 5 Ves. 278; *Bunbury v. Bunbury*, 1 Beav. 318; *Hope v. Carnegie*, L. R. 1 Ch. 320.

<sup>7</sup> *Massie v. Watts*, 6 Cranch, 160; *Farley v. Shippen*, Wythe, 135; *Kildare v. Eustace*, 1 Vern. 419; *Ward v. Arredondo*, Hopk. 213; *DeKlyn v. Watkins*, 3 Sand. Ch. 185; *Guerrant v. Fowler*, 1 Hen. & M. 4; *Shattuck v. Cassidy*, 3 Edw. Ch. 152; *Newton v. Bronson*, 3 Ker. 587; *Sutphen v. Fowler*, 9 Paige, 280; *Epis. Church v. Wiley*, 2 Hill, Ch. 584; *Dickinson v. Hoomes*, 8 Grat. 353; *Hughes v. Hall*, 5 Munf. 431; *Vaughn v. Barclay*, 6 Whar. 392; *Watkins v. Holman*, 16 Pet. 25; *Guild v. Guild*, 16 Ala. 121; *White v. White*, 7 Gill & J. 208. But see *Lewis v. Nelson*, 1 McCarter, 94.

<sup>8</sup> *Spurr v. Scoville*, 3 Cush. 578; *Meux v. Maltby*, 2 Swans. 277; *Fell v. Brown*, 2 Bro. Ch. 276.

both the trustee and the property are beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Chief-Justice Bigelow, in determining this point, said: "The residence of the trustee and *cestui que trust* out of the commonwealth does not take away the power of this court to regulate and control the proper administration of trust estates which are created by wills of citizens of this State, and which have been proved and established by the courts of this commonwealth. The legal existence of the trust takes effect and validity from the proof of the will, and the right of the trustee to receive the trust fund is derived from the decree of the Probate Court. If the trustee is unfaithful or abuses his trust, that court has jurisdiction to remove him in concurrence with this court on the application of those beneficially interested in the estate."<sup>1</sup> And where A. had fraudulently obtained a deed of land, in a foreign State, from B., and had conveyed it to C. without consideration, it was held that although the courts of other States would not declare such deeds to be nullities, yet they would order reconveyances from the parties before the court; and if such parties went beyond the jurisdiction, the court could appoint special commissioners to execute such reconveyances.<sup>2</sup> And so trustees to whom property has been conveyed by the owner by a direct conveyance can sue in any and all courts which have jurisdiction over the parties or the subject-matter of the suit; but if the trustee depends upon some court to clothe him with the office and title of trustee, he, like an administrator or executor, can only sue within the country or State over which the jurisdiction of the court appointing him extends.<sup>3</sup>

§ 72. The foundation of this doctrine is the jurisdiction of the court over the person, which was originally the only jurisdiction of courts of equity.<sup>4</sup> They cannot, when the property

<sup>1</sup> Chase v. Chase, 2 Allen, 101; Curtis v. Smith, 60 Barb. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Cooley v. Scarlett, 38 Ill. 316.

<sup>3</sup> Curtis v. Smith, 6 Blatch. 537.

<sup>4</sup> Penn v. Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 160.

is in a foreign jurisdiction, make a decree *in rem*, binding upon the land ; but they can enter a decree *in personam* and compel its performance by process in contempt ;<sup>1</sup> hence if the parties are not before the court, or the court has no jurisdiction over them, the specific performance of a contract cannot be decreed ;<sup>2</sup> and if the court cannot give relief by a decree against the person, but must go further and make a decree to be executed by its own officers against the land, it must, of course, if the land is beyond its jurisdiction, refuse to act.<sup>3</sup> It is not necessary that the person to be bound by a decree should be domiciled within the jurisdiction of the court. It will be sufficient if the person is found and served with process within the jurisdiction, and a *ne exeat* may be obtained to prevent his departing until the decree of the court is performed ;<sup>4</sup> or if a person is prosecuting a suit at law within a jurisdiction, a suit in equity may be maintained, and an injunction may be decreed against him, and service on his attorney in the suit at law would be a good service to bring him within the jurisdiction.<sup>5</sup> So if courts of equity have jurisdiction over the parties to a controversy, they can enjoin them from proceeding in the courts of foreign States or countries. This power does not depend upon any superintending power of the courts of one country over those of another, which does not exist ; but it is founded

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. ; *White v. White*, 7 Gill & J. 208 ; *Mead v. Merritt*, 2 Paige, 404.

<sup>2</sup> *Spurr v. Scoville*, 3 Cush. 578 ; *Meux v. Maltby*, 2 Swanst. 277 ; *Fell v. Brown*, 2 Bro. Ch. 276.

<sup>3</sup> *Morris v. Remington*, 1 Pars. Eq. 387 ; *Bank of Virginia v. Adams*, 1 Pars. Eq. 547 ; *Blunt v. Blunt*, 1 Hawks, 365 ; *White v. White*, 7 Gill & J. 208 ; *Cartwright v. Pettus*, 2 Ch. Ca. 214 ; 2 Swans. 323 n. ; *Waterhouse v. Stansfield*, 9 Hare, 234, 10 Hare, 254 ; *Martin v. Martin*, 2 R. & My. 507 ; *Nelson v. Bridport*, 8 Beav. 547 ; *Walker v. Ogden*, 1 Dana, 252 ; *Williams v. Mans*, 6 Watts, 278 ; *Booth v. Clark*, 17 How. 322 ; *Hawley v. James*, 7 Paige, 213 ; *White v. White*, 7 Gill & J. 208.

<sup>4</sup> *Mitchell v. Bunch*, 2 Paige, 606 ; *Baker v. Dumaresque*, 2 Atk. 66 ; *Howden v. Rogers*, 1 Ves. & B. 129 ; *Flack v. Holm*, 1 Jac. & W. 406 ; *Grant v. Grant*, 3 Russ. 598 ; *Woodward v. Schatzell*, 3 John. Ch. 412 ; *Gilbert v. Colt*, 1 Hopk. 496.

<sup>5</sup> *Chalmers v. Hack*, 19 Maine, 124.



wholly upon the power which courts of equity have over all litigants within its actual jurisdiction. This jurisdiction is *in personam*, and the decrees are directed against the persons or parties. If the decree should be disregarded, and a litigant should prosecute a suit in a foreign tribunal, no action could be taken against the agents, officers, or judges of such foreign tribunal, but the remedy would be confined to proceeding against the party who has proceeded in contempt of the injunction.<sup>1</sup> There is, however, an exception to this practice in the case of the courts of the several States and of the courts of the United States. These courts have concurrent jurisdiction over many causes; and to prevent unpleasant conflicts of jurisdiction, it has been held, upon grounds of public policy, that they have no power to restrain or enjoin suitors from pursuing their rights in the courts of their choice, whether of the State or of the United States.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 899, 900; *Dehon v. Foster*, 4 Allen, 545; *Great Falls v. Worster*, 23 N. H. 470; *Bank v. Rutland*, 28 Vt. 470; *Hays v. Ward*, 4 Johns. Ch. 123; *Vail v. Knapp*, 49 Barb. 299; *Massie v. Watts*, 6 Cranch, 158, 166; *Angus v. Angus*, West Ch. 23; *Moody v. Gay*, 15 Gray, 457; *Sutphen v. Fowler*, 9 Paige, 282; *Mitchell v. Bunch*, 2 Paige, 615; *Mackintosh v. Ogilvie*, 4 T. R. 193 n., 3 Swanst. 365 n.; *Cranstown v. Johnston*, 3 Ves. 179, 5 Ves. 277; *Bunbury v. Bunbury*, 1 Beav. 318; *Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren*, 5 H. L. Cas. 416; *Beckford v. Kemble*, 1 S. & S. 7; *Harrison v. Gurney*, 2 Jac. & W. 563; *Bowles v. Orr*, 1 Y. & C. 464; *Portarlington v. Soulby*, 3 My. & K. 104; *Duncan v. McCalmont*, 3 Beav. 409; *Graham v. Maxwell*, 1 Mac. & Gord. 71; *Briggs v. French*, 1 Sumn. 504; *Dobson v. Pearce*, 1 Duer, 142, 2 Kern. 156; *Pearce v. Olney*, 20 Conn. 544; *Cage v. Cassidy*, 23 How. 109, 117; *Marsh v. Putnam*, 3 Gray, 566; *Brigham v. Henderson*, 1 Cush. 430; *Beal v. Burchstead*, 10 Cush. 523; *Maclaren v. Stainton*, 16 Beav. 286. The case of *Carroll v. Farmers' Bank, Harrington*, 197, is not followed.

<sup>2</sup> *Diggs v. Walcott*, 4 Cranch, 179; *McKim v. Voorhies*, 7 Cranch, 279; *Sumner v. Marcy*, 3 W. & M. 119; *Coster v. Griswold*, 4 Edw. Ch. 377; *English v. Miller*, 2 Rich. Eq. 320. See also *Mead v. Merritt*, 2 Paige, 402; *Bicknell v. Field*, 8 Paige, 440; *Burgess v. Smith*, 2 Barb. Ch. 276; *Grant v. Quick*, 2 Sandf. 612. *Croft v. Lathrop*, 2 Wall. Jr. 103; *Cruikshanks v. Roberts*, 6 Madd. 104; *Bushby v. Munday*, 5 Madd. 307; *Jones v. Geddes*, 1 Phillips, Ch. 725.

## CHAPTER III.

EXPRESS TRUSTS, AND HOW EXPRESS TRUSTS ARE CREATED AT COMMON LAW, SINCE THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, AND IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, AND HEREIN OF VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES OR SETTLEMENTS IN TRUST.

§ 73. Division of trusts, according to the manner of their creation.

§§ 74-77. Trusts at common law.

§ 74. At common law, a writing not necessary to convey land.

§ 75. Uses might also be created without writing, and so may trusts, in States where the statute of frauds is not in force.

§ 76. If a trust is created in writing, parol evidence cannot control it.

§ 77. Same rule as to trusts created by parol.

§ 78. The statute of frauds, and its form in various States.

§ 79. Effect of the statute upon the creation of express trusts.

§§ 80, 81. Effect of the different forms of the words of the statutes in the several States.

§ 82. How express trusts may be proved or manifested under the statute.

§ 83. Certainty of the terms of the trust, and the person by whom it is to be declared.

§§ 84, 85. Trusts declared or proved by answers in chancery.

§ 86. Trust in personal property may be created by parol.

§§ 87, 88. Trusts arising from gifts *mortis causa* and for charitable uses.

§ 89. Statute of wills, and the execution of wills.

§ 90. Trust cannot be *created in* a will, unless it is properly executed, to pass the property.

§§ 91, 92. But might be manifested by a recital in a will not properly executed.

§ 93. The effect of the necessity of probate of wills.

§ 94. Parol evidence cannot convert a bequest in a will into a trust. An executor is a trustee of the surplus.

§ 95. An agreement upon a valuable consideration will be carried into effect as a trust or a contract.

§§ 96-98. If a complete trust is created without consideration, it will be carried into effect.

§ 97. But if any thing remains to be done to complete the trust, it will not be carried into effect, if without consideration.

§ 99. Whether a trust is completely created or not a question of fact in each case.

§ 100. Trust for a stranger without consideration not completed without transfer of the legal title.

§ 101. But if the legal title cannot be transferred, a different rule will apply.

§ 102. If the subject of the proposed trust is an equitable interest, the legal title need not be transferred.

§ 103. The instrument of trust need not be delivered.

§ 104. If once perfected cannot be destroyed, though voluntary.

- § 105. Notice not necessary to trustee or *cestui que trust*.
- §§ 106, 107. Voluntary settlements upon wife and children.
- § 108. When they will not be enforced.
- § 109. Tendency of the rule in the United States.
- § 110. Marriage a valuable as well as meritorious consideration.
- § 111. Effect of a seal.

§ 73. HAVING considered who may be the parties to a trust, and what may be the subject-matter of it, it is now to be considered in what manner a trust may be created, or how it may arise. Trusts are divided in this respect into direct or express trusts, implied, resulting, and constructive trusts. Direct or express trusts are created by the direct or express words of a grantor or settlor. Implied, resulting, and constructive trusts arise by operation of law upon the transactions of the parties, and they will be hereafter discussed. This chapter will treat of the creation of direct or express trusts. In this connection it will be necessary to inquire: (1) how trusts were created in lands at common law prior to the statutes of frauds and of wills; (2) how trusts are created in lands since the statutes; (3) how trusts may be created in personal property; and (4) the effect of a voluntary conveyance or declaration of trust.

§ 74. At common law a deed in writing was not necessary to transfer land. What was called a feoffment was the common and earliest mode of conveyance. The feoffment was a short and simple charter, and was accompanied by livery of seisin; the feoffor went upon the land in the presence of the freeholders of the neighborhood with the charter, and made a manual delivery to the feoffee of some symbolical thing in the name of delivering seisin, or ownership and possession of all the lands named in the charter. But not even this deed or charter was necessary. The land could be conveyed by mere livery of seisin in the presence of the freeholders of the neighborhood, who might be called upon to witness the act. The feoffment and livery of seisin operated upon and transferred the possession, and it barred the feoffor from all future right or possibility

of right in the land, and vested an estate in freehold in the feoffee.<sup>1</sup>

§ 75. It has been a mooted question whether at common law uses could be raised by parol, or even by deed without seal, upon a conveyance of lands.<sup>2</sup> But there seems to be no good reason for the doubt. As the estate itself could be transferred without writing, it would seem to follow that uses declared at the time in the presence of witnesses might be effectually established. Mr. Sanders says that in their commencement uses were of a secret nature, and were usually created by a parol declaration.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Lewin says, that trusts like uses are in their own nature *averrable*, i. e., may be declared by word of mouth without writing, in the absence of a statute requiring it; as if an estate had been conveyed unto and to the use of A. and his heirs, a trust might have been raised by parol in favor of B.<sup>4</sup> Lord Chief-Baron Gilbert reconciled most of the conflicting cases by stating the law thus: "At common law a use might have been raised by words upon a conveyance that passed the possession by some solemn act, as a feoffment; but where there was no such act, then it seems a deed declaratory of the use was necessary; for as a feoffment might be made at common law by parol, so might the uses be declared by parol. But where a deed was necessary for passing the estate itself, it was also requisite for the declaration of the uses. Thus a man could not covenant to stand seised to uses without a deed; but a bargain and sale by parol has raised a use without."<sup>5</sup> Lord Thurlow observed that "he had been accustomed to consider

<sup>1</sup> 4 Kent, 480, 481; 2 Sand. Uses and Trusts, 1-8.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Story, Eq. Jur., § 971; Hill on Trustees, 55.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Sand. on Uses, 14, 218 (2d Am. ed.).

<sup>4</sup> Lewin on Trusts, 41. See *Fordyce v. Willis*, 2 Bro. Ch. 587; *Benbow v. Townsend*, 1 My. & K. 506; *Bayley v. Boulcott*, 4 Russ. 347; *Crabb v. Crabb*, 1 My. & K. 511; *Kilpin v. Kilpin*, ib. 520; *Bellasis v. Compton*, 2 Vern. 294; *Thrupton v. Attorney-General*, 1 Vern. 341.

<sup>5</sup> *Gilb. on Uses*, 270; *Adlington v. Cann*, 3 Atk. 141.

uses as averrable; but perhaps when looked into, the cases may relate to feoffment, and not to conveyances by bargain and sale or lease and release.”<sup>1</sup> And Duke says expressly, “that when the things given may pass without deed, then a charitable use may be averred by witnesses; but, where the things cannot pass without deed, there charitable uses cannot be averred without a deed proving the uses.”<sup>2</sup> This question is almost purely speculative in the United States where the statute of frauds is perhaps universally adopted, and all conveyances of land and of interests in land must be by deed acknowledged and recorded; but it may arise when questions arise upon transactions prior to the passage of the statute, as it arose in Ohio upon a conveyance before 1810, the time when the statute of frauds was adopted in that State; and it was determined that a trust in land could be created, at common law, by parol.<sup>3</sup> The same question arose in Connecticut, and it was denied that at common law a trust in lands could be raised by parol. The court said that the rules of evidence as well as the statute prevented it.<sup>4</sup> In some other States the statute, or at least the seventh section of the statute, has not been adopted; and in those States it has been determined that trusts in land can be proved by parol, as in Texas,<sup>5</sup> North Carolina,<sup>6</sup> Tennessee,<sup>7</sup> and Virginia.<sup>8</sup> In Pennsylvania, under the

<sup>1</sup> *Fordyce v. Willis*, 3 Bro. Ch. 587.

<sup>2</sup> *Duke on Char.* 141; *Adlington v. Cann*, 3 Atk. 141.

<sup>3</sup> *Fleming v. Donohoe*, 5 Ohio, 250; but see *Starr v. Starr*, 1 Ohio, 321; *Ready v. Kearsley*, 14 Mich. 215; *McIntire v. Skinner*, 4 Greene, 89.

<sup>4</sup> *Dean v. Dean*, 6 Conn. 287. Contra, *Ready v. Kearsley*, 14 Mich. 215.

<sup>5</sup> *Miller v. Thatcher*, 9 Tex. 482; *Hale v. Layton*, 16 Tex. 262; *Bailey v. Harris*, 19 Tex. 102; *Osterman v. Baldwin*, 6 Wallace, 116; *Leakey v. Gunter*, 25 Tex. 400; *Grooves v. Rush*, 27 Tex. 231; *Dunham v. Chatham*, 21 Tex. 231; *Crenney v. Dupree*, 21 Tex. 20.

<sup>6</sup> *Fay v. Fay*, 2 Hayw. 131; *Shelton v. Shelton*, 5 Jones, Eq. 292; *Rigges v. Swann*, 6 Jones, Eq. 118; *McLaurin v. Fairly*, 6 Jones, Eq. 375.

<sup>7</sup> *Thompson v. Thompson*, 1 Yerg. 100; *McLanahan v. McLanahan*, 6 Humph. 99; *Haywood v. Ensley*, 8 Humph. 460; *Wilburn v. Spofford*, 4 Sneed, 705.

<sup>8</sup> *Bank of United States v. Carrington*, 7 Leigh, 576; *Walraven v. Lock*,

act of 1799, it was determined that trusts in land might be created by parol.<sup>1</sup> The statute was amended, however, in 1851.<sup>2</sup> In Kentucky, the seventh section was omitted; but the courts treat all parol agreements that would create a trust as agreements for the sale or purchase of some interest in land, and therefore void as within the fourth section of the statute.<sup>3</sup> In nearly all the other States the statute of frauds was substantially re-enacted at an early day in its full extent, and in those States it has not since been an open question whether parol trusts could be created.<sup>4</sup>

§ 76. It must also be observed that if a trust is declared in writing, courts never permit parol proof of a trust to contradict an intention expressed upon the face of the instrument itself,<sup>5</sup> for that would be to allow parol evidence to vary, contradict, or annul a written instrument; nor is it necessary, in order to exclude evidence, that the beneficial estate should be expressly conferred upon the grantee of the legal estate, for a trust cannot be raised by parol if, from the nature of the instrument or from any circumstance of evidence appearing upon the face of it, an intention can be clearly implied of making the holder of

2 P. & H. 549; *Lockwood v. Canfield*, 20 Cal. 126; *Hidden v. Jordon*, 21 Cal. 92.

<sup>1</sup> *German v. Gabbald*, 3 Binn. 302; *Wallace v. Duffield*, 2 S. & R. 521; *Slaymaker v. St. Johns*, 5 Watts, 27; *Murphy v. Hubert*, 7 Barr. 420; *Tritt v. Crotzer*, 13 Penn. St. 452; *Wetherell v. Hamilton*, 15 Penn. St. 195; *Money v. Herrick*, 18 Penn. St. 128; *Blyholder v. Gilson*, 18 Penn. St. 134. See *Freeman v. Freeman*, 2 Pars. Eq. 81.

<sup>2</sup> *Shoofstall v. Adams*, 2 Grant's Cas. 209; *Barnett v. Dougherty*, 32 Penn. St. 371.

<sup>3</sup> *Parker v. Bodley*, 4 Bibb, 102; *Childs v. Woodson*, 2 Bibb, 72.

<sup>4</sup> See Brown's Statute of Frauds, §§ 79-82; *Anding v. Davis*, 38 Miss. 574; *Harper v. Harper*, 5 Bush. 177; *Wolf v. Corley*, 30 Md. 356; *Eaton v. Eaton*, 35 N. J. (L.) 290.

<sup>5</sup> *Lewis v. Lewis*, 2 Ch. R. 77; *Finch's Cas.* 4 Inst. 86; *Childers v. Childers*, 3 K. & J. 310; 1 De G. & J. 482; *Fordyce v. Willis*, 3 Bro. Ch. 587; *Leman v. Whitley*, 4 Russ. 423; *Lloyd v. Inglis*, 1 Des. 333; *Sims v. Smith*, 11 Ga. 198; *Harris v. Barnett*, 3 Grat. 339; *Dickenson v. Dickenson*, 2 Murph. 279; *Steere v. Steere*, 5 John. Ch. 1.

the legal estate also the holder of the beneficial estate.<sup>1</sup> Thus a trust cannot be proved by parol where a valuable consideration was paid from the grantor's own money.<sup>2</sup> But where A. agreed to purchase land for B., and purchased it and took an absolute title to himself, it was held that B., not being privy to the deed, was not bound by it, and might prove a trust by parol.<sup>3</sup>

§ 77. If a trust is once effectually created by parol, it cannot subsequently be revoked or altered by the party creating it, for it is governed by the same rules that govern trusts created by writing.<sup>4</sup> And if a parol trust has been executed it cannot be revoked, and if money has been paid upon it, it cannot be recovered back.<sup>5</sup> The declarations of the grantor, to create a trust, must be prior to, or contemporaneous with, the conveyance, for it would be against reason and the rules of evidence to allow a man who has parted with all interest in an estate to charge it with any trust or incumbrance after such conveyance;<sup>6</sup> nor can the *cestui que trust* give his own declarations

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.; Lewin, 42, 5th ed.; Gilb. on Uses, 56, 57; Pilkington v. Bailey, 7 Bro. P. C. 526; Dean v. Dean, 6 Conn. 285; Hutchinson v. Tindall, 2 Green Ch. 257; Starr v. Starr, 1 Ohio, 321; Movan v. Hays, 1 John. Ch. 343; Philbrooke v. Delano, 29 Me. 410; Claggett v. Hall, 9 Gill & J. 80. See notes to Woollam v. Hearn, 2 Lead. Ca. Eq. 404; Irnham v. Child, 1 Bro. Ch. 92; Bartlett v. Pickersgill, 1 Ed. 515.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Strong v. Glasgow, 2 Murph. 289; Squire's App. 70 Penn. St. 266.

<sup>4</sup> Kilpin v. Kilpin, 1 M. & K. 531; Adlington v. Cann, 3 Atk. 151; Freeman v. Freeman, 2 Pars. Eq. 81; Crabb v. Crabb, 1 M. & K. 511; Greenfield's Est., 14 Penn. St. 489; Kirkpatrick v. McDonald, 11 Penn. St. 387; Walgrave v. Tibbs, 2 K. & J. 313; Lee v. Ferris, 2 K. & J. 357; Russell v. Jackson, 10 Hare, 204; Lomax v. Ripley, 3 Sm. & Gif. 48; *In re Dunbar*, 2 Jon. & La. 120; Brown v. Brown, 12 Md. 87; Tritt v. Crotzer, 13 Penn. St. 451.

<sup>5</sup> Eaton v. Eaton, 35 N. J. (L.) 290.

<sup>6</sup> Adlington v. Cann, 3 Atk. 145; Walgrave v. Tibbs, 2 K. & J. 313; Lee v. Ferris, 2 K. & J. 357; Russell v. Jackson, 10 Hare, 204; Lomax v. Ripley, 3 Sm. & Gif. 48; Brown v. Brown, 12 Md. 87; Tritt v. Crotzer, 13 Penn. St. 451; *In re Dunbar*, 2 Jon. & La. 120; Ivory v. Burns, 56 Penn.

in evidence to create a trust in his favor ; but where parties may be witnesses, he can testify to the facts like any other witness ; and if the circumstances are such as to raise a resulting or implied trust upon the conveyance, the person entitled to such beneficial interest has the right at any time to declare the trust.<sup>1</sup> The declarations of a trustee can be given in evidence to show how he held the estate ;<sup>2</sup> that is, in those States where the trust may be proved by parol. But these declarations must be clear and explicit, and point out with certainty both the subject-matter of the trust and the person who is to take the beneficial interest. Casual and indefinite expressions of mere inchoate intentions, not carried into effect, are insufficient to raise a trust.<sup>3</sup> If a pension from the government is granted to A., a trust cannot be raised by parol in favor of B., for a pension is conferred as an honor, and is founded upon the personal services and merits of the annuitant.<sup>4</sup>

§ 78. The seventh section of the statute of frauds enacted that all declarations or creations of trusts or confidences in any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, “ shall be manifested and proved by some writing signed by the party who is by law to declare such trust, or by his last will in writing,” or else they shall be utterly void and of none effect.

St. 303 ; *Bennett v. Fulmer*, 49 Penn. St. 155. See *Chapman v. Wilbur*, 3 Oreg. 326, for a particular case.

<sup>1</sup> *Bellasis v. Compton*, 2 Vern. 294 ; *Lee v. Huntoon*, 1 Hoff. Ch. 447 ; *Harris v. Barnett*, 3 Grat. 339 ; *Reid v. Reid*, 12 Rich. Eq. 213.

<sup>2</sup> *Ambrose v. Ambrose*, 1 P. Wms. 322 ; *Gardner v. Rowe*, 2 S. & S. 346 ; 5 Russ. 258 ; *Wilson v. Dent*, 3 Sim. 385 ; *Willard v. Willard*, 56 Penn. St. 119 ; *Dollinger's App.* 71 Penn. St. 425.

<sup>3</sup> *Kilpin v. Kilpin*, 1 M. & K. 520 ; *Benbow v. Townsend*, 1 M. & K. 506 ; *Bayley v. Boulcott*, 4 Russ. 345 ; *Harrison v. McMenomy*, 2 Edw. Ch. 251 ; *Slocumb v. Marshall*, 2 Wash. C. C. 398 ; *Sidle v. Walters*, 5 Watts, 389 ; *Mercer v. Stock*, 1 S. & M. Ch. 479 ; *Hurst v. McNeil*, 1 Wash. C. C. 70.

<sup>4</sup> *Fordyce v. Willis*, 3 Bro. Ch. 587.



Sec. 8. Provided always that where any conveyance shall be made of any lands or tenements by which a trust or confidence shall or may arise or result by the implication or construction of law, or be transferred or extinguished by an act or operation of law, then and in every such case such trust or confidence shall be of like force as the same would have been if this statute had not been made, any thing hereinbefore to the contrary notwithstanding.

Sec. 9. All grants or assignments of any trust or confidence shall likewise be in writing, signed by the party granting or assigning the same, or by such last will or devise, or else shall likewise be utterly void and of none effect.<sup>1</sup>

§ 79. Wherever this statute or the substance of the statute is in force, express trusts cannot be *proved* by parol.<sup>2</sup> They must be *manifested* or *proved* by some writing, signed by the party to be charged with the trust. They need not *be created*

<sup>1</sup> 29 Car. II. c. 3, §§ 7, 8, 9.

In Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, and South Carolina, the statute of Charles is re-enacted almost in words, and the trust or confidence must be "manifested or proved by some writing signed by the party."

In Alabama, California, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin, "the trust must be created or declared by instrument in writing signed by the party creating or declaring the same."

In New York the seventh section was re-enacted; but in the revised statutes it was enacted "that the trust should be created or declared by deed or conveyance in writing," signed, &c.; but in 1860 it was enacted "that any writing signed by the parties" should be sufficient.

In Pennsylvania the seventh section was not enacted, and trusts could be created and proved by parol; but in 1856 the seventh section was substantially enacted.

In Texas, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio the seventh section does not seem to be re-enacted. See *ante*, § 75.

In Iowa declarations and creations of trust or powers in relation to real estate must be executed in the same manner as deeds of conveyance.

The ninth section seems to be in force in all the States.

<sup>2</sup> *Gerry v. Stimson*, 60 Me. 186.

and declared in writing, but only manifested or proved by writing; for if there be written evidence of the existence of the trust, the danger of parol evidence, against which the statute was directed, is effectually removed.<sup>1</sup> It may be questioned whether it was not the intention of the statute that the creation or declaration itself should be in writing; for the ninth section enacts that "all grants and assignments of any trust or confidence *shall likewise* be in writing, signed by the party granting or assigning the same, or by his last will or devise;" but whatever may have been the actual intention of the legislature, the construction put upon the clause is now firmly established.<sup>2</sup> It is well established that the interest of the *cestui que trust* in land cannot be conveyed by parol.<sup>3</sup>

§ 80. In many of the United States the words of the seventh section are replaced by words to the effect that "the trust must be created or declared by an instrument in writing signed by the party;"<sup>4</sup> and the question has arisen whether this is a change of the law as established under the words of the original statute of frauds.

§ 81. The question has not been directly adjudged in a reported case raising the exact point; but it has arisen incidentally before the courts, and the intimations are that these words do not change the law, and that "created and declared"

<sup>1</sup> Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. Jr. 707; 5 Ves. 315; Smith v. Mathews, 3 De G., F. & J. 139; Randall v. Morgan, 12 Ves. 74; Unitarian Society v. Woodbury, 14 Me. 281; Steere v. Steere, 5 John. Ch. 1; Movan v. Hays, 1 John. Ch. 339; McCubbin v. Cromwell, 7 Gill & J. 157; Barrell v. Joy, 16 Mass. 221; Pinney v. Fellows, 15 Vt. 525; Rutledge v. Smith, 1 McCord, Ch. 119; Johnson v. Ronald, 4 Munf. 77; Hutchinson v. Tindall, 2 Green, Ch. 357; Lane v. Ewing, 31 Mo. 75; Safford v. Rantoul, 12 Pick. 233; Gibson v. Foote, 40 Miss. 788; Reid v. Reid, 12 Rich. Eq. 213. Numerous other cases might be cited; but the rule is so well established, that it is not necessary.

<sup>2</sup> Lewin on Trusts, 45; Black v. Black, 4 Pick. 236.

<sup>3</sup> Richards v. Richards, 9 Gray, 313; Smith v. Burnham, 3 Sumn. 435.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, § 78, note.

are equivalent to "manifested and proved." In practice, the great majority of trusts are not created by a deed or conveyance of land, but they arise from the transactions and agreements of parties; and if these transactions or agreements are evidenced in writing, the trust is sufficiently created, declared, manifested, or proved. Thus Mr. Justice Bennett, in Vermont, where the words are "created and declared by instrument," said, that "our statute is the same in effect as the English statute."<sup>1</sup> And Mr. Justice Story said, that "in his opinion, there was no substantial difference between the Massachusetts statute of frauds" (which is in substance the same as the statute of Vermont) "and the statute of 29 Car. II. c. 3; and such is the conclusion to which I have arrived upon an examination of these statutes."<sup>2</sup> And in Wisconsin, where the statute is the same as the statutes of Massachusetts and Vermont, it was held that an express trust need not be declared in express terms, that it is sufficiently declared or created if shown by any proper written evidence, such as an answer to a bill in equity, note, letter, or memorandum, disclosing facts which create a fiduciary relation.<sup>3</sup> In New York, the words of the statute were that "the trust should be created or declared by deed or conveyance in writing." In relation to this Mr. Justice Strong said, that "the definition of the term conveyance given in the Revised Statutes<sup>4</sup> comprehends a declaration of trust, although not under seal, as it is an instrument by which the title to such estate may be affected in law or equity."<sup>5</sup> In another case, Chief-Justice Ruggles said: "The statute prescribes no particular form by which the trust is to be created or declared. Under our former statute, in relation to this subject; it was only necessary that the trust should be manifested in writing, and therefore letters from the trustee

<sup>1</sup> *Pinnock v. Clough*, 17 Vt. 508.

<sup>2</sup> *Jenkins v. Eldredge*, 3 Story, 294.

<sup>3</sup> *Pratt v. Ayer*, 2 Chand. 265.

<sup>5</sup> *Corse v. Leggett*, 25 Barb. 394.

<sup>4</sup> 1 R. S. 762, § 38.

disclosing the trust were sufficient; such is the law of England.<sup>1</sup> Our present statute requires that the trust should be created or declared by deed or conveyance in writing, subscribed by the party creating or declaring the trust;<sup>2</sup> but it need not be done in the form of a grant. A declaration of trust is not a grant. It may be contained in the reciting part of a conveyance. Such a recital in an indenture is a solemn declaration of the existence of the facts recited; and if the trustee and the *cestui que trust* are parties to the conveyance, the trust is as well and effectually declared in that form as in any other."<sup>3</sup> Upon sound reason then, and upon the decided cases, it would seem that the peculiar form of words in some of the statutes of the American States has not altered the general rule, as established under the English statute; and that the same evidence would be generally received in the United States to establish a trust, as in England.<sup>4</sup>

§ 82. There is no particular formality required or necessary in the creation of a trust. Any agreement or contract in writing, made by a person having the power of disposal over property, whereby such person agrees or directs that a particular parcel of property or a certain fund shall be held or dealt with in a particular manner for the benefit of another, in a

<sup>1</sup> Stat. 29 Car. II. c. 3, § 7; *Forster v. Hale*, 3 Ves. Jr. 696.

<sup>2</sup> The act of 1860 now makes the statute of New York conform in words to the statutes of the other States. *Cook v. Barr*, 44 N. Y. 158.

<sup>3</sup> *Wright v. Douglass*, 3 Seld. 569; *Cook v. Barr*, 44 N. Y. 158.

<sup>4</sup> *Sheet's Estate*, 52 Penn. St. 527; *Blodgett v. Hildreth*, 103 Mass. 486. Mr. Browne, in his able treatise upon the statute of frauds, cites the case of *Jaques v. Hall*, where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, notwithstanding the words of the Massachusetts statute, considered an entry in a private memorandum book of the trustee, setting forth clearly a previous transaction by which he had become trustee, as a satisfactory declaration of trust. There was other evidence; and, as the case is not put upon this ground in the printed report, 3 Gray, 194, the court probably chose to rest the decision upon other grounds. In *Titcomb v. Morrill*, 10 Allen, 15, Mr. Justice Chapman said it was not necessary to decide the question. See Browne on Statute of Frauds, § 104, 1st ed.

court of equity raises a trust in favor of such other person against the person making such agreement, or any other person claiming under him voluntarily or with notice;<sup>1</sup> and the statute of frauds will be satisfied if the trust can be manifested or proved by any subsequent acknowledgment by the trustee, as by an express declaration,<sup>2</sup> or any memorandum to that effect,<sup>3</sup> or by a letter under his hand,<sup>4</sup> or by his answer in chancery,<sup>5</sup> or by his affidavit,<sup>6</sup> or by a recital in a bond<sup>7</sup> or deed,<sup>8</sup> or by a pamphlet<sup>9</sup> written by the trustees; in short, by

<sup>1</sup> See § 122 and cases cited; 2 Spence, Eq. 860; *Legard v. Hodges*, 1 Ves. Jr. 478; *Baylies v. Peyton*, 5 Allen, 488; *Taylor v. Pownal*, 10 Leigh, 183; *Currie v. White*, 45 N. Y. 822; *Pingre v. Coffin*, 12 Gray, 288; *Reed v. Lukens*, 44 Penn. St. 200; *Conway v. Kensworthy*, 21 Ark. 9; *Cressman's App.* 42 Penn. St. 147; *Rahun v. Rahun*, 15 La. An. 471; *Rees v. Livingston*, 41 Penn. St. 113; *Paul v. Fulton*, 32 Miss. 110; *Seymour v. Freer*, 8 Wallace, 202; *Price v. Reeves*, 38 Cal. 457; *Waddingham v. Loker*, 44 Mo. 132; *Giddings v. Palmer*, 107 Mass. 270; *Homer v. Homer*, 107 Mass. 270; *Price v. Minot*, 107 Mass. 61. But see *Kelley v. Babcock*, 49 N. Y. 32; *Ogden v. Larrabee*, 57 Ill. 389; *Whitcomb v. Cardell*, 45 Vt. 24; *Pinson v. McGehee*, 44 Miss. 229; *Conway v. Cutting*, 51 N. H. 408.

<sup>2</sup> *Ambrose v. Ambrose*, 1 P. Wms. 321; *Cross v. Norton*, 10 Mod. 233; *Willard v. Willard*, 56 Penn. St. 119.

<sup>3</sup> *Bellamy v. Burrow*, Cas. tem. Talb. 97; *Fisher v. Fields*, 10 John. 495; *Urann v. Coates*, 109 Mass. 581.

<sup>4</sup> *Johnson v. Delaney*, 35 Tex. 42; *Buckner v. Kingsbury*, 35 Tex. 42; *Phelps v. Seeley*, 22 Gratt. 573; *Montague v. Hayes*, 10 Gray, 609; *Kingsbury v. Burnside*, 58 Ill. 300; *Forster v. Hale*, 3 Ves. Jr. 696; 5 Ves. 308; *Morton v. Tewart*, 2 Yo. & Col. Ch. 67; *Steere v. Steere*, 5 John. Ch. 1; *Bentley v. Mackay*, 15 Beav. 12; *Childers v. Childers*, 1 De G. & J. 482; *Smith v. Wilkinson*, 3 Ves. 705; *O'Hara v. O'Neill*, 7 Bro. P. C. 227; *Gardner v. Rowe*, 2 S. & S. 346; *Crook v. Brooking*, 2 Vern. 106. But this case was before the statute.

<sup>5</sup> *Hampton v. Spencer*, 2 Vern. 288; *Nab v. Nab*, 10 Mod. 404; 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 464; *Gil. Eq.* 146; *Cottingham v. Fletcher*, 2 Atk. 155; *Ryall v. Ryall*, 1 Atk. 59; *Wilson v. Dent*, 3 Sim. 385; *Butler v. Portarlington*, 1 Conn. & Laws. 1, 1 Dr. & W. 20; *McCubbin v. Cromwell*, 7 Gill & J. 175; *Jones v. Slubey*, 5 Har. & J. 372.

<sup>6</sup> *Barkworth v. Young*, 4 Drew. 1; *Pinney v. Fellows*, 15 Vt. 525.

<sup>7</sup> *Moorcroft v. Dowding*, 2 P. Wms. 314; *Wright v. Douglass*, 3 Sel. 564; *Gomez v. Traders' Bank*, 4 Sandf. 102.

<sup>8</sup> *Deg v. Deg*, 2 P. Wms. 412; *Selden's App.* 31 Conn. 548; *Wright v. Douglass*, 3 Seld. 564, reversing s. c. 10 Barb. 97.

<sup>9</sup> *Barrell v. Joy*, 16 Mass. 221.

any writing in which the fiduciary relation between the parties and its terms can be clearly read.<sup>1</sup> And if there is any competent written evidence that the person holding the legal title is only a trustee, that will open the door for the admission of parol evidence to explain the position of the parties,<sup>2</sup> as where there are entries in the books of the grantee of payments made by him to or on account of the grantor, which payments were consistent only with the fact that the grantee took in trust, he was decreed to be a trustee.<sup>3</sup> Nor is it necessary that the letters, memoranda, or recitals should be addressed to the *cestui que trust*, or should have been intended when made to be evidence of the trust.<sup>3</sup> The trust thus proved, however late the proof, will relate back to its creation, as where a lease was granted to A., who afterwards became a bankrupt, and *then* executed a declaration of trust in favor of B., the jury having

<sup>1</sup> Baylies v. Payson, 5 Allen, 473; Plymouth v. Hickman, 2 Vern. 167; Blake v. Blake, 2 Bro. P. C. 250; Dale v. Hamilton, 2 Phill. 266; Orleans v. Chatham, 2 Pick. 29; Hardin v. Baird, 6 Litt. 346; Graham v. Lambert, 5 Humph. 595; Gome v. Tradesman's Bank, 4 Sand. 106; Bragg v. Paulk, 42 Maine, 502; McCubbin v. Cromwell, 7 Gill & J. 157; Unitarian Society v. Woodbury, 14 Maine, 281; Podmore v. Gunning, 7 Sim. 655; Fisher v. Fields, 10 John. Ch. 505; Murray v. Glass, 23 L. J. Ch. 126; Paterson v. Murphy, 17 Jur. 298; Raybold v. Raybold, 20 Penn. St. 308; Barron v. Barron, 24 Vt. 375; Steere v. Steere, 5 John. Ch. 1; Cuyler v. Bradt, Caine's Cas. 326.

<sup>2</sup> Cripps v. Lee, 4 Bro. Ch. 472; Hollinshed v. Allen, 17 Penn. St. 275; Prevost v. Gratz, 1 Pet. C. C. 366; Morton v. Tewart, 2 Yo. & Coll. Ch. 67-77; Hutchins v. Lee, 1 Atk. 447; Corse v. Leggett, 25 Barb. 389. But see Homer v. Homer, 107 Mass. 82.

<sup>3</sup> Forster v. Hale, 5 Ves. 308; Hutchinson v. Tindall, 2 Green, Ch. 357; Barrell v. Joy, 16 Mass. 221; Welford v. Beazeley, 3 Atk. 503; Browne on Statute of Frauds, § 99; Furman v. Fisher, 4 Cold. 626; Urann v. Coates, 109 Mass. 581. In Steere v. Steere, 5 John. Ch. 1, Mr. Chancellor Kent recognized and approved the general proposition that trusts could be proved by letters signed by the party; but in showing that the letters in that particular case were insufficient to prove a trust, he took notice of the fact that they were not addressed to the *cestui que trust*, and seemed to intimate that it was necessary that letters should be so addressed in order to manifest the trust. If the eminent chancellor intended to lay down such a rule, it would seem to be effectually overthrown by the well considered cases cited above.

found upon an issue out of chancery that A.'s name was used in good faith in the lease as the trustee of B., it was held that the assignees of A. took nothing in the property.<sup>1</sup> But it must clearly appear that the parties intended a trust by the transaction, and parol evidence is competent to explain receipts and other papers connected with the case which may be explained by parol in other cases.<sup>2</sup>

§ 83. The same principles of construction apply to trusts proved by this description of evidence as in other cases; and the objects and nature of the trust must always appear from such writings with sufficient certainty, and also their connection with the subject-matter of the trust.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, courts require demonstration on the latter point; and the trust will not be executed if the precise nature of it, and the particular persons who are to take as *cestuis que trust*, and the proportions in which they are to take, cannot be ascertained.<sup>4</sup> When all these particulars properly appear from writings signed by the party, the trust will be executed; but if the terms of the trust are collected from several papers, it is not necessary that all of them should be signed, provided they are so referred to

<sup>1</sup> Gardner v. Rowe, 2 S. & S. 346; 5 Russ. 258; Plymouth v. Hickman, 2 Vern. 167; Ambrose v. Ambrose, 1 P. Wms. 322; Wilson v. Dent, 3 Sim. 385; Smith v. Howell, 3 Stockt. 349; Ownes v. Ownes, 23 N. J. Ch. 60; McGovern v. Knox, 21 Ohio St. 547; Malin v. Malin, 1 Wend. 625; Steere v. Steere, 5 John. Ch. 1; Jackson v. Moore, 6 Cow. 706; Reid v. Fitch, 11 Barb. 399; Reggs v. Swann, 6 Jones, Eq. 115; Noble v. Morris, 24 Ind. 478; Sime v. Howard, 4 Nev. 473; Reid v. Reid, 12 Rich. Eq. 213; McLaurie v. Partlow, 53 Ill. 340.

<sup>2</sup> Smith v. Tome, 59 Penn. St. 158; Hays v. Quay, 59 Penn. St. 263.

<sup>3</sup> Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. Jr. 708; Steere v. Steere, 5 John. Ch. 1; Abeel v. Radcliff, 13 John. 297; Rutledge v. Smith, 1 McC. Ch. 119; Freeport v. Bartol, 3 Greenl. 340; Arms v. Ashley, 4 Pick. 71; Hill on Trustees, 61.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.; Smith v. Mathews, 3 De G., F. & J. 139; Morton v. Tewart, 2 Yo. & Col. Ch. 80; Lewin on Trusts, 46; Leman v. Whitley, 4 Russ. 423; Whelan v. Whelan, 3 Cow. 537; Jackson v. Moore, 3 Cow. 706; Reid v. Fitch, 11 Barb. 399.

and connected with the paper that is signed that they may be identified and read as genuine papers, and a part of the transaction.<sup>1</sup> Nor need there be an actual subscription of the party's name, if the paper is authenticated by the party as his writing for the purpose of declaring the trust by writing his initials.<sup>2</sup> The party whose signature is essential is the party who by law is enabled to declare the trust; and it has been decided, that, whether the property is real or personal, the party enabled to declare the trust is the owner of the beneficial interest, who has therefore the absolute control over the property, the holder of the legal estate being a mere instrument or conduit pipe for him.<sup>3</sup> But if there is an absolute conveyance of the legal title to a supposed trustee, and there is no declaration of a trust prior to or at the time of the conveyance by the grantor, and the *cestui que trust* attempts to charge the grantee with a trust in respect to the land, he must produce some writing signed by the grantee of the legal title in order to charge him with the trust.<sup>4</sup> It is only when there is no dispute concerning the existence of a trust, or when the trust arises by operation of law as a resulting or implied trust, that the *cestui que trust* himself can declare its terms.<sup>5</sup>

§ 84. It remains to consider when and how far trusts may be declared or proved by the answers of parties in chancery. It has been decided that a defendant is bound to answer to a bill

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.; *Denton v. Davis*, 18 Ves. 503; *Lewin on Trusts*, 47; *Browne on the Statute of Frauds*, §§ 105, 350-355.

<sup>2</sup> *Smith v. Howell*, 3 Stockt. 349.

<sup>3</sup> *Tierney v. Wood*, 19 Beav. 330; *Donahoe v. Conrahy*, 2 Jon. & La. 688; *Lewin on Trusts*, 47.

<sup>4</sup> *Browne on Statute of Frauds*, § 106; *Adlington v. Cann*, 3 Atk. 145; *Wallgrave v. Tebbs*, 2 K. & J. 313; *Lee v. Ferris*, ib. 357; *Russell v. Jackson*, 10 Hare, 204; *Lomax v. Ripley*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 48; *Brown v. Brown*, 12 Md. 87; *Tritt v. Crotzer*, 13 Penn. St. 451; *In re Dunbar*, 2 Jon. & La. 120.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.; *Bellasis v. Compton*, 2 Vern. 294; *Lee v. Huntoon*, 1 Hoff. Ch. 447; *Harris v. Barnet*, 3 Grat. 339.



suggesting a parol trust, and that a general demurrer<sup>1</sup> would be overruled; but perhaps this doctrine is confined to parol trusts that arise from fraud, accident, or mistake; for in the case of express trusts, if it can be gathered from the bill that the plaintiff relies upon parol evidence alone, with no circumstances to take it out of the statute, it has been held that the defendant may demur.<sup>2</sup> But the general rule is that if a trust is alleged in a bill it will be presumed to be legally created, *i.e.*, in writing, unless the contrary appears; therefore it must clearly appear from the bill that the alleged trust rests in parol only, or the demurrer will be overruled.<sup>3</sup> It has also been decided, that if the bill simply omits to state that the trust is in writing, a demurrer will be overruled; for, as the statute only requires that it should be proved, not created, by writing, the writing is no part of the trust, but only evidence of the trust to be adduced at the hearing.<sup>4</sup> In all cases, however, the defendant *may* answer, and if in his answer he confess the trust without insisting upon the statute of frauds, he will be held to have waived the benefit of the statute, and his answer may be used as a written declaration and proof of the trust,<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Muckleston v. Brown*, 6 Ves. 52; *Stickland v. Aldridge*, 9 Ves. 516; *Chamberlain v. Agar*, 2 V. & B. 259; *Newton v. Pelham*, 1 Ed. 514; *Lomax v. Ripley*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 48; *Peralta v. Castro*, 6 Cal. 354; *Cottingham v. Fletcher*, 2 Atk. 155; *Childers v. Childers*, 3 K. & J. 310; 1 De G. & J. 485.

<sup>2</sup> *Walker v. Locke*, 5 Cush. 91; *Wood v. Midgeley*, 27 Eng. L. & Eq. 206; 5 De G., M. & G. 41; *Ridgway v. Wharton*, 3 De G., M. & G. 677; *Barkworth v. Young*, 4 Dr. 1. See *Skinner v. McDonall*, 2 De G. & Sm. 265.

<sup>3</sup> *Cozine v. Graham*, 2 Paige, 177.

<sup>4</sup> *Davis v. Otty*, 33 Beav. 540.

<sup>5</sup> *Hampton v. Spencer*, 2 Vern. 288; *Nab v. Nab*, 10 Mod. 404; 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 404; *Gil. Eq.* 146; *Dean v. Dean*, 1 Stockt. 425; *Whiting v. Gould*, 2 Wis. 552; *Woods v. Dille*, 11 Ohio, 455; *Newton v. Swazey*, 8 N. H. 9; *Rowton v. Rowton*, 1 Hen. & Munf. 91; *Lingan v. Henderson*, 1 Bland. 236; *Tarleton v. Vietes*, 1 Gilm. 470; *Stearnes v. Hubbard*, 8 Greenl. 320; *Thornton v. Henry*, 2 Scam. 219; *School Trustees v. Wright*, 12 Ill. 432; *McCubbin v. Cromwell*, 7 Gill & J. 157; *Kinzie v. Penrose*, 2 Scam. 250; *Talbot v. Bowen*, 1 A. K. Marsh. 436; *Albert v. Ware*, 2 Md. Ch. 169, 6

on the ground that the plaintiff is not called upon to introduce evidence, and the trust appears upon the written answer before the court.

§ 85. In States where the statute of frauds is not in force, trusts can be proved by parol even in opposition to the defendant's answer denying them. Resulting and implied trusts that arise from fraud can be proved by parol, although the defendant in his answer denies the trusts and sets up the statute in bar; for such trusts are not within the statute. In cases of express trusts, if the defendant denies them, or if he denies them and at the same time sets up the statute, or if he do not answer at all, only legal evidence or evidence in writing can be given in proof.<sup>1</sup> And if the defendant confesses the parol trusts in his answer, and at the same time sets up the statute in bar, he will have the benefit of the statute, and the court will not use the answer as a written declaration and proof of the trust.<sup>2</sup> In one case, it was held, that a trust appearing

Md. Ch. 66; *Chitwood v. Brittain*, 1 Green, Ch. 450; *Baker v. Hollabaugh*, 15 Ark. 322; *Cozine v. Graham*, 2 Paige, 177; *Tilton v. Tilton*, 9 N. H. 386; *Switzer v. Skiles*, 1 Gilm. 529; *Allen v. Chambers*, 4 Ired. Eq. 125; *Hall v. Hall*, 1 Gill, 383; *McLaurie v. Partlow*, 53 Ill. 340.

<sup>1</sup> *Trapnal v. Brown*, 19 Ark. 39; *Wynn v. Garland*, ib. 23; *Smith v. Howell*, Stockt. 349; *Whyte v. Arthur*, 2 Green, Ch. 521.

<sup>2</sup> *Dean v. Dean*, 1 Stockt. 425; *Whiting v. Gould*, 2 Wis. 552. The proposition in the text was long a disputed point. It was apparently held that, as the defendant by his answer had admitted the trust, the plaintiff was not called upon to introduce any evidence. There was no danger of fraud and perjury, as the court had the defendant's statement of a trust in writing under oath, and as equity takes hold of a party's conscience, he ought to be held to execute the trust which he confesses, notwithstanding the statute. On the other hand, in bills for the specific performance of a parol contract for the sale of lands, the defendant was held not bound to execute the contract if he set up the statute, although he confessed the contract in his answer. There would seem to be no reason for a different rule in the two cases; and, since it is now established that a defendant may demur to a bill that on its face alleges a mere parol trust, it would seem to follow that the confession of a defendant should not be used to override a positive rule of law. The two cases cited establish the proposition of the

from defendant's answer would be executed by the court although it was entirely different from the trust alleged in the bill;<sup>1</sup> but this case has not been followed. In a late case where a bill was filed setting forth a fraud and asking to have a resulting trust declared and a deed set aside, and the defendant confessed an express trust by parol, and offered to execute it, Chancellor Vroom said, "I am inclined to believe that if the present complainant had filed a bill claiming this deed to be a deed of trust, and praying that it might be so decreed according to the original intention of the parties, the answer of the defendant admitting the trust would have been good evidence of it. It would have amounted to a sufficient declaration of trust. But it would seem to be different when a complainant seeks on the ground of fraud to set aside a deed absolute on its face, and confessedly without any consideration paid; for, to suffer a defendant in such case to come in and avoid the claim by setting up a trust would be to permit him to create a trust according to his own views, and thereby prevent the consequences of a fraud."<sup>2</sup> It must be observed, that if the answer of the trustee is used to prove the trust, the terms of the trust must be gathered from the whole answer as it stands, for one part of the answer cannot be read and another part rejected. If, therefore, the plaintiff read the answer in proof of the trust, he must at the same time read the particular terms of the trust as therein stated.<sup>3</sup>

text, and it is presumed that the same rule would be held in all the United States. It is a question of pleading and practice, and it is considered here only incidentally in considering how trusts may be created under the statute of frauds. The reader will find a full discussion of the question in Story's Eq. Pleading, §§ 765-768.

<sup>1</sup> *Hampton v. Spencer*, 2 Vern. 288.

<sup>2</sup> *Hutchinson v. Tindall*, 2 Green, Ch. 357; and see *Jones v. Slubey*, 5 Harr. & J. 372; *McCubbin v. Cromwell*, 7 Gill & J. 157; *Haigh v. Kay*, L. R. 7 Ch. 469.

<sup>3</sup> *Hampton v. Spencer*, 2 Vern. 288; *Nab v. Nab*, 10 Mod. 404; *Freeman v. Tatham*, 5 Hare, 329; *Stearnes v. Hubbard*, 8 Greenl. 320; *Lewin on Trusts*, 46.

§ 86. Personal chattels are not within the terms of the statute, and trusts in personal property may be declared and proved by parol, though Mr. Eden said that "he had not been able to find an instance of a declaration of trust of personal property, evidenced only by parol, having been carried into execution."<sup>1</sup> And certainly the English cases usually referred to do not establish the proposition in express terms.<sup>2</sup> There does not seem to be any objection, however, to the establishment of a trust in personal property by parol. The owner in the absence of a statute has entire control of it; he can sell and transfer it without writing and by parol, and if he can transfer it by parol, there is no reason why he may not by parol transfer it upon such lawful terms, and to such uses and trusts, as he

<sup>1</sup> *Fordyce v. Willis*, 3 Bro. Ch. (n.).

<sup>2</sup> *Nab v. Nab*, 10 Mod. 404, 1 Eq. Ca. Ch. 404, and *Jones v. Nabbe*, 451. Eq. are usually cited to sustain the proposition, but they do not. In *Crook v. Brooking*, 2 Vern. 50, 106; *Inchiquin v. French*, 1 Cox, 1; *Met-ham v. Devon*, 1 P. Wms. 529, and *Smith v. Attersoll*, 1 Russ. 274, there were written declarations of trust, and the question was as to the effect of the writings, though it was remarked in these cases that trusts of personalty could be evidenced by parol. The case of *Benbow v. Townsend*, 1 My. & K. 506, was this: A. had loaned £2000, and taken a mortgage in the name of B. his brother, declaring that he intended it for the benefit of B. After the death of A., his executor brought a bill against B. to obtain the mortgage, and the question was whether the representatives of A. were entitled to the mortgage. It was held that B. was entitled to hold the mortgage, and it was remarked that a trust of personal property was not within the statute of frauds. It will be observed that the mortgage was in writing in the name of B., and that the parol evidence was not used to establish a trust in B., but to rebut a trust resulting to A. from his having paid the purchase-money. If A. had taken the mortgage in his own name, but had declared that it was in trust for B., the question would have fairly arisen, whether a parol declaration could create a trust in a mortgage of real estate. *Bayley v. Boulcott*, 4 Russ. 346, only establishes the proposition that a paper prepared under the direction of the owner, but which she refused to execute, will not create a trust. But in *M'Fadden v. Jenkyns*, 1 Phill. 153, 1 Hare, 458, it was directly held that a parol declaration was sufficient to create a trust in personal property. If there are doubts and difficulty upon the supposed words, the court will give weight to the fact that they were not written to infer that they may not be the deliberate sentiments of the party. *Dipple v. Corles*, 11 Hare, 183; *Paterson v. Murphy*, ib. 91, 92.

may desire. It has been so ruled in express decisions in the United States.<sup>1</sup> Under these decisions trusts may be created by parol in any mere personal property, as in the shares of corporations, although the corporations themselves own real estate.<sup>2</sup> So money or a debt secured by mortgage of real estate is a personal chattel, and a trust in the money or mortgage debt, and in the mortgage itself, may be created by parol;<sup>3</sup> and although a parol declaration of trust will not affect land, yet if the land is to be converted into money, and is converted, a parol declaration will bind the proceeds, or the money.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Hill says, that "it would seem to follow that legacies and annuities, and other sums of money charged on land, do not come within the operation of the statute respecting parol declarations of trusts in land."<sup>5</sup> But all chattels real are within the statute, and trusts in them must be evidenced in writing, as in case of freehold or leasehold interests.<sup>6</sup> The same remarks are to be made in relation to parol trusts of personal property that were

<sup>1</sup> *Hooper v. Holmes*, 3 Stockt. 122; *Day v. Roth*, 18 N. Y. 448; *Robson v. Harwell*, 6 Ga. 589; *Higgenbottom v. Peyton*, 3 Rich. Eq. 398; *Kirkpatrick v. Davidson*, 2 Kelley, 297; *Gordon v. Green*, 10 Ga. 534; *Kimball v. Morton*, 1 Halst. Ch. 31. See *McFadden v. Jenkyns*, 1 Hare, 461; 1 Phill. 157; *Thorpe v. Owens*, 5 Beav. 224; *George v. Bank of England*, 7 Price, 646; *Hawkins v. Gordon*, 2 Sm. & Gif. 451; *Peckham v. Taylor*, 3 Beav. 250; *Hunnewell v. Lane*, 11 Met. 163; *Simms v. Smith*, 11 Ga. 195; *Crissman v. Crissman*, 23 Mich. 218; *Berry v. Norris*, 1 Drew. 302; *Maffitt v. Rynd*, 69 Penn. St. 30.

<sup>2</sup> *Porter v. Bank of Rutland*, 19 Vt. 410; *Forster v. Hale*, 3 Ves. Jr. 696; 5 Ves. 308; *Ashton v. Langdale*, 4 De G. & Sm. 402; 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 80; *Myers v. Perigal*, 16 Sim. 533; 14 Eng. L. & Eq. 229; *Hilton v. Giraud*, 1 De G. & Sm. 183; *Kilpin v. Kilpin*, 1 M. & K. 520; *Wheatley v. Purr*, 1 Keen, 551.

<sup>3</sup> *Bellasis v. Compton*, 2 Vern. 294; *Benbow v. Townsend*, 1 M. & K. 510; *Childs v. Jordon*, 106 Mass. 322; *Hackney v. Brooman*, 62 Barb. 650.

<sup>4</sup> *Maffitt v. Rynd*, 69 Penn. St. 30.

<sup>5</sup> Hill on Trustees, 58 (n.); see note 2, p. 74.

<sup>6</sup> *Skett v. Whitmore*, Freem. 280; *Forster v. Hale*, 3 Ves. Jr. 696; *Riddle v. Emerson*, 1 Vern. 108; *Hutchins v. Lee*, 1 Atk. 447; *Bellasis v. Compton*, 2 Vern. 294; *Gardner v. Rowe*, 5 Russ. 258; *Otis v. Sill*, 8 Barb. 102.

made in relation to parol trusts of real estate where such trusts are possible.<sup>1</sup> The subject-matter of the trust must be clearly ascertained, as well as the purposes of the trust and the persons who are to take the beneficial interests. Loose, vague, and indefinite expressions are insufficient to create the trust. If the trust is once created in writing it cannot be varied by parol, and if it is once created by parol it cannot be altered or varied by other declarations of the trustee, as where a daughter delivered to her father \$7000 upon the parol trust that he would secure the money in trust for her and invest it for her sole benefit, and the father made his will giving said notes to two trustees to receive and pay over the income and interest to the daughter during her life, and at her decease to pay the principal to such persons as she by her last will should direct and appoint, and in default of such appointment, to her heirs-at-law: the father died, and his estate turning out insolvent, she brought a bill praying that the notes might be delivered to some person to be appointed by the court as trustee for her. Mr. Justice Wilde, in delivering the opinion of the court, said, "it is very clear that the father, his executor, and his heirs and creditors, are bound by the trust. It was not in the power of the trustee to divest or defeat the trust without the consent of the *cestui que trust*, except by a sale of the trust property to a *bonâ fide* purchaser, for a valuable consideration, and without notice of the trust. Nor could the trustee vary the terms of the trust, or declare any new trust, to the prejudice of the *cestui que trust*, unless with her consent."<sup>2</sup>

§ 87. Under the statutes relating to the execution of last wills and testaments, no parol declaration can take effect as a nuncupative will, except in the case of soldiers in actual service, and mariners at sea. These persons may, according to the statutes of nearly all the States, make nuncupative wills of

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, § 77, n. 4, p. 61; *Crissman v. Crissman*, 23 Mich. 218.

<sup>2</sup> *Hunnewell v. Lane*, 11 Met. 163.

their wages and other personal property. It would seem to follow that they can create valid trusts in their wages and other personal property by nuncupative wills so made as to be proved and allowed in the courts of probate, or other courts having jurisdiction in such matters. Personal property may be so given and delivered to one in trust for another for a particular purpose that it will be good as a *donatio causa mortis*, and the trust will be executed by courts of equity;<sup>1</sup> but courts do not favor donations *'mortis causa*. It has been held that a gift, *mortis causa*, of a fund in trust to be disposed of for benevolent purposes, at the absolute and unlimited discretion of the donee, could not be sustained.<sup>2</sup>

§ 88. An attempt was made at one time to hold gifts to charitable uses as excepted from the statute; but Lord Talbot decided,<sup>3</sup> and Lord Hardwicke affirmed the decision,<sup>4</sup> and Lord Northington said every man of sense must subscribe to it, that a gift to a charity must be treated on the same footing with any other disposition.<sup>5</sup>

§ 89. In addition to the statute of frauds, which forbids the creation of express trusts in lands unless the trust is evidenced by some writing signed by the party, there are statutes in every

<sup>1</sup> *Blunt v. Burrow*, 4 Bro. Ch. 75 and Perkins's notes, 1 Ves. Jr. 546 and Sumner's notes; *Moore v. Darton*, 4 De G. & Sm. 517, 7 Eng. L. & Eq. 134; *Borneman v. Sedlinger*, 3 Shep. 429, 8 Shep. 185; *Constant v. Schuyler*, 1 Paige, 316. And see *Tate v. Leithhead*, 1 Kay, 658; *Hambrooke v. Simmons*, 4 Russ. 25; *Hill v. Hill*, 8 M. & W. 401; *Drury v. Smith*, 1 P. Wms. 404; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 607.

<sup>2</sup> *Dole v. Lincoln*, 31 Maine, 422. But the court decided the case on the ground: (1) that there was not a sufficient delivery to constitute a good gift *mortis causa*, and (2) that if the gift had been good in form, the trust for the charity could not be executed on account of its vagueness and uncertainty.

<sup>3</sup> *Lloyd v. Spillett*, 3 P. Wms. 344.

<sup>4</sup> *Lloyd v. Spillett*, 2 Atk. 148; *Barn*, 384; *Adlington v. Cann*, 3 Atk. 150.

<sup>5</sup> *Boson v. Statham*, 1 Eden, 513; *Thayer v. Wellington*, 9 Allen, 283.

State that regulate the execution of wills. By the original statute of frauds, all wills to pass real estate were required to be in writing, signed by the testator, and attested in his presence by three or four witnesses.<sup>1</sup> This statute has been substantially adopted in all the States, though there is some diversity in the number of witnesses required. By this statute nuncupative wills of personal chattels were not prohibited, but they were placed under such regulations that they ceased to be in common use. Written wills of personal property were not required to be attested by witnesses. But in England at the present time, and in most of the United States, a will to pass personal property must be executed with the same formalities, and attested by the same number of witnesses, that are required to wills affecting real estate.<sup>2</sup>

§ 90. It follows from these statutes, that no trusts in real or personal estate can be created by any declaration of trust in a will, unless the will is executed in such form that it can be allowed in the court of probate having jurisdiction, and in such form that it will pass the estate that it is intended to operate upon. Mr. Hill lays down the proposition, that, if an instrument containing a declaration of trust by reason of some informality cannot be supported as a will, it may, nevertheless, if signed by the party, be a sufficient evidence of the creation of the trust to take it out of the statute.<sup>3</sup> And Lord Northing-

<sup>1</sup> 29 Car. II. c. 3, § 5.

\* It is not within the general purposes of this treatise to enter into a discussion of the manner of executing wills in England and the several States of the Union. The reader will find the laws of the various States fully and accurately stated in the learned notes of the Hon. J. C. Perkins to 1 Jarman on Wills, pp. 113-135 (4th Am. ed.), as to real estate, and pp. 135-144, as to personal property.

<sup>3</sup> Hill on Trustees, 61. Mr. Hill cites *Nab v. Nab*, 10 Mod. 404, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 404, Gil. Eq. 146. The case was this: A daughter put into her mother's hands £180, and afterwards made a will, which was duly executed, and appointed her mother executrix, but made no mention of the £180. After making the will she desired her mother to give the money to a third



ton declared his opinion generally, "that a writing signed by the party who has power to make the trust, declaring a trust upon the will, is good, though such writing be not attested by three witnesses according to the solemnities of the statute of frauds."<sup>1</sup> But these propositions, in the broad form in which they are stated, are clearly not law. The dictum of Lord Northington stands alone, and the highest authorities are in opposition to it.<sup>2</sup>

§ 91. There is one state of facts in which the above proposition of Mr. Hill may be good law. If a testator in making his will should declare by way of recital that a certain parcel of land, or sum of money, was held by him upon trusts therein stated, and the will should be so informally executed that it could not be proved in a court of probate, still, if it was signed by him, it would seem to be as good proof of the trust as letters and other memoranda signed by the party and found after his death. In such case the will could have no effect in creating the trust, it would be simply proof in writing of a trust already created and existing at the date of the will. But if the validity of the trust in any way depended upon the effect of the will in transferring the title to the property, the will could not be used in evidence, unless it was itself so executed as to be valid as a will.<sup>3</sup> In all cases, where trusts originate in a will, the will

person. After the death of the daughter, this third person brought a bill in chancery, alleging that the mother held this money in trust. The mother admitted the trust in her answer, and set up that she was not to give the money except at her option. The court held that the trust was admitted by the answer, and that the trust should be executed. It will be observed that the question as to a will informally executed did not arise. The question was wholly upon the effect of the defendant's answer in chancery. And the court, as reported in 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 404, said that if the mother had set up the statute of frauds the trust could not have been carried into effect.

<sup>1</sup> *Boson v. Statham*, 1 Ed. 514.

<sup>2</sup> *Adlington v. Cann*, 3 Atk. 131; *Muckleston v. Brown*, 6 Ves. 67; *Stickland v. Aldridge*, 9 Ves. 519; *Puleston v. Puleston*, Finch, 312; *Thayer v. Wellington*, 9 Allen, 283; *Burlington University*, 22 Io. 30.

<sup>3</sup> *Anding v. Davis*, 38 Miss. 574.

must be executed according to the statute, or it cannot be used as a declaration and proof of the trusts.

§ 92. Mr. Lewin clearly states the law and gives the reasons, as follows: "We must bear in mind that the absolute owner of property combines in himself both the legal and equitable interest, and when the legislature enacts that no devise or bequest of property shall be valid without certain ceremonies, a testator cannot by an informal instrument affect the equitable any more than the legal estate, for the one is a constituent part of the ownership as much as the other. Thus a person cannot, but by will duly signed and attested, give a sum of *money* originally and primarily out of land; for the charge is part of the land and to be raised out of it, by sale or mortgage.<sup>1</sup> And if a testator by will duly signed and attested give lands to A. and his heirs 'upon trust,' but without specifying the particular trust intended, and then by a paper not duly signed and attested, as a will or codicil, declare a trust in favor of B., the beneficial interest under the will is a part of the original ownership, and cannot be passed by the informal paper, but will descend to the heir-at-law.<sup>2</sup> Again, if a legacy be bequeathed by a will in writing to A. 'upon trust,' and the testator by parol express an intention that it shall be held by A. upon trust for B., such a direction is in fact a testamentary disposition of the equitable interest in the chattel, and therefore void by the statute, which imposes the necessity of a written will. If it be said that such expression of intention, though void as a devise or bequest, may yet be good as a declaration of trust, and, therefore, that where the legal estate of a freehold is well devised a trust may be engrafted upon it by a single note in writing; and where a personal chattel is well bequeathed, a trust of it, as excepted from the seventh section of the statute of frauds, may be raised by a mere parol declaration,—the

<sup>1</sup> Brudenell v. Boughton, 2 Atk. 272.

<sup>2</sup> Adlington v. Cann, 3 Atk. 151.

answer is, that a wide distinction exists between testamentary dispositions and declarations of trust. The former are ambulatory until the death of the testator, but the latter take effect, if at all, at the time of the execution. 'The deed,' observed Lord Loughborough, in a similar case, 'is built on the will; if the will is destroyed, the deed I should consider absolutely gone; the will without the deed is incomplete, and the deed without the will is a nullity.'<sup>1</sup> And Mr. Justice Buller observed, 'a deed must take place upon its execution or not at all; it is not necessary for a deed to convey an immediate interest in possession, but it must take place as passing an interest to be conveyed at the execution; but a will is quite the reverse, and can only operate after death.'<sup>2</sup> We may therefore safely assume, as an established rule, that if the intended disposition be of a testamentary character and not to take effect in the testator's lifetime, but ambulatory until his death, such disposition is inoperative, unless it be declared in writing in strict conformity with the statutory enactments regulating devises and bequests."<sup>3</sup>

§ 93. There is an additional reason, in the United States, why a will or testamentary paper informally executed cannot be used as an original declaration of trust. In nearly all the United States no will can be used to prove the transfer of any interest, legal or equitable, in property of the testator, unless such will has been duly proved, allowed, and recorded, in a court of probate having jurisdiction over it;<sup>4</sup> and if such will is to be used to affect the title to property in any State other than the one where it is originally proved, it must be recorded

<sup>1</sup> *Habergham v. Vincent*, 2 Ves. Jr. 209.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Lewin on Trusts*, 66 (2d Am. ed.).

<sup>4</sup> *Rex v. Netherseal*, 4 T. R. 258; 1 Wms. Ex'rs, 172; *Strong v. Perkins*, 3 N. H. 517; *Kittredge v. Fulsome*, 8 N. H. 98; 2 Redf. on Wills, 10; *Metham v. Devon*, 1 P. Wms. 529; *Inchiquin v. French*, 1 Cox, 1. And see Mr. Lewin's remarks upon this last case, *Lewin on Trusts*, p. 49.

in such other State;<sup>1</sup> so a court in equity has no jurisdiction over trusts created by the will of a foreigner, a certified copy of which is not filed in the probate court of the jurisdiction where the remedy is sought.<sup>2</sup> But no will can be proved and allowed in a probate court unless it is duly executed under the statutes in force where it is made. This rule does not interfere with the doctrine that a testator may by his last will refer to and incorporate therein any document or paper which is in actual existence at the time, and is thus made a part of his will.<sup>3</sup> In such cases, all such papers must be clearly identified and probated and recorded with the will as a part thereof, and such papers must be in actual existence at the time of making the will. If they are made afterwards, they must be so executed that they may be probated as a revocation of the will, or as a codicil thereto, or they will have no effect;<sup>4</sup> as, where a testator made an absolute devise of an estate, and left a declaration of trust not referred to in the will, and not duly attested, and not communicated to the devisee nor assented to by him in the testator's lifetime, the devisee is

<sup>1</sup> *Wilson v. Tappan*, 6 Ohio, 172; *Bailey v. Bailey*, 8 Ohio, 239; *Ives v. Allyn*, 12 Vt. 589; *Campbell v. Sheldon*, 13 Pick. 8; *Campbell v. Wallace*, 10 Gray, 162; 2 Redf. on Wills, 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Campbell v. Wallace*, 2 Gray, 162.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Wms. Ex'rs, 289, 290, and notes; *Willington v. Adam*, 1 V. & B. 445; *Habergham v. Vincent*, 2 Ves. Jr. 228; *Smart v. Prujean*, 6 Ves. 560; *Goods of Lady Truro*, L. R. 1 P. & D. 201; *Doe v. Walker*, 12 M. & W. 591, 600; *In re Earle's Trusts*, 4 K. & J. 673; *Allen v. Maddock*, 11 Moore, P. C. 201; *Crocker v. Hertford*, 4 Moore, P. C. 339, 363; *Thayer v. Willington*, 9 Allen, 283.

<sup>4</sup> *Adlington v. Cann*, 3 Atk. 141-152; *Briggs v. Penny*, 3 De G. & Sm. 547; 3 Mac. & G. 546; 8 Eng. L. & Eq. 231; *Johnson v. Ball*, 5 De G. & Sm. 85; *Dawson v. Dawson*, 1 Chev. 148; *Johnson v. Clarkson*, 3 Rich. Eq. 305; *Thayer v. Willington*, 9 Allen, 283. How far papers referred to in a will become part thereof may be a very troublesome question. Statutes require last wills to be solemnly attested or witnessed by a certain number of witnesses. Whether papers referred to in the will as in actual existence but not attested by the witnesses can be probated, and if they cannot be probated whether they can have any effect upon the disposition made by the will, or of the construction of it, has not been determined.

entitled to both the legal and beneficial interest, because it is a good devise on the face of the will, and the informal declaration of trust cannot be probated or admitted in evidence.<sup>1</sup> So, if a testator should devise real or personal property to A. in trust and state no trusts upon which A. is to hold, no paper not referred to in the will, and not duly executed, could be received in evidence to prove the trusts, nor could A. hold the beneficial interest, because he is stamped with the character of a trustee, but he would hold only the legal title, while the beneficial interest would descend or result to the testator's heirs-at-law.<sup>2</sup>

§ 94. Even at common law parol evidence could not be received to convert a devisee under a will in writing into a trustee. In Vernon's case it was resolved that a devise implies a consideration, and therefore that it cannot be averred or proved by parol to be for the use of another;<sup>3</sup> "for that," said Lord Ch. B. Gilbert, "were an averment contrary to the design of the will appearing in the words;"<sup>4</sup> and in Lady Portington's case, the court refused to receive parol evidence, not only because of the statute of frauds, but also *from the nature of the thing*.<sup>5</sup> For the same reason, at common law

<sup>1</sup> Adlington v. Cann, 3 Atk. 141; Stickland v. Aldridge, 9 Ves. 519; Briggs v. Penny, 3 De G. & Sm. 547, 3 Mac. & G. 546; 8 Eng. L. & Eq. 231; Wallgrave v. Tebbs, 2 K. & J. 313; Lee v. Ferris, 2 K. & J. 357; Russell v. Jackson, 10 Hare, 204; Lomax v. Ripley, 3 Sm. & Gif. 48; Brown v. Brown, 12 Md. 87; Thayer v. Willington, 9 Allen, 283; Haberg-ham v. Vincent, 5 T. R. 92, 2 Ves. Jr. 204; Rose v. Cunningham, 12 Ves. 29; Johnson v. Ball, 5 De G. & Sm. 85; Langdon v. Astor, 3 Duer, 477; Thompson v. Quimby, 2 Brad. 449; Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Soc. 7 Met. 404; *In re Sothron*, 2 Curteis, 831; Ferraris v. Hertford, 3 Curteis, 468; Waggstaff v. Waggstaff, 2 P. Wms. 258; Marlborough v. Godolphin, 2 Ves. Sen. 76.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.; Muckleston v. Brown, 6 Ves. 52; Bosom v. Statham, 1 Ed. 508.

<sup>3</sup> Vernon's Case, 4 Coke, R. 4 a.

<sup>4</sup> Gilbert on Uses, 162.

<sup>5</sup> Lady Portington's Case, 1 Salk. 162. It is stated by Jenkins that at common law parol proof might be received to ingraft a trust upon a written

parol evidence of a trust was always inadmissible against a legatee under a written will.<sup>1</sup> Until a late statute<sup>2</sup> in England a person appointed executor had the title to all the personal property, and was entitled to take the surplus, after paying debts and legacies, beneficially to himself, and no parol evidence was admissible to convert him into a trustee for the heirs or next of kin.<sup>3</sup> But the authorities seem to establish that if there was any circumstance appearing on the face of the will, as the gift of a legacy to the executor, the law *presumed* that it was not intended that he should take the surplus beneficially; the executor might rebut that presumption by parol evidence,<sup>4</sup> when, of course, the next of kin might fortify the presumption by opposing parol evidence in contradiction. Where, however, the will itself invested the executor with the character of trustee, as by giving him a legacy "for his trouble," or by styling him a "trustee" expressly, the *prima facie* title to the surplus was then in the next of kin, and parol evidence was not admissible to disprove the express intention.<sup>5</sup> By the act referred to in England, and by statutes in all the United States, an executor is made *prima facie* a trustee for the next of kin.<sup>6</sup>

will. Jenk. 3 Cent. Ca. 26. But by comparing the case cited by Jenkins with the same case in Fitzherb. Ch. Devise, 22, it will be seen that Jenkins was mistaken in the point decided. And see Lewin on Trusts, 58 (2d Am. ed.).

<sup>1</sup> Porey v. Juxon, Nels. 135; Fane v. Fane, 1 Vern. 30.

<sup>2</sup> 11 Geo. IV. and 1 W. IV. c. 40.

<sup>3</sup> Langham v. Sandford, 19 Ves. 644; White v. Williams, 3 Ves. & B. 72; Coop. 58.

<sup>4</sup> Walton v. Walton, 14 Ves. 322; Clennell v. Lewthwaite, 2 Ves. Jr. 477; Langham v. Sandford, 17 Ves. 442; Lynn v. Beaver, 1 T. & R. 66.

<sup>5</sup> Rachfield v. Careless, 2 P. Wms. 158; Langham v. Sandford, 17 Ves. 453; 19 Ves. 641; Golding v. Yapp, 5 Mad. 59; White v. Evans, 14 Ves. 21; Walton v. Walton, 14 Ves. 322; Read v. Steadman, 26 Beav. 495.

<sup>6</sup> Love v. Gaze, 8 Beav. 472; Juler v. Juler, 29 Beav. 34; Harrison v. Harrison, 2 Hem. & Mill. 287; Read v. Steadman, 26 Beav. 495; Hill v. Hill, 2 Hayw. 298; Paup v. Mingo, 4 Leigh, 163; Hays v. Jackson, 6 Mass. 153; Wilson v. Wilson, 3 Bin. 559; Darrah v. McNair, 1 Ash. 240; 2 Story's Eq. Jur. § 1208-1210, and notes; Lewin on Trusts, 50.

§ 95. Where an agreement is entered into for a *valuable consideration*, and a trust is intended, the mere form of the instrument is not very material; for, if the trust is not perfectly created or executed by the instrument, a court of equity can enforce it as a contract.<sup>1</sup> Wherever a *valuable consideration* is paid, the contract will be executed as near to the intention of the parties as possible; as where for a valuable consideration a man executed a deed of land purporting to be under his hand and seal, but no seal was affixed, by reason of which defect the legal title did not pass, the court held that the defective deed might be used as a declaration of trust, and that the holder of the legal title should hold it in trust for the grantee in the deed, and that he should be ordered to convey;<sup>2</sup> and where a husband for a meritorious consideration conveyed personal property directly to his wife by deed, which could not operate, because a husband cannot convey directly to his wife, the court ordered the deed to stand as a declaration of trust for the wife, and the husband's representatives to hold the legal title in trust for her.<sup>3</sup> The authorities establish this proposition, that where there is a valuable consideration the court will enforce the trust, though it is not perfectly created, and though the instruments do not pass the title to the property, if from the documents the court can clearly perceive the terms and conditions of the trust, and the parties to be benefited. In such cases, effect is given to the *consideration* to carry out the intentions of the parties, though informally expressed. But if no *cestui que trust* is named, or so designated that he can be identified, the court cannot carry a trust

<sup>1</sup> Baldwin v. Humphrey, 44 N. Y. 609; Taylor v. Pownal, 10 Leigh, 183.

<sup>2</sup> Wadsworth v. Wendell, 5 John. Ch. 224; Haskill v. Freeman, 1 Wins. Eq. N. C. 34.

<sup>3</sup> Huntley v. Huntley, 8 Ired. Eq. 250; Livingston v. Livingston, 2 John. Ch. 587; Garner v. Garner, 1 Busb. Eq. 1; Jones v. Obinchain, 10 Grat. 259; Fellows v. Heermans, 4 Lansing, 230.

into effect, however clearly it may be created in other respects.<sup>1</sup> Even if a purchaser of land direct a declaration of trust to be inserted in the deed to him, he will be bound by it, though it is voluntary on his part.<sup>2</sup> And if no trustee's name is inserted in the deed, it may be reformed, and a suitable trustee may be appointed and inserted.<sup>3</sup>

§ 96. And where there is *no valuable consideration*, yet if the settlor, by a clear and explicit declaration duly executed and intended to be final and binding upon him, makes himself a trustee, courts of equity will enforce the trust, whether the nature of the property be legal or equitable, and whether it be capable or incapable of transfer.<sup>4</sup> If it is a mere agreement, without consideration, to execute a declaration of trust, courts will not act upon it; but if a party has declared himself to be a trustee, the beneficial interest in the property becomes vested in the *cestui que trust* without further action, and the *cestui que trust* can enforce his rights.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dillage v. Greenough, 45 N. Y. 438; Ownes v. Ownes, 8 C. E. Green, 60.

<sup>2</sup> Reilly v. Whipple, 2 S. C. 277.

<sup>3</sup> Burnside v. Wayman, 49 Mo. 356.

<sup>4</sup> *Ex parte* Pye, 18 Ves. 140; Thorpe v. Owen, 5 Beav. 224; Wilcocks v. Hannington, 5 Ir. Ch. 38; Draiser v. Brereton, 15 Beav. 221; Gray v. Gray, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 273; Vandenberg v. Palmer, 4 Kay & J. 204; Stapleton v. Stapleton, 14 Sim. 186; Searle v. Law, 15 Sim. 99; Bridge v. Bridge, 16 Beav. 315; Steele v. Waller, 28 Beav. 466; Paterson v. Murphy, 11 Hare, 88; Bentley v. MacKay, 15 Beav. 12; Ownes v. Ownes, 8 C. E. Green, 60; Crawford's App. 61 Penn. St. 52; Morgan v. Mallison, L. R. 10 Eq. 475; McFadden v. Jenkyns, 1 Hare, 471. In the last case, Sir J. Wigram said: "If the owner of property executes an instrument by which he declared himself a trustee, and had disclosed that instrument to the *cestui que trust*, and afterwards acted upon it, that might perhaps be sufficient, and a court of equity might not be bound to inquire further into an equitable title so established." Mr. Lewin says that this is "expressed with unnecessary caution." Lewin on Trusts, 57. The contrary was held in Bowering v. King, 37 Ala. 606.

<sup>5</sup> *Ex parte* Pye, 18 Ves. 149.



§ 97. If the donor or settlor does not propose to make himself a trustee, the trust is not *perfectly* created. As where there is a mere *intention* of creating a trust, or a mere voluntary agreement to do so, and the donor or settlor contemplates some further act to be done by him to give it effect, the trust is not completely instituted; and if it is voluntary, the settlor cannot be compelled to complete it.<sup>1</sup> So if the paper executed by the settlor is in the nature of a testamentary disposition which requires to be proved in a court of probate, but is so imperfectly executed that it cannot be proved as a last will and testament, no trust will be created.<sup>2</sup>

§ 98. But if the trust is *perfectly created*, so that the donor or settlor has nothing more to do, and the person seeking to enforce it has need of no further conveyances from the settlor, and nothing is required of the court but to give effect to the trust as an executed trust, it will be carried into effect, at the suit of a party interested, although it was without considera-

<sup>1</sup> Lloyd v. Brooks, 34 Md. 139; Swan v. Frick, 34 Md. 27; Cotteen v. Missing, 1 Mad. 176; Bayley v. Boulcott, 4 Rus. 345; Dipple v. Corles, 11 Hare, 133; Jones v. Lock, L. R. 1 Ch. 25; Caldwell v. Williams, 1 Bailey, Eq. 175; Crompton v. Vasser, 19 Ala. 259; Hayes v. Kershaw, 1 Sand. Ch. 258; Reid v. Vanarsdale, 2 Leigh, 560; Evans v. Battle, 19 Ala. 378; Pinkard v. Pinkard, 2 Ala. 649; Minturn v. Seymour, 4 John. Ch. 498; Acker v. Phoenix, 4 Paige, 305; Dawson v. Dawson, 1 Dev. Eq. 93; Banks v. May, 3 A. K. Marsh. 435; Bibb v. Smith, 1 Dana, 580; Darlington v. McCooile, 1 Leigh, 36; Tiernan v. Poor, 1 Gill & J. 217; Forward v. Armstead, 12 Ala. 124; Lawry v. McGee, 3 Head, 269; Lister v. Hodgson, L. R. 4 Eq. 30; Dillinger v. Llewelyn, 4 De G., F. & J. 517; Gardner v. Merritt, 32 Md. 78; Lloyd v. Brooks, 34 Md. 33; Swan v. Frick, 34 Md. 141; Lanterman v. Abernathy, 47 Ill. 437; Shaw v. Burney, 1 Ired. Eq. 148; Clarke v. Lott, 11 Ill. 105; Read v. Robinson, 6 W. & S. 338; Yarborough v. West, 10 Geo. 471; Colman v. Sarel, 3 Bro. Ch. 12; Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Ves. 39; Edwards v. Jones, 1 M. & Cr. 226; Jefferys v. Jefferys, 1 Cr. & Phil. 138; Dillon v. Coppin, 4 M. & Cr. 647; Penfold v. Mould, L. R. 4 Eq. 562; Disher v. Disher, 1 P. Wm. 204.

<sup>2</sup> Ante, §§ 92-94; Warriner v. Rogers, L. R. 16 Eq. 340; Richardson v. Richardson, L. R. 3 Eq. 686; Morgan v. Malleson, L. R. 10 Eq. 475.

tion, and the possession of the property was not changed.<sup>1</sup> And this will be true although the person who is intended to

<sup>1</sup> *Stone v. Hackett*, 12 Gray, 227; *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 662; *Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft*, 18 Ves. 99; *Sloan v. Cadogan*, Sugd. Ven. & Pur. App. 26; *Edwards v. Jones*, 1 M. & Cr. 226; *Wheatley v. Purr*, 1 Keen, 551; *Garrard v. Lauderdale*, 3 Sim. 1; *Collinson v. Patrick*, 2 Keen, 123; *Dillon v. Coppin*, 4 M. & Cr. 647; *Meek v. Kettlewell*, 1 Hare, 469; *Fletcher v. Fletcher*, 4 Hare, 74; *Price v. Price*, 4 Beav. 598; *Bridge v. Bridge*, 16 Beav. 315; *Beech v. Keep*, 18 Beav. 285; *Donaldson v. Donaldson*, 1 Kay, 711; *Scales v. Maude*, 6 De G., M. & G. 43; *Airey v. Hall*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 315; *Wright v. Miller*, 4 Seld. 9; *Andrews v. Hobson*, 23 Ala. 219; *Bunn v. Winthrop*, 1 John. Ch. 329; *Lechmere v. Carlisle*, 3 P. Wms. 222; *Minturn v. Seymour*, 4 John. Ch. 498; *Dennison v. Goehring*, 7 Barr, 175; *Tolar v. Tolar*, 1 Dev. Eq. 456; *Dawson v. Dawson*, 1 Dev. Eq. 93, 396; *Hardin v. Baird*, 6 Litt. 340; *Hayes v. Kershaw*, 1 Sand. Ch. 261; *Fogg v. Middleton*, Riley, Ch. 193; *Greenfield's Estate*, 2 Harr. 489; *Kirkpatrick v. McDonald*, 1 Jones, 387; *Graham v. Lambert*, 5 Humph. 595; *Henson v. Kinard*, 3 Strob. Eq. 371; *Dupre v. Thompson*, 4 Barb. 280; *Cox v. Sprigg*, 6 Md. 274; *Lane v. Ewing*, 31 Mo. 75; *Ownes v. Ownes*, 23 N. J. Eq. 60; *Baker v. Evans*, 1 Wins. Eq. N. C. 109; *Richardson v. Richardson*, L. R. 3 Eq. 686; *Toker v. Toker*, 3 De G., J. & S. 487; *Howard v. Savings Bank*, 40 Vt. 597; *Borum v. King*, 1 Ala. (s. c.) is *contra*.

In *Stone v. Hackett*, 12 Gray, 227, the settlor had purchased stocks in various corporations in the name of H. P. K., and took from H. P. K. a declaration that she held the stocks upon certain trusts therein particularly specified. Afterwards the settlor caused H. P. K. to indorse and sign upon the backs of the certificates a transfer to the plaintiff and a power of attorney to the plaintiff to complete the transfer, and took from her a declaration of trust, stating the purposes for which she held the stock. The settlor died, and a question arose as to the title to the stock. Chief-Justice Bigelow said: "The key to the solution of the question raised in this case is to be found in the equitable principle now well established and uniformly acted on by courts of chancery, that a voluntary gift or conveyance of property in trust, when fully completed and executed, will be regarded as valid and its provisions enforced and carried into effect against all persons except creditors and *bona fide* purchasers without notice. It is certainly true that a court of equity will lend no assistance towards perfecting a voluntary contract or agreement for the creation of a trust, nor regard it as binding so long as it remains executory. But it is equally true that if such an agreement or contract be executed by a conveyance of property in trust, so that nothing remains to be done by the grantor or donor to complete the transfer of the title, the relation of trustee and *cestui que trust* is deemed to be established, and the equitable rights and interests arising out of the conveyance,

be benefited has no knowledge of the act, at the time it is done, provided he accepts and ratifies it when he is notified.<sup>1</sup>

though made without consideration, will be enforced in chancery. The leading case in which the principle is declared and acted upon is *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 656, in which Lord Eldon decreed the enforcement of a trust which in its creation was wholly voluntary and without consideration. This has been followed by many other cases in which the same principle was recognized. *Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft*, 18 Ves. 84; *Ex parte Pye*, ib. 140; *Sloan v. Cadogan*, Sugd. Ven. & Pur. (11th ed.) 1119; *Fortescue v. Barnett*, 3 My. & K. 36; *Wheatley v. Purr*, 1 Keen, 551; *Blakely v. Brady*, 2 Dru. & Wal. 311; *Browne v. Cavendish*, 1 Jon. & La. 637; *Kekewich v. Manning*, 1 De G., M. & G. 176. The last-named case contains a full discussion of all the authorities and a clear and accurate statement of the law upon the subject."

"The application of the principle established by these authorities is entirely decisive of the rights and duties of the parties to this suit. The conveyance or transfer of the shares to the plaintiff in her capacity of trustee was full and complete and vested in her the legal title to the property. No further act was to be done by the original owner of the shares to consummate the plaintiff's title. As between the parties the delivery of the certificates of stock, with the assignments of some of them and the power of attorney to transfer the others, was equivalent to a complete executed transfer of the shares. Nor is it at all material to the validity of the plaintiff's title that transfers of the shares had not been recorded in the books of the different corporations and new certificates of stock taken out by her. That was not necessary to the conveyance of the legal title, as between the donor and the plaintiff. This is well settled by the authorities in this State. *Quinn v. Marblehead Social Ins. Co.* 10 Mass. 476; *Ellis v. Essex Merrimack Bridge*, 2 Pick. 248; *Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co.* 8 Pick. 96; *Eames v. Wheeler*, 19 Pick. 444. Such, too, is the plain import of the statute. . . . Nothing therefore was left *in fieri*. The transaction was a completely executed transfer of property, and fully created a trust which, according to the principles already stated, a court of equity is bound to recognize and enforce." *Penfield v. Public Adm'r*, 2 E. D. Smith, 505; *Millspaugh v. Putnam*, 16 Abb. 380; *Hunter v. Hunter*, 19 Barb. 631; *Grangiar v. Arden*, 10 John. 293; *Benlow v. Townsend*, 1 My. & K. 506; *Mendon v. Merrill*, 2 Edw. Ch. 333; *Howard v. Windham County Savings Bank*, 40 Vt. 597; *Sherwood v. Andrews*, 2 Allen, 79; *Warriner v. Rogers*, L. R. 16 Eq. 341; *Blasdel v. Locke*, 62 N. H. 238.

<sup>1</sup> *Neilson v. Blight*, 1 John's Cas. 205; *Weston v. Barker*, 12 John. 276; *Moses v. Murgatroyd*, 1 John's Ch. 119; *Cumberland v. Codrington*, 3 John Ch. 261; and see *Shepherd v. McEvers*, 4 John's Ch. 136; *Hosford v. Merwin*, 5 Barb. 51; *Wetzel v. Chaplin*, 3 Bradf. 386; *Brabrook v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank*, 104 Mass. 231.

But if there is any fraud, accident, or mistake in the transaction, courts will not carry a voluntary trust into execution.<sup>1</sup>

§ 99. Whether the trust is *perfectly created* or not, is a question of fact in each case; and the court, in determining the fact, will give effect to the situation and relation of the parties, the nature and situation of the property, and the purposes or objects which the settlor had in view in making the disposition.<sup>2</sup> A vast number of cases have been decided involving the last three propositions. There is much seeming

<sup>1</sup> *Lister v. Hodgson*, L. R. 4 Eq. 30.

<sup>2</sup> See *Brabrook v. Savings Bank*, 104 Mass. 228, where deposits in savings banks are fully discussed. *Jones v. Lock*, L. R. 1 Ch. 25. In this case a father put a check for £900 into the hands of his child, nine months old, with the strongest expression of an intent to give the check to the child. He afterwards took the check and locked it up, saying he should keep it for the child, and died the same day. A bill was brought in behalf of the child against his father's representatives to enforce his interest in the check as a trust. Lord Cranworth said: "No doubt a gift may be made by any person *sui juris* and *compos mentis*, by conveyance of real estate or by delivery of chattels; and there is no doubt also that by some decisions, unfortunate I must think them, a parol declaration of a trust of personalty may be perfectly valid even when voluntary. If I give any chattel, that of course passes by delivery, and if I say expressly, or impliedly, that I constitute myself a trustee of personalty, that is a trust executed, and capable of being enforced without consideration. I do not think it necessary to go into any of the authorities cited before me. *They all turn upon the question whether what has been said was a declaration of trust or an imperfect gift.* In the latter the parties would receive no aid from a court of equity, if they claimed as volunteers; but if there has been a declaration of trust, then it will be enforced whether there has been a consideration or not. *Therefore the question in each case is one of fact*, has there been a gift or not, or has there been a declaration of trust or not? This case turns on the very short question whether the father intended to make a declaration that he held the property in trust for the child, and I cannot come to any other conclusion than that he did not." His Lordship then comments upon the evidence and says, "that it was all very natural, but that the father would have been very much surprised if he had been told that he had parted with the £900, and could no longer dispose of it; and that the child, by his next friend, could have brought an action of trover for the check." See *Scales v. Maud*, 6 De G., M. & G. 51; *Hackney v. Vrooman*, 62 Barb. 650; *Brabrook v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank*, 104 Mass. 228; *Richards v. Delbridge*, L. R. 18 Eq. 11.

conflict in the decisions, and it would be an endless, perhaps useless, task to attempt to reconcile them. The proposition laid down by Lord Cranworth, that it is a question of fact in each case whether a perfect trust is created or not, goes far to reconcile the differences. Some judges give greater prominence to one element of fact in the case than other judges, and thus different judges might decide the same question upon the facts in a different manner; but so long as it is a question of fact in each case, the rule of law is the same, however the fact may be found.

§ 100. If the donor or settlor propose to make a stranger the trustee of his property, and the property is a legal estate, capable of legal transfer and delivery, the trust is not perfectly created, unless the legal interest is actually transferred to or vested in the trustee. It is not enough that the settlor executed a paper purporting to pass it, if in fact the paper does not have that effect. The intention of the settlor to divest himself of the legal title must be consummated and executed, or the court will not enforce the trust. As, for instance, if a settlor execute a deed in trust of scrip, stock, or shares in corporations, which scrip, stock, or shares can be transferred only by assignment upon the backs of the certificates, and upon the company's books, the deed, if voluntary, will not create a trust which the court will execute, unless the stocks are actually transferred in fact.<sup>1</sup> And so of mortgages,

<sup>1</sup> *Garrard v. Lauderdale*, 2 R. & M. 451; 3 Sim. 1; *Meek v. Kettlewell*, 1 Hare, 469; *Dillon v. Coppin*, 4 M. & Cr. 647; *Coningham v. Plunkett*, 2 Y. & Col. Ch. 245; *Searle v. Law*, 15 Sim. 95; *Price v. Price*, 14 Beav. 598; *Bridge v. Bridge*, 16 Beav. 315; *Beech v. Keep*, 18 Beav. 285; *Totham v. Vernon*, 29 Beav. 604; *Dillon v. Bone*, 3 Gif. 238; *Milroy v. Lord*, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 806; 4 De G., F. & J. 264; *Lonsdale's Estate*, 29 Penn. St. 407; *Parnell v. Hingston*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 337; *Kiddill v. Farnell*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 428; *Weale v. Ollive*, 17 Beav. 252; *Denning v. Ware*, 22 Beav. 184; *Roberts v. Roberts*, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 992; *Forest v. Forest*, 34 L. J. Ch. 428; *Peckham v. Taylor*, 31 Beav. 250; *Jones v. Obinchain*, 10 Grat. 259; *Henderson v. Henderson*, 21 Mo. 379; *Lane v. Ewing*, 31 Mo. 75; *Gilchrist v. Stevenson*,

mortgage debts, and other securities. If any thing remains for the donor to do to vest the legal title in the donee, the court cannot execute the trust, if it is voluntary. Lord Eldon stated the principle thus: "I take the distinction to be, that if you want the assistance of the court to constitute a *cestui que trust*, and the instrument is *voluntary*, you shall not have the assistance for the purpose of constituting a *cestui que trust*, as upon a covenant to transfer stock, &c.; but if the party has completely transferred stock, &c., though it is voluntary, yet the legal conveyance being effectually made, the equitable interest will be enforced by this court.<sup>1</sup>

§ 101. But if the subject of the trust is a legal interest, that cannot be transferred or assigned at law, as a bond or any other *chose in action*, what then is the rule? On the one hand it has been argued that in equity the universal rule is, that a court will not enforce a voluntary agreement in favor of a volunteer, and as by the supposition the legal interest remains in the settlor (who, therefore, at law retains the full control and benefit of it), a court of equity will not, in the absence of a valuable or good consideration, deprive him of that interest, with which he has not actually parted. And this reasoning has been sustained by numerous cases.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, as the settlor cannot divest himself of the legal interest, to say that he shall not constitute another as trustee without passing the legal interest, would be to debar him from the creation of a trust at all in the hands of another, and that the rule, there-

9 Barb. 9; Cressman's Appeal, 42 Penn. St. 147; Doty v. Wilson, 5 Lansing, 7.

<sup>1</sup> Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Ves. 662; Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Ves. 39; Colman v. Sarel, 1 Ves. Jr. 50; 3 Bro. Ch. 12; Dening v. Ware, 22 Beav. 184; Airey v. Hall, 3 Sm. & Gif. 315; Kiddill v. Farnell, 3 Sm. & Gif. 428; Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft, 18 Ves. 89; Brabrook v. Savings Bank, 104 Mass. 228.

<sup>2</sup> Edwards v. Jones, 1 My. & Cr. 226; Ward v. Audland, 8 Sm. 571; C. P. Coop. Cas. (1837, 1838), 146; 8 Beav. 201; Meek v. Kettlewell, 1 Hare, 464; Scales v. Maudè, 6 De G., M. & G. 43; Sewell v. Moxsy, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 189; Bridge v. Bridge, 16 Beav. 315; Beech v. Keep, 18 Beav. 285.

fore, should be, that if the settlor make all the assignment of the property in his power, and perfect the transaction as far as the law permits, the court should recognize the act and support the validity of the trust. And this reasoning has also been supported by many decided cases.<sup>1</sup> In a late leading case, Lord Justice K. Bruce made a thorough examination of all the authorities and established this proposition: "It is upon legal and equitable principles, we apprehend, clear that a person *sui juris*, acting freely and fairly, and with sufficient knowledge, ought to have, and *has it in his power to make* in a binding and effectual manner a voluntary gift of any part of his property, *whether capable or incapable of manual delivery, whether in possession or reversionary or howsoever circumstanced.*"<sup>2</sup> Mr. Lewin says, "that it is conceived that this principle will, for the future, prevail,"<sup>3</sup> and it has been followed in the later cases.<sup>4</sup> But if part of the property be capable of delivery and transfer, and part of it incapable of delivery, and that which might have been legally assigned and delivered is not so assigned and delivered, no trust is created.<sup>5</sup>

§ 102. It is well established, that, if the subject of the trust is an equitable interest, the *cestui que trust* may create a valid

<sup>1</sup> *Fortescue v. Barnett*, 3 My. & K. 36; *Roberts v. Lloyd*, 2 Beav. 376; *Blakely v. Brady*, 2 Dru. & Wal. 311; *Airey v. Hall*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 315; *Parnell v. Hingston*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 337; *Pearson v. Amicable Office*, 27 Beav. 229; *Sloan v. Cadogan*, Sugd. Ven. & Pur. App.

<sup>2</sup> *Kekewich v. Manning*, 1 De G., M. & G. 187.

<sup>3</sup> *Lewin on Trusts*, 58.

<sup>4</sup> *Wilcocks v. Hannington*, 5 Ir. Ch. 45; *Voyle v. Hughes*, 2 Sm. & Gif. 18; *Gilbert v. Overton*, 33 L. J. Ch. 683; *Way's Settlement*, 10 Jur. (N. S.) 1166; 34 L. J. Ch. 49; *Lambe v. Orton*, 1 Dr. & Sm. 125; *Donaldson v. Donaldson*, Kay, 711; *Appeal of Elliott's Ex'rs*, 50 Penn. St. 75. And see *Hill on Trustees*, 140, 141 (4th Am. ed.); *Morgan v. Malleeson*, L. R. 10 Eq. 475.

<sup>5</sup> *Woodford v. Charnley*, 28 Beav. 96. In *Richardson v. Richardson*, L. R. 3 Eq. 686, there was a voluntary assignment of all the personal property, whatsoever and wheresoever, of the assignor. There were promissory notes not endorsed by the assignor, but it was held to be a complete assignment of them in trust.

trust by executing an assignment of his interest to a new trustee, for the equitable interest can be transferred from one to another, and as the relation of trustee and *cestui que trust* already exists, the original settlor need not be called upon to do any act.<sup>1</sup> Lord Justice K. Bruce said: "Suppose stock or money to be legally vested in A. as a trustee for B. for life, and subject to B.'s life-interest for C. absolutely, surely it must be competent for C., in the lifetime of B., with or without the consent of A., to make an effectual gift of his interest to D. by way of pure bounty, leaving the legal interest and legal title untouched. If so, can C. do this better or more effectually than by executing an assignment to D?"<sup>2</sup> So the *cestui que trust* can assign voluntarily his equitable interest to a stranger in trust for himself.<sup>3</sup> Or by a new declaration of trust the *cestui que trust* can direct the old trustees to hold his interest thereafter upon new trusts.<sup>4</sup> But it has been decided that a voluntary assignment of a *mere expectancy* in an equitable interest did not perfectly create a trust that the court would enforce, that any dealing with what a person only expects to have must in some sense be *in fieri*.<sup>5</sup> And if a settlor intend to make a voluntary settlement in a particular mode, as by conveying the legal title, and he fails to convey the title, the court will not lend its aid to give effect to the settlement in

<sup>1</sup> *Sloan v. Cadogan*, Sugd. Ven. & Pur. App. This case was questioned in *Beatson v. Beatson*, 12 Sim. 281, but it has since been acted on. *Voyle v. Hughes*, 2 Sm. & Gif. 18; *Lambe v. Orton*, 1 Dr. & Sm. 125; *Gilbert v. Overton*, 2 Hem. & M. 110; *Woodford v. Charnley*, 28 Beav. 99; *Way's Settlement*, 2 De G., J. & Sm. 365, reversing 4 New R. 453. And see *Reed v. O'Brien*, 7 Beav. 32; *Bridge v. Bridge*, 16 Beav. 315; *Gannon v. White*, 2 Ir. Ch. 207; *Donaldson v. Donaldson*, 1 Kay, 711.

<sup>2</sup> *Kekewich v. Manning*, 1 De G., M. & G. 188.

<sup>3</sup> *Sloan v. Cadogan*, *ut supra*; *Cotteen v. Missing*, 1 Mad. 176; *Collinson v. Patrick*, 2 Keen, 123; *Wilcocks v. Hannington*, 5 Ir. Ch. 38; *Godsall v. Webb*, 2 Keen, 99.

<sup>4</sup> *Rycroft v. Christy*, 3 Beav. 238; *McFadden v. Jenkys*, 1 Hare, 458; 1 Phil. 153.

<sup>5</sup> *Meek v. Kettlewell*, 1 Hare, 464, by Sir J. Wigram, affirmed by Lord Lyndhurst in 1 Phil. 342.



another and different mode, as by converting the attempted conveyance into a declaration of trust, for that would be to convert every imperfect voluntary instrument into a perfect trust.<sup>1</sup>

§ 103. In case of a sale of real estate for a valuable consideration, nothing passes by the deed, although it is signed and sealed, until the purchase-money is paid and the deed delivered to the vendee, or until so much is done that the law will construe the deed to be for the use, or under the control, of the vendee; but if a party execute a voluntary settlement and the deed recites that it is sealed and delivered, it will be binding upon the settlor, although he never parts with it, but keeps it in his possession until his death.<sup>2</sup> Still, if there are circumstances that show that the settlor never intended the deed, though executed, to operate, the court will consider them, and if the deed was never delivered it will be one circumstance, and it may be a controlling circumstance, to show that the trust was never perfectly created, or that it was revocable.<sup>3</sup>

§ 104. But if the voluntary trust is once perfectly created, and the relation of trustee and *cestui que trust* is once established, it will be enforced, though the settlor has destroyed the

<sup>1</sup> *Milroy v. Lord*, 8 Jur. (N. s.) 809; *Lister v. Hodgson*, L. R. 4 Eq. 30.

<sup>2</sup> *Re Way's Trust*, 2 De G., J. & Sm. 365; *Fletcher v. Fletcher*, 4 Hare, 67; *Hope v. Harman*, 11 Jur. 1097; *Bunn v. Winthrop*, 1 John. Ch. 329; *Jones v. Obinchain*, 10 Grat. 259; *Urann v. Costes*, 109 Mass. 581; *Sear v. Ashwell*, 3 Swanst. 411; *Barlow v. Heneage*, Pr. Ch. 211; *Clavering v. Clavering*, 2 Vern. 474; *Cecil v. Butcher*, 2 J. & W. 573; *Garnons v. Knight*, 5 B. & C. 671; *Exton v. Scott*, 6 Sim. 31; *Hall v. Palmer*, 3 Hare, 532; *Souverbye v. Arden*, 1 John. Ch. 240; *Boughton v. Boughton*, 1 Atk. 625; *Brackenbury v. Brackenbury*, 2 J. & W. 391; *Roberts v. Roberts*, Daniel, 143. And see *Cecil v. Butcher*, 2 J. & W. 565.

<sup>3</sup> *Uniacke v. Giles*, 2 Moll. 257; *Antrobus v. Smith*, 12 Ves. 39; *Birch v. Blagrove*, Amb. 262; *Dillon v. Coppin*, 4 M. & Cr. 647; *Platmone v. Staple*, Coop. 250; *Naldred v. Gilham*, 1 P. Wms. 577; *Cotton v. King*, 2 P. Wms. 358, 674; *Alexander v. Brame*, 7 De G., M. & G. 525; *Otis v. Beckwith*, 49 Ill. 121.

deed,<sup>1</sup> or has attempted to revoke it by making a second voluntary settlement of the same property,<sup>2</sup> or if the estate, by some

<sup>1</sup> *Tolar v. Tolar*, 1 Dev. Eq. 456; *Dawson v. Dawson*, 1 Dev. Eq. 93, 396; *In re Way's Trust*, 10 Jur. 837; 2 De G., J. & Sm. 365; *Ritter's App.* 59 Penn. St. 9.

<sup>2</sup> *Newton v. Askew*, 11 Beav. 145; *Rycroft v. Christy*, 3 Beav. 238; *Boughton v. Boughton*, 1 Atk. 625; *Brackenbury v. Brackenbury*, 2 J. & W. 391; *Clavering v. Clavering*, 2 Vern. 473; *Roberts v. Roberts*, Daniël, 143; *Cook v. Fountain*, 3 Swans. 565; *Young v. Peachy*, 2 Atk. 254; *Cecil v. Butcher*, 2 J. & W. 565; *Souverbye v. Arden*, 1 John. Ch. 240; *Keke-wich v. Manning*, 1 De G., M. & G. 176; *Re Way's Trust*, 2 De G., J. & S. 365; *Hildreth v. Eliot*, 8 Pick. 293; *Stone v. Hackett*, 12 Gray, 227; *Falk v. Turner*, 101 Mass. 494; *Bunn v. Winthrop*, 1 John. Ch. 329; *Dennison v. Goehring*, 7 Barr, 175; *Viney v. Abbott*, 109 Mass. 302. It must be observed, however, that the absence of a power to revoke a voluntary settlement or trust is viewed by courts of equity as a circumstance of suspicion, and very slight evidence of mistake, misapprehension, or misunderstanding on the part of the settlor will be laid hold of to set aside the deed. The following opinion by the Chancellor (Runyon) in a late case in New Jersey, *Garnsey v. Mundy*, 24 N. J. Eq. 243, reprinted in 13 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 345, with a learned note by Mr. Bispham, gives a very clear view of the law applicable to voluntary settlements without a power of revocation made under circumstances which may lead to the conclusion that the settlor did not intend to put the property entirely beyond his control, or that he acted unadvisedly or improvidently: —

“On the 4th of July, 1861, the complainant, Sarah M. Garnsey, who was then a single woman (her maiden name being Sarah M. Mundy), and of the age of about twenty-one years, was seised in her own right, in fee, in possession, through inheritance from her father, James Mundy, deceased, of a parcel of unimproved farming land of about seven acres in Middlesex County in this State, and was also the owner of an undivided third of the remainder, in fee, of two other lots there, — one a wood-lot of about two acres, and the other the house-lot, containing about nine and a half acres, which had been set off to her mother, Elizabeth Mundy, in dower. She had no other property, real or personal. By a deed of that date she conveyed in fee to her mother, for the expressed consideration of natural love and affection to the grantor's daughter, Elmina May, and of fifty cents to her paid by her mother, the whole of said property on the following trust: ‘That the said Elizabeth Mundy shall and will hold, use, occupy, and rent the same, and receive the rents, issues, and profits thereof to and for the maintenance of said Elmina May Mundy until she shall arrive at the age of twenty-one years, or in case of her death, the said Elizabeth Mundy, her heirs or assigns, shall pay the rents or profits arising as above to the said Sarah M. Mundy, and in further trust to convey the land and premises with the appurtenances hereinbefore mentioned, in fee-simple, to the said

accident, afterwards becomes revested in the settlor.<sup>1</sup> In all these cases the first perfectly created trust will be upheld, with

Elmina May Mundy, or in equal shares to her and any other children of said Sarah M. Mundy (should there be any other), when the youngest of said children shall have attained the age of twenty-one years; and in the event that no issue of the said Sarah M. Mundy shall survive to inherit the same, that the estate herein named, shall be conveyed according to the direction of the executor of the will of the said Sarah M. Mundy heretofore made.'

"In 1864 Sarah M. Mundy was married to Silas Garnsey. The bill is filed by her and her husband against her two children and her mother, the trustee, to set aside the deed. The property at the time of making the conveyance in question was and still is of but little value as farming land. The buildings upon the house lot, which alone was improved, were old and dilapidated and have gone to decay, and even the fences on the premises are down. The trustee, who is a woman of advanced age, was and is wholly without means, except her dower. The deed is voluntary. It was made at the suggestion and on the advice of the grantor's mother, and of her uncle, Dr. Jacob Martin, her mother's brother. The grantor neither proposed nor suggested it. Indeed, it appears she knew nothing of it until it was presented to her for her signature, and she was urged by her mother and her uncle to execute it, 'for her good.' Their motive, they say, was to save the property for her, to prevent her from improvidently disposing of it. No professional advice whatever was taken. The deed was drawn by a son of Dr. Martin, at the latter's direction; and its execution was witnessed by Dr. Martin, who, being a commissioner of deeds, took the grantor's acknowledgment. The grantor had no advice whatever, except that which her mother and uncle gave her. Not only was she not consulted in regard to the matter in any way, but it was clear that she did not understand the provisions of the deed, nor their effect. She did not suppose that the effect of the conveyance would be to place the property beyond her reach and control. Nay, her mother and uncle both supposed that the trust was revocable, and that the grantor under it retained full power to sell the property, with the trustee's consent. The conveyance not only deprived the grantor of all her property, without reserving a power of revocation to enable her to meet the exigencies of life, but the arrangement which it made was in other respects injudicious, disadvantageous, and improvident. The motives and intentions of the mother and uncle were most praiseworthy. Their design manifestly was simply to put the property in such a position that the grantor could not dispose of it without her mother's consent and concurrence. They in good faith urged her to make the deed. She and they were alike under an erroneous impression as

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<sup>1</sup> *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 656; *Smith v. Lyne*, 2 Y. & Col. 345; *Patterson v. Murphy*, 11 Hare, 88; *Gilchrist v. Stevenson*, 9 Barb. 9; *Uzzle v. Wood*, 1 Jones Eq. 226.

all its consequences, and the settlor will be declared to be a trustee.<sup>1</sup> It can only be revoked by the full consent of all parties to the effect of it. From the operation of such a conveyance, made under such circumstances, equity will relieve the complainants. The rigidity of the ancient doctrine, that a voluntary settlement, not obtained by fraud, is binding on the settlor, and will not be set aside in equity, although the settlor has not reserved a power of revocation (*Villers v. Beaumont*, 1 Vernon, 100; *Petre v. Espinasse*, 2 M. & K. 496; *Bill v. Cureton*, 2 M. & K. 503), has been relaxed by modern decisions. In the case first cited, *Villers v. Beaumont*, decided in 1682, the Lord Chancellor said: 'If a man will improvidently bind himself up by a voluntary deed, and not reserve a liberty to himself by a power of revocation, this court will not loose the fetters he hath put on himself, but he must lie down under his own folly.' Recent cases, however, have narrowed the doctrine, and have held, not only that the absence of a power of revocation throws on the person seeking to uphold the settlement the burden of proving that such a power was intentionally excluded by the settlor, and that, in the absence of such proof, the settlement may be set aside, but that equity will set aside the settlement on the application of the settlor, when it appears that he did not intend to make it irrevocable, or when the settlement would be unreasonable or improvident for the lack of a provision for revocation. In *Everitt v. Everitt* (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 405, — a case almost precisely similar in its facts to that under consideration, — a voluntary settlement was set aside on the application of the donor. The court said: 'It is very difficult indeed for any voluntary settlement, made by a young lady so soon after she attained twenty-one, to stand, if she afterwards changes her mind and wishes to get rid of the fetters which she has been advised to put upon herself.'

"In *Wollaston v. Tribe* (1869), L. R. 9 Eq. 44, a voluntary gift, which was not subject to a power of revocation, but was meant to be irrevocable, was held to be invalid, and was set aside on the donor's application. In pronouncing the decree, the court said: 'Of course, a voluntary gift is perfectly good, if the person who makes it knows what it is, and intended to carry it into execution.' In *Coutts v. Acworth*, L. R. 8 Eq. 558, it was held that 'Where the circumstances are such that the donor in a voluntary settlement or gift ought to be advised to retain a power of revocation, it is the duty of the solicitor to insist on the insertion of such power, and the want of it will in general be fatal to the deed.' In *Prideaux v. Lonsdale* (1863), 1 De G., J. & S. 433, a voluntary settlement, which the settlor was advised to execute by persons under whose influence, as regarded money matters, she was, and which subjected her property to trusts and contained provisions which the court thought it was impossible to suppose she understood, and against which she ought to have been advised and cautioned, was set aside. In *Hall*

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<sup>1</sup> *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 656; *Smith v. Lyne*, 2 Y. & Col. 345; *Paterson v. Murphy*, 11 Hare, 88; *Gilchrist v. Stevenson*, 9 Barb. 9.

ties in interest; if any of the parties are not in being, or are not *sui juris*, it cannot be revoked at all.<sup>1</sup> But if the voluntary

*v. Hall*, L. R. 14 Eq. 365, it was held that a voluntary settlement should contain a power of revocation; and, if it does not, the parties who rely on it must prove that the settlor was properly advised when he executed it, and that he thoroughly understood the effect of omitting the power, and that he intended it to be excluded from the settlement, and, further, if that is not established, and the court sees from the surrounding circumstances that the settlor believed the instrument to be revocable, it will, even after the lapse of twenty years and the death of the settlor, interfere and give relief against it. The decree in that case was reversed. (1873, L. R. 8 Chan. Ap. 430.) In his opinion, Selborne, L. C., said: 'The absence of a power of revocation in a voluntary deed, not impeached on the ground of any undue influence, is of course material, where it appears that the settlor did not intend to make an irrevocable settlement, or where the settlement itself is of such a nature, or was made under such circumstances, as to be unreasonable and improvident, unless guarded by a power of revocation.' *Forshaw v. Welsby*, 30 Beav. 243, was a case where a voluntary settlement was made by one, *in extremis*, on his family. It contained no power of revocation in case of the settlor's recovery. On his recovery it was set aside on his application, on the ground that it was not executed with the intention that it should be operative in case of his recovery from his illness. See also *Huguenin v. Baseley*, Lead. Cas. in Eq. 406; *Cook v. Lamotte*, 15 Beav. 241; *Sharp v. Leach*, 31 Beav. 491; *Phillipson v. Kerry*, 32 Beav. 628. It is not necessary, however, to rest a decision of this case adverse to the deed, on so narrow a foundation as the mere absence of a power of revocation. The circumstances under which a voluntary deed was executed may be shown, with a view of impeaching its validity, and, if it appears that it was fraudulent, or improperly obtained, equity will decree that it be given up and cancelled. In the present case there is no room for doubt that the grantor was induced, by those in whom she very justly placed confidence, and by whose better judgment she was willing to be guided, to execute a voluntary deed whose effect she and they not only did not understand, but, on the other hand, misapprehended; and which, so far from being according to their intentions, was in two very important respects, at least, admittedly precisely the reverse. It was irrevocable; but they all supposed it was revocable, and intended that it should be so. It deprived the grantor of the power of sale; but they all supposed that she would have that power, and intended that she should have it, clogged only by the necessity of obtaining her mother's consent and concurrence in any bargain or conveyance she might make. The deed contains no power of sale whatever. The testimony of all the parties to the transaction — the grantor, her mother and uncle — has been taken in the cause. It satisfies me that the deed was not 'the pure, voluntary, well-

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<sup>1</sup> *Shaw v. Delaware, &c. R. R. Co.* 3 Stockt. 229.

settlement be subject to a life-estate in the settlor, and also subject to such debts as he contracts during his life, he can defeat the trust by contracting debts to the full amount of the estate,<sup>1</sup> even if the debts are contracted by giving voluntary bonds for the purpose of defeating the settlement.<sup>2</sup> If, however, the settlor has not reserved the right to revoke the settlement, or to charge it with his debts, he can do nothing to impair the rights of those in remainder.<sup>3</sup>

§ 105. Nor is notice to the *cestui que trust* or to the trustee, and acceptance by him, essential to the validity of a voluntary trust as against the settlor, if it is otherwise perfectly created.<sup>4</sup> But the absence of notice may become a fact of more or less importance in determining whether the trust is perfectly created or not.<sup>5</sup> As between purchasers for value, notice or no notice may have important effects, but a voluntary trust, as between the settlor, the trustee, and the *cestui que trust*, can be perfectly created without it.

understood act of the grantor's mind' (Lord Eldon in *Huguenin v. Baseley*), but was unadvised and improvident, and contrary to the intention of all of them. The fact that the infant children of the grantor are beneficiaries under the deed will not prevent the court from setting it aside. *Huguenin v. Baseley*; *Everitt v. Everitt*, *ubi sup.* There will be a decree that the deed be delivered up to be cancelled." See also *Rhodes v. Bates*, L. R. 1 Ch. 252; *Leach v. Farr*, 13 Am. Law Reg. 350 (N. S.); *Villars v. Beaumont*, 1 Vern. 99; *Bridgman v. Greene*, 2 Ves. 627; *Petre v. Espinasse*, 2 M. & K. 496; *Bill v. Cureton*, 2 M. & K. 303; *Hastings v. Ord*, 11 Sim. 205; *Coutts v. Ackworth*, L. R. 8 Eq. 538; *Phillips v. Mullings*, L. R. 7 Ch. 244; *Hall v. Hall*, L. R. 8 Ch. 430; *Toker v. Toker*, 3 De G., J. & S. 487; *Evans v. Russell*, 31 Leg. Int. 125.

<sup>1</sup> *Markwell v. Markwell*, 34 Beav. 12.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Aubuchon v. Bender*, 44 Mo. 560; *Dean v. Adler*, 30 Md. 147; *Hall v. Hall*, L. R. 14 Eq. 365; *Beal v. Warren*, 2 Gray, 447.

<sup>4</sup> *Tate v. Leithhead*, Kay, 658; *Donaldson v. Donaldson*, Kay, 711; *Roberts v. Lloyd*, 2 Beav. 376; *Burn v. Carvalho*, 4 M. & Cr. 690; *Sloper v. Cottrell*, 6 El. & Bl. 504; *Gilbert v. Overton*, 2 Hem. & Mill. 110; *Kekewich v. Manning*, 1 De G., M. & G. 176; *Tierney v. Wood*, 19 Beav. 330; *Meux v. Bell*, 1 Hare, 73; *Otis v. Beckwith*, 49 Ill. 121.

<sup>5</sup> *Beatson v. Beatson*, 12 Sim. 281; *Meek v. Kettlewell*, 1 Hare, 476; 1 Phil. 342; *Rycroft v. Christy*, 3 Beav. 238; *Godsall v. Webb*, 2 Keen, 99; *McFadden v. Jenkins*, 1 Phil. 153; *Bridge v. Bridge*, 16 Beav. 315; *Cecil v. Butcher*, 2 J. & W. 573.

§ 106. Under the statute of uses, uses could be raised either upon a valuable or pecuniary consideration, or upon what was called a good or meritorious consideration ; that is, a consideration arising out of blood, marriage, or family affection, and the moral obligation that every one is under to provide for his family or relations. Thus, a covenant to stand seised to the uses of a stranger, founded upon a valuable consideration, operated under the statute as a deed of bargain and sale to be enrolled, and conveyed the land to the stranger. But a covenant in consideration of blood or marriage, to stand seised to the use of a wife or child or other relation, created a use only in the *cestui que use*, and the deed need not be enrolled. In all cases the *consideration of this conveyance was the foundation of it*. Therefore, a covenant to stand seised to the use of a stranger in consideration of love or affection for him was inoperative for want of a consideration ; and a covenant in consideration of blood or marriage, to stand seised to the use of a relative and a stranger, vested the whole use in the relative, and was inoperative as to the stranger. From this brief statement can be seen the effect and meaning of what was called a good or meritorious consideration under the statute of uses.<sup>1</sup>

§ 107. In analogy to this doctrine, under the statute of uses it has been urged that a voluntary post-nuptial settlement in favor of a wife or child, executory in all its aspects, would be enforced in favor of such wife or child on the ground of a good or meritorious consideration for such settlement.<sup>2</sup> And in *Ellis v. Nimmo*, Sugden, Lord Chancellor of Ireland, after a most ex-

<sup>1</sup> Sand. Uses, 96-101 ; 2 Black. Com. 338.

<sup>2</sup> *Bonham v. Newcomb*, 2 Vent. 365 ; *Leech v. Leech*, 1 Ch. Cas. 249 ; *Fothergill v. Fothergill*, Freem. 256 ; *Sear v. Ashwell*, and *Gordon v. Gordon*, 3 Swans. 411 ; *Watts v. Bullas*, 1 P. Wms. 60 ; *Bolton v. Bolton*, 3 Sev. 414 ; *Goring v. Nash*, 3 Atk. 186 ; *Darley v. Darley*, 3 Atk. 399 ; *Hale v. Lamb*, 2 Ed. 292 ; *Evelyn v. Templar*, 2 Bro. Ch. 148 ; *Colman v. Sarel*, 1 Ves. Jr. 50 ; 3 Bro. Ch. 12 ; *Antrobus v. Smith*, 12 Ves. 39 ; *Rodgers v. Marshall*, 17 Ves. 294 ; *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 656.

haustive examination of the authorities, decided that the meritorious consideration of providing for a child was sufficient to lead a court of equity to enforce an executory contract against the settlor.<sup>1</sup> This case met with considerable criticism, and several cases were decided, more or less in opposition to it.<sup>2</sup> In *Moore v. Crofton*, he allowed it to be overruled, declaring, however, at the same time, that he still thought it decided upon sound principles of equity,<sup>3</sup> so that now it may be considered as settled in England, that an executory agreement founded on a meritorious consideration only will not be executed against the settlor himself.<sup>4</sup>

§ 108. As to other parties claiming under the settlor, if he had sold the estate, or become indebted, the equity of a wife or child claiming as *cestui que trust*, on the ground of a meritorious consideration, would not be enforced against a purchaser or creditors.<sup>5</sup> But if the settlor subsequently made a voluntary settlement, or died without disposing of the estate by some act *inter vivos*, there were authorities that the voluntary *cestui que trust* could enforce his equity as against other volunteers under another settlement,<sup>6</sup> or against devisees or legatees,<sup>7</sup> or against the heir-at-law or next of kin.<sup>8</sup> There was, however, this condition, that the persons against whom the settlement was sought to be enforced could not also plead a meritorious con-

<sup>1</sup> *Ellis v. Nimmo*, Lloyd & Goold, 333.

<sup>2</sup> *Holloway v. Headington*, 8 Sim. 324; *Dillon v. Coppin*, 4 My. & Cr. 646; *Jefferys v. Jefferys*, 1 Cr. & Ph. 138.

<sup>3</sup> *Moore v. Crofton*, 3 Jon. & La. 442.

<sup>4</sup> *Antrobus v. Smith*, 12 Ves. 46; *Holloway v. Headington*, 8 Sim. 325; *Walrond v. Walrond*, 1 John. 25; and see *Phillips v. Frye*, 14 Allen, 36; *White v. White*, 52 N. Y. 368.

<sup>5</sup> *Bolton v. Bolton*, 3 Swans. 414, note; *Goring v. Nash*, 3 Atk. 186; *Finch v. Winchelsea*, 1 P. Wms. 277; *Gerrard v. Lauderdale*, 2 R. & M. 154, 458. But see *Mackay v. Douglass*, L. R. 14 Eq. 106; *Perry Herrick v. Attwood*, 2 De G. & J. 39; *Beal v. Warren*, 2 Gray, 447.

<sup>6</sup> *Bolton v. Bolton*, 3 Swans. 414.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> *Watts v. Bullas*, 1 P. Wms. 60; *Goring v. Nash*, 3 Atk. 186; *Rodgers v. Marshall*, 17 Ves. 294.



sideration; for, if they also were children of the settlor, the considerations would be equal. In such cases the court referred it to a master to report whether they had an adequate provision independent of the estate.<sup>1</sup> But, at the present day in England, it would appear that even as against volunteers claiming under the settlor, with or without an adequate provision, a voluntary executory agreement, whether under seal or not, cannot be enforced on the mere ground of a meritorious consideration.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Goring v. Nash*, 3 Atk. 186; *Rodgers v. Marshall*, 17 Ves. 294.

<sup>2</sup> *Jefferys v. Jefferys*, 1 Cr. & Ph. 138; *Antrobus v. Smith*, 12 Ves. 39; *Evelyn v. Templar*, 2 Bro. Ch. 148; *Holloway v. Headington*, 8 Sm. 334; *Joyce v. Hutton*, 11 Ir. Ch. 123; *Moore v. Crofton*, 3 Jon. & La. 442.

Mr. Lewin (p. 95 of his 3d ed.) has discussed this whole matter with a fulness that leaves little to be said. He says, "It has also been supposed that where the trust is imperfectly created the court, without proof of valuable consideration, will act upon a meritorious consideration, as the payment of debts or provision for wife or child. The covenant to stand seised to uses, and the jurisdiction of the court in supplying surrenders and aiding the defective execution of powers, have generally been referred to as establishing, or at least countenancing, this doctrine.

"As regards the covenant to stand seised to uses, it is evident that mere meritorious consideration was not a sufficient ground to attract the jurisdiction of the court; for no use would have arisen in favor of a wife or child, unless there had been a covenant. 'There are several ways in the law,' said Lord Justice Holt, 'for declaring uses, whether upon transmutation of the possession or not. If a use be declared upon a transmutation of the possession, as in a fine of feoffment, it is sufficient for the party on the transmutation to declare that the use shall be to such a party of such an estate; but if the use arise without transmutation of the possession, the use then does not arise by virtue of any declaration or appointment, but there must be some precedent obligation to oblige the party declaring the use, which must be founded on some consideration; for a use, having its foundation generally on grounds of equity, could not be relieved in chancery without transmutation of possession, or an agreement founded on a consideration; and therefore if bargain and sale were made of a man's lands, on the payment of the money, the use could have arisen without deed by parol; but if the use was in consideration of blood, then it could not arise by parol agreement without a deed, because that agreement was not an obliging agreement: it wanted a consideration, and therefore, to make it an obliging agreement, there was necessity of a deed.' *Jones v. Morley*, 12 Mod. 161.

"Thus, if equity be governed by the strict analogy of uses, the court

§ 109. The tendency in the United States is to sustain and carry into effect an executory trust in favor of a wife or child

cannot act upon meritorious consideration where the contract is by parol; and though, where the agreement is under seal, the argument of analogy applies, yet it follows not that equity will now raise a trust because formerly it would have created a use. A bargain and sale for 5s. consideration still operates by way of conveyance to transfer the estate; but should the bargain and sale be void as such for want of an indenture or an indenture duly enrolled, it could not be argued that the agreement at the present day would be specifically executed upon the basis of a trust. It may further be remarked, that if the covenant to stand seised to uses were now to regulate the administration of trusts, there would still be no ground for extending the relief to *creditors*, who, however, it is admitted on all hands, are equally entitled to the benefit of meritorious consideration. And the covenant to stand seised to uses extended, we must remember, not only to wife and child, but also to brothers, nephews, and cousins; but no one at the present day would think of admitting the same latitude in the execution of a trust.

“With respect to the jurisdiction of the court in supplying surrenders of copyholds, the principle upon which the relief is founded appears to be this, that as the heir was never meant by the law to take otherwise than in default of the ancestor’s will, if the ancestor manifests any intention in favor of a meritorious object, the court will not suffer the mere want of form to carry a benefit to the representative. ‘I have looked,’ said Lord Alvanley, ‘at all the cases I can find upon what principle this court goes in supplying the defect. It is this, — whenever a man, having power over an estate, whether ownership or not, in discharge of moral or natural obligation, shows an intention to execute such power, the court will operate upon the conscience of the *heir* to make him perfect this intention. This is not to be confounded with the case of the heirs being disinherited by a will of freeholds not duly executed: there is no will at all. The court cannot see that there is such an instrument; but whenever there is such a power, it has been executed.’ Chapman v. Gibson, 3 Bro. Ch. 230. And see Ellis v. Nimmo, Lloyd & Goold, 341.

“The ground, upon which the courts aid the defective execution of powers, will be found upon examination to be precisely that upon which it supplies the surrender of copyholds. The power to the extent to which it may be exercised is regarded in equity as part of the dominion, — as a portion of the actual estate; and the donee of it is *pro tanto* the *bona fide* owner of the property, and the person taking in default of the donee’s disposition is a *quasi* heir. Holmes v. Coghill, 12 Ves. 218; Coventry v. Coventry, at the end of Francis’s Maxims in Equity. The only distinction between an actual heir and the person taking in default of the power is this, that the former is so constituted by course of law, while the latter is a *quasi* heir specially appointed by the settlor. Thus in aiding the defective execution of powers

founded upon a meritorious consideration, if the instrument is under seal,<sup>1</sup> though the rule is not fully established, and per-

the court says, as in supplying surrenders: the donee of the power, who is the owner of the property to the extent of that power, has indicated an intention of providing for a meritorious object, and the person taking in default of the power, who is a kind of heir, shall not, through want of form, run away with the estate from those who are much better entitled.

"It is clear that an agreement founded on meritorious consideration will not be executed as against the settlor himself. *Antrobus v. Smith*, 12 Ves. 39. Indeed relief in such a case would offend against the security of property; for if a man improvidently bind himself by a complete alienation, the court will not unloose the fetters he hath put upon himself, but he must lie down under his own folly. *Villers v. Beaumont*, 1 Vern. 101; but if the

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<sup>1</sup> *Stone v. Stone*, L. R. 5 Ch. 74; *Shepherd v. Bevin*, 4 Md. Ch. 133; 9 Gill, 32; *Harris v. Haines*, 6 Md. 435; *McIntire v. Hughes*, 4 Bibb, 186; *Mahan v. Mahan*, 7 B. Mon. 579; *Bright v. Bright*, 8 B. Mon. 194; *Dennison v. Goehring*, 7 Barr, 175; *Hayes v. Kershaw*, 1 Sand. 258; *Taylor v. James*, 4 Des. 5; *Caldwell v. Williams*, 1 Bai. Eq. 175; *Garner v. Garner*, 1 Busb. Eq. 1; *Jones v. Obinchain*, 10 Grat. 259; *Harvey v. Alexander*, 1 Rand. 219; *Blackely v. Holton*, 5 Dana, 520; 2 Spence, Eq. Jur. 58; *Pennington v. Gitting*, 2 Gill & J. 208; *Tolar v. Tolar*, Dev. Ch. 451; *Thompson v. Thompson*, 2 How. (Miss.) 737; *Woodson v. McClelland*, 4 Miss. 495. But see *Taylor v. Taylor*, 2 Humph. 597; *Martin v. Ramsey*, 5 Humph. 349; *Campbell's Estate*, 7 Barr, 101; *Kennedy v. Ware*, 1 Barr, 445; *Cressman's Appeal*, 42 Penn. St. 155; *Bunn v. Winthrop*, 1 John. Ch. 329. The above cases of *McIntire v. Hughes*, *Mahan v. Mahan*, and *Bright v. Bright*, are direct decisions upon the point, and fully establish the rule for the State of Kentucky, while the cases of *Bunn v. Winthrop*, *Dennison v. Goehring*, *Jones v. Obinchain*, and most of the other cases, presented a completely executed trust for enforcement, and the court was not called upon to decide whether a meritorious consideration alone would support an executory trust. In *Hayes v. Kershaw*, the settlement was for a collateral relative, and the Vice-Chancellor declined to support it, but intimated in strong language that an executory trust for a wife or child would be supported upon meritorious consideration merely. The cases are very fully commented upon by the learned editors to 1 Lead. Cas. in Eq. 330-333, with a strong leaning to the opinion that voluntary executory trusts for a wife or child would be supported. The learned editors also express strong doubts whether the case of *Ellis v. Nimmo*, 1 Lloyd & Goold, 333, is overruled by the cases which are usually thought to overrule it; and their criticism is ingenious and acute. They do not, however, advert to the case of *Moore v. Crofton*, 3 Jones & La. 442. See *Cox v. Sprigg*, 6 Md. 274.

haps, upon thorough consideration, would not be acted upon. But the rule would be strictly confined to a wife and child, and would not be extended to brothers, sisters, nephews, or parents,<sup>1</sup> and probably not to grandchildren,<sup>2</sup> nor to illegitimate children.<sup>3</sup>

court interpose where the act is left incomplete, what is it but to wrest property from a person who has not legally parted with it? Another observation that suggests itself is, that during the life of the settlor the ground of the meritorious consideration scarcely seems to apply; for can it be thought to be the duty of a husband to endow his wife, during the coverture, with a separate and independent provision? or is a parent bound by any natural or moral obligation to impoverish himself (for such a case may be supposed) for the purpose of enriching a child? or has a court of equity the jurisdiction to appropriate a specific fund to creditors, when the debtor is still living? the presumption of law is that the creditor can obtain satisfaction of his debt by the usual legal process. It is after the *decease* of the settlor that meritorious consideration becomes such a powerful plea in a court of equity. The wife and children have then lost the personal support of the husband and parent, and who can have a juster claim to the inheritance of the property? The creditor is then barred, by act of God, of his remedy against the debtor; and, should the assets prove insufficient, how but by the assistance of equity can he hope to be satisfied in his demand? Another objection to the execution of a voluntary contract against the settlor himself, at least in respect of land, is the principle expressed by Lord Cowper, that equity, like nature, will do nothing in vain. Seeley v. Jago, 1 P. Wms. 389; Billingham v. Lawthen, 1 Ch. Ca. 243; Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft, 18 Ves. 99; as if money be directed to be converted into land, or land into money, the devisee or legatee may elect to take the property in the original state, for, should the court direct an actual conversion, the devisee or legatee might immediately annul the order by resorting to a reconversion; and so, should the court decree a specific performance of a contract regarding realty for meritorious consideration, the property the next moment might be disposed of to a *bona fide* purchaser, and the settlement become nugatory. Again, if the imperfect gift can be enforced against the settlor himself, then the equitable right must form a *lien* upon the property; and, upon the death of the settlor, his heir would, *in all events*, be bound to convey: but even in aiding the defective execution of powers and supplying surrenders of copyholds, a previous inquiry by the master is invariably directed whether the heir of the settlor has any other adequate provision."

<sup>1</sup> Downing v. Townsend, Amb. 592; Buford's Heirs v. M'Kee, 1 Dana, 107; Hayes v. Kershaw, 1 Sand. Ch. 258.

<sup>2</sup> Buford's Heirs v. M'Kee, 1 Dana, 107.

<sup>3</sup> Fursaker v. Robinson, Pr. Ch. 475; but see Bunn v. Winthrop, 1 John. Ch. 329.

§ 110. Marriage is a valuable consideration, therefore executory agreements, made in contemplation of marriage, will be enforced if the marriage actually takes place.<sup>1</sup>

§ 111. A contract under seal imports a consideration, and an action at law can be maintained upon such a contract. And it has sometimes been supposed that a court of equity would enforce a contract in favor of a volunteer whenever an action of law could be sustained upon the instrument.<sup>2</sup> But equity never enforced a voluntary covenant, though under seal, to stand seised to the uses of a stranger; and it is now settled, in England, that equity will not enforce a voluntary contract, although under seal.<sup>3</sup> Equity will not decree the specific performance of a contract, where a court of law would give only nominal damages. In the United States, however, considerable stress is laid upon the solemnity of a seal. The courts say that they will not execute a voluntary executory agreement unless it is under seal,<sup>4</sup> thereby implying, that an executory contract under seal will be executed though voluntary. And in Kentucky, where the distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments is now abolished, a voluntary executory contract not under seal has been upheld.<sup>5</sup> But there is the same uncer-

<sup>1</sup> *Duval v. Getting*, Gill, 38; *Gough v. Crane*, 3 Md. Ch. 119; *Crane v. Gough*, 4 Md. Ch. 316; *Hale v. Lamb*, 2 Ed. 271; *Stone v. Stone*, L. R. 5 Ch. 74.

<sup>2</sup> *Beard v. Nutthall*, 1 Vern. 427; *Williamson v. Coddington*, 1 Ves. 511; *Hervey v. Audland*, 14 Sim. 531; *Husband v. Pollard* and *Randal v. Randal*, 2 P. Wms. 467; *Vernon v. Vernon*, 2 P. Wms. 594; *Goring v. Nash*, 3 Atk. 186; *Stephens v. Trueman*, 1 Ves. 73; *Wiseman v. Roper*, 1 Ch. R. 158.

<sup>3</sup> *Hale v. Lamb*, 2 Ed. 294; *Fursaker v. Robinson*, Pr. Ch. 475; *Evelyn v. Templar*, 2 Bro. Ch. 148; *Colman v. Sarel*, 3 Bro. Ch. 12; *Jefferys v. Jefferys*, Cr. & Ph. 138; *Meek v. Kettlewell*, 1 Hare, 475; *Fletcher v. Fletcher*, 4 Hare, 74; *Newton v. Askew*, 11 Beav. 145; *Dillon v. Coppin*, 4 M. & Cr. 647; *Kekewich v. Manning*, 1 De G., M. & G. 188; *Dening v. Ware*, 22 Beav. 184.

<sup>4</sup> *Kennedy v. Ware*, 1 Barr, 445; *Caldwell v. Williams*, 1 Bailey, Eq. 175; *Dennison v. Goehring*, 7 Barr, 175; *M'Intire v. Hughes*, 4 Bibb, 186.

<sup>5</sup> *Mahan v. Mahan*, 7 B. Mon. 579.

tainty whether a seal would render a voluntary executory contract binding in equity, as there is whether a mere meritorious consideration will enable the court to enforce the settlement. Generally, in America, very little regard is paid to mere formalities, and a seal is regarded in most States as a mere formality. A mere scratch or scroll of the pen passes for a seal, and in some States they are abolished altogether. Why any effect should be given to a form that has ceased to be a solemnity would be hard to explain on principle, and is equally uncertain upon the authorities.

## CHAPTER IV.

### IMPLIED TRUSTS.

§ 112. The manner in which trusts are implied, and the words from which they are implied.

§ 113. Words from which a trust will not be implied.

§§ 114–116. Rules by which trusts will or will not be implied.

§§ 117, 118. Implied trusts from directions as to the maintenance of children or others.

§ 119. When trusts for maintenance are not implied.

§ 120. Rules that govern implied trusts.

§ 121. Trusts arising by implication from the provisions of a will.

§ 122. Implied trusts arising from contracts to sell or settle estates.

§ 123. A direction to employ certain persons does not raise an implied trust.

§ 112. IMPLIED trusts are those that arise when trusts are not directly or expressly declared in terms, but the courts, from the whole transaction and the words used, *imply* or infer that it was the intention of the parties to create a trust.<sup>1</sup> Courts seek for the intention of the parties, however informal or obscure the language may be; and if a trust can fairly be implied from the language used as the intention of the parties, the intention will be executed through the medium of a trust. Implied trusts may arise out of agreements and settlements *inter vivos*<sup>2</sup> where there is a sufficient consideration; but they more frequently arise from the construction of wills where a consideration is implied. Thus, if a testator make an absolute gift to one person in his will, and accompany the gift with words expressing a “belief,”<sup>3</sup> “desire,”<sup>4</sup> “will,”<sup>5</sup> “request,”<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lane v. Lane, 8 Allen, 350. \* Liddard v. Liddard, 28 Beav. 266.

<sup>3</sup> Cary v. Cary, 2 Sch. & Le. 189; Paul v. Compton, 8 Ves. 380.

<sup>4</sup> Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469; Mason v. Limburg and Vernon v. Vernon, Amb. 4; Trot v. Vernon, 8 Vin. Abr. 72; Pushman v. Filliter, 3 Ves. 7; Brest v. Offley, 1 Ch. R. 246; Bonser v. Kinnear, 2 Gif. 195; Cruwys v. Colman, 9 Ves. 319; Shaw v. Lawless, Lloyd & Goold, 154, 5 Cl. & Fin. 129; Lloyd & Goold, Tem. Plunket, 559.

<sup>5</sup> Eales v. England, Pr. Ch. 200; Clowdsley v. Pelham, 1 Vern. 411.

<sup>6</sup> Pierson v. Garnet, 2 Bro. Ch. 38, 226; Eade v. Eade, 5 Mad. 118; Moriarty v. Martin, 3 Ir. Ch. 26; Bernard v. Minshull, 1 John. 276.

"will and desire,"<sup>1</sup> or, if he "will and declare,"<sup>2</sup> "wish and request,"<sup>3</sup> "wish and desire,"<sup>4</sup> "entreat,"<sup>5</sup> "most heartily beseech,"<sup>6</sup> "order and direct,"<sup>7</sup> "authorize and empower,"<sup>8</sup> "recommend,"<sup>9</sup> "hope,"<sup>10</sup> "do not doubt,"<sup>11</sup> "be well assured,"<sup>12</sup> "confide,"<sup>13</sup> "have the fullest confidence,"<sup>14</sup> "trust and confide,"<sup>15</sup> "have full assurance and confident hope;"<sup>16</sup> or, if he make the gift "under the firm conviction,"<sup>17</sup> or "well knowing;"<sup>18</sup> or, if he use the expressions, "of course the

<sup>1</sup> *Birch v. Wade*, 3 Ves. & B. 198; *Forbes v. Ball*, 3 Mer. 437.

<sup>2</sup> *Gray v. Gray*, 11 Ir. Ch. 218.

<sup>3</sup> *Foley v. Parry*, 5 Sim. 138; 2 M. & K. 138; *Cook v. Ellington*, 6 Jones, Eq. 371.

<sup>4</sup> *Liddard v. Liddard*, 28 Beav. 266.

<sup>5</sup> *Prevost v. Clarke*, 2 Mad. 458; *Meredith v. Heneage*, 1 Sim. 553; *Taylor v. George*, 2 Ves. & B. 378.

<sup>6</sup> *Meredith v. Heneage*, 1 Sim. 553.

<sup>7</sup> *Cary v. Cary*, 2 Sch. & Le. 189; *White v. Briggs*, 2 Phil. 583.

<sup>8</sup> *Brown v. Higgs*, 4 Ves. 708; 5 Ves. 495; 8 Ves. 561; 18 Ves. 192.

<sup>9</sup> *Tibbits v. Tibbits*, Jac. 317; 19 Ves. 656; *Harwood v. West*, 1 Sim. & S. 387; *Paul v. Compton*, 8 Ves. 380; *Malim v. Keighley*, 2 Ves. Jr. 333, 529; *Malim v. Barker*, 3 Ves. 150; *Meredith v. Heneage*, 1 Sim. 553; *Kingston v. Lorton*, 2 Hog. 166; *Cholmondeley v. Cholmondeley*, 14 Sim. 590; *Hart v. Tribe*, 18 Beav. 215; *Meggison v. Moore*, 2 Ves. Jr. 630; *Sale v. Moore*, 1 Sim. 534; *Ex parte Payne*, 2 Y. & Coll. 636; *Randal v. Hearle*, 1 Anst. 124; *Lefroy v. Flood*, 4 Ir. Ch. 1; *Cunliffe v. Cunliffe*, Amb. 686, distinguished in *Pierson v. Garnet*, 2 Bro. Ch. 46; *Malim v. Keighley*, 2 Ves. Jr. 532; *Pushman v. Filliter*, 3 Ves. 9.

<sup>10</sup> *Harland v. Trigg*, 1 Bro. Ch. 142; *Paul v. Compton*, 8 Ves. 380.

<sup>11</sup> *Parsons v. Baker*, 18 Ves. 476; *Taylor v. George*, 2 Ves. & B. 378; *Malone v. O'Connor*, Lloyd & Goold, 465; *Sale v. Moore*, 1 Sim. 534.

<sup>12</sup> *Macey v. Shurmer*, 1 Atk. 389; Anst. 520; *Ray v. Adams*, 3 M. & K. 237.

<sup>13</sup> *Griffiths v. Evans*, 5 Beav. 241; *Shepherd v. Nottidge*, 2 John. & H. 766.

<sup>14</sup> *Shovelton v. Shovelton*, 32 Beav. 143; *Wright v. Atkyns*, 17 Ves. 255; 19 Ves. 229; *G. Cooper*, 111; *T. & R.* 143; *Webb v. Wools*, 2 Sim. (N. s.) 267; *Palmer v. Simmonds*, 2 Dr. 225; *Warner v. Bates*, 98 Mass. 274.

<sup>15</sup> *Wood v. Cox*, 1 Keen, 317; 2 My. & Cr. 684; *Pilkington v. Boughhey*, 12 Sim. 114.

<sup>16</sup> *Macnab v. Whitbread*, 17 Beav. 299.

<sup>17</sup> *Barnes v. Grant*, 2 Jur. (N. s.) 1127.

<sup>18</sup> *Bardswell v. Bardswell*, 9 Sim. 323; *Nowland v. Nelligan*, 1 Bro. Ch. 489; *Briggs v. Penny*, 3 Mac. & G. 546; 3 De G. & Sm. 525.



legatee will give,"<sup>1</sup> or, "in consideration that the legatee has promised to give,"<sup>2</sup>—in these and similar cases, courts will consider the intention of the testator as manifestly implied, and they will carry the intention into effect by declaring the donee or first taker to be a trustee for those whom the donor intended to benefit.<sup>3</sup> And so the words, "it is my wish,"<sup>4</sup> "it is my wish and will,"<sup>5</sup> "having confidence,"<sup>6</sup> "I desire that the donee should appropriate \$50 per year,"<sup>7</sup> "to be disposed of and divided among my children,"<sup>8</sup> "with full confidence that they will dispose of such residue among our brothers and sisters according to their best discretion,"<sup>9</sup> "intrusting to her the education and maintenance of his children out of the profits of the estate,"<sup>10</sup> "I also *allow* my son to give her a support off my plantation during her life,"<sup>11</sup> were held to create trusts in favor of the parties to be benefited. And, so where a testator gave a sum of money to trustees "to pay the income yearly to his son for the support of himself and family, and the education of his children," it was held that the income was taken in trust by the son, and that the wife and children could enforce its appropriation in part for their support.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Robinson v. Smith, 6 Mad. 194; Lechmere v. Lavie, 2 M. & K. 197.

<sup>2</sup> Clifton v. Lombe, Amb. 519.

<sup>3</sup> Warner v. Bates, 98 Mass. 276; Lambe v. Eames, L. R. 10 Eq. 267.

<sup>4</sup> Brunson v. Hunter, 2 Hill, Ch. 490.

<sup>5</sup> McRee's Ad'r v. Means, 34 Ala. 349.

<sup>6</sup> Dresser v. Dresser, 46 Maine, 48; Reid's Ad'r v. Blackstone, 14 Grat. 363.

<sup>7</sup> Erickson v. Willard, 1 N. H. 217.

<sup>8</sup> Collins v. Carlisle, 7 B. Mon. 14.

<sup>9</sup> Bull v. Bull, 8 Conn. 47.

<sup>10</sup> Lucas v. Lockhart, 10 Sm. & Mar. 466.

<sup>11</sup> Hunter v. Stenbridge, 12 Ga. 192. In this case the court construed the word *allow* as expressive of an *intention*, the testator being an illiterate man, that the son should support his mother out of the property given him, and that an absolute charge or trust was implied.

<sup>12</sup> Cole v. Littlefield, 35 Me. 439; Wright v. Miller, 8 N. Y. 9, 1 Sandf. 103; Whiting v. Whiting, 4 Gray, 240; Chase v. Chase, 2 Allen, 101; Hadow v. Hadow, 9 Sim. 438; Jubber v. Jubber, 9 Sim. 503; Longmore v. Elcum, 2 Y. & Col. Ch. 363; Leach v. Leach, 13 Sim. 304; Hart v. Tribe,

§ 113. On the other hand, it has been held that no trust was implied when property was given to a donee connected

19 Beav. 149; *Raikes v. Ward*, 1 Hare, 445; *Crockett v. Crockett*, 2 Phil. 553." Technical language is not necessary to create a trust. It is enough if such intention is apparent. Thus words of recommendation, request, entreaty, wish, or expectation, addressed to a devisee or legatee, will make him a trustee for those persons in favor of whom such expressions are used; provided that, from the construction of the whole will, such is the apparent intention of the testator, and provided that he has pointed out with sufficient clearness and certainty both the subject-matter and the object of the trust. Thus, in *Massey v. Sherman*, Amb. 520, a testator devised property to his wife, not doubting that she would dispose of the same to and among his children as she should please, it was held to be a trust for the children. See also *Macey v. Shurmer*, 1 Atk. 389; *Wynne v. Hawkins*, 1 Bro. Ch. 179; *Parsons v. Baker*, 18 Ves. 476; *Malone v. O'Connor*, 2 Lloyd & Goold, 465. And in *Peirson v. Garnet*, 2 Bro. Ch. 38, 226, a testator gave a residue to A., with his dying request that if A. died without issue he would dispose of it in a certain manner pointed out; but Lord Kenyon and Lord Thurlow held that, in the event, a trust was implied and created. And see *Re O'Bierne*, 1 Jones & La. 352. And so in *Malim v. Keighley*, 2 Ves. Jr. 333, 359, a testator recommended a daughter, to whom he made a bequest, to dispose of it at her death in a certain manner, and it was held to create a trust. See also *Paul v. Compton*, 8 Ves. 380; *Ford v. Fowler*, 3 Beav. 146; *Knott v. Cottee*, 2 Phil. 192; *Cholmondeley v. Cholmondeley*, 14 Sim. 590. But in *Meggison v. Moore*, 2 Ves. Jr. 630, the word "recommend," under the peculiar circumstances of the case, was held not to create a trust; but the case throws no particular light upon the principle. In *Bird v. Wade*, 3 Ves. & B. 198, the testator added to his bequest of a part of his property that it was his will and desire that the bequest be left entirely to her disposal among such of her relations as she may think proper. The devisee having died without disposing of the property, it was held to be a trust for her next of kin. See also *Brest v. Offley*, 1 Ch. R. 246; *Eales v. England*, Pr. Ch. 202; *Harding v. Glyn*, 1 Atk. 469; *Earl of Bute v. Stuart*, 2 Eden, 87, 1 Bro. P. C. Taml. 476; *Wright v. Atkyns*, 19 Ves. 299; *Cooper*, 111; *Cary v. Cary*, 2 Sch. & L. 189; *Forbes v. Bale*, 3 Mer. 441; *Horwood v. West*, 1 Sim. & St. 387.

In *Prevost v. Clarke*, 2 Mad. 458, a testatrix gave property to her daughter, and "entreated" her son-in-law, husband of the daughter, if he should not have children by her daughter and should survive her, that he would leave any part of the property that came to him to her other children and grandchildren at his decease. These words were held to create a contingent trust for her other children and grandchildren. So in *Pilkington v. Boughey*, 12 Sim. 114, where a testator recited in his will that he had purchased an estate for a particular purpose, and then devised it to certain

with expression of kindness and good-will towards other persons, as with a hope that "he would continue it in the

individuals in trust, and "trusted" that they would apply it to such purposes as they knew he would most approve of, it was held to be a trust. In *Foley v. Parry*, 2 My. & K. 188, a testator gave property to his wife for life, the remainder to his nephew for life, and then declared it to be his particular wish and request that his wife, or a third person, should superintend and take care of the education of his nephew; and it was determined that there was a trust in the life-estate given to the widow to maintain and educate the nephew until he was twenty-one. See also same case in 5 Sim. 138. So more doubtful expressions have been held to create trusts: as, "I desire him to give," *Mason v. Limbury*, cited *Vernon v. Vernon*, Amb. 4; "I hereby request," *Nowlan v. Nelligan*, 1 Bro. Ch. 489; "I empower and authorize her to settle and dispose of the estate to such persons as she shall think fit by her will, confiding in her not to alienate the estate from my family," *Griffiths v. Evans*, 5 Beav. 241 (see also *Brook v. Brook*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 280; *Alexander v. Alexander*, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 898; "I advise him to settle," *Parker v. Bolton*, 5 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 98); "My last wish, my dear daughter, is that you do give my granddaughter £1000," *Hinxman v. Poynder*, 5 Sim. 546; "require and entreat," *Taylor v. George*, 2 Ves. & B. 378; "trusting that he will preserve the same so that, after his decease, it will go and be divided," &c., *Baker v. Mosely*, 12 Jur. 740; "under the conviction that he will dispose," &c., *Barnes v. Grant*, 26 L. J. Ch. 92, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 1127; "to apply the same," *Saulsbury v. Denton*, 3 K. & J. 392; "the other children may be allowed to participate," &c., *Liddard v. Liddard*, 6 Jur. (N. S.) 459, 28 Beav. 266. As before said, however, such expressions will not create a trust, if by the context no trust is intended to arise; as if a trust is at one time created, but by a codicil is revoked on account of the inconvenience, and there is a direction that the "property be disposed of for the good of the family," *Alexander v. Alexander*, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 898. The question in all cases is, is the devisee or legatee a beneficiary or a trustee of the gift bestowed upon him; and that depends upon the intention of the testator. But parol evidence of the intention of the testator cannot be introduced, *Irvine v. Sullivan*, L. R. 8 Eq. 673. If there is a direct trust, there is no doubt; if there are precatory words, then it remains to determine whether there is an imperative trust, or whether the words are merely suggestions to guide the discretion of the devisee in disposing of the property, the testator having implicit confidence and reliance in him and leaving him the sole judge whether he will follow the suggestions or not. If the testator supposed that he was creating an imperative trust, whether express or imperative from precatory words, a trust will be raised because such is the intention; and if such trust fails because the purposes of the trust are uncertain, or the amount of the property of the trust is uncertain, or for any other reason, it will still be a trust; but it will result to the heirs-

family;"<sup>1</sup> or, with a request "to distribute it among such members of the donee's family" as he should deem most de-

at-law, next of kin, or residuary legatees. See *post*, §§ 153-161. But such uncertainty in the objects of the trust, or in the persons to be benefited, or in the amount of the property to be subjected to the trust, or in the manner of applying it, are facts and circumstances, if they exist in the will itself, which are to be taken into consideration in construing it. See *post*, § 116; *Barnard v. Minshull*, 1 Johns. 287, 1 Jarm. on Wills, 359 (3d Lond. ed). There is also another consideration. If there is an absolute gift in the first instance to the donee, mere precatory words will not in general annex a trust to the gift: as in *Meredith v. Heneage*, 1 Sim. 542; 10 Price, 306, the bequest was to the donee, "unfettered and unlimited," followed by precatory words, and they were held not to create a trust. In *Bonser v. Kinnear*, 2 Gif. 195, there was a gift to the wife "*for her sole use and benefit, she maintaining the children*," it was held to be a trust, the words implying the trust being a part of the gift. But in *Wood v. Cox*, 1 Keen, 317, there was a gift to the devisee "for his own use and benefit," trusting and wholly confiding in his honor to act in strict conformity to the testator's wishes. There were some other circumstances, and Lord Langdale held it to be an implied trust; but Lord Cottenham said that, to make the devisee a trustee, the words "for his own use and benefit" must be expunged from the will: 2 My. & Cr. 686; and see the judgment in the case of *Irvine v. Sullivan*, L. R. 8 Eq. 673. In *Winch v. Brutton*, 14 Sim. 379, and in *Bardswell v. Bardswell*, 9 Sim. 319, there were gifts to the use, benefit, and disposal, absolutely of the devisees, "nevertheless earnestly conjuring them" to dispose of them in a certain manner; and it was held that, under the form of the gifts there, there were no trusts. See also *White v. Briggs*, 15 Sim. 33; *Fox v. Fox*, 27 Beav. 301. So in *Johnson v. Rowlands*, 2 De G. & S., a gift to be disposed of as she shall think proper, followed by a recommendation, was held not to create a trust. The case of *Williams v. Williams*, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 358, is nearly to the same effect; and see *Green v. Marsden*, 1 Drew. 646. In some of these cases the element of uncertainty enters into the construction: see *Bardswell v. Bardswell*, 14 Sim. 379; *Williams v. Williams*, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 358. *Webb v. Wools*, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 267, was a strong case in this respect. The gift was to the wife, her executors, administrators, and assigns, "to and for her and their sole use and benefit, upon the fullest trust and confidence that she will dispose of the same." &c. It was said that to allow the latter words to create a trust would be to counteract

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<sup>1</sup> *Harland v. Trigg*, 1 Bro. Ch. 142; *Wright v. Atkyns*, G. Coop. 121; *Woods v. Woods*, 1 M. & Cr. 401; *Parkinson's Trust*, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 242; *Williams v. Williams*, *ib.* 358. See also *White v. Briggs*, 2 Phil. 583; *Liley v. Hzy*, 1 Hare, 580.

serving;<sup>1</sup> or, “in full confidence that the donee would devise it to such heirs of the testator’s father as she might think best deserved a preference;”<sup>2</sup> or with a recommendation, that the donee “would consider the testator’s relations;”<sup>3</sup> or, where

the former words. In another case, involving nearly the same words, it was held that the widow took a life-estate, with a power to appoint among the children: *Ware v. Mallard*, 21 L. J. Ch. 355; 16 Jur. 492; *Gully v. Cregoe*, 24 Beav. 185. If the words of gift to the wife may be construed as making the gift to her sole and separate use, independent of her husband, the trust may be sustained: *Cholmondeley v. Cholmondeley*, 14 Sim. 590. See also *Stubbs v. Sargon*, 2 Keen, 255, 3 My. & Cr. 513; but see *Green v. Marsden*, 1 Drew. 646. If the expressions are mere statements of good-will towards other persons, a trust will not be implied: *Buggins v. Yeates*, 8 Vin. Ab. 72 Pl. 27; *Sale v. Moore*, 1 Sim. 534; *Hay v. Master*, 6 Sim. 568; *Reeves v. Baker*, 18 Beav. 373; *Lechmere v. Lavie*, 2 My. & K. 197; *Abraham v. Almon*, 1 Russ. 509; *Harland v. Trigg*, 1 Bro. Ch. 142; *Curtis v. Rippon*, 5 Mad. 434. But where a testator gave property to his son, and ordered him to take care and provide for his daughter, it was held that she was entitled to a provision: *Broad v. Bevan*, 1 Russ. 511, n. It must be repeated, that in many cases the element of uncertainty as to the property to be affected by the words of recommendation has entered largely into the construction given to wills by courts; and in that, as in most other circumstances attending the construction of a will, each case must depend upon the particular words of the will and the context in which they are found. See *Lefroy v. Flood*, 4 Ir. Ch. 1, 12; *Wynne v. Hawkins*, 1 Bro. Ch. 179; *Horwood v. West*, 1 Sim. & St. 387; *Huskisson v. Bridge*, 15 Jur. 738; *Young v. Martin*, 2 Y. & C. 582; *Ex parte Payne*, 2 Y. & C. 636; *Knight*, 3 Beav. 148; *Knight v. Boughton*, 11 Cl. & Fin. 513; *Bonser v. Kinnear*, 2 Gif. 195; *Quayle v. Davidson*, 12 Moore P. C. 268; *Maud v. Maud*, 27 Beav. 615. But see *Malone v. O'Connor*, 2 Ll. & Go. 465. Of course, if no trust is implied from the words of recommendation used in the will, the donee takes the absolute beneficial as well as legal interest to the extent to which it is limited. *Stubbs v. Sargon*, 2 Keen, 255, 3 My. & Cr. 507; *Gloucester v. Wood*, 3 Hare, 131, 1 H. L. Cas. 272; *Briggs v. Penny*, 3 De G. & S. 547, 3 Mac. & G. 546; *Fowler v. Garlike*, 1 R. & My. 232. But if a trust is intended, but it is so uncertain that it cannot be executed, it will result to the heir or next of kin, or residuary legatee or devisee, according to the circumstances.

<sup>1</sup> *Green v. Marsden*, 1 Drew. 646.

<sup>2</sup> *Meredith v. Heneage*, 1 Sim. 542; and see *Wright v. Atkyns*, G. Coop. 119; *Curnick v. Tucker*, L. R. 17 Eq. 320.

<sup>3</sup> *Sale v. Moore*, 1 Sim. 534; *McNab v. Whitehead*, 17 Beav. 209; *Wright v. Atkyns*, G. Coop. 119.

the recommendation was "to consider certain persons,"<sup>1</sup> "to be kind to them,"<sup>2</sup> "to remember them,"<sup>3</sup> "to do justice to them,"<sup>4</sup> "to make ample provision for them,"<sup>5</sup> "to use the property for herself and her children, and to remember the church of God and the poor,"<sup>6</sup> "to give what should remain at his death, or what he should die seised or possessed of,"<sup>7</sup> or, "to finally appropriate as he pleases;" with a recommendation to divide among certain persons,"<sup>8</sup> or, "to divide and dispose of the savings,"<sup>9</sup> or the bulk of the property;"<sup>10</sup> or, where the testator "recommends, but does not absolutely enjoin;"<sup>11</sup> or, where a testator gave all his property to his wife absolutely, and by a codicil, in the form of a letter to her, said it was his wish "that she should have every thing, using her judgment when to dispose of it among her children, but that he should be unhappy if he thought that any one not of her family should be the better for what he felt confidence she would so well dispose of;"<sup>12</sup> or, where every thing was given to a "wife in the fullest trust and confidence reposed in her that she will dispose of the same for the joint benefit of herself and my children,"<sup>13</sup> or where an estate was given to a wife,

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*; *Hoy v. Master*, 6 Sim. 568.

<sup>2</sup> *Buggins v. Yates*, 9 Mod. 122.

<sup>3</sup> *Bardswell v. Bardswell*, 9 Sim. 319.

<sup>4</sup> *Le Maitre v. Bannister*, Pr. Ch. 200 and note; *Pope v. Pope*, 10 Sim. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Winch v. Brutton*, 14 Sim. 379; *Fox v. Fox*, 27 Beav. 301.

<sup>6</sup> *Curtis v. Rippon*, 5 Mad. 434.

<sup>7</sup> *Sprange v. Barnard*, 2 Bro. Ch. 585; *Green v. Marsden*, 1 Drew. 646; *Pushman v. Filliter*, 3 Ves. 7; *Wilson v. Major*, 11 Ves. 205; *Eade v. Eade*, 5 Mad. 118; *Wynne v. Hawkins*, 1 Bro. Ch. 179; *Lechmere v. Lavie*, 2 M. & K. 197; *Bland v. Bland*, 2 Cox, 349; *Att'y-Gen. v. Hall*, Fitzg. 314; and see *Meredith v. Heneage*, 1 Sim. 556; *Tibbits v. Tibbits*, 19 Ves. 664; *Pope v. Pope*, 10 Sim. 1.

<sup>8</sup> *White v. Briggs*, 15 Sim. 33.

<sup>9</sup> *Cowman v. Harrison*, 10 Hare, 234.

<sup>10</sup> *Palmer v. Simmonds*, 2 Drew. 221.

<sup>11</sup> *Young v. Martin*, 2 Y. & C. Ch. 582.

<sup>12</sup> *Williams v. Williams*, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 358.

<sup>13</sup> *Webb v. Wools*, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 267; *Byne v. Blackburn*, 26 Beav. 41.

“being fully satisfied that she will dispose of the same, by will or otherwise, in a fair and equitable manner to our united relatives, bearing in mind that my relatives are in better circumstances than hers ;”<sup>1</sup> or, where all the testator’s estate was given to his wife, recommending her “to give the same to his children, at such time and in such manner as she should think best ;”<sup>2</sup> or, where a bequest of a house and an annuity was made to a niece, for the support of herself and her nephews and nieces whom she then had under her care, “and of such other persons as she from time to time might wish and request to be members of her family ;”<sup>3</sup> or, where property was given to a daughter, “to be hers for ever, to be disposed of as she may think proper among her children and grandchildren, by will or otherwise ;”<sup>4</sup> or a devise to a wife of all a testator’s property, recommending her “to make some small allowance, at her convenience, to each of his brothers and sisters : say, \$1000 to each ;”<sup>5</sup> or, a devise “of the use, benefit, and profits, to a wife absolutely, having full confidence that she will leave the surplus to be divided at her decease justly among her children ;”<sup>6</sup> or, where the testator expressed an “earnest hope” and “particular request” that “the donee would give the property to some one bearing the family name.”<sup>7</sup> In a case where A. gave property to B. and directed that his daughter should reside with and be maintained by A., and she resided of her own accord in another place, it was held that there was no implied trust for her if she resided in another place.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Reeves v. Baker*, 18 Beav. 372.

<sup>2</sup> *Gilbert v. Chapin*, 19 Conn. 351.

<sup>3</sup> *Harper v. Phelps*, 21 Conn. 257.

<sup>4</sup> *Thompson v. McKisick*, 3 Humph. 631.

<sup>5</sup> *Ellis v. Ellis*, 15 Ala. 296.

<sup>6</sup> *Pennock’s Estate*, 20 Penn. St. 268 ; reversing *Coate’s Appeal*, 2 Barr, 129, and *McKonkey’s Appeal*, 1 Harris, 253.

<sup>7</sup> *Hood v. Oglander*, 34 Beav. 513.

<sup>8</sup> *Wilson v. Ball*, L. R. 4 Ch. 581.

§ 114. It is an easy task to enumerate cases where trusts have been implied and where they have not been implied; but it is difficult to reconcile all the decisions. The words "will," "wish," "request," "hope," "desire," "trust," "have confidence," "recommend," "not doubting," and other similar words found so often in wills, express a state of mind in the testator, and they generally operate as a direct gift, devise, or bequest; but they are frequently so used that it is doubtful whether they are absolute directions, or mere suggestions to be acted on or not according to the discretion of the donee. Every case must depend upon the construction of the particular will under consideration.<sup>1</sup> The point really to be determined in all these cases is whether, looking at the whole context of the will, the testator intended to impose an obligation on his legatee to carry his wishes into effect, or whether, having expressed his wishes, he intended to leave it to the legatee to act on them or not at his discretion. It is doubtful if there exist any formula for bringing to a direct test the question, whether words of "request," "hope," or "recommendation," are or are not to be considered obligatory.<sup>2</sup> The most that can be

<sup>1</sup> *Negroes v. Palmer*, 18 Md. 165; *Meggison v. Moore*, 2 Ves. Jr. 633.

<sup>2</sup> *Warner v. Bates*, 98 Mass. 276; *Williams v. Williams*, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 358, by Sir Knight Bruce. In *Wright v. Atkyns*, 1 T. & R. 157, Lord Eldon said that in order to determine whether the words create a trust or not, it is matter of observation: first, that the words should be imperative; secondly, that the subject must be certain; and, thirdly, that the object must be as certain as the subject. See *Wood v. Cox*, 2 My. & Cr. 684; *Pope v. Pope*, 10 Sim. 1. In *Knight v. Knight*, 3 Beav. 148, Lord Langdale said, "It is not every wish or expectation which a testator may express, nor every act which he may wish his successors to do, that can or ought to be executed and enforced as a trust; and in the infinite variety of expressions employed, and of cases which arise, there is often the greatest difficulty in determining whether the act desired or recommended is an act which the testator intended to be executed as a trust. In the construction of wills it is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the testator, whenever it can be ascertained." Then, after stating that in decreeing trusts wills have been made rather than executed, and that caution is necessary, his lordship goes on to say "that as a general rule it has been laid down



done is to state a few general rules that lead to the construction of particular wills.

§ 115. However strong the language of recommendation or request may be, a trust will not be implied if the testator declare that such is not his intention, as if he declares that the gift shall be “unfettered or unlimited,” or if he “recommends but does not enjoin.”<sup>1</sup> And so a trust will not be implied if such a construction of the precatory words would render them repugnant to, or inconsistent with, other parts of the same instrument.<sup>2</sup> If construing a recommendation or the expres-

that when property is given absolutely to any person, and the same person is by the giver, who has power to command, recommended or entreated or wished to dispose of the property in favor of another, the recommendation or entreaty or wish shall be held to create a trust: first, if the words are so used that, upon the whole, they ought to be construed as imperative; secondly, if the subject of the wish be certain, and, thirdly, if the objects or persons intended to have the benefit of the recommendation or wish be also certain.” Same case under the name of *Knight v. Boughton*, 11 Cl. & Fin. 548.

The learned editors to Hill on Trustees, p. 73 (4th Am. ed.), have examined the American and English cases and state the following rules, which seem to be fairly deducible from the adjudged cases:—

1. Precatory words in a will, equally with direct fiduciary expressions, will create a trust; the wish of a testator, like the request of a sovereign, is equivalent to a command.

2. Discretionary expressions which leave the application or non-application of the subject of the devise to the objects contemplated by the testator entirely to the caprice of the devisee, will prevent a trust from attaching; but a mere discretion in regard to the method of application of the subject, or the selection of the object, will not be inconsistent with a trust.

3. Precatory words will not be construed to confer an absolute gift on the first taker, merely because of failure or uncertainty in the object or subject of the devise.

4. But failure or uncertainty will be an element to guide the court in construing words of doubtful significancy adversely to a trust.

<sup>1</sup> *Meredith v. Heneage*, 1 Sim. 542; 10 Price, 230; *Hoy v. Master*, 6 Sim. 568; *Young v. Martin*, 2 Y. & Col. 582; *Huskisson v. Bridge*, 4 De G. & Sm. 245; *Warner v. Bates*, 98 Mass. 277; *Whipple v. Adam*, 1 Met. 444; *Eaton v. Witts*, L. R. 4 Eq. 151.

<sup>2</sup> *Brunson v. Hunter*, 2 Hill, Ch. 490; *Knott v. Cottee*, 2 Phill. 192.

sion of a wish into a trust would contradict in terms the preceding bequest, a trust will not be implied.<sup>1</sup> As if the gift is absolute, and of all the testator's property, and of both the legal and equitable interest in it, words of recommendation will not cut it down into a trust; or, in the words of Kindersley, V. C., "where the later words of a sentence in a will go to cut down an absolute gift contained in the first part of a sentence, and are inconsistent with such gift, the court will, if it can, give effect to the absolute gift."<sup>2</sup> The same rule was stated by Lord Cottenham thus: "Though 'recommendation' may in some cases amount to a direction and create a trust, yet that being a *flexible* term, if such a construction of it be inconsistent with any *positive* provision in the will, it is to be considered as a recommendation and nothing more."<sup>3</sup> The flexible term must give way to the inflexible, if the two cannot stand together as they are expressed.

§ 116. Again a trust will not be implied from precatory words where it would be impracticable for a court to deal with, and execute it; as if a testator should devise a house to his wife, and express a wish that his sister should live with her, for the sister takes no interest in the house, and a court cannot decree two persons to live together.<sup>4</sup> So where a testator devised a dwelling-house and an annuity to a niece, for the support of herself and her nephews and nieces then living with her, and of such other persons as she, from time to time, might request to be members of her family.<sup>5</sup> Nor will a trust be implied, if there is uncertainty as to the property to be subjected

<sup>1</sup> Webb v. Wools, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 267; Bardswell v. Bardswell, 9 Sim. 319.

<sup>2</sup> Webb v. Wools, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 267; Van Duyne v. Van Duyne, 1 McCarter, 397.

<sup>3</sup> Knott v. Cottee, 2 Phill. 192; Second, &c. Church v. Desbrow, 52 Penn. St. 219.

<sup>4</sup> Graves v. Graves, 13 Ir. Ch. 182; Hood v. Oglander, 34 Beav. 513.

<sup>5</sup> Harper v. Phelps, 21 Conn. 257.

to the trust,<sup>1</sup> or as to the persons to be benefited by the trust,<sup>2</sup> or as to the manner in which the property is to be applied. Lord Alvanley stated the rule to be "that a trust would be implied only where the testator points out the objects, the property, and the way in which it shall go."<sup>3</sup> If the subjects and objects of the supposed trust are left uncertain by a testator, the court will infer that no obligation was intended to be imposed upon the donee, but that the whole disposition was left to his discretion.<sup>4</sup> So if a mere *power* to appoint is given to the first taker, to be exercised or not at his discretion, no trust will be implied.<sup>5</sup> And no trust will be implied, if, taking the whole instrument and all the circumstances together, it is more probable than otherwise that the testator intended to communicate a discretion and not an obligation.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Lechmere v. Lavie*, 2 M. & K. 197; *Knight v. Knight*, 3 Beav. 148; *Meredith v. Heneage*, 1 Sim. 556; *Buggins v. Yates*, 9 Mad. 122; *Sale v. Moore*, 1 Sim. 534; *Anon.* 8 Vin. 72; *Tibbits v. Tibbits*, 19 Ves. 664; *Wynne v. Hawkins*, 1 Bro. Ch. 179; *Pierson v. Garnet*, 2 Bro. Ch. 45, 230; *Bland v. Bland*, 2 Cox, 349; *Le Maitre v. Bannister*, and *Eales v. England*, Pr. Ch. 200; *Sprange v. Barnard*, 2 Bro. Ch. 585; *Pushman v. Filliter*, 3 Ves. 7; *Attorney-General v. Hall*, Fitzg. 314; *Wilson v. Major*, 11 Ves. 205; *Eade v. Eade*, 5 Mad. 118; *Curtis v. Rippon*, 5 Mad. 434; *Russell v. Jackson*, 10 Hare, 213; *Knight v. Boughton*, 11 Cl. & Fin. 513; *Flint v. Hughes*, 6 Beav. 342; *Lines v. Darden*, 5 Fla. 51.

<sup>2</sup> *Harland v. Trigg*, 1 Bro. Ch. 142; *Wynne v. Hawkins*, ib. 179; *Tibbits v. Tibbits*, 19 Ves. 664; *Richardson v. Chapman*, 1 Burns, Ecc. L. 245; *Pierson v. Garnet*, 2 Bro. Ch. 45, 230; *Knight v. Knight*, 173; *Sale v. Moore*, 1 Sim. 534; *Cary v. Cary*, 2 Sch. & Le. 189; *Meredith v. Heneage*, 1 Sim. 542; *Ex parte Payne*, 2 Y. & Co. 636; *Knight v. Boughton*, 11 Cl. & Fin. 513; *Lines v. Darden*, 5 Fla. 51.

<sup>3</sup> *Malim v. Keighley*, 2 Ves. Jr. 335; *Knight v. Boughton*, 11 Cl. & Fin. 548; *Warner v. Bates*, 98 Mass. 277; *Whipple v. Adams*, 1 Met. 444.

<sup>4</sup> *Morice v. Bishop of Durham*, 10 Ves. 536.

<sup>5</sup> *Brook v. Brook*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 280; *Paul v. Compton*, 8 Ves. 380; *Howorth v. Dewell*, 29 Beav. 18; *Lines v. Darden*, 5 Fla. 51.

<sup>6</sup> *Bull v. Hardy*, 1 Ves. Jr. 270; *Knott v. Cottee*, 2 Phill. 192; *Knight v. Knight*, 3 Beav. 174; 11 Cl. & Fin. 513; *Meggison v. Moore*, 2 Ves. Jr. 630; *Hill v. Bishop, &c.* 1 Atk. 618; *Paul v. Compton*, 8 Ves. 380; *Lefroy v. Flood*, 4 Ir. Ch. 1; *Shepherd v. Nottige*, 2 John. & Hem. 766.

§ 117. There is another variety of cases, where trusts are sometimes implied from the words used, though an express trust is not declared, as where property is given to a parent or other person standing in the relation of parent, and some directions or expressions are used in regard to the maintenance of his family or children. The question to be decided in this class of cases is, as in the others, did the settlor intend to create a trust and impose an obligation, or did he merely state incidentally the motive which led to an absolute gift?<sup>1</sup> In the following cases a trust was clearly implied by the court; where property was given, that "he may dispose thereof for the benefit of himself and children,"<sup>2</sup> or, "for his own use and benefit, and the maintenance and education of his children,"<sup>3</sup> "for the maintenance of himself and family,"<sup>4</sup> "at the disposal of the legatee for herself and her children,"<sup>5</sup> or "all overplus towards her support and her family,"<sup>6</sup> or "to A. for the education and advancing in life of her children."<sup>7</sup> In *Byne v. Blackburn*, it was held, that the fact that the property was given to a trustee instead of to the parent, was sufficient to show that no sub-trust was intended;<sup>8</sup> but this case is in conflict with other cases;<sup>9</sup> and in *Chase v. Chase*, where property was given to trustees "to pay the income yearly to a son for the support of himself and family and the education of his

<sup>1</sup> *Paisley's App.* 70 Penn. St. 158.

<sup>2</sup> *Raikes v. Ward*, 1 Hare, 445; *Whiting v. Whiting*, 4 Gray, 240.

<sup>3</sup> *Longman v. Elcum*, 2 Y. & C. Ch. 369; *Carr v. Living*, 28 Beav. 644; *Berry v. Briant*, 2 Dr. & Sm. 1; *Bird v. Maybury*, 33 Beav. 351; *Andrews v. Bank of Cape Ann*, 3 Allen, 313.

<sup>4</sup> *In re Robertson's Trust*, 6 W. R. 405; *Whelan v. Reilly*, 3 W. Va. 597; *Smith v. Wildman*, 37 Conn. 387.

<sup>5</sup> *Crockett v. Crockett*, 1 Hare, 451; 2 Phill. 461; *Bibby v. Thompson*, 32 Beav. 646.

<sup>6</sup> *Woods v. Woods*, 1 M. & Cr. 401.

<sup>7</sup> *Gilbert v. Bennett*, 10 Sim. 371.

<sup>8</sup> *Byne v. Blackburn*, 26 Beav. 41.

<sup>9</sup> *Gilbert v. Bennett*, 10 Sim. 371; *Longman v. Elcum*, 2 Y. & Col. Ch. 363; *Carr v. Living*, 28 Beav. 644.

children," it was held that the income was taken in trust by the son as sub-trustee, and that the wife and children could in equity enforce its appropriation in part for their support.<sup>1</sup> Where a testator gave his wife the entire profit of his estate for life, "intrusting to her the education and maintenance of his children," and also providing for the education and maintenance of the children "out of the profits" of the estate, it was held, that the widow was charged with the trust of educating and supporting the children;<sup>2</sup> and where a legacy was given to a wife to be applied to the maintenance of certain persons in such proportions and at such times as she should think proper, it was held to be an imperative trust.<sup>3</sup> Where a testator gave

<sup>1</sup> *Cole v. Littlefield*, 35 Me. 435; *Loring v. Loring*, 100 Mass. 340; *Wilson v. Bell*, L. R. 4 Ch. 581; *Whiting v. Whiting*, 4 Gray, 240; *Chase v. Chase*, 2 Allen, 101. In this case Chief Justice Bigelow said: "The intent of the testator to give the benefit of the income of the trust fund created by his will to the wife and children of his son Phillip, as well as to his son, is clear and unequivocal. It was intended for their joint support, and for the education of the children. The only question arising on the construction of the will is, whether the income of the trust fund, when received by the son, is held absolutely by him to be disposed of at his discretion, or whether he takes it in trust so that the wife and children can seek to enforce its due appropriation, in part for their benefit, in a court of equity. We cannot doubt that the latter is the true construction; otherwise it would be in the power of the son to defeat the purpose of the testator, by depriving his family of the support and education which was expressly provided for by the will. The adjudicated cases recognize the rule that where income arising from property is left to a person for the maintenance of children, he will be entitled to receive it for that purpose only so long as he continues properly to maintain them. It can make no difference in the application of the principle, that the person who is to receive the income also takes a beneficial interest in it for his own support. He is not thereby authorized to appropriate the whole of it to his own use, and deprive the other beneficiaries of the share to which they are entitled. *Hadow v. Hadow*, 9 Sim. 438; *Jubber v. Jubber*, 9 Sim. 503; *Longmore v. Elcum*, 2 Y. & Col. Ch. 363; *Leach v. Leach*, 13 Sim. 304; *Hart v. Tribe*, 19 Beav. 149; *Raikes v. Ward*, 1 Hare, 445; *Crockett v. Crockett*, 2 Phil. 553."

<sup>2</sup> *Lucas v. Lockhart*, 10 Sm. & Mar. 468. See also *Hunter v. Stembridge*, 12 Ga. 192; *Withers v. Yeadon*, 1 Rich. Eq. 524.

<sup>3</sup> *Hawley v. James*, 5 Paige, 318.

to his wife all his personal property for her benefit and support and the benefit of his son, it was held to be a trust in the widow, the income of one half for her own benefit and of the other half for the support of the son.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Loring v. Loring*, 100 Mass. 340; *Jubber v. Jubber*, 9 Sim. 503. When a testator has stated the motive which leads to the gift, the inquiry arises, is the motive or purpose of the gift so stated that the donee is under an obligation to apply the gift, or any part of it, to the benefit of another person? There are three classes of cases: (I.) When a complete and obligatory trust is created in the first donee. As a gift to A. "to dispose of among her children," or for bringing up her children, gives no interest to A., but creates a complete trust. *Blakeney v. Blakeney*, 6 Sim. 52; *Pilcher v. Randall*, 9 Week. R. 251; *Taylor v. Bacon*, 8 Sim. 100; *Chambers v. Atkins*, 1 Sim. & St. 382; *Fowler v. Hunter*, 3. Y. & Jer. 506; *In re Comac's Trust*, 12 Jur. 470; *Barnes v. Grant*, 26 L. J. Ch. 92; *Jubber v. Jubber*, 9 Sim. 503; *Wetherell v. Wilson*, 1 Keen, 80; *Wilson v. Maddison*, 2 Y. & C. Ch. 372; *Re Harris*, 7 Exch. 344; *Whiting v. Whiting*, 4 Gray, 420; *Chase v. Chase*, 2 Allen, 101; *Cole v. Littlefield*, 35 Me. 439; *Wright v. Miller*, 8 N. Y. 9. (II.) There is a large class of cases where the first donee has a discretion to apply a part or the whole of the gift to a third person. This discretion, if exercised in good faith, will not be interfered with by the court, and the property unapplied by the donee will belong beneficially to him. Thus in *Hornby v. Gilbert*, Jac. 354, where a gift was made to A., to be laid out and expended by her at her discretion, for or towards the education of her son, and that she should not be liable to account to her son or any other person, it was held that the property belonged to her beneficially, subject to a trust to apply a part to the education of the son during his minority. And so where income is given for life, to be applied to the education and maintenance of children in the discretion of the donee, the income must be paid to the person named, and the part unexpended belongs to such person beneficially. *Gilbert v. Bennett*, 10 Sim. 371; *Hadow v. Hadow*, 9 Sim. 438; *Leach v. Leach*, 13 Sim. 304; *Brown v. Paul*, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 92; *Bowden v. Laing*, 14 Sim. 113; *Longmore v. Elcum*, 2 Y. & C. Ch. 363. And if the interest or income of legacies to the children is given to a parent, to be applied to the maintenance and education of the children, the parent will take the surplus beneficially if he performs his duty, unless a contrary intention is expressed: and providing for other trustees in case of the parent's death does not indicate a contrary intention. *Brown v. Paul*, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 103. Sometimes the gifts to a parent are so expressed that the parent takes the property in trust, subject to a large discretion; and sometimes the parent takes the property for life, subject to a power of appointment for the children. The latter construction is the more favored by the courts. See *Crockett v. Crockett*, 2 Phil. 553; *Gully v. Cregoe*, 24 Beav. 185; *Hart v. Tribe*, 18

§ 118. In cases where a trust for the maintenance of children is implied, the person bound by the trust is regarded in the same light as the guardian of a lunatic or of a minor:<sup>1</sup> he is entitled to receive the fund, and can give a valid receipt for it;<sup>2</sup> and, so long as he discharges the trust imposed upon him, he is entitled to the surplus for his own benefit, nor is he obliged to account for the past application of the fund.<sup>3</sup> And the future application is very much according to his discretion, provided he educates and supports the children reasonably,

Beav. 215; *Ware v. Mallard*, 21 L. J. Ch. 355, 16 Jur. 492. In *Raikes v. Ward*, 1 Hare, 445, a gift was made to a wife, "to the intent she may dispose of the same for the benefit of herself and our children as she may deem most advantageous," and the court determined that the children had no absolute interest, but that their interests were subject to her honest discretion. *Connolly v. Farrell*, 8 Beav. 347; *Woods v. Woods*, 1 My. & Cr. 401; *Costababie v. Costababie*, 6 Hare, 410; *Cowman v. Harrison*, 10 Hare, 234; *Smith v. Smith*, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 967; *Cooper v. Thornton*, 3 Bro. Ch. 96; *Robinson v. Tickell*, 8 Ves. 142; *Wood v. Richardson*, 4 Beav. 174; *Pratt v. Church*, 4 Beav. 177. (III.) The third class of cases contains those in which it is held that the primary donee is absolutely entitled to the whole interest given, without any rights in third persons, as in *Brown v. Casamajor*, 4 Ves. 498, where a legacy was given to a father "the better to enable him to provide for his children." These and similar words merely express the motive of the gift, but import or imply no obligation or discretion which courts can enforce or control. *Hammond v. Neame*, 1 Swans. 35; *Benson v. Whittam*, 5 Sim. 22; *Thorp v. Owen*, 2 Hare, 607; *Andrews v. Partington*, 3 Bro. Ch. 60. See also *Biddles v. Biddles*, 16 Sim. 1; *Berkley v. Swinbourne*, 6 Sim. 613; *Oakes v. Strachy*, 13 Sim. 414; *Leigh v. Leigh*, 12 Jur. 907; *Jones v. Greatwood*, 16 Beav. 528; *Hart v. Tribe*, 18 Beav. 215; *Wheeler v. Smith*, 1 Giff. 300. It may be said that latterly courts are not so astute to discover and enforce trusts from precatory words, and are more inclined to find in the words the mere statement of a motive, or the vesting of a discretion in the donee.

<sup>1</sup> *Jodrell v. Jodrell*, 14 Beav. 411.

<sup>2</sup> *Woods v. Woods*, 1 M. & Cr. 409; *Raikes v. Ward*, 1 Hare, 449; *Cooper v. Thornton*, 3 Bro. Ch. 186; *Robinson v. Tickell*, 8 Ves. 142; *Crockett v. Crockett*, 1 Hare, 451; 2 Phil. 553; *Webb v. Wools*, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 272.

<sup>3</sup> *Leach v. Leach*, 13 Sim. 304; *Brown v. Paul*, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 92; *Carr v. Living*, 28 Beav. 644; *Hora v. Hora*, 33 Beav. 88; *Smith v. Smith*, 11 Allen, 423; *Berkley v. Swinbourne*, 6 Sim. 613; *Hadow v. Hadow*, 9 Sim. 438.

according to their position in the world and the intention of the testator.<sup>1</sup> The court, in cases where a question is raised, will order payment to be made to him, with liberty to the wife and children to apply for further orders ;<sup>2</sup> if he becomes unfit to educate the children, the court can apportion the fund, and prevent him from receiving the portion necessary for the children and family ;<sup>3</sup> and if he assigns his interest in the fund, the court can apportion it, and set apart what is needed for the support and education of the children, and give the remainder to his assignee.<sup>4</sup> Of course, if there are no children, or if they die, the person bound by the trust takes the whole benefit of the fund.<sup>5</sup> But if the devisee die before the children, the trust remains for them.<sup>6</sup> The trust also ceases as to children who become *forisfamiated*, or cease to be members of the trustee's family, and, by marriage or otherwise, become members of another home or establishment ; for it would not generally be implied, that a testator intended<sup>7</sup> an income for the support and education of his family to be divided up into as many families as he left children.<sup>8</sup> Whether a child's right to maintenance under such a will ceases by the fact of his attaining twenty-one years of age is in many cases an open question.<sup>9</sup> On the one side it may be said that the trust ought not to con-

<sup>1</sup> Raikes v. Ward, 1 Hare, 450.

<sup>2</sup> Hadow v. Hadow, 9 Sim. 438 ; Crockett v. Crockett, 1 Hare, 451.

<sup>3</sup> Chase v. Chase, 2 Allen, 101 ; Castle v. Castle, 1 De G. & Jon. 352.

<sup>4</sup> Chase v. Chase, 2 Allen, 101 ; Carr v. Living, 2 Beav. 644.

<sup>5</sup> Hammond v. Neame, 1 Swans. 35 ; Cape v. Cape, 2 Y & Co. Ex. 543 ; Bushnell v. Parsons, Pr. Ch. 219 ; Bowditch v. Andrew, 8 Allen, 339 ; Smith v. Smith, 11 Allen, 423.

<sup>6</sup> Andrews v. Cape Ann Bank, 3 Allen, 313.

<sup>7</sup> Bowden v. Laing, 14 Sim. 113 ; Carr v. Living, 28 Beav. 644 ; 33 Beav. 464 ; Thorp v. Owen, 2 Hare, 612 ; Longman v. Elcum, 2 Y. & C. Ch. 370 ; Manning v. Wopp, 2 Dev. & Bat. Ch. 11 ; Smith v. Wildman, 37 Conn. 387 ; Gardner v. Barker, 2 Eq. R. 888, overruling Soames v. Martin, 10 Sim. 287 ; Bayne v. Crowther, 20 Beav. 400 ; Brocklebank v. Johnson, 29 Beav. 211 ; Badham v. Mee, 1 R. & M. 631.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. ; Baker v. Reel, 4 Dana, 158 ; Connolly v. Farrell, 8 Beav. 350 ; citing Camden v. Benson, Crockett v. Crockett, 1 Hare, 457 ; 5 Hare, 326.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.



tinue after the child is of age, and is educated and prepared to acquire a livelihood for himself.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, if the child is willing to remain at home, and there is no reasonable objection to his so remaining, or if it is a female with no other protection and means of support, it would seem that the trust ought not to cease on the mere ground that the child has attained twenty-one.<sup>2</sup> The great majority of cases will, of course, depend upon the particular words used in the particular will, and they will be so construed by the court as to carry out the intentions of the testator.<sup>3</sup> If a trust is to a widow for life for the support of herself and the support and education of her children, and the property is to go to them absolutely upon her death, one of them, on coming of age, cannot call for his proportion, even with the concurrence of the widow, if such transfer would so diminish the fund as to endanger the rights of the other children to support and education during the life of the widow. In such case the court has ordered a part of such child's share to be paid over on his undertaking to account for the income if needed, and on the footing that the residue should be retained for security, that the income should be paid over if required.<sup>4</sup> The children have such an interest in the fund given for their maintenance that it cannot be reached by a creditor's bill or trustee process against the parent or other person charged with the obligation of maintaining the children or family; that is, if the fund is given to a person for a particular purpose, it cannot be diverted from that purpose by creditors of the donee.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *McDonnell v. Black*, Riley, Ch. 152.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*; *Cloud v. Martin*, 2 Dev. & Batt. Ch. 274; *Carr v. Living*, 33 Beav. 464.

<sup>3</sup> *Gardner v. Barker*, 18 Jur. 508; *Bowditch v. Andrew*, 8 Allen, 339; *Sargent v. Bourne*, 6 Met. 32.

<sup>4</sup> *Berry v. Briant*, 2 Dr. & Sm. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Bramhall v. Ferris*, 14 N. Y. 44; *White v. White*, 30 Vt. 342; *Rife v. Geyer*, 59 Penn. St. 393; *Wells v. McCall*, 64 Penn. St. 207; *Clute v. Bool*, 8 Paige, 83; *Doswell v. Anderson*, 1 P. & H. (Va.) 185.

§ 119. But no trust is implied where the words simply state the motive leading to the gift, as where the gift is to a person "to enable him to maintain the children,"<sup>1</sup> or an absolute gift is made, and the motive stated "that he may support himself and children,"<sup>2</sup> or a gift is made absolutely for her own use and benefit, "having full confidence in her sufficient and judicious provision for the children."<sup>3</sup> When a testator gave to his wife "the use, benefit, and profits of his real estate for life, and all his personal estate, absolutely having full confidence that she will leave the surplus to be divided justly among my children," it was held that the widow took the personal estate absolutely subject to no trust, and that the word "surplus" meant what was left unconsumed or undisposed of by her.<sup>4</sup> And it may be added that the mere expression of a purpose for which a gift is made does not render the purpose obligatory. Even if the purpose of the gift was to benefit the donee solely, he can claim the gift without applying it to the purpose named, whether the expression be obligatory in form or not. Thus if a gift be made to a person to purchase a ring,<sup>5</sup> or an annuity,<sup>6</sup> or a house,<sup>7</sup> or to set him up in business,<sup>8</sup> or for his maintenance and education,<sup>9</sup> or to bind him apprentice,<sup>10</sup> or towards

<sup>1</sup> *Benson v. Whitam*, 5 Sim. 22; *Leach v. Leach*, 13 Sim. 304; *Burt v. Herron*, 66 Penn. St. 400; *Rhett v. Mason*, 18 Gratt. 541; *Burke v. Valentine*, 52 Barb. 412.

<sup>2</sup> *Thorp v. Owen*, 2 Hare, 607.

<sup>3</sup> *Fox v. Fox*, 27 Beav. 301.

<sup>4</sup> *Pennock's Estate*, 20 Penn. St. 268, overruling the opinions in *Coate's Appeal*, 2 Barr, 129, and in *McKonkey's Appeal*, 1 Harris, 253; cases upon the same will under other names. And see *Paisley's App.* 70 Penn. St. 158, where the cases are discussed; *Willard's App.* 15 P. F. Smith, 265.

<sup>5</sup> *Apreece v. Apreece*, 1 Ves. & B. 364.

<sup>6</sup> *Dawson v. Hearne*, 1 R. & My. 606; *Ford v. Battey*, 17 Beav. 303; *Re Brown's Will*, 27 Beav. 324; *Yates v. Compton*, 2 P. Wm. 38.

<sup>7</sup> *Knox v. Hotham*, 15 Sim. 82.

<sup>8</sup> *Gough v. Bult*, 16 Sim. 45.

<sup>9</sup> *Webb v. Kelley*, 9 Sim. 472; *Young Husband v. Gisborne*, 1 Gall. 400; *Presant v. Goodwin*, 1 Sm. & Tr. 544; *Boyne v. Crowther*, 20 Beav. 400; *Twopenny v. Peyton*, 10 Sim. 487.

<sup>10</sup> *Barlow v. Grant*, 1 Vern. 255; *Nevill v. Nevill*, 2 Vern. 231; *Wool-*

the printing of a book, the profits of which to be for his benefit,<sup>1</sup> the legatee may claim the money without applying, or binding himself to apply, it to the purpose specified, even although there is an express declaration that he shall not otherwise receive the money.<sup>2</sup> These cases go upon the principle that a court of equity will not compel a legatee or other party to do what he may undo the next moment; for as soon as such party has received his ring, or house, or annuity, he may sell it or give up his business.<sup>3</sup> And where money is given to trustees, and a discretion is given to them how much and in what manner they shall apply it, the *cestui que trust* has no right to more than the trustees see fit to apply.<sup>4</sup>

§ 120. If a trust is implied, it is governed in some respects by rules entirely different from the rules that govern a direct trust. Generally in a direct trust the trustee takes no beneficial interest in himself, but in an implied trust the trustee may take the whole beneficial interest for life, with a right even to expend some part of the principal fund. Thus, where an estate was devised to A. and her heirs in the fullest confidence that at her decease she would devise the property to the heirs of the testator, Lord Eldon held, that A. had all the rights in the estate of a tenant for life, and so it was also held in the House of Lords.<sup>5</sup> But where a testator devised an estate to his wife and her heirs, under the firm conviction that

*dredge v. Stone*, 4 L. J. (o. s.) Ch. 56; *Burton v. Cook*, 5 Ves. 461; *Luke v. Kelmoray*, T. & R. 207; *Atty.-Gen. v. Haberdashers' Co.* 1 My. & Keen, 420; *Lewes v. Lewes*, 16 Sim. 266; *Noel v. Jones*, 16 Sim. 309; *Lockhart v. Hardy*, 9 Beav. 379; *Lonsdale v. Berchtoldt*, 3 K. & J. 185.

<sup>1</sup> *Re Skinner's Trusts*, 1 John. & H. 102.

<sup>2</sup> *Stokes v. Cheek*, 29 L. J. Ch. 922.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Jarm. on Wills, 368 (3d Lond. ed.).

<sup>4</sup> *In re Sanderson's Trusts*, 3 Kay & J. 497; *Beevor v. Partridge*, 11 Sim. 229; *Rudland v. Crozier*, 2 De G. & J. 143; *Cowper v. Mantell*, 22 Beav. 231.

<sup>5</sup> *Wright v. Atkyns*, T. & R. 157; *Lawless v. Shaw*, Ll. & Goo., Sugden, 154; *Shovelton v. Shovelton*, 32 Beav. 143.

she would dispose of and manage the same for the benefit of her children, it was held that the widow was not entitled to a beneficial interest as tenant for life.<sup>1</sup>

§ 121. Trusts sometimes arise by implication from the provisions of a will, in order to carry out the testator's intention. As where a testator gave his wife an annuity of \$1000 a year, to be paid her by a trustee named, to enable her to live comfortably and to support and educate her children, and if in any year said sum were insufficient, the trustee was to pay her an additional sum not exceeding \$1000. The testator gave a few legacies, and then gave the remainder of his estate to his daughters, and gave nothing to the trustee in words, but he authorized the trustee to sell certain of his real estate, and also to sell the personal property not specifically devised. The personal property was only sufficient to pay the debts of the testator, and the trustee had no funds from which to pay the annuity to the wife. It was held by the court that the trustee took the real estate in trust by implication, that the daughters took the remainder after the trusts were executed, and that the widow could enforce the payment of the annuity by bill in equity against the trustee.<sup>2</sup> So if a testator direct his real estate to be sold, or if he charge it with the payment of debts or legacies, it may descend to an heir, or pass to a devisee, but the court will consider the direction as an implied declaration of trust, and enforce its execution in the hands of those to whom it has come.<sup>3</sup> So a condition annexed to a devise which,

<sup>1</sup> *Barnes v. Grant*, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 1127.

<sup>2</sup> *Walker v. Whiting*, 23 Pick. 313; *Braman v. Stiles*, 2 Pick. 460; *Fay v. Taft*, 12 Cush. 448; *Watson v. Mayrant*, 1 Rich. Ch. 449; *Baker v. Reel*, 4 Dana, 158.

<sup>3</sup> *Pitt v. Pelham*, 2 Freem. 134; 1 Ch. R. 283; *Locton v. Locton*, 2 Freem. 136; *Auby v. Doyl*, 1 Ch. Ca. 180; *Tennant v. Brown*, 1 Ch. Ca. 180; *Garfoot v. Garfoot*, 1 Ch. Ca. 35; 2 Freem. 176; *Gwilliams v. Rowell*, Hard. 204; *Blatch v. Wilder*, 1 Atk. 420; *Carvill v. Carvill*, 2 Ch. R. 301; *Cook v. Fountain*, 3 Swans. 529; *Bennett v. Davis*, 2 P. Wms. 318; *Wigg*

being broken, might work a forfeiture of the estate, has in equity been construed into an implied trust, and enforced as such; as where a house was devised to A. for life, "he keeping the same in repair," or where an estate is given to one in fee, "he paying the testator's debts within a year."<sup>1</sup>

§ 122. Again, courts of equity will imply a trust from the contracts of parties, although there are no words of trust in the instrument;<sup>2</sup> as, if a person for a valuable consideration, agree to settle a particular estate upon another,<sup>3</sup> or if he agrees to sell an estate to another,<sup>4</sup> the settlor or vendor becomes a trustee of the fee for the purposes of the settlement, or for the purchaser.

§ 123. A direction to trustees that a certain person shall be employed, as agent and manager for the trustees, if there should be occasion for such services, gives no interest in the

*v. Wigg*, 1 Atk. 382; *Hoxie v. Hoxie*, 7 Paige, 187; *Withers v. Yeadon*, 1 Rich. Ch. 324; *McIntire Poor School v. Zan. Canal Co.*, 9 Ham. 203.

<sup>1</sup> *Wright v. Wilkin*, 2 B. & Sm. 232; *Stanley v. Colt*, 5 Wall. 119; *Sohier v. Trinity Church*, 109 Mass. 1; *Re Skingley*, 3 M. & Gor. 221; *Gregg v. Coates*, 23 Beav. 33. And see *Kingham v. Lee*, 15 Sim. 396.

<sup>2</sup> *Taylor v. Pownal*, 10 Leigh, 183.

<sup>3</sup> *Finch v. Winchelsea*, 1 P. Wms. 277; *Freemoult v. Dedire*, 1 P. Wms. 429; *Kennedy v. Daley*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 355; *Legard v. Hodges*, 1 Ves. Jr. 477; 3 Bro. Ch. 531; 4 Bro. Ch. 421; *Ravenshaw v. Hollier*, 7 Sim. 3; *Wellesley v. Wellesley*, 4 M. & C. 561; *Mornington v. Keane*, 2 De G. & J. 293; *Lyster v. Burroughs*, 1 Dr. & W. 149; *Stock v. Moyse*, 12 Ir. Ch. 246; *Lewis v. Madocks*, 8 Ves. 150; 17 Ves. 48; *Rowan v. Chute*, 13 Ir. Ch. 169; *Re McKenna*, 13 Ir. Ch. 239.

<sup>4</sup> *Ackland v. Gaisford*, 3 Mad. 32; *Wilson v. Clapham*, 1 J. & W. 38; *Ferguson v. Tadman*, 1 Sim. 530; *Foster v. Deacon*, 3 Mad. 394; *Paine v. Miller*, 6 Ves. 349; *Harford v. Purrier*, 1 Mad. 539; *Stent v. Bailis*, 2 P. Wms. 220; *Minchin v. Nance*, 4 Beav. 332; *Robertson v. Skelton*, 12 Beav. 260; *Paramore v. Greenslade*, 1 Sm. & Gif. 541; *Revell v. Hussey*, 2 B. & B. 287; *Spurrier v. Hancock*, 4 Ves. 667; *White v. Nutts*, 1 P. Wms. 61; *Wall v. Bright*, 1 J. & W. 494; *Tasker v. Small*, 3 M. & Cr. 70; *Pingree v. Coffin*, 12 Gray, 288; *Reed v. Lukens*, 44 Penn. St. 200; *Canning v. Kensworthy*, 21 Ark. 9; *Currie v. White*, 45 N. Y. 822.

estate to such person, nor will any kind of trust be implied which equity can enforce,<sup>1</sup> and so when the trustees were recommended to employ a receiver.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Finden v. Stephens*, 2 Phill. 142.

<sup>2</sup> *Shaw v. Lawless*, Ll. & Goo., Sugden, 154; 5 Cl. & Fin. 129; Ll. & Goo., Plunket, 559. In *Tibbits v. Tibbits*, 19 Ves. 656, a testator made a devise to his recommending him to continue A. & B. in the occupation of their respective farms so long as they managed them well; and it was held to create a trust for them. And see *Quayle v. Davidson*, 12 Moore, P. C. 268. In *Hibbert v. Hibbert*, 3 Mer. 681, a testator directed that H. should be appointed receiver of his estates in Jamaica, adding that he intended the appointment to benefit H. in a pecuniary point of view; and it was held that H. was entitled to be appointed agent, receiver, and consignee of said estates without giving security. And so when a testator appointed an auditor with a remuneration it was held that the trustees could not remove him, there being no imputation upon his conduct. *Williams v. Corbet*, 8 Sim. 349. The case of *Shaw v. Lawless* was a very severely contested case. Mr. Sugden, Chancellor for Ireland, was of opinion that the agent was entitled to the place; but he was overruled, and the conclusion arrived at stated in the text. From the cases cited in this note it would appear that the question is not entirely settled; or it may be that every such provision must depend upon the words and intention of each particular will.

## CHAPTER V.

### RESULTING TRUSTS.

- § 124. Creation and character of a resulting trust.
- § 125. Divisions of this kind of trust.
- § 126. Resulting trust where the purchase-money is paid by one, and deed is taken to another.
- § 127. Resulting trust where trust funds are used to purchase property, and title taken in the name of another.
- § 128. In what cases a trust results, and when a trust does not result.
- § 129. When a person uses his fiduciary relation to obtain an interest in, or affecting the trust property.
- § 130. Same rules apply to personal property unless it is of a perishable nature.
- § 131. Where a resulting trust will not be permitted as against law.
- § 132. Rules as to a resulting trust.
- §§ 133, 134. What circumstances are necessary to create a resulting trust.
- § 135. Parol evidence as to a purchase by an agent not admissible.
- § 136. No resulting trust in a joint purchase.
- §§ 137, 138. Resulting trusts may be established by parol.
- § 139. May be disproved by parol—the burden of proof.
- § 140. Cannot be changed by parol after they arise.
- § 141. Will not be enforced after a great lapse of time.
- § 142. Resulting trusts under the statutes of New York and other States.
- § 143. A resulting trust does not arise if the title is taken in the name of wife or child.
- § 144. What persons it embraces.
- § 145. Doubts and overruled cases.
- § 146. When it will be presumed to be an advancement.
- § 147. The presumption may be rebutted.
- § 148. Is rebutted by fraud in the wife or child.
- § 149. Creditors may avoid such advancements. When and how.
- § 150. A resulting trust from the conveyance of the legal title without the beneficial interest.
- § 151. Every case must depend upon its particular writing and circumstances.
- § 152. Instances and illustrations.
- §§ 153, 154. If there is an intention to benefit the donee, there is no resulting trust.
- § 155. Gifts to executors may create resulting trusts.
- § 156. Resulting trusts do not arise upon gifts to charitable uses.
- § 157. A gift *upon* trust or to a *trustee* and no trust declared.
- § 158. Always a matter of intention to be gathered from the whole instrument.
- § 159. Where a special trust fails it will result.
- § 160. Where a special trust fails from illegality or lapses, it results.
- §§ 161, 162. Whether a trust results from a voluntary conveyance without consideration.
- § 163. Equity does not favor such conveyances; they may be void for fraud, but no trust results.
- § 164. Voluntary conveyances to wife or child.
- § 165. No trust results from a fraudulent transaction.

§ 124. It has been seen from the preceding chapters that trusts are created by the express dispositions of parties, or they are implied by courts from the words used in such express dispositions. There is another class of trusts *which result in law*, from the acts of parties whether they intended to create a trust or not, and they are aptly designated as resulting trusts. They are sometimes called presumptive trusts, because the law presumes them to be intended by the parties from the nature and character of their transactions with each other, although the general foundation of this kind of trusts is the natural equity that arises when parties do certain things. Thus, if one pays the purchase-money of an estate, and takes the title-deed in the name of another, in the absence of all evidence of intention, the law presumes a trust, from the natural equity that he who pays the money for property ought to enjoy the beneficial interest. The statute of frauds does not affect the creation of these trusts, for the reason that, where there is no evidence of intention, it could not be expected that a declaration of intention in writing, properly signed, would be made or could be produced.

§ 125. Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said, that a resulting trust arising by operation of law existed: (1) when an estate was purchased in the name of one person and the consideration came from another; (2) when a trust was declared only as to part, and nothing was said as to the residue, that residue remaining undisposed of, remained to the heir-at-law; and he observed that he did not know of any other instances, unless in case of fraud.<sup>1</sup> In this chapter resulting trusts will be exam-

<sup>1</sup> *Lloyd v. Spillett*, 2 Atk. 150. In 2 Lomax, Dig. 200, resulting trusts are considered under the name of implied trusts, as arising: (1) out of the equitable conversion of land into money or money into land; (2) where an estate is purchased in the name of one person and the consideration is paid by another; (3) where there is a conveyance of land without any consideration or declaration of uses; (4) where a conveyance of land is made in trust as to part and the conveyance is silent as to the residue; (5) where a



ined under five heads: (1) when the purchaser of an estate pays the purchase-money and takes the title in the name of a third person; (2) where a person standing in a fiduciary relation uses fiduciary funds to purchase property, and takes the title in his own name; (3) where an estate is conveyed upon trusts, which fail, or are not declared, or are illegal; (4) when the legal title to property is conveyed, and there is no reason to infer that it was the intention to convey the beneficial interest, and (5) where voluntary conveyances are made, or conveyances without consideration.

§ 126. Where, upon a purchase of property, the conveyance of the legal title is taken in the name of one person, while the consideration is given or paid by another, the parties being strangers to each other, a resulting trust immediately arises from the transaction, and the person named in the conveyance will be a trustee for the party from whom the consideration proceeds.<sup>1</sup> The clear result of all the cases without exception

conveyance is made upon such trusts as shall be appointed, and there is default of appointment; (6) where a conveyance is made upon particular trusts which fail of taking effect; (7) where a purchase is made by a trustee with trust money; (8) where a purchase of real estate is made by a partner in his own name with partnership funds; (9) where a renewal of a lease is obtained by a trustee or other person standing in a fiduciary relation; (10) where purchases are made of outstanding claims upon an estate by trustees or some of the tenants thereof connected by privity of estate with others having an interest therein; (11) where fraud has been committed in obtaining the conveyance; (12) where a purchase has been made without a satisfaction of the purchase-money to the vendor; (13) where a joint purchase has been made by several and payments of the purchase-money to the vendor has been made beyond their proportion.

<sup>1</sup> *Willis v. Willis*, 2 Atk. 71; *Lloyd v. Spillett*, 2 Atk. 150; *Rider v. Kidder*, 10 Ves. 360; *Ex parte Houghton*, 17 Ves. 251; *Trench v. Harrison*, 17 Sim. 111; *Redington v. Redington*, 3 Ridg. 177; *Crop v. Norton*, 9 Mod. 235; *Barn. 184*; 2 Atk. 75; *Hungate v. Hungate*, Toth. 120; *Ex parte Vernon*, 2 P. Wms. 549; *Ambrose v. Ambrose*, 1 P. Wms. 321; *Woodman v. Morrel*, 2 Freem. 33, 123; *Murless v. Franklin*, 1 Swans. 17; *Finch v. Finch*, 15 Ves. 50; *Grey v. Grey*, 2 Swans. 597; *Finch*, 340; *Groves v. Groves*, 3 Y. & J. 170; *Lade v. Lade*, 1 Wils. 21; *May v. Steele*, 2 V. &

is, that a trust of a legal estate, whether freehold, copyhold, or leasehold, whether taken in the names of the purchaser and

B. 390; *Lever v. Andrews*, 7 Bro. P. C. 288; *Pelly v. Maddin*, 21 Vin. Ab. 498; *Smith v. Camelford*, 2 Ves. Jr. 712; *Anon.* 2 Vent. 361; *Withers v. Withers*, Amb. 151; *Pranker v. Pranker*, 1 S. & S. 1; *Howe v. Howe*, 1 Vern. 415; *Clarke v. Danvers*, 1 Ch. Ca. 310; *Goodright v. Hodges*, 1 Watk. Cop. 227, Lofft, 230; *Smith v. Baker*, 1 Atk. 385; *Bartlett v. Pickersgill*, 1 Eden, 515; *Rothwell v. Dewees*, 2 Black, 613; *Buck v. Pike*, 11 Me. 9; *Baker v. Vining*, 30 Me. 126; *Kelley v. Jenness*, 50 Me. 455; *Page v. Page*, 8 N. H. 187; *Hall v. Young*, 37 N. H. 134; *Pembroke v. Allens-town*, 21 N. H. 107; *Tebbetts v. Tilton*, 31 N. H. 283; *Dow v. Jewell*, 18 N. H. 340; *Tyford v. Thurston*, 16 N. H. 399; *Hopkinson v. Dumas*, 42 N. H. 296; *Pinney v. Fellows*, 15 Vt. 525; *Dewey v. Long*, 25 Vt. 564; *Clark v. Clark*, 43 Vt. 685; *Peabody v. Tarbell*, 2 Cush. 232; *Livermore v. Aldrich*, 5 Cush. 435; *Root v. Blake*, 14 Pick. 271; *McGowan v. McGowan*, 14 Gray, 121; *Kendall v. Mann*, 11 Allen, 15; *Powell v. Monson & Brimfield Manuf. Co.*, 3 Mason, 362; *Hoxie v. Carr*, 1 Sumn. 187; *Dean v. Dean*, 6 Conn. 285; *Jackson v. Sternberg*, 1 John. Ca. 153; 1 John. 45; *Jackson v. Matsdorf*, 11 John. 91; *Boyd v. McLean*, 1 John. Ch. 582; *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 ib. 408; *Steere v. Steere*, 5 ib. 1; *White v. Carpenter*, 2 Paige, 218; *Kellogg v. Wood*, 4 Paige, 579; *Foote v. Colvin*, 3 John. 218; *Jackson v. Morse*, 16 John. 197; *Guthrie v. Gardner*, 19 Wend. 414; *Forsyth v. Clark*, 3 Wend. 638; *Partridge v. Havens*, 10 Paige, 618; *Jackson v. Mills*, 13 John. 463; *Lounsbury v. Purdy*, 16 Barb. 376; *Jackson v. Woods*, 1 John. Ca. 163; *Gomez v. Tradesman's Bank*, 4 Sandf. S. C. 106; *Hempstead v. Hempstead*, 2 Wend. 109; *Hopk.* 288; *Harder v. Harder*, 2 Sand. Ch. 17; *Brown v. Cheney*, 59 Barb. 628; *Union College v. Wheeler*, 59 Barb. 585; *McCartney v. Bostwick*, 32 N. Y. 53; *Depeyster v. Gould*, 2 Green, Ch. 480; *Howell v. Howell*, 15 N. J. Ch. 75; *Stratton v. Dialogue*, 16 N. J. Ch. 70; *Johnson v. Dougherty*, 18 N. J. Ch. 406; *Stevens v. Wilson*, 18 N. J. Ch. 447; *Cutler v. Tuttle*, 19 N. J. Ch. 558; *Stewart v. Brown*, 2 Ser. & R. 461; *Jackman v. Ringland*, 4 Watts & S. 149; *Strimpf v. Roberts*, 18 Penn. St. 283; *Wallace v. Duffield*, 2 Ser. & R. 521; *Edwards v. Edwards*, 39 Penn. St. 369; *Lloyd v. Carter*, 5 Harris, 216; *Beck v. Graybill*, 4 Casey, 66; *Kisler v. Kisler*, 2 Watts, 323; *Lynch v. Cox*, 11 Harris, 265; *Harrold v. Lane*, 55 Penn. St. 268; *Nixon's App.* 63 Penn. St. 279; *Newells v. Morgan*, 2 Harr. 225; *Hollis v. Hollis*, 1 Md. Ch. 479; *Dorsey v. Clarke*, 4 Har. & J. 551; *Glenn v. Randall*, 2 Md. Ch. 221; *Farringer v. Ramsey*, 2 Md. 365; *Cecil Bank v. Snively*, 23 Md. 253; *Neale v. Haythrop*, 3 Bland, 551; *Bank of U. S. v. Carrington*, 7 Leigh, 566; *Henderson v. Hoke*, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 119; *McGuire v. McGowen*, 4 Des. 491; *Dillard v. Crocker*, *Speers's Eq.* 20; *Williams v. Hollingsworth*, 1 Strob. Eq. 103; *Garrett v. Garrett*, 1 Strob. Eq. 96; *Kirkpatrick v. Davidson*, 2 Kelly, 297; *Taliaferro v. Taliaferro*, 6 Ala. 404; *Foster v. Trustees of the*

others jointly, or in the name of others, without that of the purchaser, whether in one or several, whether jointly or successively, results to the person who advanced the purchase-money.<sup>1</sup> This rule has its foundation in the natural presumption, in the absence of all rebutting circumstances, that he who supplies the purchase-money intends the purchase to be for his own benefit, and not for another, and that the conveyance in the name of another, is a matter of convenience and arrangement between the parties for collat-

Athenæum, 3 Ala. 302; *Cagle v. McCollum*, 27 Ala. 461; *Anderson v. Jones*, 10 Ala. 401; *Mahorner v. Harrison*, 13 Sm. & M. 65; *Walker v. Burngood*, ib. 764; *Powell v. Powell*, 1 Freem. Ch. 134; *Leiper v. Hoffman*, 26 Miss. 615; *Runnells v. Jackson*, 1 How. (Miss.) 358; *Harvey v. Ledbetter*, 48 Miss. 95; *McCarroll v. Alexander*, 48 Miss. 128; *Hall v. Sprigg*, 7 Mar. (La.) 243; *Gaines v. Chew*, 2 How. 619; *McDonough Ex'rs v. Muddock*, 15 How. 367; *Tarpley v. Poaze*, 2 Tex. 139; *Long v. Steiger*, 8 Tex. 460; *Oberthier v. Strand*, 33 Tex. 522; *McGuire v. Ramsey*, 4 Eng. 519; *Ensley v. Balentine*, 4 Humph. 233; *Thomas v. Walker*, 5 Humph. 93; *Smitheal v. Gray*, 1 Humph. 491; *Click v. Click*, 1 Heisk. 607; *Gass v. Gass*, 1 Heisk. 613; *Harris v. Union Bank*, 1 Cold. 152; *Perry v. Head*, 1 A. K. Marsh. 47; *Letcher v. Letcher*, 4 J. J. Marsh. 592; *Doyle v. Sleeper*, 1 Dana, 536; *Stark v. Canady*, 3 Litt. 399; *Chaplin v. McAfee*, 3 J. J. Marsh. 513; *Creed v. Lancaster Bank*, 1 Ohio St. 1; *Williams v. Van Tuyl*, 2 Ohio St. 336; *McGovern v. Knox*, 21 Ohio St. 551; *Elliott v. Armstrong*, 2 Blackf. 198; *Jenison v. Graves*, ib. 444; *Rhodes v. Green*, 36 Ind. 11; *Milliken v. Ham*, 36 Ind. 166; *Church v. Cole*, 36 Ind. 35; *Smith v. Sackett*, 5 Gilm. 534; *Prevo v. Walters*, 4 Scam. 33; *Bruce v. Roney*, 18 Ill. 67; *Seaman v. Cook*, 14 Ill. 501; *Williams v. Brown*, 14 Ill. 200; *Nickols v. Thornton*, 16 Ill. 113; *Latham v. Henderson*, 47 Ill. 185; *Rankin v. Harper*, 23 Mo. 579; *Paul v. Chouteau*, 14 Mo. 580; *Kelly v. Johnson*, 28 Mo. 249; *Baumgartner v. Guessfeld*, 38 Mo. 36; *Johnson v. Quarles*, 46 Mo. 423; *Russell v. Lode*, 1 Io. 566; *McLennan v. Sullivan*, 13 Io. 521; *Ragan v. Walker*, 1 Wis. 527; *Irvine v. Marshall*, 7 Minn. 286; *Millard v. Hathaway*, 27 Cal. 119; *Bayles v. Baxter*, 22 Cal. 575; *Case v. Codding*, 38 Cal. 191; *Wilson v. Castro*, 31 Cal. 420; *Jenkins v. Frink*, 30 Cal. 586; *Settembre v. Putnam*, 30 Cal. 490; *Frederick v. Haas*, 5 Nev. 386; *Philips v. Crammond*, 2 Wash. C. C. 441. In Michigan the transaction or trust must appear upon the face of the deed, otherwise no trust results to the payer of the purchase-money. *Groesbeck v. Seeley*, 13 Mich. 329; *Campbell v. Campbell*, 21 Mich. 428.

<sup>1</sup> By Lord Ch. B. Eyre in *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, 92.

eral purposes,<sup>1</sup> and this rule is vindicated by the experience of mankind.<sup>2</sup>

§ 127. And so if a person having a fiduciary character purchase property with the fiduciary funds in his hands, and take the title in his own name, a trust in the property will result to the *cestui que trust*, or other person entitled to the beneficial interest in the fund with which the property was paid for.<sup>3</sup> As if a trustee purchase with the trust fund and take the title in his own name, the trust results to the *cestui que trust*;<sup>4</sup> if a guardian purchase with the money of his ward, a trust will result to the ward;<sup>5</sup> and if an executor or administrator purchase property in his own name with money belonging to the estate, a trust in the property will result to the heirs, legatees, or other persons entitled to the beneficial interest in the estate.<sup>6</sup> If the trustees of a corporation purchase lands in their own names, with the corporate funds, a trust will result to the

<sup>1</sup> 2 Story's Eq. Jur. § 1201; *Glidewell v. Shaugh*, 26 Ind. 319; *Bostleman v. Bostleman*, 24 N. J. Eq. 103.

<sup>2</sup> *Edwards v. Edwards*, 39 Penn. St. 369.

<sup>3</sup> *Schlaepfer v. Corson*, 32 Barb. 510.

<sup>4</sup> *Freeman v. Kelly*, 1 Hoff. 90; *Harrisburgh Bank v. Tyler*, 3 Watts & S. 373; *Martin v. Greer*, 1 Geo. Dec. 109; *Moffitt v. McDonald*, 11 Humph. 457; *Kirkpatrick v. McDonald*, 11 Penn. St. 387; *Wilhelm v. Folmer*, 6 Penn. St. 296; *Day v. Roth*, 18 N. Y. 448; *Lathrop v. Gilbert*, 2 Stockt. 344; *McLarren v. Brewer*, 51 Me. 402; *Thompson's App.* 22 Penn. St. 16; *Pugh v. Pugh*, 9 Ind. 132; *Valle v. Bryan*, 19 Mo. 423; *Neill v. Keese*, 13 Tex. 187; *Hancock v. Titus*, 33 Miss. 224.

<sup>5</sup> *Caplinger v. Stokes*, Meigs, 175; *Lee v. Fox*, 6 Dana, 171; *Pugh v. Pugh*, 9 Ind. 132; *Johnson v. Dougherty*, 3 Green, Ch. 406; *Bancroft v. Cousen*, 13 Allen, 50. But if the guardian buy for the ward, but use his own money in payment, the ward cannot claim a trust in the land, for it is within the statute of frauds. *Kisler v. Kisler*, 2 Watts, 323; *Johnson v. Dougherty*, 18 N. J. Ch. 406; *Snell v. Elam*, 2 Heisk. 82.

<sup>6</sup> *Wallace v. Duffield*, 2 Ser. & R. 521; *Buck v. Uhrich*, 16 Penn. St. 499; *Claussen v. Le Franz*, 1 Clarke, 226; *McCrary v. Foster*, 1 Clarke, Io. 271; *Harper v. Archer*, 28 Miss. 212; *Schaffner v. Grutzmacher*, 6 Clark, 137; *Seaman v. Cook*, 14 Ill. 501; *Garrett v. Garrett*, 1 Strob. Eq. 96; *Williams v. Hollingsworth*, 1 Strob. Eq. 103; *White v. Drew*, 42 Mo. 561; *Stow v. Kimball*, 28 Ill. 93; *Barker v. Barker*, 14 Wis. 131.

corporation ;<sup>1</sup> or if a committee, guardians, or trustees of an insane person purchase property in their own names, with the lunatic's money, a trust results to the lunatic ;<sup>2</sup> or if an agent, with the money of his principal, purchase lands and take the deeds to himself, a trust will result to the principal ;<sup>3</sup> or if a partner purchase lands with partnership funds, and take the title to himself, a trust will result to the partnership ;<sup>4</sup> or if a husband purchase lands with the separate estate of his wife in his hands, and take the title in his own name, a trust results to the wife ;<sup>5</sup> or if a man purchase an estate with the money of a woman with whom he cohabits, a trust results to her.<sup>6</sup> If a widow purchase an estate in her own name with funds of her deceased husband, a trust results to his children ;<sup>7</sup> and so

<sup>1</sup> *Church v. Sterling*, 16 Conn. 388 ; *Church v. Wood*, 5 Ham. 283.

<sup>2</sup> *Reid v. Fitch*, 11 Barb. 399 ; *Turner v. Pettigrew*, 6 Humph. 438 ; *Stratton v. Dialogue*, 1 Green, Ch. 70 ; *Buffalo R. R. Co. v. Lampson*, 47 Barb. 533 ; *Hamnett's App.* 72 Penn. St. 337.

<sup>3</sup> *Robb's App.* 41 Penn. St. 45 ; *Farmers, &c. Bank v. King*, 57 Penn. St. 202 ; *Church v. Sterling*, 16 Conn. 388 ; *Bank of America v. Pollock*, 4 Edw. 215 ; *Eshleman v. Lewis*, 49 Penn. St. 410 ; *Day v. Roth*, 18 N. Y. 448 ; *Bridenbecker v. Lowell*, 32 Barb. 10 ; *Moffitt v. McDonald*, 11 Humph. 457 ; *Hutchinson v. Hutchinson*, 4 Des. 77 ; *Follansbe v. Kilbreth*, 17 Ill. 522 ; *Chastain v. Smith*, 30 Ga. 96 ; *Wynn v. Sharer*, 23 Ind. 253.

<sup>4</sup> *Phillips v. Crammond*, 2 Wash. C. C. 441 ; *Baldwin v. Johnston*, Saxt. 441 ; *Freeman v. Kelly*, Hoff. 90 ; *Turner v. Pettigrew*, 6 Humph. 438, 441 ; *Edgar v. Donnally*, 2 Munf. 387 ; *Smith v. Burnham*, 3 Sumner, 435 ; *Piatt v. Oliver*, 2 McLean, 267 ; *Coder v. Haling*, 27 Penn. St. 84 ; *Smith v. Ramsey*, 1 Gil. Ill. 373 ; *Pugh v. Currie*, 5 Ala. 446 ; *Oliver v. Piatt*, 3 How. 401 ; *Evans v. Gibson*, 29 Mo. 223 ; *Mallory v. Mallory*, 5 Bush, 564 ; *Settembre v. Putnam*, 30 Cal. 490 ; *Jenkins v. Frink*, 30 Cal. 586 ; *Homer v. Homer*, 107 Mass. 85 ; *Richards v. Manson*, 101 Mass. 480 ; *Ebberts's App.* 70 Penn. St. 79.

<sup>5</sup> *Church v. Jaques*, 1 John. Ch. 450 ; 3 ib. 77 ; *Brooks v. Dent*, 1 John. Md. Ch. 523 ; *Dickinson v. Codwise*, 1 Sandf. Ch. 214 ; *Pinney v. Fellows*, 15 Vt. 525 ; *Barron v. Barron*, 24 Vt. 375 ; *Lathrop v. Gilbert*, 2 Stockt. 344 ; *Kline's App.* 39 Penn. St. 463 ; *Raybold v. Raybold*, 20 Penn. St. 308 ; *Darkin v. Darkin*, 23 L. J. Ch. 890 ; *Wallace v. McCullough*, 1 Rich. Eq. 426 ; *Fillman v. Divers*, 31 Penn. St. 429 ; *Pritchard v. Wallace*, 4 Sneed, 405 ; *Resor v. Resor*, 9 Ind. 347 ; *Lench v. Lench*, 10 Ves. 511 ; *Woodford v. Stephens*, 51 Mo. 443 ; *Davis v. Davis*, 46 Penn. St. 342.

<sup>6</sup> *James v. Holmes*, 4 De G., F. & J. 470.

<sup>7</sup> *Fox v. Doherty*, 30 Io. 334 ; *Roberts v. Opp*, 56 Ill. 34.

if a father purchase in his own name with funds of his children;<sup>1</sup> and the rule is the same if purchases are made out of the savings of the wife's separate property, but if the purchase is made from savings out of an allowance made by the husband, or out of the wife's earnings, no trust will result.<sup>2</sup>

§ 128. In all these cases the transaction is looked upon as a purchase paid for by the *cestui que trust*, as the beneficial interest in the money paid belonged to him,<sup>3</sup> and the identity of the money does not consist in the specific pieces of money or bills, but in the general character of the fund out of which the payment is made, and the fund may be followed so long as its general character can be identified.<sup>4</sup> But when the means of identification fail, as when an executor converts an estate into money, and mixes it with the general mass of his own money, and there is no identifying the particular money of the trust, the distributees or legatees have no preference over his other creditors, but they must prove their claims.<sup>5</sup> If, however, a trustee purchase an estate with trust funds, and add funds of his own to the purchase-money, a trust will result to the *cestui que trust*; and the burden will be on the trustee to show the amount of his own funds in the purchase, otherwise the *cestui que trust* will take the whole.<sup>6</sup> It has been said, however, in some cases that the *cestui que trust* has no interest

<sup>1</sup> Robinson v. Robinson, 22 Io. 427.

<sup>2</sup> Raybold v. Raybold, 20 Penn. St. 308; Merrill v. Smith, 37 Me. 394; Henderson v. Warmack, 27 Miss. 830; Farley v. Blood, 10 Foster, 354.

<sup>3</sup> Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 517; Trench v. Harrison, 17 Sim. 111.

<sup>4</sup> United States v. Waterborough, Davies, 154; Goepp's App. 3 Harris, 428; Thompson's App. 22 Penn. St. 16; McLarren v. Brewer, 51 Me. 402; De Bevoise v. Sandford, Hoff. 194; Campbell v. Walker, 15 Ves. 678; Downes v. Grazebrook, 3 Mer. 200; Sanderson v. Walker, 13 Ves. 601; Overseers of the Poor v. Bank of Virginia, 2 Grat. 544.

<sup>5</sup> Thompson's Appeal, 22 Penn. St. 16.

<sup>6</sup> Russell v. Jackson, 10 Hare, 209; McLarren v. Brewer, 51 Me. 402; Seaman v. Cook, 14 Ill. 505; Farmers, &c. Bank v. King, 57 Penn. St. 202; Persch v. Quiggle, 57 Penn. St. 247.

in the property purchased with the trust fund in the name of the trustee, but only a lien on the property in the nature of a vendor's lien for the purchase-money, with a right to a decree for a sale to reimburse the trust fund.<sup>1</sup> This is certainly one of the rights of the *cestui que trust*, if he elects to proceed in that manner, and he may hold the trustee responsible, if there is a loss on such sale. On the other hand, the trustee can make no profit to himself by dealing with the trust fund; and, if he makes a purchase with it, the *cestui que trust* can elect to treat the property as a part of the trust property, and he is entitled to all the advantages of the speculation or investment thus made with the property, in the name of the trustee.<sup>2</sup> But if one who stands in no fiduciary relation to another appropriates the other's money, and invests it in real estate or other property, no trust results to the owner of the money.<sup>3</sup> There is no doubt of this principle upon all the cases, but there is some question in the books, as to what is a fiduciary relation, as where a clerk pilfered money from the store of his employer and invested it in real estate, it was held that there was no such resulting trust, that the employer could compel a conveyance of the land.<sup>4</sup> But where a clerk in a bank embezzled money, and invested it in stocks in the names of his sisters as mere volunteers, it was held that a trust resulted to the owners of the money, and that equity would execute it by compelling a conveyance;<sup>5</sup> and this would seem to be the better opinion, as a clerk certainly holds a confidential relation to his employer. In *Newton v. Porter*, it was held that the holders of the proceeds of stolen property might be charged as trustees for the owner, and there would

<sup>1</sup> *Wallace v. Duffield*, 2 Ser. & R. 529; *Wallace v. McCullough*, 1 Rich. Ch. 426.

<sup>2</sup> *Hill on Trustees*, 534; *Lewin on Trusts*, 227 (5th Lond. ed.); *Lench v. Lench*, 10 Ves. 511; 19 Ves. 58.

<sup>3</sup> *Hawthorne v. Brown*, 3 Sneed, 462; *Ensley v. Ballentine*, 4 Humph. 233.

<sup>4</sup> *Campbell v. Drake*, 4 Ired. 94; *Pascoag Bank v. Hunt*, 3 Edw. 583.

<sup>5</sup> *Bank of America v. Pollock*, 4 Edw. 215.

seem to be no principle to the contrary.<sup>1</sup> It may depend, however, upon the extent to which the clerk is trusted.

§ 129. If a person standing in a fiduciary relation makes use of his position to purchase an interest in the trust property with his own funds, as a reversion, a junior or senior mortgage, or other interest from a third person; or if he purchase other property so immediately connected with the trust estate that it must be used with the trust estate, and the independent ownership of which would seriously affect the use and value of the trust property, he cannot retain the same for his own benefit, but he must hold it upon a resulting trust for his beneficiary.<sup>2</sup> But a mere agent, who purchases a reversion in the lands of his principal at a public sale from third persons with his own money, will not be held as a trustee, unless he purchase under some agreement to that effect,<sup>3</sup> and the same rule applies to a tenant in common.<sup>4</sup>

§ 130. The rule embraces personal property as well as real estate, and if a man purchase a bond,<sup>5</sup> annuity,<sup>6</sup> stock,<sup>7</sup> mort-

<sup>1</sup> *Newton v. Porter*, 5 Lansing, 417; *Thompson v. Parker*, 3 Mason, 332; *Hoffman v. Canow*, 22 Wend. 285; *Bassett v. Spofford*, 45 N. Y. 387; *Silsbury v. McCoon*, 3 Comst. 579.

<sup>2</sup> *Holt v. Holt*, 1 Ch. Ca. 190; *Nesbitt v. Tredennick*, 1 Ball & B. 46; *Greenlaw v. King*, 3 Beav. 9; 10 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 129; *Van Epps v. Van Epps*, 9 Paige, 237; *Torrey v. Bank of Orleans*, 9 Paige, 649; *Tanner v. Elworthy*, 4 Beav. 487; *Waters v. Bailey*, 2 Y. & C. (N. C.) Ch. 219; *Geddings v. Geddings*, 3 Russ. 241; *Dickinson v. Codwise*, 1 Sandf. Ch. 226; *Settembre v. Putnam*, 30 Cal. 490; *Jenkins v. Frink*, 30 Cal. 586; *Hall v. Vanness*, 49 Penn. St. 457; *Campbell v. Campbell*, 21 Mich. 459; *King v. Cushman*, 43 Ill. 31; *Clark v. Cantwell*, 3 Head, 202; *Harrold v. Lane*, 53 Penn. St. 269; *Heath v. Page*, 63 Penn. St. 108; *Holmes v. Campbell*, 10 Minn. 40.

<sup>3</sup> *Kennedy v. Keating*, 34 Mo. 25.

<sup>4</sup> *Keller v. Anble*, 58 Penn. St. 412; *Mandeville v. Solomon*, 33 Cal. 38.

<sup>5</sup> *Ebrand v. Dancer*, 2 Ch. Ca. 26; 1 Eq. Ab. 382.

<sup>6</sup> *Rider v. Rider*, 10 Ves. 363, and cases cited; 2 Mad. Ch. Pr. 101.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*; *Lloyd v. Read*, 1 P. Wms. 607; *Sidmouth v. Sidmouth*, 2 Beav. 447; *Garrick v. Taylor*, 29 Beav. 79; 4 De G., F. & J. 159; *Beecher v. Major*, 2 Dr. & Sm. 431; *Ex parte Houghton*, 17 Ves. 253; *Creed v. Lancaster Bank*, 1 Ohio St. 1.



gage, or other personal interest,<sup>1</sup> in the name of a third person, the equitable ownership results to the person from whom the consideration moves ; but it is said that a resulting trust cannot be set up in personal property perishable in its nature.<sup>2</sup>

§ 131. Nor can a resulting trust be set up if it would break in upon the policy of the law, or a public statute ;<sup>3</sup> as, if an alien forbidden to hold land should pay the purchase-money, and take the deed to a stranger, a resulting trust in his favor would not be enforced by the courts.<sup>4</sup> But a slave, who could not acquire property, purchased land in the name of a free person with the assent of his master, and afterwards becoming free the resulting trust was enforced in his favor ;<sup>5</sup> and so, if the disability of the alien is removed by naturalization or otherwise, he may enforce a trust created while he was under disability.<sup>6</sup>

§ 132. Lord Hardwicke doubted whether the application of the rule was not confined to a single purchaser,<sup>7</sup> but it has been expressly decided and long acted upon, that if several make the purchase, pay the consideration, but take the title in

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.* ; *Kelley v. Jenness*, 50 Me. 455.

<sup>2</sup> *Union Bank v. Baker*, 8 Humph. 447.

<sup>3</sup> *Ex parte Yallop*, 15 Ves. 60 ; *Ex parte Houghton*, 17 Ves. 251 ; *Redington v. Redington*, 3 Ridg. 181 ; *Groves v. Groves*, 3 Y. & J. 163 ; *Camden v. Anderson*, 5 T. R. 709 ; *Proseus v. McIntre*, 5 Barb. 425 ; *Ford v. Lewis*, 10 B. Mon. 127 ; *Baldwin v. Campfield*, 4 Halst. Ch. 891 ; *Cutler v. Tuttle*, 19 N. J. Ch. 562.

<sup>4</sup> *Leggett v. Dubois*, 5 Paige, 114 ; *Hubbard v. Goodwin*, 3 Leigh, 492 ; *Philips v. Crammond*, 2 Wash. C. C. 441 ; *Taylor v. Benham*, 5 How. U. S. 270 ; *Farley v. Shippen*, Wythe, 135 ; *Alsworth v. Cordby*, 3 Mis. 32 ; *Childers v. Childers*, 1 De G. & J. 482 ; *Phillpotts v. Phillpotts*, 10 C. B. 85. But if such conveyance is not intended as a fraud upon the law, but is taken by an agent or attorney of the alien in his own name without authority, equity will protect the rights of the alien. *Austin v. Brown*, 6 Paige, 448 ; *McCow v. Galbrath*, 7 Rich. Law, 74.

<sup>5</sup> *Leiper v. Hoffman*, 26 Miss. 615.

<sup>6</sup> *Osterman v. Baldwin*, 6 Wallace, 116.

<sup>7</sup> *Crop v. Norton*, Barn. 179 ; 9 Mod. 233 ; 2 Atk. 74.

the name of a stranger, the trust will result to them jointly.<sup>1</sup> The same rule applies if several pay the consideration, and take the title to one of their number. If the parties contribute unequally to the payment of the consideration, the trust results to each of them in proportion to the amount paid by each.<sup>2</sup> In these cases, it is settled that a general contribution towards a purchase is not sufficient; but the person claiming a resulting trust must show that he paid some specific sum, for some distinct interest in, or aliquot part of, the estate, as for a specific share, as one-half or one-quarter, or other particular fraction of the whole; or for a particular interest, as for an estate for life or years, or in remainder in the whole estate.<sup>3</sup> Where two contribute funds and the proportions do not appear, the presumption is that the proportions are equal.<sup>4</sup>

§ 133. The trust must result, if at all, at the instant the deed is taken, and the legal title vests in the grantee. No

<sup>1</sup> *Baumgartner v. Guessfeld*, 38 Mo. 36; *Wray v. Steele*, 2 V. & B. 388; *Ross v. Hegeman*, 2 Edw. 373; *Larkins v. Rhoades*, 5 Porter, 196; *Powell v. Monson and Brim. Manufacturing Co.*, 3 Mason, 590; *Letcher v. Letcher*, 4 J. J. Marsh. 590; *Keaton v. Cobb*, 1 Dev. Ch. 439.

<sup>2</sup> *Rigden v. Walker*, 3 Atk. 735; *Lake v. Gibson*, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 291; *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 John. Ch. 405; *Quackenbush v. Leonard*, 9 Paige, 334; *Jackson v. Moore*, 6 Cow. 706; *Stewart v. Brown*, 2 Serg. & R. 461; *Morey v. Herrick*, 18 Penn. St. 129; *Buck v. Swazey*, 35 Me. 41; *Powell v. Monson and Brim. Manufacturing Co.*, 3 Mason, 347; *Pierce v. Pierce*, 7 B. Mon. 433; *Letcher v. Letcher*, 4 J. J. Marsh. 590; *Shoemaker v. Smith*, 11 Humph. 81; *Bernard v. Bongard*, Harr. Ch. 130; *Purdy v. Purdy*, 3 Md. Ch. 547; *Seaman v. Cook*, 14 Ill. 505; *Hall v. Young*, 37 N. H. 134; *Pinney v. Fellows*, 15 Vt. 525; *Brothers v. Porter*, 6 B. Mon. 106; *Bogert v. Perry*, 17 John. 351; *Jackson v. Bateman*, 2 Wend. 570; *Cloud v. Ivie*, 28 Mo. 578; *Baumgartner v. Guessfeld*, 38 Mo. 36; *Union College v. Wheeler*, 5 Lansing, 160; *McDonald v. McDonald*, 24 Ind. 68; *Kelley v. Jenness*, 50 Me. 455; *Dow v. Jewell*, 18 N. H. 340; *Frederick v. Haas*, 5 Nev. 389; *Case v. Coddling*, 38 Cal. 191; *Clark v. Clark*, 43 Vt. 685.

<sup>3</sup> *McGowan v. McGowan*, 14 Gray, 119; *Buck v. Warren*, ib. 122, n; *Baker v. Vining*, 30 Me. 121; *Sayre v. Townsends*, 15 Wend. 647; *White v. Carpenter*, 2 Paige, 217; *Perry v. McHenry*, 13 Ill. 227; *Crop v. Norton*, 2 Atk. 74; *Reynolds v. Morris*, 17 Ohio St. 510; *Cutler v. Tuttle*, 19 N. J. Ch. 561; 1 Lead. Ca. Eq. 276.

<sup>4</sup> *Shoemaker v. Smith*, 11 Humph. 81.

oral agreements, and no payments, before or after the title is taken, will create a resulting trust, unless the transaction is such at the moment the title passes that a trust will result from the transaction itself.<sup>1</sup> Thus, if two agree to purchase, and one furnishes all the money and takes the title to himself, no trust results to the other.<sup>2</sup> And so if two agree to purchase, and one pays the whole consideration money, and the title is taken to the two, no trust results to the one who paid the whole, he can only enforce repayment of one-half the consideration money.<sup>3</sup> There must be an actual payment from a man's own money, or what is equivalent to payment from his own money, to create a resulting trust.<sup>4</sup> And the money must

<sup>1</sup> *Frickett v. Durham*, 109 Mass. 422; *Rogers v. Murray*, 3 Paige, 390; *Dudley v. Batchelder*, 53 Me. 403; *Connor v. Lewis*, 16 Me. 275; *Pinnoch v. Clough*, 16 Vt. 500; *Taliaferro v. Taliaferro*, 6 Ala. 404; *McGowan v. McGowan*, 14 Gray, 119; *Barnard v. Jewett*, 97 Mass. 87; *Freeman v. Kelly*, 1 Hoff. 90; *Foster v. Trustees, &c.*, 3 Ala. 302; *Forsyth v. Clark*, 3 Wend. 637; *Steere v. Steere*, 5 John. Ch. 1; *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 John. Ch. 408; *Jackson v. Moore*, 6 Cow. 706; *White v. Carpenter*, 2 Paige, 218; *Page v. Page*, 8 N. H. 187; *Buck v. Pike*, 2 Fairf. 9; *Graves v. Dugan*, 6 Dana, 331; *Wallace v. Marshall*, 9 B. Mon. 148; *Gee v. Gee*, 2 Sneed, 395; *Kelly v. Johnson*, 28 Mo. 249; *Williard v. Williard*, 56 Penn. St. 119; *Nixon's App.* 63 Penn. St. 279; *Cutler v. Tuttle*, 19 N. J. Ch. 561; *Sheldon v. Harding*, 44 Ill. 68; *Kendall v. Mann*, 11 Allen, 15; *Davis v. Wetherell*, 11 Allen, 19; *Gerry v. Stimson*, 60 Me. 186; *Wheeler v. Kirtland*, 23 N. J. Eq. 13; *Tunnard v. Littell*, 23 N. J. Eq. 264; *Forsyth v. Clark*, 3 Wend. 657; *Davis v. Wetherell*, 11 Allen, 19, n.

<sup>2</sup> *Brooks v. Fowle*, 14 N. H. 248; *Tebbetts v. Tilton*, 31 N. H. 273; *Edwards v. Edwards*, 39 Penn. St. 369; *Coppage v. Barnett*, 34 Mis. 621; *Cook v. Bronaugh*, 8 Eng. 183; *Fowke v. Slaughter*, 3 A. K. Marsh. 56.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Sugd. V. & P. 575 (13th ed.); *Butler v. Rutledge*, 2 Cold. 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Wheeler v. Kirtland*, 23 N. J. Eq. 13; *Tunnard v. Littell*, 23 N. J. Eq. 264; *Roberts v. Ware*, 40 Cal. 634; *Page v. Page*, 8 N. H. 187; *Gomez v. Tradesman's Bank*, 4 Sandf. S. C. 106; *Coates v. Woodworth*, 13 Ill. 634; *Beck v. Graybill*, 4 Casey, 66; *Reeve v. Strawn*, 14 Ill. 94; *Ferguson v. Sutphen*, 3 Gil. 547; *Lounsbury v. Purdy*, 16 Barb. 380; *Runnells v. Jackson*, 1 How. (Miss.) 358; *Harrisburg Bank v. Tyler*, 3 Watts & S. 373; *Morey v. Herrick*, 18 Penn. St. 123; *Smith v. Sackett*, 5 Gilm. 534; *Kelly v. Johnson*, 28 Mo. 249; *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 John. Ch. 405; *Getman v. Getman*, 1 Barb. Ch. 499; *Wright v. King*, Harr. Ch. 12; *Bernard v. Bongard*, Harr. Ch. 130; *Dudley v. Batchelder*, 53 Me. 403; *Russell v.*

be advanced and paid in the character of a purchaser ; for if one pay the purchase-money by way of *loan* for another, and the conveyance is taken to the other, no trust will result to the one who thus pays the purchase-money ;<sup>1</sup> on the other hand, if one should advance the purchase-money and take the title to himself, but should do this wholly upon the account and credit of the other, he would hold the estate upon a resulting trust for the other.<sup>2</sup>

§ 134. A trust results from the acts, and not from the agreements, of the parties, or rather from the acts accompanied by the agreements ; but no trust can be set up by mere parol agreements, or, as has been said, no trust results from the breach of a mere parol contract ; as, if one agrees to purchase land and give another an interest in it, and he purchases and pays his own money, and takes the title in his own name, no trust can result.<sup>3</sup> And so if a party makes no payment, and

Allen, 10 Paige, 249 ; *Kirkpatrick v. McDonald*, 1 Jones, 393 ; *Smith v. Burnham*, 3 Sumner, 435 ; *White v. Sheldon*, 4 Nev. 280 ; *Kendall v. Mann*, 11 Allen, 15.

<sup>1</sup> *Bartlett v. Pickersgill*, 1 Eden, 516 ; *Crop v. Norton*, 9 Mod. 235 ; *White v. Carpenter*, 2 Paige, 217 ; *Henderson v. Hoke*, 1 Dev. & Bat. Ch. 119 ; *Dudley v. Batchelder*, 53 Me. 403 ; *Gibson v. Toole*, 40 Miss. 788.

<sup>2</sup> *Aveling v. Knipe*, 19 Ves. 441 ; *Page v. Page*, 8 N. H. 187 ; *Runnells v. Jackson*, 1 How. (Miss.) 358 ; *Lounsbury v. Purdy*, 18 N. Y. 515 ; 16 Barb. 380 ; *Buck v. Pike*, 2 Fairf. 9 ; *Morey v. Herrick*, 18 Penn. St. 123 ; *Kelly v. Johnson*, 28 Mo. 249 ; *Cutler v. Tuttle*, 19 N. J. Ch. 562 ; *Dryden v. Hanaway*, 3 Md. 254 ; *Fleming v. McHale*, 47 Ill. 282 ; *Honore v. Hutchins*, 8 Bush, 687.

<sup>3</sup> *Kisler v. Kisler*, 2 Watts, 323 ; *Williard v. Williard*, 56 Penn. St. 119 ; *Loomis v. Loomis*, 60 Barb. 22 ; *Stover v. Flack*, 41 Barb. 162 ; *Thorner v. Thorner*, 18 Ind. 462 ; *Rogers v. Simmons*, 55 Ill. 66 ; *Loomis v. Loomis*, 28 Ill. 454 ; *Green v. Cook*, 2 Ill. 196 ; *Duffy v. Masterson*, 44 N. Y. 557 ; *Whetham v. Clyde*, 1 (Pa.) Leg. Gaz. R. 55. But see *Hidden v. Jordan*, 21 Cal. 92 ; *Green v. Drummond*, 3 Md. 71 ; *Meason v. Kaine*, 63 Penn. St. 335 ; *Smith v. Hollenback*, 53 Ill. 223 ; *Lantry v. Lantry*, 51 Ill. 451. A trust resulting from the acts of the parties will not be converted into an express trust by the agreement of the parties, that is, it will not be any the less a resulting trust, and it will not be within the statute of frauds. *Cotton v. Wood*, 25 Io. 43.

none is made on his account, either actually or constructively, he cannot claim a resulting trust.<sup>1</sup> As where a father made a deed to a son-in-law, in consideration of love and affection for his daughter, no trust resulted.<sup>2</sup> And so a mere parol declaration by one that he is buying land for another is not sufficient to establish a resulting trust; there must be some proof of an actual or constructive payment by the person claiming such a trust.<sup>3</sup>

§ 135. Again, parol proof cannot be received to establish a resulting trust in lands purchased by an agent and paid for by his own funds, no money of the principal being used for the payment; for the relation of principal and agent depends upon the agreement existing between them, and the trust in such a case must arise from the agreement, and not from the transaction, and where a trust arises from an agreement, it is within the statute of frauds, and must be in writing.<sup>4</sup> This rule is

<sup>1</sup> *Jackson v. Ringland*, 4 Watts & S. 149; *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 John. Ch. 408; *Lathrop v. Hoyt*, 7 Barb. 60; *Dorsey v. Clark*, 4 Har. & J. 551; *Smith v. Smith*, 3 Casey, 180; *Fischili v. Dumaresly*, 3 Marsh. 23; *Sharp v. Long*, 4 Casey, 434; *Thompson v. Branch*, Meigs, 390; *Walker v. Brungard*, 13 S. & M. 723; *Ensley v. Ballentine*, 4 Humph. 233; *Lynn v. Lynn*, 5 Gil. 602; *Sample v. Coulson*, 9 Watts & Ser. 62; *Peebles v. Reading*, 8 Ser. & R. 484.

<sup>2</sup> *Thompson v. Thompson*, 18 Ohio St. 73.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*; *Kisler v. Kisler*, 2 Watts, 323; *Williard v. Williard*, 56 Penn. St. 119.

<sup>4</sup> *Kennedy v. Keating*, 34 Mo. 25; *Woodhull v. Osborne*, 2 Edw. Ch. 615; *Lathrop v. Hoyt*, 7 Barb. 60; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1201 a; *Bartlett v. Pickersgill*, 1 Ed. 515; 4 Burr. 22; 1 Cox, 15; 4 East, 577; *Rastel v. Hutchinson*, 1 Dick. 44; *Lamas v. Bayly*, 2 Vern. 627; *Atkins v. Rowe*, Mose. 39; *O'Hara v. O'Neil*, 2 Bro. P. C. 39; *Jackman v. Ringland*, 4 Watts & S. 149; *Peebles v. Reading*, 8 Ser. & R. 492; *Pinnock v. Clough*, 16 Vt. 507; *Flagg v. Mann*, 2 Sum. 546; *Walker v. Brungard*, 13 Sm. & M. 765; *Taliaferro v. Taliaferro*, 6 Ala. 406; *Moore v. Green*, 3 B Mon. 407; *Fowke v. Slaughter*, 3 A. K. Marsh. 57; *Dorsey v. Clarke*, 4 Har. & J. 551; *Pearson v. East*, 36 Ind. 28; *Minot v. Mitchell*, 30 Ind. 228; *Arnold v. Cord*, 16 Ind. 177; *Graves v. Ward*, 2 Duv. 301; *Heacock v. Coatesworth*, Clarke, 84. But where an attorney purchased property sold upon an execution in favor of his client at a grossly inadequate price, it was

so inflexible, that though the agent may be indicted, and convicted of perjury in denying his character as agent in his answer under oath, the court cannot decree and establish the trust.<sup>1</sup> But if an agent invest his principal's money in real estate without his knowledge, or if, investing the money with his knowledge, he take the deed in his own name without his consent, or take a deed in a form contrary to the understanding, there will be a resulting trust.<sup>2</sup> But if one standing in no fiduciary relation obtains another's property wrongfully and invests it in land in his own name, or if a clerk appropriates his master's money and buys real estate in his own name, there is no resulting trust.<sup>3</sup>

§ 136. In England, if two persons join in a purchase and contribute equally, and take the title in their own names, there is no reason to presume a resulting trust, and the two are joint tenants, the survivor taking the whole *jure accrescendi*.<sup>4</sup> And so if two contract for a purchase to them and their heirs, paying equal proportions, and one dies, the court will order a specific performance by a conveyance to the survivor alone.<sup>5</sup> But

held that he was a trustee for his principal. *Howell v. Baker*, 4 John. Ch. 118. See *Wade v. Pettibone*, 11 Ohio, 57; 14 Ohio, 557.

<sup>1</sup> *Bartlett v. Pickersgill*, 1 Ed. 515; *King v. Boston*, 4 East, 572.

<sup>2</sup> *Day v. Roth*, 18 N. Y. 448; *Bridenbecker v. Lowell*, 32 Barb. 9; *Pugh v. Pugh*, 9 Ind. 132; *Rothwell v. Dewees*, 2 Black, 613; *Bruce v. Ronly*, 18 Ill. 67; *Follansbe v. Kilbreth*, 17 Ill. 522; *Squire's App.* 70 Penn. St. 268; *Seichrist's App.* 16 P. F. Smith, 237.

<sup>3</sup> *Ensley v. Ballentine*, 4 Humph. 233; *Campbell v. Drake*, 4 Ired. Eq. 94. But where A. embezzled B.'s money and invested it in stock in the name of C., a mere volunteer, a resulting trust was enforced against C. in favor of B. *Bank of America v. Pollock*, 4 Edw. Ch. 415; and see *Pascoag Bank v. Hunt*, 3 Edw. 215; *ante*, § 128. See also *Newton v. Porter*, 5 Lansing, 417.

<sup>4</sup> *Robinson v. Preston*, 4 K. & J. 505; *Bone v. Pollard*, 24 Beav. 288; *Moyse v. Gyles*, 2 Vern. 385; *Hayes v. Kingdome*, 1 Vern. 33; *York v. Eaton*, 2 Freem. 23; *Aveling v. Knipe*, 19 Ves. 441; *Rigden v. Vallier*, 3 Atk. 735; *Lake v. Gibson*, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 291; *Anon.*, Carth. 15; *Rea v. Williams*, V. & P. (11th ed.); *Thicknesse v. Vernon*, 2 Freem. 84.

<sup>5</sup> *Aveling v. Knipe*, 19 Ves. 441.

the court lays hold of every circumstance to defeat the joint tenancy and convert it into a tenancy in common.<sup>1</sup> Thus, where two tenants in common of a joint mortgage term purchase the equity of redemption,<sup>2</sup> or several engage in a joint undertaking or partnership, or trade, or speculation,<sup>3</sup> or several purchase an estate and pay equally, but one improves the estate at his own cost,<sup>4</sup> equity will construe them to be tenants in common and not joint tenants. In this country, title by joint tenancy is very much reduced in extent, and the incident of survivorship is almost entirely destroyed by statutes, except in the case of trustees, executors, and others, in whom such a tenancy is necessary for the execution of their trusts.<sup>5</sup>

§ 137. The transaction out of which a trust results may be proved by parol.<sup>6</sup> The statute of frauds extends to and embraces

<sup>1</sup> *Robinson v. Preston*, 4 K. & J. 505; *Tompkins v. Mitchell*, 2 Rand. 428; *Brothers v. Porter*, 6 B. Mon. 106; *Barribeau v. Brant*, 17 How. 43.

<sup>2</sup> *Edwards v. Fashion*, Pr. Ch. 332; *Morly v. Bird*, 3 Ves. 631; *Rigden v. Vallier*, 3 Atk. 734; *Vickers v. Cowell*, 1 Beav. 529; *Partridge v. Pawlett*, 1 Atk. 467; *Anon.*, Carth. 16; *Petty v. Styward*, 1 Ch. R. 57; *Randall v. Phillips*, 3 Mason, 378.

<sup>3</sup> *Lake v. Gibson*, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 290; 3 P. Wms. 158; *York v. Eaton*, 2 Freem. 23; *Jackson v. Jackson*, 9 Ves. 597 n.; *Lyster v. Dolland*, 1 Ves. Jr. 434; *Jeffreys v. Small*, 1 Vern. 217; *Caines v. Grant*, 5 Binn. 119; *Duncan v. Forrer*, 6 Binn. 193; *Sigourney v. Munn*, 7 Conn. 11; *Overton v. Lacy*, 6 Monroe, 13; *Deloney v. Hutcheson*, 2 Rand. 183; *Cuyler v. Bradt*, 2 Ca. C. E. 326; *Pugh v. Currie*, 5 Ala. 446; *McAllister v. Montgomery*, 3 Hayw. 94; *Farley v. Shippen*, Wythe, 135. See *Appleton v. Boyd*, 7 Mass. 131; *Kinsley v. Abbott*, 19 Me. 430.

<sup>4</sup> *Lake v. Gibson*, 1 Eq. Ca. 291.

<sup>5</sup> See 4 Kent, Com. 396 (11th ed.).

<sup>6</sup> *Livermore v. Aldrich*, 5 Cush. 435; *Boyd v. McLean*, 1 John. Ch. 582; *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 John. Ch. 405; *Verplank v. Caines*, 1 John. Ch. 57; *Page v. Page*, 8 N. H. 187; *Scoby v. Blanchard*, 3 N. H. 170; *Pritchard v. Brown*, 4 N. H. 397; *Gardner Bank v. Wheaton*, 8 Greenl. 373; *Powell v. Monson & Brim. Manuf. Co.* 3 Mason, 347; *Elliott v. Armstrong*, 3 Blackf. 199; *Jennison v. Graves*, ib. 441; *Blair v. Bass*, 4 Blackf. 550; *Snelling v. Utterback*, 1 Bibb, 609; *Foote v. Bryant*, 47 N. Y. 544; *Peiffer v. Lytle*, 58 Penn. St. 386; *McGinity v. McGinity*, 6 Penn. St. 38; *Nixon's App.* 63 Penn. St. 277; *Byers v. Wackman*, 16 Ohio, 80, 440; *Faris v. Dunn*, 7 Bush, 276; *Caldwell v. Caldwell*, 7 Bush, 515. Other-

only trusts created or declared by the parties, and does not affect trusts arising by operation of law.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, such trusts are specially excepted in the statute of frauds of most States. The exception, however, was omitted in the statute of Rhode Island; but Mr. Justice Story held that the omission was immaterial, as such trusts were excepted in the nature of things.<sup>2</sup> It follows that a party setting up a resulting trust may prove by parol the agreements under which the estate was purchased, and he may prove by parol the actual payment of the purchase-money by himself, or in his behalf, although the deed states it to have been paid by the grantee in the conveyance.<sup>3</sup> And although the holder of the legal title has fraudulently or by mistake made a declaration that he holds the property for some other person,<sup>4</sup> or states it to be for the use of the grantor,<sup>5</sup> and although the trust, and all the circumstances out of which

wise in Michigan. *Groesbeck v. Seeley*, 13 Mich. 329; and see *Barbin v. Gasford*, 15 La. An. 539.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*; *Ross v. Hegeman*, 2 Edw. Ch. 373; *Larkin v. Rhodes*, 5 Porter, 196; *Enos v. Hunter*, 4 Gil. 211; *Smith v. Sackett*, 5 Gilm. 544; *Foote v. Bryant*, 47 N. Y. 544; *Black v. Black*, 4 Pick. 238; *Bryant v. Hendricks*, 5 Io. 256; *Judd v. Haseley*, 22 Io. 428.

<sup>2</sup> *Hoxie v. Carr*, 1 Sum. 187.

<sup>3</sup> *De Peyster v. Gould*, 2 Green, Ch. 474; *Dismukes v. Terry*, Walk. 197; *Peabody v. Tarbell*, 2 Cush. 232; *Barron v. Barron*, 24 Vt. 375; *Smith v. Burnham*, 3 Sum. 438; *Malin v. Malin*, 1 Wend. 626; *Harder v. Harder*, 2 Sandf. Ch. 17; *Peirce v. McKeehan*, 3 Barr. 136; *Lloyd v. Carter*, 17 Penn. St. 216; *Peebles v. Reading*, 8 Serg. & R. 484; *Millard v. Hathaway*, 27 Cal. 119; *Lyford v. Thurston*, 16 N. H. 399; *Bayles v. Baxter*, 22 Cal. 575; *Cooper v. Skeele*, 14 Io. 578. In *Kirk v. Webb*, Pr. Ch. 84, the court refused to admit parol evidence to control the recitals of the deed as to the payment of the consideration, and this decision was followed in *Heron v. Heron*, Pr. Ch. 163; *Freem. 248*; *Skitt v. Whitmore*, *Freem. 280*; *Kinder v. Miller*, Pr. Ch. 172; *Hooper v. Eyles*, 2 Vern. 480; *Newton v. Preston*, Pr. Ch. 103; *Cox v. Bateman*, 2 Ves. 19; *Ambrose v. Ambrose*, 1 P. Wms. 321; *Deg v. Deg*, 2 P. Wms. 414; but the rule has been changed, and the doctrine stated in the text is now established beyond controversy. *Bartlett v. Pickersgill*, 1 Eden, 515; *Lench v. Lench*, 10 Ves. 17; *Groves v. Groves*, 3 Y. & J. 163. See 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1201, and notes; *Livermore v. Aldrich*, 5 Cush. 435.

<sup>4</sup> *Hanson v. First Presbyterian Church*, 1 Stock. 441.

<sup>5</sup> *Cotton v. Wood*, 25 Io. 43.



it arises, may be denied under oath in the answer, yet the facts may all be proved by parol in opposition to the answer.<sup>1</sup> In such case the trust must be clearly alleged in the bill, not only in terms, but all the facts must be set out from which the trust is claimed to result.<sup>2</sup> And the facts in all cases must be proved with great clearness and certainty.<sup>3</sup> For this purpose all competent evidence is admissible, as the admissions of the nominal purchaser and grantee in the deed, recitals in the deed and other proper documents, and even circumstantial evidence, as that the means of the nominal purchaser were so limited that it was impossible for him to pay the purchase-money.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Cooth v. Jackson*, 6 Ves. 39; *Buck v. Pike*, 2 Fairf. 24; *Baker v. Vining*, 30 Me. 121; *Page v. Page*, 8 N. H. 187; *Moore v. Moore*, 38 N. H. 382; *Boyd v. McLean*, 1 John. Ch. 582; *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 John. Ch. 405; *Swinburne v. Swinburne*, 28 N. Y. 568; *Snelling v. Utterback*, 1 Bibb, 609; *Lloyd v. Lynch*, 28 Penn. St. 419; *Letcher v. Letcher*, 4 J. J. Marsh. 590; *Miller v. Stokely*, 5 Ohio St. 194; *Elliott v. Armstrong*, 2 Blackf. 198; *Jenison v. Graves*, ib. 440; *Blair v. Bass*, 4 ib. 540; *Larkins v. Rhodes*, 5 Porter, 196; *Farringer v. Ramsey*, 2 Md. 365; *Greer v. Baughman*, 13 Md. 257; *Ensley v. Ballentine*, 4 Humph. 233; *Paine v. Wilcox*, 16 Wis. 202; *Olive v. Dougherty*, 3 Io. 371; *Vandever v. Freeman*, 20 Tex. 333; *Pugh v. Bell*, 1 J. J. Marsh. 399.

<sup>2</sup> *Rowell v. Freese*, 23 Me. 182; *Hickey v. Young*, 1 J. J. Marsh. 1; *Gascoigne v. Thwing*, 1 Vern. 366; *Rider v. Kidder*, 10 Ves. 364; *Groves v. Groves*, 3 Y. & J. 163; *Halcott v. Morkant*, Pr. Ch. 168; *Goodright v. Hodges*, 1 Watk. Corp. 229; *Willis v. Willis*, 2 Atk. 71.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*; *Slocumb v. Marshall*, 2 Wash. C. C. 397; *Newton v. Preston*, Pr. Ch. 103; *Wright v. King*, Harr. Ch. 12; *Enos v. Hunter*, 4 Gilm. 211; *Carey v. Callan*, 6 B. Mon. 44; *O'Hara v. O'Neil*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 475; *Cottington v. Fletcher*, 2 Atk. 155; *Ambrose v. Ambrose*, 1 P. Wms. 321. As to what facts are competent and necessary to be proved, see *Hunter v. Marlboro'*, 2 Wood. & M. 168; *Morey v. Herrick*, 18 Penn. St. 128; *Blyholder v. Gibson*, 18 Penn. St. 134; *Farringer v. Ramsey*, 4 Md. Ch. 33; *Malin v. Malin*, 1 Wend. 626; *Harder v. Harder*, 1 Sandf. 17; *Snelling v. Utterback*, 1 Bibb, 609; *Freeman v. Kelly*, 1 Hoff. 90; *Baker v. Vining*, 30 Me. 128; *Clarke v. Quackenboss*, 27 Ill. 260; *Nelson v. Warrall*, 20 Io. 409; *White v. Weldon*, 4 Nev. 280; *Stall v. Cincinnati*, 16 Ohio St. 169; *Browne v. Stamp*, 21 Md. 328; *Holder v. Nunnelle*, 2 Cold. 288; *Childs v. Gramold*, 19 Io. 362; *Cutler v. Tuttle*, 19 N. J. Ch. 560; *Parmlee v. Sloan*, 37 Ind. 469; *Phelps v. Seeley*, 22 Gratt. 573; *Shepard v. Pratt*, 32 Io. 296.

<sup>4</sup> *Willis v. Willis*, 2 Atk. 71; *Wilkins v. Stevens*, 1 Y. & C. Ch. Ca.

But loose and equivocal facts ought not to control the evidence of deeds; and two witnesses, or one witness with corroborating circumstances, are required to control an answer under oath. And proof of mere admissions of one that he purchased for another, without proof of some previous arrangement or advance of money by such other, is insufficient to create a resulting trust.<sup>1</sup>

§ 138. It has been stated by some writers that *after the death of the supposed nominal purchaser*, parol proof alone could not be admitted to control the express declaration of the deed;<sup>2</sup> but the cases relied upon are the cases before cited to the point that parol proof is inadmissible, both before and after the death of the supposed nominal purchaser. These cases are overruled; and it would seem upon principle that the death of the nominal purchaser cannot affect the admissibility of parol testimony, whatever effect it may have upon its weight.<sup>3</sup> Analogous to this matter is the question whether *trust money* can be followed into land by parol evidence; and it is clearly established that it may, on the ground that a purchase with trust

431; *Lench v. Lench*, 10 Ves. 518; *Benger v. Drew*, 1 P. Wms. 780; *Strimpfler v. Roberts*, 18 Penn. St. 283; *Baumgartner v. Guessfeld*, 38 Mo. 36; *Brown v. Petney*, 3 Ill. 468; *Farrell v. Lloyd*, 69 Penn. St. 239; *Sayre v. Frederick*, 1 C. E. Green, 205; *Gascoigne v. Thwing*, 1 Vroom, 366; *Willis v. Willis*, 2 Atk. 71; *Gravés v. Graves*, 3 Y. & J. 170; *Mitchell v. O'Neil*, 4 Nev. 504.

<sup>1</sup> *Sidle v. Walter*, 5 Watts, 389; and see *Sample v. Coulson*, 9 W. & S. 62. The admissions of a trustee that he purchased certain property with the trust fund is competent evidence to raise a resulting trust for the *cestui que trust* in that property. *Harrisburg Bank v. Tyler*, 3 Watts & S. 373.

<sup>2</sup> *Sanders on Uses and Trusts*, 259; note to *Lloyd v. Spillett*, 2 Atk. 150; *Roberts on Statute of Frauds*, 99.

<sup>3</sup> *Lewin on Trusts*, 138 (5th Lond. ed.), 2 Mad. Ch. Pr. 141; *Sugd. V. & P.* 136 (9th ed.); *Lench v. Lench*, 10 Ves. 117; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1201, n.; *Livermore v. Aldrich*, 5 Cush. 435; *Unitarian So. v. Woodbury*, 14 Me. 281; *De Peyster v. Gould*, 2 Green, Ch. 474; *Harrisburg Bank v. Tyler*, 3 W. & S. 373; *Harder v. Harder*, 2 Sand. Ch. 17; *McCammon v. Pettitt*, 3 Sneed, 242; *Fausler v. Jones*, 7 Ind. 277; *Neill v. Keese*, 5 Tex. 23; *Freeman v. Kelly*, 1 Hoff. 90.

money is virtually a purchase paid for by the *cestui que trust*, and such a purchase is a trust by operation of law, and not within the statute of frauds.<sup>1</sup> And if a trustee pay for property out of the trust fund, and take the deed in the name of another, the trust results to the *cestui que trust*, and not to the trustee.<sup>2</sup>

§ 139. It follows that as a resulting trust may be shown by parol proof, as a presumption of law arising out of the transaction, so the presumption may be rebutted by parol proof, showing that no trust was intended by the parties, and that it was the intention to confer the beneficial interest upon the supposed nominal purchaser. As the resulting trust is mere matter of equitable presumption, it may be rebutted by facts that negative the presumption; and whatever facts appear tending to prove that it was intended that the nominal purchaser should take the beneficial interest as well as the legal title, negatives the presumption.<sup>3</sup> The presumption may be negated as to part of the estate, and prevail in part.<sup>4</sup> The presumption,

<sup>1</sup> *Lench v. Lench*, 10 Ves. 517; *Trench v. Harrison*, 17 Sim. 111; *ante*, §§ 127, 128.

<sup>2</sup> *Russell v. Allen*, 10 Paige, 249; *Wynn v. Sharer*, 23 Ind. 573.

<sup>3</sup> *Rider v. Kidder*, 10 Ves. 364; *Benbow v. Townsend*, 1 M. & K. 508; *Goodright v. Hodges*, 1 Watk. Cop. 227; *Lofft*, 230; *Rundle v. Rundle*, 2 Vern. 252; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 1 Atk. 386; *Redington v. Redington*, 3 Ridg. 106; *Beecher v. Major*, 2 Drew. & Sm. 431; *Garrick v. Taylor*, 29 Beav. 79; 4 De G., F. & J. 159; *Bellasis v. Compton*, 2 Vern. 294; *Maddison v. Andrew*, 1 Ves. 58; *Baker v. Vining*, 30 Me. 126; *Page v. Page*, 8 N. H. 189; *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 John. Ch. 405; *White v. Carpenter*, 2 Paige, 217; *Jackson v. Feller*, 2 Wend. 465; *Steere v. Steere*, 5 John. Ch. 18; *Creed v. Lancaster Bank*, 1 Ohio St. 1; *Sewell v. Baxter*, 2 John. Md. Ch. 448; *Hays v. Hollis*, 8 Gill, 369; *McGuire v. McGowen*, 4 Des. 487; *Elliott v. Armstrong*, 2 Blackf. 199; *Phillips v. Crammond*, 2 Wash. C. C. 441; *Myers v. Myers*, 1 Casey, 100; *Squire v. Harder*, 1 Paige, 494; *Ledge v. Morse*, 16 John. 199; *Smith v. Howell*, 3 Stockt. 122; *Bayles v. Baxter*, 22 Cal. 375; *McCue v. Gallagher*, 23 Cal. 51; *Byers v. Danley*, 27 Ark. 77; *Hays v. Quay*, 68 Penn. St. 263.

<sup>4</sup> *Benbow v. Townsend*, 1 M. & K. 506; *Rider v. Kidder*, 10 Ves. 360; *Lane v. Dighton*, Amb. 409; *Pinney v. Fellows*, 15 Vt. 525.

however, is in favor of the trust resulting to the party paying the consideration, and the burden of proof is upon the mere nominal purchaser to show that he was intended to have some beneficial interest.<sup>1</sup>

§ 140. And when a clear understanding is had at the time the purchase is made, the money paid, and the deed taken, by which understanding the nominal purchaser was to have both the legal and the beneficial interest, it is incompetent for the person who paid the purchase-money to put a different construction upon the transaction at a subsequent time, and claim a resulting trust in the estate contrary to the understanding and intention at the time.<sup>2</sup> And if the nominal purchaser, under such circumstances, should afterwards agree to hold in trust for, or to execute a conveyance to the person who paid the money, courts would not enforce the agreement, if it was without a new consideration or voluntary.<sup>3</sup> So if the trust is declared in writing at the time of the transaction, there can be no resulting trust, as the one precludes the other;<sup>4</sup> or if the nominal purchaser stipulates for something out of the transaction inconsistent with the trust.<sup>5</sup>

§ 141. Courts will not enforce a resulting trust after a great lapse of time, or laches on the part of the supposed *cestui que trust*, especially when it appears that the supposed nominal purchaser has occupied and enjoyed the estate.<sup>6</sup> But if the

<sup>1</sup> *Dudley v. Bosworth*, 10 Humph. 12; 2 Sugd. V. & P. 139 (9th ed.).

<sup>2</sup> *Groves v. Groves*, 3 Y. & J. 172; *Hunt v. Moore*, 6 Cush. 1; *White v. Sheldon*, 4 Nev. 280; *Robles v. Clarke*, 25 Cal. 317.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Clark v. Burnham*, 2 Story, 1; *Anstice v. Brown*, 6 Paige, 448; *Leggett v. Dubois*, 5 Paige, 114; *Alexander v. Warrance*, 17 Mo. 230; *Mercer v. Stark*, 1 Sm. & M. 479; *Dennison v. Goehring*, 7 Barr, 175.

<sup>5</sup> *Dow v. Jewell*, 21 N. H. 470.

<sup>6</sup> *Delane v. Delane*, 7 Bro. P. C. 279; *Clegg v. Edmonson*, 8 De G., M. & G. 787; *Groves v. Groves*, 3 Y. & J. 172; *Peebles v. Reading*, 8 Ser. &

trust is admitted, and there has been no adverse holding, lapse of time is no bar.<sup>1</sup>

§ 142. The legislature of New York has abolished trusts resulting from the payment of the consideration by one and the taking the title in the name of another, except in cases where the nominal grantee has taken the deed without the knowledge and consent of the party paying the money, or except the purchase is made with another's money in violation of some duty or trust.<sup>2</sup> But the statute saves the rights of creditors of the party paying the purchase-money and taking the title in the name of another.<sup>3</sup> If such a purchase is a fraud upon creditors, they may enforce the trust in equity, though the original purchaser and payer of the money would have no remedy; <sup>4</sup> but if the debt is barred by a discharge in bankruptcy, the creditor's lien is gone.<sup>5</sup> In Kentucky, trusts resulting from the payment of the money and the purchase in

R. 484; *Graham v. Donaldson*, 5 Watts, 471; *Haines v. O'Conner*, 10 Watts, 315; *Lewis v. Robinson*, 10 Watts, 338; *Buckford v. Wade*, 17 Ves. 97; *Robertson v. Macklin*, 3 Hayw. 70; *Strimpfler v. Roberts*, 18 Penn. St. 283; *Sunderland v. Sunderland*, 19 Io. 325; *Douglass v. Lucas*, 63 Penn. St. 11; *Best v. Campbell*, 62 Penn. St. 478; *Brown v. Guthrie*, 27 Texas, 610; *Hall v. Doran*, 13 Io. 368.

<sup>1</sup> *Dow v. Jewell*, 18 N. H. 340.

<sup>2</sup> *Linsley v. Sinclair*, 24 Mich. 380.

<sup>3</sup> Rev. Stat. 1859, part II. (Vol. III., p. 15), c. 1, art. 6, §§ 52, 53, 57; *Bodine v. Edwards*, 10 Paige, 504; *Brewster v. Power*, 10 Paige, 562; *Wil-link v. Vanderveer*, 1 Barb. 599; *Norton v. Storer*, 8 Paige, 222; *Reid v. Fitch*, 11 Barb. 399; *Lounsbury v. Purdy*, 16 Barb. 376; 18 N. Y. 515; *Jencks v. Alexander*, 11 Paige, 619; *Watson v. Le Row*, 6 Barb. 481; *Russell v. Allen*, 10 Paige, 250; *Siemon v. Schureck*, 29 N. Y. 598; *Swinburne v. Swinburne*, 28 N. Y. 568; *Stover v. Flock*, 21 Barb. 162; *Safford v. Hind*, 39 Barb. 625; *Buffalo R. R. Co. v. Lampson*, 47 Barb. 533; *Gilbert v. Gilbert*, 1 Keyes (N. Y.), 159. See the comments of Church, Ch. J., upon this last case in *Foot v. Bryant*, 47 N. Y. 561; and see *Gilbert v. Gilbert*, 2 N. Y. Dec. 256; *Farrell v. Lloyd*, 69 Penn. St. 239.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*; *Jackson v. Forrest*, 2 Barb. Ch. 576; *McCartney v. Bostwick*, 32 N. Y. 53.

<sup>5</sup> *Ocean Nat. Bank v. Alcott*, 46 N. Y. 12.

the name of another are abolished, but an action is given for the recovery of the money paid.<sup>1</sup> In Massachusetts, the creditors of such a purchaser, taking the title in the name of a third person, may levy their execution upon the land, in the same manner as if the purchaser had taken the title directly to himself.<sup>2</sup> And so in New Hampshire.<sup>3</sup> The statute of New York has been strictly construed, and therefore if A makes a purchase, and pays the money, and takes the title in the name of B, upon a parol trust for C, it is not within the statute; and C may enforce the trust as against B.<sup>4</sup> Statutes similar to the statute of New York have been passed in Michigan<sup>5</sup> and Wisconsin.<sup>6</sup> In Louisiana, express trusts have been abolished; but trusts arising from the nature of transactions, or by implication of law, are still enforced by the courts.<sup>7</sup>

§ 143. As before stated, if a purchaser of an estate pays the consideration money, and takes the title in the name of a stranger, the presumption is that he intended some benefit for himself, and a resulting trust arises for him;<sup>8</sup> but if the purchaser take the conveyance in the name of a wife or child, or other person, for whom he is under some natural, moral, or legal obligation to provide, the presumption of a resulting trust is rebutted, and the contrary presumption arises, that the pur-

<sup>1</sup> *Martin v. Martin*, 5 Bush, 47; as to the rule in Minnesota, see *Durpee v. Pavitt*, 14 Minn. 424.

<sup>2</sup> Gen. Stat. 1860, c. 103, § 1; Stat. 1844, c. 107; *Foster v. Durant*, 2 Gray, 538, amending the law as ruled in *How v. Bishop*, 3 Met. 26; *Clark v. Chamberlain*, 12 Allen, 257.

<sup>3</sup> *Hutchins v. Heywood*, 50 N. H. 591.

<sup>4</sup> *Siemon v. Austin*, 33 Barb. 9; *Siemon v. Schurch*, 29 N. Y. 598; *Foot v. Bryant*, 44 N. Y. 544.

<sup>5</sup> R. S. 1846, c. 63, § 4; *Groesbeck v. Seeley*, 13 Mich. 329; *Fisher v. Fobes*, 22 Mich. 454.

<sup>6</sup> R. S. 1858, c. 84, §§ 7-9.

<sup>7</sup> *Gaines v. Chew*, 2 How. 619; *McDonough's Ex's v. Murdock*, 15 How. 367.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, § 126.

chase and conveyance were intended to be an advancement for the nominal purchaser.<sup>1</sup> The transaction will be regarded *prima facie* as a settlement upon the nominal grantee, and if the payer of the money claims a resulting trust he must rebut this presumption by proper evidence.<sup>2</sup> Lord Ch. B. Eyre stated the doctrine thus: "The circumstance of one or more of the nominees being a child or children of the purchaser is held to operate by *rebutting the resulting trust*; and it has been determined in so many cases that the nominee being a child shall have such operation, as a *circumstance of evidence*, that it would be disturbing landmarks if we suffered either of these propositions to be called into question; viz., that such circumstance shall rebut the resulting trust, and that it shall do so as a circumstance of evidence. It would have been a more simple

<sup>1</sup> *Murless v. Franklin*, 1 Swans. 17; *Grey v. Grey*, 2 Swans. 597; *Finch*, 340; *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, 93; 1 *Watk. Cop.* 219; *Redington v. Redington*, 2 *Ridg.* 176; *Elliot v. Elliot*, 2 Ch. Ca. 231; *Sidmouth v. Sidmouth*, 2 *Beav.* 454; *Thomas v. Chicago*, 55 *Ill.* 403; *Graff v. Rohrer*, 35 *Md.* 327; *Christy v. Courtenay*, 13 *Beav.* 96; *Lamplugh v. Lamplugh*, 1 *P. Wms.* 111; *Goodright v. Hodges*, 1 *Watk. Cop.* 228; *Pole v. Pole*, 1 *Ves.* 76; *Woodman v. Morrell*, 2 *Freem.* 33; *Finch v. Finch*, 15 *Ves.* 50; *Mumma v. Mumma*, 2 *Vern.* 19; *Skeats v. Skeats*, 2 *N. C. C.* 9; *Wait v. Day*, 4 *Denio*, 439; *Wilton v. Devine*, 20 *Barb.* 9; *Jackson v. Matsdorf*, 11 *John.* 91; *Proseus v. McIntire*, 5 *Barb.* 424; *Partridge v. Havens*, 10 *Paige*, 678; *Guthrie v. Gardner*, 19 *Wend.* 414; *Reid v. Fitch*, 11 *Barb.* 399; *Page v. Page*, 8 *N. H.* 187; *Astreen v. Flanagan*, 3 *Edw. Ch.* 279; *Bodine v. Edwards*, *ib.* 504; *Dennison v. Goehring*, 7 *Barr.* 182 *n.*; *Knouff v. Thompson*, 16 *Penn. St.* 357; *Fleming v. Donahoe*, 5 *Ohio*, 255; *Tremper v. Burton*, 18 *Ohio*, 418; *Stanley v. Brannon*, 6 *Blackf.* 193; *Whitten v. Whitten*, 3 *Cush.* 194; *Fatheree v. Fletcher*, 31 *Miss.* 265; *Welton v. Devine*, 20 *Barb.* 9; *Butler v. Ins. Co.* 14 *Ala.* 777; *Douglass v. Price*, 4 *Rich. Eq.* 322; *Taylor v. James*, 4 *Des.* 6; *Thompson v. Thompson*, 1 *Yerg.* 97; *Dudley v. Bosworth*, 10 *Humph.* 12; *Alexander v. Warrance*, 2 *Bennett*, 230; *Cartwright v. Wise*, 14 *Ill.* 417; *Shepherd v. White*, 10 *Tex.* 72; *Baker v. Leathers*, 3 *Ind.* 557; *Guthrie v. Gardner*, 19 *Wend.* 414; *Hill v. Pine River Bank*, 45 *N. H.* 300; *Shaw v. Read*, 47 *Penn. St.* 96; *Dickenson v. Davis*, 44 *N. H.* 647.

<sup>2</sup> *Jackson v. Matsdorf*, 11 *John.* 91; *Shepherd v. White*, 10 *Texas*, 72; *Proseus v. McIntire*, 5 *Barb.* 425; *Butler v. Ins. Co.* 14 *Ala.* 777; *Hill v. Pine River Bank*, 45 *N. H.* 300.

doctrine, if children had been considered as *purchasers for valuable consideration*. That way of considering it would have shut out all the circumstances of evidence which have found their way into the cases, and would have prevented some very nice distinctions, not very easily understood. Considering it as a circumstance of evidence, there must, of course, be evidence admitted on the other side. *Thus the question is resolved into one of intent*, which was getting into a very wide sea, without very certain guides.”<sup>1</sup> And Lord Nottingham pointed out, that the law of resulting trusts, in this respect, was analogous to uses before the statute, “for the feoffment of a stranger, before the statute, without consideration, raised a use in the feoffor; but a feoffment by a father to a son, without other consideration, raised no use by implication in the father, for the consideration of blood settled the use in the son, and made it an advancement.”<sup>2</sup>

§ 144. This rule embraces all persons for whom the purchaser is under any obligation, legal or moral, to provide. It embraces daughters as well as sons,<sup>3</sup> although a distinction was once attempted, on the ground that it is not so common to settle lands upon daughters as upon sons.<sup>4</sup> It embraces estates bought in the name of a wife,<sup>5</sup> and in the joint names of the

<sup>1</sup> *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, 94.

<sup>2</sup> *Grey v. Grey*, 2 Swans. 598.

<sup>3</sup> *Gorge's Case*, Cro. Car. 550; 2 Swans. 600; *Clarke v. Danvers*, 1 Ch. Ca. 310; *Woodman v. Morrell*, 2 Freem. 33; *Jennings v. Selleck*, 1 Vern. 467; *Bedwell v. Froome*, 2 Cox, 97; *Back v. Andrew*, 2 Vern. 120; *Baker v. Leathers*, 3 Ind. 558; *Murphy v. Nathans*, 46 Penn. St. 508. *Astreen v. Flanagan*, 3 Edw. Ch. 279, was the case of an adopted daughter.

<sup>4</sup> *Gilb. Lex Præt.* 272.

<sup>5</sup> *Glaister v. Hewer*, 8 Ves. 199; *Dummer v. Pitcher*, 2 M. & K. 262; *Kingdom v. Bridges*, 2 Vern. 67; *Christ's Hospital v. Budgin*, 2 Vern. 683; *Back v. Andrew*, ib. 120; *Benger v. Drew*, 1 P. Wms. 780; *Wallace v. Bowens*, 28 Vt. 138; *Guthrie v. Gardner*, 19 Wend. 414; *Welton v. Devine*, 20 Barb. 9; *Garfield v. Hatmaker*, 15 N. Y. 475; *Jencks v. Alexander*, 11 Paige, 619; *Astreen v. Flanagan*, 3 Edw. Ch. 279; *Kline's App.* 39 Penn. St. 463; *Alexander v. Warrance*, 2 Bennett, 230; *Drew v. Martin*, 32 L. J.



wife and the purchaser ;<sup>1</sup> also, in the names of the wife and children.<sup>2</sup> So, in the names of a son and a stranger, in which case, the moiety to the son will be an advancement,<sup>3</sup> but the moiety in the name of the stranger, will be presumed to be in trust for the purchaser.<sup>4</sup> And, if a grandparent purchase in the name of a grandchild, whether the father is or is not dead, it will be presumed to be an advancement, and not a trust ;<sup>5</sup> and so a purchase by a person who has placed himself *in loco parentis* to the nominal grantee, will be presumed to be a settlement, and not a trust, for the purchaser.<sup>6</sup> And if the nominal grantee is an illegitimate child of the purchaser, the same presumption will arise ;<sup>7</sup> or, if the nominal grantee be an idiot,<sup>8</sup> or a son-in-law.<sup>9</sup> But, if the nominal grantee be a brother of the purchaser, the law will presume a trust and not an advancement, on the ground that there is no such obligation on one brother to support or provide for another, that the

Ch. 367; *Graff v. Rohrer*, 35 Md. 327; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 16 Minn. 512; *Thomas v. Chicago*, 55 Ill. 403. But if there is no legal marriage, the conveyance will be presumed to be a trust, and not an advancement. *Soar v. Foster*, 4 K. & J. 152.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> *Dummer v. Pitcher*, 2 M. & K. 262, 5 Sim. 35; *Kingdom v. Bridges*, 2 Vern. 67; *Back v. Andrew*, *ib.* 120.

<sup>3</sup> *Lamplugh v. Lamplugh*, 1 P. Wms. 111; *Kingdom v. Bridges*, 2 Vern. 67; *Rumboll v. Rumboll*, 1 Ed. 17.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ebrand v. Dancer*, 2 Ch. Ca. 26; *Lloyd v. Read*, 1 P. Wms. 607; *Curran v. Jago*, 1 Coll. 265 n (c); *Tucker v. Burrow*, 2 Hem. & M. 525; *Kilpin v. Kilpin*, 1 M. & K. 520.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* But it is said that such purchase will not be presumed to be an advancement if the conveyance is taken to a remote relative, or to a stranger, although the real purchaser may have placed himself *in loco parentis*. *Tucker v. Burrow*, 2 Hem. & Mill. 515; *Powys v. Mansfield*, 3 My. & Cr. 359.

<sup>7</sup> *Beckford v. Beckford*, Loft. 490; *Kilpin v. Kilpin*, 1 M. & K. 556; *Anon.* 1 Wal. Jr. 107; *Kimmel v. McRight*, 2 Barr, 38; *Soar v. Foster*, 4 K. & J. 160. But it is said that this rule will not apply to the illegitimate child of a legitimate child. *Tucker v. Burrow*, 2 Hem. & Mill. 525.

<sup>8</sup> *Cartwright v. Wise*, 14 Ill. 417.

<sup>9</sup> *Baker v. Leathers*, 3 Porter, 558.

purchase can be presumed to be made for such a purpose;<sup>1</sup> so, if one sister pay the money, and take the conveyance in the name of another sister.<sup>2</sup> And, where the nominal grantee stands in the relation of *mother* or *nephew* to the real purchaser, no presumption of an advancement or settlement will arise, but it will be presumed to be a trust, unless the purchaser stands *in loco parentis* to the nominal grantee.<sup>3</sup> And if the son stands in the relation of solicitor to his mother, a purchase made by her, in his name, will be presumed to be a trust, as the relation of solicitor and client rebuts the presumption of an advancement,<sup>4</sup> and so, it is said, the rule does not apply to any purchase made by a mother, in the name of a child.<sup>5</sup> A purchase by a wife in the name of her husband may be shown to be a trust.<sup>6</sup> The rule applies to personal as well as real property.<sup>7</sup>

§ 145. The general principle is, that a purchase by the parent, in the name of a child, is presumed to be an advancement, and not a trust. This presumption is one of fact, and may be rebutted by evidence or circumstances; and some courts have been astute in finding circumstances and subtle distinctions, to rebut this presumption. Thus, if the child was an infant, it was thought that a parent would not confer upon it an absolute property, which it was incapable of managing;<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Maddison v. Andrew, 1 Ves. 58; Edwards v. Edwards, 39 Penn. St. 369; Foster v. Foster, 34 L. J. Ch. 428.

<sup>2</sup> Keaton v. Cobb, 1 Dev. Ch. 439; Field v. Lonsdale, 14 Jur. 995; 13 Beav. 78.

<sup>3</sup> Currant v. Jago, 1 Coll. N. C. 263; Lamplugh v. Lamplugh, 1 P. Wms. 111; Taylor v. Alston, 2 Cox, 97; Edwards v. Field, 3 Mad. 237; Jackson v. Feller, 2 Wend. 465.

<sup>4</sup> Garrett v. Wilkinson, 2 De G. & Sm. 244.

<sup>5</sup> *In re De Visme*, 2 De G., J. & Sm. 17.

<sup>6</sup> McGovern v. Knox, 21 Ohio St. 552.

<sup>7</sup> Devoy v. Devoy, 3 Sm. & Gif. 403; Dummer v. Pitcher, 2 M. & K. 262; Bone v. Pollard, 24 Beav. 283; Sidmouth v. Sidmouth, 2 Beav. 447; Fox v. Fox, 15 Ir. Ch. 89.

<sup>8</sup> Binion v. Stone, 2 Freem. 169; Nels. 68; 2 Freem. 128, c. 151.

and so, if the interest was reversionary, and not capable of present enjoyment, it was said that the father could not have intended it as a provision and settlement, or advancement.<sup>1</sup> Again, if a father took the conveyance in his own name jointly with his son, it was supposed that the presumption of an advancement was rebutted, on the ground that the father had some interest in one half, and might have the whole by survivorship, while the son could not sever the joint tenancy till he arrived at age.<sup>2</sup> And, if a father took a grant to himself and sons, upon *successive* lives, it was thought that, as the father must use some names beside his own, those of his sons' being used from prudential and family reasons, rebutted the presumption of an advancement, and raised the presumption of a trust,<sup>3</sup> and so the circumstance that a child was already provided for was held to rebut the presumption of a further advancement.<sup>4</sup> Again, if a father purchased in the name of an adult son, and kept the actual possession of the estate, and received the rents and profits, the presumption of an advance was supposed to be rebutted, and the presumption of a trust created.<sup>5</sup>

§ 146. But these objections have all been overruled, and from the manner these distinctions are disposed of, a general principle applicable to every case may be stated, "that reasons which partake of too great a degree of refinement should not prevail against a rule of property which is so well established as to become a landmark, and which, whether right or wrong, should

<sup>1</sup> Rumboll v. Rumboll, 2 Ed. 17 ; Finch v. Finch, 15 Ves. 43 ; Murless v. Franklin, 1 Swans. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Stileman v. Ashdown, 2 Atk. 480 ; Pole v. Pole, 1 Ves. 76.

<sup>3</sup> Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cox, 95 ; 1 Watk. Cop. 221 ; Dickinson v. Shaw, 2 Cox, 95.

<sup>4</sup> Elliot v. Elliot, 2 Ch. Ca. 231 ; Pole v. Pole, 1 Ves. 76 ; Grey v. Grey, 2 Swans. 600 ; Finch, 341 ; Lloyd v. Read, 1 P. Wms. 608 ; Redington v. Redington, 3 Ridg. 190.

<sup>5</sup> Gilb. Lex Præt. 271.

be carried throughout,"<sup>1</sup> and Lord Eldon added, that this principle of law, that a purchase is presumed *prima facie* to be an advancement, is not to be frittered away by mere refinements.<sup>2</sup> Therefore it is now established that a purchase in the name of an infant child is *prima facie* an advancement,<sup>3</sup> and the purchase of a reversionary interest in the name of a child falls within the same rule,<sup>4</sup> so a purchase by a father, in the joint names of himself and son,<sup>5</sup> or in the joint names of a son and a stranger,<sup>6</sup> and so if a father take an estate for successive lives, as his own and his sons'.<sup>7</sup> If a child in whose name the purchase is made is already provided for, it will be a circumstance to be considered with other evidence; but it will not of itself rebut the presumption of an advancement. Lord Loughborough said, "that a purchase under such circumstances by a father in the name of a son *was not*, but *might* be, a trust for the father."<sup>8</sup> If a father purchase in the name of a son, whether an infant or an adult, and keep the actual possession of the estate, and receive the profits, it will be presumed that the purchase was an advancement,<sup>9</sup> for if the son was an infant, the father would be its natural guardian, or *quasi* guardian,

<sup>1</sup> By Ch. B. Eyre, *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, 98.

<sup>2</sup> *Finch v. Finch*, 15 Ves. 50.

<sup>3</sup> *Finch v. Finch*, 15 Ves. 50; *Mumma v. Mumma*, 2 Vern. 19; *Lamplugh v. Lamplugh*, 1 P. Wms. 111; *George's Case*, 2 Swans. 600; *Collinson v. Collinson*, 3 De G., M. & G. 403; *Skeats v. Skeats*, 2 Y. & C. Ch. Ca. 9; *Christy v. Courtenay*, 13 Beav. 19.

<sup>4</sup> *Rumboll v. Rumboll*, 2 Ed. 17; *Murless v. Franklin*, 1 Swans. 13; *Finch v. Finch*, 15 Ves. 43.

<sup>5</sup> *Dummer v. Pitcher*, 2 M. & K. 272; *Grey v. Grey*, 2 Swans. 599; *Back v. Andrews*, 2 Verm. 120; *Scroope v. Scroope*, 1 Ch. Ca. 27; *Thompson v. Thompson*, 1 Yerg. 97.

<sup>6</sup> *Hayes v. Kingdom*, 1 Vern. 34; *Kingdom v. Bridges*, 2 Vern. 67; *Lamplugh v. Lamplugh*, 1 P. Wms. 111.

<sup>7</sup> *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, 95.

<sup>8</sup> *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, 93; *Redington v. Redington*, 3 Ridg. 190; *Sidmouth v. Sidmouth*, 2 Beav. 456; *Kilpin v. Kilpin*, 1 M. & K. 542.

<sup>9</sup> *Grey v. Grey*, 2 Swans. 600; *Redington v. Redington*, 3 Ridg. 190; *Lamplugh v. Lamplugh*, 1 P. Wms. 111.

and protector, and thus receive the rents of the estate.<sup>1</sup> And if the son was an adult, the natural reverence and submission due from children to their parents would account for the circumstances.<sup>2</sup> But any contemporaneous acts wholly inconsistent with the intention of an advancement to the child will make him a trustee for the father. Thus, if there is any circumstance accompanying the purchase which explains why it was taken in the wife's or child's name, and shows that it was not intended to be an advancement, but was intended to be a trust for the husband or father, the presumption of an advancement will be rebutted, and the inference of a trust will be established.<sup>3</sup>

§ 147. Whether a purchase in the name of wife or child is an advancement or not, is a question of pure intention, though presumed in the first instance to be a provision and settlement; therefore, any antecedent or contemporaneous acts or facts may be received, either to rebut or support the presumption,<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Mumma v. Mumma*, 2 Vern. 19; *Fox v. Fox*, 15 Ir. Ch. 89; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 1 Atk. 386; *Lamplugh v. Lamplugh*, 1 P. Wms. 111; *Lloyd v. Read*, ib. 608; *George's Case*, Cro. Car. 550; 2 Swans. 600; *Stileman v. Ashdown*, 2 Atk. 480; *Christy v. Courtenay*, 13 Beav. 96.

<sup>2</sup> *Grey v. Grey*, 2 Swans. 600; *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, 95; *Woodman v. Morrell*, 2 Freem. 32, note by Hovenden; *Shales v. Shales*, ib. 252; *Scawen v. Scawen*, 1 Y. & C. Ch. Ca. 65; *Murless v. Franklin*, 1 Swans. 17; *Redington v. Redington*, 3 Ridg. 190; *Sidmouth v. Sidmouth*, 2 Beav. 447; *Elliot v. Elliot*, 2 Ch. Ca. 231; *Williams v. Williams*, 32 Beav. 370; *Lloyd v. Read*, 1 P. Wms. 607.

<sup>3</sup> *Pranker v. Pranker*, 1 S. & S. 1; *Baylis v. Newton*, 1 Vern. 28; *Birch v. Blgrave*, Amb. 264; *Farr v. Davis*, 8 East, 354; *Perkins v. Nichols*, 11 Allen, 542; *Balford v. Crane*, 1 Greene, Ch. 265; *Skillman v. Skillman*, 2 McCarter, 478; *Gibson v. Foote*, 40 Miss. 788; *Cook v. Bremond*, 27 Tex. 457; *Sunderland v. Sunderland*, 19 Io. 325; *Clark v. Clark*, 43 Vt. 685.

<sup>4</sup> *Christy v. Courtenay*, 13 Beav. 96; *Baylis v. Newton*, 2 Vern. 28; *Shales v. Shales*, 2 Freem. 252; *Tucker v. Burrow*, 2 Hem. & M. 524; *Collinson v. Collinson*, 3 De G., M. & G. 409; *Murless v. Franklin*, 1 Swans. 19; *Lloyd v. Read*, 1 P. Wms. 607; *Taylor v. Alston*, cited 2 Cox, 96; *Grey v. Grey*, 2 Swans. 600; *Williams v. Williams*, 32 Beav. 370;

and any acts or facts so immediately after the purchase, as to be fairly considered a part of the transaction, may be received for the same purpose.<sup>1</sup> And so the declarations of the real purchaser, either before or at the time of the purchase, may be received to show whether he intended it as an advancement or a trust.<sup>2</sup> Such declarations are received, not as declarations of a trust by parol or otherwise, but as evidence to show what the intention was at the time. They are parts of the transaction, or words accompanying an act.<sup>3</sup> The real purchaser, if otherwise competent, may be a witness to state what his objects, purposes, and intentions were in making the purchase and in taking the title in the name of his wife or child.<sup>4</sup> Of course, declarations made by the husband or father after the purchase are incompetent to control the effect of the prior transaction.<sup>5</sup> But such declarations may be used by the wife or child against the purchaser to show that it was a settlement and not a trust.<sup>6</sup> And the after declarations of the nominal

*Redington v. Redington*, 3 Ridg. 177; *Rawleigh's Case*, cited Hard. 497; *Prankerd v. Prankerd*, 1 S. & S. 1; *Swift v. Davis*, 8 East, 354, n. (a); *Hall v. Hall*, 1 Connor & Law. 120; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 4 Gilm. 303; *Slack v. Slack*, 26 Miss. 290; *Johnson v. Matsdorf*, 11 John. 91; *Butler v. M. Ins. Co.* 14 Ala. 777; *Dudley v. Bosworth*, 10 Humph. 12; *Hayes v. Kindersley*, 2 Sm. & Gif. 194; *Peer v. Peer*, 3 Stockt. 432.

<sup>1</sup> *Jeans v. Cooke*, 24 Beav. 521; *Redington v. Redington*, 3 Ridg. 196; *Prankerd v. Prankerd*, 1 S. & S. 1; *Murless v. Franklin*, 1 Swans. 17; *Swift v. Davis*, 8 East, 354, n. (a).

<sup>2</sup> *Devoy v. Devoy*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 403; *Grey v. Grey*, 2 Swans. 594; *Kilpin v. Kilpin*, 1 M. & K. 520; *Sidmouth v. Sidmouth*, 2 Beav. 455; *Scawen v. Scawen*, 1 N. C. C. 65.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*; *Baker v. Leathers*, 3 Ind. 558.

<sup>4</sup> *Devoy v. Devoy*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 403; *Stone v. Stone*, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 708.

<sup>5</sup> *Tremper v. Burton*, 18 Ohio, 418; *Christy v. Courtenay*, 13 Beav. 96; *Williams v. Williams*, 32 Beav. 32; *Sidmouth v. Sidmouth*, 2 Beav. 456; *Elliot v. Elliot*, 2 Ch. Ca. 221; *Woodman v. Morrel*, 2 Freem. 33; *Finch v. Finch*, 15 Ves. 51; *Birch v. Blagrove*, Amb. 266; *Skeats v. Skeats*, 2 Y. & C. Ch. Ca. 9; *Gilb. Lex Præt.* 271; *Murless v. Franklin*, 1 Swans. 13; *Crabb v. Crabb*, 1 M. & K. 519; *Prankerd v. Prankerd*, 1 S. & S. 1; *Hubble v. Osborne*, 31 Ind. 249.

<sup>6</sup> *Redington v. Redington*, Ridg. 195; *Sidmouth v. Sidmouth*, 2 Beav. 455.

grantee may be used against him, but not in his favor.<sup>1</sup> But the declarations must be direct and certain, and where possible should be corroborated by other facts and circumstances; for courts will not act upon mere declarations, if they are conflicting, vague, or inconsistent with themselves.<sup>2</sup>

§ 148. If a father pays the purchase-money, and the wife or child, by fraud, or any wrongful act, and against the intention of the real purchaser, obtains the conveyance in her or its name, the presumption of an advancement would be rebutted, and the presumption of a trust would arise for the father.<sup>3</sup> So if a son pay the purchase-money and the deed is made to his father by mistake, a trust results to the son.<sup>4</sup>

§ 149. If a purchaser and payer of the money take the conveyance in the name of a wife or child, for the purpose of delaying, hindering, or defrauding his creditors, the conveyance is void, or a trust results which creditors can enforce to the extent of their debts.<sup>5</sup> If, however, the parent was not indebted at the time, subsequent creditors could not defeat the

<sup>1</sup> *Scawen v. Scawen*, 1 N. C. C. 65; *Jeans v. Cook*, 24 Beav. 521; *Sidmouth v. Sidmouth*, 2 Beav. 455; *Pole v. Pole*, 1 Ves. 76; *Murless v. Franklin*, 1 Swans. 20; *Willard v. Willard*, 56 Penn. St. 119.

<sup>2</sup> *Grey v. Grey*, 2 Swans. 597; *Scawen v. Scawen*, 1 N. C. C. 65; *Cartwright v. Wise*, 14 Ill. 417; *Cairns v. Colburn*, 104 Mass. 247.

<sup>3</sup> *Peer v. Peer*, 3 Stockt. 432; *Hall v. Doran*, 13 Iowa, 368; *Perkins v. Nichols*, 11 Allen, 542.

<sup>4</sup> *Fairhurst v. Lewis*, 23 Ark. 435.

<sup>5</sup> *Christ's Hospital v. Budgin*, 2 Vern. 684; *Lush v. Wilkinson*, 5 Ves. 384; *Townshend v. Westacott*, 2 Beav. 340; *Stileman v. Ashdown*, 2 Atk. 477; *Guthrie v. Gardner*, 19 Wend. 414; *Jencks v. Alexander*, 11 Paige, 619; *Watson v. Le Row*, 6 Barb. 487; *Newell v. Morgan*, 2 Harr. 225; *Bell v. Hallenback*, Wright, 751; *Edgington v. Williams*, Wright, 439; *Parrish v. Rhodes*, Wright, 339; *Creed v. Lancaster Bank*, 1 Ohio St. 1; *Demaree v. Driskill*, 3 Blackf. 115; *Doyle v. Sleeper*, 1 Dana, 531; *Rucker v. Abell*, 8 B. Mon. 566; *Crozier v. Young*, 3 Mon. 158; *Gowing v. Rich*, 1 Ired. 553; *Croft v. Arthur*, 3 Des. 223; *Elliott v. Hart*, 10 Ala. 348; *Abney v. Kingsland*, 10 Ala. 355; *Cutter v. Griswold*, Walk. Ch. 437; *Kimmel v. McRight*, 2 Barr, 38; *McCartney v. Bostwick*, 32 N. Y. 53.

title, nor enforce the trust,<sup>1</sup> unless the settlement or conveyance was made for the purpose of afterwards running in debt and defrauding creditors. In some States, as in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, an execution against the debtor can be levied directly upon the land in the hands of the trustee, in other States the lands can only be reached in equity.

§ 150. A very common case of a resulting trust is where the owner of both the legal and equitable estate conveys the legal title only, without conveying the equitable interest.<sup>2</sup> The general rule in such case is, that wherever it appears, upon a conveyance, devise, or bequest, that it was intended that the grantee, devisee, or legatee, should take the legal estate only, the equitable interest, or so much of it as is left undisposed of, will result, if arising out of the settlor's realty, to himself or his heirs, if out of his personal estate, to himself, his executors or administrators.<sup>3</sup> Whether the conveyance was intended to convey the beneficial as well as the legal estate is sometimes a matter of presumption by the court from all the circumstances of the case, and sometimes it is expressed upon the instrument itself in such manner that no doubts can arise. When it is matter of presumption, parol evidence may be received to rebut or sustain the presumption.<sup>4</sup> But where the trust results

<sup>1</sup> *Creed v. Lancaster Bank*, 1 Ohio St. 1; *Knouff v. Thompson*, 16 Penn. St. 357; *Dillard v. Dillard*, 3 Humph. 41; *Cutler v. Tuttle*, 19 N. J. Ch. 556.

<sup>2</sup> *Morice v. Bishop of Durham*, 10 Ves. 537; *Paice v. Canterbury*, 14 Ves. 370.

<sup>3</sup> *Lewin on Trusts*, 115 (5th ed. Lond.); *Levet v. Needham*, 2 Vern. 138; *Wych v. Packington*, 3 Bro. B. C. 44; *Sewell v. Denny*, 10 Beav. 315; *Halford v. Stains*, 16 Sim. 488; *Barrett v. Buck*, 12 Jur. 771; *Cooke v. Dealy*, 22 Beav. 196; *Fletcher v. Ashburner*, 1 Bro. Ch. 501; *Re Cross's Estate*, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 260; *Hogan v. Staghorn*, 65 N. C. 279.

<sup>4</sup> *Cook v. Hutchinson*, 1 Keen, 50; *Docksey v. Docksey*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 506; 3 Bro. P. C. 39; *North v. Crompton*, 1 Ch. Ca. 196; 2 Vern. 253; *Mallabar v. Mallabar*, Cas. t. Tal. 78; *Petit v. Smith*, 1 P. Wms. 7; *Nourse v. Finch*, 1 Ves. Jr. 344; *Walton v. Walton*, 14 Ves. 318; *Langham v. Sanford*, 2 Nev. 6; *Gladding v. Yapp*, 5 Mod. 56; *Lake v. Lake*, 1 Wils.



by force of the written instrument, it cannot be controlled, rebutted, or defeated by parol evidence of any kind.<sup>1</sup>

§ 151. No general rule can be stated, that will determine when a conveyance will carry with it a beneficial interest, and when it will be construed to create a trust; but the intention is to be gathered in each case from the general purpose and scope of the instrument.<sup>2</sup> A conveyance to a wife or child will be presumed to carry a beneficial interest,<sup>3</sup> but such consideration is only a circumstance of evidence.<sup>4</sup> It has been said, that if a man transfer property to another, it must be presumed that it proceeded from an intention to benefit the other by making the gift and conferring the beneficial interest;<sup>5</sup> but if such intention cannot be inferred consistently with all the circumstances attending the transaction, a trust will result.<sup>6</sup> The heir is not to be excluded from a resulting trust upon bare conjecture;<sup>7</sup> there must be positive evidence of a benefit in-

313; *Amb. 126*; *Trimmer v. Bayne*, 7 Ves. 520; *Williams v. Jones*, 10 Ves. 77.

<sup>1</sup> *Langham v. Sanford*, 17 Ves. 442; 19 Ves. 643; *Rachfield v. Careless*, 2 P. Wms. 158; *Gladding v. Yapp*, 5 Mad. 59; *White v. Evans*, 4 Ves. 21; *Walton v. Walton*, 14 Ves. 322; *Petit v. Smith*, 1 P. Wms. 7; *Nourse v. Finch*, 1 Ves. Jr. 344; *Ralston v. Telfair*, 2 Dev. Eq. 255; *Hughes v. Evans*, 13 Sim. 496; *White v. Williams*, 3 V. & B. 72; *Love v. Gaze*, 8 Beav. 472.

<sup>2</sup> *Hill v. Bishop of London*, 1 Atk. 620; *Walton v. Walton*, 14 Ves. 322; *Starkey v. Brooks*, 1 P. Wms. 391; *King v. Dennison*, 1 Ves. & B. 279; *Ellis v. Selby*, 1 M. & K. 298.

<sup>3</sup> *Christ's Hospital v. Budgin*, 2 Vern. 683; *Jennings v. Selleck*, 1 Vern. 467; *Grey v. Grey*, 2 Swans. 598; *Elliott v. Elliott*, 2 Ch. Ca. 232; *Hayes v. Kingdom*, 1 Vern. 33; *Baylis v. Newton*, 2 Vern. 28; *Cook v. Hutchinson*, 1 Keen, 42; *Cripps v. Jee*, 4 Bro. Ch. 472; *Rogers v. Rogers*, 3 P. Wms. 193; *Lloyd v. Spillett*, 2 Atk. 566; *Robinson v. Taylor*, 2 Bro. Ch. 594; *Smith v. King*, 16 East, 283; *Coningham v. Mellish*, Pr. Ch. 31.

<sup>4</sup> *Huggins v. Yates*, 9 Mod. 122; *Wych v. Packington*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 507; *King v. Dennison*, 1 Ves. & B. 474.

<sup>5</sup> *George v. Howard*, 7 Price, 651.

<sup>6</sup> *Custance v. Cunningham*, 13 Beav. 363.

<sup>7</sup> *Halliday v. Hudson*, 3 Ves. 211; *Kellett v. Kellett*, 3 Dow, 248;

tended to the devisee, and not merely negative evidence that none was intended for the heir; for the beneficial interest results to the heir, not from the intention of the ancestor, but because he has expressed no intention.<sup>1</sup> Thus, a trust may result upon a legacy given to the heir;<sup>2</sup> but the circumstance of being heir, with other circumstances, will be strong evidence that no trust was intended.<sup>3</sup> But in no case will the court permit the grantee to retain the beneficial interest, if there was any mistake on the part of the grantor,<sup>4</sup> or any fraud on the part of the grantee.<sup>5</sup> If the grantor intended a fraud upon the law, there can be no resulting trust;<sup>6</sup> however, even in this case, if the grantee admits the trust, the court will enforce it.<sup>7</sup> If a conveyance has been made upon a valuable consideration, there can be no resulting trust to the grantor, as the payment of a valuable consideration imports an intention to benefit the grantee in case the trusts declared fail, or are imperfectly declared, or do not take effect for any other reason.<sup>8</sup>

*Amphlett v. Parke*, 2 R. & M. 227; *Phillips v. Phillips*, 1 M. & K. 661; *Salter v. Cavanagh*, 1 Dru. & Walsh, 668.

<sup>1</sup> *Hopkins v. Hopkins*, Cas. t. Talbot, 44; *Tregonwell v. Sydenham*, 3 Dow, 211; *Lloyd v. Spillett*, 2 Atk. 151; *Habergham v. Vincent*, 2 Ves. Jr. 225.

<sup>2</sup> *Randall v. Bookey*, 2 Vern. 425; Pr. Ch. 162; *Starkey v. Brooks*, 1 P. Wms. 390, overruling *North v. Crompton*, 1 Ch. Ca. 196; *Killett v. Killett*, 1 Ball & B. 543; 3 Dow, P. C. 248.

<sup>3</sup> *Rogers v. Rogers*, 5 P. Wms. 193; Sel. Ch. Ca. 81; *Mallabar v. Malabar*, Cas. t. Talb. 78; and other cases above cited.

<sup>4</sup> *Birch v. Blagrove*, Amb. 264; *Woodman v. Morrell*, 2 Freem. 33; *Childers v. Childers*, 1 De G. & Jon. 482; *Att'y-Gen. v. Poulden*, 8 Sim. 472.

<sup>5</sup> *Lloyd v. Spillett*, 2 Atk. 150; Barn. 388; *Hutchins v. Lee*, 1 Atk. 488; *Young v. Peachy*, 2 Atk. 254-257; 2 Vern. 307; *Tipton v. Powell*, 2 Cold. 119.

<sup>6</sup> *Cottington v. Fletcher*, 2 Atk. 156; *Chaplin v. Chaplin*, 3 P. Wms. 233; *Muckleston v. Brown*, 6 Ves. 68.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> *Kerlin v. Campbell*, 15 Penn. St. 500; *Gibson v. Armstrong*, 7 B. Mon. 481; *Brown v. Jones*, 1 Atk. 158; *Ridout v. Dowding*, 1 Atk. 419.

§ 152. Thus, if upon a conveyance, devise, or bequest, a trust is declared of a part of the estate only, or the purposes of the trust do not exhaust the whole beneficial interest, the trust in the remaining part or interest will result to the settlor or his heirs;<sup>1</sup> for the reason that a declaration of trust as to part is considered sufficient evidence that the settlor did not intend the donee to take the beneficial interest in the whole, and that the creation of the trust was the sole object of the transaction. But a distinction must be observed between a devise to a person for a particular purpose, with no intention of conferring upon him any beneficial interest, and a devise with a view of conferring the beneficial interest, but subject to a particular charge, wish, or desire. Thus, if a gift be made to one and his heirs, charged with the payment of debts, it is a gift for a particular purpose, but not for that purpose only; and if it is the intention to confer upon the donee of the legal estate a beneficial interest after the particular purpose is satisfied without exhausting the whole estate, the surplus goes to the donee and does not result.<sup>2</sup> But if the gift is *upon a trust to pay debts*, that is a gift for a particular purpose and nothing more. If the whole estate is given for that one purpose, and that purpose does not exhaust the whole estate, the remainder

<sup>1</sup> *Northen v. Carnegie*, 4 Drew. 587; *Lloyd v. Spillett*, 2 Atk. 150; *Barn. 388*; *Cottington v. Fletcher*, 2 Atk. 155; *Culpepper v. Aston*, 2 Ch. Ca. 115; *Cook v. Gwavas*, cited *Roper v. Radcliffe*, 9 Mod. 187; *Sherrard v. Harborough*, Amb. 165; *Hobart v. Suffolk*, 2 Vern. 644; *Halliday v. Hudson*, 3 Ves. 210 a; *Killett v. Killett*, 3 Dow, 248; *Davidson v. Foley*, 2 Bro. Ch. 203; *Levet v. Needham*, 2 Vern. 138; *Kiricke v. Bransbey*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 508; *Robinson v. Taylor*, 2 Bro. Ch. 589; *Mapp v. Elcock*, 2 Phil. 793; 3 H. L. Ca. 492; *Read v. Stedman*, 26 Beav. 495; *Dawson v. Clarke*, 18 Ves. 254; *Wych v. Packington*, 3 Bro. Ch. 44; *Bristol v. Hungerford*, 2 Vern. 645; *Hill v. Cook*, 1 V. & B. 173; *Mullen v. Bowman*, 1 Coll. N. C. 197; *Loring v. Elliott*, 16 Gray, 568.

<sup>2</sup> *Hill v. London*, 1 Atk. 619; *King v. Dennison*, 1 V. & B. 260; *Southouse v. Bate*, 2 V. & B. 396; *Mullen v. Bowman*, 1 Coll. N. C. 197; *Dawson v. Clarke*, 18 Ves. 247; *Walton v. Walton*, 14 Ves. 313; *Wood v. Cox*, 1 Keen, 317; 2 M. & Cr. 684; *Downer v. Church*, 44 N. Y. 647; *Clarke v. Hilton*, L. R. 2 Eq. 810; *Irvine v. Sullivan*, L. R. 8 Eq. 673.

results to the donor or his heirs.<sup>1</sup> Or as Vice-Chancellor Wood stated the rule: (1) where there is a gift to one to enable him to do something, where he has a choice whether he will do it or not, then the gift is for his own benefit, the motive why it is given to him being stated; (2) where you find the gift is for the general purposes of the will, then the person who takes the estate cannot take the surplus after satisfying the trust for his own benefit; (3) where a charge is created by the will, the devisee takes the surplus for his own benefit, and no trust is implied.<sup>2</sup>

§ 153. If from the whole instrument there can be gathered an intention to benefit the donee, no trust in the remainder will result, as where a man made *his dearly beloved wife his sole heiress and executrix* to pay his debts and legacies, and there was a residue after paying debts and legacies, there was no resulting trust, for the expressions in the will indicated an intention to benefit the donee.<sup>3</sup> So any other expressions, that indicate an intention that the donee shall be benefited after the particular purposes are satisfied, will prevent a trust from

<sup>1</sup> *King v. Dennison*, 1 V. & B. 272.

<sup>2</sup> *Barrs v. Fewke*, 2 Hem. & M. 60; 11 Jur. (N. S.) 669; *Sanderson's Trust*, 3 K. & J. 497; *Saltmarsh v. Barrett*, 29 Beav. 474; 3 De G., F. & J. 279; *Pollard's Trusts*, 32 L. J. Ch. 657; *Henderson v. Cross*, 17 Jur. (N. S.) 177; *Hale v. Horne*, 21 Gratt. 112. In *Cooke v. Stationers' Co.* 3 My. & K. 262, Sir John Leach said: "If the devise to a particular, or for a particular, purpose, be intended by the testator to be an exception from the gift to the residuary devisee, the heir takes the benefit of the failure; but if it be intended to be a charge only upon the estate devised, and not an exception from the gift, the devisee will be entitled to the benefit of the failure." Thus if lands be devised to A. charged with a legacy to B. if he attain the age of twenty-one, the devise will become absolute in A. if B. dies before he becomes twenty-one. And the will is to read as if B. was not named in it. *Tregonwell v. Sydenham*, 3 Dow, 210; *Sprigg v. Sprigg*, 2 Vern. 394; *Cruse v. Barley*, 3 P. Wms. 20; *Att'y-Gen. v. Milner*, 3 Atk. 112; *Croft v. Slee*, 4 Ves. 60; *Sutcliffe v. Cole*, 3 Drew. 185; *Jackson v. Hurlack*, 2 Eden, 263; *Tucker v. Kayess*, 4 K. & J. 339.

<sup>3</sup> *Rogers v. Rogers*, 3 P. Wms. 193; *Cook v. Hutchinson*, 1 Keen, 42.

resulting.<sup>1</sup> So expressions of affection or relationship will be evidence upon the question, whether a trust was intended to result after the particular trusts are satisfied.<sup>2</sup> If the donee is an infant incapable of executing a trust, or a married woman, it will be evidence upon the same question.<sup>3</sup> But if from the whole will it is apparent that the donee shall not take a beneficial interest, all such circumstances go for nothing.<sup>4</sup>

§ 154. If the donee, to whom an estate is given upon a trust declared as to part, is also the heir, or other person to whom the trust for the remainder would result, or if he is one of a class, such gift to him will not prevent him from taking by the resulting trust the part that may come to him.<sup>5</sup> So a legacy or other beneficial gift to him will not exclude him from the resulting interest,<sup>6</sup> even if the interest given him is to arise out of the declared trust.<sup>7</sup>

§ 155. The doctrine of resulting trusts, where a trust is declared as to part only, was formerly much discussed in cases of gifts to executors for the payment of debts and legacies. In such cases at common law the appointment of the executor entitled him, both at law and equity, to all the remainder of the personal property after the payment of debts and legacies, unless it was specially disposed of by the testator in the will. Courts were always astute to find circumstances to repel the

<sup>1</sup> *Meredith v. Heneage*, 1 Sim. 555; *Wood v. Cox*, 2 M. & Cr. 692; *Cook v. Hutchinson*, 1 Keen, 42.

<sup>2</sup> *Rogers v. Rogers*, 3 P. Wms. 193; *Coningham v. Mellish*, Pr. Ch. 31; *King v. Dennison*, 1 V. & B. 274; *Hobart v. Suffolk*, 2 Vern. 644.

<sup>3</sup> *Williams v. Jones*, 10 Ves. 77; *Blinkhorn v. Feast*, 2 Ves. Sr. 27.

<sup>4</sup> *King v. Mitchell*, 8 Pet. 349; *King v. Dennison*, 1 V. & B. 275.

<sup>5</sup> *Hennershotz's Estate*, 16 Penn. St. 435.

<sup>6</sup> *Farrington v. Knightly*, 1 P. Wms. 545; *Rutland v. Rutland*, 2 P. Wms. 213; *Andrews v. Clark*, 2 Ves. Sr. 162; *North v. Pardon*, 2 Ves. Sr. 495.

<sup>7</sup> *Starkey v. Brooks*, 1 P. Wms. 390; *Randal v. Bookey*, 2 Vern. 425; Pr. Ch. 162; *Killett v. Killett*, 1 B. & B. 543; 3 Dow, P. C. 248.

beneficial interest in the executor, and to raise a resulting trust for the next of kin, or heir-at-law, and it was finally enacted, 1 Will. IV., c. 40, that such executors should be trustees of any residue, unless it plainly appeared by the will that they were intended to take the residue beneficially.<sup>1</sup> In the United States the rule never prevailed, but executors always took as trustees for those entitled to the distribution of the personal estate, unless it was expressly disposed of to some other persons, or unless it was expressly given to the executor beneficially.<sup>2</sup>

§ 156. In this connection an important exception to the general doctrine of resulting trusts should be stated. If property is given to trustees by grant or devise for charitable uses *generally*, and the particular purpose is not declared at all, or, if declared, does not exhaust the whole estate, there will be no resulting trust for the donor, his heirs, or next of kin, in either case; nor will the donees take any beneficial interest, but the court will direct the trustees to administer the whole estate under some scheme for charitable purposes.<sup>3</sup>

§ 157. If a gift is made by deed or will upon *trust*, and no trust is declared,<sup>4</sup> or a bequest is made to one named, as exec-

<sup>1</sup> See 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1208, and the elaborate note cited from Fon. Eq. B. 2, c. 5, § 3, note (k).

<sup>2</sup> Hill on Trustees, 1234 (Am. ed.); 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1208, 1209; as the doctrine has never prevailed in America, it is not worth while to state all the learning and nice distinctions of the courts. They will be found in Hill, Story, and Fonblanque as above cited.

<sup>3</sup> Cook v. Dunkensfield, 2 Atk. 567; Metford School, 8 Co. 130; Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 73; Att'y-Gen. v. Bristol, 2 J. & W. 308; Mills v. Farmer, 1 Mer. 55; Att'y-Gen. v. Haberdashers' Co. 4 Bro. Ch. 103; see *post*, chapter upon Charitable Trusts, where this matter is stated at large.

<sup>4</sup> Att'y-Gen. v. Windsor, 8 H. L. Ca. 369; 24 Beav. 679; Gloucester v. Wood, 1 H. L. Ca. 272; 3 Hare, 181; Dawson v. Clark, 18 Ves. 254; Dunnage v. White, 1 J. & W. 583; Morice v. Durham, 10 Ves. 537; Woollett v. Harris, 5 Mad. 452; Southouse v. Bate, 2 Ves. & B. 396; Goodere v. Lloyd, 3 Sim. 538; Pratt v. Sladden, 14 Ves. 198; Anon.

utor, "to enable him to carry into effect the trusts of the will," and none are declared,<sup>1</sup> or a gift is made upon *trusts* thereafter to be declared, and no declaration is ever made,<sup>2</sup> the legal title only will pass to the grantee or devisee, while a trust in the equitable interest will result to the settlor, his heirs, or legal representatives, according to the nature of the property, whether real or personal; for it appears upon the instrument itself that the legal title alone was intended for the first taker, and that the equitable interest was intended to go to some other person, and as such other person cannot take the equitable interest for want of a declaration of the trust, it results to the settlor or his heirs.<sup>3</sup> So if a testator says that he gives the residue, and stops there,<sup>4</sup> or if he cancels a residuary bequest by drawing a line through it.<sup>5</sup> But if it should plainly appear from the whole instrument that the donee is to take beneficially in case the trusts are not declared, no trust will result to the owner or heir.<sup>6</sup>

§ 158. It is to be observed, however, that the intention of the instrument is to be gathered from its general scope; hence,

1 Com. 345; *Penfold v. Bouch*, 4 Hare, 271; *Brown v. Jones*, 1 Atk. 101; *Sidney v. Shelley*, 19 Ves. 359; *Emblyn v. Freeman*, Pr. Ch. 542; *Coard v. Holderness*, 20 Beav. 147; *Longley v. Longley*, L. R. 13 Eq. 137.

<sup>1</sup> *Barrs v. Fewke*, 2 Hem. & M. 60.

<sup>2</sup> *London v. Garway*, 2 Vern. 571; *Collins v. Wakeman*, 2 Ves. Jr. 683; *Emblyn v. Freeman*, Pr. Ch. 541; *Fitch v. Weber*, 6 Hare, 145; *Brookman v. Hales*, 2 V. & B. 45; *Brown v. Jones*, 1 Atk. 188; *Sidney v. Shelley*, 19 Ves. 352; *Taylor v. Haygarth*, 14 Sim. 8; *Flint v. Warren*, 16 Sim. 124; *Onslow v. Wallis*, 1 H. & Tw. 513; 1 McN. & G. 506; *Jones v. Goodchild*, 3 P. Wms. 33; *Sturtevant v. Jaques*, 14 Allen, 526; *Shaw v. Spencer*, 100 Mass. 388.

<sup>3</sup> *Aston v. Wood*, L. R. 6 Eq. 419; *Jones v. Bradley*, L. R. 3 Eq. 635.

<sup>4</sup> *Cloyne v. Young*, 2 Ves. Sr. 91; *Langham v. Sandford*, 17 Ves. 435; *Mapp v. Elcock*, 2 Phil. 793.

<sup>5</sup> *Mence v. Mence*, 18 Ves. 348; *Skrymsher v. Northcote*, 1 Swans. 566.

<sup>6</sup> *Sidney v. Shelley*, 19 Ves. 352. Whether a trust results to a debtor in an unclaimed dividend. *Dillaye v. Greenough*, 45 N. Y. 438.

although the words *upon trust* are very strong evidence of the donor's intention not to confer the beneficial interest upon the donee,<sup>1</sup> yet it may be negatived by the context, and the general interpretation of the whole paper;<sup>2</sup> so, if the donee is called a *trustee*, the term may be shown to apply to one of two funds, and the donee may take a beneficial interest in the other,<sup>3</sup> or it may be so used as to be a mere *descriptio personæ*, and although no beneficiary is named, a trust does not necessarily result to the grantor.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand it may appear, from the whole instrument, that the donee is not to take the beneficial interest, although the words *upon trust*, or *trustee*, are not used, as where there is a direction that the donee shall be allowed his costs and expenses out of the fund given him, which would be without meaning if he took the whole beneficial interest in the fund.<sup>5</sup> But, if the conveyance is by deed for a valuable consideration, the grantee will take the beneficial interest if the trusts fail to be declared, or fail in any way; for there can be no resulting trusts where the grantee pays a valuable consideration for the estate.<sup>6</sup>

§ 159. If the gift is made upon a trust, and the trust is insufficiently or ineffectually declared, as, if it is too indefinite, vague, and uncertain to be carried into effect, it will result to the settlor, his heirs, or representatives.<sup>7</sup> Whether a trust is

<sup>1</sup> *Hill v. London*, 1 Atk. 620; *Woollett v. Harris*, 5 Md. 452; *Sturtevant v. Jaques*, 14 Allen, 526; *Shaw v. Spencer*, 100 Mass. 526.

<sup>2</sup> *Coningham v. Mellish*, Pr. Ch. 31; *Dawson v. Clark*, 15 Ves. 409; 18 Ves. 247; *Hughes v. Evans*, 13 Sim. 496; *Cook v. Hutchinson*, 1 Keen, 42; *Dillaye v. Greenough*, 45 N. Y. 438.

<sup>3</sup> *Gibbs v. Rumsey*, 2 V. & B. 294; *Pratt v. Sladden*, 14 Ves. 193; *Battely v. Windle*, 2 Bro. Ch. 31; *Bingham v. Stewart*, 13 Minn. 106; *Pratt v. Beaupre*, 13 Minn. 187; *Dillaye v. Greenough*, 45 N. Y. 438.

<sup>4</sup> *Dillaye v. Greenough*, 45 N. Y. 438.

<sup>5</sup> *Saltmarsh v. Barrett*, 3 De G., F. & J. 279, 29 Beav. 474.

<sup>6</sup> *Brown v. Jones*, 1 Atk. 158; *Kerlin v. Campbell*, 15 Penn. St. 500; *Ridout v. Dowding*, 1 Atk. 419.

<sup>7</sup> *Williams v. Kershaw*, 5 Cl. & Fin. 111; *Ellis v. Selby*, 7 Sim. 352; 1



insufficiently declared or not, depends, of course, upon the particular construction to be given to each individual deed or will;<sup>1</sup> and so, whether a trust is too vague to be executed, or not, depends upon the interpretation given to each instrument.<sup>2</sup> If the declaration of trust is too imperfect to establish that purpose, and yet plainly shows that the intention was that the donee should not take beneficially, and that the sole purpose of the gift or grant was to carry out the purpose of the trust, which fails, the donee will take in trust for the donor or his heirs; but if it appear, from the whole instrument, that some beneficial interest was intended for the donee, or that he was intended to take beneficially in case the particular purpose fails, no trust will result, but he will take the estate discharged of all burdens.<sup>3</sup>

§ 160. Where a gift is made upon trusts that are void, in whole or in part, for illegality,<sup>4</sup> or that fail by lapse, or otherwise, during the life of the donor,<sup>5</sup> a trust will result to the donor, his heirs, or legal representatives, if the property is not otherwise disposed of. Thus, where the gift or trust is

*M. & C.* 286; *Fowler v. Garlike*, 1 R. & M. 232; *Morice v. Durham*, 9 Ves. 399; 10 Ves. 522; *Kendall v. Granger*, 5 Beav. 300; *Vesey v. Jamson*, 1 S. & S. 69; *Stubbs v. Sargon*, 3 M. & C. 500; 2 K. 255; *Leslie v. Devonshire*, 2 Bro. Ch. 187; *James v. Allen*, 3 Mer. 17; *Sturtevant v. Jaques*, 14 Allen, 526; *Shaw v. Spencer*, 100 Mass. 388.

<sup>1</sup> *Ellis v. Selby*, 1 M. & K. 298.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Gibbs v. Rumsey*, 2 Ves. & B. 294; *Cawood v. Thompson*, 1 Sm. & Gif. 409; *Lomax v. Ripley*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 48; *Hughes v. Evans*, 13 Sim. 496; *Ralston v. Telfair*, 2 Dev. Eq. 255.

<sup>4</sup> *Turner v. Russell*, 10 Hare, 204; *Cook v. Stationers' Co.* 3 M. & K. 262; *Carrick v. Errington*, 2 P. Wms. 361; *Tregonwell v. Sydenham*, 2 Dow, 194; *Arnold v. Chapman*, 7 Ves. 108; *Jones v. Mitchell*, 1 S. & S. 290; *Page v. Leapingwell*, 18 Ves. 463; *Pilkington v. Boughey*, 12 Sim. 114; *Gibbs v. Rumsey*, 2 Ves. & B. 294; *Stevens v. Ely*, 1 Dev. Eq. 493; *Dashiel v. Attorney-General*, 6 Harris & J. 1; *Lemmond v. People*, 5 Ired. Eq. 137.

<sup>5</sup> *Williams v. Coade*, 10 Ves. 300; *Ackroyd v. Smithson*, 1 Bro. Ch. 503; *Spink v. Lewis*, 3 Bro. Ch. 335; *Muckleston v. Brown*, 6 Ves. 63; *Davenport v. Coltman*, 12 Sim. 610; *Cruse v. Barley*, 3 P. Wms. 22; *Hutcheson v. Hammond*, 3 Bro. Ch. 128; *Hawley v. James*, 5 Paige, 318.

void by statute, as a disposition in favor of persons or objects prohibited from taking,<sup>1</sup> or given at a time, and in a manner forbidden, as in violation of the statutes of mortmain, or similar statutes,<sup>2</sup> or where the gift contravenes some policy of the law, as tending to a perpetuity,<sup>3</sup> or where it fails by the death of the beneficial donee or *cestui que trust*,<sup>4</sup> a trust, to the extent of the estate given, will result to the donor, or his heirs, or legal representatives, if it is not otherwise disposed of. So if a trust for a particular purpose fail, by the dissolution of a corporation, or other organized body, a trust created for their particular benefit will result to the donor's heirs.<sup>5</sup> In all these cases, if the trust arises or results by presumption of law, it may be rebutted as to instruments *inter vivos* by parol evidence that it was the intention of the settlor that the donee should take the surplus beneficially, or the whole estate if the trust failed *in toto*;<sup>6</sup> but where the trust results, not by presumption of law nor from the facts and circumstances, but from the construction and force of a written instrument, no parol evidence can be introduced to control such construction and force.<sup>7</sup>

§ 160 *a*. In England the heir and the next of kin or legal representatives are not the same persons, or they have not the same rights and interests; consequently questions of some

<sup>1</sup> Carrick *v.* Errington, 2 P. Wms. 361; Davers *v.* Dewes, 3 P. Wms. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Attorney-General *v.* Weymouth, Amb. 20; Jones *v.* Mitchell, 1 S. & S. 294; West *v.* Shuttleworth, 2 M. & K. 684; Acts 39 & 40 Geo. IV. c. 98; Eyre *v.* Marsden, 2 Keen, 564; McDonald *v.* Bryce, 2 Keen, 276; Lemmond *v.* People, 6 Ired. Eq. 137.

<sup>3</sup> Tregonwell *v.* Sydenham, 3 Dow, 194; Leake *v.* Robinson, 2 Mer. 363; Marshall *v.* Holloway, 2 Swans. 432; Southampton *v.* Hertford, 2 V. & B. 54; Curtis *v.* Lukin, 5 Beav. 147; Boughton *v.* James, 1 Call, 26; 1 H. L. Ca. 406; Brown *v.* Stoughton, 14 Sim. 369; Scarisbrick *v.* Skelmersdale, 17 Sim. 187; Furrin *v.* Newcomb, 3 K. & J. 16.

<sup>4</sup> Ackroyd *v.* Smithson, 1 Bro. Ch. 503; Cox *v.* Parker, 22 Beav. 188.

<sup>5</sup> Easterbrooks *v.* Tillinghast, 5 Gray, 17.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, §§ 139, 140, 145, 147; Cook *v.* Hutchinson, 1 Keen, 50.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, § 150; Langham *v.* Sanford, 17 Ves. 442.

difficulty arise as to whether a trust in property results to the heir, or to the next of kin, or the legal representatives. The general rule is, if the property is real estate, that the trust results to the heir; if personal property, to the next of kin under the statutes of distribution, or to the legal representatives. But suppose a testator has devised real estate in trust and directed it to be sold and the proceeds applied to purposes named, and the real estate is converted into money, and the trust fails in whole or in part, or suppose money is given in trust, and there is a direction to invest it in lands, which is done and the trust fails, to whom does the trust result, to the heir as real estate, or to the next of kin as personal property? Such questions are not important in the United States, for the reason that in most, if not all the States, the same persons take both the real and personal estate of an ancestor in the same proportion and with the same rights, and it is comparatively unimportant whether the trust results as real or personal property.<sup>1</sup> There is, however, one question still important in the United States, and that is, does the trust result to the heirs-at-law, or to the residuary devisees or legatees? The donor, settlor, or testator still retains such an interest in property given by him in trust, that the interest which results upon the failure of the trusts created by him may be devised by him, and the question in each case is whether the resulting interest becomes a part of the residue and passes to the residuary legatee, if there is one, or whether it passes to the heirs. The question may be stated in another form, thus: has the testator died intestate as to the interests which result to him upon a failure of the trusts, or do the provisions of the will embrace such interests and convey them to some person or persons, or class of persons named. The distinction between the heirs and the residuary legatees is that the residuary legatees claim *under* the will, and the heirs claim *dehors* the will.

<sup>1</sup> See all the English cases cited and the nice distinctions drawn, Lewin on Trusts, 121-132 (5th ed.); Hill on Trustees, 127-143.

All the cases that can arise must depend upon the intention of the donor or settlors and upon the construction of each particular will. If the subject-matter of the bequest that fails is personal estate, the residuary legatee will take all that results, for a general residuary bequest is always held to carry every interest, whether undisposed of in the will, or undisposed of in any event.<sup>1</sup> Therefore it is only where the will, contains no residuary clause that the next of kin (or heirs in the United States) can assert any claim. There is, however, this obvious remark to be made: that if the *residuum* is itself given upon a trust that fails, it of course results to the next of kin or heirs.<sup>2</sup> But a different rule is applied at common law to gifts of real estate. If real estate was bequeathed upon trusts that were void, or that failed, the real estate did not pass to the residuary devisee, but resulted to the heir-at-law, for the reason that nothing passed by the gift of the residue except what was intended to pass, and a bequest of real estate for a particular purpose indicated a plain intention not to embrace it in the residuary bequest, and although it might be void or fail, yet it was so far operative as to indicate the intention of the donor not to allow it to pass under the residuary clause of

<sup>1</sup> Dawson v. Clarke, 15 Ves. 417; Brown v. Higgs, 4 Ves. 708; 8 Ves. 570; Shanley v. Baker, 4 Ves. 732; Johnson v. Kelly, 2 Ves. 285; Oke v. Heath, 1 Ves. 141; Cambridge v. Rous, 8 Ves. 25; Cooke v. Stationers' Co., 3 M. & K. 264; Bland v. Bland, 2 J. & W. 406; Jones v. Mitchell, 1 S. & S. 298. Sir William Grant said that it must be a very peculiar case indeed in which there can be at once a residuary clause and a partial intestacy unless some part of the residue be ill given. Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 392; King v. Woodhull, 3 Edw. Ch. 79; Swinton v. Egleston, 3 Rich. Eq. 201; Hamberlin v. Terry, 1 Sm. & M. Ch. 589; Johnson v. Johnson, 3 Ired. Eq. 427; Marsh v. Wheeler, 2 Edw. Ch. 156; Com. v. Nase, 1 Ashm. 242; Woolmer's Est. 3 Whart. 879; Taylor v. Lucas, 4 Hawks, 215; Pool v. Harrison, 18 Ala. 515; Vick v. McDaniel, 3 How. (Miss.) 337; Bryson v. Nichols, 2 Hill, Ch. 113.

<sup>2</sup> Skrymsher v. Northcote, 1 Swans. 566; McDonald v. Bryce, 2 Keen, 276; Eyre v. Marsden, 2 Keen, 564; Woolmer's Est. 3 Whart. 477; Johnson v. Clarkson, 3 Rich. Eq. 305; Salt v. Chattaway, 3 Beav. 576; Floyd v. Barker, 1 Paige, 480; Frazier v. Frazier, 2 Leigh, 642; Trippe v. Frazier, 4 H. & J. 446.

the will. The common law was altered by 1 Vict. Ch. 26, and real estate is governed by the same rule as personal estate.<sup>1</sup>

§ 161. It was formerly said, that if a man conveyed his estate to a stranger without consideration, or for a mere nominal one, a trust resulted to the owner, on the ground that the law would not presume a man to part with his property without some inducement thereto.<sup>2</sup> This was in strict analogy to the common law, whereby, if a feoffment was made without consideration, the legal title *only* passed to the feoffee, and a use resulted to the feoffor.<sup>3</sup> In conformity with this rule, Mr. Cruise lays it down, that if the legal estate in lands is conveyed to a stranger without any consideration, there arises a resulting trust to the original owner ;<sup>4</sup> for where there is neither consideration, nor declaration of use, to show the intention of the parties, it cannot be supposed that the estate was intended to be given away.<sup>5</sup> And the burden was put upon the grantee to show the consideration, and upon failure of proof, a use was presumed to the grantor, for the reason, as stated by Sir Francis Bacon, that when feoffments were made, it grew doubtful whether estates were in use or purchase, and as purchases were things notorious, and uses were things secret, the Chancellor thought it more convenient to put the purchaser to prove his consideration, than the feoffor to prove his

<sup>1</sup> In the United States there is considerable variety in the decisions of the courts, if not some uncertainty in the law, where it is not determined by statute. See a very learned discussion of the law in New York in *Van Kluck v. Dutch Reformed Church*, 6 Paige, 600, 20 Wend. 458. In Massachusetts, *Hayden v. Stoughton*, 5 Pick. 528 ; *Brigham v. Shattuck*, 10 Pick. 306 ; *Clapp v. Stoughton*, 10 Pick. 463 ; 4 Kent, Com. 541.

<sup>2</sup> *Lewin on Trusts*, 116 (5th Lond. ed.), and cases cited ; *Tolar v. Tolar*, 1 Dev. Eq. 456 ; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1199 ; *Cecil v. Butcher*, 2 J. & W. 573 ; *Souerbye v. Arden*, 1 John. Ch. 240.

<sup>3</sup> *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, 92 ; *Pinney v. Fellows*, 15 Vt. 538 ; *Botsford v. Burr*, 2 Johns. Ch. 405.

<sup>4</sup> Cruise, Dig. tit. 12, c. 1, § 52 ; tit. 11, c. 4, § 16.

<sup>5</sup> Cruise, Dig. tit. 11, c. 4, § 16 *et seq.*

trust, and so made intendment toward the use, and put the purchaser to the proof of his purchase.<sup>1</sup> To the same effect are Coke on Littleton and many of the older, and some of the more modern, authorities.<sup>2</sup>

§ 162. But the rule that a trust resulted to the grantor upon a voluntary conveyance was confined to common-law conveyances or assurances, such as feoffments, grants, fines, recoveries, and releases which operated without consideration, and vested the estate in the alienee by the act itself, as by livery of seisin;<sup>3</sup> although it was always doubtful whether a use could result from a conveyance by lease and release, even though it was voluntary, and no uses were declared; for the extinguishment of the estate of the lessee was a good consideration, yet such a conveyance was a strict common-law conveyance.<sup>4</sup> This rule does not apply to modern conveyances, and no trust is now held to result to a grantor, although he conveys his estate without consideration.<sup>5</sup> At the present day almost all conveyances are in form deeds of bargain and sale, and operate to pass the estate by virtue of the statute of uses, or of statutes in the several States prescribing the formalities necessary to convey lands. Under the statute of uses, the bargain between the bargainor and the bargainee, and the consideration, raised

<sup>1</sup> Bacon on Uses, 317.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Inst. 23 *a*, 271 *a*; Dyer, 166 *a*, 186 *b*; 11 Mod. 182; Cleve's Case, 6 Rep. 17 *b*; Woodliffe v. Drury, Cro. Eliz. 439; Duke of Norfolk v. Brown, Pr. Ch. 80; Warman v. Seaman, 2 Freem. 308; Hayes v. Kingdome, 1 Vern. 33; Grey v. Grey, 2 Swans. 598; Elliot v. Elliot, 2 Ch. Ca. 232; Attorney-General v. Wilson, 1 Cr. & Ph. 1; Sculthorpe v. Burgess, 1 Ves. Jr. 92; Tyrrell's Case, 2 Freem. 304; Ward v. Lant, Pr. Ch. 182.

<sup>3</sup> Cruise, Dig. tit. 11, c. 4, § 16.

<sup>4</sup> Cruise, Dig. tit. 32, c. 11, § 17.

<sup>5</sup> Hutchins v. Lee, 1 Atk. 447; Lloyd v. Spillett, 2 Atk. 150; Young v. Peachy, 2 Atk. 257; Burn v. Winthrop, 1 John. Ch. 329; Graff v. Rohrer, 35 Md. 327; Hogan v. Jaques, 19 N. J. Ch. 123; Bust v. Wilson, 28 Cal. 632; Jackson v. Cleveland, 15 Mich. 94; Ownes v. Ownes, 8 C. E. Green, 60. But see McKenney v. Burns, 31 Ga. 295; and Haigh v. Kaye, L. R. 7 Ch. 469; Blodgett v. Hildreth, 103 Mass. 486.

a use in the bargainee, the statute immediately stepped in and vested the legal title in the same person for whom a beneficial use had been raised by the bargain. In conveyances that are in form deeds of bargain and sale, parol evidence cannot be received to control or contradict the statement of the consideration. Such a statement is a solemn and essential part of the deed, and its *existence* cannot be disproved by parol,<sup>1</sup> although it is allowed so far to control the statement as to the payment of it, as to show that it still exists as a debt due from the grantee to the grantor.<sup>2</sup> And so in States where it is declared by statute, as in Massachusetts,<sup>3</sup> that deeds duly executed, acknowledged, and recorded, shall be effectual to pass the estate without other ceremony, it is not competent to control the effect of such deeds by parol, or to engraft uses, trusts, or other limitations upon them not contained in the instruments themselves, or in some other instrument executed before or at the same time with them, in such manner as to become a part of them.<sup>4</sup> To allow parol evidence to raise a resulting trust

<sup>1</sup> *Leman v. Whitley*, 4 Russ. 423; *Philbrook v. Delano*, 29 Me. 410; *Graves v. Graves*, 29 N. H. 129; *Randall v. Phillips*, 3 Mason, 388; *Hutchinson v. Tindall*, 2 Green, Ch. 357; *Alison v. Kurtz*, 2 Watts, 187; *Wilkinson v. Wilkinson*, 2 Dev. Eq. 376; *Morris v. Morris*, 2 Bibb, 311; *Movan v. Hayes*, 1 John. Ch. 339; *Rathburn v. Rathburn*, 6 Barb. 93; *Balbeck v. Donaldson*, 6 Am. Law Reg. 148; *Graff v. Rohrer*, 35 Md. 327.

<sup>2</sup> *Leman v. Whitley*, 4 Russ. 423; *Graves v. Graves*, 29 N. H. 129; *Philbrook v. Delano*, 29 Me. 410; *Randall v. Phillips*, 3 Mason, 388; *Thomas v. McCormack*, 9 Dana, 188; *Radsall v. Radsall*, 9 Wis. 379; *Farrington v. Barr*, 36 N. H. 86.

<sup>3</sup> Gen. Stat. c. 89, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Gerry v. Stimson*, 60 Me. 186; *Titcomb v. Morrill*, 10 Allen, 15; *Bartlett v. Bartlett*, 14 Gray, 278; *Walker v. Locke*, 5 Cush. 90; *Blodgett v. Hildreth*, 103 Mass. 484; *Carnes v. Colburn*, 104 Mass. 274; *Whitton v. Whitton*, 3 Cush. 191; *Philbrook v. Delano*, 29 Me. 410; *Graves v. Graves*, 29 N. H. 129; *Rathbun v. Rathbun*, 6 Barb. 105; *Bank of U. S. v. Housman*, 6 Paige, 526; *Miller v. Wilson*, 15 Ohio, 108; *Parnell v. Hingston*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 337; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 1 Atk. 386; *Dyer v. Dyer*, 2 Cox, 93; *Fordyce v. Wallis*, 3 Bro. Ch. 576; *Squire v. Harder*, 1 Paige, 494; *Balbeck v. Donaldson*, 6 Am. Law Reg. 148; *Jackson v. Garnsey*, 16 John. 189; *Jackson v. Caldwell*, 1 Cow. 622; *Farrington v. Barr*, 36 N. H. 431.

upon such deeds would be to break in upon the express provisions of the statute of frauds. Mr. Hill states the modern rule correctly when he says,<sup>1</sup> "that it is the clear result of the authorities that where a person, a stranger in blood to the donor, and *a fortiori* if connected with him in blood, is in possession of an estate under a voluntary conveyance duly executed, the mere fact of his being a volunteer will not of itself create any presumption that he is a trustee for the grantor; but he will be considered entitled to the enjoyment of the beneficial interest unless that title is displaced by sufficient evidence of an intention on the part of the donor to create a trust, and he need not bring proofs to keep his estate, but the plaintiff must bring proofs to take it from him."<sup>2</sup> And where the deed contains a clause, as most deeds do, that the estate is had and held to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, *to his and their use and behoof*, no trust can result, as it is a rule that when a use is declared, no other use can be shown to result.<sup>3</sup> And when a deed contains covenants of warranty, no use can result to the grantor, for such covenants estop him from claiming any legal or beneficial interest in the estate.<sup>4</sup>

§ 163. It may be stated that courts do not favor voluntary conveyances, and will not lend their aid to enforce them if they are imperfectly executed, and their decrees are necessary to give them validity and force. In such cases equity will not interfere, but will leave the parties to their rights at law.<sup>5</sup> And, further, equity will always look upon such conveyances with suspicion, especially if made to strangers for no particular

<sup>1</sup> Hill on Trustees, 170 (4th Am. ed.).

<sup>2</sup> Cook v. Fountain, 3 Swans. 590; Clavering v. Clavering, 2 Vern. 473; Boughton v. Boughton, 1 Atk. 625; Cecil v. Butcher, 2 Jac. & W. 573; Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 1 Cr. & Ph. 138; Dummer v. Pitcher, 2 M. & K. 262; Leman v. Whitley, 4 Russ. 423; Graff v. Rohrer, 35 Md. 327.

<sup>3</sup> Graves v. Graves, 29 N. H. 129; Sprague v. Woods, 4 Watts & S. 192; Vandervolgen v. Yates, 5 Seld. 219.

<sup>4</sup> Philbrook v. Delano, 29 Me. 410.

<sup>5</sup> Lane v. Ewing, 31 Mo. 75.



purpose. If any fraud or misrepresentation is practised upon a grantor, equity will fasten a trust upon the conscience of the fraudulent grantee.<sup>1</sup> If fraud upon the grantor is alleged, the fact that the conveyance was without consideration is always considered as pertinent evidence, and will be considered as one badge of fraud, if there are other facts and circumstances pointing in that direction.<sup>2</sup> A disposition by will, however, is not subject to these rules, as a gift by will imports a consideration, and no averments by parol can be received to fasten a use or trust upon such gift; but the donee will take both the legal and beneficial estate, unless it clearly appears from the whole will that such was not the intention of the donor.<sup>3</sup>

§ 164. It is further to be observed that voluntary conveyances to a wife or child were never within the rule that such gifts raised a resulting trust for the donor. In conveyances of this kind to the donor's family the analogy of the common law was followed, whereby if a feoffment was made to a stranger without consideration a use resulted to the feoffor; but if a feoffment was made to a wife or child no use resulted, for the consideration of blood was held a good consideration, and an advance or settlement was presumed. So marriage was not only a good but a valuable consideration, and no trusts could result from conveyances made in consideration of marriage, either of the grantor or of any member of his family. But if voluntary conveyances to wife or children were made by a man deeply indebted, or with an intention to delay his creditors, while he could not raise a trust in his own favor, yet his creditors could avoid the conveyances or raise a trust upon them in their own favor to the extent of their claims.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Post*, chap. VI.

<sup>2</sup> *Post*, § 187.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, § 94.

<sup>4</sup> *Dunnica v. Coy*, 28 Mo. 525; *Spirett v. Willows*, 3 De G., J. & S. 293; *Robinson v. Robinson*, 17 Ohio St. 430; *Baldwin v. Campfield*, 4 Halst. Ch. 891; *Spicer v. Ayers*, 2 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 626.

§ 165. If the voluntary conveyance is made for some illegal or fraudulent purpose, whether it is a common-law or a modern conveyance, no trust will result to the grantor; as, if the voluntary conveyance is made to delay, hinder, and defeat creditors,<sup>1</sup> or to give a man a colorable qualification to vote, or to sit in parliament,<sup>2</sup> or to kill game,<sup>3</sup> or to disqualify the grantor for an office,<sup>4</sup> or to commit any other fraud,<sup>5</sup> for the reason that the rules of law cannot be used, controlled, or avoided by parties with a fraudulent intent to do that indirectly which they cannot do directly.<sup>6</sup>

§ 165 *a*. A resulting trust is to be performed or executed by the trustee by transferring the title to the *cestui que trust* at his request;<sup>7</sup> but if the trustee has incurred any expenses upon the estate by paying taxes or making improvements, or advancing part of the purchase-money, he will be allowed to hold the estate until his advances are repaid.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Cottington v. Fletcher*, 2 Atk. 156; *Chaplin v. Chaplin*, 3 P. Wms. 238; *Muckleston v. Brown*, 6 Ves. 68; *Stewart v. Iglehart*, 7 Gill & J. 182; *Bryant v. Mansfield*, 22 Me. 310; *Randall v. Phillips*, 3 Mason, 378; *Wilson v. Cheshire*, 1 McCord, 233; *Mason v. Baker*, 1 A. K. Marsh. 208; *Chamberlayne v. Temple*, 2 Rand. 384; *Stewart v. Dailey*, 6 Litt. 212; *Jackson v. Dutton*, 3 Har. 98; *McClure v. Purcel*, 3 A. K. Marsh. 61; *Steele v. Worthington*, 2 Ham. 82.

<sup>2</sup> *Pitt's Case*, cited Amb. 266; *Curtis v. Perry*, 6 Ves. 747; *Cutler v. Tuttle*, 19 N. J. Ch. 553, 562.

<sup>3</sup> *Roberts v. Roberts*, Daniel, 143; *Brackenbury v. Brackenbury*, 2 Jac. & W. 391; *Cecil v. Butcher*, 2 Jac. & W. 565.

<sup>4</sup> *Birch v. Blagrove*, Amb. 264; *Gaskell v. Gaskell*, 2 Y. & J. 502; *Vandenberg v. Palmer*, 4 K. & J. 204; *Childers v. Childers*, 1 De G. & J. 482; *Field v. Lonsdale*, 13 Beav. 78; *Doe v. Rutledge*, Cowp. 705.

<sup>5</sup> *Tipton v. Powell*, 2 Cold. 19; *Haigh v. Kaye*, L. R. 7 Ch. 473; *Ownes v. Ownes*, 8 C. E. Green, 60; *Miller v. Davis*, 50 Mo. 572.

<sup>6</sup> *Scobie v. Blanchard*, 3 N. H. 170; *Pritchard v. Brown*, 4 N. H. 401; *Hutchins v. Heywood*, 50 N. H. 488; *Sugd. V. & P.* 416.

<sup>7</sup> *Millard v. Hathaway*, 27 Cal. 119.

<sup>8</sup> *Malroy v. Sloans*, 44 Vt. 311.

## CHAPTER VI.

### CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS.

- § 166. General nature of constructive trusts. They arise from fraud.
- § 167. Jurisdiction of equity over them, and the relief given by converting the offending party into a trustee.
- § 168. Classification of constructive trusts.
- § 169. General definition of a fraud in equity.
- § 170. Principles upon which equity gives relief against fraud.
- § 171. Actual fraud, or *suggestio falsi*.
- § 172. Illustrations of actual fraud.
- § 173. The misrepresentations and frauds that equity will relieve against.
- § 174. The misrepresentation must be of facts material to the contract.
- § 175. The misrepresentation must be of something peculiarly within the party's knowledge.
- § 176. The relief will depend upon the form in which it is sought.
- § 177. Fraud that arises from concealment, or *suppressio veri*.
- § 178. This kind of fraud depends much upon the relation of the parties.
- § 179. When a person may not be silent.
- § 180. *Suppressio veri* is generally in law an affirmative act.
- § 181. Courts will relieve where acts are fraudulently prevented from being done—illustrations.
- § 182. Trust established where a party fraudulently prevents a will from being made in another's favor.
- § 183. Trust established in *odium spoliatoris*.
- § 184. Trust established upon a conveyance made in ignorance or mistake.
- § 185. But if the conveyance is a compromise courts will support it if possible.
- § 186. Trust established when a deed by mistake contains more land than was intended.
- § 187. Misrepresentation of the value of property and inadequacy of consideration.
- § 188. Catching bargains with young heirs and reversioners.
- § 189. Trust arising from mental incapacity or imbecility of parties.
- § 190. Mental weakness — old age.
- § 191. Drunkenness.
- § 192. Duress — oppression and distress.
- § 193. Where several of these circumstances are found combined.
- § 194. Frauds that arise by construction from the fiduciary relations of parties.
- § 195. Between trustee and *cestui que trust*.
- § 196. Renewal of leases in his own name by trustee.
- §§ 197, 198. Contracts prohibited between trustee and *cestui que trust*, but the *cestui que trust* alone can avoid them.
- § 199. Rule does not apply to dry trustees.
- § 200. Guardians and wards.
- § 201. Parents and children.
- §§ 202, 203. Attorney and client.

- § 204. Rule applies to all confidential advisers.
- § 205. Administrators and executors.
- § 206. Principal and agent.
- § 207. Directors of corporations.
- § 208. Trusts that arise out of inducements held out for marriage.
- § 209. Other fiduciary relations.
- § 210. Undefined fiduciary and friendly relations.
- § 211. Trusts arising from the frauds of third persons.
- § 212. Frauds upon third persons as creditors.
- § 213. Conveyances by man or woman on the point of marriage.
- § 214. Illegal and immoral contracts.
- § 215. Fraud by pretending to buy for another.
- § 216. Devises or conveyances upon secret illegal trusts.
- § 217. Purchases from trustees with knowledge of the trusts.
- § 218. Purchases without notice of the trust.
- § 219. The safeguards thrown around such purchases.
- § 220. The consideration in such cases.
- § 221. The consideration must have been actually paid.
- § 222. Notice of the trust — to whom it may be.
- § 223. Notice may be actual or constructive.
- § 224. Purchase of property from executors or administrators — real estate.
- § 225. Personal property.
- § 226. Constructive trusts may be proved by parol — statute of frauds does not apply.
- § 227. The right to set aside a conveyance for fraud is an equitable estate that may be conveyed and devised.
- §§ 228-230. Statute of frauds and the time within which steps must be taken to avoid a fraudulent conveyance.

§ 166. THE trusts thus far considered arise from the *express* agreements and intentions of the parties, or from their intentions *implied* from their agreements, or *result* from their express or implied agreements. These trusts arise, result, or are implied from the contracts and relations of the parties. The intention of the parties as manifested in contracts made in good faith is the foundation of them. There is another large class of trusts which arise from frauds committed by one party upon another. Thus, if one party procures the legal title to property from another by fraud or misrepresentation or concealment, or if a party makes use of some influential or confidential relation which he holds towards the owner of the legal title, to obtain such legal title from him upon more advantageous terms than he could otherwise have obtained it, equity will convert such party thus obtaining property into a trustee. If a person obtains the legal title to property by such arts or

acts or circumstances of circumvention, imposition, or fraud, or if he obtains it by virtue of a confidential relation and influence under such circumstances that he ought not, according to the rules of equity and good conscience as administered in chancery, to hold and enjoy the beneficial interest of the property, courts of equity, in order to administer complete justice between the parties, will raise a trust by construction out of such circumstances or relations; and this trust they will fasten upon the conscience of the offending party, and will convert him into a trustee of the legal title, and order him to hold it or to execute the trust in such manner as to protect the rights of the defrauded party and promote the safety and interests of society.<sup>1</sup> Such trusts are called *constructive* trusts. They differ from other trusts in that they are not within the intention or contemplation of the parties at the time the contract is made from which they are construed by the court, but they are thrust upon a party contrary to his intention and against his consent. The reason is that courts of equity have a large jurisdiction over all matters of trust and confidence. They control and direct their administration, and in certain cases they annul and put an end to them by directing the trustee to convey the trust property to the person beneficially interested. They can also remove the trustees and appoint new ones. Therefore, courts of equity by raising a trust by construction in cases of fraud can do equal and complete justice between the parties. By this fiction of a constructive trust courts of equity have great powers. They can order the constructive trustee to hold the legal title for the original owner upon just and proper terms. If he has paid any value for the legal estate, they can order the estate to stand as security for it; they can order accounts to be taken and settled;<sup>1</sup> they can decree a reconveyance of the property, or they can put an end to the trust by declaring the conveyances to the constructive

<sup>1</sup> Thompson v. Thompson, 16 Wis. <sup>94</sup> 94; McLane v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 48; Pillow v. Brown, 26 Ark. 240; Collins v. Collins, 6 Lansing, 368.

trustee to be null and void, and order that they be surrendered up and cancelled. In all such cases the relief is really founded on fraud and not on constructive trust. When it is said that the person who fraudulently receives or possesses himself of trust property, or who has defrauded another of his estate by misrepresentation, concealment, or other fraudulent practices, is converted by the court into a trustee and ordered to account for or reconvey the property, the expression is used for the purpose of describing the nature and extent of the remedy against him, and it denotes that the parties defrauded or beneficially entitled, have the same rights and remedies against him as they would be entitled to against an express trustee who had fraudulently committed a breach of the trust. Generally speaking, the *constructive trusts* described in this chapter are not trusts at all in the strict and proper signification of the word "trusts;" but as courts are agreed in administering the same remedy in a certain class of frauds as are administered in fraudulent breaches of trusts, and as courts and the profession have concurred in calling such frauds constructive trusts, there can be no misapprehension in continuing the same phraseology, while a change might lead to confusion and misunderstanding.<sup>1</sup>

§ 167. Courts of common law have an extensive jurisdiction in cases of fraud, but it is readily seen that the remedy in equity is more easily moulded to the varying circumstances of different cases. As between the immediate parties, fraud makes all things void which are done under its direct influence. Thus, *non est factum* can be pleaded to a suit upon a deed or bond, procured by fraud or duress, on the ground that whatever is done under the influence of fraud is not done at all.<sup>2</sup> The same evidence is admissible in both courts. Prob-

<sup>1</sup> See Westbury, Lord Chancellor, in *Rolfe v. Gregory*, 4 De G., J. & S. 579.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Chitty, Plead. 483. Courts of chancery in England, and the courts

ably the same evidence that would convince a court of equity that a deed was procured by fraud, and that the grantee ought to hold as a constructive trustee for the grantor, would also persuade a jury to return a verdict against such deed. In some States the parties have a right to trial by jury of all questions of fact, as of fraud or no fraud, arising upon the

of the United States, and of many of the several States, have a jurisdiction in equity to set aside deeds and contracts procured by misrepresentation, concealment, collusion, or fraud. In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court has jurisdiction in equity in cases of fraud, accident, and mistake, according to the usage and practice of courts of equity where there is not a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law. Gen. Stat. ch. 113, § 2. It was supposed by the profession that this statute conferred upon the court a jurisdiction in equity in accordance with the general usages of the courts of equity in England and the United States. But the court by a strict construction of the words, "where there is not a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law," denied their jurisdiction in cases of fraud, where an action at law might be maintained by the injured party. Thus if a deed is procured from a person by fraud, he cannot maintain a suit in equity to set it aside, if it is possible to maintain a real action for the recovery of the land; and as such deeds are void or at least voidable, such action may be maintained at law, and the court has no jurisdiction in equity. *Bassett v. Brown*, 10 Mass. 355. This decision goes upon the strict meaning of the words, "where there is not a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law," words which were formerly found in every bill in equity, in order to give the court jurisdiction. But they did not exclude the jurisdiction in equity, if the court had a jurisdiction, concurrent or otherwise, according to the usage and practice of courts of equity. The court in Massachusetts still has jurisdiction in equity in cases of fraud, where there is a peculiar complication of circumstances or of parties. *Pratt v. Pond*, 5 Allen, 59; *Glass v. Hulbert*, 102 Mass. 26; *Martin v. Graves*, 5 Allen, 601; *Whittemore v. Cowell*, 7 Allen, 446; *Pool v. Lloyd*, 5 Met. 528. But the practitioner must determine at his peril whether a particular case comes within such jurisdiction. It would have been more simple and certain for the administration of justice, to have given to the words of exclusion the meaning attached to them in bills of equity, and to have made the jurisdiction of the court to depend upon the known usage and practice of courts of equity. Thus both the court and the bar would have had some known ground to go upon. Of course these remarks apply only to those cases of fraud where there is a jurisdiction in equity to set aside conveyances procured by fraud, and for other relief according to the known usage and practice of courts of equity, and not to mere cases of cheating and fraud in many of the affairs of life. See *Miller v. Scammon*, 52 N. H. 609.

pleadings in equity. In other States the court may in its discretion send such issues of fact to trial by a jury.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the remedy in equity in cases of fraud is sought, not so much from the mode of proof and the rules of evidence, as it is from the complete character of the relief given. It is true, that in some cases courts of equity will act upon circumstances and presumptions of fraud which courts of law would not deem satisfactory proofs.<sup>2</sup> As if a guardian purchases an estate from a ward, equity will presume fraud from the existence of the relation of guardian and ward, a rule that courts of law would not always act upon. Lord Eldon said, that courts of equity in many cases would order an instrument to be delivered up, as unduly obtained, which a jury would not be justified in impeaching by the rules of law.<sup>3</sup> However, fraud must be proved in both courts, and is not to be imputed from mere circumstances of suspicion. It is not, however, the rule that the court will not presume or construe a trust to arise except in cases of absolute necessity;<sup>4</sup> for courts of equity will act upon the just preponderance of all the facts and circumstances of proof in the case.<sup>5</sup>

§ 168. Constructive trusts may be divided into three classes to be determined according to the circumstances under which they arise,—first, trusts that arise from actual fraud practised by one man upon another. Second, trusts that arise from constructive fraud. In this second class the conduct may not be actually tainted with moral fraud or evil intention, but it may be contrary to some rule established by public policy for the protection of society. Thus, a purchase made by a guardian of his ward, or by a trustee of his *cestui que trust*, or by an

<sup>1</sup> 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 190 a.

<sup>2</sup> Warner v. Daniels, 1 Wood. & M. 103; Denton v. McKenzie, 1 Des. 289.

<sup>3</sup> Fullager v. Clark, 18 Ves. 483; Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. 155.

<sup>4</sup> Cook v. Fountain, 3 Swans. 555.

<sup>5</sup> 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1195; Steele v. Kinkle, 3 Ala. 352.



attorney of his client, may be in good faith, and as beneficial to all parties as any other transaction in life; and yet the inconvenience and danger of allowing contracts to be entered into by parties holding such relations to each other are so great that courts of equity construe such contracts *prima facie* to be fraudulent, and they construe a trust to arise from them. Third, trusts that arise from some equitable principle independent of the existence of any fraud, as where an estate has been purchased, and the consideration money paid, but the deed is not taken, equity will raise a trust by construction for the purchaser.

§ 169. No certain and accurate definition or description of actual fraud can be given. Courts have never laid down, in a general proposition, what does and what does not constitute fraud, nor any general rule by which they are controlled in giving relief,<sup>1</sup> lest other means of committing fraud should be resorted to. As Lord Hardwicke said, "fraud is infinite, and were courts of equity once to lay down rules how far they would go and no further, in extending the relief against it, or to define strictly the species or evidence of it, the jurisdiction would be cramped, and perpetually eluded by new schemes which the fertility of man's invention would contrive."<sup>2</sup> Although it is difficult to give a definition of it, yet Mr. Story said,<sup>3</sup> that "fraud in the sense of a court of equity properly includes all acts, omissions, and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another."<sup>4</sup> And courts of equity will not only interfere in cases of fraud to set

<sup>1</sup> *Mortlock v. Buller*, 10 Ves. 306.

<sup>2</sup> *Parke's Hist. of Chan.* 508; *Lawley v. Hooper*, 3 Atk. 279; 1 *Domat*, Civil law, B. 1, tit. 18, § 3, art. 1.

<sup>3</sup> 1 *Story, Eq. Jur.* § 187.

<sup>4</sup> *Chesterfield v. Janssen*, 2 Ves. Sr. 155; *Gale v. Gale*, 19 Barb. 251; 1 *Fonb. Eq. B.* 1, c. 2, § 3, note (r).

aside acts done ; but they will also, if acts have by fraud been prevented from being done by the parties, interfere and treat the case exactly as if the acts had been done.”<sup>1</sup>

§ 170. Although courts of equity have not made general definitions stating what is fraud and what is not, they have not hesitated to lay down broad and comprehensive principles of remedial justice, and to apply these principles in favor of innocent parties suffering from the fraud of others. These principles, though firm and inflexible, are yet so plastic, that they can be applied to every case of fraud as it occurs, however new it may be in its circumstances. The leading principle of this remedial justice is by way of equitable construction to convert the fraudulent holder of property into a trustee, and to preserve the property itself as a fund for the purpose of recompense. In investigating allegations of fraud, courts of equity disregard mere technicalities and artificial rules, and look only at the general characteristics of the case, and go at once to its essential morality and merit. Thus at law married women or infants are not liable upon their contracts, nor are they bound by their deeds, receipts, or releases, whether made *bona fide* or fraudulently;<sup>2</sup> but in equity if a married woman has obtained property by fraud, the court disregards the technical rules of common law in regard to married women, and converts her by construction into a trustee, and compels her to do justice by executing the trust.<sup>3</sup> The same principles apply to infants, although they cannot be sued at common law, save in a few exceptional cases. So if an infant fraudulently misrepresents his age and gives deeds or releases, upon which

<sup>1</sup> *Middleton v. Middleton*, 1 Jac. & W. 96; *Waltham's Case*, cited 11 Ves. 638, 14 Ves. 290; *Devenish v. Baines*, Pr. Ch. 4.

<sup>2</sup> *People v. Kendall*, 25 Wend. 399; *Burley v. Russell*, 10 N. H. 184; *West v. Moore*, 14 Vt. 447; *Conroe v. Birdsall*, 1 John. Cas. 127; *Price v. Hewitt*, 8 Exch. 145.

<sup>3</sup> *Vaughan v. Vanderslegen*, 2 Dr. 363; *Jones v. Kearney*, 1 Dr. & W. 167.

others act, equity will not allow him to impeach such deeds on account of his minority.<sup>1</sup> This is on the ground that infants and married women shall not take advantage of the rules made for their protection to perpetrate frauds upon innocent persons, but that they shall be bound by their own fraudulent representations, or by equitable estoppels, like other persons.<sup>2</sup>

§ 171. Fraud, arising from facts and circumstances of imposition, presents the plainest case for relief,<sup>3</sup> for it comes within what is called the *suggestio falsi*.<sup>4</sup> Wherever by misrepresentation, combination, conspiracy, oppression, intimidation, surprise, or any other practice at variance with honest, fair dealing, one is deceived, entrapped, or surprised into a conveyance of the legal title to his property, courts of equity will not allow the fraudulent grantee to avail himself of the transaction to enjoy the beneficial interest, but will construe him to be a trustee, and will order him to account upon equitable principles, and to make a reconveyance of the property.<sup>5</sup> Thus, where the devisee, under a will defectively executed,

<sup>1</sup> *Stoolfoos v. Jenkins*, 12 S. & R. 399; *Wright v. Snow*, 2 De G. & S. 321.

<sup>2</sup> *Davis v. Fingle*, 8 B. Monr. 539; *Wright v. Arnold*, 4 B. Monr. 643; *Hall v. Timmons*, 2 Rich. Eq. 120.

<sup>3</sup> *Chesterfield v. Janssen*, 2 Ves. 155; *Baegle v. Wentz*, 53 Penn. St. 268.

<sup>4</sup> *Evans v. Bicknell*, 6 Ves. 173; *Jarvis v. Duke*, 1 Vern. 20; *Broderick v. Broderick*, 1 P. Wms. 240; *Nevitt v. Gibson*, 1 Freem. Ch. 438; *Bulkley v. Wilford*, 2 Cl. & Fin. 102.

<sup>5</sup> *Tyler v. Black*, 13 How. 231; *Boyce v. Grundy*, 3 Pet. 210; *Smith v. Richards*, 13 Pet. 26; *McAllister v. Barry*, 2 Hayw. 290; *Walker v. Dunlop*, 5 Hayw. 271; *Stephenson v. Taylor*, 1 A. K. Marsh. 235; *Pitts v. Cottingham*, 9 Porter, 675; *Harris v. Williamson*, 4 Hayw. 124; *Lewis v. McLemore*, 10 Yerg. 206; *Spence v. Duren*, 2 Ala. 251; *Harris v. Carter*, 3 Stew. 233; *How v. Weldon*, 2 Ves. 517; *Neville v. Wilkinson*, 1 Bro. Ch. 596; *Earl of Bath's Case*, 3 Ch. Ca. 56; *Willan v. Willan*, 16 Ves. 82; *Say v. Barwich*, 1 V. & B. 195; *Barnsley v. Powell*, 1 Ves. 289; *Mathew v. Hanbury*, 2 Vern. 187; *Bridgman v. Green*, 2 Ves. 627; *Evans v. Llewellyn*, 1 Cox, 340; *Bennet v. Wade*, 2 Atk. 324, Mad. Ch. Pr. 342; *Clermont v. Tasburgh*, 1 J. & W. 112.

obtained a conveyance of the estate from the heir-at-law by representing that the will was duly executed,<sup>1</sup> or where an executor obtained a release of a legacy by representing that there was no legacy given by the will,<sup>2</sup> or where a purchaser misrepresented the quantity and quality of the land he was about to purchase,<sup>3</sup> or where the vendor misrepresented the quantity of land in a tract sold, as twenty acres overflowed by a river, when in fact it was more than a hundred acres,<sup>4</sup> the court gave relief. In *Smith v. Richards*,<sup>5</sup> the Supreme Court of the United States cited the following proposition<sup>6</sup> with approval: "Where a party intentionally or by design misrepresents a material fact, or produces a false impression<sup>7</sup> in order to mislead another,<sup>8</sup> or to entrap or cheat him, or to obtain an undue advantage of him, in every such case there is positive fraud in the truest sense of the term;<sup>9</sup> there is an evil act, with an evil intent; *dolum malum, ad circumveniendum*. And the misrepresentation may as well be by acts as words, by artifices that mislead<sup>10</sup> as by positive assertions."<sup>11</sup> Lord Thurlow said "it would be ridiculous for the court to make a distinction between the two cases."<sup>12</sup> "Whether the party

<sup>1</sup> *Broderick v. Broderick*, 1 P. Wms. 239.

<sup>2</sup> *Jarvis v. Duke*, 1 Vern. 19; *Murray v. Palmer*, 18 Sch. & Le. 474; *James v. Greaves*, 2 P. Wms. 270; *Horseley v. Chaloner*, 2 Ves. 83.

<sup>3</sup> *Tyler v. Black*, 13 How. 231.

<sup>4</sup> *Boyce v. Grundy*, 3 Pet. 210. See *Prescott v. Wright*, 4 Gray, 461. But see *Bartlett v. Salmon*, 6 De G., M. & G. 40.

<sup>5</sup> 13 Pet. 36.

<sup>6</sup> 1 Story's Eq. Jur. §§ 192, 193.

<sup>7</sup> *Laidlaw v. Organ*, 2 Wheat. 195; *Pidcock v. Bishop*, 3 B. & Cr. 605; *Smith v. Bank of Scotland*, 1 Dow, 72; *Evans v. Bicknell*, 6 Ves. 173.

<sup>8</sup> *State v. Holloway*, 8 Blackf. 45.

<sup>9</sup> *Atwood v. Small*, 6 Cl. & Fin. 232; 1 Younge, 407; *Taylor v. Ashton*, 11 Mee. & W. 401; *Warner v. Daniel*, 1 Wood. & M. 103; *Torrey v. Buck*, 1 Green, Ch. 366; *Jarvis v. Duke*, 1 Vern. 19; *Broderick v. Broderick*, 1 P. Wms. 239.

<sup>10</sup> *Chisholm v. Gadsden*, 1 Strobb. 220; *Huguenin v. Baseley*, 14 Ves. 273; *State v. Holloway*, 8 Blackf. 45.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*; *Laidlaw v. Organ*, 2 Wheat. 195; *Smith v. Bank of Scotland*, 1 Dow, 272; 2 Kent, 484; *Chesterfield v. Janssen*, 2 Ves. 155; *Neville v. Wilkinson*, 1 Bro. Ch. 546.

<sup>12</sup> *Neville v. Wilkinson*, 1 Bro. Ch. 546.

thus representing a fact knew it to be false or made the assertion without knowing whether it was true or false is wholly immaterial;<sup>1</sup> for the affirmation of what one does not know or believe to be true is, equally in morals and law, as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known to be positively false.<sup>2</sup> And even if a party innocently misrepresent a fact by mistake it is equally conclusive; for it operates as a surprise and imposition on the other party.<sup>3</sup> Or, as Lord Thurlow expresses it, it misleads the parties contracting on the subject-matter."<sup>4</sup>

§ 172. If a person purchasing an estate falsely pretends and represents that he is purchasing or acting as agent for another, when in fact he is purchasing for himself, and such misrepresentation misleads and throws the vendor off his guard, and the purchaser makes a better bargain than he otherwise could, or the representation is in any way material, equity will not enforce the agreement, or, if it is already executed, will convert the purchaser into a trustee.<sup>5</sup> And so if a purchaser at auction or otherwise represents that he is purchasing or bidding

<sup>1</sup> *Wright v. Snow*, 2 De G. & Sm. 321.

<sup>2</sup> *Ainslie v. Medlycott*, 9 Ves. 21; *Graves v. White*, Freem. 57; *Pearson v. Morgan*, 2 Bro. Ch. 389; *Foster v. Charles*, 6 Bing. 396; 7 Bing. 105; *Taylor v. Ashton*, 11 Me. & Wel. 401; *Smith v. Mitchell*, 6 Ga. 458; *Hazard v. Irwin*, 18 Pick. 85; *Doggett v. Emerson*, 3 Story, 733; *Hough v. Richardson*, 3 Story, 691; *Mason v. Crosby*, 1 Wood. & M. 352; *Smith v. Babcock*, 2 Wood. & M. 246; *Hammatt v. Emerson*, 27 Me. 308.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*; *Pearson v. Morgan*, 2 Bro. Ch. 389; *Burrows v. Locke*, 10 Ves. 475; *De Manville v. Compton*, 1 Ves. & B. 355; *Ex parte Carr*, 3 Ves. & B. 111; *Carpenter v. Am. Ins. Co.* 1 Story, 57; *Tayman v. Mitchell*, 1 Md. Ch. Dec. 496; *Pratt v. Philbrook*, 33 Me. 17; *Harding v. Randall*, 15 Me. 332; *Rosevelt v. Fulton*, 2 Cow. 129; *Champlin v. Laytin*, 6 Paige, 189; *Reese v. Wyman*, 9 Ga. 439; *Reynell v. Sprye*, 8 Hare, 222; *Lewis v. McLemore*, 11 Yerg. 206; *Thomas v. McCann*, 4 B. Mon. 601; *Hunt v. Moore*, 2 Barr, 105; *Joice v. Taylor*, 6 G. & J. 54; *Lockridge v. Foster*, 4 Scam. 570; *Turnbull v. Gadsden*, 2 Strobb. Eq. 14.

<sup>4</sup> *Neville v. Wilkinson*, 1 Bro. Ch. 546.

<sup>5</sup> *Phillips v. Bucks*, 1 Vern. 227 and notes; *Fellowes v. Gwydyr*, 1 Sim. 63; 1 R. & M. 83. But a mere mistake of parties will not avoid a lease. *Stiner v. Stiner*, 58 Barb. 643.

for some other person, as for the debtor in a sale under an execution,<sup>1</sup> or for the mortgagor in a sale under a foreclosure, or for the family under an executor's or administrator's sale, and competition is thus prevented and the purchase is made on his own terms, equity will decree that such person shall be a trustee for the person for whom he represented that he was acting. So if a purchaser by fraud prevents other purchasers from attending a sale,<sup>2</sup> or if a purchaser fraudulently agrees that he will purchase an estate in his own behalf and that of another, in order to prevent competition, and gets the property into his own name, at a less price, he will be a trustee for the person defrauded.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand where an agent makes a fraudulent representation, or does a fraudulent act, in a purchase or sale, with or without the privity or knowledge or consent of his principal, and the principal adopts the bargain and attempts to reap an advantage from it so tainted by the fraud of the agent, he will be held bound by the fraud of the agent and relief will be given.<sup>4</sup> Indeed the doctrine has been thus broadly stated: "that where once a fraud has been committed, not only is the person who committed the fraud precluded from deriving any benefit from it, but every innocent person is so likewise, unless he has innocently acquired a subsequent interest; for a third person by seeking to derive any benefit under such a transaction, or to retain any benefit resulting therefrom, be-

<sup>1</sup> *Peebles v. Reading*, 8 Ser. & R. 484; *Gilmore v. Johnson*, 29 Ga. 67; *Belcher v. Saunders*, 34 Ala. 9; *Roller v. Spilmore*, 13 Wis. 26; *Arnold v. Cord*, 16 Ind. 176; *Northcote v. Martin*, 28 Miss. 469; *Soggins v. Heard*, 31 Miss. 426; *Pearson v. East*, 36 Md. 28; *Minot v. Mitchell*, 30 Ind. 228.

<sup>2</sup> *Martin v. Blight*, 4 J. J. Marsh. 491; *Rives v. Lawrence*, 4 Ga. 283; *Baegle v. Wentz*, 55 Penn. St. 369.

<sup>3</sup> *McCulloch v. Cowher*, 5 Wat. & S. 427; *Ferguson v. Williamson*, 20 Ark. 272; *Woson v. Cown*, 22 Miss. 329.

<sup>4</sup> *Ferson v. Sanger*, 1 Wood. & M. 147; *Warner v. Daniels*, 1 Wood. & M. 90; *Kibbe v. Hamilton Ins. Co.* 11 Gray, 163; *Brooke v. Berry*, 2 Gill, 83; *Fitzsimmons v. Joslin*, 21 Vt. 129; *Fuller v. Wilson*, 3 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 58. See also *Cornfoot v. Fowke*, 6 M. & Wel. 358; *National Exchange Co. v. Drew*, 2 Macqu. 103; 144 V. & P. 718; *Gentry v. Law*, 4 Nev. 97.

comes *particeps criminis*, however innocent of the fraud in the beginning."<sup>1</sup> And the same rule applies with more force to misrepresentations made by one of several partners.<sup>2</sup> But if the agreement is a fair one between the parties, it will not be affected because brought about by the fraud of some third person for his collateral benefit.<sup>3</sup> And if the agreement is not a fair one, it will not be invalidated by the fraudulent representations of a third person in no way connected with either party,<sup>4</sup> unless the circumstances are such that the bargain may be said to have been entered into by mistake.<sup>5</sup>

§ 173. However repugnant to entire good faith and sound morals any misrepresentation upon any subject, however made, may be, courts of justice cannot undertake to sit as censors upon mere morals. There are in every community two classes of rights,—perfect rights, and imperfect rights. Perfect rights are those that may be enforced, or for the breach of which damages may be recovered; imperfect rights are those which are conceded to every man, but which cannot be enforced by human tribunals, and for the breach of which no damages can be recovered. Thus every man has a right to the utmost good faith, and the most perfect frankness and truthfulness in all the transactions of business, but courts of justice would be utterly powerless to enforce such a standard of morality. They would have neither the time nor the means of investigating the innumerable arts of buyers and sellers. And so courts have been obliged to lay down certain practical rules and limitations upon the subject of misrepresentation. Thus the mis-

<sup>1</sup> *Hortopp v. Hortopp*, 21 Beav. 259; *Scholefield v. Templar*, John. 155; *Cassard v. Hinman*, 6 Bosw. 9; *Wilde v. Gibson*, 1 H. L. Ca. 605; *Elwell v. Chamberlain*, 31 N. Y. 619; *Bennett v. Judson*, 21 N. Y. 238; *Buford v. Caldwell*, 3 Mo. 477; *Thomas v. McCann*, 4 B. Mon. 601; *Perham v. Randolph*, 4 How. (Miss.) 435; *Stone v. Denny*, 4 Met. 161; *Gentry v. Law*, 4 Nev. 97.

<sup>2</sup> *Blair v. Bromley*, 2 Phil. 239, 354.

<sup>3</sup> *Bellamy v. Sabine*, 2 Phil. 425; *Blackie v. Clarke*, 15 Beav. 595.

<sup>4</sup> *Fisher v. Boody*, 1 Curtis, 206.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

representation must generally be of facts, or matters-of-fact, and not of mere matters of expectation or opinion,<sup>1</sup> as if one should represent that an estate contained a valuable mine, when in fact no mine existed,<sup>2</sup> or that an estate contained only two or three hundred acres when in fact it contained over twelve hundred acres, or that there was no timber upon it when there was a large amount of valuable timber,<sup>3</sup> or the seller should falsely represent that the custom of a public-house was a certain sum monthly,<sup>4</sup> or that an estate was situate in one locality or county when it was situate in another,<sup>5</sup> or that stocks were selling for such a sum in the market when they were worthless,<sup>6</sup> or that a third person has paid a certain sum for the same property,<sup>7</sup> or that it rents for so much.<sup>8</sup> In these and similar cases, the misrepresentation is of facts that go to the merits of the contract, and avoid it, if false. But if the representation is to the value, which is matter of opinion, it will not in general avoid the contract, as where the affirmation is that the estate is worth so much, or even if the representation is stronger, as that so much was given for it, or that so much has been offered or refused.<sup>9</sup> Any person who confides in or is cheated by such representations is considered too careless of his own interests to invoke the interposition of courts.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ferson v. Sanger*, 1 Wood. & M. 146; *Warner v. Daniels*, ib. 98; *Rush v. Vought*, 55 Penn. St. 437.

<sup>2</sup> *Lowndes v. Lane*, 2 Cox, 363.

<sup>3</sup> *Tyler v. Black*, 13 How. 230.

<sup>4</sup> *Pilmore v. Hood*, 6 Scott, 827.

<sup>5</sup> *Best v. Stow*, 2 Sand. Ch. 298; *Bennett v. Judson*, 21 N. Y. 238.

<sup>6</sup> *Manning v. Albee*, 11 Allen, 522. See *Warner v. Daniels*, 1 Wood. & M. 102.

<sup>7</sup> *Medbury v. Watson*, 6 Met. 259.

<sup>8</sup> *Elkins v. Tresham*, 1 Sev. 102; 1 Sid. 146.

<sup>9</sup> *Hepburn v. Dunlop*, 1 Wheat. 189; *Irvine v. Kirkpatrick*, 3 Eng. L. & Eq. 17; *Medbury v. Watson*, 6 Met. 259; *Bacon v. Bronson*, 7 John. Ch. 144; *Stone v. Denny*, 4 Met. 151; *Small v. Atwood*, 3 Younge, Exch. 407; *Veasey v. Doton*, 3 Allen, 351; *Hemmer v. Cooper*, 8 Allen, 334; *Best v. Blackburn*, 6 Litt. 51; *Speiglemyer v. Crawford*, 6 Paige, 254.

<sup>10</sup> *Manning v. Albee*, 11 Allen, 522; 2 Kent, 484, 485; *Vernon v. Keys*,



A misrepresentation, however, of a mere matter of opinion may avoid a contract, or convert the fraudulent party into a trustee, where the other party is known to place confidence in the opinions and judgment of the person with whom he is dealing, or where the relations between the parties are of a confidential and fiduciary character, or where one party has peculiar or exclusive means of acquiring proper information upon which to form a judgment or opinion,<sup>1</sup> or where the representations are such that one party is induced to rely upon the opinions of the other.<sup>2</sup>

§ 174. Again, the misrepresentation must be of some fact material to the contract, or of something that goes to its essence ;<sup>3</sup> as if an estate is represented to contain one thousand acres, and it contains nine hundred and ninety-nine acres,<sup>4</sup> or if the age of an article is represented to be ten years, and it is a few months more or less,<sup>5</sup> or a thing is represented to have been purchased in one place and it is in fact purchased at another,<sup>6</sup> or if a spring of water is represented to be upon a given tract of land, when in fact it is not :<sup>7</sup> in all these matters the facts represented are too trifling or collateral to be material, and no relief would be granted. Yet, if the leading motive of the purchase of an estate was known to be the purpose of acquiring a spring of water, then a fraudulent

12 East, 632; *Hough v. Richardson*, 3 Story, 696; *Jenkins v. Eldredge*, 3 Story, 181.

<sup>1</sup> *Sheoffer v. Sleade*, 7 Blackf. 178; *Hill v. Gray*, 1 Starkie, 352; *Keates v. Cadogan*, 2 Eng. L. & Eq. 321.

<sup>2</sup> *Reynell v. Sprye*, 8 Hare, 222; 1 De G., M. & G. 660.

<sup>3</sup> *Phillips v. Bucks*, 1 Vern. 227; *Hough v. Richardson*, 3 Story, 659; *Turnbull v. Gadsden*, 2 Strobb. Eq. 14; *Morris Canal v. Emmett*, 9 Paige, 186; *Clark v. Everhart*, 63 Penn. St. 347.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*; *Stebbins v. Eddy*, 4 Mason, 414; *Winston v. Gwathmey*, 8 B. Mon. 19; *Winch v. Winchester*, 1 Ves. & B. 375; *Ingpont v. Worcup*, Finch, 310.

<sup>5</sup> *Geddes v. Pennington*, 5 Dow, 159.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Winston v. Gwathmey*, 8 B. Mon. 19.

misrepresentation as to the locality of the spring would become material to the contract; or if the vendor should fraudulently point out the boundary lines, so as to take in the spring, or more land than belonged to him, the contract would be avoided.<sup>1</sup> But if the boundaries are properly pointed out, a misrepresentation as to the number of acres in a farm is not material.<sup>2</sup>

§ 175. The misrepresentation must also be of something peculiarly within the knowledge of one of the parties, or the facts must be of such a nature that both parties cannot easily obtain the information. Thus if both parties have the same means of information, as if both parties go upon a tract of land and have equal means of judging of the quantity of timber upon it,<sup>3</sup> or if representations are made of town lots and the future prospects of the town, and the facts are equally open to both parties upon inquiry,<sup>4</sup> or if there is a misrepresentation of title, and the facts are equally accessible to both parties,<sup>5</sup> or generally, if both parties have the same information, or an equal opportunity to obtain the same information, there cannot be such a fraud, arising from such a misrepresentation as will convert one of the parties into a trustee.<sup>6</sup> So, if there are fraudulent misrepresentations sufficient to avoid the contract, and the innocent party obtains a knowledge of all the facts before completing the contract, he can have no relief.<sup>7</sup> And so if the misrepresentations, though fraudulent, are so vague and uncertain that they ought not to mislead a reasonable man, but should rather put him upon inquiry, he can have no relief.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Elliott v. Boaz*, 9 Ala. 772.

<sup>2</sup> *Stebbins v. Eddy*, 4 Mason, 414; *Morris Canal v. Emmett*, 9 Paige, 168.

<sup>3</sup> *Hough v. Richardson*, 3 Story, 659; *Tindall v. Harkinson*, 19 Ga. 448.

<sup>4</sup> *Bell v. Henderson*, 6 How. (Miss.) 311.

<sup>5</sup> *Glasscock v. Minor*, 11 Mo. 655; *Juzan v. Toulmin*, 9 Ala. 662.

<sup>6</sup> *Hobbs v. Parker*, 31 Me. 143; *Hutchinson v. Brown*, 1 Clark, 408.

<sup>7</sup> *Yeates v. Prior*, 6 Eng. 68; *Knuckolls v. Lea*, 10 Humph. 577; *Pratt v. Philbrook*, 33 Me. 17.

<sup>8</sup> *Hough v. Richardson*, 3 Story, 659.

§ 176. The action of courts in cases of alleged fraud will frequently depend upon the form in which the matter is brought before them, and upon the relief sought in the proceedings. Thus a bill may be brought by a party for the specific performance of a contract which he holds, or a bill may be brought by a party to set aside the contract, or convert the opposite party who holds under the contract into a trustee, or a suit may be brought by a party at common law to recover damages for the breach of the same contract. It does not follow, because a court of equity would refuse to decree the specific performance of a contract, that it would also on a proper bill decree the contract to be set aside, or that it would order the party claiming under it to be a trustee for the other party.<sup>1</sup> And so if a party comes into a court of equity to ask that an agreement which he holds may be specifically performed by the opposite party, he must come with clean hands as it is said. There must not be any fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment on his part in procuring the contract; or still stronger, there must not be a suspicion of concealment, misrepresentation, fraud, or unfairness adhering to him. And even further, if the bargain imposes great hardship on the defendant, or is made under any misapprehension, or mistake, or unadvisedly, courts of equity will decline to interfere actively in decreeing a specific execution of the agreement, but will leave the parties to their rights at law.<sup>2</sup> It will be seen from this that it requires much less evidence of fraud to enable a defendant to resist the specific performance of an agreement, than it requires to enable him to succeed as a plaintiff in a bill to set aside the same contract.<sup>3</sup> In the case last named he must establish the fraud affirmatively by proof of the facts and circumstances to the

<sup>1</sup> 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 693.

<sup>2</sup> *Savage v. Brocksope*, 18 Ves. 335; *Cadman v. Horner*, 18 Ves. 12; *Clermont v. Tasburg*, 1 Jac. & W. 112; *Wall v. Stubbs*, 1 Madd. 80; *Mortlock v. Buller*, 10 Ves. 292.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*; *Townshend v. Stangroom*, 6 Ves. 328 n.; *Lowndes v. Lane*, 2 Cox, 363.

reasonable satisfaction of the court. And there may be such a case that the court would refuse to set aside a contract on the one side, because the evidence of fraud was insufficient to set the court in motion, and on the other side it would refuse to decree a specific performance because the circumstances were too suspicious to allow it actively to interfere for the other party. In such case the parties would be left to an action at common law upon the agreements with such rights as they may have in a common-law suit.<sup>1</sup>

§ 177. The rules that apply to affirmative acts or representations which mislead, deceive, and defraud, are of comparatively easy application in most cases. A single affirmative word upon a material matter tending to mislead, and actually misleading, is enough to establish fraud.<sup>2</sup> It is the *suggestio falsi* which may be defined to be a false affirmation, in whatever form it may be made, whether by words or acts, of a material fact, rightfully acted upon by the other party: such an affirmation avoids the contract or converts the offending party into a trustee for the person defrauded. But how far a contracting party may legally conceal facts known to him, affecting the value of the subject-matter of the agreement, is another and more difficult question. There is no doubt in sound morals upon the matter. The natural instincts of every right-minded man concur with every writer on morals in condemning every concealment that suffers another to contract in ignorance of the facts that give value to his property.<sup>3</sup> The common law teaches as high a standard of morals as any other system of law. The decisions of judges, and the books of elementary writers, contain the highest and purest maxims of good faith and sound morality in every transaction and relation of life. Whenever, there-

<sup>1</sup> Story, Eq. Jur. § 693.

<sup>2</sup> Turner v. Harvey, 1 Jac. 169.

<sup>3</sup> Cic. de Off. Lib. 3, c. 12, 13; Paley, Mor. Phi. B. 3, c. 7; Grotius, B. 2, c. 12, § 9; Puff. Law of Nature, B. 5, c. 3, § 4.

fore, a question of concealment arises, either in a suit at common law or in equity, it cannot be a question what the highest morality requires; but it is a question how far courts can go practically in giving relief, without rendering the contracts of men so uncertain that no business could be transacted without danger of prolonged litigation. In communities governed by known, fixed, and practical rules, and not by the mere discretion of men or judges, it sometimes happens that courts must decline to give relief in cases where a man of pure principles and delicate honor would scorn to obtain or hold an advantage. Thus in all cases of *suggestio falsi*, where active steps have been taken to deceive and gain an advantage, courts have little trouble in giving relief; but where an advantage has been gained by concealment, or *suppressio veri* as it is called, or by mere silence, it is more difficult to lay down fixed rules that may not do more harm than good to business and society. However, concealment, or *suppressio veri*, is often of that fraudulent character that avoids a contract or converts the offending party into a trustee.

§ 178. There may be such relations between the parties that silence, or the non-disclosure of a material fact, will be a fraudulent concealment. If a person standing in a special relation of trust and confidence to another has information concerning property, and contracts with the other, and does not disclose his exclusive knowledge, the contract may be avoided, or he may be held as a constructive trustee.<sup>1</sup> Thus, if an attorney contracts with his client without disclosing to him material facts in his possession, the contract would be void. The trust and confidence of the client in his attorney is such that an obligation is imposed upon the attorney to

<sup>1</sup> *Pidcock v. Bishop*, 3 B. & Cr. 605; *Martin v. Morgan*, 1 Brod. & Bing. 289; *Squire v. Whitton*, 1 H. L. Ca. 333; *Owen v. Homan*, 3 Eng. L. & Eq. 121; 5 Mac. & Gor. 378; *Etting v. Bank of U. S.* 11 Wheat. 59; *Carew's Case*, 7 De G., M. & G. 43; *Smith v. Bank of Scotland*, 1 Dow, P. 292; *Clark v. Everhart*, 63 Penn. St. 347; *Miller v. Welles*, 23 Conn. 33.

communicate every material circumstance of law or fact. Mere silence, under such circumstances, becomes fraudulent concealment.<sup>1</sup> The same rule applies to all contracts of an agent with his principal, principal with his surety, landlord with his tenant, parent with his child, guardian with his ward, ancestor with the heir, husband with his wife, trustee with his *cestui que trust*, executors or administrators with creditors, legatees, or distributees of the estate, partners with their copartners, appointors with their appointees, and part-owners with part-owners.<sup>2</sup> Though the part-owners of a ship, holding by several and independent titles, were held not to stand in such confidential relations to each other, that one was under obligation to communicate material facts upon a negotiation to purchase.<sup>3</sup> If any of the parties above named propose to contract with the persons with whom they stand in such relations of trust and confidence, they must use the utmost good faith. It is not enough that they do not affirmatively misrepresent: *they must not conceal; they must speak, and speak fully to every material fact known to them*, or the contract will not be allowed to stand.<sup>4</sup> Thus, if a partner who keeps the accounts of the firm should purchase his copartner's interest, without disclosing the state of the accounts, the agreement could not stand.<sup>5</sup> The same rule applies to family relations in general; as, where a younger brother disputed the legitimacy of his elder

<sup>1</sup> Bulkley v. Wilford, 2 Clark & Fin. 102.

<sup>2</sup> Beaumont v. Boulton, 5 Ves. 485; Ormond v. Hutchinson, 13 Ves. 51; Gartside v. Isherwood, 1 Bro. Ch. App. 558; Wellford v. Chancellor, 5 Grat. 39.

<sup>3</sup> Mathews v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48.

<sup>4</sup> Maddeford v. Austwick, 1 Sim. 89; 2 M. & K. 279; Popham v. Brooke, 5 Russ. 8; Gordon v. Gordon, 3 Swans. 470; Cocking v. Pratt, 1 Ves. 401; Higgins v. Joyce, 2 Jones & La. 328; Farnham v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 234; Ogden v. Astor, 4 Sand. S. C. 312; Ormond v. Hutchinson, 13 Ves. 51; Beaumont v. Boulton, 5 Ves. 485; Gartside v. Isherwood, 1 Bro. Ch. App. 558.

<sup>5</sup> Maddeford v. Austwick, 1 Sim. 89; 2 M. & K. 279; Smith in re Hay, 6 Madd. 2; Popham v. Brooke, 5 Russ. 8.

brother, and a settlement and partition were entered into, the younger brother having in his possession facts that tended to show that his parents intermarried before the birth of the elder, which facts he did not communicate, the settlement was set aside.<sup>1</sup>

§ 179. There are, also, cases where a party must not be silent upon a material fact within his knowledge, although he stands in no relation of trust and confidence. Thus, if a party taking a guaranty from a surety does not disclose facts within his knowledge that enhance the risk, and suffers the surety to bind himself in ignorance of the increased risk,<sup>2</sup> or if a party already defrauded by his clerk should receive security from a third person for such clerk's fidelity, without communicating the fact of the fraud already committed, thus holding the clerk out as trustworthy;<sup>3</sup> in both these, and in similar cases, the contracts would be void for concealment. Silence as to such facts, under such circumstances, would be equivalent to a positive affirmation that no such facts existed.<sup>4</sup> And so, if a party knows that another is relying upon his judgment and knowledge in contracting with him, although no confidential relation exists, and he does not state material facts within his knowledge, the contract will be avoided; for knowingly to permit another to act as though the relation was confidential, and yet not to state material facts, is fraudulent. It is said

<sup>1</sup> *Gordon v. Gordon*, 3 Swans. 399; *Cocking v. Pratt*, 1 Ves. 401.

<sup>2</sup> *Martin v. Morgan*, 1 Brod. & Bing. 289; *Pidcock v. Bishop*, 3 B. & Cr. 605; *Owen v. Homan*, 3 Eng. L. & Eq. 121; 25 Eng. L. & Eq. 1; 4 H. L. Ca. 997; *Carew's Case*, 7 De G., M. & G. 43; *Leith Banking Co. v. Bell*, 8 Shaw & Dun, 721; *Railton v. Matthews*, 10 Clark & Fin. 935; *Hamilton v. Watson*, 12 Clark & Fin. 119; *Squire v. Whitton*, 1 H. L. Ca. 333; *N. British Ins. Co. v. Lloyd*, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 456; 10 Exch. 523; *Evans v. Kneeland*, 9 Ala. 42.

<sup>3</sup> *Franklin Bank v. Cooper*, 36 Me. 195; *Smith v. Bank of Scotland*, 1 Dow, P. Ca. 272; *Etting v. Bank of U. S.* 11 Wheat. 59; *Maltby's Case*, 1 Dow, P. Ca. 294.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

that a party in such circumstances is bound to destroy the confidence reposed in him, or to state all the facts which such confidence demands.<sup>1</sup> He cannot himself contract at arm's length, and permit the other to act as though the relation was one of trust and confidence. And so, if one party knows that the other has fallen into a delusion or mistake as to an article of property, and he does not remove such delusion or mistake, but is silent, and enters into a contract, knowing that the other is contracting under the influence of such delusion or mistake, the contract may be set aside; for, not to remove that delusion or mistake is equivalent to an express misrepresentation.<sup>2</sup>

§ 180. There must be a positive concealment to amount to a *suppressio veri*. Mere silence, if nothing is done to conceal a fact, is not in general *suppressio veri*. *Aliud est celare, aliud tacere*. Mere silence between strangers, contracting at arm's length, and understanding that they are so contracting, will not in general avoid a contract, or convert one of the parties into a trustee for the other.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the value of property may frequently depend upon extrinsic facts; as, whether there is peace or war, whether there is or is not a demand in the market, or in a distant place, for property of that description, whether transportation is accessible, or whether the money market is easy or close. If one having information upon such matters enters into a contract with another with whom he has no confidential or fiduciary relations, and he neither says nor does any thing to mislead or deceive, but is simply

<sup>1</sup> Per Mr. Redfield, 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 212 a.; Bruce v. Ruler, 2 Man. & Ry. 3; Fitzsimmons v. Joslin, 21 Vt. 129; Hanson v. Edgerly, 29 N. H. 343; Bank of Republic v. Baxter, 31 Vt. 101; Allen v. Addington, 7 Wend. 10; 11 Wend. 374; Paddock v. Strobridge, 29 Vt. 470; Dolman v. Nokes, 22 Beav. 402; Hayward v. Cope, 25 Beav. 140; Foote v. Foote, 58 Barb. 258; Babcock v. Case, 61 Penn. St. 427.

<sup>2</sup> Keates v. Cadogan, 2 Eng. L. & Eq. 318; Hill v. Gray, 1 Starkie, 434.

<sup>3</sup> Fox v. Mackreth, 2 Bro. Ch. 300; 2 Cox, 320; Harris v. Tyson, 24 Penn. St. 359; Mathews v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48.



silent upon the facts known to him, equity will not in general disturb the contract;<sup>1</sup> but if he speak a word, or does an act, that tends to mislead the other party, or throw him off his guard, the contract may be avoided, and he may be converted into a trustee.<sup>2</sup> The law permits persons to deal at arm's length, if they both understand that they are so dealing, and it permits them to be silent as to matters known only to one of them, if no inquiries are made; but it does not permit any artifice to be added to silence, in order to conceal a fact material to the contract. Thus, concealment, or *suppressio veri*, which amounts to a fraud in the sense of a court of equity, and for which it will grant relief, is defined to be the non-disclosure of those facts and circumstances which one party is under some legal or equitable obligation to communicate to the other, and which the latter has a right, not merely *in foro conscientiae*, *sed juris et de jure*, to know.<sup>3</sup> Thus if a stranger discover a valuable mine or spring, or any other thing or circumstances, on or in connection with land of another, he may be silent, and purchase the land;<sup>4</sup> but if he use any art to prevent a knowledge of the fact from coming to the owner, equity will rescind the contract,<sup>5</sup> and a very slight act will convert innocent silence into fraudulent concealment.<sup>6</sup> But if one of the parties employs an agent to contract, and the agent, knowing a material fact, is silent or conceals it, his

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. Mr. Kent in the earlier editions of his Commentaries stated a broader doctrine, but his later editions state the doctrine as in the text. See 2 Kent, 482, 484, 490, and notes; *Laidlaw v. Organ*, 2 Wheat. 178.

<sup>2</sup> *Turner v. Harvey*, Jac. 169; *Laidlaw v. Organ*, 2 Wheat. 178; *Mathews v. Bliss*, 22 Pick. 48.

<sup>3</sup> *Young v. Bumpass*, 1 Freem. Ch. 241; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 207; *Irvine v. Kirkpatrick*, 3 Eng. L. & Eq. 17; *Laidlaw v. Organ*, 2 Wheat. 178.

<sup>4</sup> *Fox v. Mackreth*, 2 Bro. Ch. 400; 2 Cox, 300; 1 Lead. Ca. Eq. 188; *Harris v. Tyson*, 24 Penn. St. 359; *Earl of Bath, &c.*, Case, 3 Ch. Ca. 56, 74, 103, 104; *Mathews v. Bliss*, 22 Pick. 48.

<sup>5</sup> *Bowman v. Bates*, 2 Bibb, 47.

<sup>6</sup> *Turner v. Harvey*, Jac. 169; *Laidlaw v. Organ*, 2 Wheat. 178; *Torrey v. Buck*, 1 Green, Ch. 380; *Mathews v. Bliss*, 22 Pick. 48.

principal will not be affected with the knowledge, nor will the contract be vitiated.<sup>1</sup>

§ 181. Courts of equity will not only interfere in cases of fraud, to set aside acts done, but they will also, if acts have by fraud been prevented from being done, interfere, and treat the case exactly as if the acts had been done; and this they will do, by converting the party who has committed the fraud, and profited by it, into a trustee for the party in whose favor the act would otherwise have been done.<sup>2</sup> Thus, if a person by his promises, or by any fraudulent conduct, with a view to his own profit, prevents a deed or will from being made in favor of a third person, and the property intended for such third person afterwards comes to him who fraudulently prevented the execution of the will or deed, he will be held to be a trustee for the person defrauded, to the extent of the interest intended for him.<sup>3</sup> So, where the tenant in tail in remainder, fraudulently or by force, prevented the tenant in tail for life in possession from suffering a common recovery, and thereby barring the entail for the purpose of providing for other persons by will out of the estate, it was held that the tenant in tail in remainder, when the estate came to him, was a trustee, and the court took care that the estate should go precisely as if the common recovery had been suffered, although the tenant in tail was a married woman, and the fraud had been committed by her husband, and she was not privy to it.<sup>4</sup> And where

<sup>1</sup> *Wilde v. Gibson*, 1 H. L. Ca. 605, reversing same case, 2 You. & Col. 542.

<sup>2</sup> *Middleton v. Middleton*, 1 Jac. & W. 96; *Reach v. Kennegate*, 1 Ves. 123; *Oldham v. Litchford*, 2 Vern. 506; *Dutton v. Poole*, 2 Lev. 211; *Mestaer v. Gillespie*, 11 Ves. 638, and cases cited; *Jenkins v. Edridge*, 3 Story, 181. See remarks in *McGowan v. McGowan*, 14 Gray, 119; *Morey v. Herrick*, 18 Penn. St. 128; *Wallgrave v. Tebbs*, 2 K. & J. 313; *Dixon v. Olmius*, 1 Cox, Ch. 414.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*; *Church v. Ruland*, 64 Penn. St. 432.

<sup>4</sup> *Luttrell v. Olmius*, and *Waltham's Case*, cited 11 Ves. 638; and 14 Ves. 290.

issue in tail prevented his father, tenant in tail, from suffering a recovery, by promising to provide for younger children, in favor of whom the recovery was to be suffered, equity converted the tenant in tail into a trustee for the younger children.<sup>1</sup> And where a person fraudulently intercepts a gift intended for another, by promising to hand it over if it is left to him, equity will compel an execution of the promise, by converting such person into a trustee.<sup>2</sup> So, if devisees or heirs prevent a testator from charging his estate with annuities or legacies, by saying that it is not worth while to put them in the will, and that they will pay them, they will be trustees for such intended annuitants, or legatees.<sup>3</sup> So, if an executor prevents a gift or legacy from being given to one, by promising to pay it as if inserted in the will, he will be a trustee.<sup>4</sup> So, where a testator held a note against his father, which he intended to give up in his will, the residuary legatee promising that she would surrender the note, equity held her to be a trustee.<sup>5</sup> So, where one fraudulently procured a deed to be made to herself, instead of to another.<sup>6</sup> But there must be some actual fraud in procuring a deed or devise to one's self: the mere breach of a promise to convey is not enough.<sup>7</sup> So if an heir fraudulently, or through ignorance, procure a will to be revoked, so that the estate comes to him, he will be a trustee; as, where A. had sold a part of his estate, and the purchaser desired a fine

<sup>1</sup> *Jones v. McKee*, 6 Barr, 428; *Devenish v. Baines*, Prec. Ch. 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Hoge v. Hoge*, 1 Watts, 213; *Devenish v. Baines*, Prec. Ch. 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Chamberlain v. Chamberlain*, 2 Freem. 34; *Oldham v. Litchford*, 2 Vern. 506; *Mestaer v. Gillespie*, 11 Ves. 638; *Huguenin v. Baseley*, 14 Ves. 290; *Griffin v. Nanson*, 4 Ves. 344; *Hoge v. Hoge*, 1 Watts, 213; *Jones v. McKee*, 3 Barr, 496, and 4 Barr, 428; *Norris v. Frazer*, L. R. 15 Eq. 329; *McCormick v. Grogan*, L. R. 4 H. L. 82.

<sup>4</sup> *Thynn v. Thynn*, 1 Vern. 296; *Reach v. Kennigate*, Amb. 67; *Barrow v. Greenbough*, 3 Ves. 152; *Chamberlain v. Agar*, 2 V. & B. 250; *Podmore v. Gunning*, 7 Sm. 644.

<sup>5</sup> *Richardson v. Adams*, 10 Yerg. 273; *Jones v. McKee*, 3 Barr, 496.

<sup>6</sup> *Miller v. Pearce*, 6 Wat. & S. 97.

<sup>7</sup> *Hoge v. Hoge*, 1 Watts, 213.

to be levied, B., his heir, acting as his attorney, advised a fine to be levied of his whole estate, whereby A.'s will was revoked, and the estate descended to B.; the devisee under the will called upon B. to hold the property, as his trustee, and he was so held by the court; Lord Eldon saying, "You, who have been wanting in what I conceive to be the duty of an attorney, if it happens that you get an advantage by that neglect, you shall not hold that advantage, but you shall be trustee of the property for the benefit of that person who would have been entitled to it, if you had known what, as an attorney, you ought to have known; and, not knowing it, you shall not take advantage of your own ignorance."<sup>1</sup> In such cases it has been held that mere promises are not enough, that there must be some proof of a fraudulent intent or purpose, to create a trust; it is also held that such trust does not follow the property, but is only an agreement which equity will enforce.<sup>2</sup>

§ 182. While a court of equity will thus create a trust where a person has by fraud prevented a will from being made in favor of another, it has no jurisdiction to prevent the probate of, or to set aside, a will fraudulently procured. Ecclesiastical and common-law courts in England, and probate courts with the common-law courts in the United States, alone have jurisdiction over wills. Thus, until within a short period all wills in England were first presented to the ecclesiastical courts, and they were there allowed or disallowed according to the evidence. If they were allowed, the final judgment allowing them was conclusive upon the personalty until such judgment was reversed or annulled. The validity of such will, however, so far as real estate was concerned, was tried in the courts of common law, as often as the title to the separate parcels of

<sup>1</sup> *Bulkley v. Wilford*, 2 Cl. & Fin. 177; 8 Bligh (n. s.), 11; *Segrave v. Kirwan*, Beat. 157; *Nanney v. Williams*, 22 Beav. 542. See *Mix v. King*, 55 Ill. 434.

<sup>2</sup> *Bedilian v. Seaton*, 3 Wall. Jr. 280.

land was in controversy. Whenever in the prosecution or defence of a real action such will of real estate was given in evidence, not only its execution was tried, but its validity, as whether it was obtained by undue influence or fraud, or whether the testator was of sound mind. Courts of equity in a few early cases assumed jurisdiction to set aside wills procured by fraud,<sup>1</sup> but it is now well settled that they will not interfere, but that courts of common law have exclusive jurisdiction: nor will they interfere to set aside the judgment or probate of a will procured by fraud.<sup>2</sup> To set aside such a judgment, proceedings must be had in the nature of proceedings for a new trial in the court in which such judgment or decree was passed.<sup>3</sup> The extent to which a court of equity will go, in correcting a fraud perpetrated in relation to a will, is to give relief where fraud has prevented a will from being made, or where a fraud has been practised upon the legatee, as where a name is inserted fraudulently in a will in place of the intended devisee or legatee, or where the revocation of a will has been procured by fraud,<sup>4</sup> or where there is a gift to executors under such circumstances that it ought to be a trust for relations, or where a legatee promises the testator that he will hand over the legacy to a third person.<sup>5</sup> In all these cases the will itself is estab-

<sup>1</sup> *Maundy v. Maundy*, 1 Ch. R. 66; *Well v. Thornagh*, Pr. Ch. 123; *Goss v. Tracy*, 1 P. Wms. 287; 2 Vern. 700.

<sup>2</sup> *Roberts v. Wynne*, 1 Ch. R. 125; *Archer v. Mosse*, 2 Vern. 8; *Hébert v. Lownes*, 1 Ch. R. 13; *Thynn v. Thynn*, 1 Vern. 296; *Devenish v. Baines*, 1 Pr. Ch. 3; *Barnesley v. Powell*, 1 Ves. 287; *Marriott v. Marriott*, Str. 666; *Plume v. Beale*, 1 P. Wms. 388; *Rockwood v. Rockwood*, 1 Leon. 192, Cro. Eliz. 163; *Dutton v. Poole*, 1 Vent. 318; *Beringer v. Beringer*, 26 Car. II.; *Chamberlain v. Chamberlain*, 2 Freem. 34; *Leicester v. Foxcroft*, Gilb. 11; *Ketrick v. Barnsby*, 3 Bro. P. C. 358; *Webb v. Claverden*, 2 Atk. 424; *Bennett v. Vade*, 2 Atk. 324; *Anon.* 3 Atk. 17; *Sheffield v. Buckingham*, 1 Atk. 628; *Allen v. Macpherson*, 5 Beav. 469; 1 Phil. 133; 1 H. L. Ca. 191; *Murray v. Murphy*, 39 Miss. 214.

<sup>3</sup> *Waters v. Stickney*, 12 Allen, 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Bulkley v. Wilford*, 2 Cl. & Fin. 177; 8 Bligh (N. S.), 11; *Segrave v. Kirwan*, Beat. 157; *Nanney v. Williams*, 22 Beav. 452.

<sup>5</sup> *Kennell v. Abbott*, 4 Ves. 802; *Marriott v. Marriott*, Str. 666, cited

lished, but certain other collateral things are decreed growing out of the manner in which the will was procured.<sup>1</sup> In New York, New Jersey, and South Carolina, the old English practice is followed, and wills must be proved whenever they are used to establish or defeat the title to real estate, nor has a court of equity jurisdiction to set them aside. This rule has been modified in New York so far that when the title of real estate depends upon a will, the validity of which is doubted, and the parties are not in possession of the real estate, nor in such a position that a real action can be brought, or if there is any technical reason why a real action cannot be sustained, a court of equity will take jurisdiction to prevent a failure of justice.<sup>2</sup> In nearly all the other States the judgments of the courts of probate allowing a will are conclusive upon all the world, both as to real and personal estate. In all actions at law involving title under such wills, it is only necessary to produce the judgment of the probate court allowing them. Courts of equity have no jurisdiction to set aside such wills for fraud, nor can they set aside the judgments of the probate court allowing them.<sup>3</sup> If, however, a will is probated by accident or mistake, or the probate is procured by fraud, the judgment may be reversed or modified, by proceedings in the same court in the nature of a petition for a review or for a new trial.<sup>4</sup> This, however, may depend upon the statutes of the several States

Gilbert, 203, 209; *Williams v. Fitch*, 18 N. Y. 546; 7 Sim. 644; 1 Watts, 163.

<sup>1</sup> *Marriott v. Marriott*, Str. & Gil. *ut supra*.

<sup>2</sup> *Brady v. McCosker*, 1 Comst. 214; *Clarke v. Sawyer*, 2 Com. 498.

<sup>3</sup> *Gould v. Gould*, 3 Story, 516; *Fouvergne v. New Orleans*, 18 How. 470; *Gaines v. Chew*, 2 How. 645; *Tarver v. Tarver*, 9 Pet. 180; *Adams v. Adams*, 22 Vt. 50; *Cotton v. Ross*, 1 Paige, 396; *Muir v. Trustees*, 3 Barb. Ch. 477; *Hamberlin v. Tenny*, 7 How. (Miss.) 143; *Lyne v. Guardian*, 1 Miss. 410; *Hunter's Will*, 6 Ohio, 499; *Watson v. Bothwell*, 11 Ala. 653; *Johnson v. Glasscock*, 2 Ala. 233; *Hunt v. Hamilton*, 9 Dana, 90; *McDowall v. Peyton*, 2 Des. 313; *Howell v. Whitchurch*, 4 Heyw. 49; *Burrows v. Ragland*, 6 Humph. 481; *Blue v. Patterson*, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 459; *Trexler v. Miller*, 6 Ired. Eq. 248.

<sup>4</sup> *Waters v. Stickney*, 12 Allen, 1.

giving jurisdiction to their several courts of probate. While courts of equity will not interfere to set aside wills procured by fraud, or to set aside the probate of those procured by fraud, they will not interfere in favor of the fraudulent party to enable him to establish any rights under the will.<sup>1</sup> As a general rule neither courts of equity nor of common law will take notice of a will for any purpose unless it has been proved in the courts of probate having jurisdiction over such matters.<sup>2</sup>

§ 183. Another instance of a constructive trust arising from fraud in relation to deeds or wills, is where a party has suppressed or destroyed a deed or other instrument of title. Every one is entitled to aid from the judicial tribunals in all cases of fraud, and if a defendant has fraudulently suppressed or destroyed the evidence of a man's title, and is in possession of the property himself, he ought to be declared a trustee for the rightful owner under the suppressed paper;<sup>3</sup> and if a deed or will is destroyed or suppressed, a court of equity can give relief. There seems to be no difficulty in this matter so far as relates to deeds,<sup>4</sup> nor so far as relates to wills of real estate in those jurisdictions where a will must be proved in court in every instance where it is necessary to the title of real estate ;

<sup>1</sup> *Nelson v. Oldfield*, 2 Vern. 76.

<sup>2</sup> *Price v. Dewhurst*, 4 My. & Cr. 76, 80, 81; *Gaines v. Chew*, 2 How. 645, 646.

<sup>3</sup> *Bates v. Heard*, Toth. 66; 1 Dick. 4; *Tucker v. Phipps*, 3 Atk. 360; *Hayne v. Hayne*, 1 Dick. 18; *Eyton v. Eyton*, 2 Vern. 280, Pr. Ch. 116; *Dalston v. Coatsworth*, 1 P. Wms. 731; *Woodroff v. Burton*, 1 P. Wms. 734; *Saltern v. Melhuish*, Amb. 249; *Cowper v. Cowper*, 2 P. Wms. 748; *Gartside v. Radcliffe*, 1 Ch. Ca. 292; *Hunt v. Mathews*, 1 Vern. 408; *Wardour v. Beresford*, 1 Vern. 452; *Downes v. Jennings*, 32 Beav. 290; *Sansom v. Rumsey*, 2 Vern. 561; 1 P. Wms. 733; *Hampden v. Hampden*, 3 Bro. P. C. 550; 1 P. Wms. 733; *Spencer v. Smith*, 1 N. C. C. 75; *Middleton v. Middleton*, 1 J. & W. 99; *Wood v. Abrey*, 3 Mod. 423; *Floyer v. Sherrard*, Amb. 18; *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 246; *Law v. Barchard*, 8 Ves. 133; *White v. Damon*, 7 Ves. 35; *Moth v. Atwood*, 5 Ves. 845; *Stephens v. Bateman*, 1 Bro. Ch. 22; *Griffith v. Spratley*, 2 Bro. Ch. 179.

<sup>4</sup> *Ward v. Webber*, 1 Wash. Va. 274.

but in jurisdictions where a will cannot be noticed by other courts until it is first proved in a court of probate, there is a difficulty in proceeding in equity for fraud in suppressing it, except by a bill of discovery of evidence to use in the courts of probate in proving the will. Accordingly it has been determined in some States that a will cannot be acted upon in courts of equity, although lost, destroyed, or suppressed, until it is first proved in a probate court.<sup>1</sup> In other States courts of equity, in cases of suppressed or spoliated wills, have taken jurisdiction *in odium spoliatoris*, and have allowed such will to be proved and have carried its provisions into effect, as a court of probate would have done if the will had been produced and regularly administered.<sup>2</sup>

§ 184. If a party in ignorance and mistake of his rights and interests execute a conveyance, although no fraud is practised upon him, a court of equity will relieve against the instrument; for it is against good conscience to take advantage of one's ignorance to obtain his property.<sup>3</sup> Thus if an heir, in ignorance of the value of his inheritance,<sup>4</sup> or in ignorance that some legacies or devises had lapsed,<sup>5</sup> should convey his interest

<sup>1</sup> *Morningstar v. Selby*, 15 Ohio, 345; *Gaines v. Chew*, 2 How. 345; *Gaines v. Hennen*, 24 How. 553.

<sup>2</sup> *Bailey v. Stiles*, 1 Green, Ch. 220; *Allison v. Allison*, 7 Dana, 90; *Legare v. Ashe*, 1 Bay, 464; *Meade v. Langdon*, cited 22 Vt. 59; *Buchanan v. Matlock*, 8 Humph. 390. In New York the matter is regulated by statute, and courts of equity or the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction in case of a lost or spoliated will. *Bowen v. Idley*, 6 Paige, 46; *Bulkley v. Redmond*, 2 Brad. Sur. 281.

<sup>3</sup> *Bingham v. Bingham*, 1 Ves. 126; *Ramsden v. Hylton*, 2 Ves. 394; *Turner v. Turner*, 2 Ch. R. 81; *Dunnage v. White*, 1 Swans. 137; *Naylor v. Wynch*, 1 S. & S. 564; *Evans v. Llewellyn*, 2 Bro. Ch. 150; 1 Cox, 333; *Gossmour v. Pigge*, 8 Jur. 526; *McCarthy v. Decaix*, 2 R. & M. 614; *Huguenin v. Baseley*, 4 Ves. 373; *Hore v. Beecher*, 12 Sim. 465; *Marshall v. Collett*, 1 Y. & Col. Exch. 238; *Midland Great Western Railway v. Johnson*, 6 H. L. Ca. 811.

<sup>4</sup> *Beard v. Campbell*, 2 A. K. Marsh. 125; *Tyler v. Black*, 13 How. 231.

<sup>5</sup> *Pusey v. Desbouvrie*, 3 P. Wms. 316.



for an inadequate consideration, equity would convert the purchaser into a trustee. And if the purchaser should have full knowledge, or should stand in any confidential relation, or should practise the slightest art to mislead or conceal, the equities would of course be much stronger against the transaction;<sup>1</sup> but these circumstances are not necessary to avoid the conveyance, for relief will be granted where both parties are in a mutual state of ignorance, or are laboring under the same mistake.<sup>2</sup> It is to be observed, however, that the ignorance or mistake which entitles a party to relief must be as to some matter of fact; and that mistake or ignorance of the law, or of the consequences that will follow from the conveyance, will not entitle a party to relief.<sup>3</sup> This rule is established by reason of the great danger of abuse that would arise if parties were allowed to reclaim their property upon allegations that they were ignorant of the law, or mistook the consequences of their acts.<sup>4</sup> Thus if a party has full knowledge of all the facts and intends to do the acts, or execute the instruments in question in the form in which they are executed, he cannot have relief because he was ignorant of or mistook the law, or because the consequences which legally and naturally follow from the transaction are different from what he expected.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Gossmour v. Pigge*, 13 L. J. Ch. 322; *Tyler v. Black*, 13 How. 231; *McCarthy v. Decaix*, 2 R. & M. 222; *Cocking v. Pratt*, 1 Ves. 400.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*; *Lansdowne v. Lansdowne*, 2 J. & W. 205; *Mose*. 364; *Willan v. Willan*, 16 Ves. 72.

<sup>3</sup> *Marshall v. Collett*, 1 Y. & C. Exch. 238; *Midland Great Western Railway v. Johnson*, 6; *H. L. Ca.* 811; *Hunt v. Rousmaniere*, 1 Pet. 1; *Brown v. Ingham*, 1 Bro. Ch. 92; *Pullen v. Ready*, 2 Atk. 591; *Magniac v. Thompson*, 2 Wall. Jr. 209; *Campbell v. Carter*, 14 Ill. 286; *Hall v. Read*, 2 Barb. Ch. 503; *Brown v. Armistead*, 6 Rand. 594; *Hinchman v. Emans*, Saxt. 100; *Freeman v. Cook*, 6 Ired. Eq. 378; *Gunter v. Thomas*, 1 Ired. Eq. 199; *Crofts v. Middleton*, 2 K. & J. 194; *Wintermute v. Snyder*, 2 Green, Ch. 498; *Farley v. Bryant*, 32 Me. 474; *Ferguson v. Ferguson*, 1 Ga. Dec. 135; *Freeman v. Curtis*, 51 Me. 140.

<sup>4</sup> *Bilbie v. Lumley*, 2 East, 472; *Lyon v. Richmond*, 2 John. Ch. 51; *Shotwell v. Murray*, 1 John. Ch. 512; *Storrs v. Barker*, 6 John. Ch. 169; *Proctor v. Thrall*, 22 Vt. 262.

<sup>5</sup> *Storrs v. Barker*, 6 John. Ch. 169; *Lyon v. Saunders*, 23 Miss. 124;

But if there is a mistake in the instrument itself, and it contains what was not agreed or intended, or does not contain all that was agreed and intended, to be in the writing, equity will give relief.<sup>1</sup> And if there are any other ingredients in the case, as if there is joined to a party's ignorance or mistake of the law, some practice upon him to lead him into the bargain,<sup>2</sup> or if the other party, knowing his ignorance or mistake, still suffers him to go on without information,<sup>3</sup> equity will give relief. If there are any exceptions to the rule that ignorance or mistake of the law is not a ground for relief, they are few in number, and have something peculiar in their character, which calls in other elements of equity, or they stand upon some urgent pressure of circumstances.<sup>4</sup>

§ 185. When a conveyance is made to compromise claims, which the parties deem doubtful,<sup>5</sup> and especially if the conveyance has for its object the settlement of family controversies,<sup>6</sup>

*Shafer v. Davis*, 13 Ill. 395; *Emmett v. Dewhirst*, 8 Eng. L. & Eq. 83; *Hunt v. Rousmaniere*, 1 Pet. 1; *Farley v. Bryant*, 32 Me. 474; *Mellish v. Robertson*, 25 Vt. 608; *Gilbert v. Gilbert*, 9 Barb. 532; *Arthur v. Arthur*, 10 Barb. 9; *Freeman v. Curtis*, 51 Me. 140.

<sup>1</sup> *Heacock v. Fly*, 14 Penn. St. 541; *Larkins v. Biddle*, 21 Ala. 256; *Wyche v. Green*, 11 Ga. 169; 16 Ga. 49; *Moser v. Lebenguth*, 2 Rawle, 428; *Fitzgerald v. Peck*, 4 Litt. 127.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 133.

<sup>3</sup> *Cook v. Nathan*, 16 Barb. 342; *Langstaffe v. Fenwick*, 10 Ves. 405.

<sup>4</sup> *State v. Paup.*, 13 Ark. 135; *Hunt v. Rousmaniere*, 1 Pet. 1; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 116, 137.

<sup>5</sup> *Brown v. Pring*, 1 Ves. 407; *Cann v. Cann*, 1 P. Wms. 727; *Naylor v. Winch*, 1 Sim. & S. 555; *Goodman v. Sayers*, 2 J. & W. 263; *Pickering v. Pickering*, 2 Beav. 91; *Stewart v. Stewart*, 6 Clark & Fin. 699; *Gibbons v. Caunt*, 4 Ves. 849; *Neale v. Neale*, 1 Keen, 672; *Attorney-General v. Boucherett*, 25 Beav. 116; *Wiles v. Greshon*, 5 De G., M. & G. 770; *Bradley v. Chase*, 22 Me. 511; *Richardson v. Eyton*, 15 Eng. L. & Eq. 51; 2 De G., M. & G. 79.

<sup>6</sup> *Currie v. Steele*, 2 Sandf. 542; *Stone v. Godfrey*, 27 Eng. L. & Eq. 318; 5 De G., M. & G. 76; *Gordon v. Gordon*, 3 Swans. 463, 476; *Stockley v. Stockley*, 1 V. & B. 29; *Bellamy v. Sabine*, 2 Phil. 425; *Stapilton v. Stapilton*, 1 Atk. 10; 3 Lead. Ca. Eq. 684; *Cann v. Cann*, 1 P. Wms. 727; *Persse v. Persse*, 1 West, 110; 7 Clark & Fin. 279; *Cory v. Cory*,

courts will support it if possible, although founded in ignorance or mistake of facts, as well as of law; provided no fraud has been used to mislead and deceive the party executing the conveyance.<sup>1</sup>

§ 186. If a deed is drawn by accident or mistake to embrace property not intended by the parties, equity will construe the grantee to be a trustee, and will execute the trust by reforming the deed or by ordering a reconveyance. It would be against natural right to allow a person to hold property which he never intended to buy, and which has come to him by such mistake.<sup>2</sup> But courts require the most full and satisfactory proof before they will vary by parol evidence the contract between the parties, as written and signed by them,<sup>3</sup> and will not give relief unless the mistake is common to both parties,<sup>4</sup> except the case is such that the parties may be restored to their original situa-

1 Ves. 19; *Heap v. Tonge*, 7 Eng. L. & Eq. 189; 9 Hare, 90; *Leonard v. Leonard*, 2 Ball & B. 171; *Dunnage v. White*, 1 Swans. 137; *Harvey v. Cook*, 4 Russ. 34; *Jodrell v. Jodrell*, 9 Beav. 45; *Frank v. Frank*, 1 Ch. Ca. 84.

<sup>1</sup> *Smith v. Pincombe*, 10 Eng. L. & Eq. 50; 3 Mac. & G. 653; *Groves v. Perkins*, 6 Sim. 576; *Hoge v. Hoge*, 1 Watts, 163; *Dunnage v. White*, 1 Swans. 137; *Evans v. Llewellyn*, 1 Cox, 333; 2 Bro. Ch. 150; *Townshend v. Stangroom*, 6 Ves. 333; *Chesterfield v. Janssen*, 2 Ves. 155; *Ormond v. Hutchinson*, 13 Ves. 51; *Henly v. Cook*, 4 Russ. 34; *Stainton v. Carson Co.* 6 Jur. (N. S.) 360; *Ashhurst v. Mill*, 7 Hare, 502; *Lawton v. Campion*, 18 Beav. 87; *Bennett v. Merriman*, 6 Beav. 360; *Hogton v. Hogton*, 15 Beav. 278; 11 Eng. L. & Eq. 134.

<sup>2</sup> *Exeter v. Exeter*, 3 M. & Cr. 321; *Lindo v. Lindo*, 1 Beav. 496; *Ramsden v. Hylton*, 2 Ves. 304; *Beaumont v. Bramley*, T. & R. 52; *Underhill v. Horwood*, 10 Ves. 225; *Canedy v. Marcy*, 13 Gray, 373; *Brown v. Lamphear*, 35 Vt. 252; *Green v. Morris*, 1 Beasley, 170; *Richardson v. Bleight*, 8 B. Mon. 580; *Whaley v. Eliot*, 1 A. K. Marsh. 343; *Belknap v. Scaley*, 2 Duer, 570; *Gray v. Woods*, 4 Blackf. 432; *Peters v. Goodrich*, 3 Conn. 146; *Oliver v. Ins. Co.* 2 Curtis, 277; *Tilton v. Tilton*, 9 N. H. 385; *Farley v. Bryant*, 32 Me. 474; *Loss v. Obry*, 7 C. E. Green, 52.

<sup>3</sup> *Sawyer v. Hovey*, 3 Allen, 331; *Gillespie v. Moore*, 2 John. Ch. 585; *Andrews v. Essex Ins. Co.* 3 Mason, 10; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 157.

<sup>4</sup> *Andrews v. Essex Ins. Co.* 3 Mason, 10; *Bradford v. Romney*, 30 Beav. 431.

tion.<sup>1</sup> But fraud on one party and mistake on the side of the other is a good cause for setting aside a transaction.<sup>2</sup>

§ 187. Lord Hardwickē, in his analysis of the various kinds of fraud, stated one species to be, "fraud apparent from the intrinsic value and subject of the bargain, such as no man in his senses, and not under delusion, would make on the one hand, and as no honest or fair man would accept on the other."<sup>3</sup> The meaning of this is, that fraud may be proved by the inadequacy of the consideration paid for property by the purchaser on the one hand,<sup>4</sup> or the consideration may be so extravagantly large on the other,<sup>5</sup> as to show that the purchaser was imposed upon. It is to be observed, however, that the consideration alone, whether too large or too small, cannot of itself prove fraud in a transaction, for the reason that a mere voluntary conveyance, without *any* consideration, is good and valid between the parties. On the same ground mere inadequacy of consideration will not vitiate a deed,<sup>6</sup> and so if a

<sup>1</sup> *Garrard v. Fanchell*, 30 Beav. 445; *Harris v. Pepperell*, R. 5 Eq. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Bloodgood v. Sears*, 64 Barb. 76; *Welles v. Yates*, 44 N. Y. 525.

<sup>3</sup> *Chesterfield v. Janssen*, 2 Ves. 155; *Harvey v. Mount*, 8 Beav. 439.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*; *Rosevelt v. Fulton*, 2 Cow. 129; *McDonald v. Neilson*, 2 Cow. 139.

<sup>5</sup> *Cockell v. Taylor*, 15 Beav. 103.

<sup>6</sup> *Pickett v. Loggon*, 14 Ves. 215; *Reynell v. Sprye*, 8 Hare, 222; 1 De G., M. & G. 600; *Howard v. Edgell*, 17 Vt. 9; *Osgood v. Franklin*, 2 John Ch. 1; 14 John. 527; *Butler v. Haskell*, 4 Des. 651; *Erwin v. Perham*, 12 How. 197; *Judge v. Wilkins*, 19 Ala. 765; *McCormick v. Malin*, 5 Blackf. 509; *Delafield v. Anderson*, 7 S. & M. 630; *Farmers' Bank v. Douglass*, 11 S. & M. 469; *Robinson v. Robinson*, 4 Md. Ch. 183; *Powers v. Hale*, 5 Foster, 145; *Dunn v. Chambers*, 4 Barb. 376; *Mann v. Betterly*, 21 Vt. 326; *Green v. Thompson*, 2 Ired. Eq. 365; *White v. Flora*, 2 Overt. 426; *Forde v. Herron*, 4 Munf. 316; *Holmes v. Fresh*, 9 Mis. 201; *Young v. Frost*, 5 Gill, 287; *Coster v. Griswold*, 4 Edw. 364; *Westervelt v. Matheson*, 1 Hoff. 37; *Davidson v. Little*, 27 Penn. St. 251; *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 246; *Moth v. Atwood*, 5 Ves. 845; *White v. Damon*, 7 Ves. 35; *Low v. Barchard*, 8 Ves. 133; *Griffith v. Spratley*, 2 Bro. Ch. 179; *Wood v. Abrey*, 3 Mad. 423; *Floyer v. Sherrard*, Amb. 18; *Stephens v. Bateman*, 1 Bro. Ch. 22; *Harrison v. Guest*, 6 De G., M. & G.

party, knowing that the consideration is inadequate, enters into the agreement with his eyes open, he cannot have relief.<sup>1</sup> It is only where some fraud is practised upon a party that the consideration of a conveyance is material.<sup>2</sup> If it appears that a person intended to convey his property for a consideration reasonably proportionate to its value, but that in fact the consideration received was grossly inadequate, then a court of equity would infer that some fraud or deceit had been practised upon him;<sup>3</sup> or as Lord Thurlow said, "where the inadequacy of the consideration is so gross and manifest that it is impossible to state it to a man of common sense without producing an exclamation at the inequality of it,"<sup>4</sup> the court will infer from that fact *alone*, that there must have been such imposition or oppression in the transaction, or such a want of common understanding in the party, as to amount to a case of fraud, from which no advantage or benefit ought to be derived by the other party."<sup>5</sup> Other authorities say that courts will act on the fact *alone* of inadequacy of consideration when it is so gross and manifest as to *shock the conscience*.<sup>6</sup> This princi-

424; 8 H. L. Cas. 481; Denton v. Donner, 23 Beav. 285; Eyre v. Potter, 15 How. 60; Chaires v. Brady, 10 Flor. 133.

<sup>1</sup> Willis v. Jernegan, 2 Atk. 251.

<sup>2</sup> Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273; Wormack v. Rogers, 9 Ga. 60; How v. Weldon, 2 Ves. 516; Mann v. Betterly, 21 Vt. 326.

<sup>3</sup> Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Bro. Ch. 8; Baugh v. Price, 3 Wilson, 320; Eyre v. Potter, 15 How. 60; Butler v. Haskell, 4 Des. 652; Barnett v. Spratt, 4 Ired. Eq. 171; Wright v. Wilson, 4 Yerg. 294; Juzan v. Toulmin, 9 Ala. 692.

<sup>4</sup> Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Bro. Ch. 8; Hamet v. Dundass, 4 Barr. 178.

<sup>5</sup> Heathcote v. Paignon, 2 Bro. Ch. 175; Underhill v. Horwood, 10 Ves. 219; Ware v. Horwood, 14 Ves. 28; Stilwell v. Wilkinson, Jac. 282; Barnett v. Spratt, 4 Ired. Eq. 171.

<sup>6</sup> Horsey v. Hough, 38 Md. 130; Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 246; Osgood v. Franklin, 2 John. Ch. 1; 14 John. 527; Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Bro. Ch. 9; Underhill v. Horwood, 10 Ves. 219; Peacock v. Evans, 16 Ves. 512; Wright v. Wilson, 2 Yerg. 294; Deaderick v. Watkins, 8 Humph. 520; Stilwell v. Wilkinson, Jac. 280; Copis v. Middleton, 2 Madd. 409; Howard v. Edgell, 17 Vt. 9; Butler v. Haskell, 4 Des. 652; Eyre v. Potter, 15 How. 60; Gist

ple is loose enough,<sup>1</sup> if it is a principle, and of course every case would depend upon its own facts and circumstances. Where there are suspicious circumstances connected with the fact of inadequacy of price, as where the parties stand in a fiduciary relation to each other,<sup>2</sup> or one of them is in distress,<sup>3</sup> or is ignorant,<sup>4</sup> or is weak-minded and imbecile,<sup>5</sup> inadequacy of consideration will become very pertinent, and oftentimes conclusive evidence that fraud and undue influence have been used to bring about a bargain advantageous to the one side and ruinous to the other.

§ 188. Immediately connected with this subject is the sale by an heir or reversioner of his expectancy or reversionary interest. It is said that "it is incumbent upon those who deal with an expectant heir, relative to his reversionary interest, to make good the bargain; that is, to be able to show that a full and adequate consideration was paid. In all such cases the issue is upon the adequacy of the price. No proof of fraud is necessary; and the relief is given upon general principles of mischief to the public, without requiring particular evidence of

*v. Frazier*, 2 Litt. 118; *Seymour v. Delancey*, 6 John. Ch. 222; *Juzan v. Toulmin*, 9 Ala. 692; *James v. Morgan*, 1 Lev. 111; *Rice v. Gordon*, 11 Beav. 215; *Booker v. Anderson*, 35 Ill. 66.

<sup>1</sup> *Gibson v. Jeyès*, 6 Ves. 273; *Warfield v. Ross*, 38 Md. 85.

<sup>2</sup> *Herne v. Meeres*, 1 Vern. 456; *Gibson v. Jeyès*, 6 Ves. 266; *Shaeffer v. Sleade*, 7 Blackf. 178; *Brooke v. Berry*, 2 Gill, 83; *Wright v. Wilson*, 2 Yerg. 294; *Butler v. Haskell*, 4 Des. 680.

<sup>3</sup> *Cockell v. Taylor*, 15 Beav. 103; *Warfield v. Ross*, 38 Md. 85.

<sup>4</sup> *Herne v. Meeres*, 1 Vern. 456; *Pickett v. Loggon*, 14 Ves. 215; *Murray v. Palmer*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 477; *Gwynne v. Heaton*, 1 Bro. Ch. 1; *Wood v. Abrey*, 3 Madd. 417; *McKinney v. Pinkard*, 2 Leigh, 149; *Gasque v. Small*, 2 Strob. Eq. 72; *Esham v. Lamar*, 10 B. Mon. 43; *Butler v. Haskell*, 4 Des. 680.

<sup>5</sup> *Clarkson v. Hanway*, 2 P. Wms. 203; *Gartside v. Isherwood*, 1 Bro. Ch. 558; *Stanhope v. Toppe*, 2 Bro. P. C. 183; *McArtee v. Engart*, 13 Ill. 242; *Wormack v. Rogers*, 9 Ga. 60; *How v. Weldon*, 3 Ves. 517; *Addis v. Campbell*, 4 Beav. 401; *Holden v. Crawford*, 1 Atk. 390; *Mann v. Betterly*, 21 Vt. 326; *Crane v. Conklin*, Saxt. 346; *Brooke v. Berry*, 2 Gill, 83; *Rumph v. Abercrombie*, 12 Ala. 64.

actual imposition.”<sup>1</sup> Such a purchase is a constructive fraud, and the purchaser, if a stranger, will be compelled to account and to give up the bargain, if found to be advantageous.<sup>2</sup> A sale by an heir will not be supported against him unless it is perfectly fair in every respect, and beyond suspicion, and for an adequate price.<sup>3</sup> The burden is upon the purchaser to show the fairness of the transaction, and the sufficiency of the consideration, and not upon the heir to impeach either the one or the other;<sup>4</sup> and it is said that it is immaterial that the heir is of mature age.<sup>5</sup> In this country the rule may be stated with still more severity, that the sale by an heir of his expectancy during the life of the ancestor, is contrary to public policy and is void, unless such sale is assented to by the ancestor, and supported by an adequate consideration.<sup>6</sup> If, however, the sale is at auction, it will be some proof of fairness and suffi-

<sup>1</sup> Sir Wm. Grant, in *Gowland v. De Faria*, 17 Ves. 20.

<sup>2</sup> *Jenkins v. Pye*, 12 Pet. 258; *Call v. Gibbons*, 3 P. Wms. 290; *Barnardiston v. Lingood*, 2 Atk. 133; *Gwynne v. Heaton*, 1 Bro. Ch. 10; *Walmsley v. Booth*, 2 Atk. 28.

<sup>3</sup> *Knott v. Hill*, 1 Vern. 167; *Westerfield v. Janssen*, 2 Ves. 125; 1 Lead. Ca. Eq. 428-494, Eng. and Am. notes; *Bawtree v. Watson*, 3 M. & K. 339; *Portmore v. Taylor*, 4 Sim. 182; *Peacock v. Evans*, 16 Ves. 512; *Newton v. Hunt*, 5 Sim. 54; *Foster v. Roberts*, 29 Beav. 467; *Talbot v. Staniforth*, 1 John. & H. 484; *Jones v. Ricketts*, 31 Beav. 130; *Salter v. Bradshaw*, 26 Beav. 161; *King v. Hamlet*, 4 Sim. 223; 2 M. & K. 456; *Denton v. Donner*, 23 Beav. 285; *Bury v. Oppenheim*, 26 Beav. 594; *Hannah v. Hodgson*, 30 Beav. 19; *St. Albyn v. Harding*, 27 Beav. 11; *Nesbitt v. Berridge*, 32 Beav. 282; *Perfect v. Lane*, 31 L. J. Ch. 489; *Edwards v. Burt*, 2 De G., M. & G. 55; *Aldborough v. Frye*, 7 Clark & Fin. 436.

<sup>4</sup> *Gowland v. De Faria*, 17 Ves. 24; *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 246; *Davis v. Marlborough*, 2 Swans. 141; *Portmore v. Taylor*, 4 Sim. 209; *Shelley v. Nash*, 3 Mad. 236; *Nimmo v. Davis*, 7 Tex. 260; *Poor v. Hazleton*, 15 N. H. 564.

<sup>5</sup> *Davis v. Marlborough*, 2 Wils. 146; *Evans v. Cheshire*, Belt Supp. 305; *Addis v. Campbell*, 4 Beav. 401.

<sup>6</sup> *Varick v. Edwards*, 1 Hoff. 383; *Boynton v. Hubbard*, 7 Mass. 112; *Fitch v. Fitch*, 8 Pick. 480; *Trull v. Eastman*, 3 Met. 121; *Poor v. Hazleton*, 15 N. H. 564; *Nimmo v. Davis*, 7 Tex. 266; *Jenkins v. Pye*, 12 Pet. 257; *Davidson v. Little*, 22 Penn. St. 252.

ciency of price,<sup>1</sup> and if the sale is made with the knowledge and assent of the ancestor it will be good.<sup>2</sup> But it seems that the rule is confined to those expectancies that combine the relation of heir with that of remainder-man and reversioner. If the expectant is not heir, but is simply entitled to a remainder or reversion by virtue of some instrument or settlement, he may sell and assign his future interest, and such sale will not be avoided unless some of the common rules of equity are violated by the purchaser. In such cases there is no fraud upon parents or third persons, consequently there is nothing contrary to public policy in such purchases.<sup>3</sup>

§ 189. Another kind of constructive trust arises from the mental incapacities of parties to enter into contracts. Thus a *non compos mentis* cannot make a binding contract.<sup>4</sup> The deed of such person is either absolutely void, or at least voidable,<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Fox v. Wright, 6 Mad. 111; Shelley v. Nash, 3 Mad. 232; Newman v. Meek, 1 Freem. Ch. 441; Erwin v. Parham, 12 How. 197.

<sup>2</sup> Fitch v. Fitch, 8 Pick. 480; Trull v. Eastman, 3 Met. 121; Nimmo v. Davis, 7 Tex. 266; King v. Hamlet, 2 M. & K. 456. In Ohio, however, it has been held that a contract is invalid by which a son released to his father, in consideration of an advancement, all his expectancies upon the father's estate. Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432. The case is not sustained by other authorities, and seems not to rest upon the principles applicable to such transactions.

<sup>3</sup> Cribbins v. Markwood, 13 Grat. 495; Dunn v. Chambers, 4 Barb. 376; Davidson v. Little, 22 Penn. St. 252; Wiseman v. Beake, 2 Vern. 121; Cole v. Gibbons, 3 P. Wms. 290; Barnardiston v. Lingood, 2 Atk. 133; Bowers v. Heaps, 3 V. & B. 117; Davis v. Marlborough, 2 Swans. 130; Addis v. Campbell, 4 Beav. 401; Nickolls v. Gould, 2 Ves. 422; Henley v. Axe, 2 Bro. Ch. 17; 2 Swans. 141; Griffith v. Spratley, 2 Bro. Ch. 179; 1 Cox, 383; Moth v. Atwood, 5 Ves. 845; Montesquieu v. Sandys, 18 Ves. 302. The peculiar character and position of sailors call for the interposition of courts when they are defrauded, and when one had sold his prize-money for a small sum, the Master of the Rolls said, that it was reasonable to regard them as young heirs, and to relieve them accordingly. How v. Weldon, 2 Ves. 515.

<sup>4</sup> Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. 155.

<sup>5</sup> Allis v. Billings, 6 Met. 415; Breckenridge v. Ormsby, 1 J. J. Marsh. 239; Price v. Berrington, 3 Mac. & G. 486; Molton v. Camroux, 2 Exch.



and equity will give relief by declaring a party taking under such a conveyance to be a trustee, and by ordering him to execute a reconveyance.<sup>1</sup> Whether a person has capacity enough to make a contract, is always a question of fact in each particular case; for mere weakness of mind, not amounting to idiocy or insanity, is no ground for avoiding a contract. Courts cannot measure the extent of a party's understanding. If, therefore, a person is not an idiot nor an insane person, he may enter into contracts, although he may be of a low order of intelligence and of weak reasoning powers.<sup>2</sup> At the same time such persons are easily imposed upon and defrauded; and if it appears that one of the parties to a contract is of weak mind and feeble powers, the whole transaction will be carefully investigated, and the conduct of the person procuring such contract will be closely scrutinized; for arts and practices that would be perfectly harmless in a transaction with a man of high intelligence and prudence and great power of observing and reasoning, may, and probably would, deceive and mislead a person of weak mind and feeble powers, although not incapable of entering into contracts and transacting business generally.<sup>3</sup> Therefore the weakness of a party's mind is a very material fact in determining the character of a transac-

487; 4 Exch. 17; *Desilver's Est.* 5 Rawl. 111; *Bensell v. Chancellor*, 5 Whart. 376; *Beals v. Lee*, 10 Barr, 56.

<sup>1</sup> *Rushloy v. Mansfield*, Toth. 42; *Mansfield's Case*, 12 Co. 123; *Addison v. Mascall*, 2 Vern. 678; 3 Atk. 110; *Price v. Berrington*, 7 Hare, 394; 3 Mac. & G. 486; *Addison v. Dawson*, 2 Vern. 678; *Welby v. Welby*, Toth. 164; *Wright v. Booth*, Toth. 166; *Wilkinson v. Brayfield*, 2 Vern. 307; *Clark v. Ward*, Pr. Ch. 150; *Ferres v. Ferres*, Eq. Ab. 695; *Attorney-General v. Parnter*, 3 Bro. Ch. 441.

<sup>2</sup> *Osmond v. Fitzroy*, 3 P. Wms. 130; *Willis v. Jernegan*, 2 Atk. 251; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 235; *Ex parte Allen*, 15 Mass. 58; *Hadley v. Latimer*, 3 Yerg. 537; *Mann v. Betterly*, 21 Vt. 326; *Thomas v. Sheppard*, 2 McCord, Eq. 36; *Rippy v. Gant*, 4 Ired. Eq. 447; *Mason v. Williams*, 3 Munf. 126; *Morrison v. McLeod*, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 221; *Green v. Thompson*, 2 Ired. Eq. 365; *Bath & Montague's Ca.* 3 Ch. Ca. 107.

<sup>3</sup> *Bridgman v. Green*, Wilm. 61; 2 Ves. 627; *Donnegal's Case*, 2 Ves. 407; *Gartside v. Isherwood*, 1 Bro. Ch. 560; *Blackford v. Christian*, 1

tion, and if, in contracts with such persons, there is found the least art or stratagem, or any undue influence, or any ingredient of fraud or suspicion of unfairness, courts will set the contract aside, or convert the offending party into a trustee.<sup>1</sup> Upon these principles, if the contract is of an unusual, unreasonable, or extraordinary character,<sup>2</sup> or if it is without consideration, or upon an inadequate consideration,<sup>3</sup> or if the instrument falsely recites a consideration,<sup>4</sup> or if there is actual proof of undue influence, or of art or circumvention,<sup>5</sup> or if there is a fiduciary, confidential, or influential relation between the parties,<sup>6</sup> courts will interfere and protect a person of weak mind from his contracts.

*Knapp*, 77; *Dunn v. Chambers*, 4 Barb. 376; *Clark v. Malpas*, 4 De G., F. & J. 401.

<sup>1</sup> *Griffin v. De Veulle*, 3 Wood. Lect. App. 16; *Nottige v. Prince*, 2 Gif. 246; *Longmate v. Ledger*, 2 Gif. 157; *Baker v. Monk*, 33 Beav. 419; *Boyse v. Rossborough*, 6 H. L. Ca. 2; *Harding v. Handy*, 11 Wheat. 103; *Tracey v. Sackett*, 1 Ohio St. 54; *Whitehorn v. Hines*, 1 Munf. 557; *Whelan v. Whelan*, 3 Cow. 537; *Deatly v. Murphy*, 3 A. K. Marsh. 472; *Brogden v. Walker*, 2 H. & J. 285; *Rumph v. Abercrombie*, 12 Ala. 64.

<sup>2</sup> *Fane v. Devonshire*, 2 Bro. P. C. 77; *Bridgman v. Green*, 2 Ves. 627; *Dent v. Bennett*, 7 Sim. 539; 4 M. & Cr. 629; *Malin v. Malin*, 2 John. Ch. 238; *Bennett v. Vade*, 2 Atk. 235; *Nantes v. Corrock*, 9 Ves. 181; *Willan v. Willan*, 16 Ves. 72; *Ball v. Maurice*, 3 Blich (N. S.), 1; 1 Dow (N. S.), 392.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*; *Clarkson v. Hanway*, 2 P. Wms. 203; *Gartside v. Isherwood*, 1 Bro. Ch. 558; *Hutchinson v. Tindall*, 2 Green, Ch. 357; *Rumph v. Abercrombie*, 12 Ala. 64; *Fillmer v. Gott*, 7 Bro. P. C. 70; *Hunt v. Moore*, 2 Barr, 105.

<sup>4</sup> *Gibson v. Russell*, 2 N. C. C. 104; *Harvey v. Mount*, 8 Beav. 439.

<sup>5</sup> *Portington v. Eglington*, 2 Vern. 189; *Gartside v. Isherwood*, 1 Bro. Ch. 558; *Bridgman v. Green*, 2 Ves. 627; *Edmunds v. Bird*, 1 V. & B. 542; *Fox v. Macreth*, 2 Bro. Ch. 420.

<sup>6</sup> *Kennedy v. Kennedy*, 2 Ala. 571; *Brice v. Brice*, 5 Barb. 533; *Buffalow v. Buffalow*, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 241; *Osmond v. Fitzroy*, 3 P. Wms. 130; *Dent v. Bennett*, 7 Sim. 539; 4 M. & C. 269; *Cruise v. Christopher*, 5 Dana, 181; *Whipple v. Clure*, 2 Root, 216; *Brooke v. Berry*, 2 Gill, 83; *McCraw v. Davis*, 2 Ired. Eq. 618; *Huguenin v. Baseley*, 14 Ves. 273; *Griffith v. Robins*, 3 Mad. 191; *Whelan v. Whelan*, 3 Cow. 537.

§ 190. Mental weakness is not of itself a sufficient ground for avoiding an agreement, but it must appear that some advantage was taken of it to procure a favorable contract; and if the other party stood in some fiduciary relation to the person of weak mind, the burden is upon him to show that the contract was in every respect fair, and that no advantage was obtained from the influential position on the one hand, or from the feebleness of mind on the other. And it is quite immaterial from whence the mental weakness arises. It may arise from a natural and permanent imbecility of mind, or it may arise from some temporary illness or debility, or from the weakness and infirmity of extreme old age. Each case must depend upon its own circumstances. If there is a fixed and permanent state of idiocy or insanity, or if the party is a declared lunatic and his affairs are in the hands of a committee or of a guardian, there can be little or no doubt. Questions generally arise where there is not this entire want of capacity, — where no general rule can be laid down, but the court is left to judge of the capacity of the contracting party, of the circumstances under which the contract was made, and whether from all the facts in the case the contract ought in equity and good conscience to be sustained. Extreme old age, accompanied by great infirmity; or extreme weakness and feebleness of mind, arising from temporary illness or permanent imbecility, stopping short of absolute incapacity, — are all pertinent facts, tending to show, if accompanied by other circumstances, a fraudulent contract; but if upon all the evidence the contract is a fair one, if the enfeebled person is surrounded by his friends, who understand the transaction and explain it to the party, it will not be set aside.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Griffith v. Robins, 3 Mad. 191; Harding v. Handy, 11 Wheat. 193; Dènt v. Bennett, 7 Sim. 539; Attorney-General v. Parnther, 3 Bro. Ch. 443; Hunter v. Atkins, 3 M. & K. 146; Lewis v. Pead, 1 Ves. Jr. 19; Pratt v. Barker, 1 Sim. 1; 4 Russ. 507; Rippey v. Gant, 4 Ired. Eq. 447; Gratz v. Cohen, 11 How. 1.

§ 191. Substantially the same rules apply to deeds and instruments executed by a drunken person. Drunkards while laboring under the frenzy of drink, are *non compotes mentis* by their own act,<sup>1</sup> and it is said that they may plead *non est factum* to a deed executed while so drunk that they do not know what they are doing.<sup>2</sup> In such case there can of course be no intelligent consent to any contract. But equity will not always interfere to protect a drunken man from the folly of his own acts, and will not on account of drunkenness alone set aside a contract or convert the other party into a trustee.<sup>3</sup> And this is more especially the rule where the object of the contract is to carry out a family settlement, or the contract is fair and reasonable in its terms.<sup>4</sup> But if there is any contrivance or management to induce drunkenness and to procure a contract, or if there was any unfair advantage taken of the drunkenness to procure a contract, it would be an actual fraud, and the court will not allow a party to retain any advantage procured in such manner, nor would it lend its aid to carry it into effect.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Co. Lit. 247 a, 447 a; Beverley's Case, 4 Co. 124; Hendrick v. Hopkins, Cary, 98.

<sup>2</sup> Cole v. Robins, Bull. N. P. 172; Cook v. Clayworth, 18 Ves. 12; Reynolds v. Waller, 1 Wash. 212; Rutherford v. Ruff, 4 Des. 350; Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. 623; Barrett v. Buxton, 2 Aik. 167; Peyton v. Rawlins, 1 Hayw. 77; Clifton v. Davis, 1 Pars. Eq. 31; French v. French, 2 Ham. 214; Wigglesworth v. Steers, 1 Hen. & Munf. 70; Shaw v. Thackray, 1 Sm. & Giff. 537.

<sup>3</sup> Johnson v. Meddlcott, 3 P. Wms. 131, n.; Cory v. Cory, 1 Ves. 19; Nagle v. Bayler, 2 Dr. & W. 60; Cooke v. Clayworth, 18 Ves. 12; Maxwell v. Pittinger, 2 Green, Ch. 156; Morrison v. McLeod, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 221; Whitesides v. Greenlee, 2 Dev. Eq. 152; Moore v. Read, 2 Ired. Eq. 580; Hotchkiss v. Fortson, 7 Yerg. 67; Belcher v. Belcher, 19 Yerg. 121; Hutchinson v. Brown, 1 Clark, Ch. 408; Harbison v. Lemon, 3 Blackf. 51.

<sup>4</sup> Cory v. Cory, 1 Ves. 19; Cooke v. Clayworth, 18 Ves. 12.

<sup>5</sup> Johnson v. Meddlcott, 3 P. Wms. 131; Say v. Barwick, 1 V. & B. 195; Jenness v. Howard, 6 Blackf. 240; Cory v. Cory, 1 Ves. 19; Cooke v. Clayworth, 18 Ves. 12; Crane v. Conklin, Saxt. 346; Calloway v. Wetherspoon, 5 Ired. Eq. 128; Hutchinson v. Tindall, 2 Green, Ch. 128;

§ 192. So, equity will relieve in all cases of contracts procured by duress, or fear, or apprehension; for, if there has been any restraint upon a person's freedom to consent or dissent, or any practice upon his fears, it is a kind of fraud, and no one ought to enjoy an advantage gained in such manner.<sup>1</sup> Thus, if a contract is made with one in prison, or under any circumstances of oppression, equity will scrutinize it with great care.<sup>2</sup> And so, if advantage is taken of the extreme distress or necessity of a party, to obtain a favorable bargain from him, equity will give relief;<sup>3</sup> but the advantage must have been within the contemplation of the parties at the time.

§ 193. Of course, if two or more of these suspicious circumstances are found in the same case; as, if property is obtained from a person of weak mind, or under duress, or in great distress, for a grossly inadequate consideration, or upon any unusual, extraordinary, or oppressive terms, the evidence would be much stronger of some fraudulent practice, and would call upon the suspected party for a very complete vin-

*Phillips v. Moore*, 11 Miss. 600; *Cooley v. Rankin*, 11 Miss. 642; *Cragg v. Holme*, 18 Ves. 14, n.; *Shiers v. Higgons*, 1 Mad. Ch. Pr. 399; *Nagle v. Baylor*, 2 Dr. & W. 64; *Shaw v. Thackray*, 1 Sm. & Gif. 537.

<sup>1</sup> *Attorney-General v. Sothen*, 2 Vern. 497; *Crowe v. Ballard*, 1 Ves. Jr. 220; *Anon.* 3 P. Wms. 29, n. (e); *Gist v. Frazier*, 2 Lit. 118; *Evans v. Llewellyn*, 1 Cox, 340; *Hawes v. Wyatt*, 3 Bro. Ch. 158.

<sup>2</sup> *Attorney-General v. Sothen*, 2 Vern. 497; *Roy v. Beaufort*, 2 Atk. 190; *Falkner v. O'Brien*, 2 B. & B. 214; *Underhill v. Horwood*, 10 Ves. 219; *Nicholls v. Nicholls*, 1 Atk. 409; *Griffith v. Spratley*, 1 Cox, 333; *Hinton v. Hinton*, 2 Ves. 634.

<sup>3</sup> *Gould v. Okeden*, 3 Bro. P. C. 560; *Harvey v. Mount*, 8 Beav. 439; *Hawes v. Wyatt*, 3 Bro. Ch. 156; *Bosanquet v. Dashwood*, Ca. t. Talb. 37; *Pickett v. Loggon*, 14 Ves. 215; *Farmer v. Farmer*, 1 H. L. Ca. 724; *Fitzgerald v. Rainsford*, 1 B. & B. 37; *Underhill v. Horwood*, 10 Ves. 219; *Huguenin v. Baseley*, 14 Ves. 273; *Carpenter v. Elliott*, 2 Ves. Jr. 494; *Proof v. Hines*, Ca. t. Talb. 111; *Basy v. Magrath*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 31; *Ramsbottom v. Parker*, 6 Mad. 6; *Wood v. Abrey*, 3 Mad. 417; *Crowe v. Ballard*, 1 Ves. Jr. 215; *Nottige v. Prince*, 6 Jur. (n. s.) 1066; *Davis v. McNally*, 5 Sneed, 583; *Graham v. Little*, 3 Jones, Eq. 152; *Stewart v. Hubbard*, 3 Jones, Eq. 186.

dication of the transaction, or he would be converted into a trustee.<sup>1</sup>

§ 194. Lord Hardwicke's "third species of fraud may be presumed from the circumstances and condition of the parties contracting ; and this goes further than the rule of law, which is, that fraud must be proved, not presumed."<sup>2</sup> At law, fraud must be proved ; but in equity there are certain rules prohibiting parties, bearing certain relations to each other, from contracting between themselves ; and if parties bearing such relations enter into contracts with each other, courts of equity presume them to be fraudulent, and convert the fraudulent party into a trustee. And, herein, courts of equity go further than courts of law, and presume fraud in cases where a court of law would require it to be proved ; that is, if parties within the prohibited relations or conditions contract between themselves, courts of equity will avoid the contract altogether, without proof, or they will throw upon the party standing in this position of trust, confidence, and influence, the burden of proving the entire fairness of the transaction. Thus, if a parent buys property of his child, a guardian of his ward, a trustee of his *cestui que trust*, an attorney of his client, or an agent of his principal, equity will either avoid the contract altogether, without proof, or it will throw the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction upon the purchaser ; and, if the proof fails, the contract will be avoided, or the purchaser will be construed to be a trustee at the election of the other party. The ground of this rule is, that the danger of allowing persons holding such relations of trust and influence with others to deal with them is so great that the presumption ought to be against the transaction, and the person holding the trust or influence ought to be required to vindicate it from all fraud,

<sup>1</sup> Griffin v. De Vuelle, Wood. Lect. App. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. 155.

or to continue to hold the property in trust for the benefit of the ward, *cestui que trust*, or other person holding a similar relation.<sup>1</sup>

§ 195. These principles are applied in their full vigor to all contracts and sales between trustee and *cestui que trust*.<sup>2</sup> The trustee is in such a position of confidence and influence over the *cestui que trust*, that the contract or bargain will either be void or he will be a constructive trustee, at the election of the *cestui que trust*, unless the trustee can show that the contract was entirely fair and advantageous to the *cestui que trust*.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Hoghton v. Hoghton*, 15 Beav. 278; *Cooke v. Lamotte*, 15 Beav. 234; *Ahearne v. Hogan*, 1 Dr. 310; *Espey v. Lake*, 10 Hare, 260; *Prideaux v. Lonsdale*, 1 De G., J. & S. 433; *Bayley v. Williams*, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 236; *Clark v. Malpas*, 31 Beav. 80; *Grosvenor v. Sherratt*, 28 Beav. 659; *Beanland v. Bradley*, 2 Sm. & Gif. 339; *Taylor v. Taylor*, 8 How. 183; *Greenfield's Est.* 14 Penn. St. 504; *Graham v. Pancoast*, 30 Penn. St. 89; *Nace v. Boyer*, 30 Penn. St. 99; *Sears v. Shafer*, 2 Seld. 268; *Buffalow v. Buffalow*, 2 Dev. & Bat. 241; *Prewett v. Coopwood*, 30 Miss. 369; *Graham v. Little*, 3 Jones, Eq. 152; *Powell v. Cobb*, 3 Jones, Eq. 456; *Gass v. Mason*, 4 Sneed, 497; *Wester's App.* 54 Penn. St. 60; *Lovatt v. Knipe*, 12 Ir. Eq. 124; *Ames v. Port Huron*, 11 Mich. 139; *European R.R. Co. v. Poor*, 59 Me. 277.

<sup>2</sup> *Hatch v. Hatch*, 9 Ves. 296; *Hylton v. Hylton*, 2 Ves. 549; *Hunter v. Atkins*, 3 M. & K. 135; *Bulkley v. Wilford*, 2 Clark & Fin. 102; *Farnam v. Brooks*, 9 Pick. 212; *Boynton v. Brastow*, 53 Me. 362; *Staats v. Bergen*, 2 C. E. Green, 554; *Coffee v. Ruffin*, 4 Cold. 487; *Faucett v. Faucett*, 4 Bush, 521; *Korns v. Shaffer*, 27 Md. 83; *Baltimore v. Caldwell*, 25 Md. 423; *Smith v. Townshend*, 27 Md. 368; *Colborn v. Morton*, 3 Keyes, 266; *Pairo v. Vickery*, 37 Md. 467; *Wright v. Campbell*, 27 Ark. 637.

<sup>3</sup> *Crosskill v. Bower*, 32 Beav. 86; *Pooley v. Quilter*, 2 De G. & J. 327; *Spring v. Pride*, 10 Jur. (N. S.) 646; *Ex parte Ridgeway*, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 97; *Herne v. Meeres*, 1 Vern. 465; *Ayliffe v. Murray*, 2 Atk. 59; *Fox v. Macreth*, 2 Bro. Ch. 400; *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 246; *Ex parte Lacey*, 6 Ves. 625; *Morse v. Royal*, 2 Ves. 376; *Hunter v. Atkins*, 3 M. & K. 135; *Whichcote v. Lawrence*, 3 Ves. 740; *Scott v. Davis*, 4 M. & Cr. 87; *Kerr v. Dungannon*, 1 Dr. & W. 509; *Van Epps v. Van Epps*, 9 Paige, 237; *Hawley v. Cramer*, 4 Cow. 717; *Campbell v. Walker*, 5 Ves. 678; *Gibson v. Jeyes*, 6 Ves. 277; *Michoud v. Girod*, 4 How. 503; *De Caters v. Chaumont*, 3 Paige, 178; *Child v. Bruce*, 4 Paige, 309; *Campbell v. Johnston*, 1 Sandf. Ch. 148; *Cram v. Mitchell*, ib. 251; *Davis v. Simpson*, 5 Har. & J. 147; *Boyd v. Hawkins*, 2 Ired. Ch. 304; *Matthews v. Dragand*, 3 Des. 25; *Thorpe v. McCullum*, 1 Gilm. 614; *Davoue v. Fanning*, 2 John. Ch. 252;

The general rule is, that the trustee shall not take beneficially by gift or purchase from the *cestui que trust*,<sup>1</sup> even although the supposed trustee and purchaser is a mere intermeddler and not a regularly recognized trustee;<sup>2</sup> but there are exceptions to the rule, and a trustee may buy from the *cestui que trust*, provided there is a distinct and clear contract, ascertained after a jealous and scrupulous examination of all the circumstances, that the *cestui que trust* intended the trustee to buy, and there is no fraud, no concealment, no advantage taken by the trustee of information acquired by him in the character of trustee.<sup>3</sup> Lord Eldon said he admitted that the exception was a difficult case to make out.<sup>4</sup> And it may be said generally that it is difficult to find a case where such

De Bevoise v. Sandford, 1 Hoff. 192; Stuart v. Kissam, 2 Barb. 493; Richardson v. Jones, 3 G. & J. 163; Clark v. Lee, 14 Io. 425; Zimmerman v. Harmon, 4 Rich. Eq. 165; Johnson v. Blackman, 11 Conn. 343; Moody v. Vandyke, 4 Binn. 31; Armstrong v. Campbell, 3 Yerg. 201; Bruch v. Lantz, 2 Rawle, 392; Herr's Est. 1 Grant's Ca. 172; Painter v. Henderson, 7 Barr, 48; Brackenridge v. Holland, 2 Blackf. 377; Scroggins v. McDougald, 8 Ala. 382; Thompson v. Wheatley, 5 S. & M. 499; Shelton v. Homer, 5 Met. 462; Freeman v. Harwood, 49 Me. 195.

<sup>1</sup> Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234; Renew v. Butler, 30 Ga. 954; Cadwalader's App. 64 Penn. St. 293; Wright v. Smith, 23 N. J. Eq. 106; Smith v. Drake, 23 N. J. Eq. 302.

<sup>2</sup> Wright v. Smith, 23 N. J. Eq. 106.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.; Bryan v. Duncan, 11 Ga. 67; Dobson v. Racey, 3 Sandf. 61; Brackenridge v. Holland, 2 Blackf. 377; Paillon v. Martin, 1 Sandf. 569; Stuart v. Kissam, 2 Barb. 494; Braman v. Oliver, 2 Stewart, 47; Julian v. Reynolds, 8 Ala. 680; Stallings v. Foreman, 2 Hill, Ch. 401; Pratt v. Thornton, 28 Me. 355; McCartney v. Calhoun, 17 Ala. 301; Marshall v. Stevens, 8 Humph. 159; Beeson v. Beeson, 9 Barr, 279; McKinley v. Irvine, 14 Ala. 681; Farnam v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 212; Lyon v. Lyon, 8 Ired. Eq. 201; Harrington v. Brown, 5 Pick. 519; Jennison v. Hapgood, 7 Pick. 1; Dunlap v. Mitchell, 10 Ohio, 117; Scott v. Freeland, 7 Sm. & M. 410; Penneck's App. 4 Penn. St. 446; Bruch v. Lantz, 2 Rawle, 392; Field v. Arrowsmith, 3 Humph. 442; Monro v. Allaire, 2 Caine's Cas. 163; Salmon v. Cutts, 4 De G. & Sm. 131; Harrison v. Guest, 6 De G., M. & G. 431; Herbert v. Smith, 6 Lansing, 493; Birdwell v. Cain, 1 Cold. 301; Rice v. Cleghorn, 21 Ind. 80; Johnson v. Bennett, 39 Barb. 37; Buel v. Buckingham, 16 Io. 284.

<sup>4</sup> Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 246.



a transaction has been sustained.<sup>1</sup> Any withholding of information,<sup>2</sup> or any inadequacy of price,<sup>3</sup> will make such purchaser a constructive trustee. The *cestui que trust* must know that he is dealing with the trustee. Therefore, if the trustee purchases through an agent or third person, and the *cestui que trust* does not know the trustee in the transaction, the contract will be void, or a trust in the agent.<sup>4</sup> The rule is that the trustee shall not purchase directly or indirectly; therefore if the trustee conveys to a stranger, and the stranger conveys back to the trustee, the transaction is equally void.<sup>5</sup> So, if the trustee purchases at auction of the *cestui que trust*, the presumption is strongly against the transaction,<sup>6</sup> and the purchase is generally void.<sup>7</sup> And one of several trustees is under the same disabilities:<sup>8</sup> they cannot convey to each other.<sup>9</sup> And so, if the purchase is made by an agent or attorney of the trustee.<sup>10</sup> Nor can the trustee's wife purchase.<sup>11</sup> Nor can the trustee purchase as agent for another.<sup>12</sup> The *cestui que trust* is not estopped to avoid such sales, although he has taken a legacy under the will of the

<sup>1</sup> 2 Sugd. V. & P. (8 Am. ed.) 687.

<sup>2</sup> Fox v. Mackreth, 2 Bro. Ch. 400; Scott v. Davis, 4 M. & Cr. 87; Herne v. Meeres, 1 Vern. 465.

<sup>3</sup> Pugh v. Bell, 1 J. J. Marsh. 398; Morse v. Royal, 12 Ves. 373.

<sup>4</sup> Randall v. Errington, 10 Ves. 423.

<sup>5</sup> Dobson v. Racey, 3 Sandf. 61.

<sup>6</sup> Attorney-General v. Dudley, Coop. 146; Whelpdale v. Cookson, 1 Ves. 9; Lister v. Lister, 6 Ves. 631; Sanderson v. Walker, 13 Ves. 601; Downes v. Grazebrook, 3 Mer. 200; Campbell v. Walker, 3 Ves. 378; Whitcomb v. Minichin, 5 Mad. 91.

<sup>7</sup> Roberts v. Roberts, 65 N. C. 27.

<sup>8</sup> Whichcote v. Lawrence, 3 Ves. 740.

<sup>9</sup> Boynton v. Brastow, 53 Me. 362.

<sup>10</sup> Campbell v. Walker, 3 Ves. 378; S. J. C. Suffolk, March, 1873.

<sup>11</sup> Dundas's App. 64 Penn. St. 325; Leitch v. Wells, 48 Barb. 637. But it has been held that the trustee's wife might purchase where the trust property was sold under a judicial decree of sale, in the absence of fraud and collusion, if the sale is affirmed by a decree of the court upon a report of the proceedings. Armstrong's App. 69 Penn. St. 409.

<sup>12</sup> North Baltimore, &c. Association v. Caldwell, 25 Md. 420.

trustee, if such legacy is not a charge upon the trust estate and is not otherwise connected with the trust fund.<sup>1</sup> If such sales are avoided, upon a reconveyance the trustee is entitled to receive back all the purchase-money and all other claims which he may have against the estate.<sup>2</sup> And he may purchase of the *cestui que trust* property not embraced in the trust fund, care being taken that the influence of the relation does not affect the transaction.<sup>3</sup> Sometimes the trustee is allowed by decrees of sale, to be a bidder for the property at his own auction; in such case the trustee must show the utmost diligence and good faith for the interest of the *cestui que trust*.<sup>4</sup>

§ 196. If among the assets of the trust estate there are leases, the trustee cannot renew them in his own name; and, if he renews them in his own name, he must hold them by a constructive trust for the same persons beneficially interested in the old leases.<sup>5</sup> Even if the lessor refuse to renew the lease for the benefit of the *cestui que trust*, and the trustee takes it in his own name, he is still a constructive trustee, and he must account for all the income and profits. This is on the ground that a trustee should be under no temptations to make any contracts in relation to the trust property, even collaterally, on his own private account.<sup>6</sup> The same rule extends to

<sup>1</sup> *Smith v. Townshend*, 27 Md. 368.

<sup>2</sup> *Elliott v. Pool*, 6 Jones, Eq. 42.

<sup>3</sup> *Eldredge v. Smith*, 34 Vt. 484.

<sup>4</sup> *Cadwalader's App.* 64 Penn. St. 293; *Colgate v. Colgate*, 23 N. J. Eq. 372.

<sup>5</sup> *Keech v. Sandford*, commonly called the Rumford Market Case, Sel. Ch. Ca. 61; 1 Lead. Ca. Eq. 36, Eng. and Am. notes; *Griffin v. Griffin*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 354; *Pickering v. Vowles*, 1 Bro. Ch. 198; *Pierson v. Shore*, 1 Atk. 480; *Nesbitt v. Tredennick*, 1 B. & B. 46; *Turner v. Hill*, 11 Sim. 14; *Whalley v. Whalley*, 1 Vern. 484; *Holt v. Holt*, 1 Ch. Ca. 190; *Abney v. Miller*, 2 Atk. 597; *Killick v. Flexney*, 4 Bro. Ch. 161; *Luckin v. Rushworth*, Finch, 392; *Anon.* 2 Ch. Ca. 207; *Mulvaney v. Dillon*, 1 B. & B. 409; *Fosbrook v. Balguy*, 1 M. & K. 226; *Owen v. Williams*, Amb. 794.

<sup>6</sup> *Keech v. Sandford*, Sel. Ch. Ca. 61; *Griffin v. Griffin*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 353.

all persons who have only a partial interest in property : they shall not take advantage of their situation to renew leases in their own names ; as, tenants for life,<sup>1</sup> mortgagees,<sup>2</sup> devisees subject to debts, legacies, or annuities,<sup>3</sup> joint tenants,<sup>4</sup> or partners ;<sup>5</sup> and where there was a mere tenancy at will, it was held that the tenant could not renew in his own name, and deprive the remainder-man of what might come to him.<sup>6</sup> And if, instead of renewing, the trustee or other person sell the right to renew for money, he must account for the price to the persons beneficially interested.<sup>7</sup> Nor can an agent acting for the trustee renew in his own name.<sup>8</sup> The same rule applies when the trustee of an equity of redemption becomes the purchaser in a foreclosure suit.<sup>9</sup>

§ 197. It is thus seen that the rule against purchasing by trustees of the *cestui que trust*, amounts almost to prohibition ; for if a trustee purchases the property, and sells it at a profit, he must account for it as a trustee ; not because there was any fraud in the transaction, but because it is against the policy of

<sup>1</sup> *Eyre v. Dolphin*, 2 B. & B. 290 ; *Rawe v. Chichester*, Amb. 719 ; *Coffin v. Fernyhough*, 2 Bro. Ch. 291 ; *Taster v. Marriott*, Amb. 668 ; *James v. Dean*, 11 Ves. 383 ; 15 Ves. 236 ; *Kempton v. Packman*, 7 Ves. 176 ; *Giddings v. Giddings*, 3 Russ. 241 ; *Crop v. Norton*, 9 Mod. 233 ; *Buckley v. Lanauze*, Ll. & G. t. Plunk. 327 ; *Tanner v. Elworthy*, 4 Beav. 487 ; *Waters v. Bailey*, 2 Y. & C. Ch. 218 ; *Yem v. Edwards*, 3 K. & J. 564 ; 1 De G. & J. 598 ; *Brookman v. Hales*, 2 V. & B. 45.

<sup>2</sup> *Rushworth's Case*, Freem. 13 ; *Nesbitt v. Tredennick*, 1 B. & B. 46.

<sup>3</sup> *Jackson v. Welch*, Ll. & G. t. Plunk. 346 ; *Winslow v. Tighe*, 2 B. & B. 195 ; *Stubbs v. Roth*, ib. 548 ; *Webb v. Lugar*, 2 Y. & C. 247 ; *Jones v. Kearney*, 1 Conn. & Laws. 34.

<sup>4</sup> *Palmer v. Young*, 1 Vern. 276.

<sup>5</sup> *Fetherstonhaugh v. Fenwick*, 17 Ves. 298 ; *Ex parte Grace*, 1 Bos. & P. 376 ; *Clegg v. Fishwick*, 1 McN. & G. 294 ; 299, Am. ed. Perkins, note 1 ; *Clegg v. Edmondson*, 8 De G., M. & G. 787.

<sup>6</sup> *James v. Dean*, 11 Ves. 383 ; 15 Ves. 236 ; *Re Tottenham*, 16 Ir. Ch. 118.

<sup>7</sup> *Owen v. Williams*, Amb. 734.

<sup>8</sup> *Edwards v. Lewis*, 3 Atk. 538.

<sup>9</sup> *Hubbell v. Medbury*, 53 N. Y. 98 ; *Terrett v. Crombie*, 6 Lansing, 83.

the law to allow such transactions.<sup>1</sup> Nor is it material that there should be an advantage, or profit, arising out of a purchase by the trustee from the *cestui que trust*. It is not necessary to prove such advantage or profit: it is enough to show the relation and the purchase. The trustee can make no profit from his management of the estate, and he is bound not to put himself in any position where his private interests may conflict with the interests of the *cestui que trust*.<sup>2</sup> In all cases where the trustee purchases the trust property, the *cestui que trust* may have the purchase set aside and the property resold.<sup>3</sup>

§ 198. The *cestui que trust* alone can avoid such conveyances.<sup>4</sup> They are at his option. And, if they are found to be beneficial to him or otherwise, he may compel the trustee to complete a purchase and take the estate and pay the purchase-money.<sup>5</sup>

§ 199. The above rule does not apply to mere naked or dry trustees who practically have no interest in or power over the estate, as trustees to preserve contingent remainders.<sup>6</sup> Where

<sup>1</sup> *Hawley v. Cramer*, 4 Cow. 117; *Prevost v. Gratz*, 1 Pet. 66, 367; 6 Wheat. 481; *Edwards v. Meyrick*, 2 Hare, 60; *Hamilton v. Wright*, 9 Cl. & Fin. 111; *Fox v. Mackreth*, 2 Brow. Ch. 400; 1 Cox, 310; *John v. Bennett*, 39 Barb. 237; *Kent v. Chalfant*, 7 Minn. 487; *Tiffany v. Clark*, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Add. 9.

<sup>2</sup> *Ex parte Lacey*, 6 Ves. 625; *Chesterfield v. Janssen*, 2 Ves. 138; *Campbell v. Walker*, 5 Ves. 678; 13 Ves. 138; *Cane v. Allen*, 2 Dow, 289; *Slade v. Van Vechten*, 11 Paige, 21; *Davoue v. Fanning*, 2 John. Ch. 252; *Michoud v. Girod*, 4 How. 503; *Dobson v. Racey*, 3 Sandf. 61; *Morse v. Royal*, 12 Ves. 355; *Ex parte James*, 8 Ves. 337; *Ex parte Bennett*, 10 Ves. 381; *Saagar v. Wilson*, 4 S. & W. 102.

<sup>3</sup> *Sypher v. McHenry*, 18 Io. 232. See Sugd. V. & P. (8th Am. ed.) 685 *et seq.*, where the rules are clearly stated by Lord St. Leonards, and the American cases are all collected and arranged by Hon. J. C. Perkins.

<sup>4</sup> *Rice v. Cleghorn*, 21 Ind. 80.

<sup>5</sup> *Thorp v. McCallum*, 1 Gilm. 624; *McClure v. Miller*, 1 Bail. Ch. 107; *Lister v. Lister*, 6 Ves. 631; *Ex parte Reynolds*, 5 Ves. 707; *Sanderson v. Walker*, 13 Ves. 603; *Larco v. Casaneuava*, 30 Cal. 560.

<sup>6</sup> *Parker v. White*, 11 Ves. 226; *Naylor v. Winch*, 1 S. & S. 567; *Sutton v. Jones*, 15 Ves. 587; *Pooley v. Quilter*, 4 Drew. 189.

the trustee has no duty to perform, as where one is trustee in fee for another in fee, having no authority over the estate, and standing in no relation of influence over the *cestui que trust*, the person named as trustee may purchase;<sup>1</sup> and if the *cestui que trust* make all the arrangements for the sale, such as plans, notices, choice of auctioneer, terms and conditions, and the trustee is in no situation to obtain any exclusive information, the court will deal with the contract as with contracts between other parties.<sup>2</sup> A mortgagee may purchase of the mortgagor under a decree of foreclosure or otherwise,<sup>3</sup> but if the mortgage contains a power of sale, the mortgagee becomes a trustee of the power of sale for the mortgagor, and neither he nor his agents, attorneys, or auctioneers, can purchase for themselves or others; or, if they do, they become constructive trustees.<sup>4</sup> And so the pledgee of stock cannot buy the same

<sup>1</sup> Pooley v. Quilter, 4 Drew. 189.

<sup>2</sup> Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 248; Monro v. Allaire, 2 Caine's Ca. 183; Salmon v. Cutts, 4 De G. & Sm. 131.

<sup>3</sup> Iddings v. Bruen, 4 Sand. Ch. 223; Murdoch's Case, 2 Bland, 461; Knight v. Majoribanks, 2 Mac. & G. 10; 2 Hall & T. 308; Rhodes v. Sanderson, 36 Cal. 414.

<sup>4</sup> Dobson v. Racey, 4 Selden, 216; Waters v. Groom, 11 Cl. & Fin. 684; Mapps v. Sharpe, 32 Ill. 18; Murray v. Vanderbilt, 39 Barb. 140; Blackley v. Fowler, 31 Cal. 326; Olcott v. Tioga R.R. Co. 27 N. Y. 546; Elliott v. Wood, 53 Barb. 285; Thornton v. Jarvin, 43 Mo. 153; Wall v. Town, 45 Ill. 493; Robinson v. Cudwin, 41 Ala. 693; Allen v. Chatfield, 3 Minn. 435; Montague v. Dawes, 14 Allen, 369. See Bailey v. Ætna Insurance Co. 10 Allen, 286; Fowle v. Merrill, 10 Allen, 350; Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397; Smith v. Provin, 4 Allen, 516; Woodlee v. Burch, 43 Mo. 231; Dyer v. Shurtleff, S. J. C. Mass., March, 1873, in Suffolk. See Scott v. Mann, 33 Tex. 721. But a second mortgagee may purchase under a power of sale contained in a prior mortgage. Parkinson v. Hanbury, 1 Dr. & Sm. 143; 2 De G., J. & S. 455; Shaw v. Bunney, 34 L. J. Ch. 257; 11 Jur. (N. S.) 99; 2 De G., J. & S. 468; Kirkwood v. Thompson, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 385; 2 De G., J. & S. 613; And it is said that the administrator of the mortgagee may purchase. Woodlee v. Burch, 43 Mo. 231. And so a trustee may buy the equity of redemption in property on which he holds a mortgage as trustee. Britton v. Lewis, 8 Rich. Eq. 271; Eldridge v. Smith, 5 Shaw, 484. The power of sale is a power coupled with an interest, and is irrevocable. Capron v. Attleborough Bk. 11 Gray, 492. And can be executed after the death of the mortgagor. Varnum v. Meserve, 8 Allen,

even at the broker's board.<sup>1</sup> Where land is devised to one charged with the payment of an annuity to another for life, the devisee does not stand in the position of trustee for the annuitant, and he may purchase the annuity at a profit.<sup>2</sup> So a *cestui que trust* may devise property to his trustee, and there is no presumption against such gifts.<sup>3</sup> A *cestui que trust* may purchase the trust property or other property of the trustee, and the purchase will be good, at least the trustee cannot set it aside.<sup>4</sup> But sales to a *cestui que trust* involving an investment of the trust fund, or any dealing in relation to it, may be avoided by the *cestui que trust*.<sup>5</sup>

§ 200. Conveyances from wards to guardians are investigated with more severity by courts than contracts between parent and child, for the reason that there is not that family relationship and affection which sustain and uphold family settlements. The relation between guardian and ward is one of great influence over the ward, and is generally founded upon the pecuniary relation between them. While the relation

158; *Harnehall v. Orndorff*, 35 Md. 340. As to form of notice, see *Roche v. Farnsworth*, 106 Mass. 509, and remarks of Endicott, J., upon this case in *Dyer v. Shurtleff*, S. J. C. of Mass., at the March T., 1873, in Suffolk. Equity will aid the defective execution of a power of sale in a mortgage in favor of a *bona fide* purchaser who has paid his money for the estate. *Beatty v. Clark*, 20 Cal. 11; *Rowon v. Lamb*, 4 Green, 468. The whole matter of power of sale in mortgages, with the authorities, is stated in 1 Sugd. V. & P. 65-68. If a power of sale in a mortgage provides for the payment of the expenses of the sale, counsel fees may be paid. *Varnum v. Meserve*, 8 Allen, 158. But the mortgagee can receive nothing for his own time and trouble in executing the power: *Imboden v. Atkinson*, 23 Ark. 622.

<sup>1</sup> *Maryland Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple*, 25 Md. 242; *Baltimore Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple*, 25 Md. 269. *Byron v. Rayner*, 25 Md. 424.

<sup>2</sup> *Powell v. Murray*, 2 Edw. 636.

<sup>3</sup> *Stump v. Gaby*, 5 De G., M. & G. 623; *Hindson v. Wetherill*, 5 De G., M. & G. 301; but see *Waters v. Thorn*, 22 Beav. 547.

<sup>4</sup> *Walker v. Brungard*, 13 Sm. & M. 723; *Bank v. Macy*, 4 Ind. 362.

<sup>5</sup> *McCants v. Bee*, 1 McCord, Ch. 382; *Chester v. Greer*, 5 Humph. 26; *Wade v. Harper*, 3 Yerg. 383.

actually subsists; no contracts can be made.<sup>1</sup> But if a contract or conveyance is made by the ward to the guardian just after attaining his property, and before a full settlement is made, and while the influence of the guardian is still in full force, courts will examine it in all its aspects; and the guardian claiming under such a conveyance must satisfy the court that the transaction was fair and proper, and that it did not proceed from undue influence, or from any fear, hope, or other unworthy motive induced in the mind of the ward by the conduct of the guardian.<sup>2</sup> If there is the slightest suspicion of any improper motive for a gift, as that a better or more speedy settlement may be obtained, the conveyance will be avoided, and the guardian will continue to hold the property in trust for the ward. Where a guardian improperly procures an infant's land to be sold by decree of a court, the conveyance will be avoided; but if the land has been conveyed to an innocent purchaser without notice, the title will be allowed to stand.<sup>3</sup> The influence of the guardian over the ward may be so subtle, and the motives of the gift may be of such a nature, as to baffle a court of equity in reaching them. Therefore it has been said that, although the gift from the ward may be a highly moral act, and alike creditable and honorable to him, yet, if the court is not entirely satisfied by clear demonstration that the gift was properly made, it will be set aside. Nothing can be allowed to stand that proceeds from the pressure of the relation of guardian and ward fresh upon the mind of the ward.<sup>4</sup> But if the relation

<sup>1</sup> *Dawson v. Massey*, 1 B. & B. 226; *Blackmore v. Shelby*, 8 Humph. 439; *Bostwick v. Atkins*, 3 Comst. 53; *Gallatian v. Cunningham*, 8 Cow. 361; *Clarke v. Devereaux*, 1 S. C. 172.

<sup>2</sup> *Richardson v. Linney*, 7 B. Mon. 471; *Andrews v. Jones*, 10 Ala. 400; *Eberts v. Eberts*, 54 Penn. St. 110; *Dawson v. Massey*, 1 B. & B. 229; *Wright v. Proud*, 13 Ves. 136; *Wedderburn v. Wedderburn*, 4 M. & C. 41; *Aylward v. Kearney*, 2 B. & B. 463; *Mulhallen v. Murum*, 3 Dr. & W. 317; *Cary v. Mansfield*, 1 Ves. 379; *Garvin v. Williams*, 44 Mo. 465; *Amer. Law Reg.* vol. 11 (N. S.), 656.

<sup>3</sup> *Gwinn v. Williams*, 30 Md. 376.

<sup>4</sup> *Hatch v. Hatch*, 9 Ves. 297; *Hylton v. Hylton*, 2 Ves. 548; *Pierce v.*

has entirely ceased, and a full settlement has been made, and the ward has obtained the full control of his property, and if sufficient time has elapsed to emancipate the mind of the ward from all undue impressions and influences, it may not only be proper, but highly meritorious and honorable, for a ward to make a fitting gift to a guardian who has faithfully performed his trust; and a court fully satisfied upon these points would uphold it.<sup>1</sup>

§ 201. In the same manner courts of equity carefully scrutinize contracts between parents and children by which the property of children is conveyed to parents. The position and influence of a parent over a child are so controlling, that the transaction should be carefully examined, and sales by a child to a parent must appear to be fair and reasonable.<sup>2</sup> Such contracts are not, however, *prima facie void*, but there must be some affirmative proof of undue influence or other improper conduct to render the transaction void; for while the parent holds a powerful influence over the child, the law recognizes it as a rightful and proper influence, and does not presume, in the first instance, that a parent would make use of his authority and parental power to coerce, deceive, or defraud the child.<sup>3</sup> Therefore it is always necessary to prove some improper and undue influence, in order to set aside contracts between parents and children.<sup>4</sup> As purchases by a parent in the name of a

Waring, *ib.*, and 1 Ves. 380, and 1 P. Wms. 120, n.; 1 Cox, 125; Wood v. Downes, 18 Ves. 126; Johnson v. Johnson, 5 Ala. 90; Williams v. Powell, 1 Ired. Eq. 460; Caplinger v. Stokes, Meigs, 175; *Somes v. Skinner*, 16 Mass. 348; Whitman's App. 28 Penn. St. 348; Hawkin's App. 32 Penn. St. 263; Scott v. Freeland, 7 Sm. & M. 420; Garvin v. Williams, 44 Mo. 465.

<sup>1</sup> Hylton v. Hylton, 2 Ves. 547; Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. 548.

<sup>2</sup> Blunder v. Barker, 1 P. Wms. 639; Wallace v. Wallace, 2 Dr. & W. 452; Cocking v. Pratt, 1 Ves. 401; Heron v. Heron, 2 Atk. 181; Carpenter v. Heriot, 1 Ed. 328; Young v. Peachey, 2 Atk. 258.

<sup>3</sup> Jenkins v. Pye, 12 Pet. 253, 254.

<sup>4</sup> Cocking v. Pratt, 1 Ves. 401; Hawes v. Wyatt, 3 Bro. Ch. 156; 2



child do not create a resulting trust, but are presumed, in the first instance, to be the advances made by the parent to the child, so conveyances to the parent by the child may be a proper family arrangement, and for the best interest of the child.<sup>1</sup> If no such considerations can be found in the case, and the conveyance, after all allowances are made, is found to have been wrongfully obtained from the child, a court of equity will set it aside or convert the parent into a trustee.<sup>2</sup> But the proceedings must be had at once. The child cannot wait until the parent's death, or until the rights of other parties have intervened.<sup>3</sup> The same rules apply when contracts are made between children, and those who have put themselves *in loco parentis*; <sup>4</sup> and so when family relatives make use of their position and influence to obtain undue and improper advantages, as where two brothers obtained a deed from a sister, it was set aside.<sup>5</sup>

Cox, 263; Heron v. Heron, 2 Atk. 161; Young v. Peachey, 2 Atk. 161; Carpenter v. Heriot, 1 Ed. 328.

<sup>1</sup> Blackburn v. Edgeley, 1 P. Wms. 607; Cooke v. Burtchaell, 2 Dr. & W. 165; Browne v. Carter, 5 Ves. 877; Tendrill v. Smith, 2 Atk. 85; Cory v. Cory, 1 Ves. 19; Kinchant v. Kinchant, 3 Bro. Ch. 374; Tweddell v. Tweddell, T. & R. 14; Hartopp v. Hartopp, 21 Beav. 259; Hannah v. Hodgson, 30 Beav. 19.

<sup>2</sup> King v. Savery, 1 Sm. & Gif. 271; 5 H. L. Ca. 627; Berdoe v. Dawson, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 254; Bury v. Oppenheim, 26 Beav. 594; Baker v. Bradley, 7 De G., M. & G. 597; 35 Eng. L. & Eq. 449; Field v. Evans, 15 Sim. 375; Slocumb v. Marshall, 2 Wash. C. C. 397; Brice v. Brice, 5 Barb. 533; Whelan v. Whelan, 2 Cow. 537; Young v. Peachey, 2 Atk. 254; Glisson v. Ogden, 2 Atk. 258; Baker v. Tucker, 2 Eng. L. & Eq. 1; Blackburn v. Edgeley, 1 P. Wms. 607; Morris v. Burroughs, 1 Atk. 402; Tendrill v. Smith, 2 Atk. 85; Hoghton v. Hoghton, 15 Beav. 278; Wallace v. Wallace, 2 Dr. & W. 452; Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 Beav. 234; Hunter v. Atkins, 3 M. & K. 146; Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav. 551; Findley v. Patterson, 2 B. Mon. 76.

<sup>3</sup> Wright v. Vanderplank, 2 K. & J. 1; 8 De G., M. & G. 133; Brown v. Carter, 5 Ves. 877; Taylor v. Taylor, 8 How. 201; Crispell v. Dubois, 4 Barb. 393.

<sup>4</sup> Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav. 551; Maitland v. Backhouse, 16 Sim. 68; Maitland v. Irving, 15 Sim. 437.

<sup>5</sup> Sears v. Shafer, 2 Seld. 268; Hewitt v. Crane, 2 Halst. Ch. 159; Boney v. Hollingsworth, 23 Ala. 690.

§ 202. The relation of attorney and client is one of especial confidence and influence, and while that relation continues the attorney cannot receive gifts or make purchases from the client.<sup>1</sup> It has been said in some cases that the attorney is absolutely prohibited from entering into contracts with his clients.<sup>2</sup> If the rule is not quite so peremptory as this, it at least goes to the extent of prohibiting him from contracting with his client for an interest in the subject-matter of the litigation.<sup>3</sup> The client is so completely in the hands of the attorney in relation to the subject-matter of litigation, that it would be almost impossible for him to enter into a free and fair contract in regard to it. Beside, it is against the policy of the law that attorneys should obtain interests in litigated claims, and exercise their offices under such influences of gain. In all cases the burden is upon the attorney making a purchase of a client, to vindicate the transaction from all suspicion.<sup>4</sup> And if the attorney cannot produce

<sup>1</sup> *Welles v. Middleton*, 1 Cox, 125; *Wright v. Proud*, 13 Ves. 137; *Cheslyn v. Dalby*, 2 Y. & Col. 194; *Hunter v. Atkins*, 3 M. & K. 113; *Wood v. Downes*, 18 Ves. 126; *Savery v. King*, 35 Eng. L. & Eq. 100; *De Montmorency v. Devereaux*, 7 Cl. & Fin. 188; *Jones v. Tripp*, Jac. 322; *Godard v. Carlisle*, 9 Price, 169; *Edwards v. Meyrick*, 2 Hare, 68.

<sup>2</sup> *Wright v. Proud*, 13 Ves. 138; *Holman v. Loynes*, 4 De G., M. & G. 270; *Thompson v. Judge*, 3 Dr. 306; 19 Jur. 583; 24 L. J. Ch. 785; *Henry v. Raiman*, 25 Penn. St. 354; *West v. Raymond*, 21 Ind. 305; *Atkins v. Delmage*, 12 Ir. Eq. 2; *Webster v. King*, 33 Cal. 148; *Frank's App.* 59 Penn. St. 190; *Lovatt v. Knipe*, 12 Ir. Eq. 124; *Purcell v. Buckley*, 12 Ir. Eq. 55.

<sup>3</sup> *Oldham v. Hand*, 2 Ves. 259; *Wood v. Downes*, 18 Ves. 120; *Hall v. Hallett*, 1 Cox, 134; *West v. Raymond*, 21 Ind. 305.

<sup>4</sup> *Newman v. Payne*, 2 Ves. Jr. 199; *Welles v. Middleton*, 1 Cox, 112; 4 Bro. P. C. 245; *Harris v. Tremenheere*, 15 Ves. 34; *Hunter v. Atkins*, 3 M. & K. 135; *Cane v. Allen*, 2 Dow, 289; *Champion v. Rigby*, 1 R. & M. 539; *Bellow v. Russell*, 1 B. & B. 107; *Gibson v. Jeyes*, 6 Ves. 277; *Uppington v. Buller*, 2 Dr. & W. 184; *Walmsley v. Booth*, 2 Atk. 30; *Montesquieu v. Sandys*, 18 Ves. 302; *Edwards v. Meyrick*, 2 Hare, 60; *Wood v. Downes*, 18 Ves. 120; *Lewis v. Hillman*, 3 H. L. Ca. 607; *Salmon v. Cutts*, 4 De G. & Sm. 131; *Holman v. Loynes*, 4 De G., M. & G. 270; *King v. Savery*, 5 H. L. Ca. 627; *Robinson v. Briggs*, 1 Sm. & Gif. 184; *Greenfield's Est.* 2 Harris, 489; *Merritt v. Lambert*, 10 Paige, 357; *Wallis*

evidence, that puts the transaction clearly beyond all doubt or question, it will be set aside or he will be converted into a trustee.<sup>1</sup> This disability of an attorney continues as long as the relation of attorney and client continues, and as much longer as the influence of the relation can be supposed to extend. If the relation has ceased, but the influence of the relation continues to affect the minds of the parties, all contracts made under the influence will be avoided.<sup>2</sup> But if the relation has entirely ceased, and there can be supposed to be no influence remaining, the rule will not apply.<sup>3</sup> And so, if an attorney makes a purchase of a client of property entirely disconnected with the subject of the litigation, and the transaction is in all respects as if it had taken place between strangers, the rule will not apply.<sup>4</sup> So the rule does not apply to a gift to an attorney in the will of a client, if the will is a good and valid instrument in the courts where it is presented for probate;<sup>5</sup> and a voidable conveyance to an attorney may be confirmed in the will of the client.<sup>6</sup> But the rule will not apply to an attorney incidently consulted concerning some

*v. Loubat*, 2 Denio, 607; *Howell v. Ransom*, 11 Paige, 538; *Evans v. Ellis*, 5 Denio, 640; *Barry v. Whitney*, 3 Sand. S. C. 696; *Hawley v. Cramer*, 4 Cow. 717; *Mott v. Harrington*, 12 Vt. 199; *Miles v. Ervin*, 1 McCord, Ch. 524; *Waters v. Thorn*, 22 Beav. 547; *Bank v. Tyrrell*, 27 Beav. 273; 10 H. L. Ca. 26; *Wall v. Cockerell*, 10 H. L. Ca. 229; *Brown v. Kennedy*, 33 Beav. 133; *Smedley v. Varley*, 23 Beav. 359; *O'Brien v. Lewis*, 4 Gif. 221; *Corley v. Stafford*, 1 De G. & J. 238; *Spring v. Pride*, 10 Jur. (N. S.) 646; *Gresley v. Mousley*, 4 De G. & J. 78; *Barnard v. Hunter*, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 1213; *Douglass v. Culverwell*, 31 L. J. Ch. 65, 543; *Brock v. Barnes*, 40 Barb. 521.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*; *Smith v. Brotherline*, 62 Penn. St. 461.

<sup>2</sup> *Henry v. Raiman*, 25 Penn. St. 354; *Leisenring v. Black*, 5 Watts, 303; *Hockenbury v. Carlisle*, 5 W. & S. 350.

<sup>3</sup> *Wood v. Downes*, 18 Ves. 127.

<sup>4</sup> *Edwards v. Meyrick*, 2 Hare, 60; *Bellows v. Russell*, 1 B. & B. 104; *Montesquieu v. Sandys*, 18 Ves. 302.

<sup>5</sup> *Hindson v. Wetherell*, 5 De G., M. & G. 30, overruling same case, 1 Sm. & G. 604. But see 23 L. Rev. 442, and notes to 1 Sm. & G. 604.

<sup>6</sup> *Stump v. Gaby*, 2 De G., M. & G. 623. But see *Waters v. Thorn*, 22 Beav. 447.

point of the litigation, but who is not employed or confided in, for the management of the case,<sup>1</sup> nor will it apply to the attorney upon the other side.<sup>2</sup> Nor will it apply after the relation has ceased and the attorney has assumed a hostile position in endeavoring to collect his fees.<sup>3</sup> But it has been held that an attorney having a lien or an execution in favor of his client, could not buy in land of his client at a sale thereof on execution.<sup>4</sup> If an attorney takes an absolute deed from a client in payment of his fees, the court may order it to stand as a mortgage security,<sup>5</sup> and where there was a fair agreement that an attorney's fees should be charged upon the estate, if recovered, the court allowed it to stand in the absence of undue influence,<sup>6</sup> and so the court will not interfere after a great lapse of time where the sale was for full value.<sup>7</sup>

§ 203. All the dealings between attorney and client will be carefully examined by courts, and no purchase of a client's property will be allowed to stand.<sup>8</sup> Thus a bond obtained from a poor and distressed client, the consideration not appearing with sufficient clearness, was set aside,<sup>9</sup> and so a bond was not allowed to stand except for the amount of fees actually due,<sup>10</sup> and a judgment was inquired into after a considerable lapse of time.<sup>11</sup> And even where a barrister married a lady

<sup>1</sup> *Dobbins v. Stevens*, 17 S. & R. 13; *Devinney v. Norris*, 8 Watts, 314.

<sup>2</sup> *Bank v. Foster*, 8 Watts, 305.

<sup>3</sup> *Johnson v. Fesemeyer*, 3 De G. & J. 13; *Smith v. Brotherline*, 62 Penn. St. 461.

<sup>4</sup> *Stockton v. Ford*, 11 How. 232.

<sup>5</sup> *Pearson v. Benson*, 28 Beav. 598; *Morgan v. Higgins*, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 236.

<sup>6</sup> *Moss v. Bainbridge*, 6 De G., M. & G. 292; *Blagrove v. Routh*, 2 K. & J. 509.

<sup>7</sup> *Clanricarde v. Henning*, 30 Beav. 175.

<sup>8</sup> *Moore v. Brackin*, 27 Ill. 23; *Smith v. Brotherline*, 62 Penn. St. 461.

<sup>9</sup> *Proof v. Hines*, Cas. t. Talb. 111; *Walmesley v. Booth*, 2 Atk. 28.

<sup>10</sup> *Newman v. Payne*, 4 Bro. Ch. 350; 2 Ves. Jr. 200; *Langstaffe v. Taylor*, 14 Ves. 262; *Fitcher v. Rigby*, 9 Price, 79; *Jones v. Roberts*, 9 Beav. 419.

<sup>11</sup> *Drapers' Company v. Davis*, 2 Atk. 295.

client, and undertook to draw the marriage settlement, according to the stipulations between them, it was held to be open to investigation by the court.<sup>1</sup> The same rules are applied to all persons standing in the relation of attorneys or confidential advisers, although they are not attorneys in fact; thus clerks in an attorney's office, who do business for the client and obtain a knowledge of his affairs and his confidence, cannot avail themselves of their position to make favorable bargains or purchases,<sup>2</sup> and so one who acts as a confidential adviser in a matter before a magistrate, where attorneys are not employed, is under the same obligations and disabilities.<sup>3</sup> Of course, if there is actual fraud committed by an attorney in a purchase of a client, the transaction will be summarily dealt with.<sup>4</sup>

§ 204. The same principles apply to transactions between all persons standing in confidential and influential relations to each other. The person, thus possessing the confidence of another, and having an influence by reason of such confidence, cannot use his influence to obtain contracts, conveyances, or property. *Quasi* guardians, husband and wife, confidential advisers, stewards, keepers of asylums in which the *quasi ward* may have been treated, or confidential medical advisers, all come within the rule.<sup>5</sup> But the mere fact that the donee is an

<sup>1</sup> Corley v. Stafford, 1 De G. & J. 258.

<sup>2</sup> Hobday v. Peters, 28 Beav. 349; 6 Jur. (N. S.) 794; Cowdry v. Day, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 1199; Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327; Poillon v. Martin, 1 Sandf. Ch. 569.

<sup>3</sup> Buffalow v. Buffalow, 5 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 241.

<sup>4</sup> Webster v. King, 33 Cal. 348.

<sup>5</sup> Trevelyan v. Charter, 9 Beav. 140; 11 Cl. & Fin. 714; Revett v. Harvey, 1 S. & S. 502; Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273; Gray v. Mansfield, 1 Ves. 379; Wright v. Proud, 13 Ves. 136; Ahearne v. Hogan, 1 Dr. 310; Billing v. Southee, 9 Hare, 534; 16 Jur. 188; Crispell v. Dubois, 4 Barb. 393; Blackie v. Clarke, 22 L. J. Ch. 377; Whitehorn v. Hines, 1 Munf. 559; Shallcross v. Oldham, 2 John. & Hem. 609; Dent v. Bennett, 4 M. & Cr. 269; Gibson v. Russell, 2 Y. & C. N. R. 104; Pratt v. Barker, 1 Sim. 1; Swishholm's App. 56 Penn. St. 475; Falk v. Turner, 101 Mass. 494; Rhodes v. Bate, L. R. 1 Ch. 252.

attending physician, there being no confidential relation, will not avoid a deed.<sup>1</sup> But the administrator of a deceased partner may buy the partnership property, although he may be a surviving partner.<sup>2</sup>

§ 205. Upon the same principles, administrators and executors cannot purchase the estate under their charge to administer. They cannot purchase directly of themselves, nor from the heirs, legatees, devisees, or other persons interested in the estate,<sup>3</sup> nor can they purchase indirectly by procuring a third person to purchase in the first instance, and by receiving a conveyance from such third person.<sup>4</sup> This rule is so strict, that they cannot purchase any of the assets of the estate under their charge, although the assets are ordered by the court to be sold at public auction;<sup>5</sup> and even where a creditor seized a

¶ <sup>1</sup> *Doggett v. Lane*, 12 Mo. 215.

<sup>2</sup> *Savage v. Williams*, 15 La. An. 250; *Carter v. McManus*, 15 La. An. 641; *Dugas v. Gilbeau*, 15 La. An. 581.

<sup>3</sup> *Davoue v. Fanning*, 2 John. Ch. 252; *Van Epps v. Van Epps*, 9 Paige, 237; *Ward v. Smith*, 3 Sand. Ch. 592; *Ames v. Browning*, 1 Bradf. 321; *Rogers v. Rogers*, 3 Wend. 503; *Bostwick v. Atkins*, 1 Comst. 53; *Michoud v. Girod*, 4 How. 504; *Drysdale's App.* 14 Penn. St. 531; *Moody v. Vandyke*, 4 Binn. 31; *Beeson v. Beeson*, 9 Barr. 279; *Winter v. Geroe*, 1 Halst. Ch. 319; *Conway v. Green*, 1 H. & J. 151; *Bailey v. Robinson*, 1 Grat. 4; *Hudson v. Hudson*, 5 Munf. 180; *Baines v. McGee*, 1 Sm. & M. 208; *Baxter v. Costin*, 1 Busb. Eq. 262; *Breckenridge v. Holland*, 2 Blackf. 377; *Edmunds v. Crenshaw*, 1 McCord, Ch. 252. But in South Carolina an executor may purchase the personal property. *Stallings v. Foreman*, 2 Hill, Eq. 401; and so in Alabama, *Julian v. Reynolds*, 8 Ala. 680; *Peyton v. Enos*, 16 La. An. 135; *Van Weckle v. Malla*, 16 La. An. 325; *Huston v. Cassidy*, 2 Beas. 228; *Mulford v. Winch*, 3 Stockt. 16; *Culver v. Culver*, 3 Stockt. 215; *Dugas v. Gilbeau*, 15 La. An. 581.

<sup>4</sup> *Davoue v. Fanning*, 2 John. Ch. 252; *Paul v. Squibb*, 12 Penn. St. 296; *Woodruff v. Cook*, 2 Edw. Ch. 259; *Hawley v. Cramer*, 4 Cow. 717; *Beaubien v. Poupard*, Harr. Ch. 206; *Buckles v. Lafferty*, 2 Rob. 292; *Hunt v. Bass*, 2 Dev. Eq. 292; *Forbes v. Halsey*, 26 N. Y. 53; *Miles v. Wheeler*, 43 Ill. 123; *Kruse v. Stephens*, 47 Ill. 112; *Smith v. Drake*, 23 N. J. Eq. 302; *Tiffany v. Clark*, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Add. 9.

<sup>5</sup> *Wallington's Est.* 1 Ashm. 307; *Beeson v. Beeson*, 9 Barr. 279; *Rham v. North*, 2 Yeates, 117; *Jewett v. Miller*, 10 N. Y. 402; *Fox v. Mackreth*,

portion of the estate and exposed it to public sale, it was held that the executor or administrator could not purchase.<sup>1</sup> So if an executor join with others in the purchase of the estate the sale may be avoided.<sup>2</sup> If, however, the estate is sold in good faith to a stranger, with no collusion between him and the executor, there is nothing to prevent the executor from purchasing it afterwards like any other property.<sup>3</sup> So an executor may purchase the interest of a third person in the estate.<sup>4</sup> If fraud is superadded to a purchase by an executor, or any use of his situation is made to make a more favorable purchase, it will of course be avoided, or he will be ordered to account for the property and all the profits received.<sup>5</sup> But generally a purchase of the assets of an estate by an executor is not void, but only voidable, and such sale may be confirmed by all the parties interested in the estate;<sup>6</sup> and so a long acquiescence in a purchase made by an executor, by all the heirs, would be held to be a confirmation.<sup>7</sup> If an administrator purchases the estate at his own sale, and afterwards conveys the estate to a third person, his vendee will be charged with notice of the defect of title, as it would be apparent upon

1 Lead. Ca. Eq. 1; *Colgate v. Colgate*, 23 N. J. Eq. 372; *Colburn v. Morton*, 1 N. Y. Decis. 378; *Farrar v. Farley*, 3 S. C. 11.

<sup>1</sup> *Spindler v. Atkinson*, 3 Md. 410; *Fleming v. Teran*, 12 Ga. 394; *Wyncoop v. Wyncoop*, 12 Ind. 206. But the contrary rule was held in *Fisk v. Sarber*, 6 W. & S. 18; *Prevost v. Gratz*, 1 Pet. C. C. 364; *Campbell v. Johnson*, 1 Sandf. Ch. 148; *Bank of Orleans v. Torrey*, 7 Hill, 260.

<sup>2</sup> *Mitchum v. Mitchum*, 3 Dana, 260; *Paul v. Squibb*, 12 Penn. St. 296.

<sup>3</sup> *Silverthorn v. McKinister*, 12 Penn. St. 67.

<sup>4</sup> *Alexander v. Kennedy*, 3 Grat. 379.

<sup>5</sup> *Vanhorn v. Fonda*, 5 John. Ch. 388; *Hudson v. Hudson*, 5 Munf. 180.

<sup>6</sup> *Harrington v. Brown*, 5 Pick. 519; *Bruch v. Lantz*, 2 Rawle, 392; *Pennock's App.* 14 Penn. St. 446; *Longworth v. Goforth*, Wright, 192; *Dunlap v. Mitchell*, 10 Ohio, 117; *Williams v. Marshall*, 4 G. & J. 377; *Moore v. Hilton*, 12 Leigh, 2; *Scott v. Freeland*, 7 Sm. & M. 410; *Lyon v. Lyon*, 8 Ired. Eq. 201.

<sup>7</sup> *Jennison v. Hapgood*, 7 Pick. 1; *Hawley v. Cramer*, 4 Cow. 719; *Ward v. Smith*, 3 Sandf. Ch. 592; *Baker v. Read*, 18 Beav. 398; *Musselman v. Eshelman*, 10 Barr, 394; *Bell v. Webb*, 2 Gill, 164; *Todd v. Moore*, 1 Leigh, 457.

the face of the deed.<sup>1</sup> But if the administrator should collusively convey to a third person and take back a deed from him, and then himself sell, the purchaser would not probably be charged with notice unless he had actual notice.<sup>2</sup>

§ 206. The relation of principal and agent is a fiduciary one, and the same observations apply as to other relations of trust and confidence. Some have doubted whether it would not have been wiser to have prohibited all contracts between parties sustaining these relations to each other, and to have thus taken away all temptation to abuse the trust, rather than to investigate each case as it arises.<sup>3</sup> But perhaps the entire freedom of trade and business, and the convenience of society, demand that there should be at least the possibility of dealing between persons bearing these relations, and thus there is no absolute prohibition. The principal may buy and sell of the agent, and he may make an agent the object of his bounty, but there must be the utmost good faith and frankness in the dealing.<sup>4</sup> The principal is entitled to the best skill and judgment of his agent in the conduct of his affairs. If at the same time the agent is at liberty to purchase the property of his principal, there would be such a conflict between his duty and his interest, that there could be no safety in business. An agent, therefore, if he purchases property of his principal, must communicate fully and truly every fact in relation to such property within his knowledge; and he must also be known as the pur-

<sup>1</sup> *Lazarus v. Bryson*, 3 Binn. 59; *Ward v. Smith*, 3 Sandf. 592; *Smith v. Drake*, 23 N. J. Eq. 302; *Potter v. Pearson*, 60 Me. 220.

<sup>2</sup> *Johnson v. Bennett*, 39 Barb. 237.

<sup>3</sup> *Dunbar v. Tredennick*, 2 B. & B. 319; *Norris v. La Neve*, 3 Atk. 38; *Fairman v. Bavin*, 29 Ill. 75.

<sup>4</sup> *Selsey v. Rhoades*, 2 S. & S. 49; 1 Bligh, 1; *Kerr v. Dungannon*, 1 Dr. & W. 509, 541; *Huguenin v. Baseley*, 14 Ves. 273; *Molony v. Kernan*, 2 Dr. & W. 31; *Harris v. Tremenheere*, 15 Ves. 40; *Winchelsea v. Garrety*, 1 M. & K. 253; *Benson v. Heatham*, 1 Y. & C. N. R. 326; *Neeley v. Anderson*, 2 Strob. Eq. 262; *Brooke v. Berry*, 2 Gill, 83; *Persch v. Quiggle*, 57 Penn. St. 247.



chaser, for if he acts secretly the contract will certainly be held to be fraudulent; and so if he is employed to purchase for another and he purchases for himself, he will be held to be a trustee.<sup>1</sup> No person whose duty to another is inconsistent with his taking an absolute title to himself will be permitted to purchase for himself. For no one can hold a benefit acquired by fraud or a breach of his duty.<sup>2</sup> All the knowledge of the agent belongs to the principal for whom he acts, and if the agent use it for his own benefit, he will become a trustee for his principal.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, whatever an agent may be employed to do, he cannot use his position nor the knowledge obtained by his employment, to obtain a bargain from his principal. Nor can he take advantage of his own negligence, as where an agent allowed his principal's property to be sold for taxes and bought it himself, he was held as a trustee, although the relation of principal and agent had ceased.<sup>4</sup> In some cases he may inno-

<sup>1</sup> *Lees v. Nuttall*, 1 R. & M. 53; *Taml.* 282; *Church v. Marine Ins. Co.* 1 Mason, 341; *Crowe v. Ballard*, 3 Bro. Ch. 120; *Barker v. Ins. Co.* 2 Mason, 369; *Massey v. Davies*, 2 Ves. Jr. 318; *Woodhouse v. Meredith*, 1 J. & W. 204; *Purcell v. Macnamara*, 14 Ves. 91; *Wott v. Grove*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 492; *Lowther v. Lowther*, 13 Ves. 102; *Green v. Winter*, 1 John. Ch. 27; *Morret v. Paske*, 2 Atk. 53; *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 246; *Parkist v. Alexander*, 1 John. Ch. 394; *Gray v. Mansfield*, 1 Ves. 379; *Belt*, Suppl. 167; *Fox v. Mackreth*, 2 Bro. Ch. 400; 2 Cox, 320; 1 Lead. Ca. Eq. 92, and notes; *Dennis v. McCoy*, 32 Ill. 429; *Safford v. Hinds*, 39 Barb. 625; *Squire's App.* 70 Penn. St. 268.

<sup>2</sup> *Reed v. Warner*, 5 Paige, 650; *Sweet v. Jacocks*, 6 Paige, 355; *Lees v. Nuttall*, 1 R. & M. 53; *Torrey v. Bank of Orleans*, 6 Paige, 650; *Greenfield's Est.* 2 Harris, 489; *Sheriff v. Neal*, 6 Watts, 534; *Plumer v. Reed*, 2 Wright, 46; *Hoge v. Hoge*, 1 Watts, 163; *Swartz v. Swartz*, 4 Barr, 353; *Harrold v. Lane*, 3 P. F. Smith, 268; *Jenkins v. Eldredge*, 3 Story, 181; *Morris v. Nixon*, 1 How. 118; *Seichrist's App.* 16 P. F. Smith, 237; *Squire's App.* 20 P. F. Smith, 268.

<sup>3</sup> *Gillett v. Peppercorne*, 3 Beay. 78; *Taylor v. Salmon*, 2 Mee. & Comp. 139; 4 M. & C. 139; *Voorhees v. Church*, 8 Barb. 136; *Van Epps v. Van Epps*, 9 Paige, 237; *Torrey v. Bank, &c.*, 9 Paige, 649; *Cram v. Mitchell*, 1 Sandf. 251; *Dobson v. Racey*, 3 Sandf. 61; *Reed v. Norris*, 2 M. & Cr. 361; *Ringo v. Binns*, 10 Pet. 269; *Farnham v. Brooks*, 9 Pick. 212.

<sup>4</sup> *Morris v. Joseph*, 1 West Va. 256.

cently purchase of his principal, but if he conceals himself and acts through another, either in purchasing from, or selling to his principal, he may be held as a trustee, or the contract may be entirely avoided; <sup>1</sup> or if he accepts any benefits in conducting the business of his principal, he will hold them in trust for him, <sup>2</sup> or if he makes use of his position in any way to obtain a title to himself. <sup>3</sup> If he takes a conveyance in his own name, he is a trustee *ex maleficio*. <sup>4</sup>

§ 207. The directors of corporations are trustees and agents of the shareholders and of the corporation, and the same rules are applied to the contracts of directors with the corporation, as are applied to the dealings of other parties holding a fiduciary relation to each other. <sup>5</sup> The directors are intrusted with the management of the property of the corporation for the best interests of all the members, and the directors are bound to execute their trust; nor must they allow their private inter-

<sup>1</sup> Winn v. Dillon, 27 Miss. 494; Lewis v. Hillman, 3 H. L. Cas. 629; Parkist v. Alexander, 1 John. Ch. 394; Sweet v. Jacocks, 6 Paige, 364; Bank of Orleans v. Torrey, 7 Hill, 260; 9 Paige, 653; Myer's App. 2 Barr, 463; Rankin v. Porter, 7 Watts, 387; Piatt v. Oliver, 2 McLean, 267; 3 How. 353; Church v. Ins. Co. 1 Mason, 341; Teakle v. Barley, 2 Brock. 44; Oldham v. Jones, 5 B. Mon. 467; Banks v. Judah, 8 Conn. 146; Copeland v. Ins. Co. 6 Pick. 198; McGregor v. Gardner, 14 Io. 326; Clark v. Lee, 14 Io. 425.

<sup>2</sup> Bailey v. Watkins, Sug. Law of Prop. 726; Gaskell v. Chambers, 26 Beav. 360.

<sup>3</sup> Smith v. Wright, 49 Ill. 403.

<sup>4</sup> Squire's App. 70 Penn. St. 268.

<sup>5</sup> Gaskell v. Chambers, 26 Beav. 360; Great Luxembourg R. Co. v. Magnay, 586; *Ex parte* Bennett, 18 Beav. 339; Cumberland Coal Co. v. Hoffman Steam Coal Co. 18 Md. 456; Cumberland Coal Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553; 25 Md. 117; Aberdeen R. Co. v. Blaikie, 1 McQueen, 461; Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 544; Hodges v. New Eng. Screw Co. 1 R. I. 321; York & North Midland R. Co. v. Hudson, 16 Beav. 485; 19 Eng. L. & Eq. 365; Benson v. Hawthorne, 6 Y. & Col. 326; Verplanck v. Ins. Co. 1 Edw. Ch. 84; Percy v. Milladon, 3 La. 568; Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige, 222; Murray v. Vanderbilt, 39 Barb. 237; Flint, &c. R.R. Co. 14 Mich. 477; European & N. Am. Railw. Co. v. Poor, 59 Me. 277; Scott v. Depeyster, 1 Edw. Ch. 513; Butts v. Wood, 38 Barb. 188; Ashurst's App. 60 Penn. St. 290; Drury v. Cross, 7 Wall. 299.

ests to interfere with the duties of the trust that they have assumed. It is said that the contracts of trustees are of two classes. One class consists of contracts made by trustees with themselves, or with a board of trustees or directors of which they are members. These contracts are void from the fact that no man can contract with himself. If, therefore, a board of directors should convey all the property of a corporation to themselves, the conveyance would be void, without any inquiry into its fairness, or whether it was beneficial to the corporation or not. And the same rule applies if a board of directors convey the property of a corporation, or any part of it, to one of their number, he being one of the trustees negotiating a contract with himself.<sup>1</sup> And the same rule was applied where the trustees of one corporation, being the trustees of another corporation, conveyed the property of the one corporation to another, although there was a decree of court.<sup>2</sup> The other class of contracts is where a trustee contracts with the *cestui que trust*, or a third person. These contracts are not void; as where a director makes a purchase of property from the corporation itself, acting independently of its directors, the contract is not void; but the same rules apply that apply to other trustees purchasing of the *cestui que trust*: the burden is upon the trustee to vindicate the transaction from all suspicion.<sup>3</sup> And so all advantages, all purchases, all sales, and all sums of money received by directors in dealing with the property of the corporation, are made and received by them as trustees of the corporation, and they must account for all such moneys, or advantages received by them by reason of their position as trustees.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Cumberland Coal Co. v. Sherman*, 30 Barb. 563; *Ogden v. Murray*, 39 N. Y. 202; *Bliss v. Matteson*, 45 N. Y. 22; *Buffalo, &c. R.R. Co. v. Lampson*, 47 Barb. 533; *Imperial Mer. Cred. Ass'n v. Coleman*, L. R. 6 Ch. 565.

<sup>2</sup> *St. James Church v. Church of the Redeemer*, 45 Barb. 356.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*; *Beeson v. Beeson*, 9 Penn. St. 280.

<sup>4</sup> *Gaskell v. Chambers*, 26 Beav. 360; *Bowers v. City of Toronto*, 11 Moore, P. C. Cas. 463; *Ex parte Hill*, 32 L. J. Ch. 154.

§ 208. Again, if the parents, relations, agents, or friends of young persons hold out inducements of marriage by representing the amount of property that will come to one or the other of the parties; or, if they hold out pecuniary considerations to induce the marriage, and if the marriage and a marriage settlement take place upon the faith of such representations and inducements, the persons making them will be bound to make them good: if the persons making the representations and holding out the inducements have the property referred to in their hands or under their control, a court of equity will construe them into trustees of such property for the parties to whom the inducements were held out; and the court will compel them to execute the trust by making good the representations or inducements, if they are of such a character that a party entering into a marriage might reasonably have relied upon them.<sup>1</sup> If, however, a person states his intention to confer property upon one of the parties to a marriage, as that he has made his will giving a certain estate to one of the parties, and that he does not know any reason, or have any intention of altering it, but at the same time refuses to make any contract or agreement, or to be bound in any way not to alter his will, equity will not compel the execution of such a representation or intention; and the estate named cannot be affected by a constructive trust in favor of the party to the marriage, in case the will is afterwards altered, and the estate is given to some other person.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Hamersley v. De Biel*, 12 Cl. & Fin. 45; *Downes v. Jennings*, 32 Beav. 290; *Hunt v. Mathews*, 1 Vern. 408; *Walford v. Gray*, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 106, 403; *Jordan v. Money*, 5 H. L. Cas. 185; 8 Jur. (N. S.) 281; *Caton v. Caton*, L. R. 2 H. L. 127; *Coverdale v. Eastwood*, L. R. 15 Eq. 122; *Saunders v. Cramer*, 3 Dr. & War. 87; *Moorhouse v. Calvin*, 32 Beav. 1; *Laver v. Fielder*, 15 Beav. 341; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 268-272.

<sup>2</sup> *Maunsell v. Hedges*, 4 H. L. Cas. 1039; 1 Lead. Ca. Eq. 782; *Kay v. Crook*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 407; *Stroughill v. Gulliver*, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 700; *Randall v. Morgan*, 12 Ves. 67; *De Biel v. Thompson*, 3 Beav. 469, 475, 1 Jon. & La. 539, 569.

§ 209. These rules apply to every kind of fiduciary relation. The principle is the same in all of them. Assignees of bankrupt or insolvent estates are subject to the same rules, whether they are appointed by courts and by operation of law, or by voluntary assignments, or by deeds of trust for creditors.<sup>1</sup> So the solicitors of a bankrupt cannot purchase his property. Committees or guardians of a lunatic cannot obtain the ownership of the property,<sup>2</sup> nor can the directors, trustees, or governors of a charity so deal with the funds of the charity, or take leases of the charity lands, as to make a profit to themselves.<sup>3</sup> And so of partners and joint contractors, or purchasers and receivers. In all these cases the fiduciary must account for all the trust property that comes to his hands, whether by purchase or otherwise, and for all profits which may come to him by dealing with such property, and even for all bonuses or gratuities given to him by strangers for contracts made with them in relation to the trust property.<sup>4</sup>

§ 210. But equity goes even further than this. It not only watches over these defined relations of parties, but it scrutinizes the undefined relations of friendly habits of intercourse, personal reliance, and confidential advice.<sup>5</sup> It is well known that habits of kindness, confidence, and trust grow between

<sup>1</sup> *Ex parte Hughes*, 6 Ves. 617; *Morse v. Royal*, 12 Ves. 372; *Ex parte Morgan*, 12 Ves. 6; *Ex parte Lacey*, 6 Ves. 625; *Ex parte Reynolds*, 5 Ves. 707; *Ex parte Bennett*, 10 Ves. 381; *Campbell v. McLain*, 23 Leg. Intel. 26, Phila.; *Fisk v. Sarber*, 6 W. & S. 18; *Beeson v. Beeson*, 9 Barr, 284; *Dorsey v. Dorsey*, 3 H. & J. 410; *Chapin v. Weed*, 1 Clark, 264; *Saltmarsh v. Beene*, 4 Porter, 283; *Harrison v. Mocks*, 10 Ala. 185; *Wade v. Harper*, 3 Yerg. 383.

<sup>2</sup> *Wright v. Proud*, 13 Ves. 136; *Campbell v. McLain*, 51 Penn. St. 200.

<sup>3</sup> *Attorney-General v. Clarendon*, 17 Ves. 500.

<sup>4</sup> *Bailey v. Watkins*, Sug. Law of Prop. 726; *Parsball's App.* 65 Penn. St. 233; *Swissholm's App.* 56 Penn. St. 475; *King v. Wise*, 43 Cal. 628; *Carr v. Houser*, 46 Ga. 477.

<sup>5</sup> *Hunter v. Atkins*, 3 M. & K. 140; *James v. Holmes*, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 553, 732; *Falk v. Turner*, 101 Mass. 194.

neighbors and friends; and if advantage is taken of such relations to obtain an unfair bargain, equity will set it aside or convert the offending party into a trustee.<sup>1</sup> Of course no rules can be laid down by which to judge all such cases; for every case must of necessity depend upon its own facts.<sup>2</sup> Nor will a gift or sale be set aside merely because it is to a confidential friend or adviser, even though it is made by an old and infirm person, or by one of weak mind; but if there is any proof of any superadded concealment, misrepresentation, or contrivance, or any art by which the party was thrown off his guard, or unduly influenced by his trust and confidence in, or partiality for a supposed friend, equity will interpose and correct the wrong.<sup>3</sup> Dealings of ship-owners with their masters,<sup>4</sup> of parishioners with their clergymen,<sup>5</sup> of medical advisers with their patients,<sup>6</sup> of friends and neighbors who by their situation and habits of intercourse have obtained the confidence of each other,<sup>7</sup> and of a man and woman living together as husband and wife,<sup>8</sup> come within this rule. And so the relation of landlord and tenant, partner and partner, principal and surety, and tenants in common may create such influences of trust and confidence that courts of equity will construe a trust to arise out of their contracts, or will decree such contracts to be set aside.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*; *Dent v. Bennett*, 4 M. & Cr. 277; *Smith v. Kay*, 7 H. L. Cas. 750.

<sup>2</sup> *Hunter v. Atkins*, 3 M. & K. 140.

<sup>3</sup> *Dent v. Bennett*, 7 Sim. 539; 4 M. & C. 269; *Huguenin v. Baseley*, 14 Ves. 273; *Gibson v. Russell*, 2 N. C. C. 104; *Griffiths v. Robins*, 3 Mad. 191; *Popham v. Brooke*, 5 Russ. 8; *Maul v. Reder*, 51 Penn. St. 377; *Lengenfitter v. Ritching*, 58 Penn. St. 487.

<sup>4</sup> *Shallcross v. Oldham*, 2 John. & H. 609.

<sup>5</sup> *Greenfield's Estate*, 24 Penn. St. 232; *Scott v. Thompson*, 21 Io. 599.

<sup>6</sup> *Pratt v. Barker*, 1 Sim. 1; 4 Russ. 507; *Crisspell v. Dubois*, 4 Barb. 393; *Billing v. Southee*, 10 Eng. L. & Eq. 37.

<sup>7</sup> *Hunter v. Atkins*, 3 M. & K. 113; *Greenfield's Estate*, 14 Penn. St. 489; *Cooke v. Lamotte*, 15 Beav. 234; *Smith v. Kay*, 7 H. L. Cas. 750.

<sup>8</sup> *James v. Holmes*, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 553, 732; 4 De G., F. & J. 470.

<sup>9</sup> *Maddeford v. Austwick*, 1 Sim. 89; *Farnham v. Brooks*, 9 Pick. 212; *Oliver v. Court*, 8 Price, 127; *Griffiths v. Robins*, 3 Mad. 191; *People v.*

§ 211. So property obtained by one through the fraudulent practices of a third person will be held under a constructive trust for the person defrauded, though the person receiving the benefit is innocent of collusion. If such person accepts the property, he adopts the means by which it was procured ; or, as Lord Ch. Justice Wilmot said, " Let the hand receiving the gift be ever so chaste, yet if it comes through a polluted channel, the obligation of restitution will follow it."<sup>1</sup> This principle of course cannot prevail against a purchaser in good faith for a valuable consideration, and without notice of any fraudulent influence.

§ 212. So a contract intended to defraud third persons, who are not parties to it, will be set aside, or a trust will be declared for such third persons. Thus if property is conveyed by a debtor for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, the conveyance is void at law, and in some cases equity will construe it to create a trust for the creditors.<sup>2</sup> And so if in an arrangement and composition of creditors with the debtor, one of them secretly obtains an extra advantage for executing the composition deed, he will be converted into a trustee by reason of the fraud, and the agreement will be null and void.<sup>3</sup>

Jansen, 7 John. 332 ; 2 John. 554 ; Dawson v. Lawes, Kay, 280 ; Campbell v. Moulton, 30 Vt. 667 ; Boulton v. Stubbs, 18 Ves. 23 ; *Ex parte* Rushworth, 10 Ves. 409 ; Hayes v. Ward, 4 John. Ch. 123 ; Mayhew v. Crickett, 2 Swanst. 186 ; Keller v. Auble, 58 Penn. St. 412 ; Mandeville v. Solomon, 33 Cal. 38 ; Duff v. Wilson, 72 Penn. St. 442.

<sup>1</sup> Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. 627 ; Wilm. 58, 64 ; Luttrell v. Olmius, cited 11 Ves. 638 ; 14 Ves. 290 ; Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 289 ; Graves v. Spier, 58 Barb. 349 ; Newton v. Porter, 5 Lansing, 417. But see Dixon v. Caldwell, 15 Ohio, 412.

<sup>2</sup> Loomis v. Lift, 16 Barb. 543 ; Jones v. Reeder, 22 Ind. 111. See 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 350-381.

<sup>3</sup> Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. 156 ; 15 Ves. 52 ; Mann v. Darlington, 15 Penn. St. 310 ; Case v. Gerrish, 15 Pick. 50 ; Ramsdell v. Edgerton, 8 Met. 227 ; Lothrop v. King, 8 Cush. 382 ; Partridge v. Messer, 14 Gray, 180 ; Kahn v. Gunherts, 9 Ind. 430 ; Spooner v. Whiston, 8 Moore, 580 ; Mallalieu v. Hodgson, 16 Ad. & El. N. R. 689-715 ; Turner v. Hoole,

§ 213. If a man or woman on the point of marriage privately convey away his or her property for the purpose of depriving the intended husband or wife of the legal rights and benefits arising from such marriage, equity will avoid such conveyance or compel the person taking it to hold the property in trust, or subject to the rights of the defrauded husband or wife.<sup>1</sup> But such conveyance is not void at law unless there is an actual fraud.<sup>2</sup> Nor will such conveyance be avoided, if made for a good consideration,<sup>3</sup> or for a valuable consideration;<sup>4</sup> or with the knowledge or concurrence of the other party, although an infant;<sup>5</sup> and the party alleging fraud must

*Dowl. & Ry. N. P.* 27; *Smith v. Cuff*, 6 M. & S. 160; *Horton v. Riley*, 11 M. & W. 492; *Alsager v. Spalding*, 6 Scott, 204; *Arnold*, 181; 4 Bing. N. C. 407; *Leicester v. Rose*, 4 East, 380; *Howden v. Haight*, 11 Ad. & El. 1038; *Fawcett v. Gee*, 3 Anst. 910; *Breck v. Cole*, 4 Sandf. 83; *Knight v. Hunt*, 5 Bing. 433; *Bliss v. Matteson*, 45 N. Y. 24.

<sup>1</sup> *Hunt v. Mathews*, 1 Vern. 408; *England v. Downes*, 2 Beav. 522; *Ball v. Montgomery*, 2 Ves. Jr. 191; *Strathmore v. Bowes*, 2 Bro. Ch. 345; 2 Cox, 485; 1 Ves. Jr. 22; *Goddard v. Snow*, 1 Russ. 485; *Tucker v. Andrews*, 13 Me. 124; *Waller v. Armistead*, 2 Leigh, 11; *Logan v. Simmons*, 3 Ired. Eq. 487; *Terry v. Hopkins*, 1 Hill, Eq. 1; *Duncan's App.* 43 Penn. St. 67; *Wrigley v. Swainson*, 3 De G. & Sm. 458; *Manes v. Durant*, 2 Rich. Eq. 404; *McAfee v. Ferguson*, 9 Mon. 495; *Linker v. Smith*, 4 Wash. 224; *Ramsay v. Joyce*, 1 McMull. Eq. 237; *Williams v. Carle*, 2 Stockt. Ch. 543; *Lewellin v. Cobbald*, 1 Sm. & Gif. 376; *Cheshire v. Payne*, 16 B. Mon. 618; *Carleton v. Dorset*, 2 Vern. 17; 2 Cox, 63; *McDonnell v. Hesilridge*, 16 Beav. 346; *Howard v. Hooker*, 2 Ch. R. 81; *St. George v. Wake*, 1 M. & K. 622; *Taylor v. Pugh*, 1 Hare, 608; *Ashton v. McDougall*, 5 Beav. 56; *Griggs v. Staples*, 2 De G. & Sm. 572; *Smith v. Smith*, 2 Halst. Ch. 515; *Petty v. Petty*, 4 B. Mon. 215; *Belt v. Ferguson*, 3 Grant, 289.

<sup>2</sup> *Richards v. Lewis*, 11 C. B. 1035; *Logan v. Simmons*, 1 Dev. & Bat. Law, 13.

<sup>3</sup> *De Manville v. Crompton*, 1 V. & B. 354; *England v. Downes*, 2 Beav. 522; *Smith v. Smith*, 2 Halst. Ch. 515; *Tucker v. Andrews*, 13 Me. 124; *Manes v. Durant*, 2 Rich. Eq. 404; *Terry v. Hopkins*, 1 Hill, Eq. 1; *Hunt v. Mathews*, 1 Vern. 408; *King v. Cotton*, 2 P. Wms. 674; Mos. 259.

<sup>4</sup> *Blanchet v. Foster*, 2 Ves. 264. But if the consideration is fraudulently stated in the deed, it will make the conveyance fraudulent. *Lewellin v. Cobbald*, 1 Sm. & Gif. 376.

<sup>5</sup> *St. George v. Wake*, 1 M. & K. 610; *McClure v. Miller*, 1 Bail. Eq.



prove it to the satisfaction of the court.<sup>1</sup> For the same reasons a conveyance by a husband during the pendency of a divorce suit on the part of his wife, in order to avoid the payment of alimony, will be held to be fraudulent and void.<sup>2</sup> If an intended husband has no knowledge of the particular property conveyed, and the negotiations for the marriage have no reference to that particular property, its conveyance is not fraudulent, unless it was actually intended as a fraud upon him,<sup>3</sup> and so there must be an intent to defraud the individual who is afterwards married; for if a deed is made to defraud another individual who is not married, but a marriage afterwards takes place with a person, not in contemplation at the time, there is no fraud.<sup>4</sup> If no notice of the conveyance is shown to have been given, it will be presumed that no notice was had;<sup>5</sup> and it is always a question of fact upon the whole transaction whether the conveyance is fraudulent.<sup>6</sup> If, however, the property is of that character that the husband could obtain no right over it by the marriage, the conveyance of it by the wife before marriage cannot be set aside.<sup>7</sup> In all

108; *Knottman v. Peyton*, 1 Speer's Eq. 46; *Terry v. Hopkins*, 1 Hill Eq. 1; *Cheshire v. Payne*, 16 B. Mon. 618; *Fletcher v. Ashley*, 6 Grat. 332; *Slocombe v. Glubb*, 2 Bro. Ch. 545.

<sup>1</sup> *St. George v. Wake*, 1 M. & K. 610; *England v. Downes*, 2 Beav. 522.

<sup>2</sup> *Blenkinsop v. Blenkinsop*, 1 De G., M. & G. 495; *Krupp v. Scholl*, 10 Penn. St. 193.

<sup>3</sup> *Thomas v. Williams*, Mos. 177; *De Manville v. Crompton*, 1 V. & B. 354; *St. George v. Wake*, 1 M. & K. 622; and see *Goddard v. Snow*, 1 Russ. 485.

<sup>4</sup> *Strathmore v. Bowes*, 1 Ves. Jr. 22; 2 Bro. Ch. 345; 2 Cox, 28; 6 Bro. P. C. 427; 1 Lead. Ca. Eq. 325; *England v. Downes*, 2 Beav. 522; *Cheshire v. Payne*, 16 B. Mon. 618; *Wilson v. Daniel*, 13 B. Mon. 351.

<sup>5</sup> *Cole v. O'Neill*, 3 Md. 174; *Wrigley v. Swainson*, 3 De G. & Sm. 458.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* Whether the deed on record is notice or not, is a question. *Cole v. O'Neill*, 3 Md. 174.

antenuptial contracts there must be the utmost good faith between the parties, and a grossly disproportionate settlement may be evidence of a fraudulent concealment.<sup>1</sup>

§ 214. There are certain purposes for which neither express law nor public policy will allow parties to contract; thus, the law will not permit contracts for the procuring of marriages,<sup>2</sup> or of public offices,<sup>3</sup> or of legislation,<sup>4</sup> or of illicit cohabitation.<sup>5</sup> If, therefore, such contracts are entered into, equity will enjoin their performance.<sup>6</sup> And the party creating the interest, although *in pari delicto*, may apply for an injunction. In such cases, the person applying must return any benefit that he may have received.<sup>7</sup> Such contracts are equally void at law, and if the parties are *in pari delicto*, the law will leave them where it finds them. If one party has advanced money upon an immoral or illegal contract, the law will give him no aid to recover it back. But equity will sometimes fasten a trust upon the conscience of the party who has received money or property

<sup>1</sup> Kline's Est. 64 Penn. St. 122.

<sup>2</sup> Drury v. Hook, 1 Vern. 412; Cole v. Gibson, 1 Ves. 507; Debenham v. Ox, 1 Ves. 277; Smith v. Aykwell, 3 Atk. 566; Smith v. Bruning, 2 Vern. 392; Williamson v. Gihon, 2 Sch. & L. 357; Roberts v. Roberts, 3 P. Wms. 76.

<sup>3</sup> Hartwell v. Hartwell, 4 Ves. 811; Morris v. McCulloch, Amb. 432; 2 Ed. 190; Writhingham v. Burgoyne, 2 Anst. 900; Harrington v. Duchattel, 1 Bro. Ch. 124.

<sup>4</sup> Robinson v. Cox, 9 Mod. 263; Walker v. Perkins, 3 Burr. 1568; 1 Bla. 517; Rex v. Inhabitants of Northwingfield, 1 B. & Ad. 912; Winebrinner v. Weiseger, 3 Monr. 35; Travinger v. McBurney, 5 Cow. 253; Cusack v. White, 3 Const. Ct. R. 284; Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 472; Pingry v. Washburn, 1 Aiken, 264; Grolick v. Ward, 5 Halst. 87; Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana, 366; Clippinger v. Hipbaugh, 3 W. & S. 315; Harris v. Roop, 10 Barb. 489; Sedgwick v. Stanton, 4 Kern. 289; Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152.

<sup>5</sup> Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railw. 16 How. 153.

<sup>6</sup> Robinson v. Gee, 1 Ves. 251; Gray v. Mathias, 5 Ves. 286; Franco v. Bolton, 3 Ves. 370.

<sup>7</sup> St. John v. St. John, 11 Ves. 535; Reynell v. Sprye, 1 De G., M. & G. 660.

under such contracts, and compel him to repay or reconvey it,<sup>1</sup> especially if the illegal purpose fails.<sup>2</sup>

§ 215. If at a sale of an estate of a debtor upon execution, any one announces, for the purpose of preventing competition, that he is bidding or purchasing for the debtor;<sup>3</sup> or if, upon the sale of the property of a deceased person, a bidder announces that he is purchasing for the benefit of children or heirs, or if at a mortgagee's sale a person announces that he is purchasing for the mortgagor, and thus prevents competition, the purchaser will be held to be a trustee for the benefit of the parties interested in the property.<sup>4</sup> So if any one professing to act for another purchases for himself, he will be held as a trustee.<sup>5</sup> But in such cases there must be some proof of fraud and deceit practised by the purchaser; the mere breach of a parol agreement will not create a constructive trust in such cases;<sup>6</sup> and if the conduct of the purchaser is not fraudulent and produces no injury, a trust is not raised.<sup>7</sup> If the parties for whom the

<sup>1</sup> *Smith v. Bruning*, 2 Vern. 302; *Morris v. McCulloch*, Amb. 432; *Ownes v. Ownes*, 8 C. E. Green, 60.

<sup>2</sup> *Symes v. Hughes*, L. R. 9 Eq. 475.

<sup>3</sup> *Kinard v. Hiers*, 2 Rich. Eq. 423; *Lloyd v. Currin*, 3 Humph. 462; *Seichrist's App.* 66 Penn. St. 237; *Miller v. Antle*, 2 Bush, 407; *Brannin v. Brannin*, 18 N. J. Ch. 282; *Crutcher v. Hord*, 4 Bush, 360; *Roach v. Hudson*, 8 Bush, 410; *Brown v. Lynch*, 1 Paige, 147.

<sup>4</sup> *Brown v. Dysinger*, 1 Rawle, 408; *Kellum v. Smith*, 9 Casey, 158; *Sheriff v. Neal*, 6 Watts, 534; *Sharp v. Long*, 4 Casey, 443; *Morey v. Herrick*, 6 Harris, 123; *Williard v. Williard*, 6 P. F. Smith, 119; *Robertson v. Robertson*, 9 Watts, 32; *Plumer v. Reed*, 2 Wright, 46; *Beagle v. Wentz*, 5 P. F. Smith, 369; *Kisler v. Kisler*, 2 Watts, 323; *McCaskey v. Graff*, 11 Harris, 321; *Abbey v. Dewey*, 1 Casey, 114; *McRarey v. Huff*, 32 Ga. 681; *Ryan v. Dox*, 34 N. Y. 307; *Mackay v. Martin*, 26 Tex. 225; *Dennis v. McCagg*, 32 Ill. 429; *Cook v. Cook*, 69 Penn. St. 443; *Jenckes v. Cook*, 9 R. I. 520.

<sup>5</sup> *Rothwell v. Dawes*, 2 Black (U. S.), 613; *O'Neil v. Hamilton*, 44 Penn. St. 18; *Coe v. Bradley*, 49 Me. 388; *Baylis v. Baxter*, 22 Col. 175; *Adams v. Bradley*, 12 Mich. 346; *Drennen v. Walker*, 21 Ark. 539.

<sup>6</sup> *Minott v. Mitchell*, 30 Ind. 288.

<sup>7</sup> *Taylor v. Boardman*, 24 Mich. 287.

purchaser pretends to buy have no interest in the property, they cannot establish a trust.<sup>1</sup>

§ 216. Again, if a testator make a devise, or a grantor a conveyance, upon a secret trust in fraud of the law, or for a purpose forbidden by law, or contrary to public policy, those interested may bring a bill alleging the secret trust, and the fraud upon the law, and the persons to whom the devise or conveyance was made must answer, notwithstanding the statute of frauds.<sup>2</sup> If such fraudulent trust appear by the answer,<sup>3</sup> or by any clear and explicit proof in opposition to the answer,<sup>4</sup> a trust will be declared and enforced in favor of those interested in the estate, or in the event of the failure of the illegal trust. In all cases of actual fraud parol evidence is admissible, otherwise a fraud put in writing would always escape.<sup>4</sup>

§ 217. Another large class of constructive trusts arises from purchases or conveyances from trustees, or other persons holding a fiduciary relation to property. It is a universal rule, that if a man purchases property of a trustee, with notice of the trust, he shall be charged with the same trust, in respect to the property, as the trustee from whom he purchased.<sup>5</sup> And

<sup>1</sup> *Rogers v. Simmons*, 58 Ill. 76; *Walter v. Klock*, 55 Ill. 82.

<sup>2</sup> *Muckleston v. Brown*, 6 Ves. 52; *Podmore v. Gunning*, 7 Sim. 644; *Chamberlain v. Agar*, 2 V. & B. 259; *Stickland v. Aldridge*, 9 Ves. 516; *Edwards v. Pike*, 1 Ed. 267; *Walgrave v. Tebbs*, 2 K. & J. 313; *Robinson v. King*, 6 Ga. 550.

<sup>3</sup> *Cottingham v. Fletcher*, 2 Atk. 155; *Bozon v. Statham*, 1 Ed. 508; *Bishop v. Talbot*, cited 6 Ves. 60; *Adlington v. Cann*, 3 Atk. 141; *Paine v. Hall*, 18 Ves. 473; 1 Ed. 515, n. (a).

<sup>4</sup> *How v. Camp*, Walk. Ch. 427; *Stickland v. Aldridge*, 9 Ves. 520; *Pring v. Pring*, 2 Vern. 99.

<sup>5</sup> *Le Neve v. Le Neve*, Amb. 436; 3 Atk. 646; 1 Ves. 64; 2 Lead. Ca. Eq. 23 and notes; *Merry v. Abney*, 1 Ch. Ca. 38; *Potter v. Sanders*, 6 Hare, 1; *Kennedy v. Daly*, 1 Sch. & L. 355; *Crofton v. Ormsby*, 2 Sch. & L. 583; *Ferras v. Cherry*, 2 Vern. 384; *Daniels v. Davidson*, 16 Ves. 249; *Brooke v. Bulkeley*, 2 Ves. 498; *Jennings v. Moore*, 2 Vern. 609; 2 Bro. P. C. 278; *Birch v. Ellames*, 2 Anst. 427; *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves.

even if he pays a valuable consideration, with notice of the equitable rights of a third person, he shall hold the property subject to the equitable interests of such person.<sup>1</sup> Of course, a mere *volunteer*, or person who takes the property without paying a valuable consideration, will hold it charged with all the trusts to which it is subject, *whether he have notice or not*; for in such case no wrong or pecuniary loss can fall upon him, in compelling him to execute the trust to which the property that came to him without consideration was subject. Such purchases from trustees, whether for value or not, are fraudulent, and equity will follow the property and fasten the original trust upon it for the security of the *cestui que trust*, or other person holding an equitable interest.<sup>2</sup> The rule applies not only to express trusts, or those expressly declared by written instruments, but it applies to constructive trusts, or those trusts that arise from fraud. Thus, if a party procures a conveyance of property from another by fraud, he shall be held to be a constructive trustee; and, if he sells such property to a third person who has full knowledge or notice of the fraud, such third person will be equally held as a trustee.<sup>3</sup> After a purchase is

349; *Grant v. Mills*, 2 V. & B. 306; *Saunders v. Dehew*, 2 Vern. 271; *Mansell v. Mansell*, 2 P. Wms. 681; *Wigg v. Wigg*, 1 Atk. 382; *Dunbar v. Tredennick*, 2 B. & B. 319; *Pawlett v. Att'y-Gen.* Hardr. 465; *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 Ed. 195; *Adair v. Shaw*, 1 Sch. & L. 262; *Mead v. Orrery*, 3 Atk. 238; *Bovey v. Smith*, 1 Vern. 149; *Phayre v. Peree*, 3 Dow, 129; *Wormley v. Wormley*, 8 Wheat. 421; *Oliver v. Piatt*, 3 How. 333; *Caldwell v. Carrington*, 9 Peters, 86; *Wright v. Dame*, 22 Pick. 55; *Clarke v. Hackerthorn*, 3 Yeates, 269; *Peebles v. Reading*, 8 S. & R. 495; *Reed v. Dickey*, 2 Watts, 459; *Hood v. Fahnestock*, 1 Barr, 470; *Wilkins v. Anderson*, 1 Jones, 399; *Denn v. McKnight*, 6 Halst. 385; *Murray v. Ballou*, 1 John. Ch. 566; *Bailey v. Wilson*, 1 Dev. & Bat. 182; *Massey v. McIlwaine*, 2 Hill, Eq. 426; *Benzien v. Lenoir*, 1 Car. L. R. 504; *Pugh v. Bell*, 1 J. J. Marsh. 403; *Liggett v. Wall*, 2 A. K. Marsh. 149; *Truesdell v. Calloway*, 6 Miss. 605; *Suydam v. Martin*, *Wright*, 384; *Winged v. Lefebury*, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 32; *Taylor v. Stibbert*, 2 Ves. Jr. 437; *Case v. James*, 29 Beav. 512; *Cary v. Eyre*, 1 De G., J. & S. 149; *Jones v. Shaddock*, 41 Ala. 362; *Ryan v. Doyle*, 31 Io. 53; *Smith v. Walter*, 49 Mo. 250.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*; *Lyford v. Thurston*, 16 N. H. 399.

<sup>3</sup> *Pye v. George*, 1 P. Wms. 128; *Saunders v. Dehew*, 2 Vern. 271;

once made from a trustee with notice of the trust, the person taking the title cannot bar the interest of the *cestui que trust* by buying in other interests, or by levying a fine or suffering a recovery, obtaining a judgment, or by procuring the assignment to himself of outstanding mortgages or terms.<sup>1</sup> Having once taken with notice of the trust, he is a trustee in law, and a trustee cannot defeat the interests of his *cestui que trust*; on the contrary, all the interest that the trustee, or constructive trustee, shall thus buy in, will inure to the benefit of the title for the *cestui que trust*.<sup>2</sup>

§ 218. Of course, the opposite proposition is also true, that a purchaser for a valuable consideration without actual or constructive notice of the trust, holds the property discharged of the interest of the *cestui que trust*. It is thus stated on great authority: "A purchaser, *bona fide* without notice of any defect in his title at the time he made the purchase, may buy in a statute or mortgage, or any other incumbrance, and if he can defend himself at law by any such incumbrance bought in, his adversary shall never be aided in a court of equity for setting aside such incumbrance, for *Equity will not disarm a purchaser, but assist him*; and precedents of this nature are very ancient and numerous; viz., where the court hath refused to give any assistance against a purchaser, either to an heir, or to a widow, or to the fatherless, or to creditors, or even to one purchaser against another." And it may be added that nothing is clearer than that a purchaser for valuable consideration without notice of a prior equitable right, obtaining the *legal* estate at the time of his purchase, is entitled to priority in equity as well as at law, according to the well known maxim that *where equities are equal the law shall*

Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms. 681; Smith v. Bowen, 35 N. Y. 83; Lyons v. Bodenhamer, 7 Kans. 455.

<sup>1</sup> Moloney v. Kernan, 2 Dr. & W. 31; Brook v. Bulkeley, 2 Ves. 498.

<sup>2</sup> Bovey v. Smith, 1 Vern. 145; Kennedy v. Daly, 1 Sch. & L. 37.

*prevail*.<sup>1</sup> But while a purchaser for value without notice may lay hold upon any plank to save himself, he cannot, after notice of the trust, take any conveyances from the trustee of outstanding legal interests; for that is a breach of the trust, and he cannot commit a breach of the trust to protect himself.<sup>2</sup> But a purchase of an equitable interest only, although for a valuable consideration and without notice, cannot prevail against a legal title. In law the legal title must always prevail, and in equity the legal title will prevail if the equities are equal.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Bassett v. Nosworthy*, Ca. t. Finch, 102; 2 Lead. Ca. Eq. 1 & notes; *Jerrard v. Saunders*, 2 Ves. Jr. 457; *Goleborn v. Alcock*, 2 Sim. 552; *Sanders v. Deligne*, Freem. 123; *Fagg's Case*, 1 Vern. 52; 1 Ch. Ca. 68; *Harcourt v. Knowel*, 2 Vern. 159; *Siddon v. Charnells*, Bunb. 298; *Jones v. Powles*, 3 M. & K. 581; *Willoughby v. Willoughby*, 1 T. R. 763; *Blake v. Hungerford*, Pr. Ch. 158; *Charlton v. Low*, 3 P. Wms. 328; *Ex parte Knott*, 11 Ves. 609; *Shine v. Gough*, 1 B. & B. 436; *Bowen v. Evans*, 1 Jon. & La. 264; *Boone v. Chiles*, 10 Pet. 177; *Watson v. Le Roy*, 6 Barb. 485; *Walwyn v. Lee*, 9 Ves. 24; *Varick v. Briggs*, 6 Paige, 325; *Demarest v. Wynkoop*, 3 John. Ch. 147; *Dan v. McKnight*, 6 Halst. 385; *Howell v. Ashmore*, 1 Stockt. 82; *Heilner v. Imbrie*, 6 S. & R. 401; *Mundine v. Pitts*, 14 Ala. 84; *Tomkins v. Powell*, 6 Leigh, 576; *Woodruff v. Cook*, 1 Gill & J. 270; *Whittick v. Kane*, 1 Gill & J. 202; *High v. Batte*, 10 Yerg. 335; *Jones v. Zollicoffer*, 2 Taylor, 214; *Owings v. Mason*, 2 A. K. Marsh. 384; *Halstead v. Bank of Kentucky*, 4 J. J. Marsh. 554; *Blight v. Banks*, 6 Mon. 198; *Hughson v. Mandeville*, 4 Des. 87; *Goodtitle v. Cummings*, 8 Blackf. 179; *Maywood v. Lubcock*, 1 Bail. Eq. 382; *Brown v. Budd*, 2 Cart. 442; *Fletcher v. Peck*, 6 Cranch, 36; *Alexander v. Pendleton*, 8 Cranch, 462; *Vattier v. Hinds*, 7 Pet. 252; *Dana v. Newhall*, 13 Mass. 498; *Connecticut v. Bradish*, 14 Mass. 296; *Trull v. Bigelow*, 16 Mass. 406; *Boynton v. Rees*, 8 Pick. 29; *Gallatian v. Erwin*, Hopk. 48; 8 Cow. 36; *Bumpus v. Platner*, 1 John. Ch. 213; *Griffith v. Griffith*, 9 Paige, 315; *Mott v. Clark*, 9 Barr, 399; *Brackett v. Miller*, 4 W. & S. 102; *Filby v. Miller*, 1 Casey, 264; *Rutgers v. Kingsland*, 3 Halst. Ch. 178, 658; *Holmes v. Stout*, 3 Green, Ch. 492; *City Council v. Paige*, Spear, Ch. 159; *Lacy v. Wilson*, 4 Munf. 413; *Curtis v. Lanier*, 6 Munf. 42; *Dixon v. Caldwell*, 15 Ohio St. 412; *Dillaye v. Commercial Bank*, 51 N. Y. 345; *Carter v. Carter*, 3 K. & J. 639; *Sugd. V. & P.* 740.

<sup>2</sup> *Saunders v. Dehew*, 2 Vern. 271; Freem. 123; *Allen v. Knight*, 5 Hare, 272; *Terrett v. Crombie*, 6 Lansing, 82.

<sup>3</sup> *Snelgrove v. Snelgrove*, 4 Des. 274; *Daniel v. Hollingshead*, 16 Ga. 196; *Larrow v. Beam*, 10 Ohio, 148; *Jones v. Zollicoffer*, 2 Taylor, 214; *Brown v. Wood*, 6 Rich. Eq. 155; *Blake v. Heyward*, 1 Bail. Eq. 208;

§ 219. This protection of a *bona fide* purchaser for value without notice is clear and certain, but it is hedged about with great care. *It is said to be a shield to protect, and not a sword to attack.* It is surrounded with restrictions, so that it may not become a cloak for fraud. The defendant in a suit in equity must clearly and unequivocally swear in his answer that he is a purchaser for value without notice,<sup>1</sup> and he must set forth all the particulars of the purchase, and the title or pretended title of the person from whom he purchased.<sup>2</sup> He must show an actual conveyance and not merely an agreement for a conveyance;<sup>3</sup> and it must be shown that the consideration money named in the deed was paid in good faith. It is not enough that the consideration was secured to be paid; nor is a recital of payment in the deed sufficient: there must be an actual payment.<sup>4</sup> Then he must also make an explicit denial of notice of the title which is attempted to be set up. A denial of knowledge of the particular person who might assert such title is not sufficient;<sup>5</sup> notice must be positively

*Shirras v. Caig*, 7 Cranch, 48; *Jones v. Jones*, 8 Sim. 633; *Pensonnieau v. Bleakley*, 14 Ill. 15; *Boone v. Chiles*, 10 Pet. 177; *Kramer v. Arthurs*, 7 Barr, 165; *Wailes v. Cooper*, 24 Miss. 208; *Sergeant v. Ingersoll*, 7 Barr, 340; 3 *Harris*, 343; *Flagg v. Mann*, 2 Sumn. 486, 556; *Cottrell v. Hughes*, 15 C. B. 532; *Vattier v. Hinde*, 7 Pet. 252; *Parsons v. Jury*, 1 Yerg. 296; *Gallion v. McCaslin*, 1 Blackf. 91; *Marles v. Cooper*, 22 Miss. 208.

<sup>1</sup> *Sugd. V. & P.* 507; *Marshall v. Frank*, 8 Pr. Ch. 480; 1 *Anst.* 14; *Blacket v. Langlands*, Sel. Ca. Ch. 51; *Gilb.* 58.

<sup>2</sup> *Walwyn v. Lee*, 9 Ves. Jr. 26; *Story v. Winsor*, 3 P. Wms. 279; *Head v. Egerton*, 1 Vern. 246; *Trevanion v. Morse*, 3 Ves. 32, 226; *Amb.* 421; *Jackson v. Rowe*, 4 Russ. 514; *Lanesborough v. Kilmaine*, 2 Moll. 403; *Hughes v. Garth*, *Amb.* 421; *Page v. Lever*, 2 Ves. Jr. 450; *Dobson v. Leadheater*, 13 Ves. 230.

<sup>3</sup> *Head v. Egerton*, 1 P. Wms. 281; *Brandlyn v. Ord*, 1 *Atk.* 571.

<sup>4</sup> *Millard's Case*, *Freem.* 43; *Wagstaff v. Read*, 2 Ch. Ca. 156; *More v. Mayhow*, 1 Ch. Ca. 34; 2 *Freem.* 175; *Day v. Arundel*, *Hard.* 510; *Hardingham v. Nichols*, 3 *Atk.* 304; *Moloney v. Kernan*, 2 Dr. & War. 31; *Maitland v. Wilson*, 3 *Atk.* 814. But see *Parker v. Crittenden*, 37 Conn. 148.

<sup>5</sup> *Kelsal v. Bennett*, 1 *Atk.* 522; *Brompton v. Barker*, cited 2 Vern. 159, is not law.



and affirmatively denied, and not evasively or inferentially.<sup>1</sup> If particular instances or circumstances of notice or of fraud are alleged, there must be clear, special, and particular denials of each and every circumstance.<sup>2</sup> These stringent rules are necessary for the protection of the equitable interests of one person, where the legal title is in the hands of another.<sup>3</sup>

§ 220. These leading propositions are simple and plain enough, but difficulties frequently arise as to what is a valuable consideration, and whether a purchaser had notice of the equitable estate, and when and how he obtained it. It is well established that a conveyance, to be good against the equitable interest of a *cestui que trust*, must be for a *valuable* consideration, and that a conveyance for a *good* consideration, as for love and affection, is not sufficient.<sup>4</sup> But if the consideration is valuable, it need not be adequate: mere inadequacy of consideration will not defeat a purchase for a valuable consideration without notice; but gross inadequacy of a valuable consideration would be evidence affecting the good faith of the transaction.<sup>5</sup> Marriage is a valuable consideration for a conveyance; but, if a conveyance after marriage is made in pursuance of an agreement before marriage, it must be made clearly to appear.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 3 P. Wms. 244, n. (f.); *Bran v. Marlborough*, 2 P. Wms. 492 (6 Res.); *Hughes v. Garner*, 2 Y. & Col. Exch. Ca. 328.

<sup>2</sup> *Pennington v. Beechey*, 2 S. & S. 282; *Anon.* 2 Ch. Ca. 161; *Price v. Price*, 1 Vern. 185; *Hardman v. Ellames*, 5 Sim. 650; 2 M. & K. 732.

<sup>3</sup> *Alexander v. Pendleton*, 8 Cranch, 462; *Hunter v. Simrall*, 5 Litt. 62; *Boone v. Chiles*, 10 Pet. 177; *Bush v. Bush*, 3 Strob. Eq. 131; *Blight v. Bank*, 6 Mon. 698; *Halstead v. Bank of Kentucky*, 4 J. J. Marsh. 554; *Moore v. Clay*, 7 Ala. 142; *Pillow v. Shannon*, 3 Yerg. 308; *Nantz v. McPherson*, 7 Munf. 599; *Dillard v. Crocker*, 1 Spear, Eq. 20; *Vattier v. Hinde*, 7 Pet. 252; *Jackson v. Rowe*, 2 S. & S. 472; *Jones v. Powles*, 3 M. & K. 581.

<sup>4</sup> *Upshaw v. Hargrove*, 6 Sm. & M. 292; *Frost v. Beekman*, 1 John. Ch. 288; *Patten v. Moore*, 32 N. H. 382; *Boone v. Baines*, 23 Miss. 136; *Everts v. Agnes*, 4 Wis. 343; *Swan v. Ligan*, 1 McCord, Ch. 232.

<sup>5</sup> *More v. Mayhow*, 1 Ch. Ca. 34; *Wagstaff v. Read*, 2 Ch. Ca. 156; *Bullock v. Sadlier*, Amb. 764; *Mildmay v. Mildmay*, cited Amb. 767.

<sup>6</sup> *Harding v. Hardrett*, t. Finch, 9; *Lord Keeper v. Wyld*, 1 Vern. 139.

The general definition of a valuable consideration embraces not only some valuable thing or property given or transferred to another, but also some loss of property or right, or the forbearing of some legal right or remedy.<sup>1</sup>

§ 221. In order that one may claim protection as a *bona fide* purchaser, the money must have been actually paid and the conveyance taken before notice is received of the trust. If the money is secured, but not paid, notice of the trust will convert the purchaser into a trustee,<sup>2</sup> and so if the money is paid, but the conveyance is not executed, the weight of authority is that notice of the trust will destroy the protection of the purchaser.<sup>3</sup> It is held that the money must be wholly paid before notice.<sup>4</sup> This rule proceeds upon the ground, that, as the purchaser is taking the transfer of a title that defeats the equitable right of a third person, he shall be held to take such title subject to all the equities that attach to it at the time it passes. If, therefore, he pays no money at the time the title passes, he has no equity to set up against the equity of a third person, and if he has notice before he pays the money, he

<sup>1</sup> It is impossible to pursue this subject in all its details and distinctions in a work of this character without exceeding all reasonable limits. The cases will be found most industriously collected in the notes to *Basset v. Nosworthy*, 2 Lead. Ca. Eq. 103-109, and the distinctions and qualifications are fully discussed.

<sup>2</sup> *Tourville v. Naish*, 3 P. Wms. 387; *Story v. Winsor*, 2 Atk. 630; *More v. Mayhew*, 1 Ch. Ca. 34; *Jones v. Stanley*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 685; *High v. Batte*, 10 Yerg. 555; *Christie v. Bishop*, 1 Barb. Ch. 105; *Murray v. Ballou*, 1 John. Ch. 566; *Jackson v. Cadwell*, 1 Cow. 622; *Jewett v. Palmer*, 7 Cow. 65, 265; *Heatley v. Finster*, 2 John. Ch. 19; *Harris v. Norton*, 16 Barb. 264; *Patten v. Moore*, 32 N. H. 382; *McBee v. Loftes*, 1 Strob. Eq. 90; *Hunter v. Simrall*, 5 Lit. 62; *Palmer v. Williams*, 24 Mich. 333; *Blanchard v. Tyler*, 12 Mich. 339; *Stone v. Welling*, 14 Mich. 514; *Dixon v. Hill*, 5 Mich. 404; *Warner v. Whittaker*, 6 Mich. 133; *Thomas v. Stone*, Walk. Ch. 117; *Lewis v. Phillips*, 17 Ind. 108; *Rhodes v. Green*, 36 Ind. 10; *Dugan v. Vattier*, 3 Blackf. 245; *Perkinson v. Hanna*, 7 Blackf. 400. But see *Parker v. Crittenden*, 37 Conn. 148; 2 Dart, V. & P. 760.

<sup>3</sup> *Wigg v. Wigg*, 1 Atk. 384; 2 Sugd. V. & P. 274.

<sup>4</sup> *Wormley v. Wormley*, 8 Wheat. 421; *Wood v. Mann*, 1 Sumner, 506.

pays in his own wrong. And so if he has paid his money, but has not yet taken the title when he receives notice, he takes the title subject to all the equities that attach to it when the conveyance is actually made to him, as he then has a right to refuse the conveyance and to demand back his money.<sup>1</sup> In Pennsylvania, however, it is established that part-payment of the purchase-money before notice will give the purchaser an equity *pro tanto*.<sup>2</sup> So if a purchaser without notice make improvements on the land, not having paid the purchase-money in full, he will have an equitable lien on the land for the amount of his expenditures, although he has no defence to a bill to enforce the rights of the *cestui que trust*.<sup>3</sup> This is in analogy to the statutes that give a defendant in a real action a claim for improvements upon an estate, which he has made in ignorance of the title against him.

§ 222. The notice of the trust may be either to the purchaser himself, or to his agent, counsel, or attorney. The general rule is that notice to an agent is notice to his principal.<sup>4</sup> The notice, if to an agent, must be to an agent for the

<sup>1</sup> Warner v. Winslow, 1 Sand. Ch. 430; Vattier v. Hinde, 7 Pet. 252; Bush v. Bush, 3 Strob. Eq. 131; Kyle v. Tait, 6 Grat. 44; Doswell v. Buchanan, 3 Leigh, 362; Dillard v. Crocker, 1 Spear, Eq. 20; Duncan v. Johnson, 2 Eng. 190; Cook v. Bronaugh, 8 Eng. 190; Frost v. Beekman, 1 John. Ch. 288; Cole v. Scott, 2 Wash. 141; Abell v. Howe, 43 Vt. 403.

<sup>2</sup> Youst v. Martin, 3 S. & R. 423; Lewis v. Bradford, 10 Watts, 67; Bellas v. McCarthy, 10 Watts, 13; Juvenal v. Jackson, 2 Harris, 519; Uhrich v. Beck, 1 Harris, 631; 4 Harris, 499; Paul v. Fulton, 25 Mo. 156.

<sup>3</sup> Boggs v. Varner, 6 W. & S. 469; Farmers' Loan Co. v. Maltby, 8 Paige, 563; Frost v. Beekman, 1 John. Ch. 288; Doswell v. Buchanan, 3 Leigh, 361; Flag v. Mann, 2 Sumn. 486; Everts v. Agnes, 4 Wis. 343.

<sup>4</sup> Hovey v. Blanchard, 13 N. H. 145; Aster v. Wells, 4 Wheat. 466; Bank of U. S. v. Davis, 2 Hill, 451; Griffith v. Griffith, 9 Paige, 315; Jackson v. Winslow, 9 Cow. 13; Jackson v. Sharp, 9 John. 163; Jackson v. Leek, 19 Wend. 339; Westerwelt v. Hoff, 2 Sand. 98; Barnes v. McChristie, 3 Penn. 67; Blair v. Owles, 1 Munf. 38; Brotherton v. Hutt, 2 Vern. 574; Newstead v. Searles, 1 Atk. 265; Le Neve v. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 646; 1 Ves. 64; 2 Lead. Ca. Eq. 165, notes; Tunstall v. Trappes, 3 Sim. 301; Maddox v. Maddox, 1 Ves. 61; Ashley v. Bailey, 2 Ves. 368;

purpose of the purchase, and the notice must be to him while engaged in the transaction,<sup>1</sup> for the reason that notice to agents generally, without reference to the particular business in hand, is not binding upon the principal.<sup>2</sup> Notice to a husband is not notice to a wife, unless he is her agent, and is engaged upon the business when he receives the notice.<sup>3</sup> Upon the same principle, knowledge by an executor before the death of his testator is not notice to him after his appointment as executor.<sup>4</sup> It has been held in some cases, that the notice to the principal, to convert him into a trustee, must be given to him during the progress of the transaction, as he might have known the facts long before and forgotten them.<sup>5</sup> If the first purchaser from the trustee take the property, *bona fide* for value and without notice, all purchasers from him will take the property discharged of the equitable claims, although they have notice of them at the time they purchase of the first purchaser, and such notice to them cannot convert them into trustees.<sup>6</sup> But if the property comes back into the hands of the

Bracken v. Miller, 4 W. & S. 108; Espin v. Pemberton, 3 De G. & J. 547.

<sup>1</sup> Howard Ins. Co. v. Halsey, 4 Seld. 271; Bracken v. Miller, 4 W. & S. 102; Bank of U. S. v. Davis, 2 Hill, 451; Hood v. Fahnestock, 8 Watts, 489; Winchester v. Baltimore R.R. Co. 4 Md. 231; Preston v. Tubbin, 1 Vern. 286; Mountford v. Scott, 3 Mad. 34; Warwick v. Warwick, 3 Atk. 291; Ashley v. Bailey, 2 Ves. 368; Worsley v. Scarborough, 3 Atk. 392; Tyler v. Webb, 6 Beav. 552; 14 Beav. 14; Finch v. Shaw, 19 Beav. 500; 5 H. L. Ca. 905; Fuller v. Bennett, 2 Hare, 394. But see Abell v. Howe, 43 Vt. 403.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.; U. S. Insurance Co. v. Schriver, 3 Md. Ch. 381; Fulton Bank v. New York Coal Co. 4 Paige, 127; Bank v. Payne, 25 Conn. 444; North River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill, 362; Henry v. Morgan, 2 Benn. 497; Ross v. Horton, 2 Cushman, 591.

<sup>3</sup> Snyder v. Sponable, 1 Hill, 567; 7 Hill, 427.

<sup>4</sup> Gold v. Death, Cro. Jac. 381; Hob. 92.

<sup>5</sup> Hamilton v. Royse, 2 Sch. & L. 377; 2 Sugd. V. & P. 277; Henry v. Morgan, 3 Binn. 497; Boggs v. Varner, 6 W. & S. 469; Bracken v. Miller, 4 W. & S. 111.

<sup>6</sup> Harrison v. Forth, Pr. Ch. 51; Sweet v. Southcote, 2 Bro. Ch. 66; Brandlyn v. Ord, 1 Atk. 571; Lowther v. Charlton, 2 Atk. 242; Lacy v.

original trustee, or into the hands of any one affected with the guilt of the original sale, he will be a trustee for the defrauded party, although the property may have passed through several innocent hands.<sup>1</sup>

§ 223. Notice to the purchaser may be either actual or constructive. Actual notice is a knowledge of the facts of the trust brought home to the purchaser, or a knowledge of such facts as should lead him to a knowledge of the actual facts of the case.<sup>2</sup> Constructive notice is a legal presumption of notice unless controlled, and in most cases it is not susceptible of rebuttal, even by evidence that in fact there was no actual knowledge.<sup>3</sup> Thus, by statutes of the several States the recording of a deed is made notice to all subsequent purchasers, though it frequently happens that purchasers have no actual knowledge from the record; but that does not rebut the fact of notice, for the reason that it is their duty to examine the records; they are therefore conclusively affected with notice of all of the record which is legally made, and which it was their duty to examine.<sup>4</sup> *Lis pendens* is constructive notice; that is, a suit pending in the public courts, concerning the title of the property purchased, is constructive notice to the purchaser.<sup>5</sup> Actual possession by the *cestui que trust*, or some person other than the vendor, is constructive notice to the purchaser that

Wilson, 4 Munf. 313; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 187; Truluck v. Peoples, 3 Kelly, 446; Griffith v. Griffith, 9 Paige, 315; Boynton v. Reese, 8 Pick. 329; Mott v. Clarke, 9 Barr, 399; Trull v. Bigelow, 16 Mass. 406; Church v. Ruland, 64 Penn. St. 441; Parker v. Crittenden, 37 Conn. 145; Terrett v. Crombie, 6 Lansing, 82.

<sup>1</sup> Bovey v. Smith, 1 Vern. 149; Schutt v. Large, 6 Barb. 373; Lawrence v. Stratton, 6 Cush. 163; Church v. Ruland, 64 Penn. St. 441.

<sup>2</sup> Mayor v. Williams, 6 Md. 235.

<sup>3</sup> Rogers v. Jones, 8 N. H. 264; Plumb v. Fluitt, 2 Anst. 432; Griffith v. Griffith, 1 Hoff. 153; Farnsworth v. Child, 4 Mass. 637.

<sup>4</sup> Maul v. Reder, 59 Penn. St. 167.

<sup>5</sup> Drew v. Norbury, 9 Ir. Eq. 176. Upon the filing of a bill in equity, and before the service of the subpœna, a suit is *lis pendens*. Ibid. See Leitch v. Wells, 48 N. Y. 591.

there is some claim, title, or possession of the property adverse to his vendor; and this fact should put him upon his inquiry, for if he had inquired he would have discovered the exact title and the equitable claims upon it; he therefore has constructive notice. There are many other facts and circumstances from which courts will presume that a purchaser had notice of the equities attached to an estate.<sup>1</sup> If in any way a person purchases, with what the law construes to be full notice that another has a legal or equitable title to the property, or that he has been deprived of his interest by accident, mistake, or fraud, he will be held as a trustee.<sup>2</sup>

§ 224. The same general principles affect the sales of property by executors or administrators. Executors can deal with real estate only as they are empowered to do so by the will of testators. Purchasers must therefore look to the will for the power of the executor. If they purchase in good faith from an executor with power to sell, they will take a good title; but if they make a fraudulent or collusive purchase from an executor with full power to sell, they still hold the estate upon the same trusts to which it was subject in the hands of the executor. If there are no powers to sell real estate given to executors in the will, they have no authority to deal with it, unless it is wanted to pay debts or legacies, in which case both executors and administrators must obtain an order or license from the Court of Probate to sell. In such case the purchaser must see that the order of the court was regularly obtained, and that it is properly complied with. Any fraud or collusion on the part of the executor or administrator, in procuring the decree of the court or in the conduct of the sale, would convert the

<sup>1</sup> It is impossible to state all the distinctions that have been established upon this fruitful source of litigation. The principles are most ably stated in the notes to *Le Neve v. Le Neve*, 2 Lead. Ca. Eq. 23; *Calhoun v. Burnett*, 40 Miss. 599; *Pilcher v. Rawlins*, L. R. 11 Eq. 53; *Carter v. Carter*, 3 K. & J. 687; *Farris v. Dunn*, 7 Bush, 276.

<sup>2</sup> *Forbes v. Hall*, 34 Ill. 159.

purchaser into a trustee for heirs-at-law or other persons interested.<sup>1</sup> So if an executor or administrator purchases indirectly of himself through a third person, and takes a deed to himself through such third person, the sale will be void, or the estate will be held in trust by such administrator or executor for the heirs-at-law or other persons interested.

§ 225. An executor or administrator generally has full power over the personal estate under his charge. Therefore he may sell the same and give a good title to a purchaser.<sup>2</sup> This is the rule at common law, and it prevails in all States where it is not changed by statute. In some States there are statutes that direct executors or administrators to sell the personal estate of the deceased at public auction, or in such manner as the court having jurisdiction over the administration shall order. In such States, purchasers must see to it that executors and administrators, in making sales, pursue the course marked out for them by the statutes or by the orders of the court, or they will take no title.<sup>3</sup> In all sales by executors and administrators *good faith* is indispensable. If therefore a purchaser knows, or has notice, that a sale by an administrator is fraudulent or collusive, or is a *devastavit*, or is for the purpose of a misapplication of the assets, his title will not be allowed to prevail against the beneficial interests of creditors, specific or

<sup>1</sup> *Brush v. Ware*, 15 Pet. 93; *Brock v. Phillips*, 2 Wash. 68.

<sup>2</sup> *Field v. Schieffelin*, 7 John. Ch. 155; *Rayner v. Pearsall*, 3 John. Ch. 578; *Hertell v. Bogert*, 9 Paige, 57; *Yerger v. Jones*, 16 How. 37; *Miles v. Durnford*, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 234; *Tyrrell v. Morris*, 1 Dev. & Batt. 559; *Hunter v. Lawrence*, 11 Grat. 117; *Bond v. Ziegler*, 1 Kelley, 324; *Crane v. Drake*, 2 Vern. 616; *Ewer v. Corbett*, 2 P. Wms. 148; *Newland v. Champion*, 1 Ves. 105; *Jacomb v. Harwood*, 2 Ves. 268; *Elmlie v. McAulay*, 3 Bro. Ch. 626; *Utterson v. Maire*, 4 Bro. Ch. 270; 2 Ves. Jr. 95; *Scott v. Tyler*, 2 Dick. 725; *Bonney v. Ridgard*, 1 Cox, 145; *Dickson v. Lockyer*, 4 Ves. 42; *Doran v. Simpson*, 4 Ves. 665; *Hill v. Simpson*, 7 Ves. 152.

<sup>3</sup> *Fambro v. Gantt*, 12 Ala. 305; *Bond v. Barksdale*, 4 Des. 526; *Bond v. Ziegler*, 1 Kelley, 324; *Baines v. McGee*, 1 Sm. & M. 208.

residuary legatees, or next of kin or heirs.<sup>1</sup> Equity will examine the transaction; and if circumstances appear sufficient to put the purchaser on his guard or upon his inquiry, the sale will be avoided or the purchaser will be held as a trustee.<sup>2</sup> If the transfer is by way of pledge or sale for the security or payment of the private debt of the administrator, it will be equivalent to full notice of the illegality of the transaction, and fraudulent.<sup>3</sup> But if an administrator make a pledge of the assets for a contemporaneous advance of money for the use of the estate, it will be held to be a valid transaction; or if the sale or pledge or mortgage is afterwards made for a previous advance made in good faith for the alleged benefit of the estate, it will be valid.<sup>4</sup> Of course knowledge on the part of the purchaser, that the executor or administrator is dealing with the assets in a fiduciary capacity, is not enough to raise any suspicion, for the reason that it is the duty of the administrator to dispose of the assets and settle the estate; and so a trustee may sell and transfer absolutely the personal property

<sup>1</sup> *Petrie v. Clark*, 11 S. & R. 388; *Wylson v. Moore*, 1 M. & K. 337; *Cole v. Miles*, 10 Hare, 179; *Saxon v. Barksdale*, 4 Des. 526; *McNair's App.* 4 Rawle, 155; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 2 Hill, Eq. 277; *Mead v. Orrery*, 3 Atk. 235; *McLeod v. Drummond*, 14 Ves. 361; 17 Ves. 169; *Field v. Schieffelin*, 7 John. Ch. 155; *Colt v. Lasnier*, 9 Cow. 320; *Sacia v. Berthoud*, 17 Barb. 15; *Williamson v. Branch Bank*, 7 Ala. 906; *Swink v. Snodgrass*, 17 Ala. 653; *Garnett v. Macon*, 6 Call, 361; *Dodson v. Simpson*, 2 Rand. 294; *Graff v. Castleman*, 5 Rand. 204; *Parker v. Gillian*, 10 Yerg. 394; *Williamson v. Morton*, 2 Md. Ch. 94; *Lowry v. Farmers' Bank*, 10 P. L. J. 3; *Am. L. J. (N. S.)* 111.

<sup>2</sup> *McNeillie v. Acton*, 4 De G., M. & G. 744.

<sup>3</sup> *Petrie v. Clark*, 11 Serg. & R. 388; *Shaw v. Spencer*, 100 Mass. 382; *Judson v. National City Bank*, 8 Blatch. 430, and cases cited; *Pendleton v. Fay*, 2 Paige, 202; *Bayard v. Farmers', &c. Bank*, 52 Penn. St. 232; *Baker v. Bliss*, 39 N. Y. 76; *Carr v. Hilton*, 1 Curtis, 390-393; *Field v. Schieffelin*, 7 John. Ch. 155; *Williamson v. Morton*, 2 Md. Ch. 94; *Garrard v. R.R. Co.* 29 Penn. St. 154; *Collinson v. Lister*, 7 De G., M. & G. 634; *Dodson v. Simpson*, 2 Rand. 294; *Williamson v. Branch Bank*, 7 Ala. 906.

<sup>4</sup> *Petrie v. Clark*, 11 Serg. & R. 388; *Miles v. Durnford*, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 234; *Russell v. Plaice*, 18 Beav. 21; 11 Jur. 124; 19 Jur. 445.



of his trust, if he have power to vary the securities; and if he sells and transfers notes, stocks, or other securities standing in his name as trustee, the purchaser, from that fact alone, cannot be holden as a constructive trustee, although the trustee in fact transfers such securities or order to obtain money for his own personal use. The mere fact that the word trustee is on the face of the securities cannot put a purchaser to any inquiry beyond ascertaining whether the trustee has power to vary the securities. If he has such power, a purchaser in *good faith* will be protected, although the trustee use the money for his private purposes.<sup>1</sup> But if a purchaser takes securities from a trustee, with the word trustee upon their face, in payment of a private debt due from the trustee, the sale may be avoided by the *cestui que trust*, or the purchaser may be held as a trustee.<sup>2</sup> And so if an executor, guardian, or trustee hold certificates of shares in a corporation, he may sell the same, and the corporation would be protected in issuing new certificates to the purchaser, but if the corporation knew that the sale or transfer was a breach of the trust or a *devastavit*, it might be held as a constructive trustee for the persons beneficially interested; but the mere fact that the fiduciary character of the vendor appeared upon the face of the transaction would put the corporation upon no inquiry beyond ascertaining whether he had authority to change the securities.<sup>3</sup>

§ 226. The statute of frauds is no obstacle in the way of proof of an actual or constructive fraud in the sale of property. Lord Hardwicke stated "that the court adhered to this principle, that the statute of frauds should never be understood to protect fraud, and therefore wherever a case is infected with fraud, the court will not suffer the statute to protect

<sup>1</sup> *Ashton v. Atlantic Bank*, 3 Allen, 217; *Creighton v. Ringle*, 3 S. C. 77; *Dillaye v. Com. Bank*, 51 N. Y. 355.

<sup>2</sup> *Shaw v. Spencer*, 100 Mass. 388; *Jaudon v. National Bank*, 8 Blatch. 480; *Duncan v. Jaudon*, 14 Wall. 115.

<sup>3</sup> *Ashton v. Atlantic Bank*, 3 Allen, 217, and cases cited note 1.

it.”<sup>1</sup> Lord Thurlow added, that “the moment you impeach a deed for fraud you must either deny the effect of fraud upon the deed, or you must admit parol evidence to prove it.”<sup>2</sup> If this was not so, the law would be reduced to this absurdity,—if a fraud could once succeed in procuring the transaction to be reduced to writing and signed by the parties, it would be protected by the law itself, and there would be no possible means of reaching and correcting the wrong. But in such case the bill must contain a clear and distinct charge of fraud.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, whenever the bill sets out a clear case of fraud, parol evidence will be admitted to prove it, even if the effect of such evidence is to contradict, vary, alter, or destroy written instruments.<sup>4</sup> And in any case if the trust arises from the acts of the parties, and not exclusively from their agreements, the statute of frauds is not a bar to the proof.<sup>5</sup> So if a bill is

<sup>1</sup> *Reach v. Kennegate*, 1 Ves. 125; *Young v. Peachy*, 2 Atk. 258; *Walker v. Walker*, 2 Atk. 98; *Hutchins v. Lee*, 1 Atk. 448; *Montacute v. Maxwell*, 1 P. Wms. 620; *Lincoln v. Wright*, 4 De G. & J. 16; *Childers v. Childers*, 1 De G. & J. 482; *Davis v. Oty*, 35 Beav. 208; *Ryan v. Dox*, 34 N. Y. 307; *Haigh v. Kaye*, L. R. 7 Ch. 474.

<sup>2</sup> *Shelborne v. Inchiquin*, 1 Bro. Ch. 350; *Hare v. Sherewood*, 1 Ves. Jr. 243; *Townshend v. Stangroom*, 6 Ves. 333; *Pym v. Blackburn*, 3 Ves. 38 n., and see *Conolly v. Howe*, 5 Ves. 701.

<sup>3</sup> *Irnham v. Child*, 1 Bro. Ch. 94; *Portmore v. Morris*, 2 Bro. Ch. 219; *Forsyth v. Clark*, 3 Wend. 637; *Gouverneur v. Elmendorf*, 5 John. Ch. 79; *Kennedy v. Kennedy*, 2 Ala. 571; *Skrine v. Simmons*, 11 Ga. 401; *McCalmont v. Rankin*, 8 Hare, 18.

<sup>4</sup> *Young v. Peachy*, 2 Atk. 257; *Thynn v. Thynn*, 1 Vern. 296; *Irnham v. Child*, 1 Bro. Ch. 93; *Cripps v. Gee*, 4 Bro. Ch. 475; *Oldham v. Lechford*, 2 Vern. 506; *Drakeford v. Wilks*, 3 Atk. 539; *Reach v. Kennegate*, 1 Ves. 125; *Amb. 67*; *Pember v. Mathers*, 1 Bro. Ch. 52; *Wilkinson v. Bradfield*, 1 Vern. 307; *Miller v. Cotton*, 5 Ga. 346; *Christ v. Diffenbach*, 1 S. & R. 464; *Watkins v. Stockett*, 6 H. & J. 345; *Elliott v. Connell*, 5 Sm. & M. 91; *Barrell v. Hawrick*, 42 Ala. 60; *Judd v. Mosely*, 31 Io. 433.

<sup>5</sup> *Judd v. Mosely*, 30 Io. 428; *Bryant v. Hendricks*, 5 Io. 256; *Kincell v. Feldman*, 22 Io. 363; *Ferguson v. Hass*, 64 N. C. 772; *Squire's App.* 70 Penn. St. 268. And so the statute of frauds is not a bar to relief in other cases of absolute deeds where they are used in a manner, and for purposes not contemplated at the time of their execution. Thus a deed may be shown to be a mortgage or security for a debt, although there was no written defea-

brought for relief, on the ground that the instrument is framed contrary to the intention of the parties through mistake, acci-

sance, and no fraud, accident, or mistake. This proposition has been much discussed. The latest case, *Campbell v. Dearborn*, 109 Mass. 130, contains a review of the authorities and a succinct statement of the doctrine; and as it is upon a subject closely connected with constructive trusts, the case is given at large.

“From those facts, and from the bill and answer, we think these points must be taken to be established; to wit, 1st, that the plaintiff had purchased the parcel of land in controversy, and held a contract from Tirrill for its conveyance to himself upon payment of the sum of \$5500; 2d, that the money was advanced by the defendant to the plaintiff as a loan, and the deed from the plaintiff to the defendant was given by way of security therefor. The report finds, ‘from all the circumstances surrounding the transaction, and from the acts and declarations of the parties at the time, that the plaintiff believed and had reason to believe’ this to be the case.

“From the whole case we are satisfied that it was a transaction between borrower and lender, and not a real purchase of the land by the defendant. We are brought, then, to the question, Can equity relieve in such a case?

“The decisions in the courts of the United States, and the opinions declared by its judges, are uniform in favor of the existence of the power, and the propriety of its exercise by a court of chancery. *Hughes v. Edwards*, 9 Wheat. 489; *Sprigg v. Bank of Mount Pleasant*, 14 Pet. 201, 208; *Morris v. Nixon*, 1 How. 118; *Russell v. Southard*, 12 How. 139; *Taylor v. Luther*, 2 Sumner, 228; *Flagg v. Mann*, ib. 486; *Jenkins v. Eldredge*, 3 Story, 181; *Bentley v. Phelps*, 2 Woodb. & Min. 426; *Wyman v. Babcock*, 2 Curtis C. C. 386, 398; s. c. 19 How. 289. Although not bound by the authority of the courts of the United States in a matter of this sort, still we deem it to be important that uniformity of interpretation and administration of both law and equity should prevail in the State and federal courts. We are disposed, therefore, to yield much deference to the decisions above referred to, and to follow them unless we can see that they are not supported by sound principles of jurisprudence, or that they conflict with rules of law already settled by the decisions of our own courts.

“We cannot concur in the doctrine advanced in some of the cases, that the subsequent attempt to retain the property, and refusal to permit it to be redeemed, constitute a fraud or breach of trust, which affords ground of jurisdiction and judicial interference. There can be no fraud or legal wrong in the breach of a trust from which the statute withholds the right of judicial recognition. Such conduct may sometimes appear to relate back, and give character to the original transaction, by showing, in that, an express intent to deceive and defraud. But ordinarily it will not be connected with the original transaction otherwise than constructively, or as

dent, surprise, or fraud. In such case, Lord Hardwicke said, "that a mistake could never be proved but by parol evidence,

involved in it as its legitimate consequence and natural fruit. In this aspect only can we regard it in the present case.

"The decisions in the federal courts go to the full extent of affording relief, even in the absence of proof of express deceit or fraudulent purpose at the time of taking the deed, and although the instrument of defeasance 'be omitted by design upon mutual confidence between the parties.' In *Russell v. Southard*, 12 How. 139, 148, it is declared to be the doctrine of the court, 'that, when it is alleged and proved that a loan on security was really intended, and the defendant sets up the loan as payment of purchase-money, and the conveyance as a sale, both fraud and a vice in the consideration are sufficiently averred and proved to require a court of equity to hold the transaction to be a mortgage.' The conclusion of the court was, 'that the transaction was in substance a loan of money upon security of the farm, and, being so, a court of equity is bound to look through the forms in which the contrivance of the lender has enveloped it, and declare the conveyance of the land to be a mortgage.'

"This doctrine is analogous, if not identical, with that which has so frequently been acted upon as to have become a general if not universal rule, in regard to conveyances of land where provision for reconveyance is made in the same or some contemporaneous instrument. In such cases, however carefully and explicitly the writings are made to set forth a sale with an agreement for repurchase, and to cut off and renounce all right of redemption or reconveyance otherwise, most courts have allowed parol evidence of the real nature of the transaction to be given, and, upon proof that the transaction was really and essentially upon the footing of a loan of money, or an advance for the accommodation of the grantor, have construed the instruments as constituting a mortgage; holding that any clause or stipulation therein, which purports to deprive the borrower of his equitable rights of redemption, is oppression, against the policy of the law, and to be set aside by the courts as void. 4 Kent, Com. (6th ed.) 159; Cruise, Dig. (Greenl. ed.) tit. xv. c. 1, § 21; 2 Washb. Real Prop. (3d ed.) 42; Williams on Real Prop. 353; Story, Eq. § 1019; Adams, Eq. 112; 3 Lead. Cas. in Eq. (3d Am. ed.); White & Tudor's notes to *Thornbrough v. Baker*, pp. 605 [\*874] *et seq.*; Hare & Wallace's notes to s. c. pp. 624 [\*894] *et seq.*

"The rule has been frequently recognized in Massachusetts, where, until 1855, the courts have held their jurisdiction of foreclosure and redemption of mortgages to be limited to cases of a defeasance contained in the deed or some other instrument under seal. *Erschine v. Townsend*, 2 Mass. 493; *Killaran v. Brown*, 4 Mass. 443; *Taylor v. Weld*, 5 Mass. 109; *Carey v. Rawson*, 8 Mass. 159; *Parks v. Hall*, 2 Pick. 206, 211; *Rice v. Rice*, 4 Pick. 349; *Flagg v. Mann*, 14 Pick. 467, 478; *Eaton v. Green*, 22 Pick.

consequently it must be received.”<sup>1</sup> But where through mistake of law, or carelessness or inattention, an important pro-

526. The case of *Flagg v. Mann* is explicit, not only upon the authority of the court thus to deal with the written instruments of the parties, but also upon the point of the competency of parol testimony to establish the facts by which to control their operation; although, upon consideration of the parol testimony in that case, the court came to the conclusion that there was a sale in fact, and not a mere security for a loan.

“By the statute of 1855, c. 194, § 1, jurisdiction was given to this court in equity ‘in all cases of fraud, and of conveyances or transfers of real estate in the nature of mortgages.’ Gen. Sts. c. 113, § 2. The authority of the courts, under this clause is ample. It is limited only by those considerations which guide courts of full chancery powers in the exercise of all those powers.

“If, then, the advantage taken of the borrower by the lender, in requiring of him an agreement that he will forego all right of redemption in case of non-payment at the stipulated time, or an absolute deed with a bond or certificate back, which falsely recites the character of the transaction, representing it to be a sale of the land with a privilege of repurchase, be a sufficient ground for interference in equity by restricting the operation of the deed, and converting the writings into a mortgage, contrary to the expressed agreement, it is difficult to see why the court may not and ought not to interpose to defeat the same wrong, when it attempts to reach its object by the simpler process of an absolute deed alone. In each case the relief is contrary to the terms of the written agreement. In one case it is against the express words of the instrument or clause relied on as a defeasance, on the ground that it was oppressive, and wrongful to withhold or omit the formal defeasance. In strictness, there is no defeasance in either case. The wrong on the part of the lender or grantor, which gives the court its power over his deed, is the same in both. ‘For they who take a conveyance as a mortgage without any defeasance are guilty of a fraud.’ *Cotterell v. Purchase*, Cas. temp. Talbot, 61. See also *Barnhart v. Greenshields*, 9 Moore, P. C. 18; *Baker v. Wind*, 1 Ves. Sen. 160; *Mahlor v. Lees*, 2 Atk. 494;

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<sup>1</sup> *Baker v. Paine*, 1 Ves. 457; *Towers v. Moor*, 2 Vern. 98; *Langley v. Brown*, 2 Atk. 203; *Townshend v. Stangroom*, 6 Ves. 328; *Taylor v. Radd*, 5 Ves. 595, 596, n.; *Henkle v. Royal Insurance Co.* 1 Ves. 318; *Rogers v. Earl*, 1 Dick. 294; *Barstow v. Kilvington*, 5 Ves. 593; *Hunt v. Rousmanier*, 8 Wheat. 174; *Gower v. Sternes*, 2 Whart. 75; *Keisselbrock v. Livingston*, 4 John. Ch. 144; *Peterson v. Grover*, 20 Me. 363; *Newson v. Bufferlow*, 1 Dev. Eq. 379; *Goodell v. Freed*, 15 Vt. 448; *Harrison v. Howard*, 1 Ired. Eq. 407; *Blanchard v. Moore*, 4 J. J. Marsh. 471; *Perry v. Pearson*, 1 Humph. 431.

vision is omitted from a deed, and no fraud is charged or proved, parol evidence cannot be received against the denial of the

*Williams v. Owen*, 5 Myl. & Cr. 303; *Lincoln v. Wright*, 4 De Gex & Jones, 16.

"As a question of evidence, the principle is the same. In either case the parol evidence is admitted, not to vary, add to, or contradict the writings, but to establish the fact of an inherent fault in the transaction or its consideration, which affords ground for avoiding the effect of the writings by restricting their operation, or defeating them altogether. This is a general principle of evidence, well established and recognized, both at law and in equity. *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. 27; *Fletcher v. Willard*, 14 Pick. 464; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 284; *Perry on Trusts*, § 226.

"The reasons for extending the doctrine, in equity, to absolute deeds, where there is no provision for reconveyance, are ably presented by Hare & Wallace in their notes to *Woollam v. Hearn*, 2 Lead. Cas. in Eq. (3d Am. ed.) 676, and to *Thornbrough v. Baker*, 3 ib. 624. See also *Adams*, Eq. 111; 1 Sugd. Vend. (8th Am. ed.), Perkins's notes, pp. 267, 268, 302, 303. The doctrine thus extended is declared, in numerous decisions, to prevail in New York; also in Vermont and several other States. Mr. Washburn, in his chapter on mortgages, § 1, has exhibited the law as held in the different States, in this particular; and the numerous references there made, as well as by the annotators in the other treatises which we have cited, render it superfluous to repeat them here. 2 Washb. Real Prop. (3d ed.) 35 *et seq.*

"Upon the whole, we are convinced that the doctrine may be adopted without violation of the statute of frauds, or of any principle of law or evidence; and, if properly guarded in administration, may prove a sound and salutary principle of equity jurisprudence. It is a power to be exercised with the utmost caution, and only when the grounds of interference are fully made out, so as to be clear from doubt.

"It is not enough that the relation of borrower and lender, or debtor and creditor, existed at the time the transaction was entered upon. Negotiations, begun with a view to a loan or security for a debt, may fairly terminate in a sale of the property originally proposed for security. And if, without fraud, oppression, or unfair advantage taken, a sale is the real result, and not a form adopted as a cover or pretext, it should be sustained by the court. It is to the determination of this question that the parol evidence is mainly directed.

"The chief inquiry is, in most cases, whether a debt was created by the transaction, or an existing debt, which formed or entered into the consideration, continued and kept alive afterwards. 'If the purchaser, instead of taking the risk of the subject of the contract on himself, takes a security for repayment of the principal, that will not vitiate the transaction, and render it a mortgage security.' 1 Sugd. Vend. (8th Am. ed.) 302, in

defendant in his answer to reform, vary, or defeat the instrument.<sup>1</sup> Parol evidence, however, is not favorably received by support of which the citations by Mr. Perkins are numerous. But any recognition of the debt as still subsisting, if clearly established, is equally efficacious; as the receipt or demand of interest or part payment. *Eaton v. Green*, 22 Pick. 526, 530.

“Although proof of the existence and continuance of the debt, for which the conveyance was made, if not decisive of the character of the transaction as a mortgage, is most influential to that effect, yet the absence of such proof is far from being conclusive to the contrary. *Rice v. Rice*, 4 Pick. 349; *Flagg v. Mann*, 14 Pick. 467, 478; *Russell v. Southard*, 12 How. 139; *Browne v. Dewey*, 1 Sandf. Ch. 56. When it is considered that the inquiry itself is supposed to be made necessary by the adoption of forms and outward appearance differing from the reality, it is hardly reasonable that the absence of an actual debt, manifested by a written acknowledgment or an express promise to pay, should be regarded as of more significance than the absence of a formal defeasance. It of course compels the party attempting to impeach the deed, to make out his proofs by other and less decisive means. But as an affirmative proposition it cannot have much force.

“A mortgage may exist without any debt or other personal liability of the mortgagor. If there is a large margin between the debt or sum advanced and the value of the land conveyed, that of itself is an assurance of payment stronger than any promise or bond of a necessitous borrower or debtor. Hence inadequacy of price, in such case, becomes an important element in establishing the character of the transaction. Inadequacy of price, though not of itself alone sufficient ground to set in motion chancery powers of the court, may nevertheless properly be effective to quicken their exercise, where other sufficient ground exists: *Story*, Eq. §§ 239, 245, 246; and in connection with other evidence may afford strong ground of inference that the transaction purporting to be a sale was not fairly and in reality so. *Kerr on Fraud and Mistake*, 186 and note; *Wharf v. Howell*, 5 Binn. 499.

“Another circumstance that may and ought to have much weight is the continuance of the grantor in the use and occupation of the land as owner, after the apparent sale and conveyance. *Cotterell v. Purchase*, Cas. temp. Talbot, 61; *Lincoln v. Wright*, 4 De Gex & Jones, 16.

“These several considerations have more or less weight, according to the circumstances of each case. *Conway v. Alexander*, 7 Cranch, 218; *Bentley v. Phelps*, 2 Woodb. & Min. 426. It is not necessary that all should concur to the same result in any case. Each case must be determined upon its own special facts; but those should be of clear and decisive import.” So if it is necessary for an absolute grantee to come into a court of equity for relief as for a loss of the deeds, the court can compel him to do equity, as to make a settlement upon parties entitled to a settlement by a parol understanding. *Phillips v. Phillips*, 50 Mo. 603.

<sup>1</sup> *Lemon v. Whitely*, 4 Russ. 423; *Irnham v. Child*, 1 Bro. Ch. 92;

courts in any case, and they will not act upon it against written instruments, unless it is exceedingly clear and certain, and uncontradicted by other evidence.<sup>1</sup> In Pennsylvania, however, a different rule prevails, and parol evidence of the verbal agreements and stipulations upon the faith of which the contract was made, is received in evidence to control its operation or to explain its meaning.<sup>2</sup>

§ 227. The right of a party who has been defrauded of the title to his land is not a mere right of action to set the deed aside, but it is an equitable estate in the land itself, which may be sold, assigned, conveyed, and devised.<sup>3</sup> In the view of a court of equity, he is still the owner of the estate, subject to repay whatever money or other property he may have received from the fraudulent grantee. And so the equitable interest of a purchaser under a contract of sale is of that character that it may be assigned or devised.<sup>4</sup>

*Portmore v. Morris*, 2 Bro. Ch. 219; *Rich v. Jackson*, 4 Bro. Ch. 614; 6 Ves. 334, n; *Jackson v. Cator*, 5 Ves. 688; *How v. Sherewood*, 1 Ves. Jr. 241; *Anon. Skin.* 159; *Mortimer v. Shortall*, 2 Dr. & W. 363; *Alexander v. Crosbie*, Ll. & G. 145; *London R. Co. v. Winter*, 1 Cr. & Phil. 57; *Garwood v. Eldridge*, 1 Green, Ch. 146; *Lyon v. Richmond*, 2 John. Ch. 60; *Wheaton v. Wheaton*, 9 Conn. 96; *Hunt v. Rousmanier*, 1 Pet. 1; *Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt*, 1 John. Ch. 282; *Westbrook v. Harbeson*, 2 McCord, Ch. 112; *Dwight v. Pomroy*, 17 Mass. 303; *Robson v. Harwell*, 6 Ga. 589; *Chamness v. Crutchfield*, 2 Ired. Eq. 148; *Movan v. Hayes*, 1 John. Ch. 339; *Ratcliff v. Ellison*, 3 Rand. 537; *Richardson v. Thompson*, 1 Humph. 151.

<sup>1</sup> *Barrows v. Greenhough*, 3 Ves. 154; *Townshend v. Stangroom*, 6 Ves. 334; *Shelborne v. Inchiquin*, 1 Bro. Ch. 341; *Miller v. Cotten*, 5 Ga. 346. See the whole matter elaborately discussed and all the authorities collected in notes to *Woollam v. Hearne*, 2 Lead. Ca. Eq. 684; *Barkley v. Lane*, 6 Bush, 58; *Collier v. Collier*, 30 Ind. 32; *Lingenfitter v. Richings*, 62 Penn. St. 128.

<sup>2</sup> *Chalfant v. Williams*, 35 Penn. St. 212; *Clark v. Partridge*, 2 Barr, 13; 4 Barr, 166; *Oliver v. Oliver*, 4 Rawle, 141; *Rearich v. Swinehart*, 1 Jones, 238; *Christ v. Dffenbach*, 1 S. & R. 464.

<sup>3</sup> *Stump v. Gaby*, 2 De G., M. & G. 623; *McKissick v. Pickle*, 4 Harris, 140; *Kane County v. Herrington*, 50 Ill. 232.

<sup>4</sup> *Stump v. Gaby*, 2 De G., M. & G. 623; *Morgan v. Halford*, 1 Sm. &



§ 228. Time does not bar a direct trust where the relation of trustee and *cestui que trust* is admitted to exist, but diligence must be used to establish a constructive trust on the ground of fraud. A court of equity will refuse its aid to stale demands, where a party has slept upon his rights, or has acquiesced for a great length of time.<sup>1</sup> And so a constructive trust will be barred by long acquiescence, although the fraud was evident and the relief was originally clear.<sup>2</sup> It is difficult to state as a general proposition what length of time will bar relief from the consequences of a fraud. It is necessarily subject to the equitable discretion of the court, and must depend upon the nature of each case and the circumstances of the parties.

Gif. 101; Cogswell v. Cogswell, 2 Edw. Ch. 231; Malin v. Malin, 1 Wend. 625; Clapper v. House, 6 Paige, 149; Kent v. Mehaffey, 10 Ohio St. 204.

<sup>1</sup> Smith v. Clay, 3 Bro. Ch. 639, n; Cholmondely v. Clinton, 1 J. & W. 151; Chalmer v. Bradley, 1 J. & W. 59; Beckford v. Wade, 17 Ves. 97; Portlock v. Gardner, 1 Hare, 594; Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow. 117; Dobson v. Racey, 3 Sandf. Ch. 61; Powell v. Murray, 2 Edw. Ch. 644; 10 Paige, 256; Piatt v. Vazier, 9 Pet. 405; McKnight v. Taylor, 1 How. 161; Wagner v. Baird, 7 How. 234; Veasie v. Williams, 8 How. 134; Hallett v. Collins, 10 How. 174; Hough v. Richardson, 3 Story, 659; Gould v. Gould, 3 Story, 516; Peebles v. Reading, 8 S. & R. 484; Irvine v. Robertson, 3 Rand. 549; Colman v. Lyne, 4 Rand. 454; Anderson v. Burchell, 6 Grat. 405; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1520, notes.

<sup>2</sup> Bonny v. Ridgard, cited 4 Bro. Ch. 138; Andrew v. Wrigley, 4 Bro. Ch. 124; Blennerhasset v. Day, 2 B. & B. 118; Gregory v. Gregory, Cowp. 201; Jac. 631; Selsey v. Rhoades, 1 Bligh (n. s.), 1; Champion v. Rigby, 1 R. & M. 539; *Ex parte* Granger, 2 Deac. & Ch. 459; Collard v. Hare, 2 R. & M. 675; Norris v. Neve, 3 Atk. 38; Pryce v. Byrn, 5 Ves. 681, cited Campbell v. Campbell, 5 Ves. 678, 682; Morse v. Royal, 12 Ves. 355; Medlicott v. O'Donnell, 1 B. & B. 156; Hatfield v. Montgomery, 2 Porter, 58; Bond v. Brown, 1 Harp. Eq. 270; Edwards v. Roberts, 7 Sm. & M. 544; Peacock v. Black, Halst. Eq. 535; Steele v. Kinkle, 3 Ala. 352; Smith v. Clay, Amb. 645; Bond v. Hopkins, 1 Sch. & Lef. 413; Hovenden v. Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 630-640; Stackhouse v. Barnston, 10 Ves. 466; *Ex parte* Dewdney, 15 Ves. 496; Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 John. Ch. 93; Dexter v. Arnold, 3 Sumn. 152; Decouche v. Savetier, 3 John. Ch. 190; Murray v. Coster, 20 John. 576; Prevost v. Gratz, 6 Wheat. 481; Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat. 489; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 168; Miller v. McIntire, 6 Pet. 61; Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mason, 143.

§ 229. Therefore no certain time can be stated as a limit beyond which relief will not be given. In several cases twenty years has been held to be a bar;<sup>1</sup> and so where one had acquiesced for twenty-five years,<sup>2</sup> and twenty-one years,<sup>3</sup> and in another case the lapse of eighteen years was held to be a bar.<sup>4</sup> So a delay of thirty years,<sup>5</sup> of thirty-eight years,<sup>6</sup> of forty-six years,<sup>7</sup> of fifty years,<sup>8</sup> of twenty-seven years,<sup>9</sup> and of seventeen years,<sup>10</sup> has been held to be such *laches*, if unexplained, as would be a bar to a bill for relief. Under the circumstances of other cases, a delay of twelve years,<sup>11</sup> of eleven years,<sup>12</sup> of eighteen years, was held to be no bar.<sup>13</sup> In *Michoud v. Girod* the law was elaborately examined and stated by Mr. Justice Wayne as follows, "that within what time a constructive trust will be barred must depend upon the circumstances of the case."<sup>14</sup> There is no rule in equity which excludes the consideration of circumstances, and in a case of actual fraud,

<sup>1</sup> *Smith v. Clay*, 3 Bro. Ch. 639, n; *Hovenden v. Annesley*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 636; *Stackhouse v. Barnston*, 10 Ves. 466; *Pryce v. Byrn*, 5 Ves. 681; *Ward v. Van Bakkelen*, 1 Paige, 100; *Thompson v. Blair*, 3 Murph. 593; *Farr v. Farr*, 1 Hill, Eq. 391; *Field v. Wilson*, 6 B. Mon. 479; *Bruce v. Child*, 4 Hawks, 372; *Perry v. Craig*, 3 Miss. 525; *Ferris v. Henderson*, 12 Penn. St. 54; *Bank of U. S. v. Biddle*, 2 Pars. Eq. 31; *Walker v. Walker*, 16 S. & R. 379; *McDowell v. Goldsmith*, 2 Md. Ch. 370; *Norris's App.* 71 Penn. St. 124.

<sup>2</sup> *Blennerhassett v. Day*, 2 B. & B. 118.

<sup>3</sup> *Selsey v. Rhodes*, 1 Bligh (N. S.), 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Gregory v. Gregory*, Coop. 201; Jac. 631; *Champion v. Rigby*, 1 R. & M. 539; *Roberts v. Tunstall*, 4 Hare, 257.

<sup>5</sup> *Harrod v. Fountleroy*, 3 J. J. Marsh. 548; *Phillips v. Elden*, 2 Edw. Ch. 1; *Page v. Booth*, 1 Rob. Va. 161; *Bond v. Brown*, Harp. Eq. 270.

<sup>6</sup> *Powell v. Murray*, 10 Paige, 256.

<sup>7</sup> *Maxwell v. Kennedy*, 8 How. 210.

<sup>8</sup> *Anderson v. Barwell*, 6 Grat. 405.

<sup>9</sup> *Hayes v. Goode*, 7 Leigh, 486.

<sup>10</sup> *Baker v. Read*, 18 Beav. 398; *Emerick v. Emerick*, 3 Grant, 295.

<sup>11</sup> *Butler v. Haskell*, 4 Des. 651.

<sup>12</sup> *Rhinlander v. Barrow*, 17 John. Ch. 538; *Mulhallen v. Murum*, 3 Dr. & W. 317.

<sup>13</sup> *Bell v. Webb*, 2 Gill, 263; *Grisby v. Mousley*, 4 De G. & J. 78.

<sup>14</sup> *Boone v. Chiles*, 10 Pet. 177.

we believe no case can be found in the books in which a court of equity has refused to give relief within the lifetime of either of the parties upon whom the fraud is proved, or within thirty years after it has been discovered or becomes known to the party whose rights are affected by it.”<sup>1</sup> If there is no fraud chargeable on any party, but a simple mistake or accident is made by which a title is changed, more diligence is required, and acquiescence for a less time will bar the suffering party of his relief. An acquiescence for seventeen years,<sup>2</sup> or for nineteen years,<sup>3</sup> has been held to be fatal to an application for relief.

§ 230. The statute of limitations is not necessarily controlling, as to the time within which relief is to be sought, in the case of a constructive trust by reason of fraud. A demand may be stale, and not entitled to relief under the circumstances of the case, although much less than the time allowed by the statute of limitations has elapsed; and so a party may be entitled to relief although much more than the statute limit has gone by.<sup>4</sup> In some States, however, the statute is applied to constructive trusts, unless they are concealed or undiscovered. In such States, relief must be sought within six years if it is sought by bill in equity to set aside a deed, or to establish a trust.<sup>5</sup> In Pennsylvania the limit is five years.<sup>6</sup> In other States, it has been decided, in analogy to the statute which bars a real action after twenty years, that relief

<sup>1</sup> *Michoud v. Girod*, 4 How. 561; *Trevelyan v. Charter*, 11 Cl. & Fin. 714; *Pryn v. Byrne*, 5 Ves. 681; *Malony v. L'Estrange*, Beat. 406.

<sup>2</sup> *Hite v. Hite*, 1 B. Mon. 177; *Emerick v. Emerick*, 3 Grant, 295.

<sup>3</sup> *Bruce v. Child*, 4 Hawks, 372.

<sup>4</sup> *Mason v. Crosby*, 1 Wood. & M. 342; *Piatt v. Vatie*, 1 McLean, 146; 9 Pet. 405; *Juzan v. Toulmin*, 9 Ala. 662.

<sup>5</sup> *Farnham v. Brooks*, 9 Pick. 212; *Sears v. Shafer*, 2 Seld. 268; *Williamson v. Field*, 2 Sand. Ch. 534; *Pilcher v. Flinn*, 30 Md. 202.

<sup>6</sup> *Miller v. Franciscus*, 40 Penn. St. 335; *Rider v. Maul*, 46 Penn. St. 376; *Ashurst*, App. 60 Penn. St. 290.

must be sought within the twenty years named in the statute.<sup>1</sup> In South Carolina, it is held that an action to set aside a deed as fraudulent is equivalent to an action for deceit, and must be brought within the limit of the statute for personal actions.<sup>2</sup> But, if the fraud is unknown to the injured party, or is concealed, or he is under disability, or out of the country, or the delay is caused by the defendant,<sup>3</sup> the lapse of time will not be *laches* which bar relief. If a party has knowledge of the fraud, a want of evidence will not excuse his delay,<sup>4</sup> nor will poverty and an inability to prosecute the action.<sup>5</sup> If there has been great delay, courts will require very clear evidence to impeach a transaction as fraudulent, and to convert the fraudulent party into a trustee.<sup>6</sup> So, if a great length of time has elapsed, courts will sometimes grant the relief prayed for by setting aside the conveyance, but will decree an account for

<sup>1</sup> *Ware v. Van Bakkelen*, 1 Paige, 100; *Walker v. Walker*, 16 S. & R. 379; *Ferris v. Henderson*, 12 Penn. St. 54; *Bank of U. S. v. Biddle*, 2 Pars. Eq. 31; *Thompson v. Blair*, 3 Murph. 593; *Farr v. Farr*, 1 Hill, Eq. 391; *Perry v. Craig*, 3 Mis. 525; *Field v. Wilson*, 6 B. Mon. 479; *Bruce v. Child*, 4 Hawks, 372; *McDowel v. Goldsmith*, 2 Md. Ch. 370.

<sup>2</sup> *Parkam v. McCravy*, 6 Rich. Eq. 143; *McDonald v. May*, 1 Rich. Eq. 91; *Bradley v. McBride*, Rich. Eq. Ca. 202, is overruled.

<sup>3</sup> *Sears v. Shafer*, 2 Seld. 268; *Richardson v. Jones*, 3 G. & J. 163; *Doggett v. Emerson*, 3 Story, 700; *Callender v. Calgrove*, 17 Conn. 1; *Phalen v. Clarke*, 19 Conn. 421; *Hallett v. Collins*, 10 How. 174; *Rider v. Bickerton*, 3 Swans. 81, n; *Blannerhassett v. Day*, 2 B. & B. 118; *Trevelyan v. Charter*, 11 Cl. & Fin. 714; *Bowen v. Evans*, 2 H. L. Ca. 257; *Warner v. Daniels*, 1 W. & M. 111; *Murray v. Palmer*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 487; *Aylewood v. Kearney*, 2 B. & B. 263; *Pickett v. Loggan*, 14 Ves. 215; *Purcell v. McNamara*, 14 Ves. 91; *Ferris v. Henderson*, 12 Penn. St. 49; *Michoud v. Girod*, 4 How. 561; *Henry County v. Winnebago, &c.*, 52 Ill. 299.

<sup>4</sup> *Parkam v. McCravy*, 6 Rich. Eq. 114.

<sup>5</sup> *Roberts v. Tunstall*, 4 Hare, 357; *Maxwell v. Kennedy*, 8 How. 210; *Locke v. Armstrong*, 2 Dev. & Bat. 147; *Perry v. Craig*, 3 Mis. 516.

<sup>6</sup> *Chalmers v. Bradley*, 1 J. & W. 59; *Powell v. Murray*, 10 Paige, 256; *Bowen v. Evans*, 2 H. L. Ca. 257; *Westbrook v. Harwell*, 2 McCord, Eq. 112; *Phillips v. Belden*, 2 Edw. Ch. 1; *Jennings v. Broughton*, 3 De G., M. & G. 126; *Chandos v. Brownlow*, 2 Ridg. P. C. 397; *Montgomery v. Hobson*, Meigs, 437; *Page v. Booth*, 1 Rob. 161.

only six years,<sup>1</sup> or from the time of filing the bill,<sup>2</sup> and without costs.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Pearce v. Newlyn*, 3 Mad. 189.

<sup>2</sup> *Pickett v. Loggan*, 14 Ves. 215; *Malony v. L'Estrange*, Beatt. 406; *Mulhallan v. Murum*, 3 Dr. & W. 317.

<sup>3</sup> *Pearce v. Newlyn*, 3 Mad. 189; *Attorney-General v. Dudley*, Coop. 146.

## CHAPTER VII.

TRUSTS THAT ARISE BY EQUITABLE CONSTRUCTION IN THE ABSENCE  
OF FRAUD.

§ 231. Trust by equitable construction. Illustration.

§ 232. Vendor's lien for the purchase-money of this description. States in which it exists.

§ 233. This lien does not contravene the statute of frauds.

§ 234. The nature of the interest of the vendor under this lien.

§§ 235-237. When the lien exists and when not.

§§ 238, 239. The parties between whom the lien exists.

§ 240. Trust by construction where a conveyance is made that cannot operate at law.

§ 241. Constructive trust where trust property is transferred by gift from the trustee.

§ 242. Constructive trust where a corporation distributes its capital stock without paying its debts.

§ 243. A person holding the legal title as security is a constructive trustee.

§ 244. Executor indebted to the testator's estate is a constructive trustee.

§ 245. A person may become a trustee *de son tort* by construction.

§ 246. An agent may become a constructive trustee.

§ 247. A person holding deeds or papers or property belonging to another may be a constructive trustee.

§ 231. It frequently happens that courts of equity construe a trust to arise from the contracts and dealings of parties, although a trust is not within their contemplation, and there is no fraud, actual or constructive. In this respect, courts of equity proceed in a manner and upon principles entirely unknown to courts of law. Thus, if parties enter into a valid contract for the sale and conveyance of lands, and the vendor neglects or declines to convey, courts of law can only give the vendee an action for damages for a breach of the contract, but the legal title to the property will not be affected: it will still remain in the vendor. A court of equity, however, looks upon that as already done, which was agreed to be done.<sup>1</sup> From the date of the contract it looks upon the beneficial

<sup>1</sup> Fonbl. Eq. Tr. B. 1, c. 6, § 8.

interest as in the vendee, and the legal title only as in the vendor. By construction the vendor holds the legal title in trust for the vendee.<sup>1</sup> Equity proceeds, *in personam*, against the vendor and makes him a trustee, and then orders him to execute the trust by conveying the legal title to the person to whom he has agreed to convey it. The purchaser is in like manner a trustee of the purchase-money, and the court will order him to pay it over, and receive a conveyance of the legal title to the land.<sup>2</sup> And *a fortiori*, if the purchaser has paid the purchase-money the vendor becomes a mere trustee of the legal title for the purchaser;<sup>3</sup> so if the purchaser has paid part of the purchase-money, the vendor becomes a trustee to the extent of the money paid.<sup>4</sup> If the vendor does not own the land, or some part of that which he agrees to convey, and afterwards obtains the title, he will immediately become a trustee for the purchaser.<sup>5</sup> This equity will not be affected by the death or bankruptcy of either party: If the vendor dies before he has conveyed the land, the legal title will descend to his heirs subject to the trust; and they or his legal representatives will be ordered to execute the trust.<sup>6</sup> But the

<sup>1</sup> Wall *v.* Bright, 1 J. & W. 500; Green *v.* Smith, 1 Atk. 572; Davie *v.* Beardsham, 1 Ch. Ca. 39; Atcherley *v.* Vernon, 10 Mod. 518; McKay *v.* Carrington, 1 McLean, 50; Crawford *v.* Bertholf, Saxt. 458; Ten Eyck *v.* Simpson, 1 Sandf. Ch. 244; Kerr *v.* Day, 14 Penn. St. 112; Moore *v.* Burrows, 34 Barb. 173; Adams *v.* Green, *ib.* 176; Wickman *v.* Robinson, 14 Wis. 493; Conway *v.* Kinsworthy, 21 Ark. 9; Dana *v.* Petersham, 107 Mass. 598; Currie *v.* White, 45 N. Y. 822; Reed *v.* Lukens, 44 Penn. St. 200; Lamb *v.* Davenport, 1 Sawyer, 609.

<sup>2</sup> Green *v.* Smith, 1 Atk. 572; Pollexfen *v.* Moore, 3 Atk. 272; Dexter *v.* Stewart, 7 John. Ch. 52.

<sup>3</sup> Waddington *v.* Banks, 1 Brock. 97; Fenno *v.* Sayre, 3 Ala. 458; Brown *v.* East, 5 Mon. 415; Payne *v.* Atterbury, Harring. Ch. 414; Neeson *v.* Clarkson, 4 Hare, 97.

<sup>4</sup> Wythes *v.* Lee, 3 Drew. 396; Westmacott *v.* Robins, 4 De G., F. & J. 390.

<sup>5</sup> Tyson *v.* Passmore, 2 Barr. 122; McCall *v.* Coover, 4 W. & S. 151.

<sup>6</sup> Paul *v.* Wilkins, Toth. 106; Barker *v.* Hill, 2 Ch. R. 113; Winged *v.* Lefebury, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 32, pr. 43; Orlebar *v.* Fletcher, 1 P. Wms. 737; Bowles *v.* Bowles, 6 Ves. 95, n.; Whitworth *v.* Davis, V. & B. 545; Tiernan *v.* Roland, 15 Penn. St. 429; Rutherford *v.* Green, 2 Ired. Eq. 121; Jacobs

lien or trust will not exist where the purchaser by his own fault abandons the contract,<sup>1</sup> or where the contract is for any cause illegal.<sup>2</sup> If the purchaser abandons the contract, because the vendor cannot fulfil it as agreed upon, as if it is to give a good title, the trust or lien will not continue.<sup>3</sup>

§ 232. Similar to this is the constructive lien or trust in favor of a vendor for his unpaid purchase-money; for the vendor of land has a lien on the land for the amount of the purchase-money, not only against the vendee himself and his heirs and other privies in estate, but also against all subsequent purchasers having notice that the purchase-money remains unpaid. To the extent of the lien, the vendee becomes a trustee for the vendor; and the vendee's heirs, and all other persons claiming under him or them with notice, are construed by courts of equity to be trustees. This doctrine is well established in the jurisprudence of England,<sup>4</sup> and it has been recognized, and acted upon, in many of the United States.<sup>5</sup> The

*v. Lake*, ib. 286; *Newton v. Swazey*, 8 N. H. 9; *Glaze v. Drayton*, 1 Dev. 109. In Massachusetts, the Probate Court or the Supreme Judicial Court may authorize the executor or administrator, or the guardian of an insane person, to convey in such cases. Gen. Stat. 1860, c. 117, §§ 5, 6.

<sup>1</sup> *Dinn v. Grant*, 5 De G. & Sm. 451.

<sup>2</sup> *Ewing v. Osbaldiston*, 2 My. & Cr. 88.

<sup>3</sup> *Wythes v. Lee*, 3 Drew. 396.

<sup>4</sup> See *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 329, where Lord Eldon cited and commented upon all the cases previous to that time. See s. c. 1 Lead. Ca. Eq. 336, where the later English cases are quoted and also the American cases. *Lemon v. Whitely*, 4 Rus. 423; *Chapman v. Tanner*, 1 Vern. 267; *Blackburn v. Gregson*, 1 Bro. Ch. 420; *Burgess v. Wheat*, 1 Eden, 211; 1 W. Black. 150.

<sup>5</sup> In Maine the doctrine is entirely rejected as inconsistent with the registry laws and policy of the State. *Philbrook v. Delano*, 29 Me. 415. In New Hampshire the court has left it undecided: *Arlin v. Brown*, 44 N. H. 102, and see *Buntin v. French*, 16 N. H. 592. In Vermont the doctrine was established in an able judgment by Ch. J. Redfield: *Manly v. Slason*, 21 Vt. 271, but abolished by Stat. 1851. In Massachusetts the point is not decided in the State courts: *Wright v. Dame*, 5 Met. 503. Mr. J. Story, in *Gilman v. Brown*, 1 Mason, 191 (1817), said that "nothing



principle upon which the lien depends is this, that a person who has obtained the estate of another ought not, in con-

can be clearer than that by the law of Massachusetts no lien in any case whatsoever exists upon land for the purchase-money. It has no court of chancery to recognize and enforce such a lien, and the peculiar principles and doctrines of courts of equity have never been adopted into its jurisprudence." Since then the Supreme Judicial Court has full equity powers according to the chancery jurisdiction in England (Stat. 1855). There is now no obstacle to the remedy, if the court should establish the doctrine. In Connecticut it is undecided: *Atwood v. Vincent*, 17 Conn. 575. See *Watson v. Wells*, 5 Conn. 468; *Dean v. Dean*, 6 Conn. 285; *Meigs v. Dimock*, 6 Conn. 458; *Chapman v. Beardsley*, 31 Conn. 115. In New York it is well established: *Stafford v. Van Renselaer*, 9 Cow. 316; *Garrison v. Green*, 1 John. Ch. 308; *White v. Williams*, 1 Paige, Ch. 502; *Fish v. Howland*, ib. 20; *Warner v. Van Alstyne*, 3 ib. 513; *Shirly v. Sugar Ref.* 2 Edw. Ch. 505; *Dubois v. Hall*, 43 Barb. 26; *Warren v. Fenn*, 28 ib. 333; *Champion v. Brown*, 6 John. 402. In New Jersey, also: *Vandoren v. Todd*, 2 Green, Ch. 397; *Brinkerhoff v. Vansciven*, 3 Green, Ch. 251; *Herbert v. Scofield*, 1 Stock. Ch. 492. In Pennsylvania the doctrine is rejected, though there may be such a conditional title conveyed, as will give the vendor a preference for the purchase-money over all others claiming under the vendee: *Irvine v. Campbell*, 6 Binn. 118; *Stouffer v. Coleman*, 1 Yeates, 393; *Kauffelt v. Bower*, 7 S. & R. 64; *Bear v. Whisler*, 7 Watts, 147; *Semple v. Burd*, 7 S. & R. 286; *Zentmyer v. Miltower*, 5 Penn. St. 403; *Stephens's App.* 38 Penn. St. 9; *Springer v. Walters*, 34 Penn. St. 328; *Hepburn v. Snyder*, 3 Penn. St. 72; *Megargel v. Saul*, 3 Whar. 19; *Cook v. Trimble*, 9 Watts, 15; *Heist v. Baker*, 49 Penn. St. 9; *Straus's App.* ib. 353. In Delaware the point is undecided: *Budd v. Basti*, 1 Harr. 69. In Maryland it is well established: *White v. Casanave*, 1 Har. & J. 106; *Ghiselin v. Ferguson*, 4 Har. & J. 522; *Pratt v. Van Wyck*, 6 Gill & J. 495; *Magruder v. Peter*, 11 Gill & J. 217; *Repp v. Repp*, 12 Gill & J. 341; *Moreton v. Harrison*, 1 Bland, Ch. 491; *Carr v. Hobbs*, 11 Md. 285; *Hummer v. Schott*, 21 Md. 307; *Hall v. Jones*, ib. 439; *Bratt v. Bratt*, ib. 578. In Virginia it was long acted upon: *Graves v. McCall*, 1 Call, 414; *Handley v. Lyons*, 5 Munf. 342; *Duvall v. Bibb*, 4 Hen. & M. 113; *Hatcher v. Hatcher*, 1 Rand. 53; *Redford v. Gibson*, 12 Leigh, 332. But it is now abolished by the code: *Yancy v. Manck*, 15 Grat. 300; *Hempfield R.R. Co. v. Thornbury*, 1 West Va. 261. In North Carolina, after being acted upon for some time, it was overruled: *Cameron v. Mason*, 7 Ired. Eq. 180; *Gabee v. Sneed*, 1 Dev. & B. 333; *Wamble v. Battle*, 3 Ired. Eq. 182; *Henderson v. Burton*, 3 Ired. Eq. 259. In South Carolina it was never acted upon: *Wragg v. Comptroller Gen.* 2 Des. 509. In Georgia it is acted upon: *Marine Fire Ins. Co. v. Early*, Charl. 279; *Hampden v. Miller*, Dud. 120; *Mounce v. Byars*, 16 Ga. 469; *Chance v. McWharter*, 26 Ga.

science, to keep it, and not pay the consideration money in full; and a third person, who receives the estate with full knowledge that it has not been paid for, ought not, as a matter of equity,

315; *Stile v. Griffin*, 27 Ga. 504; *Mims v. Lockett*, 23 Ga. 237; *Mims v. Macon and Western Railroad*, 3 Kelly, 333. Also in Florida: *Woods v. Bailey*, 3 Flor. 41. And so in Alabama: *Burns v. Taylor*, 23 Ala. 255; *Haley v. Bennett*, 5 Porter, 452; *Roper v. McCook*, 7 Ala. 318; *Griffin v. Camack*, 36 Ala. 695. So in Mississippi: *Trotter v. Erwin*, 27 Miss. 772; *Stewart v. Ives*, 1 Sm. & M. 197; *Tanner v. Hicks*, 4 Sm. & M. 294; *Upshaw v. Hargrave*, 6 S. & M. 286; *Dunlop v. Burnett*, 5 S. & M. 702; *Servis v. Beatty*, 32 Miss. 52. It is established in Texas: *Pinchain v. Col-lard*, 13 Tex. 333; *Wheeler v. Lane*, 21 Tex. 583; *McAlpin v. Burnett*, 23 Tex. 649. So in Arkansas: *English v. Russell*, Hemp. 35; *Scott v. Orbin-son*, 2 Ark. 202; *Shall v. Biscoe*, 18 Ark. 142. So in Missouri: *Marsh v. Turner*, 4 Mo. 53; *McKnight v. Brady*, 2 Mo. 110; *Davis v. Lamb*, 30 Mo. 441; *Bledsoe v. Games*, ib. 448; *Delassus v. Poston*, 19 Mo. 425. So in Tennessee: *Brown v. Vanlier*, 7 Humph. 239; *Eskridge v. McClure*, 2 Yerg. 84; *Marshall v. Christmas*, 3 Humph. 616; *Campbell v. Baldwin*, 2 Humph. 248; *Uzzell v. Mack*, 4 Humph. 319; *Medley v. Davis*, 5 Humph. 387; *Norvell v. Johnson*, ib. 489; *Taylor v. Hunter*, ib. 569. So in Ken-tucky: *Muir v. Cross*, 10 B. Mon. 277; *Fowler v. Rust*, 2 A. K. Marsh. 294; *Taylor v. Alloway*, 2 Lit. 216; *Mosely v. Garrett*, 1 J. J. Marsh. 212; *Richardson v. Baker*, 5 J. J. Marsh. 323; *Cox v. Fenwick*, 3 Bibb, 183. So in Ohio: *Williams v. Roberts*, 5 Ohio, 35; *Tiernan v. Bean*, 2 Ham. 383; *Magham v. Coombs*, 14 Ohio, 428; *Neil v. Kinney*, 11 Ohio St. 58. So in Indiana: *McCarty v. Pruet*, 4 Ind. 46; *Lagow v. Badollet*, 1 Blackf. 416; *Evans v. Goodlett*, ib. 246; *Merritt v. Wiles*, 18 Ind. 171; *Cox v. Wood*, 20 Ind. 54. So in Illinois: *Trustees v. Wright*, 11 Ill. 603. So in Michigan: *Sears v. Smith*, 2 Mich. 243; *Carroll v. Van Renselaer*, Harring. Ch. 225. Also in Iowa: *Pierson v. David*, 1 Io. 23; *Rakestraw v. Hamilton*, 14 Io. 147; *Patterson v. Linder*, ib. 414; *Tupple v. Viers*, ib. 515; *Grapen-together v. Fejervary*, 9 Io. 163; *Hays v. Horine*, 12 Io. 61. So in Wiscon-sin: *Toby v. McAllister*, 9 Wis. 463. Also in Minnesota: *Daughaday v. Payne*, 6 Min. 443. In Kansas there is no lien: *Simpson v. Munder*, 3 Kansas, 172. The lien exists in California: *Truebody v. Jacobson*, 2 Cal. 269; *Taylor v. McKinney*, 20 Cal. 618; *Baum v. Grigsby*, 21 Cal. 172; *Sparks v. Hess*, 15 Cal. 186; *Walker v. Sedgwick*, 8 Cal. 398; *Cahoon v. Robinson*, 6 Cal. 225; *Salmon v. Hoffman*, 2 Cal. 138; *Burt v. Wilson*, 28 Cal. 632; *Baum v. Grigsby*, 21 Cal. 172. The same doctrine is held in the courts of the United States: *Chilton v. Braiden*, 2 Black, 458; *Gilman v. Brown*, 1 Mason, 191; 4 Wheat. 255; *Bayley v. Greenleaf*, 7 Wheat. 46; *Bush v. Marshall*, 6 How. 284; *Galloway v. Finley*, 12 Pet. 264; *Mc-Learn v. McLellan*, 10 Pet. 640; *Cole v. Scott*, 2 Wash. 141.

to be allowed to keep it without paying for it.<sup>1</sup> It will at once be seen, that, as between the parties, this lien is founded in natural justice.<sup>2</sup> The civil law gave a lien on both real and personal property to the vendor for the purchase-money,<sup>3</sup> and the principle was early introduced into English equity, as to real estate.<sup>4</sup> Courts administer the equity by converting the purchaser into a trustee.<sup>5</sup> They, in effect, say, that if one conveys his land and takes no security for the purchase-money, the purchaser shall be a trustee of the land for the vendor until it is paid.<sup>5</sup>

§ 233. It has been objected that the creation of this lien or trust by courts of equity, is a repeal of the statute of frauds. It is answered, that the raising of such a trust is no more in contravention of the statute than the creation of any other resulting or constructive trust by operation of law upon the acts and contracts of parties, where they do not contemplate or intend a trust.<sup>6</sup> It is further objected, in the United States, that the raising of such trusts is contrary to the policy of the registry laws which require all deeds and liens to be matter of record.<sup>7</sup> But, as between the parties, the raising of a trust to secure the purchase-money, is no more against the policy of the registry laws than is the raising of a resulting trust to secure the actual purchaser, where the deed is taken in the name of another, or the raising of a constructive trust where one man has defrauded another of his title. In either case there is a secret trust that does not appear upon the records of

<sup>1</sup> *Hughes v. Kearney*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 135; *Chilton v. Braiden*, 2 Black, 458.

<sup>2</sup> *Inst. Lib. 2*, tit. 1, § 41; *Blackburn v. Gregson*, 1 Cox, 100; *Chapman v. Tanner*, 1 Vern. 267.

<sup>3</sup> *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 337.

<sup>4</sup> *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 337; *Dig. Lib. 18*, tit. 1. c. 19, 22, 53; *Domat*, B. 3, tit. 1, § 5, art. 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*; *Blackburn v. Gregson*, 1 Bro. Ch. 420; *Walker Am. Law*, 315.

<sup>6</sup> *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 329; *Manly v. Slason*, 15 Vt. 271.

<sup>7</sup> *Philbrook v. Delano*, 29 Me. 415.

the registry. So, as against third persons who take the land with notice that the purchase-money is unpaid, the policy of the registry laws applies in the same manner that it applies to other unrecorded deeds or liens.<sup>1</sup> Thus, if a second purchaser or mortgagee has notice of a prior sale or mortgage for a valuable consideration, he cannot, by putting his deed or mortgage first on record, deprive the prior purchaser or mortgagee of his title or security.<sup>2</sup> It is, however, true that many courts have looked upon this trust with disfavor, although they have recognized its existence,<sup>3</sup> and some States have formally abolished it by statute.<sup>3</sup> While other courts deem it highly equitable, and eminently consistent with the most perfect ideas of moral justice.<sup>4</sup>

§ 234. In most cases the *cestui que trust* has an equitable estate in the land to which his trust attaches, an estate which he may sell, assign, or devise; but a vendor having only a lien for his purchase-money, has no estate in the land. It is neither *jus in re* nor *jus ad rem*. It is the mere possibility of a right, until it is established by a final decree of a court in each case.<sup>5</sup> It is not a direct trust in the land itself, but a collateral trust for the security of the debt. It is in fact a remedy for a debt, and not a right of property. It follows, that the remedy can be enforced only so long as the debt can be enforced; that where an action for the purchase-money is gone, the right to enforce the lien, or the lien itself, is gone also. This lien or trust continues so long as the purchase-money remains unpaid, or so long as an action can be maintained for its collection. If the action is barred by the statute of limitations, the remedy

<sup>1</sup> Manly v. Slason, 21 Vt. 271.

<sup>2</sup> Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. 51; Conover v. Warren, 1 Gil. 502; Brawley v. Catron, 8 Leigh, 527; Moore v. Halcombe, 3 Leigh, 600.

<sup>3</sup> Vermont and Virginia, *ut sup.*

<sup>4</sup> Manly v. Slason, 21 Vt. 278.

<sup>5</sup> Gilman v. Brown, 1 Mason, 21; 1 Lead. Ca. in Eq. 272-275; Williams v. Young, 17 Cal. 403; 21 Cal. 227.

to enforce the lien is gone also.<sup>1</sup> In this respect the vendor's lien differs from a mortgage, which may be enforced against the land after all right to enforce the debt against the mortgagor is barred by the statute of limitations, or by his discharge in Bankruptcy. If a *cestui que trust* conveys his equitable estate in land, he will have the same lien upon it for the purchase-money as in the case of a legal estate.<sup>2</sup>

§ 235. The lien exists, notwithstanding the deed recites<sup>3</sup> or acknowledges<sup>4</sup> that the consideration is paid, and notwithstanding a receipt of the payment is indorsed upon the back of the deed,<sup>5</sup> if in fact it is not paid. And if the consideration is not to be paid until after the death of the grantor, and then only upon a contingency, as if no claim for dower is made in the mean time, the lien will arise;<sup>6</sup> but if the consideration of the sale is something other than money, as if the vendor makes the sale for the consideration of his future support, no lien will arise;<sup>7</sup> nor if in consideration that his debts are paid;<sup>8</sup> nor if

<sup>1</sup> *Borst v. Corey*, 15 N. Y. 505; *Sheratz v. Nicodemus*, 7 Yerg. 9; *Trotter v. Erwin*, 27 Miss. 772; *Addams v. Hefferman*, 9 Watts, 530; *Alexander v. McMurray*, 8 Watts, 504. But in Maryland it was held to be a direct trust and property in the land like a mortgage which could be enforced after the personal obligation of the vendee was gone. *Moreton v. Harrison*, 1 Bland, 491; *Lingan v. Henderson*, ib. 236. And see *Relfe v. Relfe*, 34 Ala. 500.

<sup>2</sup> *Iglehart v. Armiger*, 1 Bland, 519; *Galloway v. Hamilton*, 1 Dana, 576; *Lignon v. Alexander*, 7 J. J. Marsh. 288; *Stewart v. Hatton*, 3 J. J. Marsh. 178. But see *Bayley v. Greenleaf*, 7 Wheat. 46; *Schnebley v. Ragan*, 7 Gill & J. 120.

<sup>3</sup> *Thornton v. Knox*, 6 B. Mon. 74; *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 337; *Hughes v. Kearney*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 135; *Winter v. Anson*, 3 Russ. 488; 1 Sim. & S. 434; *Saunders v. Leslie*, 2 B. & B. 514.

<sup>4</sup> *Gilman v. Brown*, 1 Mason, C. C. 214; *Sheratz v. Nicodemus*, 7 Yerg. 9; *Ewbank v. Poston*, 5 Mon. 287; *Redford v. Gibson*, 12 Leigh, 344; *Tribble v. Oldham*, 5 J. J. Marsh. 144.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Redford v. Catron*, 8 Leigh, 528.

<sup>7</sup> *Arlin v. Brown*, 44 N. H. 105; *McCandlish v. Keen*, 13 Grat. 615; *Brawley v. Catron*, 8 Leigh, 528; *McKillip v. McKillip*, 8 Barb. 552.

<sup>8</sup> *Chapman v. Beardley*, 3 Conn. 115.

the amount of the consideration is uncertain and unliquidated.<sup>1</sup> Nor if it appears that the consideration is that the vendee shall enter into covenants to do certain things.<sup>2</sup> If a note or bond is taken for the consideration, and include any thing other than the price of the land sold, the lien will not attach.<sup>3</sup>

§ 236. Where a vendor takes security for the purchase-money, it is often a difficult question to determine whether he has thereby abandoned or waived his lien. Much of the litigation upon vendor's liens has arisen over this question, — whether the lien was abandoned or not by the parties. Of course, it is a pure question of fact or intention. By the civil law, the taking of any kind of security was an abandonment of the lien upon the property; this rule has not prevailed in England. The rule in England is, that *prima facie* the vendor has a lien for the purchase-money: the presumption in favor of this lien continues until it is displaced by satisfactory evidence that the lien has been abandoned or extinguished. The burden is on the vendee to repel the presumption. The taking of security by the vendor is evidence upon that question, more or less satisfactory according to the nature of the security taken and the circumstances under which it is taken.<sup>4</sup> It has been held that the taking of a mortgage on another estate was not conclusive evidence that the lien was abandoned;<sup>5</sup> and so, bills or notes indorsed by third persons, or bonds with a surety,

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Buckland v. Pocknell, 13 Sim. 406; Dixon v. Gayfere, 17 Beav. 421; 21 Beav. 118; Clarke v. Boyce, 3 Sim. 499; Parrott v. Sweetland, 3 My. & K. 655. In Alabama the lien was held to arise in case of an exchange of lands. Burns v. Taylor, 23 Ala. 255.

<sup>3</sup> McCandlish v. Keen, 13 Grat. 605; James v. Bird, 8 Leigh, 51.

<sup>4</sup> Nairn v. Prowse, 6 Ves. 759; Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 342; Garson v. Green, 1 John. Ch. 308; Lewis v. Caperton, 8 Grat. 148; Plowman v. Riddle, 14 Ala. 169; Hughes v. Kearney, 1 Sch. & Lef. 136; Saunders v. Leslie, 2 B. & B. 514; Bradford v. Marvin, 2 Flor. 463.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.; Saunders v. Leslie, 2 B. & B. 514.

are not necessarily conclusive evidence that the vendor in taking them waives his lien.<sup>1</sup> It may be, in such cases, that the vendor accepted them as evidences of the amount of the purchase-money and debt, or as security in addition to his lien. But, if the security taken is totally distinct and independent, it will be very strong evidence that it was intended to be substituted in place of the lien;<sup>2</sup> and if it is in any way inconsistent with the continued existence of the lien, it will, of course, be conclusive evidence that the lien was abandoned or extinguished.<sup>3</sup> Lord Eldon, after a careful review of the authorities, came to the conclusion that every case depended upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances; that different judges would have determined the same case differently; and that there was no general rule that was satisfactory; and he adds, "If I had found it laid down in distinct and inflexible terms, that when the vendor takes security for the consideration he has no lien, that would be satisfactory."<sup>4</sup>

§ 237. In the United States, the rule that Lord Eldon said would be satisfactory, substantially prevails. Thus, if the vendor does any act which manifests an intention to rely upon any security independent of the lien, he will be held to have

<sup>1</sup> *Hughes v. Kearney*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 135; *Gibbons v. Baddall*, 2 Eq. Ab. 682; *Grant v. Mills*, 2 Ves. & B. 306; *Cooper v. Spottiswood*, Taml. 21; *Ex parte Peake*, 1 Madd. 349; *Ex parte Loring*, 2 Rose, 79; *Saunders v. Leslie*, 2 B. & B. 514; *Winter v. Anson*, 3 Russ. 488; 1 S. & S. 434; *Fawell v. Heelis*, Amb. 724; *Frail v. Ellis*, 17 Eng. L. & Eq. 457; *Buckland v. Pocknell*, 13 Sim. 406; *Blair v. Bromley*, 5 Hare, 542; 2 Phil. 354; *Hewitt v. Loosemore*, 9 Hare, 449; *Kyles v. Tait*, 6 Grat. 44; *Blackburn v. Gregson*, 1 Bro. Ch. 420; *Coppin v. Coppin*, 2 P. Wms. 291; *Clark v. Royle*, 3 Sim. 499; *Elliott v. Edwards*, 3 Bos. & P. 181.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*; *Gilman v. Brown*, 1 Mason, 191; *Cood v. Pollard*, 9 Price, 544; 10 Price, 109; *Parrott v. Sweetland*, 3 My. & K. 655; *Nairn v. Prowse*, 6 Ves. 752; *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 342.

<sup>3</sup> *Manly v. Slason*, 21 Vt. 271; *Hallock v. Smith*, 3 Barb. 267; *Ex parte Parkes*, 1 Glyn & Jam. 228.

<sup>4</sup> *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 342

waived it;<sup>1</sup> as if he accept a mortgage on other property,<sup>2</sup> or a bond or note with a third person as surety<sup>3</sup> or indorser,<sup>4</sup> or if he takes a pledge of stock as collateral,<sup>5</sup> he will be held to have waived his lien. So if he takes a mortgage on the same land sold for part of the purchase-money, or for the whole,<sup>6</sup> he will be held to have waived his lien for the remainder.<sup>7</sup> But in these cases the presumption that the vendor intended to waive his lien by taking such securities may be rebutted by any satisfactory evidence that it was not intended that the lien should be waived.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, the presumption of a lien may be rebutted, though no security is taken, by satisfactory evidence that it was intended that the lien should not be

<sup>1</sup> *Blackburn v. Gregson*, 1 Bro. Ch. 424, and notes by Perkins: *Buntin v. French*, 16 N. H. 592; *Coit v. Fougere*, 36 Barb. 195; *Griffin v. Blanchard*, 17 Cal. 70; *Phelps v. Conover*, 25 Ill. 309; *Selby v. Stanley*, 4 Min. 65; *Hane v. Van Deusen*, 32 Barb. 92; *Parker v. Sewell*, 24 Tex. 238; *Dibble v. Mitchell*, 15 Ind. 435.

<sup>2</sup> *Richardson v. Ridgely*, 8 Gill & J. 87; *White v. Dougherty*, 1 Mart. & Y. 309; *Young v. Wood*, 11 B. Mon. 123; *Mattix v. Weand*, 19 Ind. 151; *Harris v. Harlan*, 14 Ind. 104; *Shelby v. Perrin*, 18 Tex. 515; *Camden v. Vail*, 23 Cal. 633; *Hadley v. Pickett*, 25 Ind. 450.

<sup>3</sup> *Boon v. Murphy*, 6 Blackf. 272; *Williams v. Roberts*, 5 Ohio, 35; *Mayham v. Coombes*, 14 Ohio, 428; *Wilson v. Graham*, 5 Munf. 297; *Francis v. Hazelrigg's Ex'rs*, Hardin, 48; *Way v. Patty*, 1 Carter, 102; *Burger v. Potter*, 32 Ill. 66; *Sears v. Smith*, 2 Mich. 243; *Porter v. Dubuque*, 20 Io. 440.

<sup>4</sup> *Foster v. Trustees*, 3 Ala. 302; *Gilman v. Brown*, 1 Mason, 191; 4 Wheat. 255; *Marshall v. Christmas*, 3 Humph. 616; *Burke v. Gray*, 6 How. (Miss.) 527; *Conover v. Warren*, 1 Gilm. 498; *Bradford v. Marvin*, 2 Flor. 463.

<sup>5</sup> *Lagow v. Badollet*, 1 Blackf. 416.

<sup>6</sup> *Little v. Brown*, 2 Leigh, 355; *Hadley v. Pickett*, 25 Ind. 450. But see to the contrary, *Boos v. Ewing*, 17 Ohio, 520; *Baum v. Grigsby*, 21 Cal. 172.

<sup>7</sup> *Brown v. Gilman*, 4 Wheat. 291; *Fish v. Howland*, 1 Paige, 30; *Phillips v. Saunderson*, 1 S. & M. 465. Even if the mortgage is void. *Camden v. Vail*, 23 Cal. 633; *Way v. Patty*, 1 Ind. 102.

<sup>8</sup> *Mims v. Macon and Western R.R.* 3 Kelly, 333; *Campbell v. Baldwin*, 2 Humph. 248; *Kyles v. Tait*, 6 Grat. 48; *Tiernan v. Thurman*, 14 B. Mon. 277; *Sears v. Smith*, 2 Mich. 243; *Daughaday v. Paine*, 6 Minn. 443.



relied on.<sup>1</sup> But, generally, the mere taking of the vendee's note, or bond, or bill, or check,<sup>2</sup> or the renewal of these evidences of debt,<sup>3</sup> will not be sufficient evidence that the vendor intended to waive his lien.<sup>4</sup> But any conduct in the vendor that makes it unjust, unfair, or inequitable for him to insist upon the lien, will discharge it.<sup>5</sup> If worthless securities are fraudulently imposed upon the vendor, he will retain his lien.<sup>6</sup>

§ 238. It has been said before, that the lien for the purchase-money is not an estate in the land, nor is it a charge on the land; but it is an equity between the parties, their representatives or privies in law or estate, to be resorted to in case of failure of payment by the vendee. It is a possibility that may be perfected by proceedings in equity, into an actual estate or interest in the land.<sup>7</sup> Having such a character, it is generally considered to be a personal privilege in the vendor, which descends to his heirs or representatives with the debt for the purchase-money, but which cannot be assigned to a third person, with or without the bond, note, bill, or check which the

<sup>1</sup> *Clark v. Hunt*, 3 J. J. Marsh. 553; *Phillips v. Saunderson*, 1 S. & M. 462; *Redford v. Gibson*, 12 Leigh, 332; *Scott v. Orbinson*, 21 Ark. 202.

<sup>2</sup> *Honore v. Bakewell*, 6 B. Mon. 67; *Baum v. Grigsby*, 21 Cal. 172; *Walker v. Sedgwick*, 8 Cal. 398.

<sup>3</sup> *Mims v. Lockett*, 23 Ga. 237.

<sup>4</sup> *Cox v. Fenwick*, 3 Bibb, 183; *Evans v. Goodlet*, 1 Blackf. 246; *Taylor v. Hunter*, 5 Humph. 569; *Garson v. Green*, 1 John. Ch. 308; *White v. Williams*, 1 Paige, 502; *Clark v. Hunt*, 3 J. J. Marsh. 553; *Thornton v. Knox*, 6 B. Mon. 74; *Aldridge v. Dunn*, 7 Blackf. 249; *Ross v. Whitson*, 6 Yerg. 50; *Tompkins v. Mitchell*, 2 Rand. 428; *Truebody v. Jacobson*, 2 Cal. 269; *Pinchain v. Collard*, 13 Tex. 333; *Sheratz v. Nicodemus*, 7 Yerg. 9; *Manly v. Slason*, 2 Vt. 271; *Baum v. Grigsby*, 21 Cal. 172.

<sup>5</sup> *Redford v. Gibson*, 12 Leigh, 343; *Fowler v. Rust*, 2 Marsh. 294; *Clark v. Hunt*, 3 J. J. Marsh. 558; *Phillips v. Saunderson*, 1 S. & M. 462; *McCown v. Jones*, 14 Tex. 682; *Scott v. Orbinson*, 21 Ark. 202; *Clamer v. Rawlings*, 9 S. & M. 122; *Lynch v. Dearth*, 2 Penn. 101.

<sup>6</sup> *Coit v. Fougere*, 36 Barb. 195; *Toby v. McAllister*, 9 Wis. 463.

<sup>7</sup> *Young v. Williams*, 17 Cal. 403; 21 Cal. 227; *Keith v. Horner*, 32 Ill. 524.

vendee gave for the consideration.<sup>1</sup> If one of several purchasers pays the whole purchase-money, he does not thereby secure a lien on his co-purchasers' shares;<sup>2</sup> nor does a lien accrue to a third person who loans the purchase-money to the vendee and takes his note therefor;<sup>3</sup> but if it is agreed by the vendor that a note for the purchase-money shall be given to a third person, it seems that the vendor's lien will go with the note.<sup>4</sup> If the note given to the vendor for the purchase-money is indorsed by him, and afterwards paid by him, his lien will revive and attach to it.<sup>5</sup> If a surety to the vendee's note or

<sup>1</sup> *Dixon v. Dixon*, 1 Md. Ch. 220; *Wellborn v. Williams*, 8 Ga. 258; *Green v. Demoss*, 10 Humph. 371; *Walker v. Williams*, 30 Miss. 165; *Briggs v. Hill*, 6 How. (Miss.) 362; *Shall v. Biscoe*, 18 Ark. 142; *Brush v. Kinsley*, 14 Ohio, 20; *Horton v. Horner*, 14 Ohio, 437; *Sheratz v. Nico-demus*, 7 Yerg. 9; *Gann v. Chester*, 5 ib. 205; *White v. Williams*, 1 Paige, 502; *Hallock v. Smith*, 3 Barb. 267; *Green v. Crockett*, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 390; *Moreton v. Harrison*, 1 Bland, 491; *Webb v. Robinson*, 14 Ga. 216; *Dickinson v. Chase*, 1 Morris (Io.), 492; *Jackman v. Hallock*, 1 Ohio, 318; *Tiernan v. Beam*, 2 Ohio, 383; *Clairhorn v. Crockett*, 3 Yerg. 27; *Briggs v. Planters' Bank*, 1 Freem. Ch. 574; *Iglehart v. Amiger*, 1 Bland, 519; *Hayden v. Stuart*, 4 Md. Ch. 280; *Hall v. Maccubbin*, 6 Gill & J. 107; *Baum v. Grigsby*, 21 Cal. 172; *Lewis v. Covilland*, ib. 178; *Williams v. Young*, ib. 227; *Keith v. Horner*, 32 Ill. 524; *Richards v. Leaming*, 27 Ill. 431; *Watson v. Bane*, 7 Md. 117; *Dixon v. Dixon*, 1 Md. Ch. 220. But in Alabama, Texas, Kentucky, Indiana, and Iowa, a different rule prevails. In those States, the assignment of the note given for the purchase-money carries with it to the assignee the vendor's lien. *Roper v. McCook*, 7 Ala. 318; *White v. Stover*, 10 Ala. 441; *Grigsby v. Hair*, 25 Ala. 327; *Griffin v. Camack*, 36 Ala. 695; *Murray v. Able*, 18 Tex. 515; *McAlpin v. Burnett*, 19 Tex. 497; *Moore v. Raymond*, 15 Tex. 554; *Edwards v. Bohannon*, 2 Dana, 98; *Honore v. Bakewell*, 6 B. Mon. 67; *Lagow v. Badollet*, 1 Blackf. 417; *Brumfield v. Palmer*, 7 ib. 227; *Fisher v. Johnson*, 5 Ind. 492; *Kern v. Hazlerigg*, 11 Ind. 443; *Rakestraw v. Hamilton*, 14 Io. 147; *Pierson v. David*, 1 Clarke, 23.

<sup>2</sup> *Glasscock v. Glasscock*, 17 Tex. 480.

<sup>3</sup> *Stansell v. Roberts*, 13 Ohio, 148; *Skeggs v. Nelson*, 25 Miss. 88; *Crane v. Caldwell*, 14 Ill. 468.

<sup>4</sup> *Dryden v. Frost*, 3 My. & Cr. 670. In this case the third person was a prior mortgagee, and had the title-deeds in his possession. *Colcord v. Scamonds*, 5 B. Mon. 265.

<sup>5</sup> 1 Lead. Ca. in Eq. 368.

bond for the purchase-money is obliged to pay the debt, he will be subrogated to the vendor's lien, and will have a right to have it enforced for his benefit.<sup>1</sup> If a vendor having a lien on real estate for his purchase-money enforces his debt against the personal assets of a deceased vendee, and thereby deprives creditors or legatees of the deceased vendee of the chance of being paid their debts or legacies, equity will substitute them in the place of the vendor, or will marshal the assets in order to do justice to all.<sup>2</sup>

§ 239. This equitable lien or trust prevails against the purchaser, his heirs, and all persons claiming under him or them with notice that the purchase-money is unpaid.<sup>3</sup> It prevails against the right of dower of the widow of the vendee,<sup>4</sup> also against a voluntary donee, or a purchaser without notice,<sup>5</sup> as also against a purchaser for value, if he had notice that the purchase-money remained unpaid.<sup>6</sup> If the purchaser from the

<sup>1</sup> *Kleiser v. Scott*, 6 Dana, 137; *Welch v. Parran*, 2 Gill, 329; *Ghiselin v. Ferguson*, 4 Har. & J. 522; *Magruder v. Peter*, 11 Gill & J. 228; *Burke v. Chrisman*, 3 B. Mon. 50; *Freeman v. Mebane*, 2 Jones, Eq. 44; *Jordan v. Hudson*, 11 Tex. 82; *Eddy v. Traver*, 6 Paige, 521; *In re McGill*, 6 Barr, 504; *Kinney v. Harvey*, 2 Leigh, 70; *Haffey v. Birchetts*, 11 Leigh, 83; *Schermerhorn v. Barhydt*, 9 Paige, 30; *Tompkins v. Mitchell*, 2 Rand. 428; *Melery v. Cooper*, 2 Bland, 199.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Sug. V. & P. 873-878 (7th Am. ed), where the cases are collected and commented on.

<sup>3</sup> *Hearle v. Botelers*, Cary, Ch. 25; *Mackreth v. Symmons*, 15 Ves. 329; *Gibbons v. Baddall*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 682; *Walker v. Preswick*, 2 Ves. 622; *Elliot v. Edwards*, 3 Bos. & P. 181; *Winter v. Anson*, 3 Russ. 493; *Garson v. Green*, 1 John. Ch. 308; *Warner v. Van Alstyne*, 3 Paige, 513; *Wade v. Greenwood*, 2 Robin. 475; *Ewbank v. Poston*, 5 Mon. 285; *Neil v. Kinney*, 11 Ohio St. 58.

<sup>4</sup> *Warner v. Van Alstyne*, 3 Paige, 513; *Wilson v. Davison*, 2 Rob. 385; *Ellicott v. Welch*, 2 Bland, 243; *Nazareth, &c. v. Lowe*, 1 B. Mon. 257; *Fisher v. Johnson*, 5 Ind. 492; *Crane v. Palmer*, 8 Blackf. 120; *Williams v. Wood*, 1 Humph. 408; *Besland v. Hewett*, 11 S. & M. 164.

<sup>5</sup> *Upshaw v. Hargrave*, 6 S. & M. 286; *High v. Batte*, 10 Yerg. 186, 335; *Mounce v. Byars*, 16 Ga. 469; *Burlingame v. Robbins*, 21 Barb. 327; *Hallock v. Smith*, 3 Barb. 267.

<sup>6</sup> *Wilcox v. Calloway*, 1 Wash. 38; *Graves v. McCall*, 1 Call, 414;

vendee has not paid over the purchase-money, equity will attach the lien or trust to the money in his hands.<sup>1</sup> But a *bona fide* purchaser for value from the vendee, without notice, will take the estate unaffected by the trust or lien;<sup>2</sup> or if by intermediate conveyances through persons who have notice, the estate finally comes to a *bona fide* purchaser for value without notice, it will be discharged of the lien.<sup>3</sup> A *bona fide* purchaser is defined to be one who at the time of his purchase advances a new consideration, surrenders some security, or does some other act which leaves him in a worse position if his purchase should be set aside;<sup>4</sup> of course, a mortgagee without notice for a new consideration comes within this definition.<sup>5</sup> So, a conveyance or mortgage to individual creditors without notice is held to prevail against the lien, as where the equities are equal the legal title prevails.<sup>6</sup> But the lien prevails against assignees

Redford v. Gibson, 12 Leigh, 332; Wright v. Woodland, 10 Gill & J. 388; Ghiselin v. Ferguson, 4 Har. & J. 522; Mounce v. Byars, 14 Ga. 180; Thornton v. Knox, 6 B. Mon. 74; Honore v. Bakewell, ib. 67; Tiernan v. Thurman, 14 B. Mon. 279; Eskridge v. McClure, 2 Yerg. 84; Sheratz v. Nicodemus, 7 Yerg. 9; Pierce v. Gates, 7 Blackf. 162; Brumfield v. Palmer, ib. 227; McKnight v. Brady, 2 Mo. 110; Briscoe v. Bronaugh, 1 Tex. 326; Pintard v. Goodloe, Hemp. 527; Amory v. Reilly, 9 Ind. 490; Manly v. Slason, 21 Vt. 271; Hallock v. Smith, 3 Barb. 267; Cator v. Pembroke, 1 Bro. Ch. 302; Ewbank v. Poston, 5 Mon. 291; McAlpin v. Burnett, 19 Tex. 497; Pierson v. David, 1 Clarke, 23; Grapengether v. Fejervary, 9 Io. 163; Merritt v. Wells, 18 Ind. 171.

<sup>1</sup> Ripperdon v. Cozine, 8 B. Mon. 465.

<sup>2</sup> Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. 46; Clark v. Hunt, 3 J. J. Marsh. 553; Duval v. Bibb, 4 Hen. & M. 113; Wood v. Bank of Kentucky, 5 Mon. 194; Blights, &c. v. Bank, &c., 6 Mon. 192; Taylor v. Hunter, 5 Humph. 569; Stewart v. Ives, 1 S. & M. 197; Carnes v. Hubbard, 2 S. & M. 108; Dunlop v. Burnett, 5 S. & M. 702; Work v. Brayton, 5 Ind. 396; Carter v. Bank of Georgia, 24 Ala. 37; Bradford v. Harper, 25 Ala. 337; Webb v. Robinson, 14 Ga. 216; Champion v. Brown, 6 John. Ch. 402; Collier v. Harkness, 26 Ga. 362; Selby v. Stanley, 4 Miss. 65; Scott v. Orbinson, 21 Ark. 202.

<sup>3</sup> Boon v. Barnes, 23 Miss. 136.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Duval v. Bibb, 4 Hen. & M. 113; Wood v. Bank of Kentucky, 5 Mon. 194; Clark v. Hunt, 3 J. J. Marsh. 553; Growing v. Behn, 10 B. Mon. 383.

<sup>6</sup> Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. 56; Mitford v. Mitford, 9 Ves. 100;

in bankruptcy or insolvency, and against a general assignment by a failing debtor, in trust for all his creditors. In these cases the vendees are looked upon as volunteers, and, as such, they have the rights only of the debtor himself.<sup>1</sup> Notice to the agent of the purchaser is notice to the purchaser,<sup>2</sup> and if the vendor remain in possession it will be sufficient to put a purchaser upon his inquiry and is constructive notice,<sup>3</sup> and any fact that would put a reasonable man upon his inquiry will affect the purchaser with notice.<sup>4</sup> So, if a purchaser knows that a part of the purchase-money is unpaid, he is put upon his inquiry;<sup>5</sup> and such purchaser is bound to take notice of all the recitals in the deed to the vendee.<sup>6</sup>

§ 240. A person may also become a trustee by construction, in the absence of fraud, where a trust is created, but if no trustee is appointed,<sup>7</sup> or the trustee named is incapable of tak-

*Moore v. Holcombe*, 3 Leigh, 597; *Webb v. Robinson*, 14 Ga. 216; *Dunlop v. Burnett*, 5 S. & M. 702; *Johnson v. Cawthorn*, 1 Dev. & Bat. 32; *Harper v. Williams*, ib. 179; *Roberts v. Rose*, 2 Humph. 145; *Gann v. Chester*, 5 Yerg. 205; but see *Brown v. Vanlier*, 7 Humph. 239; *Shirley v. Sugar Ref.* 2 Edw. 505; *Repp v. Repp*, 12 Gill & J. 341; *Ringgold v. Bryan*, 3 Md. Ch. 488; *Aldridge v. Dunn*, 7 Blackf. 249; but see *Chance v. McWortee*, 26 Ga. 315.

<sup>1</sup> *Mitford v. Mitford*, 9 Ves. 100; *Fawell v. Heelis*, Amb. 726; *Blackburn v. Gregson*, 1 Bro. Ch. 420; *Grant v. Mills*, 2 Ves. & B. 306; *Ex parte Peake*, 1 Madd. 356; *Chapman v. Tanner*, 1 Vern. 267; *Bayley v. Greenleaf*, 7 Wheat. 54; *Green v. Demoss*, 10 Humph. 371; *Brown v. Heathcote*, Atk. 160; *Simond v. Hilbert*, 1 Russ. & My. 729; *Jewson v. Moulson*, 2 Atk. 417; *Scott v. Surman*, Willes, 402; *Warrall v. Morlar*, 1 P. Wms. 459.

<sup>2</sup> *Mounce v. Byars*, 11 Ga. 180; *Frail v. Ellis*, 17 Eng. L. & Eq. 457.

<sup>3</sup> *Ringgold v. Bryan*, 3 Md. Ch. 488; *Hamilton v. Fowlkes*, 16 Ark. 340; *Hopkins v. Garrard*, 6 B. Mon. 67.

<sup>4</sup> *Frail v. Ellis*, 17 Eng. L. & Eq. 457; *Briscoe v. Bronaugh*, 1 Tex. 328.

<sup>5</sup> *Manly v. Slason*, 21 Vt. 271.

<sup>6</sup> *Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick*, 23 Miss. 124; *Thornton v. Knox*, 6 B. Mon. 74; *Woodward v. Woodward*, 7 B. Mon. 116; *McRemmon v. Martin*, 14 Tex. 318; *Tiernan v. Thurman*, 14 B. Mon. 277; *Honore v. Bakewell*, 6 B. Mon. 67; *Hutchinson v. Patrick*, 22 Tex. 318; *McAlpin v. Burnett*, 23 Tex. 649.

<sup>7</sup> *White v. White*, 1 Bro. Ch. 12; *Dodkin v. Brunt*, L. R. 6 Eq. 580.

ing,<sup>1</sup> or refuses to act,<sup>2</sup> or dies,<sup>3</sup> or the office becomes vacant in any other way ;<sup>4</sup> in all such cases every person to whom the trust property comes, by reason of there being no trustee, will be treated as a trustee, and he may be ordered to account, and to convey the property to such other persons as trustees as the court may appoint.<sup>5</sup> As where a man makes a devise in trust by his will, but names no trustee, the land descends to his heirs, but in trust for the purposes named in the will ; and his heirs would be required to account for the property, and to convey the same to such trustees as the court might appoint.<sup>6</sup> Courts of equity have inherent jurisdiction over all matters of trust and trustees, and they never allow a trust to fail for want of a trustee.<sup>7</sup> So, if a party forbidden by law to convey his property to some person standing in a certain relation to him, as if a husband who cannot convey to his wife should make an absolute conveyance directly to her, the conveyance would not pass the legal title, but equity would construe it into a declaration of trust, and the husband into a trustee for the wife.<sup>8</sup> Therefore if, upon the death of the trustee without heirs, the legal title should escheat to the Crown or the State, equity would follow the property and execute the trust by the appointment of new trustees or otherwise.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Sonley v. Clockmakers' Co.* 1 Bro. Ch. 81 ; *Ex parte Turner*, 1 Bailey, Ch. 395.

<sup>2</sup> *King v. Donnelly*, 5 Paige, 46 ; *Hawley v. James*, 5 Paige, 318 ; *De Peyster v. Clendinning*, 8 Paige, 295 ; *Lee v. Randolph*, 2 Hen. & M. 12 ; *Ex parte Kunst*, 1 Bailey, 489 ; *Dawson v. Dawson*, Rice, 243 ; *Field v. Arrowsmith*, 3 Humph. 448.

<sup>3</sup> *Dunscomb v. Dunscomb*, 2 Hen. & M. 11.

<sup>4</sup> *Gibson's Case*, 1 Bland, 138.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* ; *Cushney v. Henry*, 4 Paige, 345 ; *McIntire School v. Zan. Canal, &c.*, 9 Ham. 203 ; *White v. Hampton*, 13 Io. 259 ; *McKenna v. Phillips*, 6 Whart. 571 ; *Boykin v. Ciples*, 2 Hill, Eq. 200 ; *Wilson v. Towle*, 36 N. H. 129 ; *Pool v. Cummings*, 20 Ala. 563 ; *Griffith v. Griffith*, 5 B. Mon. 113.

<sup>6</sup> *Stone v. Griffin*, 3 Vt. 400.

<sup>7</sup> *McCartney v. Bostwick*, 32 N. Y. 53 ; *Vidal v. Girard*, 2 How. 128.

<sup>8</sup> *Huntly v. Huntly*, 8 Ired. Eq. 250 ; *Garner v. Garner*, Busbee, Eq. 1.

<sup>9</sup> Stat. 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 23 ; *Hughes v. Wells*, 9 Hare, 749 ; 13 Eng. L. & Eq. 389.

§ 241. Another instance of a constructive trust without fraud is where a person receives the trust property from the trustee without notice of the trust, by way of voluntary gift or without paying a valuable consideration. If such person had notice of the trust, it would be a fraud to receive the trust fund even if he paid a valuable consideration, and he would be held as a constructive trustee;<sup>1</sup> but if he paid a valuable consideration without notice, he would hold the property unaffected by the trust.<sup>2</sup> And if he receives the property without paying a valuable consideration, and without notice, equity holds the absence of a consideration as equivalent to notice, and construes the taker into a trustee, and liable as such to the same extent as the trustee from whom he took it.<sup>3</sup> But if a person comes into possession of the trust property, not by, under, or through the trustee, but against him, as by disseising or ousting him, he will not be bound by the trust, although he have notice of it; for the disseisor creates a title for himself paramount to the title of the trustee;<sup>4</sup> and all outstanding terms attending the inheritance will attend the title of the disseisor until he is dispossessed by some other paramount title.<sup>5</sup> In States where registry laws are in force, the registry of a deed from a grantor who had no right to the land is not constructive notice to the true owner that such deed has been made, and it is constructive notice only to subsequent purchasers under the same grantor.<sup>6</sup>

§ 242. Analogous to the gift or sale of the trust property by trustees, is the right of dealing with its property by a corporation. A corporation holds its property in trust, *first* to pay its

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, § 220.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, §§ 217, 218.

<sup>3</sup> *Mansell v. Mansell*, 2 P. Wms. 691; *Pye v. George*, 1 P. Wms. 128.

<sup>4</sup> *Finch's Case*, 4 Inst. 85; *Sugd. Gilb. Uses*, 429.

<sup>5</sup> *Reynolds v. Jones*, 2 S. & S. 206.

<sup>6</sup> *Bates v. Norcross*, 14 Pick. 225; *Tilton v. Hunter*, 11 Shep. 29; *Stuyvesant v. Hall*, 2 Barb. Ch. 151; *Keller v. Nutz*, 5 S. & R. 246; *Woods v. Farmene*, 7 Watts, 382; *Crockett v. McGuire*, 10 Miss. 34.

creditors, and *second* to distribute to its stockholders *pro rata*.<sup>1</sup> If therefore a corporation should dissolve, and divide its property among its shareholders without first paying its debts, equity would enforce the claims of its creditors by converting all persons, except *bona fide* purchasers for value, to whom its property had come, into trustees, and would compel them to account for the property and contribute to the payment of the debts of the corporation to the extent of its property in their hands.<sup>2</sup> In England the doctrine of constructive trusts is not enforced against the Bank of England in regard to its stock standing upon its books; the bank is bound to recognize only the person who has the legal title.<sup>3</sup> But Chief-Justice Taney said that the decisions as to the Bank of England were exceptions depending upon the policy of the acts of parliament in reference to the bank, and that certainly none of the English cases convey the idea that, upon general principles of law, a bank is not bound to notice a trust of its own stocks, and must look only at the legal estate.<sup>4</sup> In the United States it is well established, that if a corporation, that requires a transfer of its stock to be made by its own officers upon its own books, permits a transfer to be made, by an executor, trustee, or guardian, of stock held by such persons in a fiduciary capacity, such corporation, knowing the trust, and that the transfer is

<sup>1</sup> National Bank, &c. v. Lake Shore, &c. R.R. Co. 21 Ohio St. 232.

<sup>2</sup> Mumma v. Potomac Co. 8 Pet. 281; Vose v. Grant, 15 Mass. 515; Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass. 9; Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 308; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1252; Hill v. Fogg, 41 Mo. 562.

<sup>3</sup> Pearson v. B'k of Eng. 2 Bro. Ch. 529; Hartga v. B'k of Eng. 3 Ves. 55; B'k of Eng. v. Parsons, 5 Ves. 665; Austin v. B'k of Eng. 522; B'k of Eng. v. Lunn, 15 Ves. 583; Bristed v. Williams, 3 Hare, 235; Humberstone v. Chase, 2 Y. & C. 209; Franklin v. B'k of Eng. 9 B. & C. 156; B'k of Eng. v. Moffat, 3 Bro. Ch. 260; Pearson v. B'k of Eng. 2 Cox, 178; Rider v. Kidder, 10 Ves. 369; Ripley v. Waterworth, 7 Ves. 440; Stat. 4 W. & M. c. 3, § 10; 5 W. & M. c. 20, § 20; 1 Geo. I. St. 2, p. 19, § 12; 30 Geo. II. c. 19, § 49; 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vic. c. 26; 8 & 9 Vic. c. 97; Lewin on Trusts, (2d Am. ed.) 32.

<sup>4</sup> Lowry v. Commercial B'k, 3 Bankers' Mag. 201; 10 Penn. Law Jur. (3 Am. L. J. N. s.) 111.



made for purposes other than such trust, will be held in equity as a constructive trustee of the stock thus wrongfully conveyed, and will be liable to make it good to the *cestui que trust*.<sup>1</sup> And if a corporation negligently enter the names of the parties upon its books, in such manner that the stock is improperly transferred, it will be liable as a constructive trustee.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly a corporation has a right to require from all fiduciary holders of stock evidence of their authority to make the transfer.<sup>3</sup> It has been held that the mere addition of the word *trustee*, without any reference to the terms of the trust or the persons of the *cestuis que trust*, is not sufficient notice to a bank to render it liable in case the stock is wrongfully transferred by the holder;<sup>4</sup> and it is said that, as a guardian has a right to sell the personal property of his ward, a corporation is not liable if he wrongfully transfers the stock on its books.<sup>5</sup> If purchasers of stock in a corporation have notice that their vendors are trustees, they will be held as constructive trustees; and if the certificates are passed over to the purchaser with the word *trustee* added to the name of the seller, the purchaser is bound to inquire into the particulars of the trust, and he has such notice as will bind him as a trustee if the sale was wrongfully made.<sup>6</sup> But if the purchaser does not see the certificates of the stock in the seller's hands, as if the seller himself transfers the stock upon the books of the company, and brings to

<sup>1</sup> *Mechanics' B'k v. Seton*, 1 Pet. 299; *Porter v. B'k of Rutland*, 19 Vt. 410; *Albert v. Savings B'k*, 1 Md. Ch. Dec. 407; 2 Md. 160; *Farmers' B'k v. Wayman*, 5 Gill, 356; *Atkinson v. Atkinson*, 8 Allen, 15.

<sup>2</sup> *Farmers' B'k v. Wayman*, 5 Gill, 356.

<sup>3</sup> *Bayard v. Farmers' & Mech. Nat. B'k*, 2 Leg. Int. 164.

<sup>4</sup> *Albert v. Savings B'k*, 1 Md. Ch. Dec. 407; 2 Md. 160. But see to the contrary, *Walsh v. Stille*, 2 Pars. Eq. 17.

<sup>5</sup> *B'k of Virginia v. Craig*, 6 Leigh, 339. But see *Atkinson v. Atkinson*, 8 Allen, 15. In the last case, however, the transfer was after the removal of the guardian and the appointment of another in his place.

<sup>6</sup> *Walsh v. Stille*, 2 Pars. Eq. 17; *Reeder v. Barr*, 4 Ham. 446; *Simons v. S. W. Railway B'k*, 2 Am. Law Reg. 546; *Atkinson v. Atkinson*, 10 Allen, 15.

the purchaser new certificates that he is entitled to so many shares, the purchaser would not be affected with notice, and would not be held as a trustee.<sup>1</sup>

§ 243. Again if one receives a conveyance of lands or other property absolute in form, but really as security for a debt, he will hold the legal title in trust for the grantor after the payment of the debt, and before a reconveyance.<sup>2</sup> So if one receives personal property, agreeing to hold it for another, or to sell it and pay the proceeds to the holder of a note, draft, or other debt, he becomes a trustee, and a bill in equity may be maintained against him and his pledges to enforce the trust.<sup>3</sup> But if such conveyance is fraudulent and void, the *bona fide* holder of the note or draft cannot enforce the trust.<sup>4</sup> In England, upon the death of the mortgagee, the mortgage debt goes to his personal representatives, but the fee in the mortgaged real estate descends to his heirs, if not otherwise disposed of; but his heirs hold it upon a constructive trust, as security for the debt, which has gone to his executors or administrators.<sup>5</sup> In nearly all the United States, both the debt and the mortgage security are chattel interests, and go to the executors or administrators,

<sup>1</sup> Lowry v. Commercial B'k, 3 Bankers' Mag. 2111; 10 Penn. Law Jour. 111; Albert v. Savings B'k, 2 Md. 160; Atkinson v. Atkinson, 10 Allen, 15.

<sup>2</sup> Maverick, &c. Soc. v. Lovejoy, 6 Allen, 163; Baldwin v. Bannister, 3 P. Wms. 251; Poole v. Pass, 1 Beav. 600; Cru. Dig. tit. 15; Mort. c. 3, § 5; tit. 15, c. 2, § 39; Wilkinson v. Stewart, 30 Ill. 48; Smyth v. Carlyle, 16 N. H. 464.

<sup>3</sup> Michigan State Bank v. Gardner, 15 Gray, 362; Ulman v. Barnard, 7 Gray, 554; Martin v. Coles, 1 M. & S. 140; Graham v. Dyster, 6 M. & S. 1; Rodriguez v. Heffernan, 5 John. Ch. 417; De Wolf v. Gardner, 12 Cush. 19; Ellis v. Lamme, 42 Mo. 153; Petersham v. Tash, 2 Stra. 1178; Warner v. Martin, 11 How. 224; Evans v. Potter, 2 Gallison, 13; Daubigny v. Duval, 5 T. R. 604; Guerreiro v. Peile, 3 B. & Ald. 616; De Bouchout v. Goldsmid, 5 Ves. 211; Skinner v. Dodge, 4 Hen. & Munf. 423; Newson v. Thornton, 6 East, 17; McCombie v. Davies, 7 East, 5; Kinder v. Shaw, 2 Mass. 398; Van Amringe v. Peabody, 1 Mason, 440.

<sup>4</sup> Potter v. McDowall, 43 Mo. 93.

<sup>5</sup> Ellis v. Guavas, 2 Ch. Ca. 60; Chase v. Lockerman, 11 G. & J. 185.

and not to the heirs,<sup>1</sup> and payment of the mortgage debt discharges the mortgage; but while the mortgagee is in possession, he is a constructive trustee up to the time that the mortgagor's equity of redemption expires, and he is bound to account for the rents and profits in due course of administration.<sup>2</sup> It has even been thought that he is liable for the rents and profits after he has transferred his mortgage;<sup>3</sup> but, as he has a right to assign his mortgage without notice to the mortgagor, it would seem that he would not be liable for any thing after he had assigned his mortgage and the possession.<sup>4</sup>

§ 244. At common law, if a testator appointed his debtor to be the executor of his will, the debt was extinguished, on the ground that, as the executor could not maintain an action against himself, the remedy was gone, and where the remedy is gone, the debt is gone.<sup>5</sup> Equity, however, construes the debtor, although he is executor, to be a trustee, and the creditors, legatees, and next of kin of the testator can enforce the trust by compelling the executor to account for the amount of the debt due from him to the testator.<sup>6</sup> In most of the United States this matter is regulated by statute, and the executor may be required by the Probate Court to put the amount of his debt to the testator into his inventory, or the Court of Probate may require the executor to charge himself with the amount

<sup>1</sup> See Greenleaf's Cruise, Dig. tit. 15, c. 2, §§ 39, 40, and notes; 4 Kent, 160, 194.

<sup>2</sup> *Coppring v. Cooke*, 1 Vern. 270; *Bentham v. Haincourt*, Pr. Ch. 30; *Parker v. Calcroft*, 6 Madd. 11; *Hughes v. Williams*, 12 Ves. 493; *Madocks v. Wren*, 2 Ch. R. 109.

<sup>3</sup> *Venables v. Foyle*, 1 Ch. Ca. 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ringham v. Lee*, 15 Sim. 400; *Re Radcliffe*, 22 Beav. 201.

<sup>5</sup> 2 Williams' Ex'rs, 1129; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1209.

<sup>6</sup> *Berry v. Usher*, 11 Ves. 90; *Simpson v. Gutteridge*, 13 Ves. 264; *Carey v. Goodinge*, 3 Bro. Ch. 111; *Errington v. Evans*, 2 Dick. 456; *Flud v. Rumsey*, Yel. 160; *Phillips v. Phillips*, Freem. 11; 1 Ch. Ca. 292; *Brown v. Selwyn*, Cas. t. Talb. 203; 3 Bro. P. C. 607; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1209.

of his debt in his account.<sup>1</sup> And so legatees and distributees may become constructive trustees for creditors of the estate, if the executor or administrator, by accident or mistake, pays over or distributes the estate before all debts are paid. The executor may be sued at law in such case by the creditor, and he may recover over against the persons to whom he has paid the estate. In equity, however, creditors can follow the fund liable for their debts into the hands of the persons to whom it has come and treat them as constructive trustees, as they are not entitled to any thing out of the estate till the debts are first satisfied.<sup>2</sup>

§ 245. A person may become a trustee by construction, by intermeddling with, and assuming the management of, property without authority. Such persons are trustees *de son tort*, as persons who assume to deal with a deceased person's estate without authority are administrators *de son tort*. Thus an administrator has no right to interfere with the real estate of an intestate unless it is wanted to pay debts, and if he assume to act in relation to the real estate as a trustee, those interested may treat him as such, and he cannot demur to a bill charging him with neglect of duty, and praying for his removal.<sup>3</sup> If one enters upon an infant's lands, and takes the rents and profits, he may be charged as a guardian or trustee,<sup>4</sup> and so if one takes personal property.<sup>5</sup> If a deceased person holds money or

<sup>1</sup> *Pusey v. Clemson*, 9 S. & R. 204; *Griffith v. Chew*, 8 S. & R. 32; *Hill on Trustees*, 172, notes, (4th Am. ed.).

<sup>2</sup> 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 1250, 1251; *Russell v. Clark*, 7 Cranch, 69; *McCall v. Harrison*, 1 Brock. 126; *Buck v. Swazey*, 35 Me. 52; *Riddle v. Mandeville*, 5 Cranch, 329; *Anon.* 1 Vern. 162; *Newman v. Barton*, 2 Vern. 205; *Noel v. Robinson*, 1 Vern. 94; *White School House v. Post*, 31 Conn. 240; *Boddy v. Lefevere*, 1 Hare, 602.

<sup>3</sup> *Le Fort v. Delafield*, 3 Edw. 31; *McCoy v. Scott*, 2 Rawle, 222; *Schwartz's Estate*, 14 Penn. St. 42; *People v. Houghtaling*, 7 Cal. 348.

<sup>4</sup> *Wyllie v. Ellice*, 1 Hare, 505; *Drury v. Connor*, 1 H. & G. 220; *Bloomfield v. Eyre*, 8 Beav. 250.

<sup>5</sup> *Chaney v. Smallwood*, 1 Gill, 367; *Goodhue v. Barnwell*, Rice, Eq. 198.

other property in trust for another, and his heir, executor, administrator, or other person assume possession of such property, a constructive trust will be imposed upon them.<sup>1</sup> During the possession and management by such constructive trustees they are subject to the same rules and remedies as other trustees;<sup>2</sup> and they cannot avoid their liability by showing that they were not in fact trustees,<sup>3</sup> nor can they set up the statute of limitations.<sup>4</sup> Of course, such unauthorized persons will always be liable to be deprived of the possession at the suit of those beneficially interested, and they will be liable for all the costs, expenses, and damages which their unauthorized intermeddling may have occasioned. Still there may be cases where an unauthorized person may interfere from necessity to preserve and protect the property. In such cases courts of equity have power to do exact justice by decrees as to costs, compensation, and other similar matters. In all cases a person beneficially interested coming into equity must do equity, and join all who have interfered with the possession; and he cannot proceed against one alone as at law for a trespass, and compel one to bear the whole burden of the wrongful intrusion.<sup>5</sup>

§ 246. If an agent is employed by a trustee and thus comes into possession of the property, he will be accountable to his employer, and will not be responsible as a constructive trustee.<sup>6</sup> But if such agent should act fraudulently or collusively

<sup>1</sup> *White School House v. Post*, 31 Conn. 240; *People v. Houghtaling*, 7 Cal. 348.

<sup>2</sup> *Wilson v. Moore*, 1 My. & K. 127.

<sup>3</sup> *Rackham v. Siddall*, 1 Mac. & G. 607; 2 Hall & T. 44; 16 Sim. 297; *Hope v. Liddell*, 21 Beav. 183.

<sup>4</sup> *Goodhue v. Barnwell*, Rice, Eq. 198.

<sup>5</sup> *Wyllie v. Ellice*, 6 Hare, 515; *Phene v. Gillon*, 5 Hare, 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Keane v. Roberts*, 4 Mad. 332; *Nickolson v. Knowles*, 5 Mad. 47; *Myler v. Fitzpatrick*, 6 Mad. 360; *Davis v. Spurling*, 1 R. & M. 64; *Tam. 199*; *Crisp v. Spranger*, Nels. 109; *Saville v. Tancred*, 3 Swans. 141; *Fyler v. Fyler*, 3 Beav. 550; *Maw v. Pearson*, 28 Beav. 196; *Lockwood v.*

he might be made a trustee by construction, and, as such, accountable to the *cestui que trust*.<sup>1</sup>

§ 246 *a*. If a vendor undertakes to sell a good title to land for a valuable consideration, and his title is defective, but he afterwards obtains a perfect title, equity will compel him to hold it in trust for his vendee.<sup>2</sup> If, however, such vendor had conveyed the land with full covenants of warranty, the title which he afterwards obtains will enure for the benefit of his grantee, and the vendor will be estopped by his covenants from setting up his after-acquired title against his vendee.<sup>3</sup> And if a purchaser of land with notice of a prior mortgage afterwards sells the same to an innocent purchaser for its full value, equity will compel him to hold the proceeds in trust for the mortgagee.<sup>4</sup> So if one procures and puts on record a deed of land with notice of a prior deed and in fraud of a prior purchaser, equity will compel him to hold the legal title in trust for the first grantee.<sup>5</sup> So if a person sells stock, and it is conveyed in such a manner that the conveyance is void and the legal title is still in the vendor, he will hold it in trust for the actual vendee, and he may be compelled to take the title and assume the burdens.<sup>6</sup>

Abdy, 14 Sim. 437; *Ex parte* Burton, 3 Mont., D. & De Gex, 364; *Re* Bunting, 2 Ad. & El. 467.

<sup>1</sup> *Fyler v. Fyler*, 3 Beav. 550; *Att'y-Gen. v. Leicester*, 7 Beav. 171; *Hardy v. Caly*, 33 Beav. 365; *Bridgman v. Gill*, 24 Beav. 302; *Portlock v. Gardner*, 1 Hare, 606; *Ex parte* Woodin, 3 Mont., D. & De G. 399; *Bodenham v. Hoskyns*, 2 De G., M. & G. 903; *Panell v. Hurley*, 2 Coll. 241; *Alleyne v. Darcy*, 4 Ir. Ch. 199, 5 Ir. Ch. 56.

<sup>2</sup> *Clark v. Martin*, 49 Penn. St. 299; *Hope v. Stone*, 10 Minn. 14; *Doyle v. Peerless*, 44 Barb. 239; *Kelley v. Jenness*, 50 Me. 455; *Cobb v. Stewart*, 4 Met. (Ky.) 255; *Dalheguay v. Tabor*, 22 Cal. 279; *Wasby v. Foreman*, 30 Cal. 90; *Kane County v. Herrington*, 50 Ill. 232.

<sup>3</sup> *Somes v. Skinner*, 3 Pick. 51; *White v. Patten*, 24 Pick. 324; 2 Smith, Leading Cases (4 Amer. ed.), 550; *Nash v. Spofford*, 8 Met. 192.

<sup>4</sup> *Moshier v. Knox College*, 32 Ill. 155.

<sup>5</sup> *Troy City Bank v. Wilcox*, 24 Wis. 671.

<sup>6</sup> *Brown v. Black*, L. R. 15 Eq. 367.

§ 247. Where a person has possession of title-deeds or other documents in relation to property, and other persons are interested in the same property, and claim title through or under the same papers, the person having the possession of the papers is a constructive trustee for the other persons interested in the same property, and a court of equity will compel him to produce the deeds or papers at the suit of those claiming an interest in the common property.<sup>1</sup>

§ 247 a. If a person becomes surety for the debt of another, and the creditor holds mortgages on other securities from the debtor for the same debt, the surety, if he pay the debt, has a right to claim that the creditor shall hold the securities in trust for him, in other words, the surety upon paying the debt is subrogated into the rights of the original creditor;<sup>2</sup> and, if an assignor receives payment for a chose in action which he has assigned, he holds the proceeds in trust for the assignee.<sup>3</sup> So, if one sells the property of another and deposits the money in bank in his own name, upon notice to the bank, by the owner of the property, of the facts, and a demand for the money, the bank becomes a *quasi* or constructive trustee for the true owner.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lewin on Trusts, 156, 157 (5th Lond. ed.).

<sup>2</sup> Garnsey v. Gardner, 4 Me. 167.

<sup>3</sup> Post, § 438; Fortescue v. Barnett, 3 M. & K. 36.

<sup>4</sup> Bank of Wellsborough v. Baake, 71 Penn. St. 213; Arnold v. Macungie Bank, 71 Penn. St. 287; Twitchell v. Drury, 25 Mich. 393; Campan v. Campan, 25 Mich. 127.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## TRUSTS THAT ARISE BY CONSTRUCTION FROM POWERS.

§ 248. The nature of powers that imply a trust.

§ 249. Court will execute such powers as trusts.

§§ 250, 251. Instances of powers which the court will execute as trusts.

§ 252. Instances of powers that are not trusts.

§ 253. Where the power is too uncertain.

§ 254. The power must be executed as given, or it will remain a trust to be executed by the court.

§§ 255, 256. In what manner the court will execute a trust arising out of a power.

§ 257. Whether courts will distribute *per stirpes* or *per capita*.

§ 258. And whether to those living at the death of donor or of the donee.

§ 248. PROPERTY is sometimes given to a person with a power to dispose of it for a particular purpose, or to a particular class of persons, or to certain persons to be selected or designated by the donee from a particular class. If the donee executes the power and disposes of the property, or designates or selects the persons who are to take under the gift, it goes as directed, and there is no great room for doubt or question; but if the donee refuses or neglects to execute the power it becomes a grave inquiry whether the persons in whose favor the power might have been executed have any interest in the property, or any remedy for the non-exercise of the power by the first taker or donee. In dealing with the cases that have arisen upon these inquiries, courts have distributed powers into *mere powers*, and *powers coupled with a trust*, or *powers which imply a trust*.<sup>1</sup> *Mere powers* are purely discretionary with the donee: he may or may not exercise or execute them at his sole will and pleasure, and no court can compel or control his discretion, or exercise it in his stead and place, if for

<sup>1</sup> *Brown v. Higgs*, 8 Ves. 574; *White v. Wilson*, 1 Drew. 298.



any reason he leaves the powers unexecuted.<sup>1</sup> If the donee executes the powers, but executes them in a defective manner, courts may aid the execution and supply the defects, but they cannot exercise or execute mere naked powers conferred upon a donee.<sup>2</sup> It is different with powers coupled with a trust, or powers which imply a trust. In this class of cases the power is so given that it is considered *a trust* for the benefit of other parties; and when the form of the gift is such that it can be construed to be a *trust*, the power becomes *imperative*, and *must* be executed. Courts will not allow a clear trust to fail for want of a trustee; nor will they allow a trust to fail by reason of any act or omission of the trustee; therefore, courts will not allow a trust to fail, or to be defeated by the refusal or neglect of the trustee to execute a power, if such power is so given that it is reasonably certain that the donor intended that it should be exercised. There are mere powers and mere trusts. There are also powers which the party to whom they are given is intrusted with and required to execute. Courts consider this last kind of power to partake so much of the character of a trust to be executed, that they will not allow it to fail by the failure of the donee to execute it, but will execute it in the place of the donee.<sup>3</sup> Lord Hardwicke

<sup>1</sup> *Greenough v. Welles*, 10 Cush. 576; *Eldredge v. Heard*, 106 Mass. 582.

<sup>2</sup> *Wilkinson v. Getty*, 13 Io. 157; *Arundell v. Philpot*, 2 Vern. 69; *Tompkyn v. Sandys*, 2 P. Wms. 228 n.; *Bull v. Vardy*, 1 Ves. Jr. 272. And even if a party intended to execute a power, but is prevented by sudden death, the court will not execute the power. *Pigott v. Penrice*, Com. 250; *Gilb. Eq.* 138; *Sugd. on Powers*, 392.

<sup>3</sup> *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 Wm. Black. 162; *Sugd. on Pow.* 393-398; *Lucas v. Lockhart*, 10 Sm. & Mar. 466; *Harrison v. Harrison*, 2 Grat. 1; *Greenough v. Welles*, 10 Cush. 576; *Erickson v. Willard*, 1 N. H. 217; *Harding v. Glyn*, 1 Atk. 469; *Cruwys v. Colman*, 9 Ves. 319; *Forbes v. Ball*, 3 Mer. 437; *Witts v. Boddington*, 3 Bro. Ch. 95; *Walsh v. Wallinger*, 2 R. & My. 78; *Grieverson v. Kersopp*, 2 Keen, 653; *Jones v. Torin*, 6 Sim. 255; *Martin v. Swannell*, 2 Beav. 249; *Fenwick v. Greenwell*, 10 Beav. 412; *Fordyce v. Brydges*, 10 Beav. 90; 2 Phil. 497; *Burrough v.*

observed, that such powers ought rather to be called trusts than powers.<sup>1</sup> In all cases these powers or trusts must be construed according to the intention of the parties, to be gathered from the whole instrument.<sup>2</sup>

§ 249. In all cases where parties have an *imperative power or discretion* given to them, and they die in the testator's lifetime,<sup>3</sup>

Philcox, 2 My. & Cr. 73; Falkner v. Wynford, 15 L. J. Ch. 8, 9 Jur. 1006; Penny v. Turner, 15 Sim. 368; 2 Phil. 493; Alloway v. Alloway, 4 Dr. & War. 380; Salusbury v. Denton, 3 K. & J. 535; Jail v. Mills, 3 K. & J. 474; Reid v. Reid, 25 Beav. 469; Brown v. Higgs, 8 Ves. 574. In this case Lord Eldon said, if the power be one which it is the duty of the party to execute, made his duty by the requisition of the will, put upon him as such by the testator, who has given him an interest extensive enough to enable him to discharge it, he is a trustee for the exercise of the power, and not as having a discretion whether he will exercise it or not; and the court adopts this principle as to trusts, and will not permit his negligence, accident, or other circumstances to disappoint the interest of those for whose benefit he is called upon to execute it. In Attorney-General v. Downing, Wilm. 23, Ld. Ch. J. Wilmot said, as to the objection that those powers are personal to the trustees, and by their death become unexecutable, they are not *powers* but *trusts*, and there is a very essential difference between them. *Powers* are never imperative: they leave the acts to be done at the will of the party to whom they are given. *Trusts* are always imperative, and are obligatory upon the conscience of the party intrusted. The court supplies the *defective execution* of powers, but never the *non-execution* of them; for they are not meant to be *optional*. But a person who creates a trust means it shall be executed *at all events*. The individuals named as trustees are only the nominal instruments to execute that intention, and if they fail, either by death, or by being under disability, or by refusing to act, the constitution has provided a trustee. Where no trustees are appointed at all, the court assumes the office. There is some personality in every choice of trustees, but this personality is *res unius ætatis*, and if the trust cannot be executed through the *medium* which was in the primary view of the testator, it must be executed through the *medium* which the constitution has substituted in his place. Brook v. Brook, 3 Sm. & Gif. 280; Withers v. Yeadon, 1 Rich. Ch. 324; Miller v. Meetch, 8 Barr, 417; Gibbs v. Marsh, 2 Met. 243; Grimke v. Grimke, 1 Des. Eq. 375 n.

<sup>1</sup> Godolphin v. Godolphin, 1 Ves. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Kerr v. Verner, 66 Penn. St. 326; Guion v. Pickett, 42 Miss. 77.

<sup>3</sup> Maberly v. Turton, 14 Ves. 499; Attorney-General v. Downing, Wilm. 7; Amb. 550; Attorney-General v. Hickman, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 193.

or decline the trust or office,<sup>1</sup> or disagree as to the execution of it,<sup>2</sup> or do not execute it before their death,<sup>3</sup> or if from any other circumstance,<sup>4</sup> the exercise of the power by the party intrusted with it becomes impossible, the court will imply a trust, and will put itself in the place of the trustee, and will exercise the power by the most equitable rule. And the court will act retrospectively in executing these powers as *quasi* trusts;<sup>5</sup> and although there may be great difficulties and impracticabilities in the way, yet the court will exercise the power and enforce the trust:<sup>6</sup> for, if the trust or power can by *any possibility* be exercised by the court, the non-execution by the party intrusted shall not prejudice the party beneficially interested, or the *cestui que trust*.<sup>7</sup> Thus a power to sell given to tenant for life as *cestui que trust*, may be executed after his death by trustees under a decree of a court of equity.<sup>8</sup>

§ 250. In some cases the donor makes a direct gift to one party, but subjects the gift to the discretion or power of some previous taker or other party; as if a donor limit a fund "upon trust for the children of A. as B. shall appoint." In such case the children of A. take a vested interest in the subject of the gift, liable to be divested by the exercise of the power by B. Therefore, on the failure of the power, the children of A. become as absolutely entitled as if the discretion or

<sup>1</sup> *Izod v. Izod*, 32 Beav. 242; *Doyley v. Attorney-General*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 194; *Gude v. Worthington*, 3 De G. & Sm. 389.

<sup>2</sup> *Wainwright v. Waterman*, 1 Ves. Jr. 311; *Moseley v. Moseley*, t. Finch, 53.

<sup>3</sup> *Harding v. Glyn*, 1 Atk. 469; *Croft v. Adam*, 12 Sim. 639; *Hewett v. Hewett*, 2 Eden, 332; *Flanders v. Clark*, 1 Ves. 10; *Grieveson v. Kirsopp*, 2 Keen, 653.

<sup>4</sup> *Attorney-General v. Stephens*, 3 M. & K. 347.

<sup>5</sup> *Maberly v. Turton*, 14 Ves. 499; *Edwards v. Grove*, 2 De G., F. & J. 222.

<sup>6</sup> *Pierson v. Garnet*, 1 Bro. Ch. 46.

<sup>7</sup> *Brown v. Higgs*, 5 Ves. 505.

<sup>8</sup> *Faulkner v. Davis*, 18 Gratt. 651.

power had never been given to B.<sup>1</sup> But while the exercise of the power is possible, the donee of it may exercise his discretion in favor of any that he may select; he may select those who are living at the donor's death, or those living at his own death.<sup>2</sup> In other cases an estate is vested in a donee "upon trust to dispose of it among the children of A." Here the children of A. take nothing directly by way of the gift, but their interest must come to them through the medium of the power.<sup>3</sup> If the trust is to dispose of it equally among the children of A., the bequest, though in form a power, is equivalent to a simple gift.<sup>4</sup> If the donee may distribute or dispose of it *unequally* among the children of A., and no distribution or disposition is made by him, the court will execute the power, and distribute the fund *equally* among the objects of it.<sup>5</sup> In other cases the property is vested in a donee with a discretion as to the objects to which, and also as to the proportions in which, it is to be given over. Of course the first question to be determined in all such cases is, Did the donor intend to give a *mere power*, or did he create a trust, or will the court imply a trust? Lord Cottenham stated the general rule deduced from the cases as follows: "When there appears a general intention in favor of a class, and a particular intention in favor of individuals of a class to be selected by another person, and the particular intention fails from that selection

<sup>1</sup> *Davy v. Hooper*, 2 Vern. 665; *Jones v. Torin*, 6 Sim. 255; *Fenwick v. Greenwell*, 10 Beav. 412; *Hockley v. Mawbey*, 1 Ves. Jr. 143, 149, 150; *Madoc v. Jackson*, 2 Bro. Ch. 588; *Falkner v. Wynford*, 9 Jur. 1006; *Rhett v. Mason*, 18 Grat. 541; *Carson v. Carson*, Phil. N. C. Eq. 57.

<sup>2</sup> *Lambert v. Thwaites*, Law R. 2 Eq. 151; *Woodcock v. Renneck*, 4 Beav. 190; affirmed, 1 Phil. 72.

<sup>3</sup> *Ward v. Morgan*, 5 Cold. 407.

<sup>4</sup> *Rayner v. Mowbray*, 3 Bro. Ch. 234; *Phillips v. Garth*, ib. 64.

<sup>5</sup> *Hands v. Hands*, 1 T. R. 437, note; *Pope v. Whitcomb*, 3 Mer. 698; *Re White's Trust*, 1 John. 656; *Finch v. Hollingsworth*, 21 Beav. 112; *Brown v. Pocock*, 6 Sim. 257; *Grieverson v. Kirsopp*, 2 Keen, 656; *Walch v. Wallinger*, 2 R. & M. 78; Tam. 425; 1 Rev. Stat. N. Y. 734, § 100; *Dominick v. Sayre*, 3 Sandf. 555; *Hoag v. Kenney*, 25 Barb. 396.

not being made, the court will carry into effect the general intention in favor of the class. When such an intention appears, the case arises, as stated by Lord Eldon in *Brown v. Higgs*,<sup>1</sup> of the power being so given, as to make it the duty of the donee to execute it; and, in such case, the court will not permit the objects of the power to suffer by the negligence or conduct of the donee, but fastens upon the property a trust for their benefit.”<sup>2</sup>

§ 251. Thus where a testator gave an estate “to A. upon trust (subject to certain charges), to employ the remainder of the rent for such children of B. as A. should think most deserving, and that will make the best use of it, or for the children of his nephew, C., if any there are, or shall be;” and A. having died in the testator’s lifetime, it was held to be a trust in favor of all the children of B. and C.<sup>3</sup> So where a testator directed certain property to remain until certain contingencies, and then gave life-estates in the property to two of his children, with remainder to their issue, and declared that in case his two children had no issue, the same should be disposed of by the survivor by will among his nephews and nieces or their children, or either of them, or to as many of them as his surviving child should think proper, it was held to be a trust in favor of the nephews and nieces and their children, subject to the power of selection and distribution by the surviving child.<sup>4</sup> So where a testator gave to B. in tail, and if she had no issue, she was to settle the estate upon such person as she thought fit by will “confiding” in her not to transfer

<sup>1</sup> 8 Ves. 574.

<sup>2</sup> *Burrough v. Philcox*, 5 My. & Cr. 92; *Witts v. Boddington*, 3 Bro. Ch. 95; 5 Ves. 503; *Harding v. Glyn*, 1 Atk. 469.

<sup>3</sup> *Brown v. Higgs*, 4 Ves. 708; 5 Ves. 495; 8 Ves. 574; 18 Ves. 192; 2 Sugd. on Pow. 176; *Longmore v. Broom*, 7 Ves. 124; *Jones v. Torin*, 6 Sim. 255; *Prevost v. Clark*, 2 Mad. 458; *Penny v. Turner*, 2 Phil. 473; *Fordyce v. Bridges*, 2 ib. 497; *White’s Trusts*, John. 658.

<sup>4</sup> *Burrough v. Philcox*, 3 My. & Cr. 73.

the estate from his nearest family, it was held to be a trust for the heir, who was the nearest family or relation within the meaning of the will.<sup>1</sup> And where a testator gave his property to his son *in trust* to apply the income to the use of himself and family, and to give by deed or will all beyond what he should so apply, unto all or any child or children of his own in such proportions and in such manner as he should see fit. His son died having devised the property to his wife with directions to his executors to act under the will of his father; it was held to be a trust coupled with a power to appoint at his discretion among his children, that the power could not be delegated, that the son's will was not an execution of the power, and that his children took equally under their grandfather's will.<sup>2</sup> Where a man gave his property "wholly" to his wife to be disposed of by her and divided among his children at her discretion, the children took under the will and not as her heirs, in default of any distribution by her.<sup>3</sup> And where a testator gave his estate to his wife during her life, and gave all the remainder to his two brothers A. and B. who were also his executors, "with full confidence that they will dispose of such residue among our brothers and sisters and their children, as they shall judge shall be most in need of the same, this to be done according to the best of their discretion;" it was held to be a trust for the brothers and sisters and their children, to the exclusion of A. and B. and their children; and the court executed the trust, and exercised the powers.<sup>4</sup> Where a testator gave his wife certain property, and desired *her* "to give the same unto and among *such* of the testator's relations as she should think most deserving and approve of," after the death of the wife without appointing, the court decreed a

<sup>1</sup> Griffiths v. Evans, 5 Beav. 241.

<sup>2</sup> Withers v. Yeadon, 1 Rich. Eq. 324.

<sup>3</sup> Collins v. Carlisle, 7 B. Mon. 14; Russell v. Kennedy, 3 Brews. 438.

<sup>4</sup> Bull v. Bull, 8 Conn. 47; see Gilbert v. Chapin, 19 Conn. 351; Harper v. Phelps, 21 Conn. 257.

trust, and divided the property equally among the relations.<sup>1</sup> Where a tenant for life "is desired to give it among his children as he should think fit;"<sup>2</sup> or the "residue is to be disposed of among her children as she shall think proper,"<sup>3</sup> or where after the death of testator's wife the gift "is to such of his grandchildren as she should appoint,"<sup>4</sup> it was held to be a trust for selection or distribution, and in default of the exercise of the power the court enforced it as a trust and distributed it equally among all the objects named.<sup>5</sup> In such cases the word "children" will embrace grandchildren if such appears to be the general intent of the donor.<sup>6</sup>

§ 252. But where a testator empowered his wife to give away £1000 of his estate at her death, £100 to A., £100 to B., and the rest by her will, and she died without having executed the power, it was held to be a mere power, and no trust, and the court refused to carry it into effect.<sup>7</sup> So where a testator gave £30,000 to his wife for life, to be distributed at her decease to and amongst such of his children and in such manner and proportion as she should appoint, it was held to be a mere power which the court could not execute in default of an appointment by her.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Harding v. Glyn*, 1 Atk. 469.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Sugd. on Pow. 181.

<sup>3</sup> *Kemp v. Kemp*, 5 Ves. 849.

<sup>4</sup> *Witts v. Boddington*, 3 Bro. Ch. 95.

<sup>5</sup> *Whitehurst v. Harker*, 2 Ired. Ch. 292; *Fowler v. Hunter*, 2 Y. & J. 506; *Longmore v. Brown*, 7 Ves. 124; *Salisbury v. Denton*, 3 K. & John. 529; *Kennedy v. Kingston*, 2 J. & W. 431; *Davy v. Hooper*, 2 Vern. 665; *Maddison v. Andrew*, 1 Ves. 57; *Hockley v. Mawbey*, 1 Ves. Jr. 143; *Croft v. Adam*, 12 Sim. 639; *Brown v. Pocock*, 6 Sim. 257; *McNeillidge v. Galbrath*, 8 Ser. & R. 43; *Harrison v. Harrison*, 2 Grat. 1; *Frazier v. Frazier*, 2 Leigh, 642; *Cruse v. McKee*, 2 Head, 1; *Thompson v. Norris*, 2 N. J. Eq. 489; *Jecko v. Lansing*, 45 Mo. 167.

<sup>6</sup> *Ingraham v. Meade*, 3 Wall. Jr. 32.

<sup>7</sup> *Bull v. Vardy*, 1 Ves. Jr. 279; *In re Eddowes*, 1 Dr. & Sm. 395.

<sup>8</sup> *Marlborough v. Godolphin*, 2 Ves. 61; 5 Ves. Jr. 506. In this case Lord Hardwicke drew a distinction between a gift "amongst my children as A. should appoint," which he considered a trust, and a gift "among

§ 253. If the power to be executed is so uncertain as to its objects, that a court of equity cannot say what particular person or persons or class of persons are to take an interest under it as a trust, it will be considered a mere power which cannot be carried into effect;<sup>1</sup> or if the subject-matter to be affected by the power is too uncertain to be dealt with by the court, a trust will not be implied.<sup>2</sup> And where there is an express limitation of the property over in case the power is not executed, of course no trust can be implied.<sup>3</sup>

§ 254. The general rule is, that the power given must be strictly executed as given, or it will remain as a trust for the person or class in whose favor it is given; thus if the donee is to dispose of the property to such persons of a particular class, as she shall select in a last will and testament, and the disposition is made by a deed, the power is not executed, and it will be construed into a trust for the whole class, or will go over, if there is a gift over in default of an appointment or execution of the power.<sup>4</sup> So if the power is attempted to be

*such of my children as A. should appoint,"* which he considered a mere power. This distinction, however, is not now acted upon. *Crossling v. Crossling*, 2 Cox, 396, is to the same effect as *Marlborough v. Godolphin*. These cases have not been expressly overruled, but they have not been followed in the later cases, and if they were to come before the courts at the present day, it is probable that they would be held to be implied trusts, and not mere powers, as courts will if possible construe such bequests into gifts to the parties to be benefited. *Hill on Trusts*, 69; 2 *Sugd. on Powers*, 181; *Brown v. Pocock*, 6 Sim. 257.

<sup>1</sup> *Stubbs v. Sargon*, 2 Keen, 255; *Ommanny v. Butcher*, 1 T. & R. 260; *Wheeler v. Smith*, 9 How. 79; *Robinson v. Allen*, 11 Grat. 785; *Harper v. Phelps*, 21 Conn. 257; *Thompson v. McKissick*, 3 Humph. 631; *Ellis v. Ellis*, 15 Ala. 296.

<sup>2</sup> *Gibbs v. Marsh*, 2 Met. 243.

<sup>3</sup> *Pritchard v. Juinchant*, Amb. 126; 5 Ves. 596, n.; 2 *Sugd. on Pow.* 183; *Lines v. Durden*, 5 Flor. 51.

<sup>4</sup> *Moore v. Dimond*, 5 R. I. 121; *Bentham v. Smith*, 1 Cheev. 33 (2d part); *Haslen v. Kean*, 2 Taylor, 279; *Christy v. Pulliam*, 17 Ill. 59; *Balteel v. Plumer*, L. R. 8 Eq. 585; *Garth v. Townsend*, L. R. 7 Eq. 220; *Thacker v. Kay*, L. R. 8 Eq. 408.



executed in favor of a person or a class, outside of the persons or classes in whose favor it is given, the execution will be bad, and it will remain as a trust for all those in whose favor it was given.<sup>1</sup> As if the power is to distribute among children, it cannot be executed by a distribution among grandchildren.<sup>2</sup> Where the power is to distribute among a certain class, something must be given to each one or the execution of the power is bad.<sup>3</sup> But the proportion is left to the trustee.<sup>4</sup> And the donee of the power cannot execute it in favor of himself or his family, unless the terms of the power specially authorize him so to do.<sup>5</sup> Nor can he delegate the power or the execution of it to others.<sup>6</sup> It must be executed within the time named in the instrument<sup>7</sup> and if the appointment is to be made at a person's decease it must be by will.<sup>8</sup>

§ 255. Generally, if the power is left unexecuted by the donee, the court will execute it as a trust, by dividing the fund equally among the objects or persons in favor of whom it was given, or from whom the selection might have been made, on

<sup>1</sup> *Jarnagin v. Conway*, 2 Humph. 50; *Horwitz v. Norris*, 49 Penn. St. 219; *Knight v. Garborough*, Gilmer, 27; *Little v. Bennett*, 5 Jones, Eq. 156; *Lippincott v. Ridgway*, 3 Stockt. 526; *Varrell v. Wendell*, 20 N. H. 431; *Wickesham v. Savage*, 58 Penn. St. 219; *In re Gratwick's Trust*, L. R. 1 Eq. 117; *Carson v. Carson*, Phill. Eq. N. C. 57.

<sup>2</sup> *Horwitz v. Norris*, 49 Penn. St. 219; *Churchill v. Churchill*, L. R. 5 Eq. 44; *Moriarty v. Martin*, 3 Ir. Ch. 26.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*; *Lippincott v. Ridgway*, 2 Stockt. 164; 3 ib. 526; *Booth v. Alington*, 39 Eng. L. & Eq. 250. It seems that this is not the rule in Pennsylvania. *Graeff v. De Turk*, 44 Penn. St. 527.

<sup>4</sup> *Portsmouth v. Shackford*, 46 N. H. 423.

<sup>5</sup> *Bostick v. Winton*, 1 Sneed, 524; *Cruse v. McKee*, 2 Head, 1; *Holt v. Hogan*, 5 Jones, Eq. 82; *Bull v. Bull*, 8 Conn. 47; *Cooper v. Cooper*, L. R. 8 Eq. 312.

<sup>6</sup> *Singleton v. Scott*, 11 Io. 589; *Haslen v. Kean*, 2 Taylor, 279; *Withers v. Yeadon*, 1 Rich. Eq. 324; *Carr v. Atkinson*, L. R. 14 Eq. 400; *Webb v. Sadler*, L. R. 14 Eq. 533.

<sup>7</sup> *Cooper v. Martin*, L. R. 3 Eq. 47.

<sup>8</sup> *Freeland v. Pearson*, L. R. 3 Eq. 658.

the ground that *equality is equity*.<sup>1</sup> But if the donor of the power lays down any rule by which the *donee* or trustee is to be governed in his selection and distribution of the fund, it is said the court will place itself in the position of the trustee. If the discretion of the trustee is to be founded upon, or measured by, a state of facts which the court can inquire into and apply as effectually as a private person could, it "can look with the eyes of the trustee," and can substitute its own judgment for that of the individual. Lord Hardwicke said in a case before him, "Here a rule is laid down; the trustees are to judge of the occasions and necessities of the family; the court can judge of such necessity; that is a judgment to be made from existing facts, so that the court can make the judgment as well as the trustee, and, when informed by evidence of the necessity, can judge what is equitable and just on this necessity," and his Lordship referred the case to a master to report the facts, and decreed a distribution according to the necessities found.<sup>2</sup> This doctrine has been acted upon in similar cases.<sup>3</sup> In others, the courts have said that it was "impossible to distinguish between degrees of poverty," and that they would not attempt to apply the discretion given to the *donee* of the power, but would divide the fund equally.<sup>4</sup> This conflict of authority leaves the question open for further discussion. It would seem that there is no impossibility in the nature of things "in distinguishing between degrees of poverty," or in

<sup>1</sup> *Doyley v. Attorney-General*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 195; *Longmore v. Broom*, 7 Ves. 124; *Salisbury v. Denton*, 3 K. & J. 493; *Izod v. Izod*, 32 Beav. 249; *Gray v. Gray*, 13 Ir. Ch. 404; *Fordyce v. Brydges*, 2 Phil. 497; *Penny v. Turner*, ib. 493; *Whithurst v. Harker*, 2 Ired. Ch. 492; *Kennedy v. Kingston*, 2 J. & W. 431; *Frazier v. Frazier*, 2 Leigh, 642; *Cruse v. McKee*, 2 Head, 1; *Davy v. Hooper*, 2 Vern. 665.

<sup>2</sup> *Gower v. Mainwaring*, 2 Ves. 87. Mr. Belt's edition has a misprint, the court *cannot* judge.

<sup>3</sup> *Liley v. Hey*, 1 Hare, 581; *Hewett v. Hewett*, 2 Ed. 332; *Maberly v. Turton*, 14 Ves. 499; *Bull v. Bull*, 8 Conn. 48.

<sup>4</sup> *McNeillidge v. Galbrath*, 8 S. & R. 43; *Harrison v. Harrison*, 2 Grat. 1; *Withers v. Yeadon*, 1 Rich. Ch. 324.

deciding what class of persons or relations come within the description, and should take under the gift of the donor. Lord Hardwicke's observations are just, and can be acted upon by courts. It is not so much a question whether courts of equity can exercise the discretion given to the trustee, as whether it is consistent with the dignity of courts to inquire into the relative necessities of a testator's relations, or whether they have the time to enter into such inquiries. So far as the dignity of courts is concerned, they may well remember that they are created to administer justice and equity to the people, and that no inquiries or decrees that can be successfully made are inconsistent with their position or duties.<sup>1</sup>

§ 256. If the donee of the power or trustee is to *select* from the donor's *relations* those to whom he is to give the property, in the execution of the power he may select from the whole circle of relations, whether near or distant;<sup>2</sup> and he may exclude some;<sup>3</sup> but if the power is to *distribute* to the donor's relations, then the donee must confine himself to the relations that are so near that they would take under the statute of distributions.<sup>4</sup> Courts have adopted the rule of the statute of

<sup>1</sup> Upon the general subject of bequests to poor or necessitous relations, see *Attorney-General v. Buckland*, 1 Ves. 231; *Amb. 71*; *Anon. 1 P. Wms. 327*; *Widmore v. Woodroffe*, *Amb. 636*; *Brunsdon v. Woolredge*, *Amb. 507*; *Mahon v. Savage*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 111; *Green v. Howard*, 1 Bro. Ch. 33.

<sup>2</sup> *Grant v. Lynham*, 4 Russ. 292; *Brown v. Higgs*, 5 Ves. 501; *Cruwys v. Colman*, 9 Ves. 324; *Swift v. Gregson*, 1 T. R. 435, note f; *Salisbury v. Denton*, 3 K. & J. 536; *Supple v. Lowson*, *Amb. 729*; *Harding v. Glyn*, 1 Atk. 469; *Mahon v. Savage*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 111; *Huling v. Farrer*, 9 R. I. 410; *Brunsdon v. Woolredge*, *Amb. 507*, seems inconsistent with the other authorities.

<sup>3</sup> *Ingraham v. Meade*, 3 Wall. Jr. 32.

<sup>4</sup> *Clapton v. Bulmer*, 10 Sim. 426; 5 My. & Cr. 108; *Attorney-General v. Price*, 17 Ves. 373, note a; *Isaac v. Defriez*, *Amb. 595*; *Carr v. Bedford*, 2 Ch. R. 146; *Pope v. Whitcombe*, 3 Mer. 437; *In re Jeafferson's Trusts*, L. R. 2 Eq. 276; *Forbes v. Ball*, 3 Mer. 437. This case seems inconsistent, but the question was whether it was a *power* or a *trust*, and not whether the authority was exceeded.

distributions as a convenient rule in such cases, to prevent such gifts from being void for uncertainty. If the power devolves upon the court as a trust, whether it is one of *selection* or *distribution*, the court will act upon the rule of the statute of distributions,<sup>1</sup> unless the donor has himself established some rule of *selection* or distribution which the court can act upon.<sup>2</sup> And the same rule applies if the donor uses the word family.<sup>3</sup> A gift to *nearest relations* or next of kin, must be administered in the same way.<sup>4</sup> But it is said that a power of selection will be implied in the donee in the case of relations, where it would not have been implied in the case of children.<sup>5</sup> A power to an unmarried woman to appoint to her family or next of kin may extend to any relative,<sup>6</sup> and such power may be executed after coverture.<sup>7</sup>

§ 257. Intimately connected with this subject is the inquiry whether courts will execute the power of distribution among the persons intended, by distributing *per capita* or *per stirpes*. Upon this matter it is to be observed that courts have adopted the statute of distributions as a convenient rule to point out the *relations* intended by a donor, when he uses that word in a gift. The only reason for adopting the rule was to prevent the gift from failing for uncertainty. The rule is used to point out the *persons* intended to take, but the terms of the gift are used to point out the *proportions*. If, therefore, there is no

<sup>1</sup> Bennett v. Honýwood, Amb. 708; Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 13 Ir. Eq. 332; Gough v. Bult, 16 Sim. 45; Cowper v. Mantell, 22 Beav. 231.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.; or unless the gift is in some sense a charity. White v. White, 7 Ves. 423; Mahon v. Savage, 1 Sch. & L. 111; Attorney-General v. Price, 17 Ves. 371; Isaac v. Defriez, ib. 373, note a.

<sup>3</sup> Cruwys v. Colman, 9 Ves. 319; Grant v. Lynham, 4 Russ. 297.

<sup>4</sup> Edge v. Salisbury, Amb. 70; Goodinge v. Goodinge, 1 Ves. 231.

<sup>5</sup> Spring v. Biles, 1 T. R. 435, note f; Mahon v. Savage, 1 Sch. & Lef. 111; Salusbury v. Denton, 3 K. & J. 536; Pope v. Whitcombe, 3 Mer. 689.

<sup>6</sup> Snow v. Teed, L. R. 9 Eq. 622.

<sup>7</sup> Wood v. Wood, L. R. 10 Eq. 220.

rule in the gift which can apply to determine the proportions, the court will make the distribution *per capita*, and everybody within the rule will take equally as tenants in common.<sup>1</sup> But if the gift is to the *next of kin* of the donor, it will be confined to the *nearest relations*; and those who would take by representation under the statute of distributions will be excluded if there are relations a degree nearer.<sup>2</sup> If the subject-matter of the gift is incapable of division, and is to be bestowed upon some one of a class to be selected by the donee, and no selection is made, the court will notwithstanding execute the power as a trust, if by any possibility it can be done.<sup>3</sup>

§ 258. Another difficult question which courts must decide when they are called upon to execute these powers or trusts, is, whether the fund shall be distributed to the parties in interest living at the donor's death, or to those living at the donee's death. Upon this matter it has been determined that when it appears that the donee is to have his whole life to make the selection or distribution, or if the donee is to have the use of the fund for his life, then the court will distribute it to the parties entitled living at the death of the donee.<sup>4</sup> But if the

<sup>1</sup> Walker v. Maunde, 19 Ves. 427; Thomas v. Hole, Ca. t. Talb. 251; Phillips v. Garth, 3 Bro. Ch. 64; Stamp v. Cooke, 1 Cox, 326; Hinckley v. Maclaerns, 1 M. & K. 27; Withy v. Mangles, 4 Beav. 358; 10 Cl. & Fin. 215; Green v. Howard, 1 Bro. Ch. 33; Pope v. Whitcombe, 3 Mer. 689; Rayner v. Mowbray, 3 Bro. Ch. 234.

<sup>2</sup> Elmsley v. Young, 2 M. & K. 780; Withy v. Mangles, 4 Beav. 358; 10 Cl. & Fin. 215.

<sup>3</sup> Moseley v. Moseley, R. t. Finch, 53; Clarke v. Turner, Freem. 199; Richardson v. Chapman, 7 Bro. P. C. 318; Brown v. Higgs, 5 Ves. 504.

<sup>4</sup> Cruwys v. Colman, 9 Ves. 319; Brown v. Pocock, 6 Sim. 257; Bonser v. Kinnear, 2 Gif. 195; Birch v. Wade, 3 Ves. & B. 198; Walsh v. Wallinger, 2 R. & M. 78; Burrough v. Philcox, 5 My. & Cr. 72; Woodcock v. Renneck, 4 Beav. 190; 1 Phil. 72; Finch v. Hollingsworth, 21 Beav. 112; Doyley v. Attorney-General, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 194, pl. 15; Witts v. Boddington, 3 Bro. Ch. 95; Winn v. Fenwick, 11 Beav. 438; Tiffin v. Longman, 15 Beav. 275; Grieveson v. Kirsopp, 2 Keen, 653; Freeland v. Pearson, L. R. 3 Eq. 658.

donee is to make the distribution *immediately*, or as soon as may be, the court, on his death without executing the power, will distribute the fund among those entitled at the death of the donor;<sup>1</sup> and the same rule will be followed if the donee die before the donor.<sup>2</sup> These rules, however, are applicable only when the final beneficiaries take *through the medium* of the power; for, if they take directly by the form of the gift subject to be defeated by the execution of the power, they have a vested interest at the death of the donor, and of course those living at that time will take, if the power is not executed to defeat them.<sup>3</sup> Where the donee may execute the power by *deed* or *will* at any time during his life, and he dies leaving the power unexecuted, there is a conflict of the authorities upon the question to whom should the court give the funds: Mr. Lewin says that there is an equal conflict of principle.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Brown v. Higgs*, 4 Ves. 708; *Longmore v. Broom*, 7 Ves. 124; *Cole v. Wade*, 16 Ves. 27.

<sup>2</sup> *Penny v. Turner*, 2 Phil. 493; *Hutchinson v. Hutchinson*, 13 Ir. Eq. 332.

<sup>3</sup> *Lambert v. Thwaites*, L. R. 2 Eq. 151.

<sup>4</sup> *Doyley v. Attorney-General*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 195; *Harding v. Glyn*, 1 Atk. 469; *Pope v. Whitcombe*, 3 Mer. 689, are authorities that those living at the death of the donee should take. On the other hand the cases of *Hands v. Hands*, 1 T. R. 437, note; *Grieveson v. Kirsopp*, 2 Keen, 653, are authorities that those living at the death of the donor should take. Mr. Lewin says, p. 600 (5th ed. Lond.), "Upon principle, too, as well as upon authority, this question is attended with difficulty. On the one hand, the power may be properly exercised by the donee at any time before his death, and there is no obligation to exercise it earlier, and if any members of the class die before the power is exercised, they, according to the ordinary rule, cease to be objects of it. The donee of the power has an undoubted right to postpone the execution of it until the last moment of his life, and the only default which the court has to supply, is the non-exercise *just before his death*; and that default must, therefore, be supplied in favor of those who were objects at the date of the death of the donee. On the other hand, the donee of the power may exercise it in favor of the class existing at the time of exercise, to the exclusion of those who have died before, and also, where the power is one of selection, to the exclusion of those who may

come into *esse* subsequently, but the court cannot act arbitrarily, and cannot show any favor, but must observe equality towards all. Who, then, are the objects of the power? As it was not the duty of the donee of the power to exercise it at one time more than another, the only objects of the power must be all those who might by possibility have taken a benefit under it; that is, those living at the death of the testator, and those who come into being during the continuance of the life-estate; otherwise, should all the class predecease the tenant for life (an event not improbable where *children* or some limited class of relations are the objects), there would be a power imperative which is construed a trust, and no *cestui que trust*, — a result which, it is conceived, the court would be somewhat unwilling to adopt.

## CHAPTER IX.

APPOINTMENT, ACCEPTANCE, DISCLAIMER, REMOVAL, RESIGNATION,  
SUBSTITUTION, AND NUMBER OF TRUSTEES, AND APPOINTMENT  
UNDER A POWER.

- § 259. Acceptance of the trust — how and when it should be accepted.
- § 260. What is an acceptance, and its effect.
- § 261. How an acceptance may be shown.
- §§ 262, 263. Where an executor is also named as trustee.
- § 264. Of the executor of an executor, or the executor of a trustee.
- § 265. Trustee *de son tort*.
- § 266. No such thing as a passive trustee.
- § 267. Where a trustee may disclaim.
- § 268. Cannot disclaim after acceptance.
- § 269. Whether an heir can disclaim after the death of the trustee.
- §§ 270, 271. Parol disclaimer sufficient, but a writing more certain.
- § 272. Where a legacy or other benefit is given to the trustee or executor.
- § 273. Effect of a disclaimer.
- § 274. How a trustee may be removed or resign.
- § 275. For what causes may be removed.
- § 276. For what causes may be allowed to resign.
- §§ 277, 278. How the court proceeds in substituting trustees.
- § 279. Bankruptcy of trustee.
- § 280. The resignation of trustees.
- § 281. Where the same person is executor and trustee.
- § 282. The proceedings to remove and substitute trustees.
- § 283. Where all parties consent.
- § 284. Of the vesting of the property in the new trustees.
- § 285. Duty of trustee where all consent to his discharge.
- § 286. Of the number of trustees.
- § 287. Trustees cannot appoint their successors or new trustees unless power is given in the instrument of trust.
- § 288. Caution necessary in new appointments.
- § 289. Powers of appointment frequently matters of personal confidence.
- § 290. Occasions or events upon which new appointments may be made.
- § 291. An appointment may be made to fill a vacancy occurring before the death of the testator.
- § 292. Unfitness and incapacity.
- § 293. Power cannot be exercised if the trust is already in suit in court.
- § 294. By whom the power may be exercised.
- § 295. The power must be strictly followed.
- § 296. Where a married woman or an infant may exercise the power.
- § 297. Who may be appointed under a power.



§ 259. WHEN a trust is created by implication, result, or construction of law from acts of parties, they will be held by the law to the performance of the trust whether they are willing or unwilling to accept the situation; that is, when a trust is raised by law and thrust upon the conscience of a party, as the result or construction to be put upon his acts, in order to do complete justice, the acceptance or refusal of the party to be charged with the trust cannot alter his legal or equitable liability to act as a trustee, and to do all that is required of him to execute the trust. Subject to this qualification, no one is *compellable* to undertake a trust.<sup>1</sup> If a conveyance is made by a private individual or corporation to public officers and their successors in office, the successors are not bound, unless they accept the trust.<sup>2</sup> In voluntary or express trusts, no title vests in the proposed trustee, by whatever instrument it is attempted to be transferred, unless he expressly or by implication accepts the office, or in some way assumes its duties and liabilities.<sup>3</sup> And though a person may have promised or agreed beforehand to accept a trust, and his name is introduced into the will, conveyance, or settlement, yet he may decline to act, and it is proper for him to do so if he finds that his duties are different from what he conceived them to be when he entered into the agreement; or if for any reason he cannot attend to the proper discharge of the office.<sup>4</sup> Such refusal does not

<sup>1</sup> Lowry v. Fulton, 9 Sim. 123; Robinson v. Pitt, 3 P. Wms. 251; Moyle v. Moyle, 2 Russ. & M. 715. And he may renounce the trust, though such renunciation may deprive a beneficiary of all means of obtaining a benefit intended for him by a testator. Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298.

<sup>2</sup> Delaplane v. Lewis, 19 Wis. 476.

<sup>3</sup> Maccubbin v. Cromwell, 7 Gill & J. 157; Bethune v. Dougherty, 21 Ga. 257; King v. Donnelly, 5 Paige, 46; Trask v. Donaghue, 1 Aik. 370; Burritt v. Silliman, 13 N. Y. 93; De Peyster v. Clendening, 8 Paige, 295; Bulkley v. De Peyster, 26 Wend. 21; Judson v. Gibbons, 5 Wend. 224; Cooper v. McClun, 16 Ill. 435; Matter of Robinson, 37 N. Y. 261; Armstrong v. Morrill, 14 Wall. 138.

<sup>4</sup> Doyle v. Blake, 2 Sch. & Lef. 239; Evans v. John, 4 Beav. 35; Smith v. Knowles, 2 Grant Ca. 413; Crook v. Ingoldsby, 2 Ir. Eq. 375.

invalidate the deed or will: it only relieves the trustees, and enables the court to appoint others.<sup>1</sup> The refusal to act should be affirmatively shown, either by an express disclaimer, or by such a tacit refusal to act as amounts to an express rejection;<sup>2</sup> for every gift by will or deed is supposed, *prima facie*, to be beneficial to the donee, and therefore the law will presume that every gift, whether in trust or not, is accepted until the contrary is proved.<sup>3</sup> Especially will this presumption prevail after a long lapse of time, as twenty years,<sup>4</sup> or thirty-four years,<sup>5</sup> if the trustee has notice, and has not disclaimed, though he may have done nothing in the execution of the trust. And even where a deed was only four years old, and the trustees knew of their appointment, and did not object, Lord St. Leonards held that they could not be allowed to say that they did not assent to the conveyance.<sup>6</sup>

§ 260. If the trust is created by deed, the most obvious, natural, and effectual mode of signifying an acceptance is by signing the deed; but such execution of the deed by the trustee is not necessary.<sup>7</sup> If the trustee acts under the deed in the performance of the trust, he will be held to have accepted,

<sup>1</sup> *Brownell v. Downs*, 11 How. 62; *Nicoll v. Miller*, 37 Ill. 387; *Nicoll v. Ogden*, 29 Ill. 323.

<sup>2</sup> *Read v. Robinson*, 6 Watts & S. 331.

<sup>3</sup> *Read v. Robinson*, 6 Watts & S. 331; *Townson v. Tickell*, 3 B. & Ald. 36; *Thompson v. Leach*, Ventr. 198; *Wilt v. Franklin*, 1 Binn. 502; *Wise v. Wise*, 2 Jon. & La. 412; *Eyrick v. Hetrick*, 13 Penn. St. 494; 4 Kent, 500; 4 Cru. Dig. 404-406; *Goss v. Singleton*, 2 Head, 67; *Penny v. Davis*, 3 B. Mon. 313; *Furman v. Fisher*, 4 Cold. 626.

<sup>4</sup> *In re Uniacke*, 1 Jon. & La. 1; *Eyrick v. Hetrick*, 13 Penn. St. 493.

<sup>5</sup> *In re Needham*, 1 Jon. & La. 34.

<sup>6</sup> *Wise v. Wise*, 2 Jon. & La. 403-412; *Penny v. Davis*, 3 B. Mon. 314; *Lewis v. Baird*, 3 McLean, 65; *Read v. Robinson*, 6 Watts & S. 338.

<sup>7</sup> *Flint v. Clinton Co.* 12 N. H. 432; *Cook v. Fryer*, 1 Hare, 498; *Montfort v. Cadogan*, 17 Ves. 488; 19 Ves. 638; *Small v. Ayleswood*, 9 B. & Cr. 300; *Leffler v. Armstrong*, 4 Io. 482; *Buckridge v. Glasse*, 1 Cr. & Ph. 131; *Bixler v. Taylor*, 3 B. Mon. 362; *Field v. Arrowsmith*, 3 Humph. 442; *Smith v. Knowles*, 2 Grant, Ca. 413.

though he has not executed, the deed, and he may be liable for a breach of the trust;<sup>1</sup> but if the deed contains special covenants, the trustee cannot be sued upon them, if he has not executed it, though he may have accepted the deed.<sup>2</sup> Nor will the execution of the deed amount to a covenant to execute the trust, if it does not contain words that can be construed into such a covenant at law.<sup>3</sup> But the words *covenant* or *agree* are not necessary for that purpose; the word *declare* will suffice.<sup>4</sup> If there is a breach of the trust, but no execution of the deed other than by an acceptance of it, a *simple contract debt* only is created against the trustee or his estate,<sup>5</sup> but a breach of covenants under the hand and seal of the trustee creates a *specialty debt*, which in some jurisdictions takes precedence of simple contract debts.<sup>6</sup> This distinction is of no effect in the United States, as, in every State, probably the real estate of a deceased person is equally liable for his debts, however contracted or evidenced. If the trustee executes the deed, he

<sup>1</sup> Ibid; *Redenour v. Whertritt*, 30 Ind. 485.

<sup>2</sup> *Richardson v. Jenkins*, 1 Drew. 477; *Vincent v. Godson*, 1 Sm. & Gif. 384.

<sup>3</sup> *Wynch v. Grant*, 2 Drew. 312; *Courtney v. Taylor*, 6 M. & Gr. 851; *Newport v. Bryan*, 5 Ir. Ch. 119; *Adey v. Arnold*, 2 De G., M. & G. 433; *Marryatt v. Marryatt*, 6 Jur. (N. S.) 572; *Holland v. Holland*, L. R. 4 Ch. 449.

<sup>4</sup> *Richardson v. Jenkins*, 1 Drew. 477; *Saltoun v. Hanston*, 1 Bing. N. C. 433; *Cummins v. Cummins*, 3 Jon. & La. 64; 8 Ir. Ch. 723; *Jenkins v. Robertson*, Law R. 1 Eq. 123.

<sup>5</sup> *Jenkins v. Robertson*, 1 Eq. R. 123; *Lockhart v. Reilly*, 1 De G. & J. 464; *Vernon v. Vawdry*, 2 Atk. 119; *Barn. 280*; *Cox v. Bateman*, 2 Ves. 19; *Kearnan v. Fitzsimon*, 3 Ridg. P. C. 18. If the trustee execute the deed, and it is a simple acceptance of the trust on his part, the breach of the trust is a simple contract debt, for there is no breach of any express covenant. *Holland v. Holland*, L. R. 4 Ch. 449.

<sup>6</sup> *Gifford v. Manley*, For. 109; *Mavor v. Davenport*, 2 Sim. 227; *Benson v. Benson*, 1 P. Wms. 131; *Deg v. Deg*, 2 P. Wms. 414; *Turner v. Wardle*, 7 Sim. 80; *Bailey v. Ekins*, 2 Dick. 632; *Cummins v. Cummins*, 3 Jon. & La. 64; *Primrose v. Bromley*, 1 Atk. 89; *Wood v. Hardisty*, 2 Coll. 542, commented upon L. R. 1 Eq. 125.

should see to it that the recitals are all correct, otherwise he may be held liable to make them good.<sup>1</sup>

§ 261. Parol evidence of the conversations, acts, and admissions of a party are admissible to prove his acceptance of a trust.<sup>2</sup> Thus if a person, with notice of his appointment to a trust, receives the income of the trust estate;<sup>3</sup> or executes a power of attorney;<sup>4</sup> or signs a joint draft, order, or receipt, to enable some other person to act in administering the estate or the trust;<sup>5</sup> or gives notice to a tenant of the estate to pay rent to him;<sup>6</sup> or brings an action on the footing of the trust;<sup>7</sup> or interferes generally by ordering the trust property to be sold, or by being present at the sale, or by giving any directions implying ownership, or by frequently making inquiries of the acting trustee as to the affairs of the trust,<sup>8</sup> or by not objecting when the instrument of trust is read to him,<sup>9</sup> — all these acts may be shown by parol, as evidence tending to prove an acceptance, and the evidence will be more or less conclusive

<sup>1</sup> *Gore v. Bowser*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 6; *Chaigneau v. Bryan*, 1 Ir. Ch. 172; 8 Ir. Ch. 251; *Story v. Gape*, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 706; *Bliss v. Bridgewater* (cited *Lewin on Trusts*, 166, 5th ed.). But in *Fenwick v. Greenwell*, 10 Beav. 418, the Master of the Rolls refused to allow the recital of a representation to bind the trustees.

<sup>2</sup> *Urch v. Walker*, 3 My. & Cr. 703; *James v. Frearson*, 1 N. C. C. 375; 1 Y. & C. Ch. Ca. 370; *Doe v. Harris*, 16 M. & W. 517; *Redenour v. Wheritt*, 30 Ind. 485.

<sup>3</sup> *Conyngham v. Conyngham*, 1 Ves. 522.

<sup>4</sup> *Harrison v. Graham*, 1 P. Wms. 241, n.; 1 Wms. Ex'rs, 151; *Hanbury v. Kirkland*, 3 Sim. 265; *Christian v. Yancey*, 2 P. & H. (Va.) 240.

<sup>5</sup> *Broadhurst v. Balguy*, 1 Y. & C. Ch. Ca. 16; *Sadler v. Hobbs*, 2 Bro. Ch. 114; *Doyle v. Blake*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 231.

<sup>6</sup> *Montfort v. Cadogan*, 17 Ves. 487.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*; *O'Neill v. Henderson*, 15 Ark. 235; *Pond v. Hine*, 21 Conn. 519; *Penny v. Davis*, 3 B. Mon. 314.

<sup>8</sup> *James v. Frearson*, 1 Y. & C. Ch. Ca. 375; *Shepherd v. McEvers*, 4 John. Ch. 136.

<sup>9</sup> *James v. Frearson*, 1 Y. & C. Ch. Ca. 375; *Chidgey v. Harris*, 16 M. & W. 517; *Butler v. Baker*, 3 Co. 26 a; *Hanson v. Worthington*, 12 Md. 418.

according to the circumstances of each case. The general rule is, that *every voluntary interference* with the trust property will stamp a person as an acting trustee,<sup>1</sup> unless such *interference* can be *plainly* referred to some other ground of action than to an acceptance of the trust, as by showing that such person acted, in interfering, as the mere agent of an acting trustee.<sup>2</sup> The mere fact that a person named as trustee in a deed takes the custody of the deed until another trustee can be appointed is not an acceptance, because his acts are plainly referable to another ground of action.<sup>3</sup> While parol evidence is competent to show whether a supposed trustee has or has not accepted the trust, it is not *competent*, in behalf of the trustee, to prove by such evidence the conversations or declarations of the settlor, in order to show what property was subject to the trust.<sup>4</sup> A trustee should take care that his acts in relation to the trust fund are *plainly referable* to some certain ground of action; for if his acts are *ambiguous*, or it is doubtful whether he intended to accept, or to act in some other capacity, the doubt will be against him, and he will be construed to have accepted the trust and all its responsibilities.<sup>5</sup>

§ 262. At common law an executor was said to derive his authority from the will, and not from the appointment of the

<sup>1</sup> *White v. Barton*, 18 Beav. 192; *Harrison v. Graham*, cited *Churchill v. Hobson*, 1 P. Wms. 241 n. (y); *Cummins v. Cummins*, 8 Ir. Eq. 723; *Doyle v. Blake*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 231; *Malzy v. Edge*, 2 Jur. (n. s.) 80; *Lewis v. Baird*, 3 McLean, 56; *Maccubbin v. Cromwell*, 7 Gill & J. 157; *Penny v. Davis*, 3 B. Mon. 313.

<sup>2</sup> *Stacey v. Elph*, 1 M. & K. 195; *Lowry v. Fulton*, 9 Sim. 115; *Dove v. Everard*, 1 R. & M. 281; *Taml*, 376; *Orr v. Newton*, 2 Cox, 274; *Balchen v. Scott*, 2 Ves. Jr. 678; *Carter v. Carter*, 10 B. Mon. 327; *Judson v. Gibbons*, 5 Wend. 224.

<sup>3</sup> *Evans v. John*, 4 Beav. 35; *Smith v. Knowles*, 2 Grant, Ca. 413.

<sup>4</sup> *Doyle v. Blake*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 240.

<sup>5</sup> *Read v. Truelove*, Amb. 417; *Chaplin v. Givens*, 1 Rice, Eq. 154; *Doe v. Harris*, 16 M. & W. 517; *Lowry v. Fulton*, 9 Sim. 115; *Conyngham v. Conyngham*, 1 Ves. 522; *Montgomery v. Johnson*, 11 Ir. Eq. 476.

Probate Court.<sup>1</sup> Therefore most of the acts of persons nominated to execute wills were valid before the probate of the will.<sup>2</sup> Thus persons appointed by a testator in his will to administer his estate, and execute the trusts created by such will, might assume the trusts and proceed in the execution of them, without presenting the will for probate;<sup>3</sup> and the same evidence might be used to show that a trustee under a will had accepted such trust, and had assumed its responsibilities, as was admissible to show that a trustee under a deed had accepted the office.<sup>4</sup> But in nearly all the United States there are statutes upon the subject which require that wills shall be presented for probate, and that executors and trustees under them shall give bonds for the faithful discharge of their duties. Where such statutes are in force, executors or trustees have no power or authority to act without appointment by the Probate Court, and a refusal or neglect to qualify by giving bonds will be considered a refusal and disclaimer of the trust.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Toller's Ex'rs, 95.

<sup>2</sup> Easton v. Carter, 5 Exch. 8; Venables v. East Ind. Co. 2 Exch. 633; Toller's Ex'rs, 46, 47; Mitchell v. Rice, 6 J. J. Marsh. 625.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.; Vanhorne v. Fonda, 5 John. Ch. 403.

<sup>4</sup> Conyngham v. Conyngham, 1 Ves. 522; Doyle v. Blake, 2 Sch. & Lef. 231; James v. Frearson, 1 Y. & C. Ch. Ca. 370; Maccubbin v. Cromwell, 7 Gill & J. 157; Godwin v. Yonge, 22 Ala. 553; Latimer v. Hanson, 1 Bland, 51; Flint v. Clinton Co. 12 N. H. 432; Chaplin v. Givens, 1 Rice, Eq. 133; Baldwin v. Porter, 12 Conn. 473.

<sup>5</sup> Luscomb v. Ballard, 5 Gray, 403; Monroe v. James, 4 Munf. 195; Trask v. Donaghue, 1 Aik. (Vt.) 373; Carter v. Carter, 10 B. Mon. 327; Mitchell v. Rice, 6 J. J. Marsh. 625; Robertson v. Gaines, 2 Humph. 381; Johnson's App. 9 Barr, 416; Simpson's App. ib.; Wood v. Sparks, 1 Dev. & Bat. 396; Miller v. Meetch, 8 Barr, 417; Roseboom v. Moshier, 2 Denio, 61; Williams v. Cushing, 34 Me. 370; Deering v. Adams, 37 Me. 265; Hanson v. Worthington, 12 Md. 418; Knight v. Loomis, 30 Me. 208; Groton v. Ruggles, 17 Me. 137; Sawyer's App. 16 N. H. 459; Gaskill v. Gaskill, 7 R. I. 478; Mahony v. Hunler, 30 Ind. 246. In many of the States there are statutes that authorize the judges of probate to appoint executors or trustees under wills, without requiring bonds with sureties, if the testator request it in his will, or if all the parties in interest, being *sui juris*, request it in writing. In such cases the court proceeds with great caution, and it

In the absence of such statutes, if a person named as executor procures probate of the will, he will thereby constitute himself executor with all the liabilities attached to the office,<sup>1</sup> and if the same person is appointed executor and trustee, probate of the will by him will be an acceptance of the trusts.<sup>2</sup> But the same person may be appointed both executor and trustee under a will in such a manner that he may accept one of the offices and decline the other. As if a man is appointed executor, and *as* executor is to act as a trustee, in such case the probate of the will, and qualification as executor, will be an acceptance of the trust.<sup>3</sup> But if from the will it appears that the testator intended to give his trustees a distinct and independent character, probate of the will by the executors will not make them trustees, unless they also accept the trust and qualify themselves according to law.<sup>4</sup> If the executor is not expressly appointed trustee, the court may determine from the whole will whether he is to act as trustee.<sup>5</sup> If the trust is given to one named, and the same person is afterwards appointed executor, the trust is not annexed to the office of exec-

may at any time require security if the circumstances seem to require it. *Gibbs v. Guignard*, 1 S. C. 359.

<sup>1</sup> *Booth v. Booth*, 1 Beav. 125; *Ward v. Butler*, 2 Moll. 533; *Styles v. Guy*, 1 Mac. & G. 431; *Scully v. Delaney*, 2 Ir. Eq. 165; and see *Balchen v. Scott*, 2 Ves. Jr. 678; *Peeble's App.* 15 Ser. & R. 39; *Worth v. McAden*, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 209; *Cummins v. Cummins*, 3 Jon. & La. 64; *Hanson v. Worthington*, 12 Md. 418.

<sup>2</sup> *Mucklow v. Fuller*, Jac. 198; *Williams v. Nixon*, 2 Beav. 472; *Clarke v. Parker*, 19 Ves. 1; *Cummins v. Cummins*, 3 Jon. & La. 64; *Hanson v. Worthington*, 12 Md. 418; *Baldwin v. Porter*, 12 Conn. 473.

<sup>3</sup> *De Peyster v. Clendining*, 8 Paige, 295; *Hanson v. Worthington*, 12 Md. 418; *Williams v. Conrad*, 30 Barb. 524; *Mucklow v. Fuller*, Jac. 198; *Booth v. Booth*, 1 Beav. 125; *Williams v. Nixon*, 2 Beav. 472; *Ward v. Butler*, 2 Moll. 533; *Wilson's Estate*, 2 Penn. St. 325.

<sup>4</sup> *De Peyster v. Clendining*, 8 Paige, 295; *Worth v. McAden*, 1 Dev. & Bat. 209; *Judson v. Gibbons*, 5 Wend. 226; *Williams v. Cushing*, 34 Me. 370; *Deering v. Adams*, 37 Me. 265; *Hanson v. Worthington*, 12 Md. 418; *Knight v. Loomis*, 30 Me. 204; *Wheatley v. Badger*, 7 Penn. St. 459.

<sup>5</sup> *Sawyer's App.* 16 N. H. 459; *Carson v. Carson*, 6 Allen, 397; *Howard v. Amer. Peace Soc.* 49 Me. 288, 306.

utor.<sup>1</sup> The conditions of bonds of administrators are to administer the estate according to law. Bonds of executors are conditioned to administer an estate according to the will, though a condition to administer according to law is the same thing, because by law they are to administer according to the will. If, therefore, by the terms of the will the executor, *as executor*, is to keep the estate, or any portion of it, in his hands, and is to deal with it as a trustee, his bond will be held as security for the faithful performance of his duties, though such duties are much larger and different from those of an ordinary executor.<sup>2</sup> Where the income of property is given to one for life, and at his death the property is given over to another, and no trustee is named in the will, the executor is the trustee to hold the property during the life of the legatee for life.<sup>3</sup> If, however, the will contemplates that the executor, *as such*, is to perform only the ordinary duties of an executor, and that when the estate is settled by him, another duty is to arise to be performed, either by him or by another, then the bond of the executor is not security for those further duties; but the person who is to perform them must accept the office, and give a bond for their performance.<sup>4</sup> It may be further observed, that an executor will be considered as holding a legacy in his capacity as executor, unless the will clearly shows that the testator intended that he should hold it in the character of a trustee.<sup>5</sup> But after the lapse of twenty years the law will presume that an estate was fully administered, and that there-

<sup>1</sup> James's App. 3 Grant, 169.

<sup>2</sup> *Saunderson v. Stearns*, 6 Mass. 37; *Prescott v. Pitts*, 9 Mass. 376; *Hall v. Cushing*, 9 Pick. 395; *Dorr v. Wainwright*, 13 Pick. 328; *Towne v. Ammidown*, 20 Pick. 325; *Perkins v. Moore*, 16 Ala. 9; *State v. Nicols*, 10 Gill & J. 27; *Wilson's Estate*, 2 Penn. St. 325; *Sheet's Est.* 52 Penn. St. 257; *Lansing v. Lansing*, 45 Barb. 182.

<sup>3</sup> *Wheeler v. Perry*, 18 N. H. 307.

<sup>4</sup> *Knight v. Loomis*, 30 Me. 204; *Mastin v. Barnard*, 33 Ga. 520; *Perkins v. Lewis*, 41 Ala. 641; *Parsons v. Lyman*, 5 Blatch. C. C. 170; *Spark's Est.* 1 Tuck. Sur. 443.

<sup>5</sup> *State v. Nicols*, 10 Gill & J. 27.



after the executor held the funds as trustee.<sup>1</sup> So, if it appears that the executor made an actual final settlement of the estate as executor, he will be presumed to hold subsequently as a trustee.<sup>2</sup> As a general rule, executors' and trustees' bonds can be sued only by leave of court, upon good cause shown.<sup>3</sup>

§ 263. If the same person is both executor and trustee, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether, in a particular case, he is acting as executor or trustee. In England, the rule seems to be that if the executor assents to the legacy, if it is specific, or if part of the assets are clearly set apart and appropriated by him to answer a particular legacy, he will be considered to hold the fund as trustee for that trust, and not as executor.<sup>4</sup> In jurisdictions where executors and trustees are required to qualify and give bonds, it has been held that an executor, who is also a trustee under the will, cannot be considered as holding any part of the assets as trustee, until he has settled his account at the probate office as executor, and has been credited with the amount as executor with which he is afterwards to be charged as trustee.<sup>5</sup> In other cases it has been held that the change of property from the executor to the trustee, where they are the same persons, may be shown by some *authoritative and notorious act*;<sup>6</sup> but that the mere determination of the executor, in his own mind, to hold certain

<sup>1</sup> *Jennings v. Davis*, 5 Dana, 127.

<sup>2</sup> *State v. Hearst*, 12 Miss. 365.

<sup>3</sup> *Floyd v. Gilliam*, 6 Jones, Eq. 183.

<sup>4</sup> *Dix v. Burford*, 19 Beav. 409; *Brougham v. Paulett*, 19 Beav. 119; *Ex parte Dover*, 5 Sim. 500; *Phillipo v. Munnings*, 2 M. & Cr. 309; *Byrchall v. Bradford*, 6 Mad. 13; *Ex parte Wilkinson*, 3 Mont. & Ayr. 145; *Willmot v. Jenkins*, 1 Beav. 401.

<sup>5</sup> *Hall v. Cushing*, 9 Pick. 395; *Prior v. Talbot*, 10 Cush. 1; *Perkins v. Moore*, 16 Ala. 9.

<sup>6</sup> *Newcomb v. Williams*, 9 Met. 534; *Conkey v. Dickinson*, 13 Met. 53; *Hubbard v. Lloyd*, 6 Cush. 522; *De Peyster v. Clendining*, 8 Paige, 310; *Pyrton v. Mood*, 2 McMull. 288; *Hitchcock v. Bank of U. S.* 7 Ala. 386; *Perkins v. Moore*, 16 Ala. 9.

particular property thereafter in trust for a particular legatee under the will, is not such a setting apart as to discharge him from his liability as executor, and to charge him as trustee.<sup>1</sup> Where the executor may thus act in a double capacity, he must account in his capacity as executor, and the sureties on his bond as executor will be liable for the faithful discharge of his duties as such, until he has transferred his account to himself as trustee, and given a bond as trustee.<sup>2</sup> But, at the same time, it is held that if the executor, acting as trustee under such a will, acts with fidelity and due diligence, he and his sureties will not be responsible should any loss happen either to the principal or interest of the trust fund ; that is, that his liability in such a case is rather that of a trustee than that of an executor ;<sup>3</sup> and if he has acted in good faith in the investment of the legacy, any loss that may occur without his fault will fall upon the legatee or *cestui que trust*, and not upon him nor the estate.<sup>4</sup> Where a decree in chancery created a separate estate for a married woman, and the court appointed a trustee to receive it, and ordered him to give bond for the faithful administration of the trust, the property vested in him upon his giving bond, and continued during his life ; and, at his death, it did not vest in the *cestui que trust*, but remained subject to the orders of the court.<sup>5</sup>

§ 264. The executor of an executor, by accepting the office from his immediate testator, becomes the executor and trustee of his testator's testator. This is the rule in England, where an executor comes into possession of all the assets in the hands

<sup>1</sup> *Miller v. Congdon*, 14 Gray, 114. The question in this case, was whether the estate or the legatee should suffer a certain loss ; but it was not a question whether the executor should bear the loss in person.

<sup>2</sup> *Prior v. Talbot*, 10 Cush. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Hubbard v. Lloyd*, 6 Cush. 522 ; *Brown v. Kelsey*, 2 Cush. 248 ; *Dorr v. Wainwright*, 13 Pick. 332 ; *Right v. Cathill*, 5 East, 491 ; *Denne v. Judge*, 11 East, 288.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Witter v. Duley*, 36 Ala. 135.

of his testator, in whatever capacity such testator held them ; and, by accepting the duty of administering the estate of his immediate testator, he accepts the duty of administering all the trusts with which the assets in his testator's hands were charged.<sup>1</sup> This is probably the rule in the United States, modified by our probate statutes. An executor must administer and account for all the assets that come to his hands. If his testator held goods of a previous testator unadministered, or if his testator held assets as a trustee, probate courts may appoint an administrator with the will annexed of the first testator, or a new trustee ; and it will be the duty of the executor of the last testator to settle an account with the administrator with the will annexed, or with the new trustee, and to pay over to them the assets that came to his hands. Until such proceedings are had, he will hold such assets upon the same terms and trusts that his testator held them ; and it will be his duty to administer them accordingly. The proposition may be briefly stated thus : An executor, in proving the will and in accepting the office from his immediate testator, accepts not only all the trusts imposed by the immediate will under which he acts, but also all the trusts in respect to the assets which come to his hands with which his immediate testator was charged ; and he must execute those trusts until he is relieved by a new appointment in the Probate Court, and a settlement and payment over of the assets. He will not be allowed to accept the trusts created by his immediate testator, and to repudiate those with which his testator was himself charged.<sup>2</sup> And so, a trustee cannot limit his acceptance and liability to any particular portion of the trust. For if he acts

<sup>1</sup> In the *Goods of Perry*, 2 Curt. 655 ; *Goods of Beer*, 15 Jur. 160 ; *Shep. Touch.* by Preston, 464 ; *Wankford v. Wankford*, Freem. 520 ; *Hayton v. Wolfe*, Cro. Jac. 614 ; *Palm*. 156 ; *Hutt*. 30.

<sup>2</sup> *Worth v. Arden*, 1 Dev. & Bat. 199 ; *Mitchell v. Adams*, 1 Ired. (Law) 298 ; *King v. Lawrence*, 14 Wis. 238 ; *Schenck v. Schenck*, 1 Green Ch. 174.

at all, though he disclaim a part, he will be held to have accepted the entire trust;<sup>1</sup> as if one is appointed trustee of real and personal estate, and he deals with the personal, he will be deemed to have accepted the entire trust;<sup>2</sup> and so, if the same instrument appoints him to two distinct trusts, he cannot divide them.<sup>3</sup>

§ 265. If a person wrongfully interferes with the assets of a deceased person, he may become an administrator or executor *de son tort*. So, if a person by mistake or otherwise assumes the character of trustee, and acts as such, when the office does not belong to him, he thereby becomes a trustee *de son tort*, and he may be called to account by the *cestui que trust* for the assets received under color of the trust.<sup>4</sup>

§ 266. When trustees have accepted the office, they ought to bear in mind that the law knows no such person as a *passive trustee*, and that they cannot sleep upon their trust. If such trustee remains quiet for any reason, and suffers some other to do all the business, and yet executes formal papers, as a power of attorney for the sale of stock, or a release or discharge of mortgages on payment, he is answerable for the money as if he had conducted the business. And further, the trustee should make himself acquainted with the nature and circumstances of the property; for though he is not responsible for any thing that happens before his acceptance of the trust,<sup>5</sup> yet if a loss occurs from any want of attention, care, or diligence in him

<sup>1</sup> Urch v. Walker, 3 M. & Cr. 702; Read v. Truelove, Amb. 417; Doyle v. Blake, 2 Sch. & Lef. 231; Van Horn v. Fonda, 5 John. Ch. 403; Champlin v. Givens, 1 Rice, Eq. 154; Cummins v. Cummins, 3 Jon. & La. 64; Latimer v. Hanson, 1 Bland, 51; Flint v. Clinton Co. 12 N. H. 432.

<sup>2</sup> Ward v. Butler, 2 Moll. 533.

<sup>3</sup> Urch v. Walker, 3 M. & Cr. 702; Judice v. Prevost, 18 La. An. 601.

<sup>4</sup> Pearce v. Pearce, 22 Beav. 248; Life Association v. Siddall, 3 De G., F. & J. 58; Hennessey v. Bray, 33 Beav. 96; Rackham v. Siddall, 16 Sim. 297; 1 Mac. & G. 607.

<sup>5</sup> Greaves v. Strahan, 8 De G., M. & G. 291.

after his acceptance, he may be held responsible for not taking such action as was called for.<sup>1</sup>

§ 267. It has been seen that a person named as trustee, either in a deed or will, may decline the office and disclaim the estate.<sup>2</sup> If he does so, he ought to execute an effectual disclaimer without delay, for after a long interval of time it will be presumed that he accepted the office.<sup>3</sup> If a person knows of his appointment, and lies by for a long time, it is for the court to say whether, under all the circumstances, such acquiescence was an assent to the trust.<sup>4</sup> But if a trustee does no act in the office, there is no rule that requires him to disclaim within any particular time. Thus, he may disclaim after sixteen years if the delay can be so explained as to rebut the presumption of an acceptance.<sup>5</sup> A disclaimer will take effect as of the time of the gift, and will prevent the estate from vesting in the trustee disclaiming; therefore, a disclaimer, whenever made, will relate back to the time of the gift, if the party disclaiming has done no act which may be construed into an acceptance. It is therefore immaterial when the mere formal instrument of disclaimer is executed, provided that nothing has intervened to vest the estate in the trustee.<sup>6</sup>

§ 268. If a person has once accepted the office, either expressly or by implication, it is conclusive; and he cannot afterwards, by disclaimer or renunciation, avoid its duties and

<sup>1</sup> *England v. Downes*, 6 Beav. 269, 279; *Townley v. Bond*, 2 Conn. & Laws. 405; *James v. Frearson*, 1 Y. & C. Ch. Ca. 270; *Taylor v. Millington*, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 204; *Ex parte Greaves*, 25 L. J. 53; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 253; *Malzy v. Edge*, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, § 259.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, § 259.

<sup>4</sup> *Doe v. Harris*, 16 M. & W. 517; *Paddon v. Richardson*, 7 De G., M. & G. 563; *James v. Frearson*, 1 Y. & C. Ch. Ca. 370.

<sup>5</sup> *Noble v. Meymott*, 14 Beav. 471; *Doe v. Harris*, 16 M. & W. 517.

<sup>6</sup> *Stacey v. Elph*, 1 M. & K. 195-199.

responsibilities.<sup>1</sup> And the reason is, that, if the estate has once vested in the trustee, it cannot be divested by a mere disclaimer or renunciation, nor can he convey the estate against the consent of the *cestuis que trust* without committing a breach of trust, unless the instrument creating the trust gives him that power, or unless there is the decree of a court to that effect. In such case the trustee may resign the trust, and convey the estate in the manner pointed out in the instrument creating the trust, if it speaks upon that subject; or the trustee may decline the office, and convey the estate to a new trustee, by the agreement of all the parties in interest, if they are competent to act, and consent to the arrangement. But if the parties do not consent, or if there are minor children, married women, insane persons, or others incompetent to act, a trustee, after he has once accepted the office, can only be discharged by decree of a court having jurisdiction, and upon proper proceedings had.<sup>2</sup>

§ 269. If a person accepts a trust and dies, his heir cannot renounce or disclaim it. The acceptance vested the estate in the trustee, and the law at his death cast it upon the heir; and the heir cannot divest or repudiate the estate by a mere disclaimer.<sup>3</sup> But if the heir is so named in the original instrument of trust, that he takes the estate *by purchase*, and not by inheritance or descent, or if he comes in under some arrangement, as a special occupant, he may use his own judg-

<sup>1</sup> *Conyngham v. Conyngham*, 1 Ves. 522; *Reed v. Truelove*, Amb. 417; *Doyle v. Blake*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 231; *Stacey v. Elph*, 1 M. & K. 195; *Cruger v. Halliday*, 11 Paige, 314; *Shepherd v. McEvers*, 4 John. Ch. 136; *Latimer v. Hanson*, 1 Bland, 51; *Jones v. Stockett*, 2 Bland, 409; *Chaplin v. Givens*, 1 Rice, Eq. 133; *Perkins v. McGavock*, 3 Hay, 265; *Drane v. Gunter*, 19 Ala. 731; *Strong v. Willis*, 3 Flor. 124; *Thatcher v. Corder*, 2 Keyes, 157; *Armstrong v. Merrill*, 14 Wall. 138.

<sup>2</sup> *Cruger v. Halliday*, 11 Paige, 314; *Drane v. Gunter*, 19 Ala. 731; *Shepherd v. McEvers*, 4 John. Ch. 136; *Diefendorf v. Spraker*, 10 N. Y. 246.

<sup>3</sup> Co. Lit. 9 a; 3 Cru. Dig. 318; *Humphrey v. Morse*, 2 Atk. 408.

ment in accepting or refusing the estate charged with the trust.<sup>1</sup> In most of the United States there are special provisions by statute regulating the resignation of trustees, and the proceedings to be had upon their death, for the preservation of the trust estates and the appointment of new trustees. If a person is appointed trustee and has neither accepted nor disclaimed during his life, it is an open question whether his heir or personal representative can disclaim after his death. The question was raised in *Goodson v. Ellison*,<sup>2</sup> but was left undecided. Mr. Hill thinks that a disclaimer by the heir may be supported on principle.<sup>3</sup> A later case seems strongly to imply that the heir cannot disclaim.<sup>4</sup> If an acting trustee dies, a person named cotrustee with him may disclaim after his death, if the one disclaiming has done no act amounting to an acceptance.<sup>5</sup>

§ 270. It was the clear opinion of Lord Coke, that if a freehold vested in a person by feoffment, grant, or devise, it could not be divested except by matter of record; and this rule was established in order that a suitor might know, with more certainty, who was the tenant to the *præcipe*; <sup>6</sup> but, as a gift is not perfect in law until it is accepted by the assent of the donee, a disclaimer operates as evidence that the donee never assented, and consequently that the estate never vested in him. Accordingly, it is now established that a parol disclaimer is sufficient in all cases of a gift by deed or will of both real and personal estate.<sup>7</sup> And so a trust may be repudiated without

<sup>1</sup> *Creagh v. Blood*, 3 Jon. & La. 170.

<sup>2</sup> *Goodson v. Ellison*, 3 Russ. 583, 587.

<sup>3</sup> *Hill on Trustees*, 222 (4th ed.).

<sup>4</sup> *King v. Phillips*, 16 Jur. 1080.

<sup>5</sup> *Stacey v. Elph*, 1 M. & K. 195.

<sup>6</sup> *Butler & Baker's Case*, 3 Co. 26 a, 27 a; *Anon.* 4 Leon. 207; *Shep. Touch.* 285, 452; *Bonifant v. Greenfield*, *Godb.* 79; *Siggers v. Evans*, 5 El. & Bl. 380.

<sup>7</sup> *Townson v. Tickell*, 3 B. & Al. 31; *Stacey v. Elph*, 1 M. & K. 198; *Bonifant v. Greenfield*, *Cro. Eliz.* 80; *Smith v. Smith*, 6 B. & C. 112;

an express disclaimer, as by evidence of the conduct of the party amounting to a refusal of the office,<sup>1</sup> or by any conduct inconsistent with an acceptance; and a disclaimer may be presumed after a long neglect to qualify or refusal to act.<sup>2</sup> But the parol expressions of a refusal of the trust, or parol evidence of conduct inconsistent with an acceptance, must be unequivocal, and extend to a renunciation of all interest in the property; for if such refusal or conduct is coupled with a claim to the estate of another character, it will not amount to a disclaimer.<sup>3</sup> But a person would act very imprudently who allowed so important a question, as whether he was a trustee or not, to be a matter of inference and construction from conversations or conduct.<sup>4</sup>

§ 271. A disclaimer should be by deed or other writing that admits of no ambiguity, and is certain evidence.<sup>5</sup> And the instrument should be a *disclaimer* and not a *conveyance*; for if the trustee attempts to convey the estate, he may be held to have accepted the trust by the same act which was intended to be a refusal of the office.<sup>6</sup> Although Lord Eldon expressed

Begbie v. Crook, 2 Bing. N. C. 70; 2 Scott. 128; Shep. Touch. 282, 452; Smith v. Wheeler, 1 Ventr. 128; Thompson v. Leach, 2 Ventr. 198; Rex v. Wilson, 5 Man. & R. 140; Small v. Marwood, 4 Man. & R. 190; Foster v. Dawber, 1 Dr. & Sm. 172; *Re Ellison's Trust*, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 62; Doe v. Smith, 9 D. & R. 136; Bingham v. Clanmorris, 2 Moll. 253; Peppercorn v. Wayman, 5 De G. & Sm. 230; Doe v. Harris, 16 M. & W. 517; Thompson v. Meek, 7 Leigh, 419; Roseboom v. Moshier, 2 Denio, 61; Comm. v. Mateer, 16 Ser. & R. 416; Nicolson v. Wordsworth, 2 Swans. 369; Adams v. Taunton, 5 Mad. 435; Miles v. Neave, 1 Cox, 159; Sherratt v. Bentley, 1 Russ. & M. 655; Norway v. Norway, 2 M. & K. 278; Bray v. West, 9 Sim. 429.

<sup>1</sup> Stacey v. Elph, 1 M. & K. 195; Ayres v. Weed, 16 Conn. 291; Thornton v. Winston, 4 Leigh, 152; Wardwell v. McDonell, 31 Ill. 364.

<sup>2</sup> Marr v. Peay, 2 Murph. 85.

<sup>3</sup> Doe v. Smith, 6 B. & C. 112; Judson v. Gibbons, 5 Wend. 224.

<sup>4</sup> Stacey v. Elph, 1 M. & K. 199; *In re Tryon*, 7 Beav. 496.

<sup>5</sup> Stacey v. Elph, 1 M. & K. 199.

<sup>6</sup> Crewe v. Dicken, 4 Ves. 97; Urch v. Walker, 3 M. & C. 702.



the opinion, which seems to be the common-sense view, that if the intention of the instrument is to disclaim, it ought to receive that construction, although it is in form a conveyance,<sup>1</sup> but this distinction has not been acted on. A trust may also be disclaimed at the bar of the court and by counsel, or by answer in chancery.<sup>2</sup>

§ 272. If a person is nominated as trustee in a will, and a benefit is also given to him independent of the office, he can claim the testator's bounty, and yet disclaim the burden of the trust,<sup>3</sup> as an executor who is also a legatee may renounce the executorship and yet claim the legacy; but if the benefit is annexed to the office of trustee or executor, and is not a gift to the individual, the person named as executor or trustee cannot claim the benefit if he decline the office.<sup>4</sup> And a trus-

<sup>1</sup> *Nicolson v. Wordsworth*, 2 Swans. 372; *Att'y-Gen. v. Doyley*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 194; *Hussey v. Markham*, t. Finch, 258; *Sharp v. Sharp*, 2 B. & A. 405; *Richardson v. Hulbert*, 1 Anst. 65.

<sup>2</sup> *Ladbrook v. Bleadon*, 16 Jur. 630; *Foster v. Dawber*, 1 Dr. & Sm. 172; *Re Ellison's Trust*, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 62; *Hickson v. Fitzgerald*, 1 Moll. 14; *Norway v. Norway*, 2 M. & K. 278; *Sherratt v. Bentley*, 1 R. & M. 655; *Legg v. Mackrell*, 1 Gif. 166; *Bray v. West*, 9 Sim. 429; *Clemens v. Clemens*, 60 Barb. 366.

<sup>3</sup> *Pollexfen v. Moore*, 3 Atk. 272; *Andrew v. Trinity Hall*, 9 Ves. 525; *Talbot v. Radnor*, 3 M. & K. 524; *Warren v. Rudall*, 1 Johns. & Hem. 1; *Buel v. Yelverton*, L. R. 13 Eq. 131; *In re Isabella Denby*, 3 De G., F. & J. 350; *Burgess v. Burgess*, 1 Coll. 367.

<sup>4</sup> It is an established rule that bequests to individuals are considered, *prima facie*, to be given to them in that character, — a presumption to be repelled by the nature of the legacies or other circumstances arising in the will. *Roper on Leg.* 780; *Slaney v. Watney*, L. R. 2 Eq. 418. It is so even if the persons are described in the legacy as "my good friends." *Read v. Devaynes*, 3 Bro. Ch. 95. Or if the legacy is given in the will among other legacies, *Calvert v. Sebhon*, 4 Beav. 222. Or if it is given in a codicil naming the person as an individual and not naming his office. *Stackpole v. Howell*, 13 Ves. 417; per Ch. J. Chapman in *Kirkland v. Narramore*, 105 Mass. 31. And see *Lewis v. Matthews*, L. R. 8 Eq. 277; *Abbott v. Massie*, 3 Ves. 148; *Harrison v. Rowley*, 4 Ves. 212; *Cockerell v. Barber*, 1 Sim. 23; 5 Russ. 585; *Barnes v. Kirkland*, 8 Gray, 512; *Rothmaler v. Myers*, 4 Des. 255; *Dix v. Read*, 1 S. & S. 237; *Piggott v. Green*, 6 Sim. 72; *Bil-*

tee who has power, under certain circumstances, to appoint a colleague and successor to execute the trusts, may disclaim the trusts, except the power of nominating other persons to be trustees in place of those originally appointed, and an appointment by one who has never acted except to make the nomination will be held valid.<sup>1</sup>

§ 273. If a person appointed trustee effectually disclaims, it is as if he had never been named in the instrument. All parties are placed in the same situation in respect to the trust property as if his name had not been inserted in the deed or will.<sup>2</sup> Therefore if one of the several trustees disclaims, the entire estate will vest in the remaining trustee or trustees;<sup>3</sup> and if all the trustees or a sole trustee disclaim, the estate will vest in the heir subject to the trusts.<sup>4</sup> The settlor must be presumed to have known the effect of a disclaimer by the trustees named by him.<sup>5</sup> It will be seen from this, that a disclaimer operates retrospectively, and vests the estate, *ab initio*, in those trustees only who accept the trust, and, in the absence of an acceptance by any of the trustees, in the heir.<sup>6</sup> It fol-

lingslea v. Moore, 14 Ga. 370; Hall v. Cush. 9 Pick. 395; Newcomb v. Williams, 9 Met. 525; Dixon v. Horner, 9 Met. 420; Brydges v. Wotton, 1 V. & B. 134; Morris v. Kent, 2 Ed. Ch. 175; *In re* Hawk's Trust, 33 Beav. 570; Hanbury v. Spooner, 5 Beav. 630; Griffiths v. Pruen, 11 Sim. 202; King v. Woodhull, 3 Edw. Ch. 79; Brown v. Higgs, 4 Ves. 708; Thayer v. Wellington, 9 Allen, 283, 295; Granberry v. Granberry, 1 Wash. 246.

<sup>1</sup> *In re* Hadley, 5 De G. & Sm. 67; 9 Eng. L. & Eq. 67.

<sup>2</sup> Townson v. Tickell, 3 B. & Al. 31; Begbie v. Crook, 2 Bing. N. C. 70; Clemens v. Clemens, 60 Barb. 366; Hawkins v. Kemp, 3 East, 410; Smith v. Wheeler, 1 Ventr. 128; Legett v. Hunter, 25 Barb. 81; 19 N. Y. 445; Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head, 67.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*; Bonifant v. Greenfield, Cro. Eliz. 80; Denne v. Judge, 11 East, 288; Ellis v. Boston, Hartford, & Erie R.R. Co. 107 Mass. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Stacey v. Elph, 1 M. & K. 195; Austin v. Martin, 29 Beav. 523; Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head, 67. In New York it rests in the court by statute.

<sup>5</sup> Browell v. Reed, 1 Hare, 435.

<sup>6</sup> Peppercorn v. Wayman, 5 De G. & Sm. 230; Stacey v. Elph, 1 M. & K. 195; Dunning v. Ocean Nat. Bk. 6 Lansing, 296.

lows, that all the powers and authority vested in the trustees, *as such*, which are incidental or requisite to the execution of the trusts, are vested in those trustees only who accept the office. They may, therefore, grant leases of the trust estate,<sup>1</sup> and sell and convey the same,<sup>2</sup> and give valid receipts for the purchase-money,<sup>3</sup> and the disclaiming trustee need not join in the deeds, nor can his concurrence be required or enforced. But it must be known whether one of several trustees disclaims or accepts before it can be known whether the acts of the others are valid or not.<sup>4</sup> And it is immaterial that a disclaiming trustee is expressly named as one of the persons by whom a power connected with the trust is to be exercised: <sup>5</sup> a power given to the trustees, or the *survivor* of them, may be exercised by an *acting* trustee, although the disclaiming trustee is still alive.<sup>6</sup> But if the power is given to the *person* and not to the *office*, a disclaimer by one will not vest the power in the other trustees, so as to enable them to exercise it. Powers that imply a personal confidence in the donee must be exercised by the persons in whom the confidence is placed, and to whom the power is given.<sup>7</sup> Such powers, therefore, will not vest by the disclaimer of one in his cotrustees, but will be absolutely gone.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Small v. Marwood*, 9 B. & Cr. 307; *Bayly v. Cumming*, 10 Ir. Eq. 410.

<sup>2</sup> *Cooke v. Crawford*, 13 Sim. 91; *Adams v. Taunton*, 5 Mad. 435; *Crewe v. Dicken*, 4 Ves. 97; *Nicolson v. Wordsworth*, 2 Swans. 378.

<sup>3</sup> *Hawkins v. Kemp*, 3 East, 410; *Smith v. Wheeler*, 1 Ventr. 128; 2 Ven. & Pur. 850; *Vandever's App.* 8 Watts & S. 405.

<sup>4</sup> *Moir v. Brown*, 14 Barb. 39.

<sup>5</sup> *Crewe v. Dicken*, 4 Ves. 100; *Adams v. Taunton*, 5 Mad. 435.

<sup>6</sup> *Sharp v. Sharp*, 2 B. & Cr. 405; *Peppercorn v. Wayman*, 5 De G. & Sm. 280.

<sup>7</sup> *Cole v. Wade*, 16 Ves. 44; *Newman v. Warner*, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 457; *Eaton v. Smith*, 2 Beav. 236; *Att'y-Gen. v. Doyley*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 194; *Walsh v. Gladstone*, 14 Sim. 2; *Wilson v. Pennock*, 27 Penn. St. 238.

<sup>8</sup> *Eaton v. Smith*, 2 Beav. 236; *Lancashire v. Lancashire*, 2 Phil. 657; *Robson v. Flight*, 13 Beav. 268.

§ 274. If a trustee once accepts the office, he cannot by his sole action be discharged from its duties. Having once entered upon the management of the trust, he must continue to perform its duties until he is discharged in one of three ways: first, he may be removed and discharged, and a new trustee substituted in his place, by proceedings before a court having jurisdiction over the trust; second, he may be discharged, and a new trustee appointed, by the agreement and concurrence of all the parties interested in the trust; and, third, he may be discharged, and a new trustee appointed, in the manner pointed out in the instrument creating the trust, if it makes any provisions upon that subject.<sup>1</sup> Mere abandonment of the trust will not vest the trust property in the hands of his cotrustee, nor relieve a trustee from liability.<sup>2</sup> If a trustee conveys away the trust estate to another, even his cotrustee, and appoints another to execute the trust, the conveyance may pass the naked legal title, but it will have no effect in relieving the original trustee from responsibility, if the transaction is not sanctioned by the decree of the court, or by the consent of all parties interested; and it will transfer no authority to the person thus appointed, except to make him a trustee *de son tort*, if he attempts to interfere with the trust estate.<sup>3</sup>

§ 275. The *cestui que trust*, and all other persons, although contingently interested in the remainder or reversion of trust

<sup>1</sup> Craig v. Craig, 3 Barb. Ch. 76; Drane v. Gunter, 19 Ala. 731; Thatcher v. Candee, 3 Keyes (N. Y.), 157; Shepherd v. McEvers, 4 John. Ch. 186; Cruger v. Halliday, 11 Paige, 319; Ridgeley v. Johnson, 11 Barb. 527; Webster v. Vandeventer, 6 Gray, 428; Pearce v. Pearce, 22 Beav. 248; Sugden v. Crossland, 3 Sm. & Gif. 192; Jones v. Stockett, 2 Bland, 409; Perkins v. McGavock, 3 Hay. 265.

<sup>2</sup> Webster v. Vandeventer, 6 Gray, 428; Cruger v. Halliday, 11 Paige, 314; Thatcher v. Candee, 3 Keyes, 157.

<sup>3</sup> Pearce v. Pearce, 22 Beav. 248; Sugden v. Crossland, 3 Sm. & Gif. 192; Braybrooke v. Inskip, 8 Ves. 417; Chalmers v. Bradley, 1 J. & W. 68; Williams v. Parry, 4 Russ. 272; Adams v. Paynter, 1 Coll. 532; Cruger v. Halliday, 11 Paige, 314; Ardill v. Savage, 1 Ir. Eq. 79.

property,<sup>1</sup> are entitled to have the custody and the administration of it confided to *proper* persons, and to a proper *number* of persons. Thus if a trustee originally appointed by will die in the testator's lifetime, a new trustee may be appointed by the court to take the trust property, or if the original number of trustees is reduced by death, the *cestui que trust* may call upon the court to appoint new trustees in place of those deceased.<sup>2</sup> So if a trustee disclaims, or refuses to act after having once accepted,<sup>3</sup> or becomes so situated that he cannot effectually execute the office, as by becoming a permanent resident abroad,<sup>4</sup> or by absconding;<sup>5</sup> or if a *female* trustee marry;<sup>6</sup> or if the trustees of a church or chapel embrace opinions contrary to the founder's intentions:<sup>7</sup> or if the trustee

<sup>1</sup> *Finlay v. Howard*, 2 Dr. & W. 490; *Cooper v. Day*, 1 Rich. Eq. 26; *In re Sheppard's Trusts*, 4 De G., F. & J. 423; *Rennie v. Ritchie*, 12 Cl. & Fin. 204.

<sup>2</sup> *Buchanan v. Hamilton*, 5 Ves. 722; *Hibbard v. Lamb*, Amb. 309; *Webb v. Shaftesbury*, 7 Ves. 487; *Millard v. Eyre*, 2 Ves. Jr. 94; *De Peyster v. Clendining*, 8 Paige, 296; *Dixon v. Horner*, 12 Cush. 41; *Mass. Gen. Hos. v. Amory*, 12 Pick. 445.

<sup>3</sup> *Wood v. Stane*, 8 Price, 613; *Moggeridge v. Grey*, Nels. 42; *Anon.* 4 Ir. Eq. 700; *Travell v. Danvers*, Finch, 380.

<sup>4</sup> *O'Reilly v. Alderson*, 8 Hare, 101; *Re Ledwick*, 6 Ir. Eq. 561; *Com., &c. v. Archbold*, 11 Ir. Eq. 187; *Lill v. Neafie*, 31 Ill. 101; *In re Reynolds Settlement*, L. R. 7 Ch. 224; *Maxwell v. Finnie*, 6 Cold. 434; *Curtis v. Smith*, 60 Barb. 9; *Mennard v. Wilford*, 1 Sm. & Gif. 426; *Re Stewart*, 8 W. R. 297; *Re Harrison's Trusts*, 22 L. J. Ch. 69; *Dorsey v. Thompson*, 37 Md. 25. And where the *cestui que trust* was prohibited by law from coming into the State, the court, on the trustee's petition, discharged him, and appointed one living in the same State with the *cestui que trust*. *Ex parte Tunno*, 1 Bailey, Ch. 395.

<sup>5</sup> *Millard v. Eyre*, 2 Ves. Jr. 94; *Gale's Peti. R. M. Charlt.* 109; *Re Mais*, 16 Jur. 608.

<sup>6</sup> *Lake v. Lambert*, 4 Ves. 592; *Re Kaye*, L. R. 1 Ch. 387. By chap. 409 of the Acts of 1869, a married woman in Massachusetts may be appointed executrix, administratrix, guardian, or trustee, with the written assent of her husband; and the marriage of a single woman who holds such trusts shall not extinguish her authority, but her sureties on petition may be discharged, and she may be required to give new ones.

<sup>7</sup> *Att'y-Gen. v. Pearson*, 7 Sim. 309; *Att'y-Gen. v. Shore*, 7 Sim. 317; *Rose v. Crockett*, 14 La. An. 811. If individuals pay their own money,

becomes bankrupt,<sup>1</sup> or misconducts himself,<sup>2</sup> or deals with the trust fund for his own personal profit and advancement,<sup>3</sup> or commits a breach of trust,<sup>4</sup> or refuses to apply and pay over the income as directed,<sup>5</sup> or if he fails to invest as directed,<sup>6</sup> or permits a cotrustee to commit a breach of trust,<sup>7</sup> or if he loans the trust funds on personal security, although the *cestui que trust* approves of it;<sup>8</sup> or if trustees of a mortgage for the security of bond-holders of a railroad or other corporation refuse to foreclose or take other steps;<sup>9</sup> or if a trustee make a grossly unreasonable claim upon the trust property adverse to the *cestui que trust*;<sup>10</sup> or if a husband, trustee for his wife, abandons and deserts her or treats her with cruelty;<sup>11</sup> or if a municipal corporation, holding property upon special trusts, is

and take a deed to themselves in trust for a parish, the courts will not appoint a trustee to fill a vacancy; but if the parish paid the money, the court will appoint. *Draper v. Minor*, 36 Mo. 290.

<sup>1</sup> *Bainbridge v. Blair*, 1 Beav. 495; *In re Roche*, 1 Con. & Laws. 306; *Com., &c. v. Archbold*, 11 Ir. Eq. 187; *Harris v. Harris*, 29 Beav. 107; *Re Bridgman*, 1 Dr. & Sm. 164.

<sup>2</sup> *Mayor of Coventry v. Att'y-Gen.* 7 Bro. P. C. 235; *Buckeridge v. Glasse*, 1 Cr. & Ph. 126; *Thompson v. Thompson*, 2 B. Mon. 161; *Deen v. Cozzens*, 7 Rob. 178.

<sup>3</sup> *Ex parte Phelps*, 9 Mod. 357; *Clemens v. Caldwell*, 7 B. Mon. 171; *Deen v. Cozzens*, 7 Rob. 178.

<sup>4</sup> *Thompson v. Thompson*, 2 B. Mon. 161; *Mayor of Coventry v. Att'y-Gen.* 7 Bro. P. C. 235; *Att'y-Gen. v. Drummond*, 1 Dr. & W. 353; 3 Dr. & W. 162; *Att'y-Gen. v. Shore*, 7 Sim. 309 n.; *Ex parte Greenhouse*, 1 Mad. 92.

<sup>5</sup> *Ex parte Potts*, 1 Ash. 340.

<sup>6</sup> *Clemens v. Caldwell*, 1 B. Mon. 171; *Deen v. Cozzens*, 7 Rob. N. Y. 178.

<sup>7</sup> *Ex parte Reynolds*, 5 Ves. 707.

<sup>8</sup> *Johnson v. Simpson*, 9 Barr, 416.

<sup>9</sup> *Matter of Merchants' Bank*, 2 Barb. S. C. 446.

<sup>10</sup> *Cooper v. Day*, 1 Rich. Ch. 26.

<sup>11</sup> *Boaz v. Boaz*, 36 Ala. 334; *Fisk v. Stubbs*, 30 Ala. 355; *Smith v. Oliver*, 31 Ala. 139; *Abernathy v. Abernathy*, 8 Flor. 243. But if the wife deserts the husband without cause, though the husband may be at some fault, it is no cause for removing him as her trustee. *Abernathy v. Abernathy*, 8 Flor. 243.

abolished ;<sup>1</sup> or if a trustee becomes an habitual drunkard ;<sup>2</sup> or a lunatic :<sup>3</sup> or if there is any other good cause,<sup>4</sup> as if the trust fund is in danger of being lost for want of care and attention by the trustee,<sup>5</sup>—in all these and similar cases, the old trustees may be removed, and new ones substituted in their room. And in a suit for the purpose, it will not be impertinent nor scandalous to charge the trustee with misconduct, or to impute to him a corrupt or improper motive, or to allege that his behavior is vindictive towards the *cestui que trust* ; but it will be impertinent, and may be scandalous, to charge *general* malice or general personal hostility.<sup>6</sup> If the court have jurisdiction of the subject-matter, mere irregularity in the proceedings or in the appointment will not make it void in a collateral proceeding, nor can the regularity of the proceedings or of the appointment be inquired into in a collateral suit ; such appointment must stand until it is reversed by a proceeding for the purpose in the same case.<sup>7</sup>

§ 276. It may be stated generally, that if the conduct or circumstances of the trustees are such as to render it very inconvenient, improper, or inexpedient for them to continue in the trust, the court will exercise its discretion and relieve them, and appoint others in their place, as where the trustees

<sup>1</sup> *Montpelier v. East Montpelier*, 29 Vt. 12.

<sup>2</sup> *Everett v. Prythergh*, 12 Sim. 367 ; *Bayles v. Staats*, 1 Halst. Ch. 513.

<sup>3</sup> *Matter of Wadsworth*, 2 Barb. Ch. 387 ; *Re Fowler*, 2 Russ. 449 ; *Anon.* 5 Sim. 322.

<sup>4</sup> *Piper's App.* 20 Penn. St. 67 ; *Franklin v. Hayes*, 2 Swan, 521.

<sup>5</sup> *Jones v. Dougherty*, 10 Ga. 273 ; *Harper v. Straws*, 14 B. Mon. 57 ; *Holcomb v. Coryell*, 1 Beas. 289 ; *Lasley v. Lasley*, 1 Duv. 117 ; and see *Commissioners v. Archibald*, 11 Ir. Eq. 195 ; where L. Ch. Brady ably discusses the removal of trustees.

<sup>6</sup> *Portsmouth v. Fellows*, 5 Mad. 450 ; *Parsons v. Jones*, 26 Ga. 644.

<sup>7</sup> *Budd v. Hiler*, 3 Dutch. 43 ; *People v. Norton*, 5 Selden, 176 ; *Paules v. Dille*, 9 Gill, 222 ; *Curtis v. Smith*, 60 Barb. 9 ; *Howard v. Waters*, 19 How. 529 ; *Hodgdon v. Shannon*, 44 N. H. 572.

were desirous of being discharged,<sup>1</sup> or were incapable through age and infirmity of acting,<sup>2</sup> or so disagreed among themselves that they could not act,<sup>3</sup> or where cotrustees refuse to act with one of their number,<sup>4</sup> or where the trustees appointed were municipal officers for the time being and are changed yearly,<sup>5</sup> or where a corporation appointed trustee had become subject to a foreign power;<sup>6</sup> in these and the like cases the courts interposed and appointed other trustees. But if there is a controversy, the court will exercise a sound discretion. Mere disagreements between the trustee and *cestui que trust* will not justify a removal;<sup>7</sup> and if a trustee fails in the discharge of his duties from an honest mistake, or mere misunderstanding of them, or from a misjudgment, it is no ground for removal;<sup>8</sup> and if a trustee in good faith refuses to exercise a purely discretionary power in favor of the estate, as to vary the securities, he will not be removed;<sup>9</sup> nor will he be removed for a mere constructive fraud, as for buying the trust property at his own sale;<sup>10</sup> and where a trust was to take effect in the future upon the happening of a certain event, and in the mean time it was to remain passive, the court refused to interfere, and remove the trustee for an alleged misfeasance.<sup>11</sup> In no case ought the trustee to be removed where there is no danger

<sup>1</sup> Bogle v. Bogle, 3 Allen, 158; Howard v. Rhodes, 1 Keen, 581; Coventry v. Coventry, 1 Keen, 758; Greenwood v. Wakeford, 1 Beav. 576; Hamilton v. Frye, 2 Moll. 458.

<sup>2</sup> Gardner v. Downes, 22 Beav. 395; Bennett v. Honeywood, Amb. 710.

<sup>3</sup> Bagot v. Bagot, 32 Beav. 509; Uvedale v. Patrick, 2 Ch. Ca. 20.

<sup>4</sup> Uvedale v. Patrick, 2 Ch. Ca. 20.

<sup>5</sup> *Ex parte* Blackburne, 1 J. & W. 297; Webb v. Neal, 5 Allen, 575.

<sup>6</sup> Attorney-General v. London, 3 Bro. Ch. 171.

<sup>7</sup> Clemens v. Caldwell, 7 B. Mon. 171; Gibbes v. Smith, 2 Rich. Eq. 131; Foster v. Davies, 4 De G., F. & J. 133.

<sup>8</sup> In matter of Durfee, 4 R. I. 401; Attorney-General v. Coopers' Co. 19 Ves. 192; Attorney-General v. Caius Coll. 2 Keen, 150; Lathrop v. Smalley, 23 N. J. Eq. 192.

<sup>9</sup> Lee v. Young, 2 Y. & C. Ch. Ca. 532.

<sup>10</sup> Webb v. Dietrich, 7 W. & S. 401.

<sup>11</sup> Sloo v. Law, 1 Blatch. C. C. 512.



of a breach of trust, and some of the beneficiaries are satisfied with the management.<sup>1</sup> Nor will a trustee be removed for every violation of duty, or even breach of the trust, if the fund is in no danger of being lost.<sup>2</sup>

§ 277. In removing and substituting trustees, the court does not act arbitrarily, but upon certain general principles, and after a full consideration of the case. Where the trustees are required to give security it will order such notice and to such persons as it sees fit.<sup>3</sup> It always has regard to the wishes of the author of the trust, to be gathered from the instrument of trust; if he has expressed a disapprobation of an individual, the court would refrain from appointing him; and so the court will not appoint a new trustee with a view to the interest of some of the *cestuis que trust*, for the trustee ought to hold an even hand between all parties, and not favor a particular one. Further, the court has regard to the nature of the trust, and to those instrumentalities by which it can best be carried into execution.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, courts will not substitute trustees upon the mere *caprice* of the *cestui que trust*, and without a reasonable cause,<sup>5</sup> and although the instrument of trust or a statute gives the *cestui que trust* full power to remove and appoint other trustees, yet good cause must be shown or the court cannot be put in motion,<sup>6</sup> nor will they appoint a trustee out of the jurisdiction without security.<sup>7</sup> There is no absolute rule of law that prevents a *cestui que trust* from being a trustee for himself and others, and the court is sometimes obliged to ap-

<sup>1</sup> *Berry v. Williamson*, 11 B. Mon. 245.

<sup>2</sup> *Lathrop v. Smalley*, 23 N. J. Eq. 192; *Corlies v. Corlies*, 23 N. J. Eq. 192.

<sup>3</sup> *Matter of Robinson*, 37 N. Y. 271.

<sup>4</sup> *In re Tempest*, L. R. 1 Ch. 487.

<sup>5</sup> *O'Keeffe v. Calthorpe*, 1 Atk. 18; *Pepper v. Tuckey*, 2 Jon. & La. 95; *Ward v. Dorch*, 69 N. C. 279; *Bouldin v. Alexander*, 15 Wall. 132.

<sup>6</sup> *Stevenson's App.* 59 Penn. St. 101; 68 Penn. St. 101.

<sup>7</sup> *Ex parte Robert*, 2 Strob. 86; *Gibson's Case*, 1 Bland, 138.

point him; but the arrangement is irregular and sometimes disastrous, and the court will not sanction it if it can be avoided.<sup>1</sup> So a husband may be trustee for a wife, and a wife for a husband,<sup>2</sup> but difficulties frequently grow out of the relation, and the courts have sometimes said that they would not make such appointments.<sup>3</sup> In no case will the court remove old trustees and substitute new ones, unless satisfied of the necessity of the removal, and of the fitness of the new trustee proposed. Nor will the court authorize the new trustees to nominate their successors. There was some doubt and difference of practice at first;<sup>4</sup> but it is now settled, except in charities,<sup>5</sup> that the court will not delegate this part of its jurisdiction to new appointees.<sup>6</sup>

§ 278. If the instrument of trust requires the trustees of a charity to have a particular residence, it is irregular to appoint others not answering that description, provided there are those proper to be trustees.<sup>7</sup> But if it is the custom to appoint such non-residents, the court will not remove them, but will see that vacancies when they occur are properly filled.<sup>8</sup> And, generally, if an irregular appointment has been acquiesced in for a long

<sup>1</sup> *Passingham v. Sherborne*, 9 Beav. 424; *Reid v. Reid*, 30 Beav. 388; *Ex parte Clutton*, 17 Jur. 988; *Ex parte Conybeare's Settlement*, 1 W. R. 458; *Wilding v. Bolder*, 21 Beav. 222; *Craig v. Hone*, 2 Edw. Ch. 554.

<sup>2</sup> *Tweedy v. Urquhart*, 30 Ga. 446; *Livingston v. Livingston*, 2 John. Ch. 541; *Bennett v. Davis*, 2 P. Wms. 316; *Shirley v. Shirley*, 9 Paige, 363; *Jamison v. Brady*, 6 S. & R. 467; *Boykin v. Cipples*, 2 Hill, Ch. 200; *Picquet v. Swann*, 4 Mason, 455; *Griffith v. Griffith*, 5 B. Mon. 113; *Gibson's Case*, 1 Bland, 138; *Watkins v. Jones*, 28 Ind. 12; *Gardner v. Weeks*, 32 Ga. 696.

<sup>3</sup> *Dean v. Sanford*, 9 Rich. Eq. 423.

<sup>4</sup> *Joyce v. Joyce*, 2 Moll. 276; *White v. White*, 5 Beav. 221.

<sup>5</sup> *Lewin on Trusts*, 606 (5th ed.).

<sup>6</sup> *Bayley v. Mansell*, 4 Mad. 226; *Brown v. Brown*, 3 Y. & Col. 395; *Bowles v. Weeks*, 14 Sim. 591; *Oglander v. Oglander*, 2 De G. & Sm. 381; *Southwell v. Ward*, Tambl. 314; *Holder v. Durbin*, 11 Beav. 594; overruling *White v. White*, 5 Beav. 221.

<sup>7</sup> *Attorney-General v. Cowper*, 1 Bro. Ch. 439.

<sup>8</sup> *Attorney-General v. Daugous*, 33 Beav. 621; *Attorney-General v. Clifont*, 32 Beav. 596; *Attorney-General v. Stamford*, 1 Phil. 737.

time, the court will not remove.<sup>1</sup> In making the selection, the inquiry is whether the proposed appointment is proper, not whether it is the most proper.<sup>2</sup>

§ 279. It is laid down in several cases, that if a trustee becomes bankrupt he may be removed,<sup>3</sup> or if he becomes insolvent and compounds with his creditors; and this is on the ground that the *cestui que trust* has a right to have the trust administered by responsible trustees. The English bankrupt act<sup>4</sup> provides, that, if a trustee becomes bankrupt, the chancellor, on petition and due notice, may order the trust estate to be conveyed by the bankrupt, the assignees, and all other persons interested, to such other persons as the chancellor shall think fit, upon the same trusts. Under this statute it has been determined that the court will exercise its discretion whether to remove the bankrupt or not,<sup>5</sup> but that *prima facie* the bankrupt is to be removed,<sup>6</sup> although he may have obtained his discharge.<sup>7</sup> But the court will not interfere long after the bankruptcy to remove the trustee, if he has obtained his discharge.<sup>8</sup> Generally the insolvency or bankruptcy of a trustee does not disqualify him for the trust,<sup>9</sup> nor does his bankruptcy affect the trust estate in his hands; and his certificate does not discharge him from fiduciary obligations.<sup>10</sup> In the United States trustees are, or may be, required, in the great majority of cases, to give bonds or security for the safety of the trust

<sup>1</sup> Attorney-General v. Cuming, 2 Y. & Col. Ch. Ca. 150.

<sup>2</sup> Lancaster Charities, 7 Jur. (N. s.) 96.

<sup>3</sup> Bainbrigge v. Blair, 1 Beav. 495; *In re Roche*, 1 Conn. & Laws. 306; Com. &c. v. Archbold, 11 Ir. Eq. 187; Harris v. Harris, 29 Beav. 107.

<sup>4</sup> 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, § 130.

<sup>5</sup> *Re Roche*, 2 Dr. & W. 289; 2 H. L. Ca. 461.

<sup>6</sup> Bainbrigge v. Blair, 1 Beav. 495.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> *Re Bridgman*, 1 Dr. & Sm. 164.

<sup>9</sup> Shryock v. Waggoner, 28 Penn. St. 430; Turner v. Maule, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 222; *Ex parte Watts*, 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 67.

<sup>10</sup> Belknap v. Belknap, 5 Allen, 468.

fund: in all such cases it would seem that the bankruptcy of the trustee would not *per se* render him removable, unless there was some misconduct that rendered it proper for the court to exercise a sound discretion.

§ 280. In *Bogle v. Bogle*,<sup>1</sup> the court determined that one who, without compensation and for no definite time, undertook a trust for the benefit of another was entitled to a decree discharging him, when the further care of the property became inconvenient to him. Generally, trustees who have acted are not entitled, as against the trust estate, to refuse at pleasure to continue: they must have some good cause to entitle them to be relieved.<sup>2</sup> If they have received a legacy or other benefit given to them *as trustees*, they cannot be allowed to retire except for good cause,<sup>3</sup> at least without restoring the legacy. It is a good cause for relief if the *cestui que trust* incumber and complicate the estate, and embarrass the trustee in the performance of his duties.<sup>4</sup> But where there is no cause for a discharge, except the wish of the trustee, or his convenience, he ought to pay the costs of the proceeding, and not impose the burden and expense upon the estate;<sup>5</sup> and so if the old trustee is removed for misconduct on his part.<sup>6</sup> But if the trustee has a good reason for his discharge, he will be entitled to his costs out of the estate as between solicitor and client.<sup>7</sup> Courts of equity, by virtue of their general chancery powers, have juris-

<sup>1</sup> 3 Allen, 158.

<sup>2</sup> *Greenwood v. Wakeford*, 1 Beav. 576; *Cruger v. Halliday*, 11 Paige, 314; *Jones v. Stockett*, 2 Bland, 409; *Re Meloney*, 2 Jon. & La. 391.

<sup>3</sup> *Craig v. Craig*, 3 Barb. Ch. 76.

<sup>4</sup> *Howard v. Rhodes*, 1 Keen, 481; *Coventry v. Coventry*, 1 Keen, 758; *Greenwood v. Wakeford*, 1 Beav. 576; *Hamilton v. Frye*, 2 Moll. 458.

<sup>5</sup> *Matter of Jones*, 4 Sandf. Ch. 615; *Howard v. Rhodes*, 1 Keen, 581; *Courtenay v. Courtenay*, 3 Jon. & La. 529.

<sup>6</sup> *Ex parte Greenhouse*, 1 Mad. 92; *Howard v. Rhodes*, 1 Keen, 581.

<sup>7</sup> *Coventry v. Coventry*, 1 Keen, 758; *Taylor v. Glanville*, 3 Mad. 176; *Curteis v. Chandler*, 6 Mad. 123; *Greenwood v. Wakeford*, 1 Beav. 581.

diction, by bill or petition, to accept the resignation of trustees, or to remove them for cause, and to appoint new trustees; and courts of probate in several States have power by statute to remove and appoint new trustees, whether they are created by will or deed.<sup>1</sup> Proceedings are generally commenced directly for the removal and appointment of trustees; but when a bill or petition is already pending for the administration of the trust, the appointment or removal may be made upon motion in those proceedings.<sup>2</sup> And, further, if the trusts created in an instrument are of such a nature that they can be severed without injury to the estate, courts may allow the trustee to resign a part, and will commit that part to other trustees under proper arrangements for security.<sup>3</sup> But courts will not remove trustees against their will from one part of the trust, and leave them burdened with the responsibility of the remainder.<sup>4</sup>

§ 281. If a testator in his will appoint his executor to be a trustee, it is as if different persons had been appointed to each office; <sup>5</sup> a court of equity cannot remove him from the executorship, for courts of probate have exclusive jurisdiction over the appointment and removal of administrators and executors;

<sup>1</sup> *Bowditch v. Bannelos*, 1 Gray, 220; *King v. Donnelly*, 5 Paige, 46; *De Peyster v. Clendining*, 8 Paige, 295; *Field v. Arrowsmith*, 3 Humph. 442; *McCosker v. Brady*, 1 Barb. Ch. 329; *In re Potts*, 1 Ash. 340; *Matter of Mechanics' Bank*, 2 Barb. S. C. 446; *Dawson v. Dawson*, Rice, Eq. 243; *Lee v. Randolph*, 2 H. & Munf. 12.

<sup>2</sup> ——— *v. Osborne*, 6 Ves. 455; *Webb v. Shaftesbury*, 7 Ves. 487; ——— *v. Roberts*, 1 J. & W. 251; *Ex parte Potts*, 1 Ash. 340.

<sup>3</sup> *Craig v. Craig*, 3 Barb. Ch. 76. But where there is a single power of appointment in the trust instrument, though the estates are of a different description, or are held under a different title, or upon different trusts, there is no authority for dividing the trusts, and appointing different sets of trustees for the different estates or trusts. *Cole v. Wade*, 16 Ves. 27; *Re Anderson*, 1 Ll. & G. t. Sugd. 29; *Curtis v. Smith*, 6 Blatch. 537.

<sup>4</sup> *Sturges v. Knapp*, 31 Vt. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Parsons v. Lyman*, 5 Blatch. C. C. 170; *Perkins v. Lewis*, 41 Ala. 649.

but if the office of trustee is separate from and independent of the office of executor, a court of equity may remove him from the office of trustee, and leave him to act as executor; or if he has completed his duties as executor, and is holding and administering the estate simply as trustee, a court of equity may remove him.<sup>1</sup>

§ 282. Courts of equity, having jurisdiction to remove and appoint trustees,<sup>2</sup> may be applied to, as before stated, either by bill or petition;<sup>3</sup> or, if a bill is already pending for administration of the estate, application may be made in those proceedings, by motion.<sup>4</sup> All persons interested in the trust may institute proceedings in their own names, but notice should be given to all other parties in interest.<sup>5</sup> If the trustee must give security for the fund, notice is within the discretion of the court;<sup>6</sup> but if the trust instrument provides that notice of the proceedings for the appointment of new trustees shall be given to particular persons, the appointment will be irregular if the

<sup>1</sup> *Wood v. Brown*, 34 N. Y. 339; *Leggett v. Hunter*, 25 Barb. 81; 19 N. Y. 445; *Craig v. Craig*, 3 Barb. Ch. 76; *Matter of Wordsworth*, 2 Barb. Ch. 381; *Ex parte Dover*, 5 Sim. 500; *Quackenboss v. Southwick*, 41 N. Y. 117.

<sup>2</sup> *Bowditch v. Bannelos*, 1 Gray, 220, and cases cited last section; *Williamson v. Suydam*, 6 Wall. 723; *Livingston, Pet'r*, 34 N. Y. 555.

<sup>3</sup> *Mitchell v. Pitner*, 15 Ga. 319; *Ex parte Knust*, 1 Bail. Eq. 489; *Matter of Van Wyck*, 1 Barb. Ch. 565; *Ex parte Hussey*, 2 Whart. 330; *Ex parte Rees*, 3 V. & B. 11; *Miller v. Knight*, 1 Keen, 129; *Barker v. Peile*, 2 Dr. & Sm. 340. This matter is mostly regulated by the statutes of the several States. Although proceedings by statute may be originated by petition, yet the proceedings may be by bill. *Barker v. Peile*, *ut supra*. In some cases it is said that the right to proceed by petition is confined to cases where there is a breach of the trust. *In re Sanford Charity*, 2 Mer. 456; *Re Livingston*, 34 N. Y. 567.

<sup>4</sup> ——— *v. Osborne*, 6 Ves. 455; ——— *v. Roberts*, 1 J. & W. 251; *Webb v. Shaftesbury*, 7 Ves. 487; *Ex parte Potts*, 1 Ash. 340.

<sup>5</sup> *Abbott, Pet'r*, 55 Me. 580; *Williamson v. Wickersham*, 2 Coll. 52; *Guion v. Melvin*, 69 N. C. 242; *Wardle v. Hargreaves*, 11 Law Jour. (N. S.) Ch. 126.

<sup>6</sup> *Matter of Robinson*, 37 N. Y. 261.

notice is not given.<sup>1</sup> The *cestui que trust* and those directly interested may of course originate the suit,<sup>2</sup> and those interested in remainder or reversion may begin proceedings.<sup>3</sup> The trustees may bring the suit against the *cestuis que trust*;<sup>4</sup> or one or more of several trustees may bring the suit against one or more of their cotrustees, joining the *cestuis que trust* either as plaintiffs or defendants.<sup>5</sup> In all public charities the Attorney-General may begin proceedings by information or petition with or without a relator.<sup>6</sup> But where a settlor had conveyed property to a trustee for himself for life, and at his decease to his issue according to the statute of distributions, and in case of his dying without issue to his nephews, it was held that the trust was only an implied trust for the nephews; that they had no interest in the express trusts for the settlor for life; and that they could not maintain a petition for the removal of the trustee.<sup>7</sup> And where a *cestui que trust* drew an order on the trustees in favor of her children, it was held that this did not give the children such an interest in the funds that they were parties to proceedings for the appointment of new trustees.<sup>8</sup> If a trustee retires, allowing a new trustee to be appointed,

<sup>1</sup> Washington, &c. R. R. Co. v. Alexander, &c. R. R. Co. 19 Gratt. 592.

<sup>2</sup> Bainbrige v. Blair, 1 Beav. 495; Bennett v. Honeywood, Amb. 708; Buchanan v. Hamilton, 5 Ves. 722; Portsmouth v. Fellows, 5 Mad. 450; Howard v. Rhodes, 1 Keen, 581; Millard v. Eyre, 2 Ves. Jr. 94; In Matter of Smith's Settlement, 2 De G. & Sm. 781; *Ex parte Tunno*, 1 Bail. Eq. 395.

<sup>3</sup> Finlay v. Howard, 2 Dr. & W. 490; Cooper v. Day, 1 Rich. Eq. 26; *Re* Livingston, 34 N. Y. 567; Joyce v. Gunnels, 2 Rich. Eq. 260; *Re* Sheppard, 1 N. R. 76, overruling same case, 10 W. R. 704; s. c. 4 De G., F. & J. 423.

<sup>4</sup> Coventry v. Coventry, 1 Keen, 758; Greenwood v. Wakeford, 1 Beav. 576.

<sup>5</sup> Lake v. De Lambert, 4 Ves. 592.

<sup>6</sup> Attorney-General v. London, 3 Bro. Ch. 171; Attorney-General v. Stephens, 3 M. & K. 347; Attorney-General v. Clack, 1 Beav. 467; *Re* Bedford Charity, 2 Swans. 520; Wilson v. Wilson, 2 Keen, 251; *Re* Fowey's Charities, 4 Beav. 225.

<sup>7</sup> *In re* Livingston, 34 N. Y. 555; *Ex parte* Brown, Coop. 295.

<sup>8</sup> Hawley v. Ross, 7 Paige, 103.

without communication with the *cestui que trust*, and a suit is instituted complaining of such appointment, but seeking no relief against such retiring trustee, he is not a necessary party.<sup>1</sup> And if a trustee transfers the property to a new trustee appointed by order of court, he will be bound by the proceedings, though they were irregular and without notice to him.<sup>2</sup> If some of the *cestuis que trust* are minors, they ought to have a guardian *ad litem*, but a new trustee may be appointed.<sup>3</sup> The proceedings ought to be in a court having jurisdiction of the original trust.<sup>4</sup>

§ 283. If all the parties are *sui juris*, and consent to the appointment of the new trustee, the court will at once make the appointment, and direct the conveyances to be made.<sup>5</sup> But generally it will be referred to a master to report a proper person to be appointed.<sup>6</sup> Upon the coming in of the master's report, exceptions may be taken to it in the usual manner; but the exceptions must be to the unfitness of the person recommended,<sup>7</sup> and not that some other one is more fit.<sup>8</sup>

§ 284. The appointment of a new trustee is not complete until the property is vested in him; therefore the court usually embraces, in the decree appointing a new trustee, a direction for a proper conveyance to be executed to him alone, or to him jointly with the continuing or remaining trustees, by all the

<sup>1</sup> *Marshall v. Sladden*, 7 Hare, 427.

<sup>2</sup> *Thomas v. Higham*, 1 Bail. Eq. 222.

<sup>3</sup> *Hunter v. Gibson*, 16 Sim. 158.

<sup>4</sup> *Howard v. Gilbert*, 39 Ala. 72.

<sup>5</sup> *O'Keeffe v. Calthorpe*, 1 Atk. 18; *Young v. Young*, 4 Cranch, C. C. 499.

<sup>6</sup> *Howard v. Rhodes*, 1 Keen, 581; *Buchanan v. Hamilton*, 5 Ves. 722; *Attorney-General v. Stephens*, 3 M. & K. 352; *Millard v. Eyre*, 2 Ves. Jr. 94; *Seton's Decrees*, 249; *Matter of Stuyvesant*, 3 Edw. Ch. 229; — *v. Roberts*, 1 J. & W. 251; *Attorney-General v. Clack*, 1 Beav. 474; *Attorney-General v. Arran*, 1 J. & W. 229.

<sup>7</sup> *Attorney-General v. Dyson*, 2 S. & S. 528.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*



requisite parties, whether remaining trustees, or heirs or representatives of the last survivor, or trustees who have been removed from office.<sup>1</sup> In some States it is provided by statute, that, upon qualification by the newly appointed trustee, the trust estate shall vest in him in like manner as it had or would have vested in the trustee in whose place he is substituted.<sup>2</sup> It has been determined that no conveyance is necessary where such statutes are in force, but that the trust estate vests immediately upon the appointment, by virtue of the statute.<sup>3</sup> And so if the instrument of trust provides for the vesting of the estate in the remaining, surviving or new trustees, upon the removal, resignation, death, and appointment of others, the trust estate will vest according to the provisions of the instrument, as the creator of the trust may mould it at his pleasure.<sup>4</sup> It has already been seen that, if one of the trustees disclaims without having acted or accepted the trust, the estate vests in the acting trustees; and if a sole trustee disclaims before acting, the estate vests in the heirs at law subject to the trust.<sup>5</sup> So where a vacancy results from the incapacity of the trustee, or upon his removal from the jurisdiction of the court, the want of power to compel a conveyance, *and the necessity of the case*, require the court to recognize the power of the remaining trustee to convey to his new cotrustee without a conveyance from the retiring or removed trustee.<sup>6</sup> In trusts, that do not come within the words or the spirit of the statute in relation to the

<sup>1</sup> O'Keeffe v. Calthorpe, 1 Atk. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Mass. Gen. Stat. c. 100, § 9; Trustees Act, 1850, 12 & 13 Vict. c. 74, §§ 33, 34, 35, 36; Stearly's App. 3 Grant, 270.

<sup>3</sup> Parker v. Converse, 5 Gray, 341; *Re Fisher's Will*, 1 W. R. 505; Smith v. Smith, 3 Dr. 72; Woolridge v. Planters' Bank, 1 Sneed, 297; Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head, 67; Gibbs v. Marsh, 2 Met. 243, 253; Duffy v. Calvert, 6 Gill, 487.

<sup>4</sup> Ellis v. Boston, Hartford, & Erie R.R. 107 Mass. 13.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, § 273.

<sup>6</sup> Cape v. Bent, 9 Jur. 653; O'Reiley v. Alderson, 8 Hare, 101; Mennard v. Wilford, 1 Sm. & Gif. 426; Eaton v. Smith, 2 Beav. 236; Cooke v. Crawford, 13 Sim. 91; *In re Moravian Soc.* 26 Beav. 101.

vesting of trust estates in new appointees, and in cases where the trust instrument is silent concerning the vesting of the estate in new trustees, and *there is no necessity* for a departure from the ordinary rule of a conveyance, a conveyance must be made to the new trustee, in order to vest the estate in him.<sup>1</sup>

§ 285. A trustee may be relieved from his office by the consent of all parties interested, without the decree of a court, even if the instrument of trust is silent upon that subject. But the transaction operates rather as an estoppel of the *cestui que trust* than as an affirmative transfer of power. Thus, no *cestui que trust* who concurs in a breach of trust can afterwards call the trustee to an account for the disastrous consequences;<sup>2</sup> therefore, if a trustee conveys the trust estate to another person, and appoints such other person trustee, and all the *cestuis que trust* execute the conveyances, or otherwise consent to the transaction, they would be for ever precluded from holding the retiring trustee responsible for any delegation of his office, or for any loss that occurred afterwards.<sup>3</sup> But the trustee must see to it that all the *cestuis que trust* are parties to the transaction and concur; for, even in the case of a large number of creditors, each individual must act for himself, or he is not estopped, and the consent of a majority cannot affect the rights of one who did not concur.<sup>4</sup> The trustee must also see to it that all the *cestuis que trust* are *sui juris*, and not married women, infants, or other persons incapable of acting, or of no legal capacity to consent. For if there are such *cestuis que trust*, there can be no discharge and substitution of trustees

<sup>1</sup> Folley v. Wontner, 2 Jac. & W. 24; Owen v. Owen, 1 Atk. 496; Foster v. Goree, 4 Ala. 440; Crosby v. Huston, 1 Tex. 203; Miller v. Priddon, 1 De G., M. & G. 339.

<sup>2</sup> Wilkinson v. Parry, 4 Russ. 276.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Colebrook's Case, cited *Ex parte Hughes*, 6 Ves. 622; *Ex parte Lacy*, ib. 628-630, n.

without the sanction of the court, in the absence of a power in the instrument of trust; <sup>1</sup> or if there may be parties in interest not yet in existence, as if the trust is for children not yet born, there can be no change of trustees by consent. But a *married woman* is considered *sui juris* in respect to her sole and separate estate, where there is no restraint against anticipation or alienation.<sup>2</sup>

§ 286. If there are two or more trustees named in an instrument of trust with power to appoint successors, and they all retire at the same time, they ought not to appoint a single trustee *only* in the place of two or more.<sup>3</sup> In such case the settlor has fixed the number which he thinks necessary for the proper administration and safety of the trust fund; and if a single trustee is appointed and wishes to retire, he ought not to appoint a plurality of trustees, for in such a case he ought not to increase the machinery and expense of the trust contrary to the settlor's intention.<sup>4</sup> But the power may be so drawn that several may be put in place of one, or one in the place of several. Thus where a testator appointed two trustees, and the surviving or continuing trustee or trustees were authorized to appoint one or more persons to be trustee or trustees, in the room of the trustee or trustees so dying, &c., the surviving trustee appointed two new trustees, and the appointment was held by the court to be authorized.<sup>5</sup> So, three trustees have been appointed in place of two,<sup>6</sup> and three have been authorized in place of four,<sup>7</sup> and two in place of one,<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Cruger v. Halliday*, 11 Paige, 314.

<sup>2</sup> *Hulme v. Hulme*, 1 Bro. Ch. 20; *Lewin on Trusts*, 540, 541 (5th ed.).

<sup>3</sup> *Hulme v. Hulme*, 2 M. & K. 682; *Mass. Gen. Hospital v. Amory*, 12 Pick. 445.

<sup>4</sup> *Rex v. Lexdale*, 1 Burr. 448; *Ex parte Davis*, 2 Y. & C. Ch. Ca. 468; 3 Mont. D. & De G. 304.

<sup>5</sup> *D'Almaine v. Anderson*, *Lewin on Trusts*, 468 (5th ed.); *Hill on Trustees*, 182.

<sup>6</sup> *Meinertzhagen v. Davis*, 1 Coll. 335.

<sup>7</sup> *Emmet v. Clarke*, 3 Gif. 32.

<sup>8</sup> *Hillman v. Westwood*, 3 Eq. R. 142.

and four in place of five.<sup>1</sup> In another case, one trustee was appointed by the court in place of two.<sup>2</sup> And if a successor cannot be found to a retiring trustee, the court may appoint the continuing trustees to be sole trustee or trustees.<sup>3</sup>

§ 287. The duties and powers of trustees cannot be delegated to others, unless there is express authority for that purpose given in the instrument creating the trust.<sup>4</sup> It follows, that a power to appoint new trustees can seldom or never exist, except in express trusts created by deed or will. The person who creates the trust may mould it into whatever form he pleases: he may therefore determine in what manner, in what event, and upon what condition the original trustees may retire and new trustees may be substituted. All this is fully within his power; and he can make any legal provisions which he may think proper for the continuation and succession of trustees during the continuance of the trust.<sup>5</sup> This power to appoint new trustees in place of the original ones can only be

<sup>1</sup> *Corrie v. Byrom*, Lewin on Trusts, 468 (5th ed.); Hill on Trustees, 181.

<sup>2</sup> *Greene v. Borland*, 4 Met. 330. In this case the appointment was assented to by all parties, and great stress was laid upon that fact. The court might also have said that the proceedings were in a collateral matter, and that, as long as the appointment by a court having jurisdiction stood unreversed, its validity could not be tried in another and distinct proceeding. The case of *Greene v. Borland* is not necessarily inconsistent with *Mass. Gen. Hospital v. Amory*, 12 Pick. 445, decided by the same court.

<sup>3</sup> *In re Stokes Trusts*, L. R. 13 Eq. 333.

<sup>4</sup> *Selden v. Vermilyea*, 3 Comst. 336; *Wilkinson v. Parry*, 4 Russ. 272; *Adams v. Paynter*, 1 Coll. 532; *Chalmers v. Bradley*, 1 J. & W. 68; *Swarez v. Pumpelly*, 2 Sand. Ch. 336; *Wilson v. Towle*, 36 N. H. 129; *Bailey v. Mansel*, 4 Mad. 226.

<sup>5</sup> *Whelan v. Reilly*, 3 W. Va. 597. The testator may authorize the trustee appointed by him to appoint his successor by will. *Abbott, Pet'r*, 55 Me. 580. While the settlor may make such provisions as he may think best for filling vacancies, as a general proposition, yet it has been held that a power reserved to an assignor in a deed of trust for creditors, to appoint new trustees to fill vacancies occurring in the board, was void, as interfering with the rights of creditors. *Planck v. Schermerhorn*, 3 Barb. Ch. 644; *Robins v. Embry*, 1 Sm. & M. Ch. 207.

given by the author and creator of the trust. For, in cases where courts are called upon to appoint trustees, authority to appoint successors will not be given, but recourse must be had to the courts *toties quoties*.<sup>1</sup> There is, however, an exception to this rule in case of charitable trusts ; for, in such cases, to save costs, and for convenience, courts of equity will not only appoint new trustees to fill vacancies, but they will sanction a scheme for the administration of the charity, which provides for the appointment and succession of trustees without a continual recourse to legal proceedings.<sup>2</sup>

§ 288. Every well-drawn instrument, creating trusts intended to continue for any considerable time, should contain authority and power for any of the trustees to relinquish the trust, as well as provisions for filling vacancies occasioned by resignation, death, or incapacity. Such provisions save the cost and trouble of constant applications to courts. In framing these powers, great care should be taken to provide for every possible contingency in which a resignation or new appointment may become convenient or necessary. The power should clearly express the cases in which new trustees may be appointed, and embrace every event which can render such an appointment necessary or desirable, as the death of all, any one, or more of the original or substituted trustees, their absence from the country or State, their wish to resign, their original refusal to accept, and their future incapacity or unfitness to discharge the duties ; the instrument should also point out clearly and by whom and in what manner the new

<sup>1</sup> *Wilson v. Towle*, 36 N. H. 129 ; *Oglander v. Oglander*, 2 De G. & Sm. 381 ; *Holder v. Durbin*, 11 Beav. 594 ; *Bowles v. Weeks*, 14 Sim. 591 ; *Bayley v. Mansell*, 4 Mad. 226 ; *Southwell v. Ward*, Taml. 314. A different practice was followed in *Joyce v. Joyce*, 2 Moll. 276 ; *Sampayo v. Gould*, 12 Sim. 426, and *White v. White*, 5 Beav. 221 ; but these cases are not authorities now. See *Brown v. Brown*, 3 Y. & Col. 395.

<sup>2</sup> *Attorney-General v. Winchelsea*, 3 Bro. Ch. 373 ; *Attorney-General v. Shore*, 1 M. & Cr. 394 ; 12 Sim. 426.

appointments are to be made. Such provisions are extremely convenient, and save much perplexity, expense, and trouble; and where a settlement is to be drawn up under articles, by the direction of the court, it will order such provisions to be inserted as are *just and reasonable*.<sup>1</sup> Where it is necessary to

<sup>1</sup> *Lindow v. Fleetwood*, 6 Sim. 152; *Brewster v. Angell*, 1 J. & W. 628; *Sampayo v. Gould*, 12 Sim. 426; *Belmont v. O'Brien*, 2 Kern. 394. The following form is approved by both Mr. Lewin and Mr. Hill, as a proper power for the appointment of new trustees:—

“Provided always, and it is hereby further declared, that if the trustees hereby appointed, or any of them, or any future trustees or trustee hereof, shall die (either before or after their or his acceptance of the trusts thereof), go to reside abroad, desire to be discharged from, renounce, decline, or become incapable or unfit to act in the trusts of these presents, while the same trusts or any of them shall be subsisting, then, and in every or any such cases, and so often as the same shall happen, it shall be lawful for the said (*the cestuis que trust* [if any] *for life*), or the survivors of them, by any writing or writings, under their, his, or her hands or hand, attested by two or more witnesses, and after the decease of such survivor, then for the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee hereof, or the executors or administrators of the then last acting trustee (whether such surviving trustees or trustee, or executors or administrators, respectively, shall be willing to act in other respects or not), by any writing or writings, under their or his hands or hand, attested by two or more witnesses, to nominate and substitute any person or persons to be trustee or trustees hereof, in the place of the trustee or trustees so dying, going to reside abroad, desiring to be discharged, renouncing, declining, or becoming incapable or unfit to act as aforesaid. And that, so often as any new trustee or trustees hereof shall be appointed as aforesaid, all the hereditaments, &c., which shall, for the time being, be holden upon the trusts hereof, shall be thereupon conveyed, assigned, and transferred respectively, in such manner that the same may become legally and effectually vested in the acting trustees hereof for the time being, to and for the same uses, and upon the same trusts, and with and subject to the same powers and provisions as are herein declared, and contained of and concerning the same hereditaments and premises respectively, or such of the same uses, trusts, powers, and provisions as shall then be subsisting or incapable of taking effect.

“And that every new trustee, to be from time to time appointed as aforesaid, shall thenceforth be competent in all things to act in the execution of the trusts hereof, as fully and effectually, and with all the same powers and authorities to all purposes whatsoever, as if he had hereby been originally appointed a trustee in the place of the trustee to whom he shall, whether immediately or otherwise, succeed.”

act under the powers thus given in the instrument of trust, it is of the utmost consequence that there should be an exact compliance with the power and authority as given. For if the circumstances do not justify or demand a new appointment, as contemplated in the instrument of trust, or if there is any irregularity as to the persons by whom the new appointment is made, or as to the manner in which it is made, the retiring trustee will still be liable for any breaches of trust which may be committed, and the new trustee will be incapable of exercising any legal authority over the trust property, and will be a trustee only *de son tort*, if he interfere; and any purchaser of the trust property may find his title utterly worthless.<sup>1</sup> The retiring trustee should be careful not to part with the control of the fund before the new trustee has been actually appointed and qualified, for if he transfer it into the name of the intended trustee, and by some accident the appointment is not completed, the old trustee still remains answerable for the fund.<sup>2</sup>

§ 289. These powers of appointing successors are frequently matters of *personal* confidence reposed in the trustees appointed by the settlor, and they are always matters of general trust and confidence to be strictly executed. Being powers given to third persons over the property of others, they are construed with great strictness, and a great variety of decisions have been made upon the various forms in which the power has been expressed. Questions have arisen: (1.) As to the time, occasion, or event when a new appointment may be made; (2.) As to the person or persons by whom the appointment may be made; (3.) As to the persons who may be appointed; (4.) As to the number of persons who may be appointed; (5.) As to the manner of making the new appointment.

§ 290. It should always be carefully considered whether the circumstances or events are such as the settlor intended for the

<sup>1</sup> *Adams v. Paynter*, 1 Col. 532; *Walker v. Brungard*, 13 Sm. & M. 723.

<sup>2</sup> *Pearce v. Pearce*, 22 Beav. 248.

retirement of one or more of the trustees appointed by him, and the substitution of new trustees ; thus in a case where the power provided that, " in case either of the trustees, the said A. and B., shall happen to die, or desire to be discharged from, or neglect or refuse or become incapable to act in the trust, it shall be lawful for the survivor or survivors of the trustees so acting, or the executors or administrators of the last surviving trustee, by any writing, &c., to nominate a new trustee." *Both* the trustees declining to act, they executed a conveyance to two other persons, as an appointment of them as new trustees under the power ; and it was held that the power was not well executed, that the word *survivor* referred to the trustee " continuing to act," that it was the intention of the testator that in case of the death, refusal, or incapacity of *one* of his trustees, the remaining one who had been named by him, and who was the object of his confidence, should have the power of associating with himself some other person, and that the *event* of both declining at the same time was not provided for.<sup>1</sup> Where a settlement upon a chapel contained a power for the appointment of new trustees upon the desertion or removal of any existing trustee, Lord Eldon held that the case of a trustee, who left the trust on account of its being converted by the other trustees to purposes different and distinct from the intention of the settlor, was an event not provided for.<sup>2</sup> And so where

<sup>1</sup> *Sharp v. Sharp*, 2 B. & Ad. 405 ; *Guion v. Pickett*, 42 Miss. 77.

<sup>2</sup> *Attorney-General v. Pearson*, 3 Mer. 412. In *Morris v. Preston*, 7 Ves. 547, power was given to a husband and wife, or the survivor, with the consent of the *cotrustee* or *trustees*, to appoint any new trustee or trustees, and upon such appointment the surviving cotrustees should convey the estate, so that the surviving trustee or trustees, and the new trustee or trustees, might be jointly concerned in the trusts in the same manner as such surviving trustee and the person so dying would have been in case he were living. No new appointment was made till after the death of both the original trustees. The new appointees having made a sale, the purchaser objected to the title on the ground of the invalidity of their appointment under the power ; but the objection was waived without argument. Mr. Sugden regrets that the opinion of the court was not taken. 2 Sugd. on Powers, 529. He has, however, never since acted on the doctrine. As



*cestuis que trust* were to appoint a trustee upon the refusal or neglect of the others to act, it was held that they could not appoint upon the death of one of them.<sup>1</sup> But generally where the power to appoint new trustees is given to the *survivor* of several trustees, it may be legally exercised by the *continuing* trustee upon the resignation or refusal of the others to act.<sup>2</sup>

§ 291. In some earlier cases, it was held that where a power was given to the surviving trustee or trustees to appoint new trustees *in case of the death of either of their* cotrustees, it did not authorize an appointment to fill a vacancy caused by the death of trustees during the *lifetime* of the testator, upon the ground that persons dying in the lifetime of the testator had never *filled the character* of trustees so as to come within the terms of the power ;<sup>3</sup> but these are overruled by the later cases, and it may be considered as settled that the surviving trustee or trustees may fill vacancies caused by the death of persons nominated by the testator, whether they die in his lifetime or afterwards.<sup>4</sup> So if the continuing trustee or trustees are to appoint upon the *refusing* or *declining* of any of the original trustees, they may appoint upon the *disclaimer* of any one or more ;<sup>5</sup> and so a payment of the trust fund into court, under an order or permission to that effect, is a *refusing* or *declining* by the trustee that authorizes the exercise of the power.<sup>6</sup>

where a similar power was given, to a tenant for life, of appointing new trustees, one trustee died and the other became bankrupt, and it was objected that the power of appointment was gone, Sir Edward Sugden ruled to the contrary. *Re Roche*, 1 Conn. & Laws. 306, 2 Dr. & War. 287.

<sup>1</sup> *Guion v. Pickett*, 42 Miss. 77.

<sup>2</sup> *Sharp v. Sharp*, 2 B. & Ad. 405; *Eaton v. Smith*, 2 Beav. 236; *Travis v. Illingworth*, 2 Dr. & Sm. 344; *Cooke v. Crawford*, 13 Sim. 91; *Hawkins v. Kemp*, 3 East, 410.

<sup>3</sup> *Walsh v. Gladstone*, 14 Sim. 2; *Winter v. Rudge*, 15 Sim. 576.

<sup>4</sup> *Lonsdale v. Beckett*, 4 De G. & Sm. 73; *In re Hadley's Trust*, 5 De G. & Sm. 67; 9 Eng. L. & Eq. 67; *Noble v. Meymott*, 14 Beav. 477.

<sup>5</sup> *In re Roche*, 1 Conn. & Laws. 306; *Walsh v. Gladstone*, 14 Sim. 2; *Mitchell v. Nixon*, 1 Ir. Eq. 155; *Cook v. Ingoldsby*, 2 Ir. Eq. 375; *Travis v. Illingworth*, 2 Dr. & Sm. 344.

<sup>6</sup> *Re William's Settlement*, 4 K. & J. 87.

§ 292. If the settlement provides that a new appointment may be made on either of the trustees becoming *unfit*, the power may be exercised if one of them becomes *bankrupt*; <sup>1</sup> but if the word is *incapable* without the word *unfit*, a new appointment cannot be made, for the word *incapable* means personal incapacity and not pecuniary embarrassment,<sup>2</sup> and a bankrupt who had some time before obtained a first-class certificate of discharge was not regarded as coming within the term *unfit*.<sup>3</sup> But where a trustee of property in London had been domiciled in New York for twenty years, he was declared *incapable* within the meaning of the word.<sup>4</sup> Where a power declared that, "if the trustees were not deemed *suitable* and *sufficient* to act as trustees by the *cestui que trust*, he might remove them, it was held to be a matter of discretion in the beneficiary to remove the trustees or not."<sup>5</sup>

§ 293. Where a suit is already pending in court for the administration of the trust, the donees of the power to appoint cannot exercise it without first obtaining the court's approval of the person proposed.<sup>6</sup> When it is desired to change the

<sup>1</sup> *In re Roche*, 1 Conn. & Laws. 308; 2 Dr. & War. 287.

<sup>2</sup> *Re Watt's Settlement*, 9 Hare, 106; *Turner v. Maule*, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 222; 15 Jur. 761. *In re Bignold's Settlement*, L. R. 7 Ch. 223; *Re Blanchard*, 3 De G., F. & J. 131. A statute in New York provides that administration, &c., shall not be granted to any person who shall be judged *incompetent* by the surrogate to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness, *improvidence*, or want of understanding. Under this statute it was held that mere *moral turpitude* does not *per se* disqualify, but that professional gambling was such evidence of *improvidence* as *prima facie* to disqualify. *Cooke v. Lawerne*, 1 Barb. Ch. 45; *McMahon v. Harrison*, 2 Seld. 443.

<sup>3</sup> *Re Bridgman*, 1 Dr. & Sm. 164.

<sup>4</sup> *Mennard v. Welford*, 1 Sm. & Gif. 426. The opposite doctrine was previously held in *Withington v. Withington*, 16 Sim. 104; *O'Reilly v. Alderson*, 8 Hare, 101.

<sup>5</sup> *Walker v. Brungard*, 13 Sm. & Mar. 758.

<sup>6</sup> *Millard v. Eyre*, 2 Ves. Jr. 94; *Webb v. Shaftesbury*, 7 Ves. 480; *Peatfield v. Benn*, 17 Beav. 552; *Kennedy v. Turnley*, 6 Ir. Eq. 399; *Attorney-General v. Clack*, 1 Beav. 467; *Middleton v. Reay*, 7 Hare, 106; — *v. Roberts*, 1 J. & W. 251.

trustees during the pendency of a suit, a motion must be made, and such motion is referred to a master to report upon the person proposed. The master is to regard the power of appointment; but he is not bound to approve the proposed person.<sup>1</sup> If an appointment is made, however, by the old trustees, it is not contempt, nor is it altogether void; but it puts the burden upon those making the appointment of proving, by the strictest evidence, that it was just and proper. If they fail in such proof, the act will be declared null and void.<sup>2</sup> So if the trustee or other person having power to appoint a new trustee is a lunatic, the court must appoint.<sup>3</sup>

§ 294. It will at once be seen that the power of appointing other trustees can be exercised only by those to whom it is expressly given. Therefore, if the power is not given to any one, new trustees can be appointed only by the court.<sup>4</sup> So if the power be given to particular persons by name, without saying more, or adding words of survivorship, it must be exercised jointly, and upon the death of one of them the power will be gone.<sup>5</sup> But if a power be given to a class consisting of several persons, as to my "trustees," "my sons," or "my brothers," and not to individuals by their proper names, the authority will exist in the class, so long as the plural number remains, although it may have been reduced in number by the death or resignation of some;<sup>6</sup> and where a power is given to "my

<sup>1</sup> *Webb v. Shaftesbury*, 7 Ves. 487; *Middleton v. Reay*, 7 Hare, 106.

<sup>2</sup> *Cape v. Bent*, 3 Hare, 249; *Attorney-General v. Clack*, 1 Beav. 467; *Baker v. Lee*, 8 H. L. Ca. 495.

<sup>3</sup> *In re Sparrow*, 1 L. R. 5 Ch. 662; *In re White*, L. R. 5 Ch. 698; *In re Cuming*, L. R. 5 Ch. 72; *In re Heaphy*, 18 W. R. 1070; *In re Nicholl*, 18 W. R. 416.

<sup>4</sup> *Wilson v. Towle*, 36 N. H. 129.

<sup>5</sup> *Co. Litt.* 113 a.; 1 Sug. Pow. 141.

<sup>6</sup> *Gartland v. Mayott*, 2 Vern. 105; *Eq. Ca. Ab.* 202; 2 Freem. 105; *Dyer*, 177 a.; *Co. Litt.* 112 b.; *Byam v. Byam*, 19 Beav. 58; *Belmont v. O'Brien*, 2 Kern. 394; 1 Sug. Pow. 144; *McKim v. Handy*, 4 Md. Ch. 230.

executors" as a class, it may be exercised by a single surviving executor.<sup>1</sup> A power to be exercised by the survivor of two persons cannot be executed by the one dying first,<sup>2</sup> nor even by the two acting together during the lives of both.<sup>3</sup> So a power given to the surviving or continuing trustee to appoint a co-trustee, if *either* of the two decline to act, does not authorize an appointment if *both* decline.<sup>4</sup> So the power of appointment cannot be executed by *heirs*, *personal representatives*, or *assigns* of any trustee, unless the authority is expressly given in the instrument of trust.<sup>5</sup> In these, as in all other cases, the authority will be strictly confined to those persons who answer the precise description. Thus a power given to a trustee, his *heirs*, *executors*, or *administrators*, cannot be executed by a *devisee* or *assignee* of the trustee.<sup>6</sup> It is, however, well established, that a power given to a *surviving* trustee may be executed by a *continuing* or *acting* trustee, although a cotrustee who disclaimed is still living.<sup>7</sup>

§ 295. Upon this principle, the number of parties undertaking to execute a power must come within the exact description given of the number of those who are to execute it; thus, if a power is given to be exercised by a certain specified number, or when they are reduced to a certain number, it cannot be exercised by a less number, and is gone if not exercised before

<sup>1</sup> 1 Sug. Pow. 244; *Davoue v. Fanning*, 2 John. Ch. 252.

<sup>2</sup> *Bishop of Oxford v. Leighton*, 2 Vern. 376.

<sup>3</sup> *McAdam v. Logan*, 3 Bro. Ch. 320.

<sup>4</sup> *Sharp v. Sharp*, 2 B. & Ad. 405.

<sup>5</sup> *Bradford v. Belfield*, 2 Sim. 264; *Eaton v. Smith*, 2 Beav. 236; *Davoue v. Fanning*, 2 John. Ch. 252; *Titley v. Wolstenholme*, 7 Beav. 424; *Granville v. McNeale*, 7 Hare, 156; *Hall v. May*, 3 Kay & J. 585; *Cooke v. Crawford*, 13 S m. 91.

<sup>6</sup> *Bradford v. Belfield*, 2 Sim. 264; *Cole v. Wade*, 16 Ves. 27; *Cape v. Bent*, 3 Hare, 245; *Ackleston v. Heap*, 1 De G. & Sm. 640; *McKim v. Handy*, 4 Md. Ch. 230; *Mortimer v. Ireland*, 6 Hare, 196.

<sup>7</sup> *Lane v. Debenham*, 11 Hare, 188; *Eaton v. Smith*, 2 Beav. 236; *Sharp v. Sharp*, 2 B. & A. 405.

the number is reduced below the number which is named for its execution.<sup>1</sup> But the power may be executed before the trustees are reduced to the lowest number specified, as where a conveyance to twenty-five trustees for a chapel directed that when, by death or otherwise, the number should be reduced to fifteen, a majority of those remaining should make up the number to twenty-five. The number was reduced to seventeen; and twelve, the others dissenting, elected eight new trustees, and it was held a good appointment under the power.<sup>2</sup>

§ 296. A married woman may exercise the power of appointing new trustees, if such power is expressly given to her, as she may exercise any other power given to her in an instrument of trust;<sup>3</sup> and she may appoint her husband trustee;<sup>4</sup> but an infant cannot exercise such power unless it is simply collateral.<sup>5</sup>

§ 297. Where the appointment of new trustees is given to the discretion of the acting trustees, courts of equity will not interfere to control the exercise of the discretion if the old trustees act in *good faith*,<sup>6</sup> and if the administration of the

<sup>1</sup> Att'y-Gen. v. Floyer, 2 Vern. 748; Att'y-Gen. v. Litchfield, 5 Ves. 825.

<sup>2</sup> Dupleix v. Roe, 1 Anst. 86.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, § 49.

<sup>4</sup> Tweedy v. Urquhart, 30 Ga. 446.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, § 52.

<sup>6</sup> Bowditch v. Bannelos, 1 Gray, 220; Hodgson's Settlement, 9 Hare, 118. In Bowditch v. Bannelos, above cited, Ch. J. Shaw said: "But when we say that she (the *cestui que trust*) had power at her pleasure to appoint, we do not mean to say that this was an arbitrary power to appoint a person unfit or unsuitable to execute such a trust, as a minor, an idiot, a pauper, or person incapable of performing the duties. It must be a person of full age, sufficient mental and legal capacity, and in all respects capable of performing the required duties. In case of trust property of real and personal estate, we are not prepared to say whether an alien, not naturalized, and not capable by law to hold real estate, would or would not be a suitable or legal appointment. We think the power was not exhausted by the appointment of the first substitute, but that the same power existed, on every resignation, to appoint a new trustee, pursuant to the original trusts; but

trust is not already in the hands of or before the court by a pending suit.<sup>1</sup> Thus the old trustees in a case for the exercise of their discretion may appoint any suitable person. The inquiry in such cases is not whether the person proposed is the *most* suitable, but whether he is suitable.<sup>2</sup> It is generally the duty, however, of trustees to appoint new trustees, who are agreeable to the *cestuis que trust*, and who would administer the fund for their interest; to this end it is generally the duty of the trustees to consult the *cestuis que trust*, as to the appointment.<sup>3</sup> And a new appointee ought to consult the *cestuis que trust*, before accepting the office.<sup>4</sup> An appointment for the mere purpose of having a particular solicitor employed in the management of the trust ought not to be allowed.<sup>5</sup> Generally the new trustees appointed under a power should be amenable to the jurisdiction of the court, but where the *cestui que trust* resides abroad, it may be proper to appoint trustees in the same jurisdiction with the beneficiary.<sup>6</sup> Though if the court is called upon to exercise the power, it will not appoint trustees out of its jurisdiction.<sup>7</sup> Nor is the appointment of one of the *cestuis que trust* proper, as each of the *cestuis que trust* has a right to a *disinterested* and *impartial* trustee.<sup>8</sup> This rule

that this power, by necessary implication, was limited to the appointment of a person legally capable of executing it." Whether the nomination of her husband on account of the conjugal relation, would have been incompatible with the scope of the whole instrument, and would be a valid objection, or whether the fact that another appointee was a foreigner having no domicile in the United States, an alien not naturalized, would be a valid objection, the court did not decide, because the nominations were withdrawn.

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, § 293.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, § 278.

<sup>3</sup> *O'Reilly v. Alderson*, 8 Hare, 101; *Marshall v. Sladden*, 7 Hare, 428; *Peatfield v. Benn*, 17 Beav. 522; *Nagle's Est.* 52 Penn. St. 154.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Marshall v. Sladden*, 7 Hare, 428.

<sup>6</sup> *Meinertzhagen v. Davis*, 1 Coll. 335; *Ex parte Tunno*, 1 Bail. Eq. 395.

<sup>7</sup> *Guibert's Trust*, 13 Eng. L. & Eq. 372. But see *Ex parte Tunno*, 1 Bail. Eq. 395.

<sup>8</sup> *Passingham v. Sherborne*, 9 Beav. 424.

probably only affects the parties to the trust; for if a *cestui que trust* should be appointed, and should sell the estate under a power of sale, the purchaser would be protected.<sup>1</sup> *Cestuis que trust* are not absolutely incapacitated to take the trusts, and courts themselves sometimes appoint them;<sup>2</sup> but it is not generally desirable. So, near relationship is not a disqualification; but it is almost always better to have a capable person not intimately connected with the *cestuis que trust*.<sup>3</sup> Nor should the donee of a power to appoint nominate himself, for trustees cannot even pay over the assets to one of their own number.<sup>4</sup> It is said, however, that if a trust with power of appointment is committed to trustees and the survivor of them, his executors or administrators, and the trustees all die, the appointment is in the executor of the survivor; and, as the instrument of trust declares him to be a proper person to execute the trust, he may appoint himself under the power. Mr. Lewin, however, says that "the exercise of every power should be regulated by the circumstances as they stand at the time, and that the limitation to executors cannot dispense with the *discretion* to be applied afterwards."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Reid v. Reid, 30 Beav. 388.

<sup>2</sup> *Ex parte Clutton*, 17 Jur. 988; 21 Eng. L. & Eq. 186; *Ex parte Conybeare's Settlement*, 1 W. R. 458.

<sup>3</sup> Wilding v. Bolder, 21 Beav. 222; where the husband of a *cestui que trust* was appointed trustee, the court required him to undertake to apply for the appointment of a new trustee in case he became sole trustee, 18 W. R. 416; 21 L. T. (N. S.), 781.

<sup>4</sup> ——— v. Walker, 5 Russ. 7; *Stickney v. Sewell*, 1 M. & C. 14; *Westover v. Chapman*, 1 Coll. 177.

<sup>5</sup> Lewin on Trusts, 472 (5th Lond. ed.).

## CHAPTER X.

## NATURE, EXTENT, AND DURATION OF THE ESTATE TAKEN BY TRUSTEES.

- § 298. Where trustees take and hold no estate, although an express gift is made to them. Statute of uses.
- § 299. Effect of the statute of uses upon conveyancing in the several States.
- § 300. Effect of the statute in the rise of trusts.
- §§ 301, 302. Rules of construction which gave rise to trusts.
- § 303. The word "seised."
- § 304. The primary use must be in the trustee to raise a trust.
- §§ 305, 306. Personal property not within the statute.
- §§ 307, 308. Where the statute executes trusts as uses, and where it does not.
- § 309. Where a charge upon an estate will vest an estate in trustees, and where not.
- § 310. Where the trust is for the sole use of a married woman.
- § 311. Trusts of personalty are not executed by the statute.
- § 312. The statute only executes the exact estate given to the trustee ; but the trustee may take an estate commensurate with the purposes of the trust where it is unexecuted by the statute. Rules.
- §§ 313, 314. Courts may imply an estate in the trustee where none is given.
- §§ 315, 116. May enlarge the estate of the trustee for the purposes of the trust.
- § 317. Illustrations, explanations, and modifications of the rule.
- §§ 318, 319. Rule in respect to personal estate.
- § 320. Distinctions between deeds and wills in England and the United States.

§ 298. It may happen that although words of express trust are used in the grant or bequest of an estate to a trustee, yet no estate vests or remains in the trustee. Thus if A. grants or bequeaths land to B. and his heirs, in trust for C. and his heirs, the trustee, B., will take nothing in the land, but the legal title, as well as the beneficial use, will vest immediately in C. ;<sup>1</sup> for the statute of uses,<sup>2</sup> so called, executes the posses-

<sup>1</sup> *Austin v. Taylor*, 1 Eden, 361 ; *Williams v. Waters*, 14 M. & W. 166 ; *Robinson v. Grey*, 9 East, 1 ; *Chapman v. Blissett*, Ca. t. Talbot, 150 ; *Broughton v. Langley*, 2 Salk. 150 ; 2 Ld. Raym. 873 ; *Thatcher v. Omans*, 3 Pick. 521 ; *Upham v. Varney*, 15 N. H. 466 ; *Kinch v. Ward*, 2 Sim. & St. 409 ; and see *Doe v. Biggs*, 2 Taunt. 109 ; *Shapland v. Smith*, 1 Bro. Ch. 75, and notes ; *Boyer v. Cockerell*, 3 Kan. 282.

<sup>2</sup> 27 Henry VIII. c. 10, § 1.



sion and the legal title in the same person to whom the beneficial interest is given. As stated in previous sections,<sup>1</sup> a large part of the land in England was at one time held to uses. The legal title was in one person, but upon the trust and confidence that such person would apply it to the use of some person named, or that such legal owner would permit some other person to have the possession, use, and income of the estate. This system, originating partly in fraud of the law, and partly in the necessities and convenience of the subject, became at last the source of great abuses. To remedy these abuses, the statute of uses was enacted.<sup>2</sup> This statute executes the use by conveying the possession to the use, and transferring the use into possession, thereby making the *cestui que use* complete owner of the estate, as well at law as in equity. It does not abolish the conveyance to uses, but only annihilates the inter-

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, §§ 3, 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, §§ 5, 6, 7. And see the preamble of the statute. The first section of the statute was as follows: "That where any person or persons stand or be seised, or at any time hereafter shall happen to be seised of and in any honors, castles, manors, lands, tenements, rents, services, reversions, remainders, or other hereditaments, to the use, confidence, or trust of any other person or persons, or of any body politic, by reason of any bargain, sale, feoffment, fine, recovery, covenant, contract, agreement, will, or otherwise, by any manner of means whatsoever it be; that in every such case, all and every such person and persons, and bodies politic that have or hereafter shall have any such use, confidence, or trust in fee-simple, fee-tail, for term of life, or for years, or otherwise, or any use, confidence, or trust in remainder or reverter, shall from henceforth stand and be seised, deemed and adjudged, in lawful seisin estate and possession, of and in the same honors, castles, manors, lands, tenements, rents, services, reversions, remainders, and hereditaments, with their appurtenances, to all intents, constructions, and purposes, in the law of and in such like estates, as they had or shall have in use, trust, or confidence of or in the same; and that the estate, title, right, and possession that was in such person or persons that were or hereafter shall be seised of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, to the use, confidence, or trust of any such person or persons, or of any body politic, be from henceforth clearly deemed and adjudged to be in him or them, that have, or hereafter shall have, such use, confidence, or trust after such quality, manner, form, and condition as they had before, in or to the use, confidence, or trust that was in them." *Saund. on Uses*, 70-82.

vening estate, and turns the interest of the *cestui que use* into a legal instead of an *equitable* estate.<sup>1</sup> A *use*, a *trust*, and a *confidence* is one and the same thing, and if an estate is conveyed to one person for the use of, or upon a trust for, another, and nothing more is said, the statute immediately transfers the legal estate to the use, and no trust is created, although express words of trust are used.<sup>2</sup> So absolute is the statute that it will operate upon all conveyances in the words above stated, although it was the plain intention of the settlor that the estate should vest and remain in the first donee; for the intention of the citizen cannot control express enactments of the legislature,<sup>3</sup> or positive rules of property.

§ 299. The statute of uses is in force in most of the United States,<sup>4</sup> but where the statute is not in force either by adoption or by re-enactment, and even where it is expressly repealed and a form of deed is enacted, a knowledge of the law of uses is necessary in order to understand and apply the common forms of conveyance.<sup>5</sup> The statute of uses, and the doctrines it established are so interwoven with the history of every American State, and with the growth of its jurisprudence in regard to real estate, that the law of tenures is necessarily interpreted in America by the precedents established under

<sup>1</sup> *Eustace v. Seamen*, Cro. Jac. 696; 2 Black. Com. 333, 338; *Thatcher v. Omans*, 3 Pick. 529; *Hutchins v. Heywood*, 50 N. H. 495.

<sup>2</sup> *Terry v. Collier*, 11 East, 377; *Right v. Smith*, 12 East, 454; *Broughton v. Langley*, 2 Salk. 679; *Ease v. Howard*, Pr. Ch. 338, 345; *Hammerston's Case*, Dyer, 166 a, note; *Ramsay v. Marsh*, 2 McCord, 252; *Moore v. Shultz*, 13 Penn. St. 98; *Jackson v. Fish*, 10 John. 456; *Parks v. Parks*, 9 Paige, 107.

<sup>3</sup> *Carwardine v. Carwardine*, 1 Ed. 36; *Gregory v. Henderson*, 4 Taunt. 772. In this case the intent of the testator was loosely talked of, but it was an active trust, as pointed out by Heath, J. *Doe v. Collier*, 11 East, 377; *Shapland v. Smith*, 1 Bro. Ch. 75; 1 Sugd. Ven. 309, 314.

<sup>4</sup> 4 Kent, Com. 299; 1 Green. Cru. tit. 11, Use, c. 3, § 3, note.

<sup>5</sup> Walk. Am. Law, 311;  *Helfensteine v. Garrard*, 7 Ohio, 275; 2 Washb. on Real Prop. 152.

the statute;<sup>1</sup> and in this branch of the law, as in all others, it is impossible to obtain a clear perception of its present state, without a full knowledge of the successive steps by which the latest development has been reached. The application of the statute has been very much modified in many of the States, but the general idea is still acted upon.<sup>2</sup> Mr.

<sup>1</sup> 4 Kent, Com. 299-301.

<sup>2</sup> In Maine, a person may convey land by deed acknowledged and recorded, Rev. Stat. 1857, c. 73, § 1. And a deed may be any species of conveyance, not plainly repugnant in terms, and necessary to give effect to the intention of the parties. *Emery v. Chase*, 5 Me. 235. And the statute of uses is in force. *Shapleigh v. Pilsbury*, 1 Me. 271; *Emery v. Chase*, 5 Me. 232; *Webster v. Cooper*, 14 How. 496; *Morden v. Chase*, 32 Me. 329.

In New Hampshire, the form in which lands may be conveyed is fixed by statute. Rev. Stat. But this does not exclude other known forms of conveyance at common law, and the statute of uses is in full force. *Exeter v. Odiorne*, 1 N. H. 232; *Chamberlain v. Crane*, ib. 64; *French v. French*, 3 N. H. 234; *Upham v. Varney*, 15 N. H. 462; *Hayes v. Tabor*, 41 N. H. 526; *Bell v. Scammon*, 15 N. H. 394; *Pritchard v. Brown*, 4 N. H. 397; *Dennett v. Dennett*, 40 N. H. 498; *Hutchins v. Heywood*, 50 N. H. 496.

In Vermont, there is similar legislation as to the form of conveyances; but Chief Justice Redfield held that the English statute of uses was not in force, for the reason that their court of equity could carry out the intention of parties without the help of the statute. *Gorham v. Daniels*, 23 Vt. 600; *Sherman v. Dodge*, 28 Vt. 26. Mr. Justice Thompson, of the United States court for the district held the contrary. *Soc. &c. v. Hartland*, 2 Paine, C. C. 536.

In Massachusetts, a deed acknowledged and recorded conveys land without any other ceremony. Gen. Stat. 1860, c. 89, § 1. The form of deed in general use *gives, grants, bargains, sells, and conveys*, upon a consideration, limiting the estate to the grantee and his heirs *to their use*. These words prevent a resulting use in the grantor; and it is a conveyance at common law, since the *grantee* and the *cestui que use* is the same person. But if, for any reason, it is necessary, in order to give effect to the conveyance, to construe it as operating under the statute of uses, the court will do so. *Cox v. Edwards*, 14 Mass. 492; *Marshall v. Fish*, 6 Mass. 24; *Hunt v. Hunt*, 14 Pick. 374; *Wallis v. Wallis*, 4 Mass. 135; *Pray v. Pierce*, 7 Mass. 381; *Russell v. Coffin*, 8 Pick. 143; *Blood v. Blood*, 8 Pick. 80; *Parker v. Nichols*, 7 Pick. 111; *Gale v. Coburn*, 18 Pick. 397; *Brewer v. Hardy*, 22 Pick. 376; *Thatcher v. Omans*, 3 Pick. 522; *Norton v. Leonard*, 12 Pick. 157; *Newhall v. Wheeler*, 7 Mass. 189; *Chapin v. Univer. Soc.* 8 Gray, 580; *Baptist Soc. v. Hazen*, 100 Mass. 322; *Durant v. Ritchie*, 4 Mason, 45; *North Hampton Bank v. Whiting*, 12 Mass. 104; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 7 Allen, 197.

In Rhode Island, deeds of bargain and sale, lease and release, and cove-

Washburn remarks, that it is not a fair inference that the doctrine of uses would be inapplicable in any State where they

nants to stand seised, are recognized by statute. Rev. Stat. (1857) p. 335, and the statute of uses would seem to be in partial force. 1 Lomax, Dig. 188; *Nightingale v. Hidden*, 7 R. I. 132.

In Connecticut, the act of acknowledging and recording a deed is held equivalent to livery of seisin: *Barrett v. French*, 1 Conn. 354; but the statute of uses is held to be part of its common law. *Bacon v. Taylor*, Kirb. 368; *Barrett v. French*, 1 Conn. 354; *Bryan v. Bradley*, 16 Conn. 474.

In New York, previous to 1827, the English statute of uses was in full force. *Jackson v. Myers*, 3 John. 388; *Jackson v. Fish*, 10 John. 456; *Jackson v. Root*, 18 John. 79; *Jackson v. Cary*, 16 John. 302; *Jackson v. Dunsbagh*, 1 John. Ca. 91; *Jackson v. Cadwell*, 1 Cow. 622. After that year, the rules of the common law were repealed; all uses and trusts were abolished, except such as were expressly authorized. Every interest in land is declared to be a legal right, and cognizable in a court of law except where it is otherwise provided. A conveyance by *grant*, *assignment*, or *devise* is substituted for a conveyance to uses, and future interests in lands may be conveyed by grant. 3 Rev. Stat. 15 (5th ed.), 4 Kent, 300. It has, however, been determined that if land is granted to one in fee in trust for another, the *cestui que trust* takes the estate absolutely, but subject, however, to such incumbrances as the trustee made upon the estate at the time of the conveyance, as if the trustee should give back a mortgage for the purchase-money, it would be held to be one transaction. *Rawson v. Lampman*, 1 Seld. 456. Nor have these statutes any application to securities by mortgage. *King v. Merchants' Exchange Co.* 1 Seld. 547.

In New Jersey, the statute of uses is substantially re-enacted. *Den v. Crawford*, 3 Halst. 107; *Prince v. Sisson*, 13 N. J. 168.

In Pennsylvania, a statute declares all deeds in a prescribed form equivalent to a feoffment with livery of seisin at common law, and the statute of uses is also in full force. Opinion of the Judges, 3 Binn. 599; *Ashhurst v. Given*, 5 Wat. & Ser. 323; *Welt v. Franklin*, 1 Binn. 502; *Sprague v. Woods*, 4 Wat. & Ser. 192; *O'Kinson v. Patterson*, 1 Wat. & Ser. 395; *Hurst v. McNeil*, 1 Wash. C. C. 70; *Franciscus v. Reigart*, 4 Watts, 118. Indeed, at one time, the Pennsylvania courts carried the application of the statute to an unusual extent, and held that *equitable* were converted into *legal* estates in all cases except active trusts, and even *then* if the purposes of the trust did not furnish a legitimate reason for not executing the trust in the beneficiary. *Kuhn v. Newman*, 26 Penn. St. 227; *Whichcote v. Lyle*, 28 Penn. St. 73; *Bush's App.* 33 Penn. St. 85; *Kay v. Scates*, 37 Penn. St. 31. But these cases were overruled, and the law restored to its former condition, in *Barnett's App.* 46 Penn. St. 392; *Shankland's App.* 47 Penn. St. 113.

In Delaware, the statute provides that lands may be transferred by deed

are not declared not to exist, either because no case has arisen in the courts of the State to test the question, or because a

without livery, and that the legal estate shall accompany the use, and pass with it. Rev. Code (1852), p. 266.

In Maryland, the English statute of uses is the foundation of their conveyances, and their rules of construction of it are nearly similar to the English rules. *Lewis v. Beall*, 4 Harr. & McH. 488; *Mason v. Smallwood*, 4 Harr. & McH. 484; *Matthews v. Ward*, 10 Gill & J. 443; *Cheney v. Watkins*, 1 Harr. & J. 527; *West v. Biscoe*, 6 Harr. & J. 465; *Calvert v. Eden*, 2 Harr. & McH. 331.

In Virginia, the statute of uses was a part of the colonial law; but it was repealed in 1792. Afterwards, in 1819, and in Rev. Code (1849), p. 502, a partial substitute was adopted, by which the possession was transferred to the use only in cases of deeds of bargain and sale, lease and release, and deeds operating by way of covenant to stand seised to uses. If uses or trusts are raised by any other form of conveyance, as by devise, they remain, as before the statute of Henry VIII., mere equitable estates, not cognizable by courts of law. *Bass v. Scott*, 2 Leigh, 359, 1 Lomax, Dig. 188, 2 Mat. Dig. 34; *Rowletts v. Daniel*, 4 Munf. 473; *Tabb v. Baird*, 3 Call, 475; *Duvall v. Bibb*, 3 Call. 362.

In North Carolina, the statute is similar to the statute of Virginia, and the statute of uses has nearly the same application. Rev. Code (1854), p. 270; *Den v. Hanks*, 5 Ired. 30.

In South Carolina, the statute of uses was re-enacted in terms. 2 Stat. at Large, p. 467; *Ramsay v. Marsh*, 2 McCord, 252; *Redfern v. Middleton*, Rice, 464; *Kinsler v. Clark*, 1 Rich. 170; *Chancellor v. Windham*, 1 Rich. 161; *Laurens v. Jenney*, 1 Spears, 356; *McNish v. Guerard*, 4 Strob. 74.

In Georgia, the form of deed in general use is that of bargain and sale, which operates under the statute of uses. *Adams v. Guerard*, 29 Ga. 676.

In Florida, there is a statute similar to the statute of Virginia, and the statute of uses is in partial force. *Thompson's Dig.* p. 178, § 4; 1 Lomax, Dig. 188.

In Alabama, the statute of uses is part of the law of the State. *Horton v. Sledge*, 29 Ala. 478; *You v. Flinn*, 34 Ala. 411.

In Mississippi, there is a statute similar to the statute of Virginia. *How. & Hutch. Dig.* p. 349.

In Louisiana, conveyances originated under the civil law, or the code of France.

In Texas, a statute recognizes deeds of bargain and sale, which operate under the statute of uses.

In Arkansas, the mode of conveyance is by deeds of bargain and sale, and of course the statute of uses must be a part of their law.

In Tennessee, the statute of uses is not in force, though deeds good at

form of deed not known under the statute of uses may have been declared by the statute of a State sufficient to convey lands.<sup>1</sup> It is true that Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said, that the statute of uses had no other effect than to add at most three words to a conveyance;<sup>2</sup> Mr. Kent thinks this rather too strongly expressed, and says that the doctrine of the statute has insinuated itself deeply and thoroughly into

common law or under the statute of uses are valid to convey estates; but if uses are raised, they remain as before the statute of Henry VIII.

The statute of Kentucky is in nearly the same words as the statute of Virginia, and the statute of uses has the same application. Rev. Stat. p. 279 (ed. 1860).

In Ohio, the statute of uses was never in force, and if trusts or uses are raised by the form of conveyance they remain unexecuted, and mere equitable estates, cognizable only in courts of equity. *Williams v. Presbyterian Church*, 1 Ohio St. 497; *Helfensteine v. Garrard*, 7 Ham. 276; *Foster v. Dennison*, 9 Ohio, 124; *Walker*, Am. Law, 124; *Thompson v. Gibson*, 2 Ohio, 439.

In Indiana, the statute of uses is enacted in substance. Rev. Stat. (1843) p. 447; *Linville v. Golding*, 11 Ind. 374; *Nelson v. Davis*, 55 Ind. 474.

In Illinois, the statute is very similar to the statute of Virginia, 2 Stat. (1858) p. 959.

In Michigan, the laws are similar to the statutes of New York, by which all uses and trusts are abolished. 2 Compt. Laws (1857) p. 824; *Ready v. Kearsley*, 14 Mich. 228.

In Missouri, the statute of uses is re-enacted in substance. Rev. Stat. (1845) p. 218; *Guest v. Farley*, 19 Miss. 147.

In Iowa, uses are recognized, and deeds may operate under the statute of uses. *Pierson v. Armstrong*, 1 Iowa, 282.

In Wisconsin, the statute is very similar to the statute of New York, and all uses and trusts are abolished except those specially provided for. Rev. Stat. (1858) p. 529.

In Minnesota, deeds may be in form of bargain and sale, which operate under the statute.

In California, conveyances originated under the old Spanish law, and probably the statute of uses has little or no influence upon the law of the State.

In Kansas, a conveyance to A. to the use of B. vests the estate at once in B., by force of the statute. *Bayer v. Cockerill*, 3 Kan. 292.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Washburn on Real Property, 154.

<sup>2</sup> *Hopkins v. Hopkins*, 1 Atk. 591.

every branch of the jurisprudence of real property.<sup>1</sup> It seems to have been the intention of the statutes of the various States to supply the want of livery of seisin, and to make all deeds, or other writings executed with certain formalities, equivalent to the old feoffments; therefore, any old and well-established rule of conveyancing ought not to be considered as abolished, in the absence of express provisions to that effect.

§ 300. The statute of uses at the time when it was passed had an immense effect upon the tenures of the realm. Many interests in land which had been merely equitable, and cognizable only according to the rules of equity, became at once legal interests, cognizable in courts of common law. Many persons who were seised of estates to uses, and who only could sue or be sued at law in relation to the same, ceased at once to have any title either at law or equity. Although it is probable that it was the intent of the statute to convert all uses or trusts into legal estates,<sup>2</sup> yet the convenience to the subject of being able to keep the legal title to an estate in one person, while the beneficial interest should be in another, was too great to be given up altogether, and courts of equity were astute in finding reasons to withdraw a conveyance from the operation of the statute.<sup>3</sup> Three principal reasons or rules of construction were laid down, whereby conveyances were excepted from such operation: first, where a use was limited upon a use; second, where a copyhold or leasehold estate, or personal property, was limited to uses; third, where such

<sup>1</sup> 4 Kent, Com. 301.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Green. Cruise, tit. 12, c. 1, § 1.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Cruise thought that the strict construction put upon the statute by the judges in a great measure defeated its effect. *Ib.* Mr. Blackstone is of a similar opinion. 2 Black. Com. 336. And Lord Mansfield, in *Goodright v. Wells*, 2 Doug. 771, said that it was not the liberality of courts of equity, but the absurd narrowness of courts of law, resting on literal distinctions, which in a manner repealed the statute of uses, and drove *cestuis que trust* into equity.

powers or duties were imposed with the estate upon a donee to uses that it was necessary that he should continue to hold the legal title in order to perform his duty or execute the power.<sup>1</sup> In all of these three instances, courts both of law and equity held that the statute did not execute the use, but that such use remained, as it was before the statute, a mere equitable interest, to be administered in a court of equity. These uses, which the statute did not execute, were called trusts, and justify Mr. Cruise's language that "a trust is a use not executed by the statute of 27 Henry VIII."

§ 301. The first two of these rules originated in a strict construction of the technical words used in the statute, which are "where any person is *seised* of any lands or to the use of another." If A. grants lands to B. for the use of C. for the use of D., B. was said to be "seised" of the lands to the use of C.; and the statute immediately executed the use in C. and gave him the legal title. But C. was said not to be "seised" of lands to the use of D., but only of a *use*, therefore the use in C. for D. remained, as it was before the statute, unexecuted.<sup>2</sup> It remained therefore a mere equitable estate or trust cognizable in a court of equity alone. Hence the maxim that a use could not be limited on a use, not that such second use was void, but the statute did not execute it, and it remained a mere equitable interest. Thus, if lands come to A. and his heirs by feoffment, grant, devise, or other assurance, to the use of B. and his heirs, to the use of C. and his heirs; or to the use of C. in fee or for life, with remainders over; or to B. and his heirs in trust to permit C. and D. to receive the rents,—in all these cases, the statute executes the first use only in B. and his heirs, and the legal estate is vested in him, as trustee for the parties beneficially interested.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hill on Trustees, 230.

<sup>2</sup> Tyrrell's Case, Dyer, 155 a.

<sup>3</sup> Durant v. Ritchie, 4 Mason, 65; Hurst v. McNeil, 1 Wash. C. C. 70; Hutchins v. Heywood, 50 N. H. 496; Croxall v. Sherard, 5 Wall. 268;



§ 302. So where lands are conveyed by covenant to stand seised, or by bargain and sale, or by appointment under a power, to A. and his heirs, to the use of B. and his heirs, the *legal* estate will vest in A., and B. will take only an equitable interest; for these conveyances do not operate to transfer the seisin to A.<sup>1</sup> They merely raise a use which the statute executes in him, and stops there. Thus, in a deed of bargain and sale, the operation is as follows: the consideration and the bargain raise a use in the bargainee which the statute executes; and thus, under a deed of bargain and sale, the bargainee obtains both the use and the legal title. But no use can be limited and executed on a use. Hence, if A. conveys land to B., to the use of C. by a deed of bargain and sale, the statute will not execute the use in C., but the legal title will remain in B. subject to a trust for C. to be administered in equity; for the consideration and bargain only raise a use in

Reed v. Gordon, 35 Md. 183; Matthews v. Ward, 10 G. & J. 443; Whetstone v. Bury, 2 P. Wms. 146; Wagstaff v. Wagstaff, 2 P. Wms. 258; Attorney-General v. Scott, Forrest, 138; Doe v. Passingham, 6 B. & Cr. 305; Jones v. Lord Saye & Sele, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 383; Marwood v. Darell, Ca. t. Hard. 91; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 581; Jones v. Bush, 4 Harr. 1; 1 Sand. Uses, 195; 2 Black. Com. 336; Williams v. Waters, 14 M. & W. 166; Ramsay v. Marsh, 2 McCord, 252; Burgess v. Wheate, 1 W. Black. 160; Wilson v. Cheshire, 1 McCord, 233. The statute of uses in some of the States, as Virginia, speaks of uses raised by deed. Consequently, it is said that uses raised by devise are not executed, but remain trusts. Judge Lomax, however, denies this construction. 1 Lomax, Dig. 188, 196. In New York, the uses named in the text would be executed in the *cestui que use* by the statute of uses and trusts, and he would have the entire legal title.

<sup>1</sup> Johnson v. Cary, 16 John. 304; 1 Cruise, Dig. tit. 12, c. 1, § 9; Gilb. on Uses, 67, 347. Mr. Blackstone condemned this rule. 2 Black. Com. 336. And Lord Mansfield said that the rule grew up from the absurd narrowness of courts of common law. Goodright v. Wells, 2 Doug. 771. And Mr. Greenleaf doubts if the rule that a use cannot be limited upon a use would be generally acted upon in the United States, especially in those States which have declared by statute what formalities shall alone be necessary to pass estates. Green. Cruise Dig. tit. 12, c. 1, § 4, n. (vol. i. p. 380); and see Davis v. Hayden, 9 Mass. 514; Flint v. Sheldon, 13 Mass. 443; Marshall v. Fisk, 6 Mass. 24.

B., which the statute executes, but the use in B. for C. is in the nature of a use limited upon a use, which the statute does not execute.<sup>1</sup>

§ 303. Another technical construction of the word "seised" withdrew all uses or trusts created in copyhold or leasehold estates, and all chattel interests and personal property, from the operation of the statute. The judges resolved in the 22d of Elizabeth that the word "seised" was only applicable to freeholds; consequently no one could be said to be "seised" of a leasehold or other chattel interests in real estate, or of personal property. Therefore, if A. gave leaseholds or personal property to B. for the use of C., the statute did not execute the use, but B. took the *legal* title in trust for C., which trust was not recognized at law, but only in equity.<sup>2</sup> So tenants by curtesy or in dower cannot stand seised to a use, for

<sup>1</sup> The question has been raised in Massachusetts whether land can be conveyed by deed of bargain and sale to one for the use of another, and create any thing more than a trust for the last beneficiary. *Stearns v. Palmer*, 10 Met. 32; *Norton v. Leonard*, 12 Pick. 152. The general doctrine stated in the text is fully admitted, but it is claimed in answer that the deeds in general use, although in the general form of deeds of bargain and sale, are in fact, by force of the statutes, equivalent to grants or feoffments, and it is said that if deeds will not operate in the form in which they are drawn, they shall be construed to operate according to the intention of the parties. *Higbee v. Rice*, 5 Mass. 352; *Pray v. Peirce*, 7 Mass. 384; *Knox v. Jenks*, 7 Mass. 494; *Russell v. Coffin*, 8 Pick. 143. The question was left undecided in *Norton v. Leonard* and *Stearns v. Palmer*, *ut supra*, but see the remarks of Chief-Justice Dana, in *Thatcher v. Omans*, 3 Pick. 528. The same question may arise in other States, where their deeds are in form deeds of bargain and sale.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, § 6. *Dyer*, 369 a.; *Doe v. Routledge*, 2 Cowp. 709; *Symson v. Turner*, 1 Eq. Ab. 383; 2 Wooddes. Lect. pp. 295, 297; 1 Cruise, Dig. p. 354, and tit. 12, c. 1; *Gilb. Ten.* 182; *Gilb. Uses*, 67 n.; *Rice v. Burnett*, 1 Spear, Eq. 579; *Joor v. Hodges*, Spear, 593; *Pyron v. Mood*, 2 McMullan, 293. In some States, the statutes use the word *possessed* instead of the word *seised*, in which case both real and personal estate and chattel interests would be transferred to the uses raised. *Tabb v. Baird*, 3 Call, 482. But this construction is controverted by Judge Lomax. 1 Lomax, Dig. 196.

they are in by act of law in consideration of marriage and not in privity of estate; but in equity they would be held to execute any trusts charged upon their interests or estates.<sup>1</sup>

§ 304. From these instances, it will be seen that, in order to create a trust, it is necessary to prevent the legal estate from vesting in the *cestui que trust*, and it is necessary that not only the *legal* title, but the *primary use*, should vest in the trustee. Any form of conveyancing that will effect this, notwithstanding the statute, will create a trust; as if a grant or devise be made to a *trustee and his heirs*, to the *use of the trustee* and his heirs, or unto and to the use of the trustee and his heirs, the title and the primary use will both be vested in the trustee; and although there is a trust or use over to some other person, yet it will not be affected by the statute, it not being the primary use.<sup>2</sup>

§ 305. The third rule of construction is less technical, and relates to special or active trusts, which were never within the purview of the statute.<sup>3</sup> Therefore if any agency, duty, or power be imposed on the trustee, as by a limitation to a trustee

<sup>1</sup> 1 Saunders on Uses, 86; 2 Fonbl. Eq. book 2, c. 6, § 1, and notes, p. 140.

<sup>2</sup> Rackham v. Siddall, 1 McN. & G. 607; Doe v. Passingham, 6 B. & C. 305; Robinson v. Comyns, t. Talb. 154; Doe v. Field, 6 B. & Ad. 564; Attorney-General v. Scott, t. Talb. 138; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 589; Harris v. Pugh, 12 Moore, 577; 4 Bingh. 335; Prise v. Sisson, 2 Beas. 168; Eckels v. Stewart, 33 Penn. St. 460; Freyvogle v. Hughes, 56 Penn. St. 228; Dodson v. Ball, 60 Penn. St. 492; McMullin v. Beatty, 56 Penn. St. 387; Keyser's App. 57 Penn. St. 636; Koenig's App. 57 Penn. St. 352; Bacon's App. 57 Penn. St. 504; Goodrich v. Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 422.

<sup>3</sup> Chapin v. Universalist Soc. 8 Gray, 580; Exeter v. Odiorne, 1 N. H. 232; Mott v. Buxton, 7 Ves. 201; Wright v. Pearson, 1 Edw. 125; Wheeler v. Newhall, 7 Mass. 189; Norton v. Leonard, 12 Pick. 152; Striker v. Mott, 2 Paige, 387; Wood v. Wood, 5 Paige, 596.

and his heirs to pay the rents,<sup>1</sup> or to convey the estate,<sup>2</sup> or if any control is to be exercised, or duty performed by the trustee in *applying* the rents to a person's maintenance,<sup>3</sup> or in making repairs,<sup>4</sup> or to preserve contingent remainders,<sup>5</sup> or to raise a sum of money,<sup>6</sup> or to dispose of the estate by sale,<sup>7</sup> in all these, and in other and like cases, the operation of the statute is excluded, and the trusts or uses remain mere equitable estates. So if the trustee is to exercise any discretion in the management of the estate, in the investment of the proceeds or the principal, or in the application of the income;<sup>8</sup> or if the purpose of the trust is to protect the estate for a given time, or until the death of some one, or until division,<sup>9</sup> or until a request

<sup>1</sup> *Robinson v. Grey*, 9 East, 1; *Jones v. Saye & Sele*, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 383; *Barker v. Greenwood*, 4 M. & W. 429; *Sympson v. Turner*, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 383; *Chapman v. Blissett*, Ca. t. Talb. 145; *Garth v. Baldwin*, 2 Ves. 646; *Sherwin v. Kenny*, 16 Ir. Ch. 138; *Anthony v. Rees*, 2 Cr. & Jer. 75; *Doe v. Hampray*, 6 Ad. & El. 206; *White v. Barker*, 1 Bing. N. C. 573; *Kenrick v. Beauchlerk*, 3 Bos. & P. 178; *Neville v. Saunders*, 1 Vern. 415. See the elaborate case, *Leggett v. Perkins*, 2 Comst. 297; *Brewster v. Striker*, ib. 19; *Morton v. Barrett*, 22 Me. 261; *McCosker v. Brady*, 1 Barb. Ch. 329; *Doe v. Biggs*, 2 Taunt. 109; *Wickham v. Berry*, 53 Penn. St. 70; *Manice v. Manice*, 43 N. Y. 203; *Adams v. Perry*, 43 N. Y. 487; *Hutchins v. Heywood*, 50 N. H. 500; *Barnett's App.* 46 Penn. St. 392; *Shankland's App.* 47 Penn. St. 113; *Ogden's App.* 70 Penn. St. 501.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* *Doe v. Edlin*, 4 Ad. & El. 582; *Doe v. Scott*, 4 Bing. 505; *Mott v. Buxton*, 7 Ves. 201.

<sup>3</sup> *Sylvester v. Wilson*, 2 T. R. 444; *Doe v. Edlin*, 4 Ad. & El. 582; *Vail v. Vail*, 4 Paige, 317; *Porter v. Doby*, 2 Rich. Eq. 52; *Doe v. Ironmonger*, 3 East, 533; *Gerard Ins. Co. v. Chambers*, 46 Penn. St. 485.

<sup>4</sup> *Shapland v. Smith*, 1 Bro. Ch. 75; *Brown v. Ramsden*, 3 Moore, 612; *Tierney v. Moody*, 3 Bing. 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Biscoe v. Perkins*, 1 Ves. & B. 485; *Barker v. Greenwood*, 4 M. & W. 431; *Vanderheyden v. Crandall*, 2 Denio, 9.

<sup>6</sup> *Wright v. Pearson*, 1 Eden, 119; *Stanley v. Lennard*, ib. 87.

<sup>7</sup> *Bagshaw v. Spencer*, 1 Ves. 142; *Wood v. Mather*, 38 Barb. 473.

<sup>8</sup> *Exeter v. Odiorne*, 1 N. H. 232; *Ashhurst v. Given*, 5 W. & S. 323; *Vaux v. Parke*, 7 W. & S. 19; *Nickell v. Handly*, 10 Grat. 336.

<sup>9</sup> *Posey v. Cook*, 1 Hill (S. C.), 413; *Morton v. Barrett*, 22 Me. 261; *Wood v. Mather*, 38 Barb. 473; *McCaw v. Galbraith*, 7 Rich. L. 74;

for a conveyance is made.<sup>1</sup> So if an estate is given upon a trust to sell or mortgage for the payment of debts, legacies, or annuities, or to purchase other lands to be settled to certain uses;<sup>2</sup> and this construction will not be affected by a power given to one of the *cestuis que trust* to control the sale of part of the estate,<sup>3</sup> nor by the fact that the direction for the payment of debts and legacies, out of the proceeds of the sale of the land, is only in aid of the personal property.<sup>4</sup>

§ 306. If, however, the trust simply is to *permit and suffer* A. to occupy the estate, or to receive the rents, the legal estate is executed in A. by the statute.<sup>5</sup> And a trust to hold for the use and benefit of, and to apply the rents to, the children of A., is executed in the children, notwithstanding the word *apply* is used.<sup>6</sup> But where the trust is “to pay unto” or to permit and suffer a person to receive the rents, using both expressions, the construction will be governed by the intention of the donor; and in this view the position of the words in the sentence, and the priority of the words, and the consideration

*Williams v. McConico*, 36 Ala. 22; *Nelson v. Davis*, 35 Ind. 474; *McNish v. Guerard*, 4 Strob. Eq. 66, was to the contrary upon the facts of that particular case.

<sup>1</sup> *Walter v. Walter*, 48 Mo. 140.

<sup>2</sup> *Curtis v. Price*, 12 Ves. 89; *Doe v. Ewart*, 7 Ad. & El. 636, 668; *Ashhurst v. Given*, 5 W. & S. 323; *Vaux v. Parke*, 7 W. & S. 19; *Keene v. Deardon*, 8 East, 248; *Bagshaw v. Spencer*, 1 Ves. 142; *Chamberlain v. Thompson*, 10 Conn. 244; *Sanford v. Irby*, 3 B. & Al. 654; *Creaton v. Creaton*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 386; *Spence v. Spence*, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 199; *Smith v. Smith*, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 121.

<sup>3</sup> *Chapman v. Blissett*, Forr. 145; *Naylor v. Arnitt*, 1 R. & M. 501; *Wykham v. Wykham*, 18 Ves. 395.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* *Murthwaite v. Jenkinson*, 2 B. & Cr. 257.

<sup>5</sup> *Right v. Smith*, 12 East, 455; *Wagstaff v. Smith*, 9 Ves. 524; *Gregory v. Henderson*, 4 Taunt. 773; *Warter v. Hutchinson*, 5 Moore, 143; 1 B. & C. 721; *Barker v. Greenwood*, 4 M. & W. 429; *Boughton v. Langley*, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 383; 2 Salk. 679 (overruling *Burchett v. Durdant*, 2 Vent 311); *Doe v. Biggs*, 2 Taunt. 109; *Ramsey v. Marsh*, 2 McCord, 252; *Parks v. Parks*, 9 Paige, 107.

<sup>6</sup> *Laurens v. Jenney*, 1 Spears, 356.

whether the instrument is a deed or will, will have a material bearing upon the decision.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Jarman and Mr. Lewin suggest that the repugnancy would be obviated in such a case by construing the instrument to give an election or discretion to the trustees.<sup>2</sup>

§ 307. Although the direction may be for the trustees to *permit and suffer* another person to receive the rents, yet if any duty is imposed upon the trustees expressly or by implication, the legal estate will remain in them unaffected by the statute. As if the direction is to *permit* A. to receive the *net*<sup>3</sup> rents, or the *clear*<sup>4</sup> rents, the trustees take the legal estate, the words *net* and *clear* implying that the trustees are to pay all charges, and pay over the balance. So if, in addition to a devise in trust to preserve contingent remainders, there is a direction to *permit* A. to receive the rents and profits;<sup>5</sup> and so if trustees are to pay certain life annuities out of the rents, and subject to those annuities to *permit and suffer* certain persons to receive the rents and profits.<sup>6</sup> So if the trustees are to exercise any control,<sup>7</sup> as if there is a trust to *permit and suffer* a woman to receive the rents, and that her receipts with the approbation of one of the trustees should be good.<sup>8</sup>

§ 308. A mere *charge* of debts and legacies on real estate will not vest the estate in the trustees, unless there is some direction to them to raise the money and pay them, or unless

<sup>1</sup> Doe v. Biggs, 2 Taunt. 109; Pybus v. Smith, 3 Bro. Ch. 340.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Jarm. Pow. Dev. 222 n.; Lewin on Trusts, 174 (5th Lond. ed.).

<sup>3</sup> Barker v. Greenwood, 4 M. & W. 421; Keene v. Deardon, 8 East, 248; Rife v. Geyer, 59 Penn. St. 395.

<sup>4</sup> White v. Parker, 1 Bing. N. C. 573.

<sup>5</sup> Biscoe v. Perkins, 1 Ves. & B. 485, 489; Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. 499; Vanderheyden v. Crandall, 2 Denio, 9.

<sup>6</sup> Naylor v. Arnitt, 1 R. & M. 501.

<sup>7</sup> Exeter v. Odiorne, 1 N. H. 232.

<sup>8</sup> Gregory v. Henderson, 4 Taunt. 772; Barker v. Greenwood, 4 M. & W. 430.

there is some other implication that they are to exercise an *active trust* for the purpose.<sup>1</sup> Nor does the legal estate vest in the trustees where the *charge* of the debts and legacies upon the real estate is contingent upon the insufficiency of any other fund, for in that case the trustees do not take an *immediate* vested interest;<sup>2</sup> but if the *charge* is made in aid of any other fund without contingency, the trustees will take immediately a legal estate.<sup>3</sup> So if the trustees are to demise the estate for a term, at rack-rent or otherwise, the term must come out of their interest, and the legal estate must be in them.<sup>4</sup> If, however, the instrument confers by construction upon the trustees a mere *power* of leasing, a good legal term may be created by the exercise of the power and without the legal estate in them.<sup>5</sup> So if a testator give his trustees a simple power of disposing of his estates, as that his executors or trustees, or other persons, shall sell or let or mortgage, or otherwise dispose of his estate, to pay his debts or legacies or annuities, or other charges, or where he directs his executors to raise money, no estate vests in the trustees, executors, or other persons, but it descends to the heir or the person to whom it is directed to go in the will, until it is wanted for the purposes named, and then it is divested only to the extent necessary for the purposes named. So where an estate was to remain in the hands of executors, for the use of the widow and children, until the youngest child

<sup>1</sup> Doe v. Claridge, 6 Man. & Scott, 657; 1 Jarm. Pow, Dev. 224 n.; Kenrick v. Beauclerk, 3 B. & P. 178; Cadogan v. Ewart, 7 Ad. & El. 636, 668; Jones v. Saye & Sele, 8 Vin. 262; Creaton v. Creaton, 3 Sm. & Gif. 386; Collier v. McBean, 34 Beav. 426.

<sup>2</sup> Goodtitle v. Knott, Coop. 43; Hawker v. Hawker, 3 B. & Al. 537; Gibson v. Montfort, 1 Ves. 485.

<sup>3</sup> Murthwaite v. Jenkinson, 2 B. & Cr. 357; Wykham v. Wykham, 18 Ves. 395; and see Popham v. Bamfield, 1 Vern. 79.

<sup>4</sup> Doe v. Willan, 2 B. & Al. 84; Doe v. Walbank, 2 B. & Al. 554; Osgood v. Franklin, 2 John. Ch. 20; Burr v. Sim, 1 Whart. 266; Riley v. Garnett, 3 De G. & Sm. 629; Brewster v. Striker, 2 Comst. 19; Doe v. Cafe, 7 Exch. 675.

<sup>5</sup> Doe v. Willan, 2 B. & Al. 84; Doe v. Simpson, 5 East, 162.

should become twenty-one years old, the executors or trustees took no interest in the estate but a simple power.<sup>1</sup> Such directions are simple *powers* of disposition, which may be executed without any legal title.<sup>2</sup>

§ 309. Where a testator gave his wife an annuity, and a certain sum to his children to be paid when they arrive at twenty-one years, and appointed three persons by name, "as trustees of inheritance for the execution thereof," it was held that the trustees took the legal estate.<sup>3</sup> And if several trusts are created in the same instrument, some of which would be executed by the statute, and others would require the legal estate to remain in the trustees, they will take the legal estate; and this will be the case, though the trusts are limited to arise successively.<sup>4</sup> In all cases where an estate is given to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, the statute does not execute the estate in the *cestui que trust*; <sup>5</sup> and in every case where the words "to the use of the trustees" are used, the statute does not execute the estate, although it is to the use of the trustees

<sup>1</sup> *Burke v. Valentine*, 52 Barb. 412.

<sup>2</sup> *Reeve v. Att'y-General*, 2 Atk. 223; *Hilton v. Kenworthy*, 3 East, 553; *Bateman v. Bateman*, 1 Atk. 421; *Fowler v. Jones*, 1 Ch. Ca. 262; *Lancaster v. Thornton*, 2 Burr. 1027; *Yates v. Compton*, 2 P. Wms. 308; *Fay v. Fay*, 1 Cush. 94; *Shelton v. Homer*, 5 Met. 462; *Bank of U. S. v. Beverly*, 10 Peters, 532; 1 How. 134; *Deering v. Adams*, 37 Me. 264; *Jackson v. Schaubert*, 7 Cow. 187; 2 Wend. 12; *Burr v. Sim*, 1 Whart. 266; *Guyer v. Maynard*, 6 Gill & J. 420; *Dabney v. Manning*, 3 Ohio, 321; *Jameson v. Smith*, 4 Bibb, 307; *Hope v. Johnson*, 2 Yerg. 123; *Bradshaw v. Ellis*, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 20. In Pennsylvania, such powers conferred upon executors pass the estate by force of a statute. *Miller v. Meetch*, 8 Penn. St. 417; *Chew v. Chew*, 28 Penn. St. 17.

<sup>3</sup> *Trent v. Harding*, 10 Ves. 495; 1 B. & P. N. C. 116; 7 East, 95; *Re Hough*, 4 De G. & Sm. 371; *Re Turner*, 2 De G., F. & J. 527.

<sup>4</sup> *Hawkins v. Luscombe*, 2 Swans. 375, 391; *Horton v. Horton*, 7 T. R. 652; *Blagrove v. Blagrove*, 4 Exch. 570; *Brown v. Whiteway*, 8 Hare, 156; *Stockbridge v. Stockbridge*, 99 Mass. 244. But see *Tucker v. Johnson*, 16 Sim. 341; *Leonard v. Diamond*, 31 Md. 536.

<sup>5</sup> *Laurens v. Jenney*, 1 Spears, 365; *Co. Lit.* 265 a, n. 2, 337 a, n. 2.



in trust for another ; for the statute only executes the first use.<sup>1</sup>

§ 310. If an estate be given to trustees upon a trust for a married woman "for her sole and separate use," and "her receipts alone to be sufficient discharges ;" or if the trust be to "permit and suffer a *feme covert* to receive the rents to her separate use," the legal estate will vest in the trustees, and the statute will not execute it in the *cestui que trust*.<sup>2</sup> In all these cases the court will give this construction to the gift, if possible ;<sup>3</sup> for if the statute should execute the estate in the married woman, certain rights would arise to the husband which might defeat the intention of the donor.<sup>4</sup> These are not the only words necessary to prevent the estate from vesting. Any words that show an intent to create an estate or a trust, for the sole and separate use of a married woman, will have the same effect.<sup>5</sup> But it is said that if an estate is "released by deed" to A. and his heirs "upon a trust" for "the sole and separate use of the releasor," and no *active* duty is imposed upon the trustee in respect to the sole and separate estate, a common-law court will reject the sole and separate use as an

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, § 304 ; Keene v. Deardon, 8 East, 248 ; Whetstone v. St. Bury, 2 P. Wms. 146 ; Pr. Ch. 591 ; Symson v. Turner, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 383 ; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 586 ; Hawkins v. Luscombe, 3 Swans. 376, 388.

<sup>2</sup> Horton v. Horton, 7 T. R. 652 ; Neville v. Saunders, 1 Vern. 415 ; Jones v. Saye & Sele, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 383 ; Doe v. Claridge, 6 C. B. 641 ; Hawkins v. Luscombe, 2 Swans. 391 ; South v. Alleyne, 5 Mod. 63, 101 ; Bush v. Allen, 5 Mod. 63 ; Robinson v. Grey, 9 East, 1 ; Ayer v. Ayer, 16 Pick. 330 ; Williman v. Holmes, 4 Rich. Eq. 475 ; McNish v. Guerard, 4 Strob. Eq. 475 ; Franciscus v. Reigart, 4 Watt. 109 ; Escheator v. Smith, 4 McCord, 452 ; Bass v. Scott, 2 Leigh, 356 ; Rogers v. Ludlow, 3 Sand. Ch. 104 ; Richardson v. Stodder, 100 Mass. 528.

<sup>3</sup> Ware v. Richardson, 3 Md. 505 ; Moore v. Shultz, 13 Penn. St. 98.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* ; Rice v. Burnett, 1 Spear, Eq. 580.

<sup>5</sup> Ayer v. Ayer, 16 Pick. 331 ; Kirk v. Paulin, 7 Vin. Ab. 95 ; Tyrrel v. Hope, 2 Atk. 558 ; Darley v. Darley, 3 Atk. 399 ; Hartley v. Hurle, 5 Ves. 540.

estate unknown to the law, and it has been held in such case that the statute vested the estate in the *cestui que trust*.<sup>1</sup>

§ 310 *a*. But in order that an estate given to the sole and separate use of a woman may vest and remain in the trustees, it is necessary that she should be married or in immediate contemplation of marriage. For if she is unmarried, or the estate is not given in the immediate contemplation of her marriage, it will vest in her at once by the statute of uses; or she will have the right to call for the execution of the trust at once, by a conveyance of the legal estate to her by the trustee, unless there are some other provisions in the will or purposes of the trust which render it an active trust, and the continuance of the legal estate in the trustees necessary for its purposes.<sup>2</sup> It is not necessary that the contemplation of her immediate marriage should appear upon the face of the will or settlement, if in fact an immediate marriage was contemplated, and such fact was probably known to the testator or settlor.<sup>3</sup> In such cases the trust will continue during the coverture of the woman, and at the decease of her husband she will have the right to call for a conveyance of the property as upon a termination of the trust.<sup>4</sup>

§ 311. As stated, chattel interests in land and personal property were never within the statute of uses, and the legal title

<sup>1</sup> *Nash v. Allen*, 1 Hurl. & Colt. 167; *Williams v. Waters*, 14 M. & W. 166 (see remarks on this case in *Ware v. Richardson*, 3 Md. 505); *Roberts v. Moseley*, 51 Mo. 282; *Westcott v. Edmunds*, 68 Penn. St. 34; *Edmund's App.* 68 Penn. St. 24.

<sup>2</sup> *Lancaster v. Dolan*, 1 Rawle, 231; *Smith v. Starr*, 3 Wharton, 63; *Hammersley v. Smith*, 4 Wharton, 129; *McBride v. Smyth*, 54 Penn. St. 250; *Yarnall's App.* 70 Penn. St. 339; *Ogden's App.* 70 Penn. St. 501; 29 Legal Int. (May, 1872) 165; *Wells v. McCall*, 64 Penn. St. 207; *Springer v. Arundel*, 64 Penn. St. 218; 7 Phila. R. 224; *Credlant's Est.* 7 Phila. R. 58.

<sup>3</sup> *Wells v. McCall*, 64 Penn. St. 207; *Springer v. Arundel*, 64 Penn. St. 218.

<sup>4</sup> *Megargle v. Naglee*, 64 Penn. St. 211; *Yarnall's App.* 70 Penn. St. 339; *Freyvogel v. Hughes*, 56 Penn. St. 230.

to them will remain in the trustee, until the purposes of the trust are accomplished, and until the possession of the property is in some way transferred to the person entitled to the use, or the last use.<sup>1</sup> But where the trust is at an end, the title is in the person entitled to the last use ;<sup>2</sup> and a mere delivery, without other formality, gives such person full and absolute control of the property.<sup>3</sup> Until such delivery the law cannot recognize any equitable interests in the property.<sup>4</sup> If the *cestui que trust* is an infant, it is said that the trust will not be executed by delivering the property to him, because he is incapable of assenting to such transfer.<sup>5</sup>

§ 312. In all cases where an estate is given to one for the use of another, in such manner that the statute of uses steps in and executes the estate in the *cestui que trust*, the statute executes in the *cestui que trust* only the estate that the first donee or trustee takes ; that is, the statute executes or transfers the exact estate given to the trustee. Therefore, if A. give an estate to B. and his heirs for the use of C. and his heirs, the statute will execute the fee-simple in C. But if A. gives an estate to B. for the use of C. and his heirs, the statute will execute only an estate for the life of A. in C. ; for that is the extent of the estate conveyed to B. by a deed in that form ; that is, by a deed that has no words of inheritance in B.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, § 303 ; *Harley v. Platts*, 6 Rich. L. 315 ; *Rice v. Burnett*, 1 Spear, Eq. 590 ; *Schley v. Lyon*, 6 Ga. 530 ; *Doe v. Nichols*, 1 B. & Cr. 336 ; *Slevin v. Brown*, 3 Mo. 176.

<sup>2</sup> *Westcott v. Edmunds*, 68 Penn. St. 34 ; *Bacon's App.* 57 Penn. St. 500 ; *Dodson v. Ball*, 60 Penn. St. 492 ; *Barnett's App.* 10 Wright, 392 ; *Rife v. Geyes*, 59 Penn. St. 395 ; *Freyvogel v. Hughes*, 56 Penn. St. 228.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* ; *Bringham v. Cuthbert*, 6 Binn. 398 ; *Lawrie v. Bankes*, 4 K. & J. 142.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* ; *Iorr v. Hodges*, 1 Spear, Eq. 593.

<sup>5</sup> *Harley v. Platts*, 6 Rich. L. 315. But see *Lawrie v. Bankes*, 4 K. & J. 142 ; *White v. Baylor*, 10 Ir. Eq. 53, *Bulstrode*, 184.

<sup>6</sup> *Newhall v. Wheeler*, 7 Mass. 189 ; *Cro. Car.* 231 ; *Nelson v. Davis*, 35 Ind. 474 ; *Baptist Soc. v. Hazen*, 100 Mass. 322 ; *Idle v. Cooke*, 1 P. Wms. 77 ; *Doe v. Smeddle*, 2 B. & Al. 126 ; *Chambers v. Taylor*, 2 M.

While this is the rule in respect to estates which the statute executes, a very different rule applies to estates upon a trust or use not executed by the statute. In these cases, the extent or quantity of the estate taken by the trustee is determined, not by the circumstance that words of inheritance in the trustee are or are not used in the deed or will, but by the intent of the parties. And the intent of the parties is determined by the scope and extent of the trust. Therefore, the extent of the legal interest of a trustee in an estate given to him in trust is measured, not by words of inheritance or otherwise, but by the object and extent of the trust upon which the estate is given.<sup>1</sup> On this principle, two rules of construction have been adopted by courts: first, "Wherever a trust is created, a legal estate, sufficient for the purposes of the trust, shall, if possible, be implied in the trustee, whatever may be the limitation in the instrument, whether to him and his heirs or not."<sup>2</sup> And second, "although a legal estate may be limited

& Cr. 376; *Vanhorn v. Harrison*, 1 Dall. 137; *Jackson v. Fish*, 10 John. 456. Where a gift is made by deed to individuals and their "successors," without the word "heirs," in trust for or to the use of a corporation or religious society, an inheritance or succession is not created; and if the statute of uses applies to the conveyance, only a life-estate is executed in the corporation or religious society. *Henderson v. Hunter*, 59 Penn. St. 325; *First Bap. Soc. in Andover v. Hazen*, 100 Mass. 322.

<sup>1</sup> *Cleveland v. Hallett*, 6 Cush. 407; *Gibson v. Montfort*, 1 Ves. 485; *Newhall v. Wheeler*, 7 Mass. 189, 198; *Oates v. Cooke*, 3 Burr. 1684; *Stearns v. Palmer*, 10 Met. 32; *Sears v. Russell*, 8 Gray, 86; *Gould v. Lamb*, 11 Met. 84; *Brooks v. Jones*, 11 Met. 191; *Fisher v. Fields*, 10 John. 495; *Doe v. Field*, 2 B. & Ad. 564; *Trent v. Hanning*, 7 East, 99; *Doe v. Willan*, 2 B. & Al. 84; 8 Vin. Ab. 262, pl. 18; *Shaw v. Wright*, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 176, pl. 8; *Brewster v. Striker*, 1 E. D. Smith, 321; *Richardson v. Stodder*, 100 Mass. 528.

<sup>2</sup> *Neilson v. Lagow*, 12 How. 98; *Sears v. Russell*, 8 Gray, 86; *Chamberlin v. Thompson*, 10 Conn. 244; *Cleveland v. Hallett*, 6 Cush. 407; *Payne v. Sale*, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 460; *Nichol v. Walworth*, 4 Denio, 385; *Upham v. Varney*, 15 N. H. 462; *King v. Parker*, 9 Cush. 71; *Williams v. First Soc. in Cin.* 1 Ohio St. 478; *Hawley v. James*, 5 Paige, 318; *Deering v. Adams*, 37 Me. 265; *Webster v. Cooper*, 14 How. 499; *Combry v. McMichael*, 19 Ala. 751; *Gill v. Logan*, 11 B. Mon. 233; *Powell v.*

to a trustee to the fullest extent, as to him and his heirs, yet it shall not be carried farther than the complete execution of the trust necessarily requires.”<sup>1</sup>

§ 313. Thus courts have by construction implied an estate in the trustees, although no estate was given them in words ; but, in all such cases, the trustees were required to do something that required a legal estate of some kind in them ; as, where a testator gave to a married woman the rents and profits of certain lands to be paid her by his executors, it was held to be a devise of the land itself to the executors, although nothing was given them in terms, to enable them to carry out the purposes of the trust.<sup>2</sup> So a power given to executors to rent, lease, repair, and insure, implies a legal title in them.<sup>3</sup>

§ 314. In the same manner, and for the same reasons, courts have enlarged or extended estates given to trustees.

Glen, 21 Ala. 468 ; *King v. Akerman*, 2 Black, 408 ; *Ward v. Amory*, 1 Curtis, C. C. 427 ; *White v. Baylor*, 10 Ir. Eq. 54 ; *Meeting St. Bap. Soc. v. Hail*, 8 R. I. 240 ; *Nelson v. Davis*, 35 Ind. 474.

<sup>1</sup> *Norton v. Norton*, 2 Sand. 296 ; *Williman v. Holmes*, 4 Rich. Eq. 475 ; *Watson v. Pearson*, 2 Exch. 593 ; *Blagrave v. Blagrave*, 4 Exch. 569 ; *Brown v. Whiteway*, 8 Hare, 156 ; *Saye & Sele v. Jones*, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 383 ; 3 Bro. P. C. 113 ; *Shapland v. Smith*, 1 Bro. Ch. 75 ; *Heardson v. Williamson*, 1 Keen, 33 ; *Player v. Nicholls*, 1 B. & Cr. 142 ; *Warter v. Hutchinson*, 5 Moore, 153 ; 1 B. & Cr. 721 ; *Chapman v. Blissett*, Forr. 145 ; *Doe v. Hicks*, 7 T. R. 433 ; *Nash v. Coates*, 3 B. & Ald. 839 ; *Ex parte Gadsden*, 3 Rich. 468 ; *Adams v. Adams*, 6 Q. B. 866 ; *Barker v. Greenwood*, 4 M. & W. 429 ; *Doe v. Claridge*, 6 C. B. 641 ; *Ware v. Richardson*, 3 Md. 505 ; *Pearce v. McClenaghan*, 5 Rich. 178 ; *Ellis v. Fisher*, 3 Sneed, 231 ; *Gardenhire v. Hinds*, 1 Head, 402 ; *Smith v. Metcalf*, 1 Head, 64 ; *Slevin v. Brown*, 32 Mo. 176 ; *Greenwood v. Coleman*, 34 Ala. 150 ; *Bryan v. Weems*, 29 Ala. 423 ; *Koenig's App.* 57 Penn. St. 552 ; *Ivory v. Burns*, 56 Penn. St. 300 ; *Wilcox v. Wilcox*, 47 N. H. 488 ; *McBride v. Smyth*, 59 Penn. St. 245. But see *Watkins v. Specht*, 7 Cold. 585.

<sup>2</sup> *Oates v. Cooke*, 3 Burr. 1684 ; *W. Black*, 543 ; *Bush v. Allen*, 5 Mod. 63 ; *Doe v. Woodhouse*, 4 T. R. 89 ; *Doe v. Homfray*, 6 Ad. & El. 206 ; *Doe v. Sampson*, 5 East, 162 ; *Feedey's App.* 60 Penn. St. 349.

<sup>3</sup> *Kellam v. Allen*, 52 Barb. 605.

Thus if A. gives an estate to B. without words of limitation, it is an estate for the life of A. ; but if A. gives an estate to B. to pay certain annuities to persons named, for their lives, the trustee takes an estate for the lives of the several annuitants.<sup>1</sup>

§ 315. So, if land is devised to trustees without the word *heirs*, and a trust is declared which cannot be fully executed but by the trustees taking an inheritance, the court will enlarge or extend their estate into a fee-simple, to enable them to carry out the intention of the donor.<sup>2</sup> Thus, if land is conveyed to trustees, without the word *heirs*, in trust to *sell*, they must have the fee, otherwise they could not sell.<sup>3</sup> The construction would be the same if the trust was to sell the whole or a part ; for no purchasers would be safe unless they could have the fee ;<sup>4</sup> and a trust to convey or to lease at discretion would be subject to the same rule.<sup>5</sup> *A fortiori*, if an estate is limited to trustees and their heirs in trust to sell or mortgage or to lease at their discretion, or if they are to convey the property in fee, or divide it equally among certain persons ; for to do any or all these acts requires a legal fee.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Jenkins v. Jenkins*, Willes, 656; *Shaw v. Weigh*, 2 Str. 798; *Oates v. Cook*, 3 Burr, 1684, and other cases cited, § 313, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Villiers v. Villiers*, 2 Atk. 72; *Cleveland v. Hallett*, 6 Cush. 407; *Fisher v. Fields*, 10 John. 505; *Ellis v. Fisher*, 3 Sneed, 231; *Rackham v. Siddall*, 1 Mac. & G. 607; 2 Hall & T. 44; *Deering v. Adams*, 37 Me. 265; *Brown v. Brown*, 12 Md. 87; *Webster v. Cooper*, 14 How. 499; *Blaggrave v. Blaggrave*, 4 Exch. 569; *Hawkins v. Chapman*, 36 Md. 94; *Farquharson v. Eichelberger*, 15 Md. 72.

<sup>3</sup> *Gibson v. Montford*, 1 Ves. 491; *Amb. 95*; *Shaw v. Weigh*, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 184; *Bagshaw v. Spencer*, 1 Ves. 144; *Glover v. Monckton*, 3 Bing. 113; 10 Moore, 453; *Hawker v. Hawker*, 3 B. & Al. 537; *Warter v. Hutchinson*, 5 Moore, 143; 1 B. & C. 121; *Watson v. Pearson*, 2 Exch. 594; *Chamberlin v. Thompson*, 10 Conn. 244; *Doe v. Howland*, 7 Cow. 277; *Jackson v. Robins*, 16 John. 537; *Spessard v. Rohrer*, 9 Gill, 262.

<sup>4</sup> *Bagshaw v. Spencer*, 1 Ves. 144.

<sup>5</sup> *Booth v. Field*, 2 B. & Ad. 556; *Keen v. Walbank*, 2 B. & Ad. 554; *Brewster v. Striker*, 2 Comst. 19; *Deering v. Adams*, 37 Me. 265. But see *Doe v. Cafe*, 7 Exch. 675.

<sup>6</sup> *Bagshaw v. Spencer*, 1 Ves. 142; *Keane v. Deardon*, 8 East, 242; *Cad-*

§ 316. Where an estate is given to trustees in fee upon trusts that do not exhaust the whole estate, and a power is super-added which can only be exercised by the trustees conveying in fee-simple, the trustees will take the fee, and the estate conveyed by them will be sustained by the fee in them, and not by the mere power.<sup>1</sup> Where it is possible that the trustees may be under the necessity of exercising a power over the fee, as by mortgage, a gift to them of the fee will not be cut down;<sup>2</sup> and the rule is that all the trusts which trustees must execute are to be executed out of the estate given them.<sup>3</sup> Lord Talbot said that it was wholly a matter of intention whether the trustees should take a fee or not;<sup>4</sup> hence, in other cases, it has been said that, if no intention appeared upon the face of the will that the trustees were to take any thing beyond what was necessary for the execution of the trust, the estate, though limited to them and their heirs, would be cut down to the limit of the trust.<sup>5</sup> So trustees may take only a *chattel* interest in real estate, although limited to them and their heirs, as where they are to hold it in trust only for a short time to pay debts and legacies, and convey it to the *cestui que trust* when he comes

ogan v. Ewart, 7 Ad. & El. 636; Tompkins v. Willan, 2 B. & Ald. 84; Keen v. Walbank, 2 B. & Ald. 354; Garth v. Baldwin, 2 Ves. 646; Booth v. Field, 2 B. & Ad. 564; Rees v. Williams, 2 M. & W. 749; Shelly v. Eldin, 4 Ad. & El. 582; Creaton v. Creaton, 2 Sm. & Gif. 386; Collier v. Walters, L. R. 17 Eq. 265.

<sup>1</sup> Fenwick v. Potts, 8 De G., M. & G. 506; Poad v. Watson, 37 Eng. L. & Eq. 112; Watkins v. Frederick, 11 H. L. Cas. 354; Haddelsey v. Adams, 22 Beav. 266. A power of appointment superadded to a life-estate will not enlarge it into a fee; and so a power of appointment added to an estate of inheritance will not cut down the fee. Yarnell's App. 70 Penn. St. 342; Burleigh v. Clough, 52 N. H. 267.

<sup>2</sup> Fenwick v. Potts, 8 De G., M. & G. 506; Horton v. Horton, 7 T. R. 652; Brown v. Whiteway, 8 Hare, 156.

<sup>3</sup> Watson v. Pearson, 2 Exch. 593.

<sup>4</sup> Chapman v. Blissett, Forr. 145; t. Talb. 145; Hawkins v. Luscombe, 2 Swans. 375; Curtis v. Price, 12 Ves. 89; Collier v. McBean, L. R. 1 Ch. 80.

<sup>5</sup> Doe v. Hicks, 7 T. R. 433; Nash v. Coates, 3 B. & Ald. 839; Boteler v. Allington, 1 Bro. Ch. 72, is criticised in 7 T. R. 433, by Lord Kenyon; Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. 499; Beaumont v. Salisbury, 19 Beav. 198.

of age or at a certain time ;<sup>1</sup> and this construction will be much stronger if the fee is not limited to them.<sup>2</sup> The same construction as to the estate of trustees will prevail where the limitation is to them and their heirs, to their use and behoof for ever, whether it is contained in a deed or will.<sup>3</sup> Where a gift was made to one in trust for his wife for life, and to her heirs for ever, subject to her husband's curtesy, the trustee took an estate for the life of his wife only, and at her death the trust ceased.<sup>4</sup>

§ 317. Where a testator gave all his real and personal estate to trustees, "their executors, administrators, and assigns," in trust to pay several annuities, sums, and legacies, on the deficiency of the personal estates out of the rents, issues, and profits arising from the real estate, and gave the residue over, Lord Hardwicke held that if the annual reception of the rents and profits would satisfy the purposes of the trust, the trustees would take only a chattel interest in the real estate ; but, as the land must be sold for the payment of the legacies, the trustees took the fee.<sup>5</sup> The court, however, is always reluctant to enlarge an estate in trustees beyond the terms of the gift ; and it will not be done unless it is necessary for the execution of the trust.<sup>6</sup> Where it is plain that the trustees are to pay all

<sup>1</sup> *Goodtitle v. Whitby*, 1 Burr. 228 ; *Warter v. Hutchinson*, 1 B. & Cr. 721 ; *Stanley v. Stanley*, 16 Ves. 491 ; *Badder v. Harris*, 2 Dowl. & Ry. 76 ; *Wheeldon v. Lea*, 3 T. R. 41 ; *Pratt v. Timins*, 1 B. & Ald. 530 ; *Brune v. Martin*, 8 B. & Cr. 497 ; *Tucker v. Johnson*, 16 Sim. 341 ; *Glover v. Monkton*, 3 Bing. 13 ; *Doe v. Davies*, 1 Q. B. 430 ; *Player v. Nicholls*, 1 B. & Cr. 336 ; *Cadogan v. Ewart*, 7 Ad. & E. 136, 667.

<sup>2</sup> *Pearce v. Savage*, 45 Me. 90 ; *Boraston's Case*, 3 Co. 19 ; *Player v. Nicholls*, 1 B. & Cr. 336.

<sup>3</sup> *Hawkins v. Luscombe*, 2 Swans. 375 ; *Curtis v. Price*, 12 Ves. 89 ; *Venables v. Morris*, 7 T. R. 342 ; *Watkins v. Specht*, 7 Cold. 585. But see *Cooper v. Kynock*, L. R. 8 Ch. 402.

<sup>4</sup> *Noble v. Andrews*, 37 Conn. 346.

<sup>5</sup> *Gibson v. Montfort*, 1 Ves. 485 ; *Amb. 93* ; *Woodgate v. Flint*, 44 N. Y. 21 n.

<sup>6</sup> *Heardson v. Williamson*, 1 Keen, 33 ; *White v. Simpson*, 5 East, 162 ;



charges, debts, legacies, annuities, or other moneys out of the rents and profits of the estate, and no anticipation of the income is necessary or contemplated for that purpose, they will take a chattel interest, or a term for years necessary for the purpose, and not the legal inheritance;<sup>1</sup> and if the testator use an inartificial word, as that the trustees are to lend the estate, they will not take a fee.<sup>2</sup> A trust to preserve contingent remainders, without limitation to heirs, will not be enlarged; for the trust does not require an estate of inheritance.<sup>3</sup>

§ 318. If, however, the subject-matter of the gift to trustees is personal estate, the whole legal interest will vest in them without words of limitation. They may generally dispose of personal estate absolutely, being compelled to account for it.<sup>4</sup>

§ 319. In England, a distinction is kept up between limitations to trustees in wills and deeds. Thus it is said that in wills there is more room for construction to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of testators, and that in deeds

*Wykham v. Wykham*, 3 Taunt. 316; 11 East, 458; 18 Ves. 395, 416; *Ackland v. Lutley*, 9 Ad. & El. 879; *Doe v. Claridge*, 6 C. B. 641.

<sup>1</sup> *Cordall's Case*, Cro. Eliz. 315; *Carter v. Bernadiston*, 1 P. Wms. 589; *Hitchens v. Hitchens*, 2 Vern. 404; *Wykham v. Wykham*, 18 Ves. 416; *Heardson v. Williamson*, 1 Keen, 33 Co. Lit. 42 a.

<sup>2</sup> *Payne v. Sale*, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 455.

<sup>3</sup> *Thong v. Bedford*, 1 Bro. Ch. 14; *Webster v. Cooper*, 14 How. 499; *Beaumont v. Salisbury*, 19 Beav. 198; Co. Lit. 290 b.; Butl. n. viii.

<sup>4</sup> *Dinsmore v. Biggert*, 9 Barr, 135; *Nicoll v. Walworth*, 4 Denio, 385; *Chamberlain v. Thompson*, 10 Conn. 244; *Combry v. McMichael*, 19 Ala. 751; *Elton v. Shepherd*, 1 Bro. Ch. 531; 2 Jarm. Pow. Dev. 631; *Doe v. Willan*, 2 B. & Ald. 84; *Smith v. Thompson*, 2 Swan, 386; *Foster v. Coe*, 4 Lansing, 59; *Fellows v. Heermans*, 4 Lansing, 230; and *Aiken v. Smith*, 1 Sneed, 304, held that when personalty was limited to trustees, their heirs and executors, in trust for a married woman for life, and after her death to be equally divided among her children, or to be conveyed to her children, the trustee took an estate for her life only, and that at her death the trust ceased. These cases, however, are not consistent with principle or authority, and probably would not be followed.

the rules of property are carried into effect with more strictness. So it is said, that if in a deed an estate is given to a trustee *and his heirs*, there is no power to abridge the estate on the ground that the purposes of the trust do not require a fee, in the trustees; and that, on the other hand, when an estate is given by deed to a trustee in trust without words of inheritance, there is no authority to enlarge the estate in the trustee because the purposes of the trust seem to require a larger estate. There is a very respectable amount of authority, even in England, that an estate given to trustees and their heirs in trust, by a deed, may be restricted to an estate for the life of another, where the purposes of the trust can all be answered by such an estate in the trustee.<sup>1</sup> In the cases sustaining the power to abridge the legal operation of the words of inheritance in a deed, there were some further limitations of the estate, either to the trustees or to third persons, inconsistent with the idea of a fee in the trustees.<sup>2</sup> The authorities, however, greatly preponderate, that courts cannot look to the equitable interests given or created by a *deed*, in order to determine whether the trustee under it takes a fee or not, if there are plain words of inheritance in it. Lord Eldon said, that it appeared to him very difficult to apply the doctrine to a *deed*, and he refused thus to cut down an estate.<sup>3</sup> While there is this conflict of authority upon the point, whether an estate given in fee by deed to trustees can be abridged to the extent of the trust, there is said to be no authority in England that an estate given by a deed to trustees without words of inheri-

<sup>1</sup> *Curtis v. Price*, 12 Ves. 89; *Venables v. Morris*, 7 T. R. 342, 438; *Doe v. Hicks*, 7 T. R. 437; *Brune v. Martyn*, 8 B. & Cr. 497; *Beaumont v. Salisbury*, 19 Beav. (198, where the authorities were commented on); *Lewis v. Rees*, 3 K. & J. 132; *Cooper v. Kynock*, L. R. 8 Ch. 403.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Wykham v. Wykham*, 18 Ves. 395; *Colomore v. Tyndall*, 2 Y. & J. 605; Co. Lit. 20 b.; Butl. n. viii.; *Dinsmore v. Biggert*, 9 Barr, 123; *Lewis v. Rees*, 3 K. & J. 132, where the authorities are reviewed by Wood V. C.

tance can be enlarged to suit the purposes of the trust ;<sup>1</sup> although there is one expression by Lord Hardwicke that such enlargement is within the power of the court when the circumstances require it.<sup>2</sup>

§ 320. In the United States, the distinction between deeds and wills, in respect to the trustees' estate, has not been kept up; and the general rule is, that, whether words of inheritance in the trustee are or are not in the *deed*, the trustee will take an estate adequate to the execution of the trust, and no more nor less.<sup>3</sup> Courts will abridge the estate where words of inheritance are used, if the execution of the trust does not require a fee; and so they will enlarge the estate if no words of inheritance are used in a deed.<sup>4</sup> In examining the cases, however, where a trust ceases upon the death of a tenant for life, or upon the death of a person for whom the property was held in trust, care must be taken that this principle is not confounded with another. Thus, where an estate is given to trustees and their heirs in trust to pay the income to A. during her life, and at her decease to hold the same for the use of her children or her heirs, or for the use of other persons named, the trust ceases upon the death of A. for the reason that it remains no longer an *active* trust; the statute of uses immediately executes the use in those who are limited to take it after the death of A., and the trustees cease to have any thing in the estate, not because the court has abridged their estate to the

<sup>1</sup> Pottow v. Fricker, 6 Exch. 570; Hill on Trustees, 251.

<sup>2</sup> Villiers v. Villiers, 2 Atk. 72.

<sup>3</sup> King v. Parker, 9 Cush. 71; Stearns v. Parker, 10 Met. 32; Gould v. Lamb, 11 Met. 84; Cleveland v. Hallett, 6 Cush. 403; Att'y-Gen. v. Federal Street Meeting House, 3 Gray, 1; Wright v. Delafield, 23 Barb. 498; Fisher v. Fields, 10 John. 105; Welch v. Allen, 21 Wend. 147; Rutledge v. Smith, 1 Busb. Eq. 283; Liptrot v. Holmes, 1 Kelley, 390; Cooper v. Kynock, L. R. 8 Ch. 402.

<sup>4</sup> Neilson v. Lagow, 12 How. 110; North v. Philbrook, 34 Me. 537; Rutledge v. Smith, 1 Busb. Eq. 283; Cleveland v. Hallett, 6 Cush. 406. See to the contrary, Miles v. Fisher, 10 Ohio, 1.

extent of the trust, but because, having the fee or legal estate, the statute of uses has executed it in the *cestui que trust*.<sup>1</sup> But where the operation of the statute of uses does not put an end to the trust, and where it is necessary to enlarge an estate although there are no words of inheritance, courts have been obliged to resort to different expedients to avoid the technical rules of law upon the subject of inheritances.<sup>2</sup> In those States where no technical or other words are necessary to convey a fee no difficulties arise.

<sup>1</sup> *Parker v. Converse*, 5 Gray, 336; *Greenwood v. Coleman*, 34 Ala. 150; *Churchill v. Corker*, 25 Ga. 479.

<sup>2</sup> *Williams v. First Presby. Soc.* 1 Ohio St. 498; *Rutledge v. Smith*, 1 Busb. Eq. 283; Co. Litt. 385, 386; 1 Prest. Touchstone, 182; Rawle on Covenants, 344; *Shaw v. Galbraith*, 7 Penn. St. 112.

## CHAPTER XI.

### PROPERTIES AND INCIDENTS OF THE LEGAL ESTATE IN THE HANDS OF TRUSTEES.

- § 321. Common-law properties attach to estates in trustees.
- § 322. Dower and curtesy in trust estates.
- §§ 323, 324. Dower and curtesy in equitable estates of *cestui que trust*.
- § 325. Forfeiture and escheat of trust estates.
- § 326. Trustees must perform duties of legal owners.
- § 327. Forfeiture and escheat of the equitable estates of *cestui que trust*.
- § 328. Suits concerning legal title must be in name of trustee.
- § 329. Who has possession and control of trust estates.
- §§ 330, 331. Who has possession of personal estate. Rights and privileges of trustees.
- § 332. Who proves debt against bankrupt.
- § 333. Who has the right of voting.
- § 334. Trustee may sell the legal estate.
- § 335. May devise the legal estate.
- § 336. By what words in a devise the trust estate passes.
- § 337. Where a trust estate passes by a devise, and where not.
- § 338. The interest of a mortgagee in fee.
- § 339. Propriety of devising a trust estate.
- § 340. Whether a devisee can execute the trust.
- § 341. Rule in New York, &c.
- § 342. Where a testator has contracted to sell an estate.
- §§ 343, 344. Rights of the last surviving trustee, and his heirs or executors.
- § 345. Trust property does not pass to bankrupt trustee's assignee.
- § 346. A disseisor of a trust estate is not bound by the trust.
- §§ 347, 348. Merger of the equitable and legal titles.
- §§ 349, 350. Presumption of a conveyance or surrender by trustee to *cestui que trust*.
- §§ 351-353. Where the presumption will be made, and where not.
- § 354. Must be some evidence on which to found the presumption.
- § 355. Is made in favor of an equitable title, not against it.

§ 321. As a general rule, the legal estate in the hands of a trustee has at common law precisely the same properties, characteristics, and incidents, as if the trustee were the absolute beneficial owner. The legal title vests in him, together with all the appurtenances and all the covenants that run with the land.<sup>1</sup> The trustee may sell and devise it, or mortgage it, or

<sup>1</sup> Devin v. Henderchott, 32 Io. 192.

it may be taken on execution. It may be forfeited, and it will escheat on failure of heirs, and so it will descend to heirs on the death of the trustee. All these properties and incidents attach to the legal estate at common law, whether in the hands of a trustee or of an absolute owner; but these incidents do not generally interfere with the proper execution of the trust, for all conveyances and all incumbrances made or imposed upon the estate by the trustee, for other purposes than those of the trust, or in breach of the trust, are utterly disregarded by a court of equity, whatever may be the effect of such conveyances or incumbrances in a court of common law.<sup>1</sup> And as the trustee may in a court of law, as a general rule, deal with the legal estate in his hands, as if he was the absolute owner, so the *cestui que trust* in a court of equity may deal with the equitable estate in him: he is the beneficial and substantial owner, and in the absence of any disability, — that is, if he is *sui juris*, — he may sell and dispose of it; and any legal conveyance of it will have in equity the same operation upon the equitable estate as a similar conveyance of the legal estate would have at law upon the legal estate.<sup>2</sup>

§ 322. The legal estate in the hands of a trustee was subject at common law to dower and curtesy;<sup>3</sup> but, as those who take in dower or curtesy take by operation of law, they are subject to the same equities as the original trustee; therefore, if the widow of a trustee should take dower in a trust estate, she would take her dower subject to the same trusts that the estate was under in the hands of her husband. It would thus be of no benefit to her; and it is now understood, from the

<sup>1</sup> *Leake v. Leake*, 5 Ir. Eq. 366.

<sup>2</sup> *Matthews v. Wardel*, 10 G. & J. 443; *Burgess v. Wheate*, Eden, 226; *Croxall v. Sherard*, 5 Wall. 268; *Reid v. Gordon*, 35 Md. 184; *Boteler v. Attington*, 1 Br. Ch. 72; *Campbell v. Prestons*, 22 Gratt. 396.

<sup>3</sup> *Bennett v. Davis*, 2 P. Wms. 319; *Noel v. Jevon*, Freem. 43; *Nash v. Preston*, Cro. Car. 190; *Casborne v. English*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 728; *Hinton v. Hinton*, 2 Ves. 631; 1 Sugd. V. & P. 358.

equitable rule, that a widow has no dower in the lands held by her husband as trustee, and the same observations apply to the right of curtesy in trust estates.<sup>1</sup> If, however, the equitable estate meets the legal estate in the same holder, the equitable merges in the legal estate, and dower and curtesy will attach;<sup>2</sup> and so they will attach so far as there is a beneficial interest in the trustee.<sup>3</sup>

§ 323. While speaking upon this subject, it may be said that, until lately, in England the widow of a *cestui que trust* had no dower in his equitable estate, or his equitable fee in lands.<sup>4</sup> A widow was not dowable of a use, and lands were frequently conveyed to uses to defeat the right of dower.<sup>5</sup> Thus, if a man before marriage conveyed his lands to trustees upon trust for himself and his heirs in fee, or if after marriage he purchased lands, and took the conveyance to a trustee upon a trust for himself and his heirs, his wife had no right of dower.<sup>6</sup> But if lands were settled on trustees upon a trust for a woman and her heirs in fee, her husband was entitled to his curtesy.<sup>7</sup> This anomaly grew up from an attempt to give

<sup>1</sup> *Derush v. Brown*, 8 Ham. 412; *Green v. Green*, 1 Ham. 249; *Cooper v. Whitney*, 3 Hill, 97; *Powell v. Monson, &c.* 3 Mason, 364; *Bartlett v. Gouge*, 5 B. Mon. 152; *Cowman v. Hall*, 3 Gill & J. 398; *Robison v. Codman*, 1 Sumn. 129; *Dean v. Mitchell*, 4 J. J. Marsh. 451; *Ray v. Pung*, 5 B. & Ald. 561; *Gomez v. Tradesmen's Bank*, 4 Sandf. 102.

<sup>2</sup> *Hopkinson v. Dumas*, 42 N. H. 303.

<sup>3</sup> 4 Kent, 43, 46; *Prescott v. Walker*, 16 N. H. 343.

<sup>4</sup> *Dixon v. Saville*, 1 Bro. Ch. 326; *Maybury v. Brien*, 15 Pet. 38; *D'Arcy v. Blake*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 387; 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 384; 4 Kent, 43; 1 Rep. Hus. & Wife, 354; *Banks v. Sutton*, 2 P. Wms. 716, was overruled; *Park. on Dow*. 138. In Pennsylvania, however, a wife can have dower in both legal and equitable estates. *Dubs v. Dubs*, 31 Penn. St. 154.

<sup>5</sup> Wms. Real Prop. 134-136; *Perkins*, § 349.

<sup>6</sup> Co. Lit. 208 a (n. 105).

<sup>7</sup> *D'Arcy v. Blake*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 387; *Chaplin v. Chaplin*, 3 P. Wms. 234; *Attorney-General v. Scott*, t. Talb. 139; *Watt v. Ball*, 1 P. Wms. 108; *Sweetapple v. Bindon*, 2 Vern. 536; *Cunningham v. Moody*, 1 Ves. 174; *Dodson v. Hay*, 3 Bro. Ch. 405.

to equitable estates the same incidents that belong to legal estates; but when it was proposed to assign dower to a widow out of her husband's equitable estate, it was found that it would disarrange so many titles and estates that the attempt was abandoned. The same inconvenience did not arise in allowing curtesy to a husband, for the reason that a wife could not convey her equitable interests without her husband joining in the act, and thus, to allow him curtesy would not affect titles to any considerable extent.<sup>1</sup> But by a late statute a wife is now dowable in equity of all the lands in which her husband dies possessed of a beneficiary interest.<sup>2</sup>

· § 324. The general rule in the United States is, that a wife is dowable in equity in all lands to which the husband had a complete equitable title at the time of his death.<sup>3</sup> This rule, it is presumed, would apply in all the States where the common-law principles of dower prevail, except in Maine and Massachusetts, where a wife is not entitled to dower in her husband's equitable estates.<sup>4</sup> The husband also in most States has curtesy in the equitable estates of his wife.<sup>5</sup> But the wife must be

<sup>1</sup> *Chaplin v. Chaplin*, 3 P. Wms. 234; *Attorney-General v. Scott*, t. Talb. 139; *Burgess v. Wheat*, 1 Ed. 196; *Dixon v. Saville*, 1 Bro. Ch. 327; *Banks v. Sutton*, 2 P. Wms. 713; *Casburne v. Casburne*, 2 J. & W. 204; *Watt v. Ball*, 1 P. Wms. 109; *D'Arcy v. Blake*, 2 Sch. & L. 388.

<sup>2</sup> 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 105; 1 Spence Eq. Jur. 505.

<sup>3</sup> *Shoemaker v. Walker*, 2 S. & R. 554; *Dubs v. Dubs*, 31 Penn. St. 154; *Reid v. Morrison*, 12 S. & R. 18; *Miller v. Beverly*, 1 Hen. & Munf. 368; *Clairborne v. Henderson*, 3 Hen. & Munf. 322; *Lawson v. Morton*, 6 Dana, 471; *Bowie v. Berry*, 1 Md. Ch. 452; *Miller v. Stump*, 3 Gill, 304; *Hawley v. James*, 5 Paige, 318; *Thompson v. Thompson*, 1 Jones (N. C.), 430; *Gully v. Ray*, 18 Ky. 113; *Barnes v. Gay*, 7 Io. 26; *Lewis v. James*, 8 Humph. 537; *Rowton v. Rowton*, 1 Hen. & Munf. 92; *Gillespie v. Somerville*, 3 St. & P. 447; *Robinson v. Miller*, 1 B. Mon. 93; *Smiley v. Wright*, 2 Ohio, 512; *Davenport v. Farrar*, 1 Scam. 314; *Bowers v. Keesecker*, 14 Io. 301; *Peay v. Peay*, 2 Rich. Eq. 409.

<sup>4</sup> *Hamlin v. Hamlin*, 19 Me. 141; *Reed v. Whitney*, 7 Gray, 533; *Lobdell v. Hayes*, 4 Allen, 187.

<sup>5</sup> *Tillinghast v. Coggeshall*, 7 R. I. 383; *Nightingale v. Hidden*, 7 R. I.



actually in possession of her equitable interest: a mere right not in possession is not enough to entitle the husband to curtesy.<sup>1</sup> But the husband's curtesy will not be defeated by the negligence of the trustee, as where money is directed to be laid in land in such manner that the husband would have been entitled to his curtesy, and the trustee neglected to invest the money during the life of the wife, the husband was held to be entitled to his curtesy.<sup>2</sup> Nor will a trust for the separate use of the wife exclude the husband's curtesy, if at her decease the estate is to go to her heirs.<sup>3</sup>

§ 325. At common law if a person holding land committed treason or felony, he forfeited his land to the crown; and if he died without heirs, the land escheated to the crown or to his superior lord. Exactly the same incidents applied to land held in trust for another, if the trustee committed a treason or felony, or died without heirs.<sup>4</sup> This rule of law has been changed in England by statute.<sup>5</sup> At the present day the land

115; *Dubs v. Dubs*, 31 Penn. St. 154; *Alexander v. Warrance*, 17 Mo. 228; *Robinson v. Codman*, 1 Sumn. 128; *Gardner v. Hooper*, 3 Gray, 404; *Houghton v. Hapgood*, 13 Pick. 154; *Rawlings v. Adams*, 7 Md. 54; and see *Fletcher v. Ashburner*, 1 Bro. Ch. 503, and Amer. notes; 1 Green. Cruise, 147, n.

<sup>1</sup> *Parker v. Carter*, 4 Hare, 413; *Sartill v. Robeson*, 2 Jones, Eq. 510; *Pitt v. Jackson*, 2 Bro. Ch. 51; *Morgan v. Morgan*, 5 Mad. 408; 4 Kent Com. 31.

<sup>2</sup> *Sweetapple v. Bindon*, 2 Vern. 536; *Dodson v. Hay*, 3 Bro. Ch. 405; *Parker v. Carter*, 4 Hare, 413; *Casborne v. Scarfe*, 1 Atk. 609.

<sup>3</sup> *Roberts v. Dixwill*, 1 Atk. 609; *Hearle v. Greenbank*, 3 Atk. 715; *Morgan v. Morgan*, 5 Mad. 408; *Follett v. Tyrer*, 14 Sim. 125; *Bennett v. Davis*, 2 P. Wms. 316; *Tillinghast v. Coggeshall*, 7 R. I. 383.

<sup>4</sup> *Burgess v. Wheat*, 1 Ed. 177; 1 Bro. Ch. 123; *Hovenden v. Annesley*, 2 Sch. & L. 617; *Eales v. England*, Pr. Ch. 200; *Pawlett v. Attorney-General*, Hard. 467; *Attorney-General v. Leeds*, 2 M. & K. 243; *Penn v. Baltimore*, 1 Ves. 453; *Williams v. Lonsdale*, 3 Ves. Jr. 752; *Reeves v. Attorney-General*, 2 Atk. 223; *Geary v. Bearcroft*, Cart. 67; *King v. Mildmay*, 5 B. & Ad. 254; *Wilks's Case*, Lane, 54; *Scounden v. Hawley*, Comst. 172.

<sup>5</sup> 4 & 5 Wm. IV. c. 23; 39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 88; *Hughes v. Wells*, 9 Hare, 749; 14 Vic. c. 60.

either will not be forfeited or escheat, or the crown or superior lord will take it subject to the same equities under which the trustee held it. In the United States, either the land would not be forfeited or escheat, by reason of the failure or incapacity of the trustee or his heirs, or the State would hold it, subject to all the equities it was under in the hands of the trustee. It might not go to the State, for the reason that, if trustees are wanting, courts will appoint new trustees; and if, for any reason, the trust estate should vest in the State, care would be taken that all the rights of the *cestui que trust* should be protected. There are statutes in most of the States determining the rights of the *cestui que trust* in such cases.

§ 326. The trustee is so far clothed with the legal title and all its incidents, that he must perform all the duties of the holder of the legal estate.<sup>1</sup>

§ 327. Before the statute of uses, the estate of the *cestui que use* was not forfeited for crime, and did not escheat upon failure of heirs; but the feoffee to uses held the estate absolutely as his own.<sup>2</sup> And the same rule was afterwards followed in regard to trusts.<sup>3</sup> Although it was enacted by statute that the *cestui que use* or *cestui que trust* should forfeit his equitable interest upon conviction for *treason*,<sup>4</sup> yet the law never went further; and if the *cestui que trust* committed a *felony*, so that he could no longer claim his equitable rights, the trustee continued to hold the lands for his own use discharged of the trusts.<sup>5</sup> And so it was held, after great debate in *Burgess v. Wheat*, that if the *cestui que trust* left no heirs, the trust estate

<sup>1</sup> *Wilson v. Hoare*, 2 B. & Ad. 350; *Trinity Coll. v. Brown*, 1 Vern. 441; 2 *Ld. Raym.* 994; *Bath v. Abney*, 1 *Dick.* 260; *Carr v. Ellison*, 3 *Atk.* 73; 1 *Cru. Dig.* 305.

<sup>2</sup> *Burgess v. Wheat*, 1 *Ed.* 199, per Sir Thos. Clarke, M.R.

<sup>3</sup> *Attorney-General v. Sands*, 1 *Hale*, P. C. 249.

<sup>4</sup> 33 *Hen. VIII.* c. 20; 1 *Hale*, P. C. 248.

<sup>5</sup> *Attorney-General v. Sands*, 1 *Hale*, P. C. 249.

of inheritance did not escheat, but that the trustee thenceforth held the estate discharged of the trust.<sup>1</sup> This case has been doubted,<sup>2</sup> but it has been followed as the law.<sup>3</sup> This is upon the principle, that there is no want of a tenant to the land, the trustee being clothed with all the rights of ownership against all the world except the *cestui que trust*, and those claiming under him. But this principle does not apply to chattels, where there can be no tenant, nor to leaseholds,<sup>4</sup> nor to an equity of redemption.<sup>5</sup> In the United States, trustees would hold personal property subject to the right of the State as *ultima hæres*, in case the *cestui que trust* died without heirs or next of kin; and it is conceived that they would hold real estate under the same rule.<sup>6</sup>

§ 328. It is the duty of the trustee to defend and protect the title to the trust estate; and, as the legal title is in him, he alone can sue and be sued in a court of law; the *cestui que trust*, the absolute owner of the estate in equity, is regarded in law as a stranger.<sup>7</sup> The rule is carried to the extent that

<sup>1</sup> *Burgess v. Wheat*, 1 Ed. 177; 1 Black. 123; 1 Bro. Ch. 123.

<sup>2</sup> *Middleton v. Spicer*, 1 Bro. Ch. 204; *Fawcet v. Lowther*, 2 Ves. 300; *Sweeting v. Sweeting*, 33 L. J. Ch. 211.

<sup>3</sup> *Taylor v. Haygarth*, 14 Sim. 8; 8 Jur. 185; *Henchman v. Attorney-General*, 3 M. & K. 485; *Onslow v. Wallis*, 1 Mac. & G. 506; 1 Hall & T. 513; *Rittson v. Stordy*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 230; *Barrow v. Wadkin*, 24 Beav. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Middleton v. Spicer*, 1 Bro. Ch. 201; *Walker v. Dean*, 2 Ves. Jr. 170; *Barclay v. Russell*, 3 Ves. 424; *Henchman v. Attorney-General*, 3 M. & K. 485; *Taylor v. Haygarth*, 14 Sim. 8; *Cradock v. Owen*, 2 Sm. & Gif. 241; *Bishop v. Curtis*, 17 Jur. 23; *Powell v. Merritt*, 22 L. J. 208; 1 Sm. & Gif. 381.

<sup>5</sup> *Down v. Morris*, 3 Hare, 394.

<sup>6</sup> *McCaw v. Galbraith*, 7 Rich. L. 75; *Darrah v. McNair*, 1 Ash. 236; *Matthews v. Ward*, 10 G. & J. 443; 4 Kent, 425; *Crane v. Ruder*, 21 Mich. 25.

<sup>7</sup> *May v. Taylor*, 6 M. & Gr. 261; *Gibson v. Winter*, 5 B. & Ad. 96; *Allen v. Imlett*, Holt, 641; *Goodtitle v. Jones*, 7 T. R. 47; *Baptist Soc. v. Hazen*, 100 Mass. 322; *Cox v. Walker*, 26 Me. 504; *Beach v. Beach*, 14 Vt. 28; *Moore v. Burnet*, 11 Ohio, 334; *Wright v. Douglass*, 3 Barb. 59; *Matthews v. Ward*, 10 G. & J. 443; *Mordecai v. Parker*, 3 Dev. 425; *Finn*

the grantee of the trustee can alone maintain an action upon the legal title, although the conveyance to him was a breach of the trust.<sup>1</sup> To protect himself, the trustee must defend the title if he is sued. It is his duty to give the *cestui que trust* notice of a suit hostile to his interests, and to defend the action in good faith. To act otherwise would be a breach of trust.<sup>2</sup> A trustee may also maintain an action for any trespass upon the land;<sup>3</sup> but if the *cestui que trust* is in the actual possession of it, he may maintain an action for any injury done to his possession.<sup>4</sup> If, however, the trust is terminated by operation of law or otherwise, and the property has vested in the *cestui que trust*, he may after that time maintain an action upon the title;<sup>5</sup> and so if there has been a conveyance or surrender by the trustees to the *cestui que trust*,<sup>6</sup> or a presumption of a surrender from the fact that the purposes of the trust are all accomplished.<sup>7</sup> If the trustee is in possession, he must sue for all injuries to the possession, and he is the proper person to maintain the claim for damages for flowing the land under the mill acts, or for taking it for railroad purposes, turn-

*v. Hohn*, 21 How. 481; *Hooper v. Scheimer*, 23 How. 235; *Fitzpatrick v. Fitzgerald*, 13 Gray, 400; *Chapin v. Universalist Society*, 8 Gray, 581; *Crane v. Crane*, 4 Gray, 323; *Davis v. Charles River Railroad*, 11 Cush. 506; *Raymond v. Holden*, 2 Cush. 268; *Moody v. Farr*, 33 Miss. 192; *Adler v. Sewell*, 20 Ind. 598; *Western R.R. Co. v. Nolan*, 48 N. Y. 517; *Church v. Stewart*, 27 Barb. 553; *Ryan v. Bibb*, 46 Ala. 323; *Ponder v. McGruder*, 42 Ga. 242.

<sup>1</sup> *Reece v. Allen*, 5 Gilm. 241; *Taylor v. King*, 6 Munf. 358; *Canoy v. Troutman*, 7 Ired. 155; *Cary v. Whitney*, 48 Me. 516; *Matthews v. McPherson*, 65 N. C. 189; *Phillips v. Ward*, 51 Mo. 295.

<sup>2</sup> *Mackay v. Coates*, 70 Penn. St. 350.

<sup>3</sup> *Walker v. Fawcett*, 7 Ired. 44.

<sup>4</sup> *Cox v. Walker*, 26 M. 504; *Stearns v. Palmer*, 10 Met. 32; *Second Cong. Soc. North Bridgewater v. Waring*, 24 Pick. 309.

<sup>5</sup> *Nicoll v. Walworth*, 4 Denio, 385; *Matthews v. McPherson*, 65 N. C. 189; *Lockhart v. Canfield*, 49 Miss. 470.

<sup>6</sup> *Obert v. Bordine*, 1 Spencer; *Hopkins v. Ward*, 6 Munf. 38; *Doggett v. Hart*, 5 Flor. 215.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

pikes, or public highways.<sup>1</sup> In Pennsylvania, however, the action of ejectment is an equitable action, and the *cestui que trust* may maintain the suit if he is entitled to possession, or it may be maintained by the trustee.<sup>2</sup> In a few States there are statutes or codes which enact that parties beneficially interested in the subject-matter of the suit shall be made the parties plaintiffs; but the right or duty of trustees, or persons holding the legal title in a fiduciary capacity, to sue is generally provided for.<sup>3</sup> Merely nominal trustees, as officers of a town or parish, cannot sue in their own name.<sup>4</sup>

§ 329. Whether the trustees are entitled to the possession, control, and management of real estate, as against the *cestui que trust*, depends upon the whole scope of the settlement, and the nature of the duties which the trustees are required to perform. If the entire interest is vested in the trustees, and they are to manage the property, keep it insured, and pay taxes, premiums, annuities, and other charges out of the income, the court will imply that the trustees are to have the possession, and will not take it from them, unless there is some very clear intention expressed to control such directions.<sup>5</sup> And the trustees may purchase whatever is necessary, and cultivate the land instead of renting it.<sup>6</sup> If the *cestui que trust*,

<sup>1</sup> *Davis v. Charles River R.R. Co.* 11 Cush. 506; *Woodruff v. Orange*, 32 N. J. 49.

<sup>2</sup> *School Dir. v. Dunkleberger*, 6 Barr, 29; *Presbyterian Cong. v. Johnston*, 1 W. & S. 56; *Kennedy v. Fury*, 1 Dall. 76; *Hunt v. Crawford*, 3 Penn. 426; *Caldwell v. Lowden*, 3 Brews. 63.

<sup>3</sup> See Codes of New York and Ohio, *McGill v. Doe*, 9 Ind. 306.

<sup>4</sup> *Regina v. Shee*, 4 Q. B. 2; *Manchester v. Manchester*, 17 Q. B. 859; *Queen v. Commissioners*, 15 Q. B. 1012; *Connor v. New Albany*, 1 Blackf. 88.

<sup>5</sup> *Tidd v. Lister*, 3 Mad. 429; *Naylor v. Arnitt*, 1 R. & M. 501; *Young v. Miles*, 10 B. Mon. 290; *Blake v. Bunbury*, 1 Ves. Jr. 194, 514; 4 Bro. Ch. 21; *Jenkins v. Milford*, 1 J. & W. 629; *Moseley v. Marshall*, 22 N. Y. 200; *Marshall v. Sladen*, 4 De G. & Sm. 468; *Matthews v. McPherson*, 65 N. C. 189.

<sup>6</sup> *Mayfield v. Kegour*, 21 Md. 241.

or tenant for life is a *female*, the court will continue the possession in the trustees for her protection in case of marriage.<sup>1</sup> So if the trustees themselves have a beneficial interest, or a reversion or remainder after the death of the tenant for life, the court will continue the possession in them.<sup>2</sup> If, however, the plain intention of the settlement is, that the *cestui que trust* is to have the possession, then all other considerations must give way; as, if it is plain that the settlor intended the estate to be a place of residence for the *cestui que trust*, the intention must be carried out.<sup>3</sup> If the tenant for life takes a *legal* estate, subject to a charge, he will of course be entitled to the possession, so long as he discharges all incumbrances thus put upon the estate.<sup>4</sup> But if the tenant for life allows the annuities or other charges to fall in arrears, the trustees must take possession for the security of the annuitants, and must continue the possession until ample security is made for the future.<sup>5</sup> Security may be required in any case where the tenant for life is let into possession.<sup>6</sup>

§ 330. The trustee is entitled to the possession of all personal securities, such as bonds, notes, mortgages, and certificates of stocks, belonging to the trust estate; and he may maintain an action for their delivery, even against the *cestui que trust*.<sup>7</sup> All personal actions for injury to the personal

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. ; Weekham v. Berry, 55 Penn. St. 70.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Tidd v. Lister, 3 Mad. 432 ; Campbell v. Prestons, 22 Gratt, 396.

<sup>4</sup> Denton v. Denton, 7 Beav. 388 ; Blake v. Bunbury, 1 Ves. Jr. 194 ; Tidd v. Lister, 5 Mad. 432.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. ; Pugh v. Vaughn, 12 Beav. 517 ; Langston v. Ollivant, Coop. 33 ; Baylies v. Baylies, 1 Col. 137.

<sup>7</sup> Jones v. Jones, 3 Bro. Ch. 80 ; Poole v. Pass, 1 Beav. 600 ; Beach v. Beach, 14 Vt. 28 ; Gunn v. Barrow, 17 Ala. 743 ; White v. Albertson, 3 Dev. 241 ; Guphill v. Isbell, 8 Rich. L. 463 ; Presley v. Stribling, 24 Miss. 257 ; Pace v. Pierce, 49 Mo. 393 ; Ryan v. Bibb, 46 Ala. 343 ; Western R.R. Co. v. Nolan, 48 N. Y. 513.

property, or for its detention or conversion, such as trespass,<sup>1</sup> trover,<sup>2</sup> detinue,<sup>3</sup> or replevin,<sup>4</sup> must be brought in the name of the trustee, although the possession is in the *cestui que trust*,<sup>5</sup> and although there may be a defect in the title of the trustee;<sup>6</sup> for the possession of the *cestui que trust* is the possession of the trustee, and in law he is not allowed to dispute the title or possession of his trustee.<sup>7</sup> The action of assumpsit is an equitable action, and, generally, if a promise is made to one for the benefit of another, the person for whose benefit the promise is made may bring the action; but if a promise is made to a trustee for the benefit of the *cestui que trust*, the trustee alone can sue.<sup>8</sup> So only those parties can sue on a contract with whom it is made, unless it is negotiable paper; therefore, substituted trustees cannot sue upon a contract made with their predecessors in the trust, but the suit must be in the names of the parties with whom it was made, for the benefit of the estate.<sup>9</sup> Generally, all notices and tenders<sup>10</sup> must be made to the trustees; and they must use all due diligence in prosecuting suits in favor of the estate and of the *cestui que trust*, and they must take the proper care in defending such suits; and if appeals are taken from decrees or

<sup>1</sup> *McRaeny v. Johnson*, 2 Flor. 520.

<sup>2</sup> *Hower v. Geesaman*, 17 S. & R. 251; *Poage v. Bell*, 8 Leigh, 604; *Coleson v. Blanton*, 3 Hayw. 152; *Guphill v. Isbell*, 8 Rich. L. 463; *Thompson v. Ford*, 7 Ired. 418; *Schley v. Lyons*, 6 Ga. 530.

<sup>3</sup> *Jones v. Strong*, 6 Ired. 367; *Murphy v. Moore*, 4 Ired. Eq. 118; *Chambers v. Mauldin*, 4 Ala. 477; *Parsons v. Boyd*, 20 Ala. 112; *Stoker v. Yelby*, 11 Ala. 327; *Baker v. Washington*, 3 Stew. & P. 142; *Newman v. Montgomery*, 5 How. (Miss.) 742.

<sup>4</sup> *Presley v. Stribling*, 24 Miss. 527; *Daniel v. Daniel*, 6 B. Mon. 230.

<sup>5</sup> *Jones v. Cole*, 2 Bail. 330; *Wynn v. Lee*, 5 Ga. 236.

<sup>6</sup> *Rogers v. White*, 1 Sneed, 69.

<sup>7</sup> *White v. Albertson*, 3 Dev. 241.

<sup>8</sup> *Treat v. Stanton*, 14 Conn. 445.

<sup>9</sup> *Binney v. Plumly*, 5 Vt. 500; *Ingersoll v. Cooper*, 5 Blackf. 420; *Davant v. Guerard*, 1 Spear, 242; *Wake v. Tinkler*, 16 East, 36.

<sup>10</sup> *Chahoon v. Hollenback*, 16 S. & R. 425; *Henry v. Morgan*, 2 Binn. 497.

judgments in favor of the estate, or of the *cestui que trust*, they must duly support the rights of the *cestui que trust* in whatever court the case may be carried.<sup>1</sup> If the *cestui que trust* brings an action in the name of the trustee, the trustee may insist upon indemnity against the costs.<sup>2</sup> If the trustee collusively releases such suit without the consent of the party beneficially interested, the court will set aside the release.<sup>3</sup> So if a trustee discharges a debt or mortgage without payment, the court would set aside the discharge;<sup>4</sup> and if a trustee refuses to bring a suit, or to allow his name to be used, equity will compel him to take such steps as the interest of the estate and of the *cestui que trust* requires.<sup>5</sup> In all such suits in the name of the trustee, a debt due from the *cestui que trust* cannot be set off.<sup>6</sup> If a trustee sue for matters pertaining to the trust estate, a private debt due from the trustee cannot be set off.<sup>7</sup>

§ 331. The trustee, being liable for a breach of the trust, if he permits any misapplication of the funds, should of course have the possession and control of all personal property. So all the duties and privileges which attach to such property pertain to him. If the property consists of stocks in corpora-

<sup>1</sup> Wood v. Burnham, 6 Paige, 513.

<sup>2</sup> Ins. Co. v. Smith, 11 Penn. St. 120; Annesley v. Simeon, 4 Mad. 390; Roden v. Murphy, 10 Ala. 804.

<sup>3</sup> Anon. Salk. 260; Bauerman v. Radenius, 7 T. R. 670; Legh v. Legh, 1 B. & P. 447; Payne v. Rogers, Doug. 407; Manning v. Cox, 7 Moore, 617; Hickey v. Burt, 7 Taunt. 48; Barker v. Richardson, 1 Y. & J. 362; Roden v. Murphy, 10 Ala. 804; Greene v. Beatty, Coxe, 142; Kirkpatrick v. McDonald, 11 Penn. St. 387.

<sup>4</sup> Woolf v. Bate, 9 B. Mon. 210.

<sup>5</sup> Blin v. Pierce, 20 Vt. 25; Chisholm v. Newton, 1 Ala. 371; Robinson v. Mauldin, 11 Ala. 978; Welch v. Mandeville, 1 Wheat. 233; Parker v. Kelly, 10 Sm. & M. 184; McCullum v. Coxe, 1 Dall. 139.

<sup>6</sup> Wells v. Chapman, 4 Sand. Ch. 312; Campbell v. Hamilton, 4 Wash. C. C. 93; Woolf v. Bate, 9 B. Mon. 211; Beale v. Coon, 2 Watts, 183; Tucker v. Tucker, 4 B. & Ad. 745; Porter v. Morris, 2 Harr. 509.

<sup>7</sup> Page v. Stephens, 23 Mich. 357.



tions, he may attend corporate meetings, vote, and hold office by virtue of such stock.<sup>1</sup> If the trustee die, the personal property devolves upon his executor or administrator until the appointment of a new trustee, and such executor or administrator has a right to vote upon stocks at corporate meetings.<sup>2</sup> So the trustee is rated or assessed for taxes, and must see that the taxes upon the trust property are paid. The statutes of the various States determine the localities where such property shall be assessed: real estate is generally assessed in the parish, town, or county where it is situated; and personal property, either in the place of the domicile of the trustee or of the *cestui que trust*, as the statutes of a State may direct. In the absence of a statute, the law would look upon the trustee as the owner, and assess the property at his domicile.<sup>3</sup>

§ 332. The trustee must prove a debt against a bankrupt debtor of the estate, as he is the person to receive the dividend; <sup>4</sup> but in special cases the concurrence of the *cestui que trust* may be required, as where he may have a right to receive the payment.<sup>5</sup>

§ 333. In England, trustees had at common law the right to vote for local officers and for members of parliament, by virtue of the qualification conferred upon them by the trust property, if it was sufficient in amount. Statutes have, however, changed the common law, and given the right in most cases to the *cestui*

<sup>1</sup> *Matter of Barker*, 6 Wend. 509; *Re Phoenix Life Assur. Co.* 2 J. & H. 279.

<sup>2</sup> *North Shore Ferry Co.* 63 Barb. 556; *People v. Tebbetts*, 4 Cow. 364; *Bailey v. Hollister*, 26 N. Y. 112; *Middlebrook v. Merchants' Bank*, 3 Keyes, 135; *Bunn v. Vaughan*, 3 Keyes, 345.

<sup>3</sup> *Latrobe v. Baltimore*, 19 Md. 13; *Green v. Mumford*, 4 R. I. 313; and see the statutes of the various States.

<sup>4</sup> *Ex parte Green*, 2 Dea. & Ch. 116.

<sup>5</sup> *Ex parte Dubois*, 1 Cox, 310; *Ex parte Butler*, Buck, 426; *Ex parte Gray*, 4 Dea. & Ch. 778; *Ex parte Dickenson*, 2 Dea. & Ch. 520.

*que trust*. In the United States, property qualifications of voters are generally abrogated.<sup>1</sup>

§ 334. Trustees of real or personal estate may *at law*, sell, convey, assign, or incumber the same, as if they were the beneficial owners,<sup>2</sup> and each of several trustees may exercise all his rights of ownership. If the trustees are joint-tenants, each may receive the rents,<sup>3</sup> and each may sever the joint-tenancy by a conveyance of his share,<sup>4</sup> and each may collect the dividends on stocks. The general power of a trustee to sell and convey the estate is coextensive with his ownership of the legal title; and this general power over the legal title is entirely distinct from the execution of a special power given in respect to the sale of an estate. Though the trustee may thus sell, even in breach of the trust, a conveyance without consideration will not injure the *cestui que trust*; as the grantee, who is a volunteer, will hold upon the same trusts as the trustee held, and if the purchaser for a valuable consideration have notice of the trust he will still hold the estate upon trust.<sup>5</sup> In New York, however, a statute has converted the trustee's ownership of the legal title into a power or power in trust;<sup>6</sup> and where a trust is expressly created by a written instrument, every sale in breach or contravention of the trust is declared to be absolutely void, even if the sale is under the sanction of a court.<sup>7</sup> Whether a trustee intends to convey an estate is

<sup>1</sup> See 5 Ired. Eq. Appendix; 4 Kent Com. 195.

<sup>2</sup> Shortz v. Unangst, 3 W. & S. 55; Canoy v. Troutman, 7 Ired. 155.

<sup>3</sup> Townley v. Sherborne, Bridg. 35.

<sup>4</sup> Boursot v. Savage, L. R. 2 Eq. 134.

<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, § 321.

<sup>6</sup> Anderson v. Mather, 44 N. Y. 249; New York, &c. v. Stillman, 30 N. Y. 174; Fitzgerald v. Topping, 48 N. Y. 441; Fellows v. Heermans, 4 Lansing, 230; Martin v. Smith, 56 Barb. 600; Critton v. Fairchild, 41 N. Y. 289. The law is the same in Michigan. 24 Mich. 328; Palmer v. Wilkins. See Jones v. Shaddock, 41 Ala. 262; 1 Rev. Stat. 730, § 65; Briggs v. Palmer, 20 Barb. 392; Briggs v. Davis, 20 N. Y. 15, 21 N. Y. 574.

<sup>7</sup> Cruger v. Jones, 18 Barb. 468; Lahens v. Dupasseur, 56 Barb. 256.

frequently a question made upon conveyances, and it has been determined that a general assignment of all the trustee's estates, for the benefit of his creditors, does not pass estates held by him in trust.<sup>1</sup>

§ 335. As among the incidents of the trustee's legal title in the trust estate is his power to sell it, so he may devise it by his last will and testament. The principal question that here arises is, whether the words of the will of a trustee embrace estates held by him in trust, for a trust estate will not in all cases pass by the same words as would pass the beneficial ownership; for wherever an estate passes, not by operation of law, but by the intention of any one, it is necessary to find the intention from the instrument under the circumstances in which it is made; and an intention to devise a trust estate is not so readily inferred as an intention to devise a beneficial estate.

§ 336. An assignment in general words by a trustee of all his estate for his creditors will not pass a trust estate, for the reason that the court will not presume that the trustee intended to commit a breach of trust; for a similar reason it has at times been said that a devise of all a trustee's estates in general words would not operate upon estates that he held in trust, unless there appeared a positive intention that they should so pass.<sup>2</sup> The question was finally considered by Lord Eldon; and after a careful examination, the rule was declared to be, that "where the will contained words large enough, and there was no expression authorizing a narrower construction, nor any such disposition of the estate as it was unlikely a testator would make of property not his own, in such case the trust

<sup>1</sup> *Ludwig v. Highley*, 5 Barr, 132; *Abbott, Peti.* 55 Me. 480.

<sup>2</sup> *Casborne v. Scarfe*, 1 Atk. 605; *Strode v. Russell*, 2 Vern. 625; *Leeds v. Munday*, 3 Ves. 348; *Ex parte Sergison*, 4 Ves. 147; *Ex parte Bowes*, cited note 1 Atk. 605; *Pickering v. Vowles*, 1 Bro. Ch. 198; *Att'y-Gen. v. Buller*, 5 Ves. 340.

property would pass.”<sup>1</sup> Mr. Hill states the rule, “that a general devise of real estate will pass estates vested in the testator as trustee or mortgagee, unless a contrary intention can be collected from the expressions of the will, or from the purposes or limitations to which the devised lands are subjected.”<sup>2</sup> This general rule is acted upon in the United States.<sup>3</sup>

§ 337. Notwithstanding the rule, that a trust estate will pass by general words in a devise, unless there is something in the will to show a contrary intention, there has continued to be a conflict of opinion upon the propriety of the rule, and more conflict upon its application. But a charge of debts, legacies, and annuities upon the estate devised, or a power given to sell it, is an indication that the testator did not intend that the trust estate should pass under the words of his devise, for the reason that he could not have intended that his devisee should do that with the estate which would be a breach of trust.<sup>4</sup> So if there is a limitation of the estate in strict settlement, with a great number of complicated conditions, contingencies, remainders and limitations, it will not be presumed that a trustee intended to devise a dry trust in a legal title upon such terms, and the estate will not pass under general words;<sup>5</sup> so if the

<sup>1</sup> *Braybrooke v. Inskip*, 8 Ves. 436; *Roe v. Read*, 8 T. R. 118; *Ex parte Morgan*, 10 Ves. 101; *Langford v. Auger*, 4 Hare, 313; *Linsell v. Thacher*, 12 Sim. 178; *Ex parte Shaw*, 8 Sim. 159; *Hawkins v. Obeen*, 2 Ves. 559.

<sup>2</sup> *Hill on Trustees*, 283.

<sup>3</sup> *Taylor v. Benham*, 5 How. 270; *Heath v. Knapp*, 4 Barr, 228; *Jackson v. Delancy*, 13 John. 537; *Hughes v. Caldwell*, 11 Leigh, 342; *Merritt v. Farmers' Ins. Co.* 2 Edw. 547; *Ballard v. Carter*, 5 Pick. 112; *Asay v. Hoover*, 5 Barr, 35; *Richardson v. Woodbury*, 43 Me. 206; *Drane v. Gunter*, 19 Ala. 731.

<sup>4</sup> *Rackham v. Siddall*, 16 Sim. 297; 1 Mac. & G. 607; *Hope v. Liddell*, 21 Beav. 183; *Life Asso. of Scotland v. Siddall*, 3 De G., F. & J. 58; *Wall v. Bright*, 1 J. & W. 494; *Leeds v. Munday*, 3 Ves. 348; *Ex parte Marshall*, 9 Sim. 555; *Re Morley's Trusts*, 10 Hare, 293; *Sylvester v. Jarman*, 10 Price, 78; *Roe v. Reade*, 8 T. R. 118; *Att'y-Gen. v. Buller*, 5 Ves. 339; *Ex parte Morgan*, 10 Ves. 101; *Ex parte Brettell*, 6 Ves. 577; *Merritt v. Farmers' Ins. Co.* 2 Edw. Ch. 547.

<sup>5</sup> *Braybrooke v. Inskip*, 8 Ves. 434.

devise is to A. in tail with remainder over in strict settlement;<sup>1</sup> so a devise to a testator's nephews and nieces in equal shares as tenants in common, is to a class not ascertained at the date of the will, and will not by general words pass a trust estate.<sup>2</sup> So a devise to a woman for her separate use imports a beneficial use, and not a dry legal estate, and the trust estate would not pass to her under general words.<sup>3</sup> But a devise to a woman, her heirs and assigns, to her and their own sole and absolute use, passes the estate for the reason that there is nothing inconsistent with their holding the absolute use in trust;<sup>4</sup> and a devise to A. and B. to be equally divided between them, as tenants in common, and their respective heirs, will pass the estate.<sup>5</sup> A devise of all my estates will pass trust property.<sup>6</sup> So a devise to A., his heirs and assigns, to and for his and their own use and benefit;<sup>7</sup> and a devise to A. and her heirs, to be disposed of, by her will or otherwise, as she shall think fit,<sup>8</sup> will pass trust property under general words, for there is no necessary breach of the trust.

§ 338. The interest of a *mortgagee in fee* in the mortgaged land stands upon a somewhat different ground. The mortgagee has a debt due him which is the principal thing, and the mortgage is a beneficial interest in the land as security for the

<sup>1</sup> *Thompson v. Grant*, 4 Mad. 438; *Ex parte Bowes*, cited 1 Atk. 603; *Galliers v. Moss*, 9 B. & Cr. 267; *Re Horsfall*, 1 M'Clel. & Y. 292.

<sup>2</sup> *Re Finney's Est.* 3 Gif. 465.

<sup>3</sup> *Lindsell v. Thacher*, 12 Sim. 178; the case itself, not the marginal note.

<sup>4</sup> *Lewis v. Mathews*, L. R. 2 Eq. 177.

<sup>5</sup> *Ex parte Whiteacre*, cited Lewin on Trusts, 186; 1 Saund. Uses & Tr. 359; *Re Morley's Trusts*, 10 Hare, 293.

<sup>6</sup> *Braybrooke v. Inskip*, 8 Ves. 425; *Bangs v. Smith*, 98 Mass. 273; *Amory v. Meredith*, 7 Allen, 397; *Willard v. Ware*, 10 Allen, 263; *Stone v. Hackett*, 12 Gray, 237.

<sup>7</sup> *Ex parte Shaw*, 8 Sim. 159; *Bainbridge v. Ashburton*, 2 Y. & C. 347; *Sharpe v. Sharpe*, 12 Jur. 598; *Ex parte Brettell*, 6 Ves. 577; *Heath v. Knapp*, 4 Barr, 228; *Abbott, Peti.* 55 Me. 580.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

debt. This interest generally goes with the debt. Therefore a general devise of all securities for moneys would carry the mortgagee's right and interest in the mortgage, and, as a consequence, in the land covered by the mortgage.<sup>1</sup> In such case neither a general trust to sell and convert, nor a charge of debts, would prevent it from passing.<sup>2</sup> But if there are special trusts for sale, or other special charges annexed to the devise, inconsistent with the idea of holding the estate as security for money, it would not pass under a general devise.<sup>3</sup>

§ 339. In allowing a trust estate to pass under general words of a devise, it is assumed that the testator does not intend by his devise to commit a breach of the trust. It is simply a question, whether the testator has devised, or can or should devise, a trust estate, or whether he should allow it to descend to his heir or legal representatives. It was said in *Cook v. Crawford*, that it was not lawful for the trustee to dispose of the estate, but that he ought to permit it to descend; that a devise did not differ from a deed *inter vivos*; and that it was only a *post mortem* conveyance.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, it is said that there is a wide distinction between a conveyance and a devise. That during the trustee's lifetime there was a personal trust and confidence in his discretion, which he could not delegate; that the settlor could have reposed no confidence in the heir, for he could not know beforehand who the heir would be; that if the estate was allowed to descend, it might become

<sup>1</sup> *Ex parte Barber*, 5 Sim. 451; *Doe v. Benett*, 6 Exch. 892; *Re Cantley*, 17 Jur. 124; *King's Mort.* 5 De G. & Sm. 644; *Knight v. Robinson*, 2 K. & J. 503; *Rippen v. Priest*, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 508; *Ballard v. Carter*, 5 Pick. 112; *Asay v. Hoover*, 5 Barr. 35; *Richardson v. Woodbury*, 43 Me. 206.

<sup>2</sup> *Ex parte Barber*, 5 Sim. 451; *Mather v. Thomas*, 6 Sim. 119; *Field's Mort.* 9 Hare, 414, overruling *Benvoize v. Cooper*, 10 Price, 78, and in opposition to *Doe v. Lightfoot*, 8 M. & W. 553.

<sup>3</sup> *Re Cantley*, 17 Jur. 123.

<sup>4</sup> *Cook v. Crawford*, 13 Sim. 98; and see *Beasley v. Wilkinson*, 13 Jur. 649.

vested in married women, infants, bankrupts, or persons out of the jurisdiction of the court; and that therefore it could not be a breach of trust for a trustee to devise the estate by will to persons capable of executing it, or of transferring it to other trustees.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Lewin concludes from these observations, that whether the devise of the trust estate is proper or not depends upon the circumstances of each case. If the heir is a fit person to execute the trust, the testator ought not to intercept the descent and pass the legal estate to another, and especially not to an unfit person. In such case the estate of the testator might be liable for the costs of restoring the trust estate to its proper channel or to proper trustees. If, however, the heir is an unfit person, as an infant, bankrupt, insolvent, lunatic, married woman, or out of the jurisdiction, it may be proper to devise the estate.<sup>2</sup> And this seems to be the result of the authorities.<sup>3</sup>

§ 340. It does not follow that the devisee can execute the trust from the fact that the legal title is devised to him, nor does it follow that the heir can execute the trust from the fact that the legal title descends to him. How far either can execute the trust depends upon the intention of the settlor, to be gathered from the terms of the instrument.<sup>4</sup> Thus, if an estate is so vested in A. that A. alone shall *personally* execute the trust, neither the heir nor the devisee of A. could execute it, although holding the legal title.<sup>5</sup> As if an estate is vested in A. and his heirs upon a trust to sell, and A. devises the estate, neither the heir nor the devisee can sell: for the heir has nothing in the estate to sell, it having gone to the devisee; and the

<sup>1</sup> *Titley v. Wolstenholme*, 7 Beav. 435; *Macdonald v. Walker*, 14 Beav. 556; *Wilson v. Bennett*, 5 De G. & Sm. 479.

<sup>2</sup> Lewin, 187, 188.

<sup>3</sup> *Beasley v. Wilkinson*, 13 Jur. 649.

<sup>4</sup> *Abbott, Peti.* 55 Me. 580.

<sup>5</sup> *Mortimer v. Ireland*, 6 Hare, 196; 11 Jur. 721; *Ockleston v. Heap*, 1 De G. & Sm. 640.

devisee has no power, he not being mentioned in the original settlement.<sup>1</sup> So, where property was vested in two trustees, their executors and administrators in trust, and the surviving trustee devised the property to A. and B., and appointed A., B., and C. executors, the court refused to hand over the property to A. and B. for the reason that devisees were not named as parties who could execute the trust; and the court refused to hand it over to the executors for the reason that the legal title was given away from them; new trustees were therefore appointed to receive the property and execute the trust.<sup>2</sup> But where the word *assigns* is part of the limitation of the estate to trustees, as where an estate is vested in A., his heirs, executors, administrators, and *assigns* in trust, and A. devises the estate, the devisee may execute the trust, for the reason that he comes within the limitation of the persons who may take the trust property and execute the trust.<sup>3</sup> This principle has been doubted and criticised,<sup>4</sup> but it seems to be acted upon in the English courts.<sup>5</sup>

§ 341. In New York, Michigan, Wisconsin, Alabama, and Missouri, trust property, upon the death of the surviving trustee, does not descend to the heir, nor can it be devised, but it vests in the court, and will be administered by the court by the appointment of new trustees to execute the trust.<sup>6</sup> In the

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*; *Cook v. Crawford*, 13 Sim. 91; *Stevens v. Austen*, 7 Jur. (N. S.) 873; *Wilson v. Bennett*, 5 De G. & Sm. 475.

<sup>2</sup> *Re Burt's Est.* 1 Dr. 319; *McDonald v. Walker*, 14 Beav. 556.

<sup>3</sup> *Titely v. Wolstenholme*, 7 Beav. 425; *Saloway v. Strawbridge*. 1 K. & J. 371; 7 De G., M. & G. 594.

<sup>4</sup> *Ockleston v. Heap*, 1 De G. & Sm. 642.

<sup>5</sup> *Mortimer v. Ireland*, 6 Hare, 196; 11 Jur. 721; *Ashton v. Wood*, 3 Sm. & Gif. 436; *Hall v. May*, 3 K. & J. 585; *Lane v. Debenham*, 11 Hare, 188.

<sup>6</sup> *Clark v. Crego*, 47 Barb. 597; *Hawley v. Ross*, 7 Paige, 103; *McCosker v. Brady*, 1 Barb. Ch. 329; *People v. Morton*, 5 Seld. 176; *McDougald v. Cary*, 38 Ala. 320; *Hook v. Dyer*, 47 Mo. 241. This rule is confined to real property. Trusts in personal property are governed by the ordinary rules that apply to them in other States. *Bucklin v. Bucklin*, 1 N. Y. Dec. 242.



other States the trust estate descends to the heir, or vests in the devisee, as the legal title must go somewhere in the absence of a statute, upon the death of the surviving trustee. Courts in the United States do not have occasion often to consider the question, whether the heir or devisee can execute the trust, as new trustees can be appointed in any case at the desire of the parties, and, in many States, the trust property may be vested in the new trustees by an order of the court. In most cases, it would simply be a question whether the words of the will were comprehensive enough to pass the trust estate, or whether it had descended to the heir ; and this question would be important only in determining who should make a conveyance of the trust property to the new trustees, if it became necessary that a conveyance should be made.

§ 342. If an owner of real estate contracts to sell it, he becomes a trustee of the legal title for the vendee ; and if he dies before conveying the legal title, it will descend to his heir or heirs, as the legal title must vest somewhere ; and so he may devise it ; and the heir, in case it descends, and the devisee, in case it is devised, may be called upon to convey it to the vendee.<sup>1</sup> In Massachusetts, there is a statute, authorizing the vendor's executor or administrator to convey such estate, under the direction of the Court of Probate.<sup>2</sup>

§ 343. Trust property is generally limited to trustees, as joint-tenants ; and if by the terms of the gift it is doubtful, whether the trustees take as joint-tenants, or tenants in common, courts will construe a joint-tenancy if possible, on account of the inconvenience of trustees holding as tenants in common ; and, where statutes have abolished joint-tenancy, an exception is generally made in the case of trustees. And courts will not allow a process for the partition of a trust estate.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Wall v. Bright*, 1 J. & W. 494 ; *Read v. Read*, 8 T. R. 118.

<sup>2</sup> Gen. Stat. c. 117, §§ 5 and 6 ; *Reed v. Whitney*, 7 Gray, 533.

<sup>3</sup> *Baldwin v. Humphrey*, 44 N. Y. 609.

Therefore, upon the death of one of the original trustees, the whole estate, whether real or personal, devolves upon the survivors, and so on to the last survivor; and upon the death of the last survivor, if he has made no disposition of the estate by will or otherwise, it devolves upon his heirs, if real estate, and upon his executors or administrators if it is personal estate.<sup>1</sup> The title in the surviving trustee is complete, and no breaches of trust after the death of his cotrustees can be charged upon their estate;<sup>2</sup> nor can the representatives of his cotrustees interfere with his management of the trust estate, even if he is insolvent or unfit for the trust.<sup>3</sup> The *cestui que trust* alone can interfere or apply to the court for redress or relief. So all rights of action are in the surviving trustee, and he may sue in his own name or as survivor, according as the cause of an action accrued before or after the death of his cotrustees;<sup>4</sup> and, in case of his death, his executor or administrator may continue the action.<sup>5</sup> The rule is that actions must be brought in the names of the parties to the contract.<sup>6</sup>

§ 344. So absolute is the rule that the heir or administrator takes the trust property upon the death of the last surviving trustee, that a husband, as administrator of his wife, takes the personal property that she held in trust, but he must hold it upon the original trust.<sup>7</sup> In England, the heir, in case of real

<sup>1</sup> Whiting v. Whiting, 4 Gray, 236; Moses v. Murgatroyd, 1 John. Ch. 119; De Peyster v. Ferrars, 11 Paige, 13; Shook v. Shook, 19 Barb. 653; Shortz v. Unangst, 3 W. & S. 45; Gray v. Lynch, 8 Gill, 404; Mauldin v. Armstead, 14 Ala. 702; Powell v. Knox, 16 Ala. 364; Richeson v. Ryan, 15 Ill. 13; Stewart v. Pettus, 10 Mo. 755; Jenks v. Backhouse, 1 Binn. 91; King v. Leach, 2 Hare, 59; Watkins v. Specht, 7 Coldw. 585; Webster v. Vanderverter, 6 Gray, 429.

<sup>2</sup> See *post*, § 426.

<sup>3</sup> Shook v. Shook, 19 Barb. 653.

<sup>4</sup> Richeson v. Ryan, 15 Ill. 13; Wheatley v. Boyd, 7 Exch. 20.

<sup>5</sup> Nichols v. Campbell, 10 Grat. 561; Powell v. Knox, 16 Ala. 364; Mauldin v. Armstead, 14 Ala. 702.

<sup>6</sup> Robins v. Deshon, 19 Ind. 204; King v. Lawrence, 14 Wis. 238; Farrell v. Ladd, 10 Allen, 127; Childs v. Jordan, 106 Mass. 323.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, § 264; Kuster v. Howe, 3 Ind. 268.

estate in trust, or the executor, in case of personal, is competent to administer and execute the trusts, but they cannot execute discretionary trusts confided *personally* to the original trustee, unless the power and confidence are also confided in them by the instrument.<sup>1</sup> In the United States, the heirs or executors will take the trust property, and they must settle the accounts of the testator in relation to the trust. They must also see that the property is protected and preserved, but they are not under any obligation to execute the trust. They may decline the office, and generally the court will appoint new trustees to succeed to the original trustees. If the heirs or executors continue to act as trustees, they will be liable for no past breaches of trust, but only for breaches that occur under their own management.<sup>2</sup>

§ 345. It has been before stated that a general assignment for creditors does not pass a trust estate. In such case, it requires special words to vest the estate in an assignee. So an assignment in bankruptcy of all the trustee's property does not pass estates which the bankrupt holds in trust.<sup>3</sup> If the bankrupt by a breach of trust has converted the trust estate into other property, the *cestui que trust* may follow it into the hands of the assignee, so far as he can identify the particular property obtained by breach of the trust.<sup>4</sup> But if the trust property has become so amalgamated with the general mass of the bankrupt's estate that it cannot be traced or identified, the *cestui que trust* must prove his claim.<sup>5</sup> If an assignee should get posses-

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, § 264; *Mansell v. Mansell*, Wilm. 36; *Cook v. Crawford*, 13 Sim. 91; *Hall v. Dewes*, Jac. 189; *Peyton v. Bury*, 2 P. Wms. 626; *Bradford v. Belfield*, 2 Sim. 264; *Cole v. Wade*, 16 Ves. 27; *Sharp v. Sharp*, 2 B. & Ald. 405. See *Townsend v. Wilson*, 1 B. & Ald. 608.

<sup>2</sup> *Baird's App.* 3 W. & S. 459; *Schenck v. Schenck*, 1 Gren. Ch. 174; *Hill v. State*, 2 Ark. 604.

<sup>3</sup> *Scott v. Surman*, Willes, 402.

<sup>4</sup> *Taylor v. Plumer*, 3 M. & S. 562; *Ex parte Sayers*, 5 Ves. 169.

<sup>5</sup> *Ex parte Dumas*, 1 Atk. 232; *Ryall v. Rolle*, 1 Atk. 172; *Scott v. Surman*, Willes, 403.

sion of the trust estate, and refuse to restore it, the trustee, though a bankrupt, may maintain a suit for its restoration, or the *cestui que trust* may have a bill for the appointment of new trustees, and the conveyance of the property to them.<sup>1</sup> But if a bankrupt trustee has a beneficial interest in the trust property, it will pass to his assignee ; and the assignee will hold the bankrupt's beneficial interest in trust for his creditors, and the remainder of the property in trust for the other parties beneficially interested.<sup>2</sup>

§ 346. It is now a universal rule that all those who take under the trustee, except purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice, take subject to the trust, and they must either execute the trust themselves, or convey the property to new trustees appointed by the court. Thus the heir, executor, administrator, devisee, and the assignee by deed or in bankruptcy, are bound by the trust ; so are those who take dower or curtesy in the trust estate, or a creditor who levies an execution upon it. If the trust estate is forfeited to the crown or the State, it is still subject to the trust ; so if it escheats upon the failure of heirs. But a disseisor is not an *assignee* of the trustee ; he holds a wrongful title of his own, adversely to the trust. The *cestui que trust* has no remedy in such case, except to procure the trustee to bring an action upon his legal title to recover the possession. The *cestui que trust* could not maintain a suit in equity to compel the disseisor to hold upon the same trusts as the trustee ; for there is no privity between the disseisor and disseeisee.<sup>3</sup> The only remedy of the *cestui que trust* is against

<sup>1</sup> *Winch v. Keely*, 1 T. R. 619 ; *Carpenter v. Marnell*, 3 B. & P. 40.

<sup>2</sup> *Carpenter v. Marnell*, 3 B. & P. 40 ; *Parnham v. Hurst*, 8 M. & W. 743 ; *D'Arny v. Chesneau*, 13 M. & W. 809 ; *Leslie v. Guthrie*, 1 Bing. N. C. 697 ; *Boddington v. Castelli*, 1 El. & Bl. 879.

<sup>3</sup> *Finch's Case*, 4 Inst. 85 ; *Gilbert on Uses* by Sugd. 249 ; *Reynolds v. Jones*, 2 Sim. & S. 206 ; *Turner v. Buck*, 22 Vin. Ab. 21 ; *Doe v. Price*, 16 M. & W. 603.

the trustee; and if he refuses to bring an action to recover the estate, he may be removed and a new trustee appointed.

§ 347. Where the legal and equitable estate in the same land becomes vested in the same person, the equitable will merge in the legal estate; for a man cannot be a trustee for himself, nor hold the fee, which embraces the whole estate, and at the same time hold the several parts separated from the whole.<sup>1</sup> But in order that this may be true, the two estates must be commensurate with each other; or the legal estate must be more extensive or comprehensive than the equitable. The equitable fee cannot merge in a partial or particular legal estate.<sup>2</sup> And there will be no merger, if it is contrary to the intention of the parties.<sup>3</sup> If A. should convey lands to B. in trust for C. and her heirs, and C. should be the heir of B., upon the death of B. the legal title would descend to C., and thus both the legal and equitable title would meet in C.; but if C.

<sup>1</sup> *Wade v. Paget*, 1 Bro. Ch. 363; *Selby v. Alston*, 3 Ves. 339; *Philips v. Brydges*, 3 Ves. 126; *Goodright v. Wells*, Doug. 771; *Finch's Case*, 4 Inst. 85; *Harwood v. Oglander*, 8 Ves. 127; *Creagh v. Blood*, 3 Jones & L. 133; *James v. Morey*, 2 Cow. 246; *Mason v. Mason*, 2 Sandf. Ch. 433; *James v. Johnson*, 6 John. Ch. 417; *Cooper v. Cooper*, 1 Halst. Ch. 9; *Healy v. Alston*, 25 Miss. 190; *Brown v. Bontee*, 10 Sm. & M. 268; *Lewis v. Starke*, 10 Sm. & M. 128; *Nicholson v. Halsey*, 1 John. Ch. 422; *Butler v. Godley*, 1 Dev. 94; *Hopkinson v. Dumas*, 42 N. H. 306; *Gardner v. Astor*, 3 John. Ch. 53; *Downes v. Grazebrook*, 3 Mer. 208; *Ayliff v. Murray*, 2 Atk. 59; *Wills v. Cooper*, 1 Dutch. N. J. 137; *Habergham v. Vincent*, 2 Ves. Jr. 204.

<sup>2</sup> *Selby v. Alston*, 3 Ves. 339; *Hunt v. Hunt*, 14 Pick. 374; *Donalds v. Plumb*, 8 Conn. 453; *James v. Morey*, 2 Cow. 284; *Goodright v. Wells*, Doug. 771; *Philips v. Brydges*, 3 Ves. 125; *Robinson v. Cuming*, t. Talbot, 164; 1 Atk. 475; *Boteler v. Allington*, 1 Bro. Ch. 72; *Buchanan v. Harrison*, 1 Jon. & Hen. 662; *Merest v. James*, 6 Mad. 118; *Habergham v. Vincent*, 2 Ves. Jr. 204.

<sup>3</sup> *Gardner v. Astor*, 3 John. Ch. 53; *James v. Morey*, 2 Cow. 246; *Mechanics' Bank v. Edwards*, 1 Barb. S. C. 272; *Starr v. Ellis*, 6 John. Ch. 393; *Donald v. Plumb*, 8 Conn. 453; *Den v. Vanness*, 5 Halst. 102; *Hunt v. Hunt*, 14 Pick. 374; *Nurse v. Yerwarth*, 3 Swans. 608; *Saunders v. Bournford*, Finch, 424; *Thom v. Newman*, 3 Swans. 603; *Mole v. Smith*, Jac. 490.

was a married woman, and it was plainly the intention of the grantor or settlor, to be gathered from the whole instrument, that the trust should not cease, but continue an active trust, the court would not allow the equitable estate to merge in the legal, but a new trustee would be appointed to take the legal title.<sup>1</sup> Of course, in law the estates will merge wherever the interests meet; but courts of equity will preserve the estates separate, where the rights or interests of the parties require it. If the trustee acquires the equitable interest by any breach of his duty, or by fraud, courts will not allow it to merge.<sup>2</sup> So if there are intervening heirs who would be squeezed out, the estates will not merge.<sup>3</sup> So if the legal estate comes to the *cestui que trust* by a conveyance which turns out to be void, there will be no merger.<sup>4</sup> Whether charges upon an estate, as mortgages, will merge in the legal title, upon being paid off, depends upon the intention of the parties, and frequently upon the interests and equities between them.<sup>5</sup> If a leasehold is held by a wife in her right, but is in the occupation of her husband, and he purchases the reversion, there will be no merger.<sup>6</sup>

§ 348. Thus if a tenant for life pays off a charge or incumbrance upon an estate, it will be considered that, as his interest ceases with his life, he could never have intended that the charge should be extinguished, and not survive for the benefit

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 572.

<sup>3</sup> Lewis v. Stark, 10 Sm. & M. 128.

<sup>4</sup> Elliott v. Armstrong, 2 Blackf. 208; Buchanan v. Harrison, 1 John. & H. 662; Brandon v. Brandon, 31 L. J. Ch. 47.

<sup>5</sup> Hunt v. Hunt, 14 Pick. 374; Johnson v. Webster, 4 De G., M. & G. 474; Tyrwhitt v. Tyrwhitt, 32 Beav. 244; Morley v. Morley, 25 L. J. Ch. 1; Compton v. Oxden, 2 Ves. Jr. 264; Forbes v. Moffatt, 18 Ves. 390; Horton v. Smith, 4 K. & J. 630; Tomlinson v. Steers, 3 Mer. 210; Smith v. Phillips, 1 Keen, 694; Medly v. Horton, 14 Sim. 226; Brown v. Stead, 5 Sim. 535; Parry v. Wright, 1 S. & S. 369; 5 Russ. 542; Mocatta v. Murgatroyd, 1 P. W. 193; Greswold v. Marsham, 2 Ch. Ca. 170; Garnett v. Armstrong, 2 Conn. & Laws. 458; Watts v. Symes, 16 Sim. 646; Cooper v. Cartwright, 1 John. 679.

<sup>6</sup> Clark v. Tennison, 33 Md. 85.

of his representatives.<sup>1</sup> And the same rule applies, though the tenant for life may be ultimately entitled to the reversion in fee, subject to remainders which fail.<sup>2</sup> Even in this case, evidence may be given that the tenant for life intended the charge to be merged and extinguished.<sup>3</sup> A tenant in tail in possession has the power to convert the estate into an absolute fee; therefore, if he pays off an incumbrance, the presumption is that he intended it to merge.<sup>4</sup> But if the estate of the tenant in fee-simple or in tail is subject to any executory limitations that may defeat their estate, or if they pay off the charges under any mistake as to their title, the court would not allow the charges to merge or become extinguished.<sup>5</sup> But if a person pays or takes up the charges or incumbrances, and afterwards the legal title should come to him, the charges would merge.<sup>6</sup> So if a person, having the legal title and holding charges and incumbrances upon the estate, conveys in fee or in mortgage, and makes no mention of the charges or incumbrances, they would merge as between the grantor and grantee.<sup>7</sup> Generally, where the owner in fee-simple pays off a charge or incumbrance on an estate, the presumption of law is that such charge or incumbrance will merge;<sup>8</sup> but if he owns only a partial inter-

<sup>1</sup> *Pitt v. Pitt*, 22 Beav. 294; *Burrell v. Egremont*, 7 Beav. 205; *Redington v. Redington*, 1 B. & B. 139; *Faulkner v. Daniel*, 3 Hare, 217; *State v. Kock*, 47 Mo. 582.

<sup>2</sup> *Wyndham v. Egremont*, Amb. 753; *Trevor v. Trevor*, 2 M. & K. 675.

<sup>3</sup> *Astley v. Milles*, 1 Sim. 298.

<sup>4</sup> *St. Paul v. Dudley*, 15 Ves. 173; *Buckinghamshire v. Hobart*, 3 Swans. 199; *Jones v. Morgan*, 1 Bro. Ch. 206.

<sup>5</sup> *Drinkwater v. Combe*, 2 S. & S. 340; *Shrewsbury v. Shrewsbury*, 3 Bro. Ch. 120; 1 Ves. Jr. 227; *Wigsell v. Wigsell*, 2 S. & S. 364; *Horton v. Smith*, 4 K. & J. 624; *Buckinghamshire v. Hobart*, 3 Swans. 199; *Kirkham v. Smith*, 1 Ves. 528.

<sup>6</sup> *Horton v. Smith*, 4 K. & J. 624; *Trevor v. Trevor*, 2 M. & K. 675; *Wigsell v. Wigsell*, 2 S. & S. 364.

<sup>7</sup> *Tyler v. Lake*, 4 Sim. 351; *Johnson v. Webster*. 4 De G., M. & G. 474.

<sup>8</sup> *Hood v. Phillips*, 3 Beav. 513; *Pitt v. Pitt*, 22 Beav. 294; *Gunter v. Gunter*, 23 Beav. 571; *Swinfen v. Swinfen*, 29 Beav. 199; *Tyrwhitt v. Tyrwhitt*, 32 Beav. 244.

est, the presumption is that the charge was to be kept on foot.<sup>1</sup> Mere possession of the property by the trustee or by the *cestui que trust* is no evidence of a merger.<sup>2</sup>

§ 349. Sometimes where an estate has been vested by deed or will in trustees for a *cestui que trust*, whether it is a fee or some lesser estate, the law will presume that the trustees have surrendered, conveyed, or assigned the estate, whatever it was, to the *cestui que trust*.<sup>3</sup> This presumption of law is necessary for the quieting of titles. If such presumptions could not be made, some titles would remain for ever imperfect. There might be an outstanding legal estate, which would at any time defeat the tenant, if there could not be a presumption of a conveyance or surrender by the trustee to the *cestui que trust*. This presumption is somewhat different from that prescription by which one tenant by an open, peaceable, and adverse occupation, under a claim of right, obtains the legal title as against another person. In such case, after a definite period of time, a grant or conveyance is presumed in favor of the tenant in occupation, though it may be well enough understood that no such grant or conveyance was ever made. So there may be a presumption that a trustee has conveyed to the *cestui que trust*, though such presumption may not always be founded on a belief that such conveyance was actually made.<sup>4</sup> There is another difficulty between trustees and *cestuis que trust* which

<sup>1</sup> Price v. Gibson, 2 Ed. 115; Swinfen v. Swinfen, 29 Beav. 199; Comp-ton v. Oxenden, 2 Ves. Jr. 263; Donisthorpe v. Porter, 2 Ed. 162.

<sup>2</sup> Broswell v. Downs, 11 Flor. 62.

<sup>3</sup> England v. Slade, 4 T. R. 682; Wilson v. Allen, 1 J. & W. 611; Noel v. Bewley, 3 Sim. 103; Cooke v. Salton, 2 S. & S. 154; Hillary v. Waller, 12 Ves. 239; Lade v. Holford, Bul. N. P. 110; Doe v. Hilder, 2 B. & Ald. 782; Emery v. Grocock, 6 Mad. 54; Townshend v. Champenown, 1 Y. & J. 583; Goodtitle v. Jones, 7 T. R. 47; Doe v. Sybourn, 7 T. R. 2; Moore v. Jackson, 4 Wend. 59; Dutch Church v. Mott, 7 Paige, 77; Jackson v. Moore, 13 John. 513; 1 Green. Cruise, Dig. 412; Matthews v. Ward, 10 Gill & J. 443; Jackson v. Pierce, 2 John. 226; Sinclair v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 543.

<sup>4</sup> Hillary v. Waller, 12 Ves. 252.



does not exist between adverse claimants of the same legal title. The titles of the trustee and *cestui que trust* are not adverse to each other, and generally the possession of the *cestui que trust* is the possession of the trustee; at any rate it is generally consistent with the legal title of the trustee. Therefore, mere length of time as between trustee and *cestui que trust* will afford no ground for a presumption of a conveyance or surrender from the trustee to the *cestui que trust*,<sup>1</sup> as *cestuis que trust* may occupy the estate indefinitely under a merely equitable title.

§ 350. This presumption has been discussed at length in several cases, and some difference of opinion has been expressed;<sup>2</sup> but it seems now to be well settled that three circumstances must concur in order to raise the presumption of a conveyance or surrender by the trustee to the *cestui que trust*: (1.) It must have been the duty of the trustee to make the conveyance; (2.) There must be some sufficient reason to support the presumption; (3.) The presumption must be in support of a just title, and not to defeat it.

§ 351. Thus where the *cestui que trust* becomes absolutely entitled to the whole beneficial interest in the trust estate, and the active duties of the trustee have ceased, the statute of uses generally executes the legal title of the trustee to the *cestui que trust*, and he obtains the legal as well as the beneficial estate. But there are cases where the active duties of the trustee having ceased, the legal title does not pass without a conveyance. In such cases it is clearly the duty of the trustee to convey the legal title to the *cestui que trust*, or to such person as he shall

<sup>1</sup> Keene v. Deardon, 8 East, 263; Goodson v. Ellison, 3 Russ. 588; Hillary v. Waller, 12 Ves. 251; 1 Sugd. V. & P. 350, 470; Flournoy v. Johnson, 7 B. Mon. 694; Doe v. Langdon, 12 Q. B. 719.

<sup>2</sup> Lade v. Holford, Bull. N. P. 110; Doe v. Sybourn, 7 T. R. 2; Goodtitle v. Jones, 7 T. R. 49; Doe v. Read, 8 T. R. 118; see note, 1 Green. Cruise, 410; 2 Pow. on Mort. 491.

appoint.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, if the beneficial owner has been a long time in possession, dealing with the estate in every respect as his own, it will be presumed that the trustee performed his duty and conveyed the legal estate to the proper person. As where a mortgage in fee was made to a trustee for the real mortgagee, and the *cestui que trust* or real mortgagee took a conveyance of the equity of redemption, and ever after dealt with the estate as if the legal fee was in him, a conveyance of the mortgage was presumed to have been made to him by the trustee.<sup>2</sup> There was a use of the estate in this case for one hundred years. Where lands were conveyed to trustees for a religious society, which was afterwards incorporated, it was held, after the use of the land for one hundred and forty years by the incorporated society, that a conveyance by the trustees might be presumed.<sup>3</sup> So where several persons conveyed to a trustee a tract of land for the purposes of a partition by the trustee conveying back to each person his share in severalty, as set forth in the deed, it was held, after an occupation of many years by each person in severalty according to the intended partition, that the trustee might be presumed to have conveyed.<sup>4</sup> Where the trustees are to convey upon a certain event, or at a certain time, as when a minor becomes twenty-one, the presumption will arise after a much shorter lapse of time.<sup>5</sup> Thus, where trustees were to convey to the testator's son immediately on his coming of age, the son became of age in 1788, and granted a long lease in 1789, the court presumed a conveyance in 1792, or only four years after the event, there being no proof of an actual conveyance. Lord Kenyon said

<sup>1</sup> Langley v. Sneyd, 1 S. & S. 45 ; Carteret v. Carteret, 2 P. Wms. 134 ; Angier v. Stannard, 3 M. & K. 571 ; England v. Slade, 4 T. R. 682 ; Goodson v. Ellison, 3 Russ. 583.

<sup>2</sup> Noel v. Bewley, 3 Sim. 103.

<sup>3</sup> Dutch Church v. Mott, 7 Paige, 77.

<sup>4</sup> Jackson v. Moore, 13 John. 513.

<sup>5</sup> Wilson v. Allen, 1 J. & W. 611 ; Hillary v. Waller, 12 Ves. 239 ; Doe v. Sybourn, 7 T. R. 2.

“there was no reason why the jury should not presume a conveyance from the trustees. They were bound to make one, and a court would have compelled them to have done it if they had refused. It is rather to be presumed that they did their duty. And as to time, the jury may be directed to presume a conveyance and surrender in much less time than twenty years.”<sup>1</sup> So where the direction to the trustee to convey applies to only a part of the estate, the court may presume a conveyance of the whole, if the circumstances require or warrant such presumption.<sup>2</sup>

§ 352. If the estate was originally conveyed to trustees for some particular purpose, as by way of security or indemnity, or to raise an annuity or portion, or for any other purpose, as soon as the purpose is accomplished, the trustees become mere dry trustees, and it is their duty to convey the estate to the beneficial owner.<sup>3</sup> Where, from lapse of time joined with other circumstances, there is a moral certainty that the purposes of the trust have all been accomplished, the court will act upon the certainty, and presume a reconveyance, although there is no direct proof of the fact.<sup>4</sup>

§ 353. Where an estate is vested in trustees upon an express trust, they must retain the legal title until the trusts are fully executed. Therefore, no conveyance will be presumed, so long as the trustees have any duties to perform; for that would be to presume a breach of trust, which will never be presumed: the fact must be proved by competent evidence.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *England v. Slade*, 4 T. R. 682; *Marr v. Gilman*, 1 Cold. 488.

<sup>2</sup> *Hillary v. Waller*, 12 Ves. 239.

<sup>3</sup> *Hillary v. Waller*, 12 Ves. 239; *Doe v. Sybourn*, 7 T. R. 2; *Cooke v. Soltau*, 2 S. & S. 154; *Ex parte Holman*, 1 Sugd. V. & P. 509; *Emery v. Grocock*, 6 Mad. 54; *Doe v. Wright*, 2 B. & Ald. 710; *Bartlett v. Downes*, 3 B. & Cr. 616.

<sup>4</sup> *Emery v. Grocock*, 6 Mad. 54; *Hillary v. Waller*, 12 Ves. 252.

<sup>5</sup> *Beach v. Beach*, 14 Vt. 28; *Doe v. Steaple*, 2 T. R. 684; *Keene v. Deardon*, 8 East, 248; *Flournoy v. Johnson*, 7 B. Mon. 694.

In *Aiken v. Smith*, the court presumed that the conveyance was made at the death of the tenant for life, that being the time fixed for the conveyance, and the time when the active duties of the trustees ceased.<sup>1</sup>

§ 354. But there must always be sufficient reason for presuming a reconveyance or surrender by the trustee; that is, there must be some evidence of such a conveyance, or some evidence upon which the presumption of the conveyance may be founded. The mere fact that the trustee was to convey upon the execution of the trust, or upon the happening of a certain event, is not enough. There must be some circumstance from which it may be reasonably concluded that he did in *fact* convey. Mere length of time is not enough.<sup>1</sup> Courts have refused after the lapse of one hundred and twenty years to presume a reconveyance, when there were no intermediate transactions to give force to the length of time;<sup>2</sup> for the possession during all that time may not be inconsistent with the trustee's title.<sup>3</sup> However, great lapse of time is an important circumstance; and the fact that it was the duty of the trustees to convey is another important circumstance. Very slight circumstances added to these will be sufficient to justify a court or jury in presuming a conveyance; and a conveyance may be presumed where the estate has been dealt with by the beneficial owner in a manner in which reasonable men do not deal with their estates, unless they are the legal as well as beneficial owners.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Aiken v. Smith*, 1 Sneed, 304. This case is opposed to *Rees v. Williams*, 2 M. & W. 749.

<sup>2</sup> *Goodright v. Swymmer*, 1 Kenyon, 385; *Goodson v. Ellison*, 3 Russ. 583; *Langley v. Sneyd*, 1 S. & S. 45; *Doe v. Lloyd*, Mathews on Presumptions, 215.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* *Keene v. Deardon*, 8 East, 363; *Hillary v. Waller*, 12 Ves. 250.

<sup>4</sup> *Garrard v. Tuck*, 8 C. B. 248; *Cottrell v. Hughes*, 15 C. B. 532; *Hillary v. Waller*, 12 Ves. 239; *Wilson v. Allen*, 1 J. & W. 611.

§ 355. It is further said that the purpose of the presumption must be to prevent a just title from being defeated by mere matter of form.<sup>1</sup> The presumption is a shield for defence and not a sword for attack, as was said of another principle of law. As the presumption was introduced for the security of estates and the protection of innocent purchasers, it cannot be set up to eject them from their estates; and therefore the presumption will be made only in favor of the person in whom the beneficial title is clearly vested for the time being, whatever may be the extent of his equitable interest.<sup>2</sup> So it was not allowed to be set up in favor of a defendant who showed no title but a mere naked possession, which might have been obtained by a disseisin of the beneficial owner.<sup>3</sup> And where two litigants both claimed to be the beneficial owners, a surrender of an outstanding legal estate or term was not presumed, lest either obtaining it should defeat the other without regard to the merits of his beneficial title.<sup>4</sup>

§ 356. In England there was a system of conveyancing by which outstanding terms were made to attend the legal title and protect it. Much litigation and discussion has been had over these terms, their merging in the legal title, and their presumed surrender. They have very little importance in this country, and the statement of the law concerning them is not deemed necessary.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Lade v. Holford*, Bull. N. P. 110; *Doe v. Sybourn*, 7 T. R. 2; *Goodtitle v. Jones*, 7 T. R. 47.

<sup>2</sup> *Doe v. Cook*, 6 Bing. 179; *Tenny v. Jones*, 10 Bing. 75; *Bartlett v. Downes*, 8 B. & Cr. 616; *Noel v. Bewley*, 3 Sim. 103; *Wilson v. Allen*, 1 J. & W. 611.

<sup>3</sup> *Doe v. Cook*, 6 Bing. 179; *England v. Slade*, 4 T. R. 682; *Doe v. Sybourn*, 7 T. R. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Doe v. Wright*, 2 B. & Ald. 710.

<sup>5</sup> See Hill on Trustees, pp. 253-263.

## CHAPTER XII.

## EXECUTORY TRUSTS.

- §§ 357-359. Nature of an executory trust. The rule in Shelley's case.
- § 360. Distinction between marriage articles and wills.
- § 361. Construction of marriage articles and their correction.
- § 362. Where strict settlements will not be ordered.
- §§ 363, 364. Settlement of personal property.
- § 365. Construction of marriage settlements.
- § 366. Executory trusts under wills.
- § 367. Who may enforce the execution of executory trusts.
- § 368. Inducements for marriage.
- §§ 369, 370. Construction of executory trusts under wills.
- § 371. The words "heirs of the body" and "issue."
- § 372. When courts will reform executory trusts.
- § 373. How courts will direct a settlement of personal chattels.
- § 374. Whether courts will order a settlement in joint-tenancy.
- § 375. What powers the court will order to be inserted in a settlement.
- § 376. Settlement will be ordered *cy près* the intention.

§ 357. It is a fundamental proposition that equitable estates are governed by the same rules as legal estates, otherwise inextricable confusion would ensue.<sup>1</sup> If there was one rule on the equity side, and another on the law side of courts, there would be no certainty or uniformity of interpretation or construction. Thus at common law a grant to A. for life, remainder to the heirs of his body, vested an estate in fee-tail in A., which he could bar, and cut off the remainder. The same rule was applied to *executed* trusts. Thus if land is given to A. and his heirs in trust for B. for life, remainder to the heirs of his body, B. takes an equitable fee-tail;<sup>2</sup> for the same rules apply

<sup>1</sup> *Frye v. Porter*, 1 Mod. 300; *Price v. Sisson*, 2 Beas. 168; *Cowper v. Cowper*, 2 P. Wm. 753; *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 Wm. Black. 123.

<sup>2</sup> This illustration states the law only in States where the rule in Shelley's case, as it is called, is in force. In States where the rule is abrogated by statute, those who take in remainder under the limitation, take as purchasers; and the same rule applies to equitable estates.

to the two species of estate.<sup>1</sup> Therefore where technical words are used in the creation of an executed trust estate, they will be taken in their legal technical sense,<sup>2</sup> though Lord Hardwicke once added this qualification, "unless the intention of the testator or author of the trust plainly appeared to the contrary."<sup>3</sup> But this qualification has been time and again overruled, and it is now an established canon that a limitation in trust, perfected and declared by the settlor, shall have the same construction as in the case of an executed legal estate.<sup>4</sup> But while technical words receive their technical meaning in equitable as well as legal estates, technical words are not always necessary to create and limit equitable estates in fee. Thus an equitable fee may be created in a deed without the word "heirs," and an equitable entail without the words "heirs of the body," if the words used in their popular sense are equivalent to the technical words, or if the intention is sufficiently expressed and clear.<sup>5</sup> Thus if an estate is *devised* to A. and his heirs in trust for B. without other limitations, B. will take an equitable fee; for it is plain that B. is to take an equitable estate as large as the legal estate that passed to A. and his heirs, which is a legal fee.<sup>6</sup> But if an estate is conveyed by *deed* to A. and his heirs in trust for the grantor for life, remainder for his children, without the word "heirs," the children take an estate for life only, in analogy to the rules of law.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Noble v. Andrews, 37 Conn. 346.

<sup>2</sup> Wright v. Pearson, 1 Ed. 125; Bale v. Coleman, 8 Vin. 268; Jerboise v. Northumberland, 1 J. & W. 571; McPherson v. Snowden, 19 Md. 197.

<sup>3</sup> Garth v. Baldwin, 2 Ves. 655.

<sup>4</sup> Brydges v. Brydges, 3 Ves. Jr. 125; Austen v. Taylor, 1 Ed. 367; Glenorchy v. Bosville, Ca. t. Talb. 19; Synge v. Hales, 2 B. & B. 507; Wright v. Pearson, 1 Ed. 125.

<sup>5</sup> Shep. Touch. by Preston, 106.

<sup>6</sup> Moore v. Cleghorn, 10 Beav. 423; 12 Jur. 591; Knight v. Selby, 3 Man. & Gr. 92; Doe v. Cafe, 7 Exch. 675; Watkins v. Weston, 32 Beav. 238; McClintock v. Irving, 10 Ir. Ch. 481; Brennan v. Boyne, 16 Ir. Ch. 87; Betty v. Elliott, 16 Ir. Ch. 110 n.; Re Bayley, 16 Ir. Ch. 215.

<sup>7</sup> Halliday v. Overton, 14 Beav. 467; 15 Beav. 480; 16 Jur. 71; Lucas

§ 358. The rule in Shelley's case was never a rule of intention, or of construction to reach and carry out the settlor's intention ; but it was established as an absolute rule of property to obviate certain difficulties that would arise in relation to tenures, if certain persons to whom property was limited were allowed to take as purchasers, and not by descent.<sup>1</sup> It is notorious that the rule disappointed the intention of settlors in most cases, and gave an absolute disposal of the inheritance to the first taker, where the settlor intended that such first taker should have only an estate for life.<sup>2</sup> As trusts are wholly inde-

*v. Brandreth*, 28 Beav. 274 ; *Tatham v. Vernon*, 29 Beav. 604 ; *Nelson v. Davis*, 35 Ind. 474.

<sup>1</sup> Doeblen's App. 64 Penn. St. 9.

<sup>2</sup> For these reasons, the rule is now abolished in many of the States by statute. The proposition of the text, however, should be read in the light of the remarks of Agnew, J., in *Yarnall's App.* 70 Penn. St. 340. "In regard to wills the cases show that technical phrases, as well as forms of expression decided in other cases, are not permitted to overturn the intent of the testator, when that intent is clearly ascertained to be different in the will under examination by the court. This broad principle needs no citation to support it, for it is founded on the universal rule that the intention of the testator is the guide for the interpretation of wills. The rule in Shelley's case is only an apparent not a real exception to this statement. It sacrifices a particular intent only to give effect to the main intent of the testator. All the authorities that this rule has no place in the interpretation of wills, and takes effect only when the interpretation has been first ascertained. Mr. Fearn, *Contingent Remainders*, p. 188, says, 'Nothing can be better founded than Mr. Hargrave's doctrine, that the rule in Shelley's case is no medium for finding out the intention of the testator ; that, on the contrary, the rule supposes the intention already discovered and to be a superadded succession to the heirs, general or special, of the donee for life, by making such donee the ancestor *terminus* or *stirps*, from which the generation of posterity or heirs is to be accounted ; and that whether the conveyance has or has not so constituted an estate of freehold, with a succession engrafted on it, is a previous question which ought to be adjusted before the rule is thought of ; that, to resolve that point, the ordinary rules for interpreting the language of wills ought to be resorted to ; that when it is once settled that the donor or testator has used words of inheritance according to their legal import, has applied them intentionally to comprise the whole line of heirs of the tenant for life, and has really made him the *terminus*, or ancestor by reference to whom the succession is to be regulated, then comes the proper time to inspect the rule in Shelley's case.' In *Hileman v. Bous-*



pendent of tenure, they ought not to be affected by the rule, and a few cases have seemed to indicate that they were withdrawn from the operation of it;<sup>1</sup> but it is now established that the same rule shall apply to the same limitation whether it is of an equitable or a legal estate.<sup>2</sup> Thus the rule in Shelley's case will be applied to a gift to A. and his heirs in trust for B. for life, and remainder to his heirs, or heirs of his body. The reason of the rule as applied to legal estates was some real or fancied difficulty concerning tenures, or to bring estates one generation sooner into commerce, or some other reason; for neither judges nor text-writers are agreed upon the original reasons of the rule. The reason of the application of the rule to limitations of trust estates is to preserve a uniformity of the law in relation to the two kinds of estates in land. This leads Mr. Lewin to say, that although the rule is not *equally applicable* to trust estates, yet it is *equally applied*.<sup>3</sup> But the rule will not be applied to vest a fee or fee-tail in the first taker, unless the word "heir" is used as a term of succession, and not as a mere *designatio personæ*. Thus if an estate be *devised* to A. and his heirs in trust for B. for life, and after his decease in trust for the person who shall then be his heir, B. takes an estate for life only, and the person thus designated takes the estate by purchase.<sup>4</sup> So if the legal estate is given to A. *in trust* for B. for life, and the legal remainder to the heirs of B.,

laugh, 1 Harris, 351, Ch. J. Gibson expresses the same idea in fewer words, thus: 'This operates only on the intention of the testator when it has been ascertained, not on the meaning of the words used to express it. The ascertainment is left to the ordinary rules of construction peculiar to wills; but when this is ascertained, is found to be within the rule, then there is but one way; it admits of no exceptions.'

<sup>1</sup> Withers v. Allgood, cited, and Bagshaw v. Spencer, 1 Ves. 150.

<sup>2</sup> Garth v. Baldwin, 2 Ves. 646; Wright v. Parsons, 1 Ed. 128; Brydges v. Brydges, 3 Ves. 120; Jones v. Morgan, 1 Bro. Ch. 206; Webb v. Shaftesbury, 3 M. & K. 599; Roberts v. Dixwell, 1 Atk. 610; West, 536; Britton v. Twining, 3 Mer. 175; Spence v. Spence, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 199; Coape v. Arnold, 2 Sm. & Gif. 311; Noble v. Andrews, 37 Conn. 346.

<sup>3</sup> Lewin on Trusts, 88 (5th ed.).

<sup>4</sup> Greaves v. Simpson, 10 Jur. (N. S.) 609.

at his decease the rule cannot apply ; for the legal and equitable estate cannot so coalesce that B. can take a fee either legal or equitable.<sup>1</sup>

§ 359. But in order that technical words may receive their legal signification, and in order that the rule in Shelley's case may be applied to limitations of equitable estates, the trusts must be *executed* and *not executory*.<sup>2</sup> All trusts are *executory*

<sup>1</sup> Collier v. McBean, 34 Beav. 426.

<sup>2</sup> Egerton v. Brownlow, 4 H. L. Ca. 210 ; Rochford v. Fitzmaurice, 2 Dr. & W. 20 ; 4 Ir. Eq. 384 ; Tatham v. Vernon, 29 Beav. 604 ; Bacon's App. 57 Penn. St. 504. This distinction was very early established. Bale v. Coleman, 8 Vin. 267 ; Stamford v. Hobart, 3 Bro. P. C. 33 ; Papillon v. Voice, 2 P. Wms. 471 ; Glenorchy v. Bosville, t. Talb. 3 ; Gower v. Grosvenor, Barn. 62 ; Roberts v. Dixwell, 1 Atk. 607 ; Baskerville v. Baskerville, 2 Atk. 279 ; Woodhouse v. Haskins, 3 Atk. 24 ; Read v. Snell, 2 Atk. 648 ; Marryat v. Townley, 1 Ves. 102. Several of these cases were decided by Lord Hardwicke ; but in Bagshaw v. Spencer, 1 Ves. 152, he nearly confounded and denied the distinction. In Exel v. Wallace, 2 Ves. 233, however, Lord Hardwicke explained his meaning, and desired to have it remembered that he did not mean to say that his predecessors were wrong. The distinction, as stated in the text, is now firmly established both in England and the United States. Barnard v. Proby, 2 Cox, 8 ; Wright v. Pearson, 1 Ed. 125 ; Austen v. Taylor, 1 Ed. 366 ; Stanley v. Lennard, 1 Ed. 95 ; Lincoln v. Newcastle, 12 Ves. 227 ; Jervoise v. Northumberland, 1 J. & W. 570 ; Deerhurst v. St. Albans, 5 Mad. 233 ; 2 Cl. & Fin. 611 ; Blackburn v. Stables, 2 V. & B. 369 ; Douglass v. Congreve, 1 Beav. 59 ; 4 Bing. N. C. 1 ; 5 Bing. N. C. 318 ; Boswell v. Dillon, 1 Dru. 297 ; Neves v. Scott, 9 How. 211 ; 13 How. 268 ; 4 Kent, Com. 218 *et seq.* ; Garner v. Garner, 1 Des. 444 ; Porter v. Doby, 2 Rich. Eq. 49 ; Dennison v. Goehring, 7 Barr, 177 ; Findlay v. Riddle, 3 Binn. 152 ; Edmondson v. Dyson, 2 Kelly, 307 ; Wiley v. Smith, 3 Kelly, 559 ; Wood v. Burnham, 6 Paige, 518 ; 26 Wend. 19 ; Imlay v. Huntington, 20 Conn. 162 ; Berry v. Williamson, 11 B. Mon. 251 ; Horne v. Lyethe, 4 H. & J. 434 ; Loring v. Hunter, 8 Yerg. 31 ; Bold v. Hutchinson, 5 De G., M. & G. 558. Lord Northington said that the words " executory " trusts seemed to him to have no fixed signification. Lord King said a trust was executory where the party must come into court to have the benefit of the will. Mr. Lewin says the true criterion is where the assistance of the court is necessary to complete the limitations, p. 89. Lord Eldon said the trust was executory where the testator had not completed the devise, but had left something to be done, so that the court must look to the intention. Jervoise v. Northumberland, 1 J. & W. 570. Lord St. Leonards distinguishes the two as follows : " Has

in one sense of the word ; that is, the trustee must have some duty, either active or passive, to perform, so that the statute of uses shall not execute the estate in the *cestui que trust*, and leave nothing in the trustee.<sup>1</sup> But such is not the meaning of judges when they speak of *executed* trusts, and *executory* trusts. These words refer rather to the manner and perfection of their creation, than to the action of the trustee in administering the property. Thus a trust created by a deed or will, so clear and certain in all its terms and limitations that a trustee has nothing to do but to carry out all the provisions of the instrument according to its letter, is called an *executed* trust. In these trusts, technical words receive their legal meaning, and the rules applicable to legal estates govern the equitable estates thus created.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, an *executory* trust is where an estate is conveyed to a trustee upon trust, to be by him conveyed or settled upon other trusts in certain contingencies, or upon certain events, and these other trusts are imperfectly stated, or mere outlines of them are stated, to be afterwards drawn out in a formal manner, and are to be carried into effect according to the final form which the details and limitations shall take under the directions thus given.<sup>3</sup> They are called *executory*, not because the trust is to be performed in the future, but because the trust instrument itself is to be moulded into form and perfected according to the outlines or instructions made or left by the settlor or testator.<sup>3</sup>

the testator been what is called, and very properly called, his own conveyancer? Has he left it to the court to make out, from general expressions, what his intention is, or has he so defined that intention that you have nothing to do but to take that which is given you, and to convert them into legal estates?" *Egerton v. Brownlow*, 4 H. L. Ca. 210.

<sup>1</sup> *Bagshaw v. Spencer*, 1 Ves. 142 ; *Egerton v. Brownlow*, 4 H. L. Ca. 210 ; *Coape v. Arnold*, 4 De G., M. & G. 585.

<sup>2</sup> *Wright v. Pearson*, 1 Ed. 125 ; *Austen v. Taylor*, 1 Ed. 367 ; 4 Kent, Com. 220 ; *Jones v. Morgan*, 1 Bro. Ch. 206 ; *Jervoise v. Northumberland*, 1 J. & W. 559 ; *Boswell v. Dillon*, 1 Dru. 291.

<sup>3</sup> *Austen v. Taylor*, 1 Ed. 366 ; *Wright v. Pearson*, 1 Ed. 125 ; *Jervoise v. Northumberland*, 1 J. & W. 570 ; *Coape v. Arnold*, 4 De G., M. & G.

Thus land conveyed to A. upon trust, to settle the same upon B. and C. and their issue, in the event of their marriage, is an *executory trust*.<sup>1</sup> There is a conveyance or settlement to be executed by A., and the form or terms of this conveyance or settlement is to be determined by the intention of the original grantor.<sup>1</sup> When this conveyance or settlement is finally determined and made, the trust becomes *executed* in the sense of the word as applicable to this distinction, and it is afterwards governed by all the rules of an executed trust. The difference between the two kinds of trusts is this. In *executed* trusts the rules of property govern, and not the intention of the settlor, if it is contrary to the law or rule of property.<sup>2</sup> Thus if, in an executed trust, an estate is given to A. in trust for B. for life, with remainder to his heirs, B. takes an equitable fee, and may convey the equitable inheritance and exclude his heirs, although it is perfectly certain that the settlor intended that B. should take an estate for his life only.<sup>2</sup> But an executory trust is settled and carried into effect according to the *intention* of the settlor.<sup>3</sup> Thus if an estate is conveyed to A. in trust, with instructions to convey it to B. for life,

585; *Neves v. Scott*, 9 How. 211; *Wiley v. Smith*, 3 Kelly, 559; *Edmondson v. Dyson*, 2 Kelly, 307; *Wood v. Burnham*, 6 Paige, 518; 26 Wend. 19; *Thompson v. Fisher*, L. R. 10 Eq. 207.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> *Choice v. Marshall*, 1 Kelly, 97; *Schoonmaker v. Sheely*, 3 Hill. 165; *Kingsland v. Rapelye*, 3 Edw. 2; *Brant v. Gelston*, 2 John. Ca. 384.

<sup>3</sup> *Wood v. Burnham*, 6 Paige, 513; 26 Wend. 9; 4 Kent, Com. 219; 1 West. Ch. t. Hardwicke, 542. A mere direction to convey will not render the trust executory, if the directions are so clear, and the limitations are so certainly defined, that there is nothing to do but to convey in accordance with them. In order that the trust may be executory, there must be some room for construction; in order to determine the intention of the settlor; that is, to determine what limitation shall be, and what shall not be, introduced into the conveyance to be made. *Egerton v. Brownlow*, 4 H. L. Ca. 210; *Austen v. Taylor*, 1 Ed. 361; *Wight v. Leigh*, 15 Ves. 564; *Graham v. Stewart*, 2 Macq. H. L. Ca. 205; *Herbert v. Blunden*, 1 Dr. & Walsh, 78; *East v. Twyford*, 9 Hare, 713; *Doncaster v. Doncaster*, 3 K. & J. 26; *Stanley v. Stanley*, 16 Ves. 491; *Glenorchy v. Bosville*, 1 Lead. Ca. Eq. 20, and notes.

with remainder to his heirs, or to convey it in trust for B. for life, with remainder to his heirs, B. takes an estate for life only, and his heirs take by purchase at his decease, if such appeared to be the intention of the original gift or grant.<sup>1</sup>

§ 360. In the history of executory trusts, still another distinction has been drawn, or a distinction between executory trusts created by marriage articles, and executory trusts created by wills. This is not so much a difference between two classes of executory trusts, as it is a difference between the rules that will be applied to the interpretation of *marriage articles and of wills*, in order to determine the intention of the settlor or the testator. Lord Eldon once said, that “there was no difference in the execution of an executory trust created by will, and a covenant in marriage articles; such a distinction would shake to their foundation the rules of equity.”<sup>2</sup> But the great chancellor afterwards modified his expression.<sup>3</sup> And certainly there is no difference in the execution of the two trusts when it is settled what they are; but there is a difference in the construction of marriage articles and of wills in order to reach the intention of the creator of the trusts. Thus, in marriage articles, the intention of the parties to the articles is presumed to be a provision for the issue of the marriage, and such construction is given to the articles as to carry into effect this presumed intention if possible; while in construing wills, in order to settle the limitations of a trust, there is no such presumed leading intention; or as Sir W. Grant put it, “I know of no difference between an executory trust in marriage articles and in a will, except that the object and

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.; *Savage v. Tyers*, L. R. 8 Ch. 356.

<sup>2</sup> *Lincoln v. Newcastle*, 12 Ves. 230; and see *Turner v. Sargent*, 17 Beav. 519; *Reed v. Palmer*, 53 Penn. St. 379.

<sup>3</sup> *Jervoise v. Northumberland*, 1 J. & W. 574; *Mayer v. Townsend*, 3 Beav. 443; *Lassence v. Tierney*, 1 Mac. & G. 551; *Gardner v. Stevens*, 30 L. J. Ch. 199; *Crofton v. Davies*, L. R. 4 C. P. 159.

purpose of the former furnish an indication of intention, which must be wanting in the latter. Where the object is to make a provision by the settlement for the issue of a marriage, it is not to be presumed that the parties meant to put it in the power of the father to defeat that purpose, and appropriate the estate to himself. If, therefore, the agreement be to limit an estate for life with remainder to the heirs of the body, the court decrees a strict settlement in conformity to the presumable intention. But if a will directs a limitation for life with remainder to the heirs of the body, the court has no such ground for decreeing a strict settlement.”<sup>1</sup>

§ 361. Thus if, in marriage articles, the real estate of the husband or of the wife is limited to the *heirs of the body* or to the *issue*<sup>2</sup> of the contracting parties, or either of them, or to the issue of the body, or to the issue and their heirs,<sup>3</sup> so that the words and limitations, taken in their legal sense, would enable the parents, or one of them, to defeat this provision for the children, equity will construe the articles to mean that the estate is limited to the parents for life, and the children will take at the decease of their parent or parents as purchasers; and equity will decree a formal settlement to be drawn in such way as to carry out this purpose.<sup>4</sup> If a settlement is already drawn *after* the marriage, but not in accordance with this rule, equity will correct and reform it so as to carry out

<sup>1</sup> *Blackburn v. Stables*, 2 Ves. & B. 369; *Bale v. Coleman*, 8 Vin. 267; *Strafford v. Powell*, 1 B. & B. 25; *Synge v. Hales*, 2 B. & B. 508; *Maguire, v. Scully*, 2 Hog. 113; *Rochford v. Fitzmaurice*, 1 Con. & Laws. 173; 2 Dru. & W. 18; 4 Ir. Eq. 375; *Jervoise v. Northumberland*, 1 J. & W. 574; *Deerhurst v. St. Albans*, 5 Mad. 260.

<sup>2</sup> *Dod v. Dod*, Amb. 274.

<sup>3</sup> *Phillips v. James*, 2 Dr. & Sm. 404.

<sup>4</sup> *Handick v. Wilkes*, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 393; *Gilb. Eq.* 114; *Trevor v. Trevor*, 1 P. Wms. 622; *Rochford v. Fitzmaurice*, 1 Con. & Laws. 173; 2 Dr. & War. 18; 4 Ir. Eq. 375; *Cusack v. Cusack*, 5 Bro. P. C. 116; *Davies v. Davies*, 4 Beav. 54; *Griffith v. Buckle*, 2 Vern. 13; *Jones v. Langton*, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 392; *Stonor v. Curwen*, 5 Sim. 269; *Barnaby v. Griffin*, 3 Ves. 206; *Horne v. Barton*, 19 Ves. 398; *Coop.* 257; 22 L. J. (N. s.) Ch. 225.

this intention.<sup>1</sup> But if the settlement was formally drawn out before marriage contrary to this rule, the court will presume that the parties abandoned the articles, and entered into a new agreement, as expressed in the settlement.<sup>2</sup> If, however, a settlement before marriage is expressed on its face to be made to carry out the articles, and it does not carry them out in this respect, equity will reform it.<sup>3</sup> So if it can be shown in any other way that the formal settlement was intended to carry out the articles, and it does not do so, equity will reform it on the ground of mistake,<sup>4</sup> or if the settlement is made in the very words of the articles, and the legal effect of the words of the articles and settlement is different from the intention of the parties, the settlement will be corrected and reformed in order to carry out the exact intention of the parties.<sup>5</sup> If, however, there are any intervening rights as those of an innocent purchaser, without notice, his rights of course will be protected.<sup>6</sup> So it is established that daughters are included under the general term of *heirs* or *issue*, and that they take as purchasers.<sup>7</sup> And children include children.<sup>8</sup> This has been held in England.<sup>9</sup> Of course

<sup>1</sup> *Warrick v. Warrick*, 3 Atk. 293; *Sheatfield v. Sheatfield*, Ca. t. Talb. 176; *Legg v. Goldwire*, ib. 20; *Burton v. Hastings*, Gilb. Eq. 113; overruling same case, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 393; *Briscoe v. Briscoe*, 7 Ir. 129.

<sup>2</sup> *Legg v. Goldwire*, Ca. t. Talbot, 20; *Warrick v. Warrick*, 3 Atk. 291.

<sup>3</sup> *Honor v. Honor*, 1 P. Wms. 123; *West v. Errissey*, 2 P. Wms. 349; *Roberts v. Kingsley*, 1 Ves. 238.

<sup>4</sup> *Bold v. Hutchinson*, 5 De G., M. & G. 568; *Rogers v. Earl*, 1 Dick. 294; 1 Sugd. V. & P. 143.

<sup>5</sup> *West v. Errissey*, 2 P. Wms. 349; *Roberts v. Kingsley*, 1 Ves. 238; *Honor v. Honor*, 1 P. Wms. 128; 2 Vern. 658; *Powell v. Price*, 2 P. Wms. 535; *Gaillard v. Pardon*, 1 McMul. Eq. 358; *Neves v. Scott*, 9 How. 197; *Gause v. Hale*, 2 Ired. Eq. 241; *Smith v. Maxwell*, 1 Hill, Eq. 101; *Allen v. Rumph*, 2 Hill, Eq. 1; *Briscoe v. Briscoe*, 7 Ir. Eq. 129.

<sup>6</sup> *Warrick v. Warrick*, 3 Atk. 291; *Trevor v. Trevor*, 1 P. Wms. 622; *West v. Errissey*, 2 P. Wms. 349. But if the purchaser have notice of the articles, they may be enforced against him. *Davies v. Davies*, 4 Beav. 54; *Thompson v. Simpson*, 1 Dr. & W. 491; *Abbott v. Geraghty*, 4 Ir. Eq. 15.

<sup>7</sup> *West v. Errissey*, 2 P. Wms. 349; *Comyn*, R. 412; 1 Bro. P. C. 225.

<sup>8</sup> *Scott v. Moore*, 1 Wins. N. C. Eq. 98.

<sup>9</sup> *Burton v. Hastings*, 2 P. Wms. 535; Gilb. Eq. 113; 1 Eq. Ca. Ab

in the United States where primogeniture is abolished, estates will be settled upon sons and daughters equally, or upon daughters alone in default of sons. But if the children or issue of the marriage are provided for in some other way, as by portions to be raised for them in such manner that it appears that they are not intended to take as purchasers of the particular estate under the settlement, then the rule in Shelley's case will prevail, and the parents or parent may sell the whole estate.<sup>1</sup> And so where there is an actual present conveyance of personal property by a marriage contract executed before marriage in trust for the wife, and at her death to the heirs of her body, it was held to be an executed trust, there being no further conveyances to be executed, and that the rule in Shelley's case applied.<sup>2</sup>

§ 362. In England, when a married woman could not convey her interest in real estate, a strict settlement was not ordered under marriage articles that limited the *husband's* estate to the heirs of the body of the wife, for the reason that this created an entail that could not be barred without considerable difficulty; but since the Fines and Recoveries Act, the difficulty is removed.<sup>3</sup> Nor will the court order a strict settlement, if there is any thing in the nature of the limitations or otherwise on the face of the articles, which indicates that such was not the intention of the parties, for the reason that the rule now under discussion was established in order to carry out the intention of the parties. If, therefore, the intention of the parties appears to be in accordance with, or not contrary to,

393; *Hart v. Middlehurst*, 3 Atk. 371; *Maguire v. Scully*, 2 Hog. 113; 1 Beat. 370; *Marryat v. Townley*, 1 Ves. 105; *Phillips v. Jones*, 4 Dr. & Sm. 406; 3 De G., J. & S. 72.

<sup>1</sup> *Powell v. Price*, 2 P. Wms. 535; *Fearne's Con. Rem.* 103.

<sup>2</sup> *Carroll v. Renick*, 7 Sm. & M. 799; *Tillinghast v. Coggershall*, 7 R. I. 383.

<sup>3</sup> *Rochford v. Fitzmaurice*, 2 Dru. & W. 19; *Highway v. Banner*, 1 Bro. Ch. 587; *Howel v. Howel*, 2 Ves. 358; *Green v. Ekins*, 2 Atk. 477; *Honor v. Honor*, 1 P. Wms. 123.



the ordinary rule, the ordinary rule will be allowed to prevail.<sup>1</sup>

§ 363. If personal property is agreed to be settled on the parents for life, and then to their heirs, or the heirs of their bodies, the chattels will not vest in the parents absolutely, but in the heirs when they are born ;<sup>2</sup> and it is not necessary that they should survive their parents, or become actual heirs,<sup>3</sup> unless the gift is to the parents and their heirs living at the death of the surviving parent, or there are other equivalent words.<sup>4</sup>

§ 364. If there is a covenant in marriage articles to settle personal property upon the same trusts, and for the same purposes, as the real estate is settled, the court will not apply the same limitations to the personal as to the real estate, for that would be to vest an absolute interest in the heirs at their birth ; but the court will insert a provision making the personal property follow the course of the real estate.<sup>5</sup> Courts will also

<sup>1</sup> Ibid. *Power v. Price*, 2 P. Wms. 535 ; *Chambers v. Chambers*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 35 ; *Fitzg.* 127.

<sup>2</sup> *Hodgeson v. Bussey*, 2 Atk. 89 ; *Barn.* 195 ; *Bartlett v. Green*, 13 Sim. 218.

<sup>3</sup> *Theebridge v. Kilburne*, 2 Ves. 233.

<sup>4</sup> *Read v. Snell*, 2 Atk. 642.

<sup>5</sup> *Stanley v. Leigh*, 2 P. Wms. 690 ; *Gower v. Grosvenor*, *Barn.* 63 ; 5 *Mad.* 348 ; *Newcastle v. Lincoln*, 3 Ves. 387, 394, 397 ; *Scarsdale v. Curzon*, 1 John. & Hem. 51. The matter referred to in the text seldom or never arises in the marriage settlements made in the United States, as primogeniture is abolished, and entails on the eldest son are seldom resorted to. But where personal chattels are made to vest under a marriage settlement in the eldest son as heir, and such son dies under age, very awkward effects follow ; and, under covenants to settle personal property upon the same limitations as are applied to a settlement of real estate wherein the eldest son takes as heir, it was a matter of great discussion in the Court of Chancery and in the House of Lords, what kind of provisions ought to be inserted to protect the parents and other children in case the eldest son died under age and without issue. *Newcastle v. Lincoln*, 3 Ves. 387 ; 12 Ves. 218.

insert a provision that the children or issue shall take, as tenants in common, and not as joint-tenants, on account of the inconveniences of joint-tenancies, and from the presumed intention of the parties ;<sup>1</sup> and so the court will insert other words and conditions, and vary the literal instruction of the articles in order to carry out the presumed intention, and promote a convenient settlement for the protection and security of all the parties,<sup>2</sup> as if the settlement is to be of all the property which the settlor might thereafter become entitled to, it will be construed to embrace only the property acquired during the marriage.<sup>3</sup> The court will not always order a formal settlement to be drawn out, but will declare the meaning and intention of the articles, and leave the parties to act upon the declaration, as if it was a formal settlement drawn out and executed by them.<sup>4</sup> So the court will sometimes rectify the settlement drawn under articles by a decree, without ordering a new deed to be drawn out and executed.<sup>5</sup>

§ 365. Marriage settlements, whether made in pursuance of articles, or under directions contained in wills, or under decrees of the court, are matters in which courts exercise the most liberal principles of equity. If a settlement is drawn up under a decree, and it is not in all respects in accordance with the decree, the court will set it aside, and order a new settlement.<sup>6</sup> In *Grout v. Van Schoonhoven*, the court ordered a new settlement, in substance that the trust should be for the

<sup>1</sup> *Taggart v. Taggart*, 1 Sch. & L. 88; *Rigden v. Vallier*, 3 Atk. 734; *Marryat v. Townley*, 1 Ves. 103. Joint-tenancy is abolished by statute in most of the United States, with the exception, in some States, of gifts and grants to husband and wife.

<sup>2</sup> *Kentish v. Newman*, 1 P. Wms. 234; *Martin v. Martin*, 2 R. & M. 507; *Master v. De Croismar*, 11 Beav. 184; *Targus v. Puget*, 2 Ves. 194.

<sup>3</sup> *Steinberger v. Potter*, 3 Green, Ch. 452.

<sup>4</sup> *Byam v. Byam*, 19 Beav. 58.

<sup>5</sup> *Tebbitt v. Tebbitt*, 1 De G. & Sm. 506.

<sup>6</sup> *Temple v. Hawley*, 1 Sand. Ch. 154.

wife during her life without power of anticipating the income ; and upon her death for the use of her husband for life, in case he survived her ; and, after the death of both, to be divided equally among all their children then living, and the descendants of such as had died leaving issue, *per stirpes* ; with a power to make advances with the approbation of the trustees to the children, on their attaining full age or being married, out of the capital fund, in anticipation of the ultimate distribution, in order to set them up in the world.<sup>1</sup> An advance cannot be made in order that a child may put the money in its pocket, but an advance may be made to trustees under a marriage settlement for a child.<sup>2</sup> Where there was power of advancement to a married woman, it was held that an advance to her husband to set him up in business might be allowed ;<sup>3</sup> and so where there was power in a settlement to withdraw funds, and lay them out in the purchase of a trade for the benefit of husband and wife, the power may be exercised for the benefit of one after the death of the other.<sup>4</sup> In *Imlay v. Huntington*, a husband covenanted that he would pay over to certain trustees \$10,000, and one-half of certain other expected moneys of his intended wife, to be held by said trustees in trust for the wife for the term of twenty years, after which time they were to convey to such persons as the wife should appoint. The marriage was consummated, and the husband received \$60,000, which he continued to hold and manage as his own during the lifetime of his wife, making no payment to the trustees, and neither the trustees nor the wife requesting him to pay the sum over, or to make any settlement in pursuance of the articles. On the death of the wife, at the end of twenty years, her brothers and sisters, there being no issue of the marriage, applied to the court by bill in equity for the execution of the marriage settle-

<sup>1</sup> *Grout v. Van Schoonhoven*, 1 Sand. Ch. 342.

<sup>2</sup> *Roper v. Curzon*, L. R. 11 Eq. 452.

<sup>3</sup> *In re Kershaw's Trust*, L. R. 6 Eq. 322.

<sup>4</sup> *Doorly v. Arnold*, 18 W. R. 540.

ment, in accordance with the articles and covenants entered into by the husband before marriage: but it was held that it was competent for the wife to discharge the husband from the fulfilment of the covenants, and to abandon the trust; that, under the circumstances of the case, the articles were abandoned by the wife and all the parties; that the wife's personal property vested absolutely in the husband; and that the wife's heirs had no right to maintain the bill for any part of her personal estate.<sup>1</sup>

§ 366. In executory trusts created by *wills*, no presumption arises *a priori* that a provision was intended for the children of the first taker, as in marriage settlements, and that such children were intended to take as purchasers. If the trust be "for A. and the heirs of his body,"<sup>2</sup> or "for A. and the heirs of his body and their heirs,"<sup>3</sup> or "for A. for life and after his decease to the heirs of his body,"<sup>4</sup> A. will be tenant in tail; and he may disappoint his heirs by barring the entail. So, where a testator directed an estate to be settled on his "daughter and her children, and, if she died without issue," remainder over, the court held that the daughter was tenant in tail; and that in a voluntary devise the court must take it as they find it, though upon like words in a marriage settlement it might be different.<sup>5</sup> So where a testator directed lands to be settled on his "nephew for life, remainder to the heirs male of his body, and the heirs male of every such heir male severally and successively, one after another, as they should be in seniority and priority of birth, every elder and the heirs male of his body to be preferred

<sup>1</sup> *Imlay v. Huntington*, 20 Conn. 146; *Jones v. Higgins*, L. R. 2 Eq. 538.

<sup>2</sup> *Harrison v. Naylor*, 2 Cox, 247; *Bagshaw v. Spencer*, 1 Ves. 151; *Marshall v. Bousley*, 2 Mad. 166; *Robertson v. Johnston*, 36 Ala. 197.

<sup>3</sup> *Marryat v. Townley*, 1 Ves. 104.

<sup>4</sup> *Blackburn v. Stables*, 2 V. & B. 370; *Seale v. Seale*, 1 P. Wms. 290; *Meure v. Meure*, 2 Atk. 266; *Robertson v. Johnston*, 36 Ala. 197.

<sup>5</sup> *Sweetapple v. Bindon*, 2 Vern. 536.

before the younger," it was held that, although the nephew took by a voluntary executory devise, the court must execute it in the words of the will and according to the rules of law, and that equity could not carry the words further than the same words would operate at law, and that the nephew took an estate tail. The words in this case all went upon the idea of an entail.<sup>1</sup> So if there is a direction that the trustees shall not give up their trust until "a proper entail was made to the heir male by them."<sup>2</sup> But in another similar executory trust, Lord Eldon declined to compel a purchaser to accept the title, on the ground that the entail was too doubtful to be acted upon in so grave a matter.<sup>3</sup> Where a testator devised real estate to his daughter, then unmarried, in trust for her heirs, she to receive the income for her and their support and education, and, if she should die leaving no heirs, then over to her brothers and sisters, it was held that the word income passed the estate to the daughter, that the word heirs was a word of limitation, and that the daughter took an estate tail.<sup>4</sup>

§ 367. In executory trusts under marriage articles, many distinctions arise upon the question, Who may enforce their specific performance, and compel the execution of the formal deed and the disposal of the property in accordance with the settlement that should have been made under the articles? Thus the general rule is, that parties, seeking a specific execution of such articles, must be those who come strictly within the reach and influence of the consideration of the marriage, or who claim through them, as the wife, or the husband, and the issue of the husband or wife, or both. As a general rule, mere volunteers, or collateral relatives of husband or wife, cannot interfere and

<sup>1</sup> *Legatt v. Sewell*, 2 Vern. 551; *McPherson v. Snowden*, 19 Md. 197.

<sup>2</sup> *Blackburn v. Stables*, 2 V. & B. 367; *Marshall v. Bousley*, 2 Mad. 166; *Dodson v. Dodson*, 3 Bro. Ch. 405.

<sup>3</sup> *Jervoise v. Northumberland*, 1 J. & W. 559; *Woolmore v. Burrows*, 1 Sim. 512.

<sup>4</sup> *Allen v. Henderson*, 49 Penn. St. 333.

ask for a specific performance of the articles.<sup>1</sup> But there are so many exceptions and qualifications to this rule, that a case is rarely decided upon it. The principle is, that, to bring collateral relations within the reach and influence of the consideration, there must be something over and above that flowing from the immediate parties to the marriage articles, from which it can be inferred that relatives beyond the issue were intended to be provided for, and that, if the provision in their behalf had not been agreed to, the superadded consideration would not have been given.<sup>2</sup> While this is the general rule, the court seize hold of the slightest valuable consideration to give effect to the settlement in favor of collateral relatives; and it need not appear that these slight considerations were inserted in favor of distant relatives: the court will presume such to be the case.<sup>3</sup> The result of all the cases is, that, if from the circumstances under which marriage articles were entered into by the parties, or as collected from the face of the instrument itself, it appears to have been intended that the collateral relatives in a given event should take the estate, and a proper limitation to that effect is contained in the articles, a court of equity will enforce the trust for their benefit. Such parties are not volunteers outside the deed, but come fairly within the influence of the consideration upon which it is founded. Such considera-

<sup>1</sup> *Vernon v. Vernon*, 2 P. Wms. 594; *Edwards v. Warwick*, 2 P. Wms. 171; *Osgood v. Strode*, 2 P. Wms. 245; *Ithell v. Beane*, 1 Ves. 215; 1 Dick. 132; *Stephens v. Trueman*, 1 Ves. 73; *Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft*, 18 Ves. 90; 2 Kent, Com. 172, 173; *Atherly on Mar. Sett.* 145; *Bradish v. Gibbs*, 3 John. Ch. 550; *West v. Errissey*, 2 P. Wms. 349; *Kettleby v. Atwood*, 1 Vern. 298, 471; *Williamson v. Codrington*, 1 Ves. 512; *Colman v. Sarel*, 1 Ves. Jr. 50; 3 Bro. Ch. 13; *Ellison v. Ellison*, 6 Ves. 662; *Graham v. Graham*, 1 Ves. Jr. 275; *Wycherly v. Wycherly*, 2 Ed. 177, note; *Bunn v. Winthrop*, 1 John. Ch. 336; *Gevers v. Wright*, 3 Green Ch. 330.

<sup>2</sup> *Osgood v. Strode*, 2 P. Wms. 245; *Goring v. Nash*, 3 Atk. 186; *Hamerton v. Whitton*, 2 Wils. 356; *Williamson v. Codrington*, 1 Ves. 512; *Bleeker v. Bingham*, 3 Paige, 246.

<sup>3</sup> *Neves v. Scott*, 9 How. 209; *Stephens v. Trueman*, 1 Ves. 73; *Edwards v. Warwick*, 2 P. Wms. 171.

tion extends through all the limitations of the articles for the benefit of the remotest persons provided for, consistent with the rules of law.<sup>1</sup> But of course there is a more direct equity in favor of a wife and children.<sup>2</sup> So in respect to chattel interests, it has been held that a bond under seal, though voluntary, will uphold a decree for the execution of the trust in favor of those whom the obligor is under obligations to support, as wife or children; for a seal in law imports a consideration.<sup>3</sup> But this doctrine seems to be rejected; and it is now held that neither wife nor child can enforce a purely voluntary contract or settlement.<sup>4</sup>

§ 368. And where a third person — parent, agent, or friend of the parties — holds out any considerations of a pecuniary nature to induce a marriage, and articles are drawn up, and a marriage takes place, equity will compel the party holding out the inducements to make them good, or specifically perform the articles.<sup>5</sup>

§ 369. If, however, in an executory trust created in a will there are indications of an intention that the words “heirs of

<sup>1</sup> *Neves v. Scott*, 9 How. 210; *Canby v. Lawson*, 5 Jones, Eq. 32; *Denison v. Goehring*, 7 Barr, 175; *King v. Whitely*, 10 Paige, 465. See this matter very learnedly discussed in *Neves v. Scott*, 9 Monthly Law Reporter, 67, Boston, June, 1846. This decision, however, was overruled in *Neves v. Scott*, 9 How. 98. The case was again discussed before the State court of Georgia, and the opinion of the Circuit Court of the district of Georgia was followed. That case was in turn overruled in 13 How. 268. The judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States was, that on the face of that instrument the consideration extended to brothers and sisters; and, further, that it was an executed trust, and that they had an interest.

<sup>2</sup> *Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft*, 18 Ves. 99.

<sup>3</sup> *Bunn v. Winthrop*, 1 John. Ch. 336; *Minturn v. Seymour*, 4 John. Ch. 500; *Lechmere v. Carlisle*, 3 P. Wms. 222; *Walwyn v. Coutts*, 3 Mer. 708; *Antrobus v. Smith*, 12 Ves. 44; *Colman v. Sarel*, 1 Ves. Jr. 54; *Beard v. Nuttall*, 1 Vern. 427.

<sup>4</sup> *Jefferys v. Jefferys*, 1 Cr. & Phil. 138; *Holloway v. Headington*, 8 Sim. 325.

<sup>5</sup> *Hammersley v. De Biel*, 2 Cl. & Fin. 45.

the body" shall be words of purchase and not of inheritance, they will receive that construction; that is, the intention of the testator will be carried out, if it is sufficiently clear, although the same words in an ordinary grant would create an estate tail. Thus, if there are other words in the will that indicate that the words "heirs of the body" are words of designation, and not of inheritance, such heirs will take by purchase, and the first taker of course will have only an estate for life. Thus, if the testator direct a settlement on A. for life "without impeachment of waste,"<sup>1</sup> or with a limitation "to preserve contingent remainders,"<sup>2</sup> or if he direct that "care be taken in the settlement that the tenant for life shall not bar the entail,"<sup>3</sup> the superadded words show the intention to be, that the first taker shall have only an estate for life with no power over the inheritance. So where a gift was in trust for the separate use of a married woman for life, she alone to receive the rent, and her husband not to intermeddle, and, after her decease, to the heirs of her body, the wife took only for life, and the words "heirs of her body" were words of purchase; for if the wife takes the inheritance in tail, the husband will have curtesy, which would be contrary to the clause against his intermeddling.<sup>4</sup> So, where a testator directed an estate to be settled on a married woman for life for her separate use, and at her death on her *issue*, she was not tenant in tail; for there would be only an equitable estate in her, while a legal estate would vest in her issue, and the two estates could not coalesce in such manner as to make her tenant in tail.<sup>5</sup> So a direction to settle land on A.

<sup>1</sup> *Glenorchy v. Bosville*, Ca. t. Talb. 3; 1 Lead. Ca. Eq. 1, and notes.

<sup>2</sup> *Pappillon v. Voice*, 2 P. Wms. 471; *Rochford v. Fitzmaurice*, 1 Conn. & Laws. 158.

<sup>3</sup> *Leonard v. Sussex*, 2 Vern. 526.

<sup>4</sup> *Roberts v. Dixwell*, 1 Atk. 607; *West*, Ca. t. Hardw. 536; *Turner v. Sargent*, 17 Beav. 515; *Stanley v. Jackman*, 5 W. R. 302; *Stonor v. Curwen*, 5 Sim. 264; *Shelton v. Watson*, 16 Sim. 542.

<sup>5</sup> *Stonor v. Curwen*, 5 Sim. 268; *Verulam v. Bathurst*, 13 Sim. 386; *Coape v. Arnold*, 2 Sim. & Gif. 311; 4 De G., M. & G. 574. And see *Collins v. McBean*, 34 Beav. 426.



and the heirs of his body "as counsel shall advise,"<sup>1</sup> or as "the executors shall think fit,"<sup>2</sup> implies that a simple estate tail is not intended, for if it was there would be no need of the additional words. And where the trust was to settle on A. for life without impeachment of waste, remainder to his issue in *strict settlement*, the court directed the estates to be settled on A. for life, without impeachment for waste, remainder to his sons successively in tail male, remainder to his daughters as tenants in common in tail male, with cross-remainders in tail male, and with limitations to trustees to preserve contingent remainders.<sup>3</sup>

§ 370. Where a testator devised his estate to trustees for the term of six years, and to be then divided among his children or their issue, and conveyances to be given therefor, and directed that "in each deed or writing to any of my children shall be inserted and expressed a clause limiting such grant or interest conveyed to the grantee for life, *with remainder over to the right heirs of such grantee, their heirs and assigns for ever*," it was held that the deeds must be so drawn as to give the children a life-estate only, and not a fee in their shares.<sup>4</sup> The same rule of construction has been established and enforced in Georgia,<sup>5</sup> and in Tennessee,<sup>6</sup> and has been recognized in South Carolina,<sup>7</sup> Maryland,<sup>8</sup> and Pennsylvania.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *White v. Carter*, 2 Ed. 366; Amb. 670.

<sup>2</sup> *Read v. Snell*, 2 Atk. 642.

<sup>3</sup> *Trevor v. Trevor*, 13 Sim. 103; 1 H. L. Ca. 239; *Coape v. Arnold*, 2 Sm. & Gif. 311; 4 De G., M. & G. 574.

<sup>4</sup> *Wood v. Burham*, 6 Paige, 515, affirmed on appeal, 27 Wend. 9. The rule in Shelley's case was in force in New York at the time, and would have applied to this case if it had not been an executory trust. The rule in Shelley's case was soon after abrogated in that State, and the decision has ceased to be important; nor is the subject-matter now under discussion of importance in any State where the rule in Shelley's case is abolished by statute.

<sup>5</sup> *Edmondson v. Dyson*, 2 Kelly, 307; *Wiley v. Smith*, 3 Kelly, 551, 559; *Neves v. Scott*, 9 How. 197; 13 How. 268.

<sup>6</sup> *Loring v. Hunter*, 8 Yerg. 4.

<sup>7</sup> *Garner v. Garner*, 1 Des. 437; *Porter v. Doby*, 2 Rich. Eq. 49.

<sup>8</sup> *Horner v. Lyeth*, 4 H. & J. 431. <sup>9</sup> *Findlay v. Riddle*, 3 Binney, 139.

§ 371. It will be observed that "heirs of the body" and "issue" are not synonymous terms. "Heirs" are technical words of limitation, while the word "issue" is *prima facie* a word of purchase; and courts have ordered a strict settlement when the word "issue" was used, when it would probably have been otherwise if the word "heir" had been used.<sup>1</sup> The words "heirs of the body,"<sup>2</sup> and "issue,"<sup>3</sup> embrace daughters; for they equally answer the description, and are equally the objects of bounty; and where the words are words of purchase, the settlement, in default of sons, will be made upon daughters, as tenants in common in tail, with cross-remainders.<sup>4</sup> In the United States, the settlement would be made upon sons and daughters in common, with cross-remainders in default of issue, unless the direction was to settle upon some particular one of the heirs of the body or issue.

§ 372. If the limitations of an executory trust are imperfectly or defectively declared in a will, the court will rectify the limitations, and order the settlements to be made in accord-

<sup>1</sup> *Meure v. Meure*, 2 Atk. 265; *Haddelsey v. Adams*, 22 Beav. 276; *Rochford v. Fitzmaurice*, 2 Conn. & Laws. 158; *Bastard v. Proby*, 2 Cox, 6; *Dodson v. Hay*, 3 Bro. Ch. 405; *Stonor v. Curwen*, 5 Sim. 264; *Horne v. Barton*, G. Coop. 257; *Crozier v. Crozier*, 2 Conn. & Laws. 311; *Ashton v. Ashton*, cited in *Bagshaw v. Spencer*, 1 Coll. Jur. 402; *McPherson v. Snowden*, 19 Md. 197. Where a testator intends the estate to go to the whole body of persons, in legal succession, constituting *in law* the entire line of descent lineal, he evidently means the same thing as if he had said "issue," or "heirs of the body;" or if he intends it to go to the whole line of descent, lineal and collateral, he means the same thing as if he had used the term "heirs," which, as a word of art, describes precisely the same line of descent. Per Agnew, J., in *Yarnall's App.* 70 Penn. St. 340. And see *Kleppner v. Laverty*, 70 Penn. St. 70; *Kiah v. Grenier*, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 388.

<sup>2</sup> *Bastard v. Proby*, 2 Cox, 6.

<sup>3</sup> *Meure v. Meure*, 2 Atk. 265; *Trevor v. Trevor*, 13 Sim. 108; *Ashton v. Ashton*, *ut supra*.

<sup>4</sup> *Marryat v. Townley*, 1 Ves. 105; *Meure v. Meure*, 2 Atk. 265; *Trevor v. Trevor*, 13 Sim. 108; 1 H. L. Ca. 239; *Bastard v. Proby*, 2 Cox, 6; *Ashton v. Ashton*, in *Spencer v. Bagshaw*, *ut supra*; *Shelton v. Watson*, 16 Sim. 543.

ance with the intention of the testator, and to be drawn up in proper form to effectuate that intention.<sup>1</sup> But if a testator undertake to be his own conveyancer, and himself draw up in his will all the particulars of the limitations upon which he desires his property to be settled, intending them to be final and to be carried into effect in the trusts, the court is bound by the words, as in *Austen v. Taylor*, where Lord Northington said that “the testator had referred no settlement to the trustees to complete, but had declared his own uses and trusts,” and that there was no authority in the court to vary them.<sup>2</sup>

§ 373. When a testator has devised lands in strict settlement, and then devises personal chattels as *heirlooms*, to be held by, or in trust for, the parties entitled to the use of the real estate under the limitations of the settlement; or when he expresses a desire that the heirlooms should be held upon the same trusts as the real estate, — “so far as the rules of law and equity will permit,” the tenant for life will have the use of the heirlooms, and they will vest absolutely in the first tenant in tail, upon his birth, though he die immediately after.<sup>3</sup> In such cases, the court regards the trust, either as executed, or, if the trust is executory, that it has no authority to insert a limitation over in case of the tenant in tail dying under twenty-one. But such a limitation over is not illegal; and if the

<sup>1</sup> *Franks v. Price*, 3 Beav. 182; *Doncaster v. Doncaster*, 3 K. & J. 26; *Rochford v. Fitzmaurice*, 1 Conn. & Laws. 173; 2 Dru. & W. 21.

<sup>2</sup> *Austen v. Taylor*, 1 Ed. 368. This case, however, has been criticised. See *Green v. Stephens*, 17 Ves. 76; *Jervoise v. Northumberland*, 1 J. & W. 572. And see *East v. Twyford*, 9 Hare, 713; *Meure v. Meure*, 2 Atk. 265; *Harrison v. Naylor*, 2 Cox, 247.

<sup>3</sup> *Foley v. Burnell*, 1 Bro. Ch. 274; *Vaughan v. Burslem*, 3 Bro. Ch. 101; *Newcastle v. Lincoln*, 3 Ves. 387; *Carr v. Erroll*, 14 Ves. 228; *Trafford v. Trafford*, 3 Atk. 347; *Doncaster v. Doncaster*, 3 K. & J. 26; *Rowland v. Morgan*, 6 Hare, 463; 2 Phil. 674; *Gower v. Grovesnor*, Barn. Ch. 54; 5 Mad. 337, overruled; *Evans v. Evans*, 17 Sim. 108; *Tollemache v. Coventry*, 2 Cl. & Fin. 611; 8 Bligh (N. S.), 547; *Stapleton v. Stapleton*, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 212; *Deerhurst v. St. Albans*, 5 Mad. 232, overruled; *Scarsdale v. Curzon*, 1 Johns. & Hem. 40, where all the cases are cited and commented on.

bequest of the heirlooms is clearly executory, and if the intention of the testator is plainly manifested that no person shall take the chattels absolutely who does not live to become possessed of the real estate, the court will execute the intention by directing the insertion of a limitation that the absolute interest of the first tenant in tail, if he should die under twenty-one, should go over to the next person in remainder.<sup>1</sup> And so where the absolute vesting of the chattels is coupled with the actual possession, and is therefore suspended until the death of the tenant for life, the chattels will vest in the child, who, after the death of the tenant for life, shall fulfil all the requisites of being tenant in tail in possession.<sup>2</sup>

§ 374. If the words of a will, taken in their ordinary sense, create a *joint-tenancy*, the court cannot order a settlement giving a *tenancy in common*, as it may do under marriage articles. But in some cases, where a testator is providing for his children, or where a grandparent *in loco parentis* is providing for his grandchildren, the court will order a settlement that will create a *tenancy in common*.<sup>3</sup> And, generally, executory trusts under wills will be construed in the same manner as marriage articles entered into after marriage.<sup>4</sup>

§ 375. When a settlement is directed in an executory trust, but there is no direction as to the powers to be given under it, the court cannot order the insertion of any powers,<sup>5</sup> except perhaps the power of leasing, which generally is an implied power to enable a party to enjoy the estate.<sup>6</sup> But if the exec-

<sup>1</sup> *Potts v. Potts*, 3 J. & L. 353; 1 H. L. Ca. 671; *Trafford v. Trafford*, 3 Atk. 347; *Lincoln v. Newcastle*, 3 Ves. 387.

<sup>2</sup> *Scarsdale v. Curzon*, 1 Johns. & Hen. 40.

<sup>3</sup> *Synge v. Hales*, 2 B. & B. 499; *Marryat v. Townley*, 1 Ves. 102. But there were other circumstances in these cases that indicated a *tenancy in common*. *McPherson v. Snowden*, 19 Md. 197.

<sup>4</sup> *Rochford v. Fitzmaurice*, 1 Conn. & Laws. 158.

<sup>5</sup> *Wheate v. Hall*, 17 Ves. 80; *Brewster v. Angell*, 1 J. & W. 628.

<sup>6</sup> *Woolmore v. Burrows*, 1 Sim. 518; *Fearne's*, P. W. 310; but see the

utory articles or the will contain a direction to insert the "*usual powers*," powers to lease for twenty-one years,<sup>1</sup> of sale and exchange,<sup>2</sup> of varying the securities,<sup>3</sup> of appointing new trustees,<sup>4</sup> and (according to the nature of the property) of partition, of leasing mines, and of granting building leases, will be inserted.<sup>5</sup> But there is a distinction between powers for the management and enjoyment of the estate, and powers which are personally beneficial to one or more particular persons, such as powers of jointure, to charge portions, or to raise money for a particular purpose.<sup>6</sup> The court cannot therefore order these latter powers to be inserted under the direction to insert the *usual powers*, for there is no rule by which the court could be governed in reducing the *corpus* of the estate.<sup>7</sup> So if certain particular powers are directed to be inserted, the *usual powers* will be qualified by the direction. Thus, where it was directed that the settlement should contain a power of leasing for twenty-one years, a power of sale and exchange, and of appointment of new trustees, it was held that a power of granting building leases could not be inserted.<sup>8</sup> So the powers must be inserted and executed as they are directed; as where a power was directed to be inserted of selling and exchanging estates in one county, *and all other usual powers*, it was held that the powers could not be extended to estates in other counties.<sup>9</sup> And where a testator directed the insertion of a power of making leases, *and otherwise according to circumstances*, and of appointing new trustees, the court refused

late cases, *Turner v. Sargent*, 17 Beav. 515; *Scott v. Steward*, 27 Beav. 367; *Charlton v. Rendall*, 1 Hare, 296.

<sup>1</sup> *Hill v. Hill*, 6 Sim. 144; *Bedford v. Abercorn*, 1 M. & Cr. 312.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*; *Peake v. Penlington*, 2 V. & B. 311.

<sup>3</sup> *Sampayo v. Gould*, 12 Sim. 426.

<sup>4</sup> *Lindow v. Fleetwood*, 6 Sim. 152; *Sampayo v. Gould*, 12 Sim. 426; *Brewster v. Angell*, 1 J. & W. 628.

<sup>5</sup> *Hill v. Hill*, 6 Sim. 145; *Bedford v. Abercorn*, 1 M. & Cr. 312.

<sup>6</sup> *Hill v. Hill*, 6 Sim. 144.

<sup>7</sup> *Higginson v. Barneby*, 2 S. & S. 516.

<sup>8</sup> *Pearse v. Baron*, Jac. 158.

<sup>9</sup> *Hill v. Hill*, 6 Sim. 141.

to insert a power of sale and exchange, saying that, if where nothing is expressed nothing can be implied, it is impossible, where something is expressed, to imply more than is expressed, especially where the will notices what powers are to be given.<sup>1</sup> But under particular directions as to certain powers, and general directions that other usual powers should be inserted, the two directions being separate and independent of each other, it was held that a power to appoint new trustees might be inserted.<sup>2</sup> Where *proper powers* of making leases or otherwise were directed to be reserved in the settlement to the tenants for life while qualified to exercise them, and when disqualified to the trustees, and a power of sale and exchange was inserted in the settlement, Lord Eldon held that it was improperly introduced;<sup>3</sup> and Sir T. Plummer gave a similar decision, on the ground that the tenant for life ought not to have a power of sale unless it was expressly directed, nor ought the trustees to have such a power in the absence of an express direction.<sup>4</sup> But where there was a settlement of stock with a power of varying the securities, and also a covenant to settle real estate upon the same trusts and with like powers, it was held that a power to sell and exchange was properly introduced in analogy to the power of varying the securities.<sup>5</sup>

§ 376. In drawing up the final deed of settlement under executory articles or a will, the intention of the settlor is to be carried out if possible. If the intention conflicts with any of the rules of law, it shall be executed so far, and as near as it can be. The doctrine of *cy près* applies to this class of executory trusts. Thus, if a settlement is directed which would create a perpetuity, the court will order a settlement which

<sup>1</sup> Brewster v. Angell, 1 J. & W. 625; Horne v. Barton, Jac. 439.

<sup>2</sup> Lindow v. Fleetwood, 6 Sim. 152.

<sup>3</sup> Brewster v. Angell, 1 J. & W. 625.

<sup>4</sup> Horne v. Barton, Jac. 437.

<sup>5</sup> Williams v. Carter, Append. to Treatise on Powers, 945 (8th ed.); Elton v. Elton, 27 Beav. 634; Horne v. Barton, Jac. 437.

shall carry the trust as far as it can extend without running counter to the rules against perpetuities. As where there was a devise to a corporation in trust to convey to A. for life, and after his death to his first son for life, and so on to the first son of such first son for life; and, in default of male issue, then to B. for life, and to his son for life after the death of B., and so as in the case of A., Lord Cowper said the attempt to create a perpetuity was vain, yet the directions should be complied with, so far as consistent with the law, and he directed that all the sons already born should take estates for life in succession, with limitations to unborn sons in tail.<sup>1</sup> But if the devise is such that it cannot be carried into effect, in any form approximating the intention of the testator, without contravening the law against perpetuities or remoteness, the whole trust will be void.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See § 383; *Humberston v. Humberston*, 1 P. Wms. 332; 2 Vern. 737; Pr. Ch. 455; *Parfitt v. Hember*, L. R. 4 Eq. 443; *Peard v. Kekewich*, 15 Beav. 178; *Lyddon v. Ellison*, 19 Beav. 565; *Williams v. Teal*, 6 Hare, 239, and cases; *Vanderplank v. King*, 3 Hare, 1; *Monypenny v. Dering*, 16 M. & W. 418.

<sup>2</sup> *Blgrave v. Hancock*, 16 Sim. 371.

## CHAPTER XIII.

## PERPETUITIES AND ACCUMULATIONS.

- § 377. Definitions of a perpetuity.
- § 378. Executory devises — springing and shifting uses.
- § 379. Growth of the rule against perpetuities.
- § 380. Application of the rule. Indefinite failure of issue.
- § 381. Applies to the possible vesting of estates — not to the actual.
- § 382. Applies equally to trust and legal estates.
- § 383. An equitable interest that may not vest within the rule is void.
- § 384. Distinction between private trusts and charitable trusts.
- § 385. A proper trust to raise money to be applied contrary to the rule.
- § 386. Equitable estates cannot be made unalienable.
- § 387. Exception in the case of married women.
- § 388. How trusts can be limited, so that *cestui que trust* cannot alienate.
- § 389. Limitation of personal estate to such tenant in tail as first attains twenty-one.
- § 390. When courts will alter trusts and when not.
- §§ 391, 392. Statutes of various States in relation to perpetuities.
- § 393. Rule respecting trusts for accumulations.
- § 394. In England the rule was altered by the Thellusson Act.
- § 395. Construction of the Thellusson Act.
- § 396. Rule against accumulations — when it applies and when not.
- § 397. Application of the income in cases of illegal directions to accumulate.
- § 398. Statutes in various States as to accumulations.
- § 399. Accumulations for charitable purposes.
- § 400. Accumulations in cases of life insurance.

§ 377. THAT the same rules apply to trusts as to legal estates is further apparent from the rule against perpetuities. A perpetuity has been declared to be “an estate unalienable, though all mankind should join in the conveyance;”<sup>1</sup> and an executory devise is said to be “a perpetuity as far as it goes.” Again, it has been said, that “a perpetuity is when if all that have interest join, yet they cannot pass the estate.”<sup>2</sup> These are characteristics of a perpetuity. There are other descriptions given, as that “a perpetuity is a thing odious in the law,

<sup>1</sup> Scattergood v. Edge, Salk. 229.

<sup>2</sup> Washborne v. Downes, 1 Ch. Ca. 213.



and destructive to the commonwealth : it would stop commerce and prevent the circulation of property.”<sup>1</sup> Others have described the rule of law as respects the period of remoteness, rather than the thing itself called a perpetuity ;<sup>2</sup> thus, “ a perpetuity is a limitation tending to take the subject out of commerce for a longer period than a life or lives in being and twenty-one years beyond, and, in the case of a posthumous child, a few months more, allowing for the term of gestation.”<sup>3</sup> Mr. Saunders says : “ A perpetuity may be defined to be a future limitation, restraining the owner of the estate from alienating the fee-simple of the property, discharged of such future use or estate, before the event is determined, or the period is arrived, when such future use or estate is to arise. If that period is within the bound prescribed by law, it is not a perpetuity.”<sup>4</sup> This describes the thing itself, and not the rule of law, or the length of time, which may vary. Mr. Lewis gives a fuller definition : “ A perpetuity is a future limitation, whether executory, or by way of remainder, and of either real or personal property, which is not to vest, until after the expiration of, or will not necessarily vest within, the period fixed and prescribed by law for the creation of future estates and interests ; and which is not destructible by the persons for the time being entitled to the property, subject to the future limitation, except with the concurrence of the individual interested under that limitation.”<sup>5</sup> If such person is not yet in being, as he may not be after an extended period, of course the estate cannot be conveyed, even if all the world join in the deed.

§ 378. Executory devises are a species of testamentary dis-

<sup>1</sup> Duke of Norfolk's Case, 1 Vern. 164.

<sup>2</sup> Stanley v. Leigh, 2 P. Wms. 688.

<sup>3</sup> Rand. Perp. 48.

<sup>4</sup> Uses and Trusts, 204.

<sup>5</sup> Lewis on Perpetuity, 164. Jarman's Treatise on Wills contains this marked sentence : “ *Te teneam moriens* is the dying lord's apostrophe to his manor, for which he is forging these fetters that seem, by restricting the dominion of others to extend his own.” 1 Jar. on Wills, 226, note (ed. 1861).

positions, allowed by courts of law, and when properly exercised, they pass the *legal* estate or interest to all persons in favor of whom the dispositions are made. They are devises to take effect at a certain time in the future, or upon a certain event, and in favor of certain persons. Limitations by way of springing or shifting uses are similar in effect, except that they are created by deeds *inter vivos*, and are based upon the statute of uses. Whenever the event happens when a shifting or springing use is to take effect, the statute of uses vests the legal seisin and ownership in the person entitled by virtue of the use. These executory devises, and shifting and springing uses, must vest in the persons intended to be benefited within the time allowed by law, or they will be declared illegal and of no effect. The same rules apply in equity to trusts. In cases of trusts the legal estate is vested in certain trustees, and their heirs; but the beneficial interest, or equitable estate, is given by the grantor, testator, or settlor to such person or persons, and upon such terms and upon such events, as he shall declare. The settlor can change and shift the beneficial enjoyment of the equitable estate from one person to another, in the future, in a manner analogous to the limitations of springing or shifting uses under the statute of uses.<sup>1</sup> Courts of equity always take special care that future estates or interests shall not be destroyed by the present user of the property; and that the limitations of future equitable interests shall not transcend the limits assigned for the limitation of similar legal interests or executory devises, and shifting and springing uses at law.

§ 379. The rule against perpetuities has been gradually established by judicial decisions, and affords a most notable instance of the nice adaptation of the principles of the common law to the decision of a question which requires at once a due regard for the rights of persons and property, and a careful

<sup>1</sup> *Harrison v. Harrison*, 36 N. Y. 543.

consideration of these larger principles of public policy so essential to the welfare of communities and States. For public policy is opposed to the perpetual settlement of property in families in such manner that it is for ever inalienable, or inalienable so long as there may be a person to take, answering the designation of some testator who died generations before. The first stand of the judges was to allow only those limitations which would take effect at the end of one life from the death of the testator.<sup>1</sup> This was afterwards modified to include two or more lives in being, and running at the same time, "or where the candles are all burning at once;" for it is plain that such a space of time is only one life in being, — that of the longest liver.<sup>2</sup> The next step was much debated; but it was finally settled, that an executory devise might be made to vest at the end of lives in being and twenty-one years after, to allow for the infancy of the next taker, who by reason of infancy could not alienate the estate.<sup>3</sup> The statute of 10 & 11 Wm. III., c. 16, having provided that children *en ventre sa mère*, born after their father's death, should for the purposes of the limitations of estates be deemed to have been born in his lifetime, a further extension of nine or ten months was allowed for the period of gestation.<sup>4</sup> The next step was to allow a period of nine months for gestation at the beginning of the

<sup>1</sup> *Pells v. Brown*, Cro. Jac. 590; 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 187, c. 4 (A. D. 1621): see *Snow v. Cutler*, 1 Lev. 135, t. Raym. 162; 1 Keb. 151, 752, 800; 2 Keb. 11, 145, 296; 1 Sid. 153.

<sup>2</sup> *Goring v. Bickerstaff*, Pollexf. 31; 1 Ch. Ca. 4; 2 Freem. 163 (1664); 2 Harg. Jurid. Arg. 46; *Lloyd v. Carew*, Shower, P. C. 137; Pr. Ch. 72.

<sup>3</sup> *Taylor v. Biddal*, 2 Mad. 289; Freem. 243; 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 188, c. 11; *F. C. R.* 432; *Laddington v. Kime*, 1 Raym. 203; *Gore v. Gore*, 2 W. Kel. 204; 2 P. Wms. 28; 2 Stra. 948; *Scattergood v. Edge*, 12 Mod. 277; *Duke of Norfolk's Case*, 3 Ch. Ca. 32, Ch. R. 229; 2 Freem. 72; Pollexf. 223; *Massenburgh v. Ash*, 1 Vern. 234; *Maddox v. Staine*, t. Talb. 228; 2 Harg. Jurid. Arg. 50.

<sup>4</sup> *Stephens v. Stephens*, Ca. t. Talb. 228; *Forrest*, 228; *Goodtitle v. Woods*, Willes, 211; 7 T. R. 103 (n.); *Sheffield v. Orrery*, 3 Atk. 282; *Gulliver v. Wicket*, 1 Wils. 185; *Bullock v. Stones*, 2 Ves. 521; *Goodman v. Goodright*, 2 Burr. 873.

term, as the life in being during which the term would run might be that of a child *en ventre sa mère*.<sup>1</sup> Much discussion arose upon each one of these steps.<sup>2</sup> For instance, the term of twenty-one years, it was said, could not be allowed as a term in gross, and without reference to the infancy of some person interested in the estate; this question was not settled until *Cadell v. Palmer*, in the House of Lords in 1833, when it was finally determined, that twenty-one years might be allowed as a term in gross, without reference to the infancy of any person, but that the period of nine months for gestation should be allowed in cases only where the gestation had commenced<sup>3</sup> of some persons who, if born, would take an interest in the estate. By such steps, by imperceptible degrees, and after two centuries of doubt and litigation, and unaided by legislation, the judges framed and completed the *great rule against perpetuities*.<sup>4</sup>

§ 380. Thus all future legal estates which arise by way of executory devise, conditional limitation, or shifting and springing uses, must vest within a life or lives in being at the death of the testator, and twenty-one years; and, in case the person in whom the estate or interest should then vest is *en ventre sa mère*, nine months more will be allowed; and all estates created as aforesaid, and so limited that they may not vest within that time, are void.<sup>5</sup> If the estates are created and limited by

<sup>1</sup> *Long v. Blackall*, 7 T. R. 100; 2 Harg. Jurid. Arg. 105; 6 Cru. Dig. 488.

<sup>2</sup> *Davies v. Speed*, 12 Mod. 39; 2 Salk. 675; Holt, 731; *Bostock's case*, Ley, 56; *Roe v. Tranmer*, 2 Wils. 75; *Lloyd v. Carew*, Show. P. C. 137; Pr. Ch. 72; 2 Harg. Jurid. Arg. 36; *Carwardine v. Carwardine*, 1 Ed. 34; *Blandford v. Thackerell*, 2 Ves. Jr. 241; 1 Sand. Uses & Tr. 198; *Thellusson v. Woodford*, 4 Ves. 337; *Routledge v. Dorrell*, 2 Ves. Jr. 357; *Keily v. Fowler*, Wilmut, 306; *Beard v. Westcott*, 5 Taunt. 393; 5 B. & Al. 801; T. & R. 25; *Bengough v. Edridge*, 1 Sim. 173, 271.

<sup>3</sup> *Cadell v. Palmer*, 7 Bligh (N. S.), 202; 10 Bing. 140; 1 Cl. & Fin. 372; 1 Jarm. Wills, 222.

<sup>4</sup> *Lewis on Perpetuity*, pp. 140-162; 1 Powell on Devisees by Jar. 389 n.

<sup>5</sup> *Proprietors of Church in Brattle Square v. Grant*, 3 Gray, 149; *Sears*

deeds *inter vivos*; the lives in being must be those persons who are living at the execution of the deed, and not at the death of the grantor or settlor.<sup>1</sup> And if an absolute term is taken, and no anterior term for a life in being is referred to, such absolute term cannot be longer than twenty-one years;<sup>2</sup> but a term of any number of years may be taken, provided the term is so connected with some life or lives in being that the interest must vest in some person living at the death of the testator and at the time of the vesting.<sup>3</sup> So estates limited to take effect after an indefinite failure of issue of a living or deceased person are void, for the reason that the issue of such persons may not fail until after the term of a life or lives in being and twenty-one years has expired.<sup>4</sup> But a limitation over in case

*v. Russell*, 8 Gray, 86; 1 Shep. Touch. 126; 4 Kent, Com. 128 and notes; 2 Fearn, Cont. Rem. 50; *Nightingale v. Burrell*, 15 Pick. 111; 6 Cru. Dig. tit. 38, c. 17, § 23; *Cadell v. Palmer*, 1 Cl. & Fin. 372, 423; *Bacon v. Proctor*, T. & R. 31; *Mackworth v. Hinxman*, 2 Keen, 658; *Ker v. Duggannon*, 1 Dr. & W. 509; Com. &c. v. De Clifford, 1 Dr. & War. 245; *Welsh v. Foster*, 12 Mass. 97; *Tilbury v. Barbut*, 3 Atk. 617; *Conklin v. Conklin*, 3 Sand. Ch. 64; *Tyte v. Willis*, Ca. t. Talb. 1; *Att'y-Gen. v. Gill*, 2 P. Wms. 369; *Nottingham v. Jennings*, 1 P. Wms. 25; *Kampf v. Jones*, 2 Keen, 756; *Miller v. Macomb*, 26 Wend. 229; *Tator v. Tator*, 4 Barb. 431; *Ring v. Hardwicke*, 2 Beav. 352; *Ferris v. Gibson*, 4 Edw. 707; *Egerton v. Brownlow*, 4 H. L. Ca. 1, 160.

<sup>1</sup> *Lewis on Perpetuity*, 171, 172. Mr. Lewis observes an inconsistency in taking lives in being at the death of the testator, if the future interest is created by will, and lives in being at the date or execution of the deed, if such interests are created by deed. But it should be remembered that a will speaks as at the death of the testator, while a deed speaks as at the time of its execution, so that there is no inconsistency in principle. See *Tregonwell v. Sydenham*, 3 Dow, 194; 2 Jar. on Wills, 257; Ed. 1861.

<sup>2</sup> *Crooke v. De Vandes*, 9 Ves. 197; *Palmer v. Holford*, 4 Russ. 403; *Speakman v. Speakman*, 8 Hare, 180.

<sup>3</sup> *Lachlan v. Reynolds*, 9 Hare, 796.

<sup>4</sup> *Randolph v. Wendel*, 4 Sneed, 646; *Van Vechten v. Pearsen*, 5 Paige, 512; *Van Vechten v. Van Vechten*, 8 Paige, 104; *Hone v. Van Schaick*, 20 Wend. 564; *Watkins v. Quarles*, 23 Ark. 179; *Campbell v. Harding*, 2 Rus. & My. 390; *Condy v. Campbell*, 2 Cl. & Fin. 421, 427; *Harrison v. Harrison*, 36 N. Y. 543; *Allen v. Henderson*, 49 Penn. St. 233; *Fisher v. Webster*, L. R. 14 Eq. 287; *Newill v. Newill*, L. R. 7 Ch. 253; *Roe v. Jeffery*, 1 T. R. 589; *Hawley v. James*, 5 Paige, 318; 16 Wend. 61;

the heirs of A.'s body living at her death, die before reaching the age of twenty-one, is not void if A. leave no heirs of her body, but it takes effect at her death.<sup>1</sup>

§ 381. It will be observed, that, in determining whether a particular devise is contrary to the rule against perpetuities, the inquiry is not whether the contingency upon which the estate is to vest actually occurs within the time limited by the rule, but whether it is possible that the event may not happen within the time. If it is possible that the event upon which an executory devise or shifting or springing use is to vest in some person may not happen within the time, the executory estate is void, although in fact the event actually happens within the time.<sup>2</sup> And it must further be observed, that, if the estate is to vest in some persons within the time limited, it

*Miller v. Macomb*, 2 Wend. 229; 9 Paige, 265; *Lorillard v. Coster*, 5 Paige, 172; *Boehm v. Clark*, 9 Ves. 580; *Black v. McAulay*, 5 Jones, L. 375; *Jackson v. Billinger*, 18 John. 368; *Fisk v. Keen*, 35 Me. 349; *Bramlet v. Bates*, 1 Sneed, 554; *Jordan v. Roach*, 32 Miss. 481; *Gray v. Bridgforth*, 33 Miss. 312; *Tongue v. Nutwell*, 13 Md. 415; *Jones v. Miller*, 13 Ind. 337; *Chism v. Williams*, 29 Mo. 288; *Dodd v. Wake*, 8 Sim. 615; *Trafford v. Boehm*, 3 Atk. 440; *Ellicombe v. Gompertz*, 3 M. & Cr. 127; *Murray v. Addenbrook*, 4 Russ. 407; *Hayes v. Hayes*, 4 Russ. 311; *Bell v. Phyn*, 7 Ves. 453; *Thackeray v. Sampson*, 2 S. & S. 214; *Cross v. Cross*, 7 Sim. 201; *Bradshaw v. Skilbeck*, 2 Bing. N. C. 182; *Budd v. State*, 22 Md. 48; *Johnson v. Currin*, 10 Penn. St. 498; *Bedford's App.* 40 Penn. St. 18; *Deihl v. King*, 6 S. & R. 29; *Eichelberger v. Barnitz*, 17 S. & R. 293; *Rice v. Satterwhite*, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 69; *Postell v. Postell*, Bail. Ch. 390; *Conklin v. Conklin*, 3 Sand. Ch. 64; *Brasbear v. Marcy*, 3 J. J. Marsh. 89; *Allen v. Parkam*, 5 Munf. 457; *Mazyck v. Vanderhost*, Bail. Ch. 48; *Adams v. Chaplin*, 1 Hill, Eq. 265; *Lanesborough v. Fox*, Ca. t. Talb. 262; *Bennett v. Lowe*, 5 Moor. & P. 485; *Smith v. Dunwoody*, 19 Ga. 237; *McRee v. Means*, 34 Ala. 378; *Powell v. Brandon*, 24 Miss. 343; *Armstrong v. Armstrong*, 14 B. Mon. 333. As to the legislation in the various States upon the failure of issue, see 2 Washburn, Real Prop. 683 (3d ed.).

<sup>1</sup> *Egbert v. Schultz*, 29 Ind. 242.

<sup>2</sup> *Post*, § 393; *Langdon v. Simson*, 12 Ves. 295; *O'Neill v. Lucas*, 2 Keen, 313; *Moore v. Moore*, 6 Jones, Eq. 132; *Welch v. Foster*, 12 Mass. 97; *Craig v. Hone*, 2 Edw. Ch. 554; *Robinson v. Bishop*, 23 Ark. 378; *Sears v. Putman*, 102 Mass. 5.

will not be obnoxious to the rule against perpetuities, even if such person may not be entitled to the actual enjoyment of the property; that is, the rule as to perpetuities deals with the *vesting of the title*, and not with the *actual reception of the profits of an estate*.<sup>1</sup> If two constructions may be put upon a will, one of which will offend against the rule against perpetuities, and the other not, the construction which will not offend against the rule will be adopted, if in other respects it can be sustained.<sup>2</sup> And so a will speaks, upon the subject of remoteness, from the time of the last codicil, and not from the date of the original will.<sup>3</sup>

§ 382. The same rule applies with equal force in law and equity, and trusts and beneficial or equitable estates are subject to the same restrictions.<sup>4</sup> A perpetuity will no more be tolerated when it is covered by a trust, than when it displays itself undisguised in the settlement of a legal estate.<sup>5</sup> "If," as Lord Guilford said, "in equity you could come nearer to a perpetuity than the common law admits, all men, being desirous to continue their estates in their families, would settle their estates by way of trust, which might make well for the jurisdiction of chancery, but would be destructive to the commonwealth."

§ 383. Therefore, the creation of a trust or equitable interest, which cannot vest in the object of the trust within the time

<sup>1</sup> *Loring v. Blake*, 98 Mass. 253; *Murray v. Addenbrook*, 4 Russ. 407; *Phipps v. Kelynge*, 2 V. & B. 57, n. (c); *Curtis v. Lukin*, 5 Beav. 147; *Otis v. McLellan*, 13 Allen, 339; *Yard's App.* 64 Penn. St. 95.

<sup>2</sup> *Martelli v. Holloway*, L. R. 5 H. L. 532.

<sup>3</sup> *Hosea v. Jacobs*, 98 Mass. 65.

<sup>4</sup> *Duke of Norfolk's Case*, 3 Ch. Ca. 20; 2 Ch. R. 229; 2 Freem. 72; *Pollexf.* 293; *Massenburgh v. Ash*, 1 Vern. 254; *Schutter v. Smith*, 41 N. Y. 329; *Knox v. Jones*, 47 N. Y. 397; *Burrill v. Boardman*, 43 N. Y. 254. *Æquitas sequitur legem*, but courts of equity have rather led the law courts in fashioning the rules against perpetuities.

<sup>5</sup> *Norfolk's Case*, 1 Vern. 164; *Humberston v. Humberston*, 1 P. Wms. 332; *Parfitt v. Hember*, L. R. 4 Eq. 443; *Sears v. Putnam*, 102 Mass. 5; *Lovering v. Worthington*, 106 Mass. 86.

limited by law for the vesting of legal estates, will be nugatory. Thus where a testator devised his real estate to trustees, in trust to apply the rents to the support of his wife, and his present and future grandchildren, during the life of the wife, and on her death to convey the estates to all his present and future grandchildren, as they respectively attained the age of twenty-five years, to hold to them and their heirs as tenants in common, it was held that the trust to convey was void, for the reason that some of the grandchildren might not become twenty-five years old until after the expiration of the life of the tenant for life, and twenty-one years in addition.<sup>1</sup> So a testator cannot authorize his trustees to limit an estate beyond the limits of the rule against perpetuities; but the persons appointed to take must be capable of taking directly under the will.<sup>2</sup> So where a testator devised land to a corporation in trust to convey the same to A. for life, with remainder to his oldest son for life, remainder to the son's oldest son for life, and so on in an endless series, and in default of issue of A., then to B. for life, and remainder to his oldest son for life, and so on in the same manner as to the sons of A., it was held to be void and vain as a perpetuity.<sup>3</sup> So if any directions are given which, if complied with, must enforce a perpetuity, they will be void; as when a testator gave land to a college, and directed that the same should be leased for ever to his wife's relations at two-thirds its value, it was held to be a void direction, as tending to a perpetuity.<sup>4</sup>

§ 384. In private trusts the beneficial interest is vested absolutely in some individual or individuals who are, or within a

<sup>1</sup> *Blagrove v. Hancock*, 16 Sim. 374; *Dodd v. Wake*, 8 Sim. 615; *Brough-ton v. James*, 1 Coll. 26; 1 H. L. Ca. 406; *Walker v. Mower*, 16 Beav. 365; *Leake v. Robinson*, 2 Mer. 363; *Sears v. Russell*, 8 Gray, 86.

<sup>2</sup> *Marlborough v. Godolphin*, 1 Ed. 404; *Robinson v. Hardcastle*, 2 T. R. 241, 380, 781; *Fonda v. Fenfield*, 56 Barb. 503; *Barnum v. Barnum*, 26 Md. 119. But a power to change trustees does not come within the principle. *Clark v. Platt*, 30 Conn. 282.

<sup>3</sup> *Humberston v. Humberston*, 1 P. Wms. 332; *Parfitt v. Hember*, L. R. 4 Eq. 443; *Floyer v. Bankes*, L. R. 8 Eq. 115.

<sup>4</sup> *Att'y-Gen. v. Greenhill*, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 1307.



certain time may be, definitely ascertained; and to whom, therefore, collectively, unless under some disability, it is, or within the allowed limit, will be competent to control, modify, or end the trust. Private trusts of this kind cannot be extended beyond the legal limitations of a perpetuity, as before stated. Nor can a settlor give his trustees a power to appoint the property subject to a trust, to new trusts to arise at or upon the termination of the trusts created by himself. But a trust created for charitable or public purposes is not subject to similar limitations, but it may continue for a permanent or indefinite time.<sup>1</sup>

§ 385. A trust to raise a sum of money out of an estate will be good if properly limited, although the trust itself upon which the money is limited after it is raised is void as being too remote. In such case, the heir will take the money as personal estate.<sup>2</sup> Contingent remainders of trust estates do not follow the strict rules of legal estates, but they are made to wait upon the contingency. In legal estates, the contingency must happen before the time, or the estate is gone. In the contingent remainders of equitable estates here spoken of, if the contingency may happen within the time, the estate is made to wait: if it happens, the estate vests; if it does not happen, the estate fails.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Christ's Hospital v. Granger*, 1 Mac. & G. 460; *Att'y-Gen. v. Foster*, 10 Ves. 344; *Att'y-Gen. v. Newcombe*, 14 Ves. 1; *Fearon v. Webb*, 14 Ves. 19; *Walker v. Richardson*, 2 M. & W. 892; *Att'y-Gen. v. Aspinall*, 2 M. & Cr. 622; *Att'y-Gen. v. Heelis*, 2 S. & S. 76; *Att'y-Gen. v. Shrewsbury*, 6 Beav. 224; *Gass v. Wilhite*, 2 Dana, 183; *Griffin v. Graham*, 1 Hawks. 131; *Miller v. Chittenden*, 2 Io. 362; *Philadelphia v. Girard*, 45 Penn. St. 26; *Odell v. Odell*, 10 Allen, 1; *Yard's App.* 64 Penn. St. 95. The rule is held differently under the legislation of the State of New York. *Levy v. Levy*, 33 N. Y. 130; *Bascombe v. Albertson*, 34 N. Y. 598; *Beekman v. Bonsor*, 23 N. Y. 308; *Yard's App.* 64 Penn. St. 95, and see *White v. Hale*, 2 Cold. 77.

<sup>2</sup> *Ells v. Lynch*, 8 Bosw. 465; *Burnly v. Evelyn*, 16 Sim. 290; *Tregonwel v. Sydenham*, 3 Dow. 194. But see *Parson v. Snook*, 40 Barb. 144.

<sup>3</sup> *Mogg v. Mogg*, 1 Mer. 654; *Monypenny v. Deering*, 7 Hare, 568;

§ 386. A legal estate in fee cannot be conveyed to a person with a provision that it shall not be alienated, or that it shall not be subject to the claims of creditors; and so trusts cannot be created with a proviso, that the equitable estate, or interest of the *cestui que trust*, shall not be alienated or charged with his debts.<sup>1</sup> If it is ascertained that an interest is vested in the *cestui que trust*, the mode in which, or the time when, he is to reap the benefit is immaterial. The law does not allow property, whether legal or equitable, to be fettered by restraints upon alienation. Therefore when an equitable interest is once vested in the *cestui que trust*, he may dispose of it, or it may pass to his assignees by operation of law, if he becomes a bankrupt. Thus a trust for a person's support,<sup>2</sup> or to pay the interest to a person for life, as the trustees may think proper,<sup>3</sup> or when it shall become payable,<sup>4</sup> or in such sums or portions, and at such times and in such manner, as the trustees think best,<sup>5</sup> may be exercised according to the discretion of the trustees; but the bankruptcy of the *cestui que trust* puts an end to the discretion of the trustees, and vests the whole interest in the assignees; and this is so,

Alexander v. Alexander, 16 C. B. 59; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 581; Festing v. Allen, 12 M. & W. 279; Sayer's Trusts, L. R. 6 Eq. 319; Litt v. Randall, 3 Sm. & G. 83; Hodson v. Ball, 14 Sim. 558; Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox, 324; Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 3 Gray, 142; Arnold v. Congreve, 1 R. & M. 209; Wilson v. Wilson, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1076; 28 L. J. (N. S.) 95; Storrs v. Benbow, 3 De G., M. & G. 390; Cattlin v. Brown, 11 Hare, 372; Griffith v. Pownall, 13 Sim. 393; Merlin v. Blagrove, 25 Beav. 125; Greenwood v. Roberts, 15 Beav. 92; Dunganon v. Smith, 12 Cl. & Fin. 546; Seaman v. Wood, 22 Beav. 591; Vanderplank v. King, 3 Hare, 1; Webster v. Boddington, 26 Beav. 128; Curtis v. Lukin, 5 Be. v. 147.

<sup>1</sup> Snowden v. Dales, 6 Sim. 524; Green v. Spicer, 1 R. & M. 395; Graves v. Dolphin, 1 Sim. 66; Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429; Ware v. Cann, 10 B. & Cr. 433; Bradley v. Peixoto, 3 Ves. 324; Hood v. Oglander, 34 Beav. 513; Bird v. Johnson, 18 Jur. 976; Blackstone Bank v. Davis, 21 Pick. 43; Etches v. Etches, 3 Drew. 441.

<sup>2</sup> Younghusband v. Gisborne, 1 Coll. 400.

<sup>3</sup> Green v. Spicer, 1 R. & M. 395.

<sup>4</sup> Graves v. Dolphin, 1 Sim. 66.

<sup>5</sup> Piercy v. Roberts, 1 M. & K. 4.

even where the trustees were directed to pay as they should think proper, and at their will and pleasure and not otherwise, so that the *cestui que trust* should have no right, claim, or demand, other than the trustees should think proper. The court thought, in *Snowdon v. Dales*, that, taking the whole instrument together, the *cestui que trust* had a vested interest, that these directions applied only to the manner of enjoyment, and that the equitable interest vested in the assignees at his bankruptcy.<sup>1</sup> The test is, Would executors of the *cestui que trust* have a right to call for any arrears? if so, the assignees would have the right to call for the future income or interest.<sup>2</sup>

§ 386 a. These distinctions and observations must, however, be borne in mind. If the absolute equitable interest is in a *cestui que trust*, the incidents of legal ownership attach to it, and it goes to his assignees or creditors in case of insolvency. And it may be said, that, if an absolute equitable interest is given to a *cestui que trust*, no restraints upon alienation can be imposed. But a trust may be so created that no interest vests in the *cestui que trust*; consequently, such interest cannot be alienated, as where property is given to trustees to be applied in their discretion to the use of a third person, no interest goes to the third person until the trustees have exercised this discretion. So if property is given to trustees to be applied by them to the support of the *cestui que trust* and his family, or to be paid over to the *cestui que trust* for the support of himself and the education and maintenance of his children. In short, if a trust is created for a specific purpose, and is so limited that it is not repugnant to the rule against perpetuities, and is in other respects legal, neither the trustees, nor the *cestui que trust*, nor his creditors or assignees, can divest the property from the appointed purposes.<sup>3</sup> Any

<sup>1</sup> *Snowdon v. Dales*, 6 Sim. 524.

<sup>2</sup> *Re Sanderson's Trust*, 3 Kay & J. 497.

<sup>3</sup> *Rife v. Geyer*, 59 Penn. St. 393; *Wells v. McCall*, 64 Penn. St. 207;

conveyance, whether by operation of law or by the act of any of the parties, which disappoints the purposes of the settlor by divesting the property or the income from the purposes named, would be a breach of the trust. Therefore it may be said, that the power to create a trust for a specified purpose does, in some sort, impair the power to alienate property.

§ 386 *b*. In the cases referred to in the last section, it will be perceived that the trust may be for a particular purpose, and that purpose may not be exclusively for the benefit of the primary *cestui que trust*; as where an estate was vested in trustees by a marriage settlement in trust to apply the annual produce thereof “for the *maintenance and support of A. B., his wife and children*,” it was held that the wife and children were to be supported, and that A. B. was entitled to the surplus after their support, and that such surplus would go to his assignees in case of his bankruptcy:<sup>1</sup> but when the trustees have an arbitrary power of applying such part of an income as they see fit to support of a *cestui que trust*, and for no other purpose, it was held that nothing passed to his assignees.<sup>2</sup> And so if the trustees are to apply the money to the support of one and his wife and children, nothing tangible can pass to the assignees;<sup>3</sup> but, if the power is not arbitrary, but is imperative on the trustees to pay over the income

White *v.* White, 30 Vt. 342; Clute *v.* Bool, 8 Paige, 83; Bramhall *v.* Ferris, 14 N. Y. 44; Doswell *v.* Anderson, 1 P. & H. (Va.) 185; Raikes *v.* Ward, 1 Hare, 445; Crockett *v.* Crockett, 1 Hare, 451; Wetmore *v.* Truslow, 51 N. Y. 338; Graff *v.* Bonnett, 31 N. Y. 9; Locke *v.* Mabbett, 3 Court of App. Dec. 71; Blackstone Bank *v.* Davis, 21 Pick. 42; Etches *v.* Etches, 3 Drew. 441; Genet *v.* Beekman, 45 Barb. 382; Chase *v.* Chase, 2 Allen, 101; Loring *v.* Loring, 100 Mass. 340; Cole *v.* Littlefield, 35 Me. 439. See *ante*, § 117, and notes.

<sup>1</sup> Page *v.* Way, 3 Beav. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Twopenny *v.* Peyton, 10 Sim. 487; *Re Sanderson's Trust*, 3 K. & J. 497; Lord *v.* Bun, 2 Y. & C. Ch. Ca. 98; Holmes *v.* Penney, 3 K. & J. 90.

<sup>3</sup> Godden *v.* Crowhurst, 10 Sim. 642; Kearsley *v.* Woodcock, 3 Hare, 185; Wallace *v.* Anderson, 16 Beav. 533.

for the support of the *cestui que trust* and another person or persons, the assignees are entitled to take a part upon the insolvency of one, or the whole in the event of the death of the others.<sup>1</sup>

§ 387. There is a further exception to the general rule, that an equitable interest, without the right to alienate, cannot be created; and that is in the case of trusts created for married women. It is not unusual to create trusts for married women, and give such women all the rights of unmarried women over their separate equitable interests, and at the same time to insert a clause against their anticipating the income, by which means they are unable to assign or transfer it, or in any way receive any benefit from the property, except by receiving the income, as it becomes due and payable.<sup>2</sup>

§ 388. But though a settlor cannot put a restraint upon alienation, or exclude the rights of creditors, he may settle property upon another in such manner that it cannot be alienated, and creditors and assignees cannot take it. But in such case the *cestui que trust* must lose the use of the property in case of his bankruptcy. Thus A. may settle property upon B. until alienation or bankruptcy, with a limitation over to C. upon either event. Or A. may give real or personal estate to B. with a *proviso*, that, on alienation or bankruptcy, it shall shift over to C.<sup>3</sup> But a clause divesting the property upon *alienation* alone, will embrace only the voluntary acts

<sup>1</sup> *Rippon v. Norton*, 2 Beav. 63; *Wallace v. Anderson*, 16 Beav. 533.

<sup>2</sup> See this matter stated *post*, chap. on Trusts for Married Women, §§ 670, 671.

<sup>3</sup> *Muggeridge Trusts*, John. Ch. (Eng.) 625; *Kearsley v. Woodcock*, 3 Hare, 185; *Joel v. Mills*, 3 K. & J. 458; *Large's Case*, 2 Leon. 82; *Churchill v. Marks*, 1 Coll. 441; *Sharpe v. Cossent*, 20 Beav. 470; *Shee v. Hale*, 13 Ves. 404; *Lewes v. Lewes*, 6 Sim. 304; *Cooper v. Wyatt*, 5 Mad. 482; *Lockyer v. Savage*, 2 Stra. 947; *Yarnold v. Moorhouse*, 1 R. & M. 364; *Stephens v. James*, 4 Sim. 499; *Ex parte Oxley*, 1 B. & B. 257; *Rochford v. Hackman*, 9 Hare, 475; *Ex parte Hinton*, 14 Ves. 598; *Stanton v. Hall*, 2 R. & M. 175.

of the party, and will not apply to transfers by operation of law, as by bankruptcy,<sup>1</sup> unless it was intended that the clause should have so wide a signification.<sup>2</sup> Nor will a power to confess judgment be a voluntary act of alienation, unless it was within the contemplation of the parties;<sup>3</sup> nor will the marriage of a woman be an alienation of her *choses in action*.<sup>4</sup> So if there is a clause against anticipation, an assignment of arrears already accrued, and not of future income, is good.<sup>5</sup> An assignment in general words will not embrace property which would be forfeited by such assignment.<sup>6</sup>

§ 389. If a testator devises his real estate in strict settlement, and then gives his personal estate to such tenant in tail as first attains the age of twenty-one, if the tenant in tail is not of age at the testator's death, the event may never occur, and the trust is void. But if the personal property is given upon trusts that correspond to the settlement of the real estate, with a proviso that it should not vest absolutely in any tenant in tail unless he attained twenty-one, the trust is good.<sup>7</sup>

§ 390. Thus where trusts are complete in themselves, or are what are termed executed trusts, courts will not mould,

<sup>1</sup> *Lear v. Leggett*, 2 Sim. 479; 1 R. & M. 690; *Wilkinson v. Wilkinson*, G. Coop. 259; 3 Swans. 528; *Whitfield v. Prickett*, 2 Keen, 608.

<sup>2</sup> *Cooper v. Wyatt*, 5 Mad. 482; *Dommett v. Bedford*, 6 T. R. 684.

<sup>3</sup> *Avison v. Holmes*, 1 John. & H. 530; *Barnet v. Blake*, 2 Dr. & Sm. 117.

<sup>4</sup> *Bonfield v. Hassell*, 32 Beav. 217.

<sup>5</sup> *Re Stulz Trusts*, 4 De G., M. & G. 404; 1 Eq. R. 334.

<sup>6</sup> *Re Waley's Trust*, 3 Eq. R. 380. And as to the general effect of proceedings in insolvency and bankruptcy, and of annulling the proceedings, see *Lloyd v. Lloyd*, 1 W. N. 307; *Pym v. Lockyer*, 12 Sim. 394; *Brandon v. Aston*, 2 Y. & C. Ch. 24; *Churchill v. Marks*, 1 Coll. 441; *Townsend v. Early*, 34 Beav. 23; *Martin v. Margham*, 14 Sim. 230; *Graham v. Lee*, 23 Beav. 388.

<sup>7</sup> *Gosling v. Gosling*, 1 De G., J. & S. 1, 17, Am. ed. Perkins, note 1; s. c. L. R. 1 H. L. 279; *Lincoln v. Newcastle*, 12 Ves. 218; *Dungannon v. Smith*, 12 Cl. & Fin. 546; *Scarsdale v. Curzon*, 1 John. & H. 40.

alter, or put any peculiar construction on them, in order to avoid or evade the rule against perpetuities. The ordinary rules of construction will be adhered to without regard to the consequences of avoiding trusts that are illegal.<sup>1</sup> But in cases of executory trusts, where trustees are directed to settle a formal deed of trust upon terms which are faintly and incompletely sketched, another rule will be applied. If from the articles or will it appears that a perpetuity was intended, that must be the end of the trust, whether executed or executory. But if the direct object of the limitations suggested in the articles is not the creation of a perpetuity, and if the remoteness is confined to some of the distant links only in the chain of limitations, equity, in decreeing the settlement, will carry into effect the general intention, especially if the expression of that intention clearly indicates that the limitations are to be carried out so far as the law allows.<sup>2</sup>

§ 391. In some of the States, legislation has been had whereby the period within which estates must vest is shortened. Thus in Alabama<sup>3</sup> estates may be given to wife and children, or children only, severally, successively, and jointly, and to the heirs of the body of the survivor, if they come of age, and in

<sup>1</sup> *Blagrove v. Hancock*, 16 Sim. 371.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, § 376; *Bankes v. Le Despencer*, 10 Sim. 576; 7 Jur. 210; 11 Sim. 508; *Lincoln v. Newcastle*, 3 Ves. 387; 12 Ves. 218; *Phipps v. Kelynge*, 2 V. & B. 57 n.; *Woolmore v. Burrows*, 1 Sim. 512; *Dorchester v. Eppingham*, 10 Sim. 587, 588 n.; 3 Beav. 180; *Kampf v. Jones*, 2 Keen, 756; *Tregonell v. Sydenham*, 3 Dow, 194; 1 Jar. on Wills, 235 n.; see argument of Sir Edward Sugden in *Bengough v. Edridge*, 1 Sim. 226, 227; *Mogg v. Mogg*, 1 Mer. 654; 1 Jar. on Pow. Dev. 414, and note; *Trevor v. Trevor*, 13 Sim. 108; 1 H. L. Ca. 239; *Tennent v. Tennent*, *Drury*, 161; *Boydell v. Golightly*, 14 Sim. 346; *White v. Briggs*, 15 Sim. 17; *Vanderplank v. King*, 3 Hare, 5; *Monypenny v. Dering*, 7 Hare, 568; 2 De G., M & G. 145; 16 M. & W. 418; *Hale v. Penn*, 25 Beav. 335; *Humberston v. Humberston*, 2 Vern. 737; 1 P. Wms. 332; Pr. Ch. 455; *Deerhurst v. St. Albans*, 5 Mad. 232; *Jervoise v. Northumberland*, 1 J. & W. 559; *Blackburn v. Stables*, 2 V. & B. 367; *Rowland v. Morgan*, 2 Phil. 763; *Parfitt v. Hember*, L. R. 4 Eq. 443.

<sup>3</sup> Code, 1852, § 1309.

default thereof over. But gifts to others than wife and children must vest within the term of three lives in being, and ten years thereafter. In Connecticut,<sup>1</sup> no estate can be given by deed or will to any person or persons, except such as are in being, or to the immediate issue or descendants of such as are in being at the time of making the deed or will. In New York,<sup>2</sup> Michigan,<sup>3</sup> Minnesota,<sup>4</sup> and Wisconsin,<sup>5</sup> the absolute power of alienation cannot be suspended, by any limitation or condition, for a longer period than the continuance of two lives in being at the creation of the estate, except that a contingent remainder in fee may be limited on a prior remainder in fee to take effect in the event that the persons to whom the first remainder is limited shall die under the age of twenty-one years, or upon any other contingency by which the estate of such persons may be determined during their minority. Successive limitations of estates for life are not valid except to persons in being at the time of their creation. And if a remainder is limited on more than two successive estates for lives in being, all the subsequent successive estates are void; and, upon the death of those two persons the remainder will take effect as if no other life-estate has been created. No remainder can be created for the life of a person other than the grantee or devisee of such estate, unless such remainder is in fee; nor can a remainder be created upon such an estate in a term of years, unless it is for the whole residue of the term. If more than two lives are named, the remainder takes effect upon the death of the two persons first named, in the same manner as if no other persons had been named or lives introduced. A con-

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Stat. 1854, p. 630, § 4.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Rev. Stat. (4th ed.) 133, §§ 15-20; *Knox v. Jones*, 47 N. Y. 398; *Wood v. Wood*, 5 Paige, 596; *Amory v. Lord*, 5 Seld. 503; *Schutter v. Smith*, 41 N. Y. 328; *Gott v. Cook*, 7 Paige, 531; *Van Vechten v. Van Vechten*, 8 Paige, 104.

<sup>3</sup> Comp. Laws, 1857, c. 85, §§ 15-26.

<sup>4</sup> Comp. Stat. 1859, c. 31, §§ 15-26.

<sup>5</sup> Rev. Stat. 1858, c. 83, §§ 15-26.



tingent remainder cannot be limited on a term for years, unless the contingency on which it is limited is such that it must vest during the continuance of two lives in being at the creation of such remainder, or at the termination of such term of years. Thus a limitation to A. for life, remainder to B. for life, remainder to C. and D., and the survivor of them, is within the statute, and void as to C. and D. as a limitation upon more than two lives in being.<sup>1</sup> If the power of alienation is suspended for an indefinite period, the trust is void.<sup>2</sup>

§ 392. In Ohio,<sup>3</sup> no estate can be limited to any person or persons, except they are in being, or to the immediate descendants of such as are in being at the time of making of the deed or will. In Mississippi,<sup>4</sup> fees-tail are prohibited, and converted into fees-simple; and estates may be limited in succession to two donees in being, and to the heirs of the body of the remainder-man, and in default thereof to the heirs of the donor in fee. In Indiana,<sup>5</sup> the power of selling lands cannot be suspended, by any limitation or condition, longer than the continuance of any number of specified lives in being at the time of the creation of the estate; except that contingent remainders in fee may be limited on a prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the person or persons to whom the first remainder is limited shall be under the age of twenty-one years, or upon any other contingency by which the estate of such person or persons may be determined during their minorities. In Kentucky,<sup>6</sup> the absolute power of alienation cannot be suspended by limitations or conditions for a longer period than during a life or lives in being and twenty-one years and ten months; which is substantially the common-law rule in the

<sup>1</sup> *Arnold v. Gilbert*, 5 Barb. 190.

<sup>2</sup> *Donaldson v. American Tract Soc.* 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Add. 15; *Leonard v. Bell*, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 608; *Kiah v. Grenier*, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 388.

<sup>3</sup> Rev. Stat. 1854, c. 42, § 1.

<sup>4</sup> Code, 1857, c. 38, § 1, art. 3; See *Jordan v. Roach*, 32 Miss. 481.

<sup>5</sup> Rev. Stat. 1852, p. 238, § 40.

<sup>6</sup> Rev. Stat. c. 80, § 34.

form of a statute. So, in Iowa,<sup>1</sup> alienation cannot be suspended for a period longer than lives in being and twenty-one years. In Arkansas<sup>2</sup> and Vermont,<sup>3</sup> their constitutions declare that a perpetuity shall not be allowed. What is a perpetuity in those States would necessarily, in the absence of legislation, be determined by the common-law rule. So it is conceived that the common law prevails in those States. In all the other States, except perhaps Louisiana, where the rules of property were derived from the civil law or the code of France, and California, where they were derived from the Spanish laws, the common-law rules as to perpetuities are in force, and trusts that are contrary to these rules are void.

§ 393. Intimately connected with this matter is the rule against accumulations. Trusts for accumulation must be strictly confined within the limits of the rule against perpetuities. It has been seen that a settlor may restrain the alienation of property for a life or lives in being and twenty-one years; and, in case the beneficiary is then *en ventre sa mère*, an addition of nine months may be made to the term. In analogy to this rule, a settlor may prevent the beneficial enjoyment of property for the same length of time, by directing an accumulation of the interest, income, rents, or profits.<sup>4</sup> If a trust for accumulation may possibly exceed this limit, it is wholly void, and it cannot be cut down to the legal limit.

<sup>1</sup> Code, 1851, p. 1191.

<sup>2</sup> Const. art. 2, § 19.

<sup>3</sup> Const. pt. 2, § 36; Gen. Stat. 1863, pp. 25, 446.

<sup>4</sup> Fosdick v. Fosdick, 6 Allen, 43; Hooper v. Hooper, 9 Cush. 122; Thorndike v. Loring, 15 Gray, 391; Boughton v. James, 1 Coll. 26; 1 H. L. Ca. 406; Southampton v. Hertford, 2 V. & B. 54; Marshall v. Holloway, 2 Swans. 432; Curtis v. Lukin, 5 Beav. 147; Brown v. Stoughton, 14 Sim. 369; Scarisbrooke v. Skelmersdale, 17 Sim. 187; Turvin v. Newcome, 3 K. & J. 16; Craig v. Craig, 3 Barb. Ch. 76; Mathews v. Keble, L. R. 1 Eq. 467; L. R. 3 Ch. 691; Killam v. Allen, 52 Barb. 605; Dutch Reform Church v. Brandon, 52 Barb. 228; White v. Howard, 52 Barb. 294; Hilliard v. Miller, 10 Barr, 326.

§ 394. The above is the rule where there are no statutes to control it. Trusts, by which the vesting, alienation, or enjoyment of property is postponed beyond the legal period, are considered as contrary to public policy, and therefore void; and, as courts cannot substitute legal directions in the place of illegal provisions in a will, the whole fails if there is an illegal gift for accumulation. The period during which accumulation might go on was found to be inconvenient in case a settlor availed himself of all its terms. Thus Mr. Thellusson, by an ingenious and skilful use of these legal limitations, constructed a will by which a fortune of £600,000 was left to accumulate for some person to come into existence in the future, answering a certain description, while mere pittances were given to his children and grandchildren then in being. It was calculated that accumulations might go on under this will from seventy-five to one hundred years, and that the gross accumulation would amount to a sum from £32,000,000 to £100,000,000, according to the time during which it might accumulate. The will was most carefully considered and discussed in all the courts, but it was found to be drawn carefully within the law, and all its provisions were sustained.<sup>1</sup> Thereupon Parliament interfered, and passed a statute, usually called the Thellusson Act, which curtailed the period during which accumulations might be directed.<sup>2</sup> This act established four alternate periods during which accumulations might be made: (1.) The life of the settlor; (2.) Twenty-one years from the death of the settlor; (3.) The minority or minorities of any persons living at the death of the settlor; (4.) During the minority or minorities of any person or persons who, if of full age, would be entitled under the limitations to the income which is directed to be accumulated.

§ 395. It has been determined that these four periods are alternative, and not cumulative, and that accumulations must

<sup>1</sup> Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 227; 11 Ves. 112; 4 Kent, Com. 285.

<sup>2</sup> Stat. 39 and 40, Geo. III. c. 98.

be confined to one of them.<sup>1</sup> If the accumulation does not begin until several years after the testator's death, it must cease at the end of twenty-one years from his death,<sup>2</sup> excluding the day of his death.<sup>3</sup> The act further directs, that any accumulation directed contrary to its provision shall be void. By these words accumulations directed contrary to the statute are not wholly void, as at common law, but only the excess beyond the time allowed by the statute is void.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Lewis calls this a "rule of construction entirely novel."<sup>5</sup> It is also said, that the act is one of restraining force, and cannot give validity to trusts for accumulation, which are in themselves void, as transgressing the common-law limits of a perpetuity. Thus a direction to accumulate beyond the time allowed by the statute, but within the time allowed by the common law, will be good for the actual time allowed by the statute, and void only for the excess; but a direction to accumulate, beyond the rule of the common law against perpetuity, is wholly void notwithstanding the statute. Consequently, in England a trust for accumulation may verge *almost* upon the outside of the limit of a perpetuity, and yet be void only for the excess beyond the time

<sup>1</sup> *Ellis v. Maxwell*, 3 Beav. 587; *Rosslyn's Trust*, 16 Sim. 391; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 288.

<sup>2</sup> *Nettleton v. Stephenson*, 3 De G. & Sm. 366; *Att'y-Gen. v. Poulden*, 3 Hare, 555; *Webb v. Webb*, 2 Beav. 493; *Shaw v. Rhodes*, 1 My. & Cr. 135.

<sup>3</sup> *Toder v. Sansom*, 1 Brown, P. C. 468; *Lester v. Garland*, 15 Ves. 248; *East v. Lowndes*, 11 Sim. 434. And the day of the death was excluded by the rules of the common law, independently of the statute. *Toder v. Sansom*, *ut supra*.

<sup>4</sup> *Griffiths v. Vere*, 9 Ves. 127; *Palmer v. Holford*, 4 Russ. 403; *Langdon v. Simson*, 12 Ves. 295; *Rosslyn's Trust*, 16 Sim. 391; *Freke v. Lord Carbery*, L. R. 16 Eq. 461. There are a great number of cases upon this construction, but they are not important in America. The reader can see 1 Jar. on Wills, 286; Hill on Trustees, 394; *Lade v. Holford*, Amb. 479; *Eyre v. Marsden*, 2 Keen, 564; 4 My. & Cr. 231; *Marshall v. Holloway*, 3 Swans. 432; *Southampton v. Hertford*, 2 V. & B. 61; *Haly v. Bannister*, 4 Mad. 277.

<sup>5</sup> *Lewis on Per.* 593.

established in the statute; but if a trust for accumulation transcends in the slightest degree the boundary of a perpetuity, it is wholly void, and will fail without regard to the actual course of events.<sup>1</sup>

§ 396. If a good bequest is made to a devisee, subject to an illegal or void direction to accumulate, as where such direction is independently engrafted upon the devise, and can be stricken out without destroying the substantial form of the gift, the gift may be held to be good, but the direction to accumulate void.<sup>2</sup> But where the gift is limited to take effect *after* a prescribed period of accumulation, and out of the accumulated fund, as part of the subject-matter of the gift, and such period of accumulation is illegal or too remote, the gift itself will fail, as the form of the gift in such case is of the substance of it.<sup>3</sup> If the gift and all its accumulations are of necessity to vest in some person absolutely, in such manner that he will have a right to call for the fund, and stop the accumulations within the legal period, the bequest will be good, although such persons should allow the accumulations to go on as directed;<sup>4</sup> that is, the same rule applies as in the case of perpetuities. The law concerns itself with the possibilities of an illegal accumulation, and not with the fact, whether a person, having an absolute vested right to a fund, allows it to go on accumulating in accordance with a void direction.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lewis on Per. 593, 594; Hargrave, Accum. 91, 110; 1 Pow. on Devi. by Jar. 419; 2 Prest. Abst. 183.

<sup>2</sup> Haxtun v. Corse, 2 Barb. Ch. 506; Craig v. Craig, 3 Barb. Ch. 76; Martin v. Margham, 14 Sim. 230; Williams v. Williams, 4 Selden, 525; Phelps v. Pond, 23 N. Y. 69; Kilpatrick v. Johnson, 15 N. Y. 322; Hawley v. James, 5 Paige, 318; Philadelphia v. Girard, 45 Penn. St. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Amory v. Lord, 5 Selden, 403.

<sup>4</sup> Phipps v. Kelynge, 2 Ves. & B. 57 n, 62, 63; Tregonell v. Sydenham, 3 Dow, 194; Lewis on Per. 640; Conner v. Ogle, 4 Md. Ch. 443; Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115; Cr. & Phil. 240; Oddie v. Brown, 4 De G. & J. 179; Bateman v. Hotchkin, 10 Beav. 426; Bacon v. Proctor, T. & R. 31; Briggs v. Oxford, 1 De G., M. & G., 363; Williams v. Lewis, 6 H. L. Ca. 1013.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, § 381.

§ 397. When a direction to accumulate is void for a part of the term, the income during such void part will belong to the heir or next of kin, or to the residuary legatee. Mr. Jarman has pointed out the destination of such income as follows: (1.) Where there is a present gift in possession, and the direction for accumulation is merely to govern the mode of enjoyment, the result is to give those entitled the present income, the same as if the direction had not been given.<sup>1</sup> (2.) Where the trust for accumulation is grafted upon an estate where vesting is deferred or made contingent, until after the period of accumulation, the statute by stopping the accumulation does not hasten the vesting or the possession, and the income goes to the residuary legatee or the heir, according as it is personal or real estate, until the vesting or possession of the estate is matured. But where the residue is not given absolutely, but only for life or years, the interest upon a legacy thus directed to be accumulated beyond the legal period goes into the residue of the estate as capital.<sup>2</sup> (3.) Where a residue is directed to be accumulated, the income, when its accumulation becomes illegal, will go to the heir or next of kin, according as the property may be real or personal estate.<sup>3</sup> (4.) The income of the accumulations follows the same rule as the accumula-

<sup>1</sup> *Trickey v. Trickey*, 3 My. & K. 560; *Clulow's Trust*, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 1002; 28 L. J. Ch. 696; *Combe v. Hughes*, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 194; 1 Jar. on Wills, 292; *Hawley v. James*, 5 Paige, 318.

<sup>2</sup> *Jones v. Maggs*, 9 Hare, 605; *Macdonald v. Brice*, 2 Keen, 276; *Eyre v. Marsden*, 2 Keen, 574; *Ellis v. Maxwell*, 3 Beav. 587; *Nettleton v. Stephenson*, 3 De G. & Sm. 366; *Barrington v. Liddell*, 10 Hare, 429; *Att'y-Gen. v. Poulden*, 3 Hare, 555; *Crawley v. Crawley*, 7 Sim. 427; *Morgan v. Morgan*, 4 De G. & Sm. 175; *Hull v. Hull*, 24 N. Y. 647; 1 Jar. on Wills, 292.

<sup>3</sup> *Skrymsher v. Northcote*, 1 Swans. 566; *Macdonald v. Brice*, 2 Keen, 276; *Pride v. Fooks*, 2 Beav. 437; *Elborne v. Goode*, 14 Sim. 165; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 288; *Bourne v. Buckton*, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 91; *Oddie v. Brown*, 4 De G. & J. 179; *Halford v. Stains*, 16 Sim. 488; *Wilde v. Davis*, 1 Sm. & G. 475; *Eyre v. Marsden*, 2 Keen, 564; 4 My. & Cr. 431; *Edwards v. Tuck*, 3 De G., M. & G. 40; *Burt v. Sturt*, 10 Hare, 415; 1 Jar. on Wills, 292.

tion.<sup>1</sup> These are substantially the same rules that apply to the distribution of income which is illegally directed to be accumulated at common law.

§ 398. In New York,<sup>2</sup> Michigan,<sup>3</sup> Wisconsin,<sup>4</sup> and Minnesota,<sup>5</sup> the common-law rules in relation to accumulations are changed by statutes, which are substantially the same in each State. In those States, accumulations may be directed by deed or will, during the minority of one or more persons, to commence with the creation of the estate out of which the accumulation is to be made, and to end with the minority of the persons named. If there is a direction for an accumulation for a longer period, the excess only is void. In Alabama,<sup>6</sup> accumulations can go on only for ten years, unless they are for the benefit of a minor child in being at the creation of the trust, or at the death of the testator, in which case they may continue during its minority. In Pennsylvania,<sup>7</sup> trusts for accumulation cannot be created for a longer term than the life or lives of the grantor or testator, and the term of twenty-one years from the death of such grantor or testator, and if these limits are exceeded, the excess is void. In the other States, the common-law rules, as before stated, are supposed to prevail. The rule in regard to accumulation is analogous to the rules in regard to the vesting of executory estates. At common law, the same rule prevails in both cases. In many of the States, the rules regulating the vesting of such estates

<sup>1</sup> *Crawley v. Crawley*, 7 Sim. 427; *O'Neill v. Lucas*, 2 Keen, 316; *Morgan v. Morgan*, 4 De G. & Sm. 175; 20 L. J. Ch. 441; 1 Jar. on Wills, 292.

<sup>2</sup> Rev. Stat. (4th ed.) p. 135; *Craig v. Craig*, 3 Barb. Ch. 76; *Killam v. Allen*, 52 Barb. 605; *Hawley v. James*, 5 Paige, 480; *Hull v. Hull*, 24 N. Y. 647; *Robinson v. Robinson*, 5 Lansing, 167; *Williams v. Williams*, 8 N. Y. 358; *Kilpatrick v. Johnson*, 15 N. Y. 322; *Haxtun v. Corse*, 2 Barb. Ch. 508; *Lang v. Ropke*, 5 Sand. S. C. 363.

<sup>3</sup> Comp. Laws, 1857, c. 85, §§ 15-26.

<sup>4</sup> Rev. Stat. 1858, c. 83, §§ 15-26.

<sup>5</sup> Comp. Stat. 1859, c. 31, §§ 15-26.

<sup>6</sup> Code, 1852, § 1310.

<sup>7</sup> *Purd. Dig.* 1861, p. 853, § 9.

have been altered by statutes. Whether the modification of those rules by statute, without reference to the rule as to accumulations, would also alter the rule as to accumulations in those States does not seem to have been considered.

§ 399. Where there are no statutes regulating accumulations, a direction to accumulate a fund for a charity, for a term beyond the common-law limit, does not vitiate the gift for the charity,<sup>1</sup> although no limit has been determined by courts during which an accumulation for a charity may be permitted. It is probable that courts would take care that no extraordinary or extravagant term for accumulation should be allowed for a future and prospective good. But where there are statutes against accumulations, charities will be governed by the same rules unless they are specially excepted.<sup>2</sup>

§ 400. In *Bassil v. Lister*,<sup>3</sup> it was determined that a direction of a testator that premiums on policies of insurance should be paid out of his estate, upon the lives of his sons during their lives, was not a direction for an accumulation within the prohibition of the statute. The case is severely criticised in *Jarman on Wills*; <sup>4</sup> but it would seem, that it would not be illegal for a testator to direct the premiums to be paid upon a life policy, if the primary object of such a direction is not accumulation, but security or safety. The question cannot arise, however, in the absence of statutory provisions upon the subject of accumulations; for it can be an accumulation for one life only in being at the time, and such an accumulation is legal by the rules of the common law.

<sup>1</sup> *Odell v. Odell*, 10 Allen, 1; but see *Hillyard v. Miller*, 10 Penn. St. 326; *Philadelphia v. Girard*, 45 Penn. St. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Martin v. Margham*, 14 Sim. 230.

<sup>3</sup> *Bassil v. Lister*, 9 Hare, 177.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Jarm. 294-297.



## CHAPTER XIV.

## GENERAL PROPERTIES AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE OF TRUSTEE.

- § 401. A trustee, having accepted the office, is bound to discharge its duties.
- § 402. He cannot delegate his authority.
- § 403. Not responsible if he follow directions in employing agents.
- § 404. Where agents must be employed.
- § 405. When responsible for agents and attorneys.
- § 406. When not responsible.
- § 407. Difference of liability in law and equity.
- § 408. Trustees responsible for all mischiefs arising from delegating discretionary powers.
- § 409. Employing agents or attorneys may not be a delegation of authority or discretion.
- § 410. A sale or devise of the trust estate not a delegation of the trust.
- § 411. Several trustees constitute but one collective trustee.
- §§ 412, 413. When they must all act and when not.
- § 414. As to the survivorship of the office of trustee.
- § 415. General rule as to liability for cotrustees.
- § 416. May make themselves liable, where otherwise they would not be.
- § 417. Trustees must use due diligence in all cases, or they will be liable for cotrustees.
- § 418. Cases of a want of due care and prudence.
- § 419. In case of collusion or gross negligence, a trustee will be liable for acts of cotrustees.
- § 420. When cotrustees are liable for others upon sales of real estate under a power.
- § 421. As to liability of coexecutors for the acts of each other.
- § 422. An executor must not enable his coexecutor to misapply the funds.
- § 423. When executors must all join they are not liable for each other's acts; but they must use due diligence.
- § 424. An executor must not allow money to remain under the sole control of his coexecutor.
- § 425. Executors and administrators governed by the same rules.
- § 426. Rule where coexecutors or cotrustees give joint bonds for security of the administration of the estate.
- § 427. Trustees can make no profit out of the office.
- § 428. Cannot buy up debts against the estate or *cestui que trust* at a profit.
- § 429. Cannot make a profit from the use of trust funds in business, trade, or speculation.
- § 430. All persons holding a fiduciary relation, subject to the same rule.
- § 431. All persons holding fiduciary relations to an estate, subject to the same rule.
- § 432. Can receive no profit for serving in their professional characters a trust estate.
- § 433. Trustees can set up no claim to the trust estate, and ought not to betray the title of the *cestui que trust*.
- § 434. In England, upon failure of heirs to the *cestui que trust*, trustee may hold real estate to his own use.

§ 435. Speculative questions.

§ 436. In the United States, the interest of the *cestui que trust* in real estate escheats.

§ 437. So it does in England and the United States in personalty.

§ 401. A TRUSTEE, having accepted a trust, cannot renounce it. If any one undertakes an office for another, he is bound to discharge its duties, and he cannot free himself from liability by mere renunciation. He must be discharged by a court of equity, or by a special power in the instrument of trust, or by the consent of all parties interested in the estate, if they are *sui juris*: if all the parties are not *sui juris*, recourse must be had to a court of equity, in the absence of any provisions in the instrument of trust.<sup>1</sup> Nor can a party qualify his own acts. Where he is named trustee or executor, and acts in behalf of certain parties in the management of the estate, he cannot protest that he is not acting generally, and that he will not be responsible for any mismanagement. On the contrary, if he so acts, and his coexecutors accept the trust, and commit a *devastavit*, he will be equally responsible.<sup>2</sup> Even if a trustee gives a bond for the due execution of the trust, and in a suit upon the bond is obliged to pay the full amount, he is not discharged from the trust, nor does the trust property vest in him beneficially. He is still a trustee, and must account for the trust property, and all the income and profits. Courts of equity, however, in such cases have power to do equity; and the trustee would not be ordered to convey the trust property without repayment to him of the money paid out on his bond.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Post*, §§ 920-922; *Doyle v. Blake*, 2 Sch. & L. 245; *Chalmer v. Bradly*, 1 J. & W. 68; *Read v. Truelove*, Amb. 417; *Manson v. Baillie*, 2 Macq. H. L. Ca. 80; *Switzer v. Skiles*, 3 Gilm. (Ill.) 529; *Diefendorf v. Spraker*, 6 Seld. 246; *Shepherd v. McEvers*, 4 John. Ch. 136; *Matter of Jones*, 4 Sandf. 615; *Cruger v. Halliday*, 11 Paige, 314; *Courtenay v. Courtenay*, 3 Jo. & La. 529.

<sup>2</sup> *Lowry v. Fulton*, 9 Sim. 123; *Doyle v. Blake*, 2 Sch. & L. 231; *Read v. Truelove*, Amb. 417; *Urch v. Walker*, 3 M. & Cr. 702; *Van Horn v. Fonda*, 5 John. Ch. 403.

<sup>3</sup> *Moorcroft v. Dowding*, 2 P. Wms. 314. See *Barker v. Barker*, 14 Wis. 131; *Saunders v. Webber*, 39 Cal. 287.

§ 402. The office of trustee is one of personal confidence, and cannot be delegated. If a person takes upon himself the management of property for the benefit of another, he has no right to impose that duty on others, and if he does, he will be responsible to the *cestui que trust*, to whom he owes the duty.<sup>1</sup> Therefore if a trustee confides his duties or the trust fund to the care of a stranger,<sup>2</sup> or to his attorney,<sup>3</sup> or even to his cotrustee or coexecutor,<sup>4</sup> he will be personally responsible. But, before this responsibility can arise, the trustee must have accepted the office. Where a person named executor received a bill by post, and passed it over to a coexecutor who had accepted the trust, it was held that the act might be considered as the act of a stranger, and did not impose any responsibility.<sup>5</sup> So where a coexecutor collected money, and paid it to a banker, who was also his coexecutor, and whom the testator employed as his banker, he was held excused for trusting the

<sup>1</sup> *Turner v. Corney*, 5 Beav. 517; *Taylor v. Hopkins*, 41 Ill. 442.

<sup>2</sup> *Adams v. Clifton*, 1 Russ. 297; *Kilbee v. Sneyd*, 2 Moll. 199; *Hardwick v. Mynd*, 1 Anst. 109; *Venables v. Foyle*, 1 Ch. Ca. 2; *Douglass v. Browne*, Mont. 93; *Ex parte Booth*, Mont. 248; *Walker v. Symonds*, 3 Swans. 79, n. (a); *Char. Corp. v. Sutton*, 2 Atk. 405; *Wilkinson v. Parry*, 4 Russ. 272; *Hulme v. Hulme*, 2 M. & K. 682; *Black v. Irwin*, Harp. L. 411; *Berger v. Duff*, 4 John. Ch. 368; *Pearson v. Jamison*, 1 McLean, 199; *Newton v. Bronson*, 3 Kern. 587; *Andrew v. N. Y. Bible Soc.* 4 Sand. 156; *Niles v. Stevens*, 4 Denio, 399; *Beekman v. Bonsor*, 23 N. Y. 298; *Whitlebury v. Hugh*, 39 M. S. 13; *Graham v. King*, 50 Mo. 22; *Howard v. Thornton*, 50 Mo. 291; *Bales v. Perry*, 51 Mo. 449.

<sup>3</sup> *Chambers v. Minchin*, 7 Ves. 196; *Griffiths v. Porter*, 25 Beav. 236; *Ingle v. Partridge*, 32 Beav. 661; 34 Beav. 411; *Bostock v. Floyer*, L. R. 1 Ch. 26; *Ex parte Townsend*, 1 Moll. 139; *Ghost v. Waller*, 9 Beav. 497; *Turner v. Corney*, 5 Beav. 115; *Sinclair v. Jackson*, 8 Cow. 582.

<sup>4</sup> *Langford v. Gascoyne*, 11 Ves. 333; *Clough v. Bond*, 3 M. & Cr. 497; *Eaves v. Hickson*, 30 Beav. 136; *Davis v. Spurling*, 1 R. & M. 66; *Anon. Mos.* 35, 36; *Harrison v. Graham*, 1 P. Wms. 241, n. (y); *Kilbee v. Sneyd*, 2 Moll. 200; *Marriott v. Kinnersley*, Tam. 470; *Thompson v. Finch*, 22 Beav. 316; 8 De G., M. & G. 560; *Dines v. Scott*, T. & R. 361; *Cowell v. Gatcombe*, 27 Beav. 568; *Trutch v. Lamprell*, 20 Beav. 116; *Ex parte Winnall*, 3 D. & C. 22; *Burger v. Duff*, 4 John. Ch. 368.

<sup>5</sup> *Balchen v. Scott*, 2 Ves. Jr. 678.

same person as his coexecutor whom the testator trusted as his banker.<sup>1</sup>

§ 403. So trustees are not responsible, if they follow the directions of the settlor. Thus where a testator recommended his executors to employ a person who had been his own agent and clerk, and they employed him to collect moneys, and he became insolvent, it was held that, as the testator pointed out the agent to whom certain business might be delegated, the executors were not liable for the loss, if they used due diligence to recover the money.<sup>2</sup> So if an executor pays over money which he has no right to retain. Thus a testator appointed A., B., and C. his executors, and authorized A. to sell real estate for certain purposes. A. employed B. as his agent to sell the real estate; B. sold the estate and paid the money over to A., who misapplied it; and it was held that B. received the money, not as executor, but as agent of A., and as A. had authority to sell, he had a right to the money, and that B. could not retain it, and was not responsible for it.<sup>3</sup>

§ 404. But there are circumstances where the trustees must employ agents. Lord Hardwicke said, "There are two sorts of necessity, *legal* necessity and *moral* necessity. As to the first a distinction prevails. Where two *executors* join in giving a discharge for money, and only one of them receives it, they are both answerable for it; because there is no necessity for both to join in the discharge, the receipt of either being sufficient; but if *trustees* join in giving a discharge, and one receives, the other is not answerable, because his joining in the discharge was necessary. *Moral* necessity is from the usage

<sup>1</sup> Churchill v. Hobson, 1 P. Wms. 241; Chambers v. Minchin, 7 Ves. 198. And see 1 P. Wms. 241, n. (y.)

<sup>2</sup> Kilbee v. Sneyd, 2 Moll. 199; Doyle v. Blake, 2 Sch. & L. 239.

<sup>3</sup> Davis v. Spurling, 1 R. & M. 64; Tam. 199; Keane v. Roberts, 4 Mad. 332, 356; Crisp v. Spranger, Nels. 109.

of mankind, if the trustee acts prudently for the trust, as he would have done for himself, 'and according to the usage of business;' as if a trustee appoint rents to be paid to a banker at that time in credit, but who afterwards breaks, the trustee is not answerable. So in the employment of stewards and agents; for none of these cases are on account of necessity, but because the persons acted in the usual method of business."<sup>1</sup> Other cases have held, that "necessity includes the usual course of business."<sup>2</sup> Thus where an executor in London remitted money to an executor in the country to pay debts there due, it was held to be a *necessary* transaction in the course of business, and the executor in London was not responsible for the loss of the money by his coexecutor in the country.<sup>3</sup> So where A. and B. were assignees of a bankrupt, and A. signed dividend checks and delivered them to B. for his signature, and for delivery to the creditors, and they were stolen from B. and negotiated at the bank, it was held that A. was not responsible for the loss, as he had delegated the checks to B. in the necessary course of the business.<sup>4</sup> So a trustee is not called upon, in the ordinary course of business, to take security from the agent or other person whom he employs.<sup>5</sup> One trustee may employ his cotrustee as his agent, or one trustee may act for the whole, within the scope of those duties where an agent may be employed.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ex parte* Belchier, Amb. 219.

<sup>2</sup> *Bacon v. Bacon*, 5 Ves. 335; *Clough v. Bond*, 3 M. & C. 497; *Joy v. Campbell*, 1 Sch. & L. 341; *Chambers v. Minchin*, 7 Ves. 193; *Langford v. Gascoyne*, 11 Ves. 335; *Davis v. Spurling*, 1 R. & M. 66; *Munch v. Cockerell*, 5 M. & Cr. 214; *Hawley v. James*, 5 Paige, 487; *May v. Frazer*, 4 Lit. 391; *Telford v. Barry*, 1 Io. 591; *Blight v. Schenck*, 10 Barr, 285; *Lewis v. Reed*, 11 Ind. 239; *Mason v. Wait*, 4 Scam. 132.

<sup>3</sup> *Joy v. Campbell*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 341; *Barrings v. Willing*, 4 Wash. C. 251; *Jones's App.* 8 W. & S. 147; *State v. Guilford*, 15 Ohio, 593; *Deaderick v. Cantrell*, 10 Yerg. 254; *Thomas v. Scruggs*, 10 Yerg. 401; *Maccubbin v. Cromwell*, 7 G. & J. 157.

<sup>4</sup> *Ex parte* Griffin, 2 Gl. & J. 114; *Wackerbath v. Powell*, Buck, 495; 2 Gl. & J. 151.

<sup>5</sup> *Ex parte* Belchier, Amb. 220.

<sup>6</sup> *Ex parte* Rigby, 19 Ves. 463; *Abbott v. American Hard Rubber Co.*

§ 405. It was held in one case, that assignees were responsible for the loss of money by an attorney employed by them to collect debts due the estate, on the ground that there was no *necessity* for them to allow the attorney to receive a shilling of the money except the costs, as he could not give a valid receipt for the same ;<sup>1</sup> and Lord Eldon was cited as an authority for this. Mr. Lewin questions this case, and says that trustees must not allow money to remain in the hands of an attorney, but that the authorities are doubtful which say that money may not pass through the hands of an attorney in the ordinary course of business. The case is authority, however, thus far, that attorneys cannot sign receipts for trustees, and if they authorize them so to do, the trustees will be responsible as for the acts of an agent improperly appointed.<sup>2</sup>

§ 406. If money is to be transmitted to a distant place, a trustee may do so through the medium of a responsible bank, or he may take bills from persons of undoubted credit, payable at the place where the money is to be sent ; but the bills must be taken to him *as trustee* : if he neglects these precautions he will be responsible for any loss.<sup>3</sup>

§ 407. It is said that there is a difference in the rule, as applied to executors in a court of law and a court of equity. Thus, in a court of law, an executor will be charged with all the assets that come to his hands to be administered, and he must discharge himself by showing a legal administration of all of them ; and he cannot discharge himself at law by show-

33 Barb. 579 ; *Sinclair v. Jackson*, 8 Cow. 543 ; *Webb v. Ledsom*, 1 K. & J. 385 ; *Leggett v. Hunter*, 19 N. Y. 445 ; *Bowers v. Seeger*, 3 W. & S. 222.

<sup>1</sup> *Ex parte Townsend*, 1 Moll. 139 ; *Anon.* 12 Mod. 560 ; *Re Fryer*, 3 K. & J. 317.

<sup>2</sup> Lewin, 208.

<sup>3</sup> *Wren v. Kirton*, 11 Ves. 380 ; *Ex parte Belchier*, 219 ; *Routh v. Howell*, 3 Ves. 566 ; *Massey v. Banner*, 1 J. & W. 247 ; *Knight v. Plymouth*, 1 Dick. 120 ; 3 Atk. 480.

ing that he intrusted them to another in the ordinary course of business; that he used due caution and prudence, and reposed a reasonable confidence in such other person; and that the assets were lost without negligence or default on his part. Such a state of facts would not sustain a plea of *plene administravit* in a court of law. But a court of equity would adjust the account of the executor upon equitable principles.<sup>1</sup> A court of probate, in taking the account, would also act upon equitable principles.<sup>2</sup>

§ 408. If the trust is of a *discretionary* nature, the trustee will be responsible for all the mischievous consequences of the delegation, and the exercise of the discretion will be absolutely void in the substitute.<sup>3</sup> Nor can a *discretionary* trust be delegated to a cotrustee.<sup>4</sup> Where a sum of money was given to three trustees to be distributed in charity in their *discretion*, and they divided it into three parts, and each took control of a third, Lord Hardwicke said: "I am of opinion that the trustees could not divide the charity into three parts, and each trustee nominate a third absolutely, because the determination of the propriety of every object was left by the testator to the discretion of *all* the executors." <sup>5</sup>

§ 409. But it must be observed that the appointment of an attorney, proxy, or agent, is not necessarily a delegation of the trust. The trustee must act at times through attorneys or agents, and if he determines in his own mind how to exercise

<sup>1</sup> *Cross v. Smith*, 7 East, 246; *Jones v. Lewis*, 2 Ves. 241; *Poole v. Munday*, 103 Mass. 174; *Upton v. Badeau*, 3 Bradf. Sur. 13.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Alexander v. Alexander*, 2 Ves. 643; *Att'y-Gen. v. Scott*, 1 Ves. 413; *Wilson v. Dennison*, Amb. 82; 7 Bro. P. C. 296; *Bradford v. Belfield*, 2 Sim. 264; *Hitch v. Leworthy*, 2 Hare, 200; *Doe v. Robinson*, 24 Miss. 688; *Singleton v. Scott*, 11 Io. 589; *Pearson v. Jamison*, 3 McLean, 69, 197.

<sup>4</sup> *Crewe v. Dicken*, 4 Ves. 97.

<sup>5</sup> *Att'y-Gen. v. Gleg*, 1 Atk. 356.

the discretion, and appoints agents or instruments to carry out his determination, he cannot be said to delegate the trust, even though deeds or other instruments are signed by attorneys in his name. So if he gives instructions to his attorneys and agents how to act, it cannot be said to be a delegation of the trust.<sup>1</sup>

§ 410. It has been before stated that a sale or devise of the trust estate by the trustee will not be a delegation or communication of a discretionary trust to the vendee or devisee, unless the original instrument of trust contemplated and authorized such an act by vesting the trust or power annexed to the estate in the trustee and his assigns or devisees.<sup>2</sup>

§ 411. Where a settlor vests his property in several cotrustees, they all form, as it were, one collective trustee; therefore they must perform their duties in their joint capacity,<sup>3</sup> even in making a purchase.<sup>4</sup> In law there is no such person known

<sup>1</sup> *Att'y-Gen. v. Scott*, 1 Ves. 413; *Ex parte Rigby*, 19 Ves. 463; *Ord v. Noel*, 5 Mad. 498; *Sinclair v. Jackson*, 8 Cow. 582; *Hawley v. James*, 5 Paige, 487; *Newton v. Bronson*, 3 Kern. 587; *Blight v. Schenck*, 10 Barr, 285; *Ex parte Belchier*, Amb. 219; *Bacon v. Bacon*, 5 Ves. 335; *Clough v. Bond*, 3 M. & Cr. 497; *Lewis v. Reed*, 11 Ind. 239; *Mason v. Wait*, 4 Scam. 132; *Powell v. Tuttle*, 3 Comst. 396; *Bales v. Perry*, 51 Mo. 449.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, § 340; *Saunders v. Webber*, 39 Cal. 287.

<sup>3</sup> *Smith v. Wildman*, 37 Conn. 384; *White v. Watkins*, 23 Mo. 423; *Ex parte Griffin*, 5 Gl. & J. 116; *Shook v. Shook*, 19 Barb. 653; *De Peyster v. Ferrers*, 11 Paige, 13; *Franklin v. Osgood*, 14 John. 560; *Cox v. Walker*, 26 Me. 504; *Hill v. Josselyn*, 13 Sm. & M. 597; *Crewe v. Dicken*, 4 Ves. 97; *Fellows v. Mitchell*, 1 P. Wms. 83; 2 Vern. 516; *Churchill v. Hobson*, 2 Vern. 241; *Chambers v. Minchin*, 7 Ves. 198; *Leigh v. Barry*, 3 Atk. 584; *Belchier v. Parsons*, Amb. 219; *Ex parte Rigby*, 19 Ves. 463; *Webb v. Ledsam*, 1 K. & J. 385; *Latrobe v. Tiernan*, 2 Md. Ch. 480; *Vandever's App.* 8 W. & S. 405; *Sinclair v. Jackson*, 8 Cow. 544; *Ridgeley v. Johnson*, 11 Barb. 527; *Austin v. Shaw*, 10 Allen, 552; *King v. Stone*, 6 John. Ch. 323; *Powell v. Tuttle*, 3 Comst. 396; *Sherwood v. Read*, 7 Hill, 431.

<sup>4</sup> *Holcomb v. Holcomb*, 3 Stockt. 281.



as an *acting* trustee apart from his cotrustees. All who accept the office are acting trustees. If any one trustee who has accepted, refuses to join in the proposed act, or is incapable, the others cannot proceed without him, but an application must be made to the court.<sup>1</sup> So if trustees bring suits, or defend suits in court, they must act jointly, and they should all employ the same counsel. If they sever in their defence and incur extra costs, they might be compelled to bear them personally.

§ 412. A receipt for money, in the absence of special directions in the instrument of trust, must be signed by all the trustees, or it will be invalid.<sup>2</sup> Where the trustees are numerous, the court generally inserts an order that moneys may be paid to two or more.<sup>3</sup> This rule is, however, relaxed in the United States; and it has been held that payment of a mortgage to one of two trustees is a valid payment.<sup>4</sup> So all the trustees must join in proving a debt against a bankrupt;<sup>5</sup> but, under special circumstances, the court may order the proof to be made by one or more, even when payment must be made to all the trustees.<sup>6</sup> A different rule prevails in regard to bank stocks, for the bank recognizes only the legal title, and at law one joint-tenant may receive moneys; so one trustee may receive dividends upon public stocks,<sup>7</sup> or the rents of real

<sup>1</sup> *Smith v. Wildman*, 37 Conn. 384; *Doyley v. Sherratt*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 742; *Re Cong. Church v. Smithwick*, 1 W. N. 196; *Scruggs v. Driver*, 31 Ala. 274; *Matter of Wadsworth*, 2 Barb. Ch. 381; *Matter of Mechanics' Bank*, 2 Barb. Ch. 446; *Burrill v. Sheil*, 2 Barb. 457; *Wood v. Wood*, 5 Paige, 596; *Davis v. McNeil*, 1 Ired. Eq. 344; *Matter of Van Wyke*, 1 Barb. Ch. 565; *Guyton v. Shane*, 7 Dana, 498; *Ridgeley v. Johnson*, 11 Barb. 527; *Ex parte Belchier*, Amb. 219.

<sup>2</sup> *Walker v. Symonds*, 3 Swans. 63; *Hall v. Franck*, 11 Beav. 519.

<sup>3</sup> *Att'y-Gen. v. Brickdale*, 8 Beav. 223.

<sup>4</sup> *Bowers v. Seeger*, 8 W. & S. 222.

<sup>5</sup> *Ex parte Smith*, 1 Dea. 191; *M. & A.* 506; *Ex parte Phillips*, 2 Dea. 334.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Williams v. Nixon*, 2 Beav. 472.

estate, unless the tenant has had notice not to pay to one;<sup>1</sup> but both trustees must join in conveying such stocks or in executing a conveyance of land.<sup>2</sup> A deed of land executed by one trustee does not convey his share, as in the case of ordinary joint-tenants.<sup>3</sup> Where a deed was executed by two of three trustees, the burden was put upon the purchaser to prove that the other trustee was dead.<sup>4</sup> It has been said, however, that in a case of necessity, and after considerable time, the concurrence of a cotrustee may be presumed in some transactions.<sup>5</sup> A banker may require checks to be signed by one only, or by all the trustees. But if trustees place money at a banker's in such manner that one of their number can withdraw it in his sole name, all the trustees will be liable in case of a loss under such an arrangement.<sup>6</sup>

§ 413. In the case of a public trust, where there are several trustees, the act of the majority is held to be the act of the whole number;<sup>7</sup> but the act of the majority must be strictly within the sphere of their power and duty.<sup>8</sup> When a special power is given to trustees, it cannot be exercised by a majority only: all must join.<sup>9</sup> If a settlement declares, that, on the death or resignation of a trustee, the surviving trustees shall

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*; *Townley v. Sherborne*, Bridg. 35; *Gouldsworth v. Knight*, 11 M. & W. 337; *Husband v. Davis*, 1 C. B. 645. See *Webb v. Ledsam*, 1 K. & J. 385; *Mendes v. Guedalla*, 2 John. & H. 259.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Sinclair v. Jackson*, 8 Cow. 543.

<sup>4</sup> *Ridgeley v. Johnson*, 11 Barb. 527; *Learned v. Welton*, 40 Cal. 339; *Burngarner v. Coggs*, 49 Mo. 259.

<sup>5</sup> *Vandever's App.* 8 W. & S. 405.

<sup>6</sup> *Townley v. Sherborne*, Bridg. 35.

<sup>7</sup> *Wilkinson v. Malin*, 2 Tyr. 544; *Perry v. Shipway*, 1 Gif. 1; 4 De G. & J. 353; *Att'y-Gen. v. Shearman*, 2 Beav. 104; *Att'y-Gen. v. Cuming*, 2 Y. & C. Ch. 139; *Younger v. Welham*, 3 Swans. 180; *Att'y-Gen. v. Scott*, 1 Ves. 413; *Wilson v. Dennison*, Amb. 82; *Sloo v. Law*, 3 Blatch. 66, 459.

<sup>8</sup> *Ward v. Hipwell*, 3 Gif. 547; *Sloo v. Law*, 3 Blatch. 66, 459.

<sup>9</sup> *Re Cong. Church v. Smithwick*, 1 W. N. 196.

appoint his successor, all the surviving trustees must join in the appointment.<sup>1</sup> Where the trustees are numerous, as in the case of a charity, the court may direct that a majority shall form a quorum. Private trusts, where the rule prevails that all must join, cannot be affected by these principles, or by any agreements that may be made by the parties.<sup>2</sup> But an instrument of trust may contain express directions that the trust shall be administered according to the will of the majority of the trustees, in which case the minority will be compelled to give effect to the determinations of the majority.<sup>3</sup> So if the power is given to either of two trustees.<sup>4</sup> So trustees are bound to concur in every merely ministerial act necessary for the execution of the trust; and, if they refuse, they may be compelled by order of the court. But where it is a mere matter of personal discretion, the court cannot interfere, unless a cotrustee refuses to act from a corrupt or selfish motive.<sup>5</sup> But a majority of trustees cannot deprive one of their number of his right and interest in the trust property.<sup>6</sup>

§ 414. A *bare authority*, committed to several persons, ceases upon the death of one; but if the authority is coupled with an interest, it passes to the survivors.<sup>7</sup> The committee of a lunatic's estate are mere protectors without any interest, and the death of one extinguishes the office.<sup>8</sup> An executorship survives, for the joint executors have an interest in the estate.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Re Cong. Church v. Smithwick*, 1 W. N. 196.

<sup>2</sup> *Swale v. Swale*, 22 Beav. 585; *State v. Lord*, 31 L. J. Ch. 391.

<sup>3</sup> *Att'y-Gen. v. Cuming*, 2 Y. & C. Ch. 139; *Taylor v. Dickinson*, 15 Io. 483.

<sup>4</sup> *Taylor v. Dickinson*, 15 Io. 486.

<sup>5</sup> *Clarke v. Parker*, 19 Ves. 1; *Tomlin v. Hatfield*, 12 Sim. 167; *Gouldsworth v. Knight*, 11 M. & W. 337; *Burrill v. Sheil*, 2 Barb. 457; *Matter of Mechanics' Bank*, 2 Barb. 446.

<sup>6</sup> *Methodist Episcopal Church v. Stewart*, 27 Barb. 553.

<sup>7</sup> *Co. Lit.* 113 a; *Eyre v. Shaftsbury*, 2 P. Wms. 108, 121, 124; *Attorney-General v. Gleg*, 1 Atk. 356; *Amb.* 584; *Mansell v. Vaughn*, Wilm. 49; *Butler v. Bray*, *Dyer*, 189 b; *Peyton v. Bury*, 2 P. Wms. 628.

<sup>8</sup> *Ex parte Lyne*, t. Talb. 143.

<sup>9</sup> *Adams v. Buckland*, 2 Vern. 514; *Hudson v. Hudson*, t. Talb. 129.

So testamentary guardianship survives, as such guardians have an authority over the estate.<sup>1</sup> So cotrustees have an authority coupled with an interest in the legal title of the estate, and the office is impressed with the quality of survivorship.<sup>2</sup> If land is given to two trustees in trust to sell, and one dies, the other may sell, as he holds the legal title in the land, and the office of trustee.<sup>3</sup> Otherwise, the precaution taken by a settlor to guard his estate, by increasing the number of trustees, would be futile; for the death of one of them might result in defeating his whole trust. Where the trust was to raise £2000 out of the testator's estate, by sale or otherwise at the discretion of the trustees, who should invest the same in their own names upon trust, one of the trustees died and the other sold; and Vice-Chancellor Wood held that the survivor could make a good title. He said: "I find a clear estate in the vendor, and a clear duty to perform. Is it to be said that the sale is a breach of trust, because the cotrustee is dead? If I were to lay down such a rule, it would come to this, that when an estate is vested in two or more trustees, to raise a sum by sale or mortgage, you must come into this court on the death of one of the trustees."<sup>4</sup> The survivorship of the trust will not be

<sup>1</sup> *Eyre v. Shaftsbury*, 2 P. Wms. 102. But if joint guardians are appointed by the court, the death of one destroys the guardianship. *Bradshaw v. Bradshaw*, 1 Russ. 528; *Hall v. Jones*, 2 Sim. 41.

<sup>2</sup> *Hudson v. Hudson*, t. Talb. 129; Co. Lit. 113 a; *Attorney-General v. Gleg*, Amb. 585; *Billingsley v. Mathew*, Toth. 168; *Gwilliams v. Rowell*, Hard. 204; *Stewart v. Peters*, 10 Mo. 755; *Butler v. Bray*, Dyer, 189 b; *Dominick v. Sayre*, 3 Sand. 555; *Belmont v. O'Brien*, 2 Kern. 394; *De Peyster v. Ferrers*, 11 Paige, 13; *Moses v. Murgatroyd*, 1 John. Ch. 119; *Shook v. Shook*, 19 Barb. 653; *Gregg v. Currier*, 36 N. H. 200; *Powell v. Knox*, 16 Ala. 364; *Parsons v. Boyd*, 20 Ala. 112; *Leggett v. Hunter*, 19 N. Y. 445; *Aubuchon v. Lory*, 23 Mo. 99; *Barton v. Tunnell*, 5 Harr. 182; *Smith v. McConnell*, 17 Ill. 135; *Hopper v. Adees*, 3 Duer, 235; *Britton v. Lewis*, 8 Rich. Eq. 271.

<sup>3</sup> *Warburton v. Sandys*, 14 Sim. 622; *Watson v. Pearson*, 2 Exch. 594; *Attorney-General v. Litchfield*, 5 Ves. 285; *Attorney-General v. Cuming*, 2 Y. & C. Ch. 139; *Slater v. Wheeler*, 9 Sim. 156.

<sup>4</sup> *Lane v. Debenham*, 11 Hare, 188; *Hind v. Poole*, 1 K. & J. 383.

defeated, because the settlement contains a power for restoring the original number of trustees by new appointments,<sup>1</sup> unless there is something in the instrument that specially manifests such an intention.<sup>2</sup> Where an act of Parliament declared that "survivors should, and they were thereby required" to appoint new trustees, the court expressed an opinion that the clause was not imperative, but simply directory.<sup>3</sup>

§ 415. The general rule is, that one trustee shall not be responsible or liable for the acts or defaults of his cotrustee. This rule was established in the time of Charles the First, after very great consideration and consultation by the judges in the case of *Townley v. Sherborne*,<sup>4</sup> wherein it was resolved "that where lands or leases were conveyed to two or more upon trust, and one of them receives all or the most part of the profits, and after dyeth or decayeth in his estate, his cotrustee shall not be charged or be compelled in chancery to answer for the receipts of him so dying or decayed, unless some practice, fraud, or evil dealing appear to have been in them to prejudice the trust; *for they being by law joint-tenants*, or tenants in common, every one

<sup>1</sup> *Doe v. Godwin*, 1 D. & R. 259; *Attorney-General v. Cuming*, 2 Y. & C. Ch. 139; *Jacob v. Lucas*, 1 Beav. 436; *Warburton v. Sandys*, 14 Sim. 622; *Hall v. Dewes*, Jac. 193; *Attorney-General v. Floyer*, 2 Vern. 748; *Townsend v. Wilson*, 1 B. & Ald. 608.

<sup>2</sup> *Foley v. Wontner*, 2 J. & W. 245; *Jacob v. Lucas*, 1 Beav. 436.

<sup>3</sup> *Doe v. Godwin*, 1 D. & R. 259. And see *Attorney-General v. Locke*, 3 Atk. 166; *Stamper v. Millar*, 3 Atk. 212; *Rex v. Flockwood*, 2 Chit. 252.

<sup>4</sup> *Townley v. Sherborne*, Bridg. 35; 3 Lead. Ca. Eq. 718, and notes; *Bowes v. Seegar*, 8 W. & S. 222; *Sinclair v. Jackson*, 8 Cow. 543; *Vandever's App.* 8 W. & S. 405. And see *Leigh v. Barry*, 3 Atk. 584; *Anon.* 12 Mod. 560; *Taylor v. Benham*, 5 How. 233; *Ochiltree v. Wright*, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 336; *Ray v. Doughty*, 4 Blackf. 115; *Jones's App.* 8 W. & S. 143; *Peters v. Beverly*, 10 Peters, 532; 1 How. 134; *Taylor v. Roberts*, 3 Ala. 86; *State v. Guilford*, 18 Ohio, 509; *Latrobe v. Tiernan*, 2 Md. Ch. 480; *Worth v. McAden*, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 109; *Boyd v. Boyd*, 3 Grat. 114; *Glen v. McKim*, 3 Gill, 366; *Stell's App.* 10 Barr, 149; *Banks v. Wilkes*, 3 Sandf. Ch. 99. And see *Royall v. McKenzie*, 25 Ala. 363.

by law may receive either all or as much of the profits as he can come by; it is no breach of trust to permit one of the trustees to receive all or the most part of the profits; it falling out many times that some of the trustees live far from the lands, and are put in trust out of other respects than to be troubled with the receipt of the profits. But his lordship and the said judges did resolve, that if, upon the proofs or circumstances, the court should be satisfied that there had been any *dolus malus*, or any evil practice, fraud, or ill intent in him that permitted his companion to receive the whole profits, he should be charged though he received nothing." And the same doctrine has been acted upon from that day to this.<sup>1</sup>

§ 416. In the same case of *Townley v. Sherborne*, it was determined that if the trustees joined in signing a receipt for money, they should each be responsible for it.<sup>2</sup> But where the administration of a trust is vested in several trustees, they must all join in signing a receipt for the principal or capital sum of the trust fund; and it is now established that a trustee who joins in the receipt for *conformity*, but without receiving any of the money, shall not be answerable for the misapplication of the money by his cotrustee who receives it; as it would be tyranny to punish a trustee for an act which the nature of his office compelled him to do.<sup>3</sup> But in such case the burden

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> *Townley v. Sherborne*, Bridg. 35; *Spalding v. Shalmer*, 1 Vern. 303; *Sadler v. Hobbs*, 2 Bro. Ch. 114; *Bradwell v. Catchpole*, cited 3 Swans. 78, note (a); *Fellowes v. Mitchell*, 2 Vern. 516.

<sup>3</sup> *In re Freyer*, 3 K. & J. 317; *Price v. Stokes*, 11 Ves. 324; 3 Lead. Ca. Eq. 730; *Harden v. Parsons*, 1 Eden, 147; *Westley v. Clarke*, 1 Eden, 359; *Heaton v. Marriott*, cited Pr. Ch. 173; *Ex parte Belchier*, Amb. 219; *Leigh v. Barry*, 3 Atk. 584; *Fellowes v. Mitchell*, 1 P. Wms. 81; *Gregory v. Gregory*, 2 Y. & C. 316; *Sadler v. Hobbs*, 2 Bro. Ch. 117; *Chambers v. Minchin*, 7 Ves. 198; *Shipbrook v. Hinchinbrook*, 16 Ves. 479; *Harrison v. Graham*, 3 Hill's MS. 239, cited 1 P. Wms. 241; *Carsey v. Barsham*, cited 1 Sch. & Lef. 344; *Anon. Mose. 35*; *Ex parte Wackerbath*, 2 Gl. & J. 151; *Kip v. Deniston*, 4 John. 23; *Jones's App.* 8 W. & S. 147; *Irwin's*

is on the trustee to prove that his acknowledgment of the receipt of the money was merely for conformity, and that in fact he received none of the money, and that his cotrustee received it all.<sup>1</sup> If there is no evidence upon this point, all the trustees who join in signing the receipt will be held responsible *in solido*, on the ground that the acknowledgment in the receipt is *prima facie* evidence of the facts stated.<sup>2</sup> At law the receipt is *conclusive* evidence, and estops the trustee from denying that he received any of the money;<sup>3</sup> but a court of equity rejects estoppels, and pursues the actual truth; and will determine and decree according to the verity and justice of the fact.<sup>4</sup> But if a trustee, signing a receipt, receives any part of the money, and it does not appear how much, he will be answerable for the whole; as, where he mixes his corn with another's heap, he must lose the whole.<sup>5</sup>

§ 417. It was said in *Townley v. Sherborne*,<sup>6</sup> that individuals are sometimes joined in a trust, where it is not expected that they are to take an active part in its management; and it is

App. 35 Penn. St. 294; *Sterrett's App.* 2 Penn. 419; *Wallis v. Thornton*, 2 Brock. 434; *Monell v. Monell*, 5 John. Ch. 283; *Deaderick v. Cantrell*, 10 Yerg. 264; *Aplyn v. Brewer*, Pr. Ch. 172; *Churchill v. Hodson*, 1 P. Wms. 241; *Attorney-General v. Randell*, 7 Bacon, Ab. 184; *Murrell v. Cox*, 2 Vern. 173; *Terrell v. Mathews*, 11 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 31; *McMurray v. Montgomery*, 2 Swan. 374; *Griffin v. Macaulay*, 7 Grat. 476; *Worth v. McAdden*, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 199.

<sup>1</sup> *Brice v. Stokes*, 11 Ves. 324; *Scurfield v. Howes*, 3 Bro. Ch. 95, note (8); *Chambers v. Minchin*, 7 Ves. 186; *Monell v. Monell*, 5 John. Ch. 394; *Hall v. Carter*, 8 Ga. 388; *Manahan v. Gibbons*, 19 John. 427; *Martindale v. Picquot*, 3 K. & J. 317; *Cottam v. Eastern Counties R.R. Co.* 1 John & H. 243.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*; *Westley v. Clarke*, 1 Eden, 359; *Maccubbin v. Cromwell*, 7 Gl. & J. 157; *Hengst's App.* 12 Harris, 413. The answer of the trustee in chancery would not be sufficient evidence unless responsive to the bill. *Monell v. Monell*, 5 John. Ch. 283; *Maccubbin v. Cromwell*, 7 Gl. & J. 157. But as parties are now witnesses, the rule is not very important.

<sup>3</sup> *Harden v. Parsons*, 1 Eden, 147.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*; *Fellowes v. Mitchell*, 1 P. Wms. 83.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Bridg.* 35.

well settled that each of several trustees, is not bound to take upon himself the active management of every part of a trust; and it seems that the management of the whole may be left to any one of the number.<sup>1</sup> So trustees may apportion their duties among themselves, as where one of two guardians accepted the trust, saying he would take care of the real estate, but would have nothing to do with receiving and disbursing money, which duties the other guardian assumed, it was held that the former was not answerable for the defaults of the latter.<sup>2</sup> It sometimes happens that the convenience or necessities of business require the trust funds to be in the hands of one trustee. If a loss happens from the default of such trustee, the others will not be held to answer. As where a bond is to be collected by one trustee, or money is put in the hands of one to be paid away; or where a fund was given to three trustees, one in London and two in Cornwall, to build an almshouse in London, it was held that the fund was properly in the hands of the trustee in London, and that during the construction of the almshouse the others were not answerable for the loss of part of it by his insolvency.<sup>3</sup> The same rule applies where the shares of a company are required to be in the name of a single individual;<sup>4</sup> and so where the settlor appoints one of the trustees to perform certain acts, or make certain sales, or receive certain moneys.<sup>5</sup> But if trustees expressly agree to be answerable for each other,

<sup>1</sup> *Ray v. Doughty*, 4 Blackf. 115; *Ochiltree v. Wright*, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 336; *Jones's App.* 8 W. & S. 143; *State v. Guilford*, 18 Ohio, 500.

<sup>2</sup> *Jones's App.* 8 W. & S. 143. But see *Gill v. Attorney-General*, Hardr. 314.

<sup>3</sup> *Attorney-General v. Randell*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 742; 7 Bacon, Ab. 184; *Clough v. Bond*, 3 M. & Cr. 497; *Townley v. Sherborne*, Bridg. 35; 3 Lead. Ca. Eq. 718, notes; *Ex parte Griffin*, 2 Gl. & J. 114; *Bacon v. Bacon*, 5 Ves. 231; *Hovey v. Blakeman*, 4 Ves. 596; *Williams v. Nixon*, 2 Beav. 472; *Curtis v. Mason*, 12 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 442; *Broadhurst v. Balguy*, 1 N. C. C. 28; *Hanbury v. Kirkland*, 3 Sim. 265. But see *Cowell v. Gatchcombe*, 27 Beav. 568.

<sup>4</sup> *Consterdine v. Consterdine*, 31 Beav. 331.

<sup>5</sup> *Davis v. Spurling*, 1 R. & M. 64; *Paddon v. Richardson*, 7 De G., M. & G. 563; *Birls v. Betty*, 6 Mad. 90.



courts will hold them to their agreement.<sup>1</sup> So this power to apportion the duties of the trust, or the rule that a trustee not receiving the money shall not be liable for the defaults of his cotrustees, does not excuse him for not exercising a general superintendence and care over the trust, or for not intervening, if the fact come to his knowledge that the fund is unsafe, or that it ought not longer to remain under the control of the other trustee.<sup>2</sup> Even a direct provision in the deed of settlement, that trustees shall not be liable for the defaults of their cotrustees, does not excuse them from this general care and superintendence, and from the duty of intervening, if they hear any fact tending to call for their intervention; nor will it justify them in paying over the money to the sole credit of one trustee; and generally it will not authorize them to do any acts which would be a breach of trust, if such clause was not in the deed or will.<sup>3</sup> So if the trustees join in accounting, and hold themselves out, in joint accounts, as acting together and as jointly liable, they will be estopped to deny their joint liability to those who have acted on a knowledge of such accounts; and this would be almost conclusive evidence of a joint liability in all cases.<sup>4</sup> So if the will makes them all liable for the acts of each,

<sup>1</sup> *Leigh v. Barry*, 3 Atk. 583; *Brazer v. Clark*, 5 Pick. 96; *Town v. Ammidown*, 2 Pick. 535.

<sup>2</sup> *Clark v. Clark*, 8 Paige, 153; *Evans's Est.* 2 Ash. 470.

<sup>3</sup> *Mucklow v. Fuller*, Jac. 198; *Williams v. Nixon*, 2 Beav. 472; *Leigh v. Barry*, 3 Atk. 584; *Dawson v. Clark*, 18 Ves. 254; *Underwood v. Stevens*, 1 Mer. 712; *Hanbury v. Kirkland*, 3 Sim. 265; *Langston v. Olivant*, Coop. 33; *Brumridge v. Brumridge*, 27 Beav. 5; *Rehden v. Wesley*, 29 Beav. 213; *Drosier v. Brereton*, 15 Beav. 409; *Fenwick v. Greenwell*, 10 Beav. 418; *Pride v. Fooks*, 2 Beav. 430; *Sadler v. Hobbs*, 2 Bro. Ch. 114; *Bone v. Cook*, M'Clel. 168; 13 Price, 332; *Clough v. Dixon*, 8 Sim. 594; 3 M. & Cr. 490; *Dix v. Burford*, 19 Beav. 409; *Litchfield v. White*, 3 Selden, 438; *Wilkins v. Hogg*, 3 Gif. 116; 10 W. R. 47; *Morrill v. Harford*, 8 Ves. 8; *Moyle v. Moyle*, 2 R. & M. 170; *Munch v. Cockerell*, 9 Sim. 339; 5 M. & Cr. 178; *Macdonnel v. Harding*, 7 Sim. 176. But a testator can draw the indemnity clause so broad that cotrustees will not be liable even for gross negligence. *Wilkins v. Hogg*, 3 Gif. 116; 10 W. R. 47.

<sup>4</sup> *Hengst's App.* 12 Harris, 413; *Clark's App.* 6 Harris, 175; *Duncommun's App.* 5 Harris, 268.

or contemplates the joint action and joint liability of all, they cannot excuse themselves if they accept the trust.<sup>1</sup>

§ 418. Though a trustee may join in a receipt without receiving any of the money, and may not be liable or answerable for it, yet he may be responsible for the whole, though he receives none; thus, if knowing that his cotrustee has no character or credit, and is unfit to manage the trust funds, he suffers the money to be received by him, or to remain in his hands, he will be answerable, as if he receives it himself, on the ground that he has committed a breach of trust in not using due care and diligence;<sup>2</sup> and the same rule will apply if he suffers the money to remain in the hands of his cotrustee, however competent and responsible, longer than is necessary.<sup>3</sup> It is also the duty of the trustee to ascertain the actual facts, and not rely upon the bare assertion of his cotrustee, in relation to the condition of the trust fund.<sup>4</sup> Thus where two trustees allowed their cotrustee to open a box at their banker's in which were stocks and bonds, and he converted some of the trust property to his own use, but assured his cotrustees that all was right, they were held to answer for the loss, because they had not taken the pains to ascertain the facts, but had relied upon the assertion of their cotrustee.<sup>5</sup> So trustees must ascertain the condition of the

<sup>1</sup> *Burrill v. Sheil*, 2 Barb. 457; *Contee v. Dawson*, 2 Bland, 264; *Wood v. Wood*, 5 Paige, 596; *Weigand's App.* 4 *Casey*, 471.

<sup>2</sup> *Clark v. Clark*, 8 Paige, 153; *Weyman v. Jones*, 4 Md. Ch. 500; *Elmendorf v. Lansing*, 4 John. Ch. 562; *Ringgold v. Ringgold*, 1 H. & G. 11; *State v. Guilford*, 15 Ohio, 593; *Pim v. Downing*, 11 S. & R. 71; *Evans's Est.* 2 Ash. 470; *Jones's App.* 8 W. & S. 147; *Larod v. Douglass*, 2 Beav. 308. But the circumstances must be such as would put a reasonable man upon his guard in relation to his own property. *Jones's App.* 8 W. & S. 147.

<sup>3</sup> *Brice v. Stokes*, 11 Ves. 319; *Re Freyer*, 3 K. & J. 317; *Gregory v. Gregory*, 2 Y. & C. 313; *Bone v. Cook*, McClel. 168; *Thompson v. Finch*, 22 Beav. 316; *Lincoln v. Wright*, 4 Beav. 427.

<sup>4</sup> *Thompson v. Finch*, 22 Beav. 316; 8 De G., M. & G. 560; *Hanbury v. Kirkland*, 3 Sim. 265.

<sup>5</sup> *Mendes v. Guedalla*, 2 John. & Hem. 259.

funds at all times within which a reasonable man should ascertain the condition of his own property ; as where a mortgage to three trustees had been paid off, and the money came to the hands of one, and was invested in bills and notes of the East India Company payable in two years, and these were paid into the hands of the same trustee to whom the mortgage had been paid, and the acting trustee asked to have the money remain in his hands on a mortgage to be given ; and it so remained for a year, no mortgage being executed, the other trustees taking no active steps for several years to know the actual condition of the trust fund ; this was held to be a breach of trust, and they were decreed to make good the loss.<sup>1</sup> A trustee is bound to inquire and ascertain for what purpose a cotrustee desires the money ; what investments he proposes to make, and what securities he proposes to take, and he must take pains to see that the proposed investments are actually made.<sup>2</sup> If a trustee performs his duty in these respects, and his cotrustee, in spite of these precautions, squanders or wastes the fund, he will not be answerable therefor. So if the cotrustee gets possession of the trust fund by a fraud or crime, the others will not be liable.<sup>3</sup> But if a trustee receive any portion of the funds from a transaction, he must personally see to the application of them : he cannot pass them over to his cotrustee for investment or distribution ; and, if he do so, he will be personally responsible for the acts and defaults of such cotrustee.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Walker v. Symonds*, 3 Swans. 1. See *Thompson v. Finch*, 22 Beav. 326.

<sup>2</sup> *Hanbury v. Kirkland*, 3 Sim. 265 ; *Broadhurst v. Balguy*, 1 Y. & C. Ch. 16 ; *Thompson v. Finch*, 22 Beav. 326.

<sup>3</sup> *Cottam v. Eastern Counties R.R. Co.* 1 Johns. & Hem. 243 ; *Mendes v. Guedalla*, 2 Johns. & Hem. 259 ; *Barnard v. Bagshaw*, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 220 ; 3 De G., J. & S. 355 ; *Trutch v. Lamprell*, 20 Beav. 116 ; *Baynard v. Woolley*, 20 Beav. 583 ; *Griffiths v. Porter*, 25 Beav. 236 ; *Eager v. Barnes*, 31 Beav. 579 ; *Margetts v. Perks*, 34 L. J. Ch. 109.

<sup>4</sup> *Sterrett's App.* 2 Penn. 219 ; *Clark's App.* 6 Harris, 175 ; *Nyce's App.* 5 W. & S. 254 ; *Commonwealth v. McAlister*, 4 Casey, 480 ; *Deaderick v. Cantrell*, 10 Yerg. 263 ; *McMurray v. Montgomery*, 2 Swans. 374 ; *Hughlett*

§ 419. In the original case of *Townley v. Sherborne*, it was determined that if there was any *dolus malus*, or any evil practice, or fraud, or ill intent in him that permitted his companion to receive the whole fund, *he* should be charged that received nothing.<sup>1</sup> Thus, if one trustee stands by and sees his cotrustee misemploy or misapply the money;<sup>2</sup> or acquiesces in the wrongful use of the money by his cotrustee;<sup>3</sup> or if a trustee acquiesces in his cotrustee's retaining the money in his hands unnecessarily;<sup>4</sup> or if he connives at a breach of trust by his cotrustee;<sup>5</sup> or conceals such breach;<sup>6</sup> or makes any misrepresentation respecting the investment of the fund;<sup>7</sup> or if he does any act to put the money out of his own control and into the sole power of his cotrustee, as by joining in a conversion of the property and allowing his cotrustee to receive and retain the proceeds exclusively;<sup>8</sup> or if he makes over the trust fund exclusively to his cotrustee;<sup>9</sup> or executes a power of attorney

*v. Hughlett*, 5 Humph. 453; *Mumford v. Murray*, 6 John. Ch. 1; *Ray v. Doughty*, 4 Blackf. 115; *Worth v. McAdden*, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 199; *Graham v. Davidson*, 2 Dev. & B. Eq. 155; *Sparhawk v. Buell*, 9 Vt. 41; *Edmonds v. Grenshaw*, 14 Peters, 166.

<sup>1</sup> *Townley v. Sherborne*, Bridg. 35; *Mucklow v. Fuller*, Jac. 198.

<sup>2</sup> *Williams v. Nixon*, 2 Beav. 475.

<sup>3</sup> *Booth v. Booth*, 1 Beav. 125; *Dix v. Burford*, 19 Beav. 409.

<sup>4</sup> *Lincoln v. Wright*, 4 Beav. 427; *James v. Frearson*, 1 N. C. C. 370; *Evans's Est.* 2 Ash, 470; *Pim v. Downing*, 11 S. & R. 71; *Styles v. Guy*, 1 H. & Tw. 523; 1 Mac. & Gor. 422; 16 Sim. 230; *Scully v. Delany*, 2 Ir. Eq. 165; *Egbert v. Butter*, 21 Beav. 560; *West v. Jones*, 1 Sim. (N. s.) 205.

<sup>5</sup> *Boardman v. Mosman*, 1 Bro. Ch. 68.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Bates v. Scales*, 12 Ves. 402.

<sup>8</sup> *Sadler v. Hobbs*, 2 Bro. Ch. 114; *Chambers v. Minchin*, 7 Ves. 198; *Hanbury v. Kirkland*, 3 Sim. 265; *Clough v. Bond*, 3 M. & Cr. 496; *Scurfield v. Howes*, 3 Bro. Ch. 90; *Shipbrook v. Hinchinbrook*, 11 Ves. 252; *Brice v. Stokes*, 11 Ves. 319; *Underwood v. Stevens*, 1 Mer. 713; *Bradwell v. Catchpole*, 3 Swans. 78 n.; *Williams v. Nixon*, 2 Beav. 472; *Broadhurst v. Balguy*, 1 N. C. C. 16; *Curtis v. Mason*, 12 L. J. (N. s.) Ch. 443.

<sup>9</sup> *Keble v. Thompson*, 3 Bro. Ch. 111; *Langford v. Gascoyne*, 11 Ves. 333; *French v. Hobson*, 9 Ves. 103; *Joy v. Campbell*, 1 Sch. & L. 341; *Moses v. Levi*, 3 Y. & C. 359.

to him;<sup>1</sup> or signs a draft or order, or assigns a mortgage, enabling his cotrustee to deal with the investments exclusively;<sup>2</sup> or if he suffers the trust fund to be invested in the sole name of his cotrustee;<sup>3</sup> or to be paid into bank to his sole credit;<sup>4</sup> in all these cases, there is an actual or constructive breach of trust, which renders all the trustees liable for any loss; and so if a trustee does not collect a debt due to the estate from his cotrustee.<sup>5</sup> In all cases, if a trustee becomes aware of any fact tending to show that his cotrustee is committing a breach of trust, or if he learns any fact endangering the trust fund, he must communicate it to his cotrustees or make application to the court,<sup>6</sup> and take active measures to protect the fund, or he will be personally liable for its loss. If a trustee himself receives the trust fund or part of it, and pays it over to his cotrustee, who wastes it, he will be liable for it;<sup>7</sup> and so if he permits his cotrustee to receive money, having notice that it will be misapplied, or if he is guilty of any negligence or want of reasonable care.<sup>8</sup>

§ 420. In a few cases, it has been held that, if trustees join in executing a power of sale, and one receive the money, all

<sup>1</sup> *Harrison v. Graham*, 1 P. Wms. 241, n.; *Hewett v. Foster*, 6 Beav. 259; *Monell v. Monell*, 5 John. Ch. 283; *Pim v. Downing*, 11 S. & R. 66; *Duncommun's App.* 5 Harris, 268.

<sup>2</sup> *Sadler v. Hobbs*, 2 Bro. Ch. 114; *Broadhurst v. Balguy*, 1 N. C. C. 16.

<sup>3</sup> *Walker v. Symonds*, 3 Swans. 58.

<sup>4</sup> *Clough v. Bond*, 3 M. & Cr. 490.

<sup>5</sup> *Mucklow v. Fuller*, Jac. 198; *Candler v. Tillett*, 22 Beav. 257.

<sup>6</sup> *Wayman v. Jones*, 4 Md. Ch. 506; *Chertsey v. Market*, 6 Price, 279; *Powlet v. Herbert*, 1 Ves. Jr. 297; *Franco v. Franco*, 3 Ves. 75; *Walker v. Symonds*, 3 Swans. 71; *Brice v. Stokes*, 11 Ves. 319; *Olive v. Court*, 8 Price, 166; *Attorney-General v. Holland*, 2 Y. & C. 699; *Booth v. Booth*, 1 Beav. 125; *Williams v. Nixon*, 2 Beav. 472; *Blackwood v. Burrows*, 2 Conn. & Laws. 477; *Holcomb v. Holcomb*, 2 Beas. 413.

<sup>7</sup> *Mumford v. Murray*, 6 John. Ch. 1; *Monell v. Monell*, 5 John. Ch. 283; *Clark v. Clark*, 8 Paige, 153; *Ringgold v. Ringgold*, 1 H. & G. 11; *Glenn v. McKim*, 3 Gill, 366; *Evans's Est.* 2 Ash. 470; *Graham v. Austin*, 2 Grat. 273; *Graham v. Davidson*, 2 Dev. & B. Eq. 155.

<sup>8</sup> *Schenck v. Schenck*, 1 Green, Ch. 174.

must be held answerable, if it is lost by the one that receives it.<sup>1</sup> These decisions have been founded upon the rule, that all the trustees who join in any transaction must be responsible for carrying it through. But they ignore the other rule, that a power must be strictly executed by all the persons to whom it is given, and that if a trustee joins in the power, and signs receipts for conformity, but receives none of the money, omits no duty, and does no act tending to a breach of the trust, he will not be held for a loss occasioned by a breach of trust by the other trustees. The great preponderance of authority is, that a sale under a power is not different from the execution of a receipt for the trust moneys.<sup>2</sup> If, however, a proper investment of the money received under a sale is once made, the liability of a non-acting trustee ceases under all the cases.<sup>3</sup> If a trustee renounces the trust, he, of course, cannot be liable for a breach of the trust by the other trustees, unless the trust fund is in some manner in his hands, and is misapplied by him.<sup>4</sup> So the estate of a deceased trustee cannot be liable for a breach of trust by a surviving trustee, after the decease of a cotrustee.<sup>5</sup> A distinction has been attempted between discretionary trusts and directory trusts as follows: it has been said, that, in discretionary trusts, that is, where the funds may be invested or employed according to the discretion of the trustees, a non-acting trustee will not be responsible for a misapplication of

<sup>1</sup> *Spencer v. Spencer*, 11 Paige, 299; *Ringgold v. Ringgold*, 1 H. & G. 11; *Maccubbin v. Cromwell*, 7 G. & J. 157; *Deaderick v. Cantrell*, 10 Yerg. 263; *Wallace v. Thornton*, 2 Brocken. 434; *Hauser v. Lehman*, 2 Ired. Eq. 594.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, § 416, note; *Griffin v. Macauley*, 7 Grat. 476; *Atcheson v. Robertson*, 3 Rich. Eq. 132; *Kip v. Deniston*, 14 John. 23; *Jones's App.* 8 W. & S. 147; *Boyd v. Boyd*, 3 Grat. 114. But if a trustee not only join in the execution of the power, but in receiving the money, he must keep it in the joint names of the trustees until invested; and he cannot pay it over to his cotrustee without being responsible for it if lost. *Ringgold v. Ringgold*, 1 H. & G. 11; *Glenn v. McKim*, 3 Gill, 366.

<sup>3</sup> *Glenn v. McKim*, 3 Gill, 366.

<sup>4</sup> *Claggett v. Hall*, 9 G. & J. 80.

<sup>5</sup> *Brazer v. Clark*, 5 Pick. 96; *Towne v. Ammidown*, 20 Pick. 535.

the fund by a cotrustee, unless he is guilty of some fraud or negligence that amounts to a breach of trust, upon the principles before stated ;<sup>1</sup> but where a will is peremptory that certain investments shall be made by the trustees, all the trustees will be liable if the directions of the will are not carried out.<sup>2</sup> But these directory trusts may be executed by a part of the trustees, and the others may join for *conformity*, without doing more than is absolutely necessary to accomplish the trust, and therefore these trusts fall within the rule, that a trustee who signs receipts for *conformity*, and does no more, is not liable for a breach of trust by his cotrustee.<sup>3</sup> But if the will expressly provide for the joint action and responsibility of the executors or trustees, it will be binding upon all those who assume the trust, and render them all liable for any loss through the default of one.<sup>4</sup>

§ 421. Following the rule as to cotrustees, executors are generally liable only for their own acts, and not for the acts of their coexecutors.<sup>5</sup> But while cotrustees may not be liable for money which they did not receive, although they joined in the receipt, coexecutors are always liable if they join in the receipts. The reason is this, trustees *must* join in many acts, they having for the most part a joint power, while executors have a several power, over the estate. Each executor has an

<sup>1</sup> Deaderick v. Cantrell, 10 Yerg. 264; Thomas v. Scruggs, 10 Yerg. 400.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ante, § 416, note.

<sup>4</sup> Weigand's App. 4 Casey, 471; Wood v. Wood, 5 Paige, 596; Contee v. Dawson, 2 Bland, 264; Burrill v. Sheil, 2 Barb. 457.

<sup>5</sup> Hargthorpe v. Milforth, Cro. Eliz. 318; Anon. Dyer, 210 a; Went. Ex. 306; Williams v. Nixon, 2 Beav. 472; Peters v. Beverly, 10 Peters, 532; 1 How. 134; Sutherland v. Brush, 7 John. Ch. 17; White v. Bullock, 20 Barb. 91; Douglas v. Satterlee, 11 John. 16; Banks v. Wilkes, 3 Sand. Ch. 99; Moore v. Tandy, 3 Bibb, 97; Fennimore v. Fennimore, 2 Green, Ch. 292; Call v. Ewing, 1 Blackf. 301; Williams v. Maitland, 1 Ired. 92; Kerr v. Kirkpatrick, 8 Ired. Eq. 137; Clarke v. Blount, 2 Dev. Ch. 51; Clarke v. Jenkins, 3 Rich. Eq. 318; Knox v. Pickett, 4 Des. 190; Kerr v. Water, 19 Ga. 136; Charlton v. Durham, L. R. 4 Ch. 433.

independent right over the personal property of his testator: he may sell it, and receive the purchase-money, and give receipts in his own name. If, therefore, an executor joins his coexecutor in signing a receipt, he does an unmeaning act, unless he intended to render himself jointly answerable for the money; and so the court hold, that if an executor joins in giving a receipt for money he shall be answerable, whether he received any of it or permitted his coexecutor to receive the whole.<sup>1</sup> So if an executor joins in executing a power of sale, given in the will, he will be responsible for the appropriation of the proceeds, though his coexecutor received all the money.<sup>2</sup> An attempt has been made to break down these distinctions between executors and trustees, and to establish the rule, that no intention to be jointly answerable can be inferred from the mere fact of signing a receipt without receiving any part of the money either separately or jointly.<sup>3</sup> And it appears now to be well settled, that if the joint receipt is purely nugatory, and no funds pass upon it into the hands of either executor, a coexecutor will not be liable.<sup>4</sup> So far the doctrine of Lord Northington in *Westerly v. Clarke* has been agreed to, though the case

<sup>1</sup> *Aplyn v. Brewer*, Pr. Ch. 173; *Murrill v. Cox*, 2 Vern. 560; *Ex parte Belchier*, Amb. 219; *Leigh v. Barry*, 3 Atk. 584; *Harrison v. Graham*, 1 P. Wms. 241, cited *Darwell v. Darwell*, 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 456; *Gregory v. Gregory*, 2 Y. & C. 316; *Hall v. Carter*, 8 Ga. 388; *Monell v. Monell*, 5 John. Ch. 283; *Monahan v. Gibbons*, 19 John. 427; *Sterrett's App.* 2 Penn. 219; *Jones's App.* 8 W. & S. 143; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 2 Hill, Eq. 290; *Clarke v. Jenkins*, 3 Rich. Eq. 318.

<sup>2</sup> *Ochiltree v. Wright*, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 336; *Hauser v. Lehman*, 2 Ired. Eq. 594; *Mathews v. Mathews*, 1 McM. Eq. 410; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 2 Hill, Eq. 277; *McMurray v. Montgomery*, 2 Swans. 374; *Deaderick v. Cantrell*, 10 Yerg. 263.

<sup>3</sup> *Westerly v. Clarke*, 1 Ed. 537; 1 Dick. 329; *Candler v. Tillett*, 22 Beav. 257; *Harden v. Parsons*, 1 Ed. 147; *Churchill v. Hobson*, 1 P. Wms. 241, n.; *Stell's App.* 10 Barr. 152; *McNair's App.* 4 Rawle, 145; *Ochiltree v. Wright*, Dev. & B. Eq. 336; *Doyle v. Blake*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 242.

<sup>4</sup> *Westerly v. Clarke*, 1 Ed. 537; *Scurfield v. Howes*, 3 Bro. Ch. 94; *Hovey v. Blakeman*, 4 Ves. 608; *Chambers v. Minchin*, 7 Ves. 198; *Brice v. Stokes*, 11 Ves. 319; 3 Lead. Ca. Eq. 557, 558.



itself seemed to go further.<sup>1</sup> Lord Harcourt, in *Churchill v. Hobson*,<sup>2</sup> started another distinction, that executors who joined in the receipt were liable to creditors, though they did not receive the money, while they were not liable to legatees or heirs; but this distinction has no standing in a court of equity, whatever may be the rule at law, and is now overruled.<sup>3</sup>

§ 422. If an executor does any act to transfer the property into the exclusive control of a coexecutor, and thus enables his coexecutor to misapply the same, he will be liable;<sup>4</sup> as if he joins in drawing<sup>5</sup> or indorsing<sup>6</sup> a bill or note, or delivers or assigns securities to his coexecutor to enable him to receive the money alone,<sup>7</sup> or if he gives him a power of attorney,<sup>8</sup> or does any other act that enables his coexecutor to misapply the money; and so it was held, "that, if by agreement between the executors, one be to receive and intermeddle with such a part of the estate, and the other with such a part, each of them will be chargeable for the whole, because the receipts of each are pursuant to the agreement made betwixt both."<sup>9</sup> Probably the case would not now be followed, but it illustrates the principle.

<sup>1</sup> *Scurfield v. Howes*, 3 Bro. Ch. 94; *Hovey v. Blakeman*, 4 Ves. 608; *Chambers v. Minchin*, 7 Ves. 198; *Brice v. Stokes*, 11 Ves. 325; 3 Lead. Ca. Eq. 725-759; *Walker v. Symonds*, 3 Swans. 64; *Shipbrook v. Hinchinbrook*, 16 Ves. 479; *Joy v. Campbell*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 341; *Doyle v. Blake*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 242.

<sup>2</sup> 1 P. Wms. 241; *Gibbs v. Herring*, Pr. Ch. 49; *Harden v. Parsons*, 1 Ed. 147.

<sup>3</sup> *Sadler v. Hobbs*, 2 Brown, Ch. 117; *Doyle v. Blake*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 239.

<sup>4</sup> *Townshend v. Barber*, 1 Dick. 356; *Moses v. Levi*, 3 Y. & C. 359; *Candler v. Tillet*, 22 Beav. 263; *Clough v. Dixon*, 3 M. & C. 497; *Dines v. Scott*, T. & R. 361; *Edmonds v. Crenshaw*, 14 Pet. 166; *Sparhawk v. Buell*, 9 Vt. 41.

<sup>5</sup> *Sadler v. Hobbs*, 2 Bro. Ch. 114.

<sup>6</sup> *Hovey v. Blakeman*, 4 Ves. 608.

<sup>7</sup> *Candler v. Tillet*, 22 Beav. 236.

<sup>8</sup> *Doyle v. Blake*, 2 Sch. & L. 231; *Lees v. Sanderson*, 4 Sim. 28; *Kilbee v. Sneyd*, 2 Moll. 200.

<sup>9</sup> *Gill v. Attorney-General*, Hardw. 314; *Moses v. Levi*, 3 Y. & C. 359.

§ 423. But if the act is such that it is absolutely necessary that the executors should all join in it, their liability will be put upon the same ground as the liability of trustees joining; as, if it is necessary that they should indorse a bill in order to collect it,<sup>1</sup> or that they should join in transferring stock.<sup>2</sup> But even if the act is indispensable, it is still the duty of the executor to see that it is consistent with a due execution of the trust,<sup>3</sup> and he must not rely upon the representations or assertions of his coexecutor, as to its necessity. He must use due diligence and make due investigations to ascertain if the representations are true;<sup>4</sup> as where the debts should have been long paid in the ordinary course of administration a coexecutor applied to the other to join in a sale of stocks to pay the debts, and the executor inquired and learned that there were debts to be paid, but it afterwards appeared that the coexecutor had the money to pay the debts in his own hands; the executor who joined in conveying the stocks was held for the default of his coexecutor, on the ground of negligence in not knowing how the assets in the hands of the coexecutor were disposed of, and how it happened that the debts remained unpaid.<sup>5</sup>

§ 424. So an executor will be called upon to make good the loss of money that he allows to remain two years or any other unreasonable time in the hands of his coexecutor;<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Hovey v. Blakeman*, 4 Ves. 608.

<sup>2</sup> *Chambers v. Minchin*, 7 Ves. 197; *Shipbrook v. Hinchinbrook*, 11 Ves. 254; 16 Ves. 479; *Terrell v. Mathews*, 1 Mac. & G. 434, n.; *Murrill v. Cox*, 2 Vern. 570; *Scurfield v. Howes*, 3 Bro. Ch. 94; *Moses v. Levi*, 3 Y. & C. 359.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*; *Underwood v. Stevens*, 1 Mer. 712; *Bick v. Motley*, 2 M. & K. 312; *Williams v. Nixon*, 2 Beav. 472; *Hewett v. Foster*, 6 Beav. 259.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Shipbrook v. Hinchinbrook*, 11 Ves. 254; *Bick v. Mathews*, 3 M. & K. 312; *Clark v. Clark*, 8 Paige, 152.

<sup>6</sup> *Scurfield v. Howes*, 3 Bro. Ch. 91; *Styles v. Guy*, 1 Mac. & G. 422; 1 H. & Tw. 523; *Egbert v. Butter*, 21 Beav. 560; *Lincoln v. Wright*, 4 Beav. 427.

but he will not be called upon to repay that part which he can show that his coexecutor actually expended in the execution of the trust.<sup>1</sup> So if an executor neglects for an unreasonable time to insist upon the payment of a debt to the estate due from his coexecutor, he will be liable to pay the debt himself.<sup>2</sup>

§ 425. The same rules that apply to the powers and liabilities of coexecutors, apply also to the powers and liabilities of joint administrators. There is one *dictum* that the liability of joint administrators is like the liability of cotrustees,<sup>3</sup> but it is well settled that the liability of joint administrators and coexecutors is identical.<sup>4</sup>

§ 426. It must be borne in mind, that in the United States, administrators, executors, guardians, and a large class of trustees, are appointed by judges of probate, surrogates, ordinaries, or officers exercising a similar jurisdiction. All trustees appointed under wills, proved and recorded in probate courts, are appointed by decrees of the court in the same manner as executors. In many cases, a bond with sureties is required as a prerequisite to an appointment and qualification to act, unless such bond is expressly waived by the testator or the *cestui que trust*. This bond generally runs to the judge or some officer for the use and protection of those beneficially interested in the estate. If it is a joint bond, executed by all the joint administrators, guardians, coexecutors, or cotrustees, it is in the nature of an agreement to be answerable for each

<sup>1</sup> Shipbrook v. Hinchinbrook, 11 Ves. 252; 16 Ves. 477; Williams v. Nixon, 2 Beav. 472; Kilbee v. Sneyd, 2 Moll. 213; Underwood v. Stevens, 1 Mer. 172; Brice v. Stokes, 11 Ves. 328; Hewett v. Foster, 6 Beav. 259.

<sup>2</sup> Styles v. Guy, 1 Mac. & G. 422; 1 H. & Tw. 523; Egbert v. Butter, 21 Beav. 560; Scully v. Delany, 2 Ir. Eq. 165; Candler v. Tillett, 22 Beav. 257; Carter v. Cutting, 5 Munf. 223.

<sup>3</sup> Hudson v. Hudson, 1 Atk. 460.

<sup>4</sup> Willand v. Fenn, 2 Ves. 267, cited; Murray v. Blatchford, 1 Wend. 583; O'Neill v. Herbert, 1 McMul. Eq. 495.

other's acts and defaults. The remedy for a breach of trust in such cases is a suit upon the bond in the name of the proper person for the benefit of those interested, against all the joint makers and sureties of the bond ; and any breaches of trust, committed by either or all of the trustees, may be given in evidence, and a judgment against all will be rendered, although the breach of trust was committed by one alone.<sup>1</sup> This joint liability of all the cotrustees under a joint bond results from the nature of the bond, and from the technical nature of an action at law for a breach of the bond by a breach of the trust. If, however, one of the coexecutors or cotrustees dies, and a breach of trust is committed by the survivor after his death, the estate of the deceased executor cannot be made liable for the breach of the trust.<sup>2</sup> It will be seen at once, that very few of the rules heretofore stated in relation to the liabilities of executors or trustees for the acts and defaults of their coexecutors or cotrustees have any bearing upon the liability of cotrustees who have given a joint bond for the faithful execution of the trust. The statutes of many of the States, however, provide that separate bonds with sureties may be taken from each of the administrators, executors, guardians, or trustees, as the case may be. It is conceived that where separate bonds are taken from each of the executors or trustees, the liability of the executor or trustee for the acts and defaults of his coexecutor or cotrustee would be governed by the rules and principles hereinbefore stated. But if they sign a joint bond, they are jointly liable.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ames v. Armstrong*, 106 Mass. 35 ; *Hill v. Davis*, 4 Mass. 137 ; *Brazer v. Clark*, 5 Pick. 96 ; *Towne v. Ammidown*, 20 Pick. 535 ; *Newcombe v. Williams*, 9 Met. 525 ; *Sparhawk v. Buell*, 9 Vt. 41 ; *Boyd v. Boyd*, 1 Watts, 368 ; *Bostick v. Elliott*, 3 Head, 507 ; *Braxton v. State*, 25 Ind. 82 ; *Jeffries v. Lawson*, 39 Miss. 791 ; *Gayden v. Gayden*, 1 McMul. Eq. 435 ; *Hughlett v. Hughlett*, 5 Humph. 453 ; *Clarke v. State*, 6 G. & J. 288 ; *South v. Hay*, 3 Mon. 88 ; *Anderson v. Miller*, 6 J. J. Marsh. 568 ; *Morrow v. Peyton*, 8 Leigh, 54 ; *Babcock v. Hubbard*, 2 Conn. 539.

<sup>2</sup> *Brazer v. Clark*, 5 Pick. 96 ; *Towne v. Ammidown*, 20 Pick. 535.

<sup>3</sup> *Ames v. Armstrong*, 106 Mass. 18.

§ 427. Trustees hold a position of trust and confidence. The legal title of the trust property is in them, and generally its whole management and control is in their hands. At the same time the beneficiaries of the trust may be women, or children, or persons incompetent to protect their own interests. For these reasons, to protect the weak and helpless on the one hand, and to prevent trustees from using their position and influence for their own gain, and to prevent them from hazarding the trust property upon what they may think to be profitable speculations, on the other, they are not allowed to make any profit from their office. They cannot use the trust property, nor their relation to it, for their own personal advantage. All the power and influence which the possession of the trust fund gives must be used for the advantage and profit of the beneficial owners, and not for the personal gain and emolument of the trustee. No other rule would be safe; nor would it be possible for courts to apply any other rule, as between trustee and *cestui que trust*.<sup>1</sup> This rule is so stringent that Lord Eldon once sent a case to a master to inquire, whether the privilege of sporting on the trust estate could be let for the benefit of the *cestui que trust*: if not, he thought the game should belong to the heir; the trustee might appoint a game-keeper for the preservation of game for the heir, but he ought not to keep up a lodge for his own pleasure.<sup>2</sup> So where a trustee retired from the office in consideration that his successor paid him a sum of money, it was held that the

<sup>1</sup> *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 Ed. 226; *Docker v. Somes*, 2 M. & K. 664; *O'Herlihy v. Hedges*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 126; *Bently v. Craven*, 18 Beav. 75; *Gubbins v. Creed*, 2 Sch. & Lef. 218; *Ex parte Andrews*, 2 Rose, 412; *Hamilton v. Wright*, 9 Cl. & Fin. 111; *Middleton v. Spicer*, 1 Bro. Ch. 205; *Sherrard v. Harborough*, Amb. 165; *Re Shrewsbury School*, 1 M. & C. 647; *Martin v. Martin*, 12 Sim. 579; *Cooke v. Cholmondeley*, 3 Drew. 1; *Hawkins v. Chappell*, 1 Atk. 621; *Johnson v. Barber*, 22 Beav. 562; 6 De G., M. & G. 439; *Parshall's App.* 65 Penn. St. 233; *Ellis v. Barker*, L. R. 7 Ch. 104; *Sloo v. Law*, 3 Blatch. C. C. 457; *Williams v. Stevens*, L. R. 1 P. C. 352.

<sup>2</sup> *Webb v. Shaftesbury*, 7 Ves. 480; *Hutchinson v. Morritt*, 3 Y. & C. 47.

money so paid must be treated as a part of the trust estate, and that the trustee must account for it, as he could make no profit, directly nor indirectly, from the trust property or from the position or office of trustees.<sup>1</sup> Trustees may be enjoined from carrying out a contract made for their own benefit.<sup>2</sup>

§ 428. A trustee, executor, or assignee cannot buy up a debt or incumbrance to which the trust estate is liable, for less than is actually due thereon, and make a profit to himself; but such purchase inures for the benefit of the trust estate, and the creditors, legatees, and *cestuis que trust* shall have all the advantage of such purchase.<sup>3</sup> But if a trustee buys up an outstanding debt for the benefit of the *cestuis que trust*, and they refuse to take it or to pay the purchase-money, they cannot afterwards, when the purchase turns out to be beneficial, claim the benefit for themselves.<sup>4</sup> Nor can the trustee make any contract with the *cestui que trust* for any benefit, or for the trust property, nor can he accept a gift from the *cestui que trust*.<sup>5</sup> The better opinion, however, is, that a trustee may purchase of the *cestui que trust*, or accept a benefit from him, but the transaction must be beyond suspicion; and the burden is on the trustee to vindicate the bargain or gift from any shadow of suspicion, and to show that it was perfectly fair and

<sup>1</sup> Sugden v. Crossland, 3 Sim. & Gif. 192.

<sup>2</sup> Sloo v. Law, 3 Blatch. C. C. 457.

<sup>3</sup> Robinson v. Pett, 3 P. Wms. 251, n. (a); Pooley v. Quilter, 4 Drew. 184; 2 De G. & Jon. 327; Morret v. Paske, 2 Atk. 54; Dunch v. Kent, 1 Vern. 241; Darcy v. Hall, 1 Vern. 49; *Ex parte* Lacey, 6 Ves. 268; Anon. 1 Salk. 155; Fosbrooke v. Balguy, 1 M. & K. 226; Carter v. Horne, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 7; Schoonmaker v. Van Wyke, 31 Barb. 457; Matter of Oakley, 2 Edw. 478; Herr's Est. 1 Grant's Ca. 272; Quackenbush v. Leonard, 9 Page, 334; Slade v. Van Vechten, 11 Paige, 21; Barksdale v. Finney, 14 Grat. 338; King v. Cushman, 41 Ill. 31.

<sup>4</sup> Barwell v. Barwell, 34 Beav. 371.

<sup>5</sup> Vaughton v. Noble, 30 Beav. 34; Baxter v. Costin, 1 Busb. Eq. 262; Andrews v. Hobson, 23 Ala. 219; Mason v. Martin, 4 Md. 124; Green v. Winter, 1 John. Ch. 26; Spindler v. Atkinson, 3 Md. 409; Wiswall v. Stewart, 3 Ala. 433.

reasonable in every respect, and courts will scrutinize the transaction with great severity.<sup>1</sup> So if a trustee buys the trust property at private sale or public auction, he takes it subject to the right of the *cestui que trust* to have the sale set aside, or to claim all the benefits and profits of the sale for himself.<sup>2</sup>

§ 429. Trustees cannot make a profit from the trust funds committed to them, by using the money in any kind of trade or speculation, nor in their own business; nor can they put the funds into the trade or business of another, under a stipulation that they shall receive a *bonus* or other profit or advantage. In all such cases, the trustees must account for every dollar received from the use of the trust money, and they will be absolutely responsible for it if it is lost in any such transactions. By this rule, trustees may be liable to great losses while they can receive no profit; and the rule is made thus stringent, that trustees may not be tempted from selfish motives to embark the trust fund upon the chances of trade and speculation.<sup>3</sup> If a trustee charge a bonus in his account

<sup>1</sup> *Ex parte Lacey*, 6 Ves. 226; *Scott v. Davis*, 1 M. & Cr. 87; *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 234; *Morse v. Royal*, 12 Ves. 372; *Dunlop v. Mitchell*, 10 Ohio, 17; *Harrington v. Brown*, 5 Pick. 519; *Bolton v. Gardner*, 3 Paige 273; *Ames v. Downing*, 1 Bradf. 321; *Lyon v. Lyon*, 8 Ired. Eq. 201; *Pennock's App.* 14 Penn. St. 446; *Bruch v. Lantz*, 2 Rawle, 392; *Stuart v. Kissam*, 2 Barb. 493; *Jones v. Smith*, 33 Miss. 215; *Soller v. Chandler*, 26 Miss. 154; *Herne v. Meeres*, 1 Vern. 465; *Smith v. Isaac*, 12 Mo. 106.

<sup>2</sup> *Beeson v. Beeson*, 9 Barr, 279; *Patton v. Thompson*, 2 Jones, Eq. 285; *Mason v. Martin*, 4 Md. 124; *Spindler v. Atkinson*, 3 Md. 409; *Davoue v. Fanning*, 2 John. Ch. 252; *Iddings v. Bruer*, 4 Sandf. Ch. 222; *Hendricks v. Robinson*, 2 John. Ch. 283; *Evertson v. Tappan*, 5 John. Ch. 497; *Smith v. Lansing*, 22 N. Y. 530; *Ames v. Downing*, 1 Bradf. 321; *Andrews v. Hobson*, 23 Ala. 219; *Charles v. Dubois*, 29 Ala. 367; *Wiswall v. Stewart*, 32 Ala. 433; *Bellamy v. Bellamy*, 6 Fla. 62; *Schoonmaker v. Van Wyke*, 31 Barb. 457.

<sup>3</sup> *Docker v. Somes*, 2 M. & K. 664; *Willett v. Blanford*, 1 Hare, 253; *Cummins v. Cummins*, 8 Ir. Eq. 723; *Wedderburn v. Wedderburn*, 2 Keen, 722; 4 M. & Cr. 41; 22 Beav. 84; *Townend v. Townend*, 1 Gif. 201; *Parker v. Bloxam*, 20 Beav. 295; *Manning v. Manning*, 1 John. Ch. 527; *In re*

for his skill and services in conducting the business of the trust, it will be set aside.<sup>1</sup>

§ 430. All persons who stand in a fiduciary relation to others must account for all the profits made upon moneys in their hands by reason of such relation.<sup>2</sup> Thus partners stand in a fiduciary relation to each other, and if a partner, instead of winding up the partnership affairs, when for any reason he ought to do so, continues to use the partnership property in business, and makes a profit thereon, he must account for it.<sup>3</sup> But in making up the accounts, courts will make a just allowance for time, skill, and other elements of success in conducting the business.<sup>4</sup> If a trader has trust funds in his hands, not in a fiduciary character, but through a breach of trust by a trustee, he is liable only for interest.<sup>5</sup> Agents, guardians, directors of corporations, officers of municipal corporations, and all other persons clothed with a fiduciary character, are subject to this rule.<sup>6</sup>

Thorp, Davies, 290; *Brown v. Ricketts*, 4 John. Ch. 303; *William v. Stevens*, L. R. 1 P. C. 352; *Blauvelt v. Ackerman*, 5 C. E. Green, 141; *Durling v. Hammer*, 5 C. E. Green, 220; *Pluman v. Slocum*, 41 N. Y. 53; *Frank's App.* 5 Penn. St. 190.

<sup>1</sup> *Barrett v. Hartly*, L. R. 2 Eq. 789.

<sup>2</sup> *Hawley v. Cramer*, 4 Cow. 717; *Richardson v. Spencer*, 18 B. Mon. 450; *Thorp v. McCullum*, 1 Gil. Ill. 615; *Van Epps v. Van Epps*, 9 Paige, 237; *Ackerman v. Emot*, 4 Barb. 626.

<sup>3</sup> *Bentley v. Craven*, 18 Beav. 75; *Parsons v. Hayward*, 31 Beav. 199; *Crawshay v. Collins*, 15 Ves. 226; *Brown v. De Tastet*, Jac. 284; *Wedderburn v. Wedderburn*, 2 Keen, 722; 4 M. & Cr. 41; 22 Beav. 84.

<sup>4</sup> *Docker v. Somes*, 2 M. & K. 662; *Willett v. Blanford*, 1 Hare, 253; *Brown v. De Tastet*, Jac. 284.

<sup>5</sup> *Strand v. Gwyer*, 28 Beav. 130; *Townend v. Townend*, 1 Gif. 210; *Simpson v. Chapman*, 4 De G., M. & G. 154; *Macdonald v. Richardson*, 1 Gif. 81; *Brown v. De Tastet*, Jac. 284; *Chambers v. Howell*, 11 Beav. 6; *Ex parte Watson*, 2 V. & B. 414.

<sup>6</sup> *Morret v. Paske*, 2 Atk. 52; *Powell v. Glover*, 3 P. Wms. 251; *Great Luxembourg Railway Co. v. Magnay*, 25 Beav. 586; *Chaplin v. Young*, 33 Beav. 414; *Bowes v. Toronto*, 11 Moore, P. C. C. 463; *Docker v. Somes*, 2 M. & K. 665.



§ 431. So if persons, standing in such a relation to an estate, obtain advantages in respect to it, those who succeed to the estate shall have the advantages which are thus obtained.<sup>1</sup> As where a mortgagee had purchased the right of dower of the widow of a deceased mortgagor, the heir of the mortgagor, upon a bill to redeem, was held to have the right to take the purchase of the dower at the price which the mortgagee had paid.<sup>1</sup> So an heir cannot hold an incumbrance for more than he gave for it, against the creditors of the ancestor's estate,<sup>2</sup> and it is conceived that the same rule applies to a devisee.<sup>3</sup> But if the heir or devisee is himself an incumbrancer at the death of the ancestor, he may buy in a prior, but not a subsequent, incumbrance, and hold it for the whole amount due. The court considers him, in buying such a prior incumbrance, not as heir or devisee, but as an incumbrancer or stranger; and so if, as such prior incumbrancer, he obtains a prior incumbrance by the bounty or gift of another, he shall hold such bounty or gift for the benefit of his own incumbrance, and there is no reason why he should hold it for the benefit of the creditors of the ancestor.<sup>4</sup> So the heir or devisee may hold a prior incumbrance for full value, though bought for less, against a subsequent incumbrancer.<sup>5</sup> So if one of several joint purchasers of an estate, buy in an incumbrance for less than its face, he shall hold it for his copurchasers at the same price he paid.<sup>6</sup> And the opinion has been expressed, that a tenant for life holds the same relation toward the remainder-man; and if such tenant buy in an incumbrance upon the estate for

<sup>1</sup> *Baldwin v. Bannister*, cited 3 P. Wms. 251; *Dobson v. Land*, 8 Hare, 220; *Arnold v. Garner*, 2 Phil. 231; *Mathison v. Clarke*, 3 Drew. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Lancaster v. Cross*, 10 Beav. 154; 1 Phil. 354; *Morret v. Paske*, 2 Atk. 54; *Long v. Clopton*, 1 Vern. 464; *Brathwaite v. Brathwaite*, 1 Vern. 334; *Darcy v. Hall*, 1 Vern. 49.

<sup>3</sup> *Long v. Clopton*, 1 Vern. 464; *Davis v. Barrett*, 14 Beav. 542.

<sup>4</sup> *Davis v. Barrett*, 14 Beav. 542; *Darcy v. Hall*, 1 Vern. 49; *Anon.* 1 Salk. 155.

<sup>5</sup> *Davis v. Barrett*, 14 Beav. 542.

<sup>6</sup> *Carter v. Horne*, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 7.

less than its face, he cannot claim from the remainder-man more than he gave.<sup>1</sup>

§ 432. The rule that trustees can make no profit out of the estate is carried so far in England that they can receive no compensation for their services. In the United States, trustees are entitled to reasonable compensation. But both in England and the United States, a trustee can receive no indirect profit from the estate by reason of his connection with it. Thus a trustee cannot be appointed *receiver* with a salary,<sup>2</sup> nor would he be appointed without compensation except under peculiar circumstances; for it is his duty to superintend and watch over the receiver.<sup>3</sup> The same reasons do not apply for excluding a dry trustee.<sup>4</sup> If trustees are factors,<sup>5</sup> or brokers,<sup>6</sup> or commission agents,<sup>7</sup> or auctioneers,<sup>8</sup> or bankers,<sup>9</sup> or attorneys, or solicitors,<sup>10</sup> they can make no charges against the trust estate for services rendered by them in their professional capacity to the estate of which they are trustees. They may employ the services of such agents, if necessary, and pay for them from the estate; but if they undertake to act in such capacities themselves for the estate, they can receive no compensation. This

<sup>1</sup> *Hill v. Brown*, Dr. 433.

<sup>2</sup> *Sutton v. Jones*, 15 Ves. 584; *Morison v. Morison*, 4 M. & C. 215; *Sykes v. Hastings*, 11 Ves. 363; — *v. Jolland*, 8 Ves. 72; *Anon.* 3 Ves. 515.

<sup>3</sup> *Sykes v. Hastings*, 11 Ves. 363.

<sup>4</sup> *Sutton v. Jones*, 15 Ves. 587.

<sup>5</sup> *Scattergood v. Harrison*, Mos. 128.

<sup>6</sup> *Arnold v. Garner*, 2 Phil. 231.

<sup>7</sup> *Sheriff v. Aske*, 4 Russ. 33.

<sup>8</sup> *Mathison v. Clarke*, 3 Drew. 3; *Kirkman v. Booth*, 11 Beav. 273.

<sup>9</sup> *Crosskill v. Bower*, 1 Dr. & Sm. 319.

<sup>10</sup> *Pollard v. Doyle*, 1 Dr. & Sm. 319; *Moore v. Frowd*, 3 M. & Cr. 46; *Frazer v. Palmer*, 4 Y. & C. 515; *York v. Brown*, 1 Coll. 260; *Broughton v. Broughton*, 5 De. G., M. & G. 160; *In re Sherwood*, 3 Beav. 338; *Douglass v. Archbutt*, 2 De G. & J. 148; *Harkin v. Darby*, 28 Beav. 325; *Morgan v. Homans*, 49 N. Y. 667; *Gomley v. Wood*, 9 Ir. Eq. 418; *Binsse v. Paige*, 1 Keyes, 87; 1 N. Y. Decis. 138.

rule is so strict, that if the trustee has a partner, and employs such partner, no charge can be made by the firm;<sup>1</sup> but if the trustee is excluded from all participation in the compensation, the partner of the trustee may be paid like any other person for similar services.<sup>2</sup> In one case where several trustees were made defendants, one of them, being a solicitor, conducted the defence, and was allowed his full costs, it not appearing that the costs were increased by such conduct.<sup>3</sup> This case is put upon the ground that the services were rendered under the eye of the court, and there could be no danger of collusion; but the case is not approved in England, and has not been followed.<sup>4</sup> In the United States a trustee has been refused compensation as solicitor, for professional services rendered by himself for himself as trustee, on the ground that no man can make a contract with himself.<sup>5</sup>

§ 433. Under no circumstances can a trustee claim or set up a claim to the trust property adverse to the *cestui que trust*.<sup>6</sup> Nor can he deny his title.<sup>7</sup> If a trustee desires to set up a title to the trust property in himself, he should refuse to accept the trust. But if a claim is made upon him by a third person, adverse to the *cestui que trust*, he may decline to deliver over

<sup>1</sup> *Collin v. Carey*, 2 Beav. 128; *Lincoln v. Winsor*, 9 Hare, 158; *Christophers v. White*, 10 Beav. 523; *Lyon v. Baker*, 5 De G. & Sm. 622; *Manson v. Baillie*, 2 Macq. H. L. Ca. 80.

<sup>2</sup> *Clack v. Carlon*, 7 Jur. (N. S.) 441; *Burge v. Burton*, 2 Hare, 373.

<sup>3</sup> *Cradock v. Piper*, 1 McN. & G. 664; 1 Hall & T. 617, overruling *Bainbrigge v. Blair*, 8 Beav. 588.

<sup>4</sup> *Lyon v. Baker*, 5 De G. & Sm. 622.

<sup>5</sup> *Mayer v. Galluchet*, 6 Rich. Eq. 2; *Jenkins v. Fickling*, 4 Des. 470; *Edmonds v. Crenshaw*, Harp. 232.

<sup>6</sup> *Att'y-Gen. v. Monroe*, 2 De G. & Sm. 163; *Stone v. Godfrey*, 5 De G., M. & G. 76; *Frith v. Curtland*, 2 Hen. & Mil. 417; *Pomfret v. Winsor*, 2 Ves. 476; *Kennedy v. Daley*, 1 Sch. & Lef. 381; *Ex parte Andrews*, 2 Rose, 412; *Conry v. Caulfield*, 2 B. & B. 272; *Newsome v. Flowers*, 30 Beav. 461; *Shields v. Atkins*, 3 Atk. 560; *Langley v. Fisher*, 9 Beav. 90; *Reece v. Frye*, 1 De G. & Sm. 279; *Benjamin v. Gill*, 45 Ga. 110.

<sup>7</sup> *Von Hurter v. Spergeman*, 2 Green Ch. 185.

the property to his *cestui que trust* until the title is determined, or he is indemnified or secured against the consequences,<sup>1</sup> or he may pay the fund into court,<sup>2</sup> and if he neglects to do so, and thus makes a suit necessary, he will recover only such costs as he would have been entitled to if he had paid the money into court.<sup>3</sup> A trustee must assume the validity of the trust under which he acts, until it is actually impeached, although he may have some suspicion that there may have been fraud or collusion in the appointment and settlement.<sup>4</sup> So if a trustee obtains a knowledge of facts that would defeat the title of his *cestui que trust*, and give the property over to another, he is not justified in morals in communicating such facts to such other person. His duty is to manage the property for his *cestui que trust*, and not to keep his conscience, or betray his title or interests,<sup>5</sup> and he can make no admissions prejudicial to the rights of his *cestui que trust*,<sup>6</sup> nor can he use his influence to defeat the purposes of the trust as declared by the creator of it.<sup>7</sup>

§ 434. In England a trustee, being in possession of real estate in trust, may profit from his trust if the *cestui que trust* dies without heirs; for, as the trustee is tenant in possession, there is no such failure of a tenant as to cause an escheat; and the trustee thenceforth holds the lands for his own use, there being no *cestui que trust* to call him to an account.<sup>8</sup> This is a benefit to the trustee; but it arises rather from an absence

<sup>1</sup> Neale v. Davies, 5 De G., M. & G. 258.

<sup>2</sup> Gunnell v. Whitear, L. R. 10 Eq. 664.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.; Weller v. Fitzhugh, 22 L. T. (N. S.) 567.

<sup>4</sup> Beddoes v. Pugh, 26 Beav. 407; Reid v. Mullins, 48 Mo. 344.

<sup>5</sup> Lewin, 234.

<sup>6</sup> Thomas v. Bowman, 30 Ill. 34; 29 Ill. 426.

<sup>7</sup> Ellis v. Barker, L. R. 7 Ch. 104.

<sup>8</sup> Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Ed. 177, 186, 216, 256; Taylor v. Haygarth, 14 Sim. 8; Davall v. New River Co. 3 De G. & Sm. 394; Cox v. Parker, 22 Beav. 168; Barrow v. Wadkin, 24 Beav. 9; Att'y-Gen. v. Sands, Hard. 496.

of right in others, than from an affirmative right in himself. But if he is not in possession, or if he has need of the assistance of a court of equity to enforce his rights, the court will not act;<sup>1</sup> though it is said, that having the legal title, which a court of law must recognize, he can obtain all the rights which a court of law must give.<sup>2</sup> But if the *cestui que trust* devise the estate to another upon trusts that fail, the trustee must pass over the estate to the devisee, for the reason that the trustee can have no advantage from trusts that so fail, and he has no equity against the devisee to keep the estate.<sup>3</sup>

§ 435. Upon this rule of law in England, several questions were started in the case of *Burgess v. Wheate*,<sup>4</sup> which are rather curious than practical in this country; as, for instance, if a purchaser should pay the money in full for land, and die without heirs, before he obtained a conveyance, could the vendor keep both land and purchase-money?<sup>5</sup> Again, if a mortgagor in fee should die without heirs, could a mortgagee in fee keep the whole estate, for the reason that there was no person having a right to redeem?<sup>6</sup> Of course the equity of redemption would be assets for the payment of the debts of the mortgagor.<sup>7</sup> But if there were no debts, could the mortgagee keep a large estate for a small debt?<sup>8</sup> Another question was raised, whether a trust in such cases might not result to the grantor.<sup>9</sup> No answers have been given to these questions by decided cases, and as they were put more than a century ago, it is not probable that a case will arise requiring their judicial determination.

<sup>1</sup> *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 Ed. 212; *Onslow v. Wallis*, 1 McN. & G. 506; *Williams v. Lonsdale*, 3 Ves. 752.

<sup>2</sup> *King v. Coggan*, 6 East, 431; 2 Smith, 417; *King v. Wilson*, 10 B. & C. 80.

<sup>3</sup> *Onslow v. Wallis*, 1 McN. & G. 506; *Jones v. Goodchild*, 3 P. Wms. 33.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Ed. 177.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* 212.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* 210.

<sup>7</sup> *Beal v. Symonds*, 16 Beav. 406; *Downe v. Morris*, 3 Hare, 394.

<sup>8</sup> 1 Ed. 236, 256.

<sup>9</sup> 1 Ed. 185.

§ 436. In the United States, if a *cestui que trust* should die without heirs, the trustee could not hold for his own beneficial use; but he would hold for the State as *ultima hæres* where all other heirs fail.<sup>1</sup>

§ 437. Where a *cestui que trust* of chattels dies without heirs, the trustee can take no benefit; for the beneficial use in such chattels will go as *bona vacantia* to the crown or State. So if the *cestui que trust* makes a will and appoints an executor, but makes no further disposition of his personalty, the executor will take for the State; for the executor can take no beneficial interest unless the will expressly gives it to him.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *McCaw v. Galbraith*, 7 Rich. L. 75; *Matthews v. Ward*, 10 G. & J. 443; *Darrah v. McNair*, 1 Ashm. 236; *Ringgold v. Malott*, 1 Harr. & John. 299; 4 Kent, 425; 1 Cruise, Dig. 448; *Crane v. Reeder*, 21 Md. 25.

<sup>2</sup> *Middleton v. Spicer*, 1 Bro. Ch. 201; *Taylor v. Haygarth*, 14 Sim. 8; *Russell v. Clowes*, 2 Coll. 648; *Powell v. Merritt*, 1 Sim. & Gif. 381; *Crodoek v. Owen*, 2 Sim. & Gif. 241; *Read v. Steadman*, 26 Beav. 495; *Cane v. Roberts*, 8 Sim. 214.

## CHAPTER XV.

### POSSESSION — CUSTODY — CONVERSION — INVESTMENT OF TRUST PROPERTY, AND INTEREST THAT TRUSTEES MAY BE MADE TO PAY.

- § 438. Duty of trustee to reduce the trust property to possession.
- § 439. Time within which possession should be obtained.
- § 440. Diligence necessary in acquiring possession.
- § 441. The care necessary in the custody of trust property.
- § 442. In what manner certain property should be kept.
- § 443. Where the property may be deposited.
- §§ 444, 445. How money must be deposited in bank.
- § 446. Within what time trustee should wind up testator's establishment.
- § 447. Trustee must not mix trust property with his own.
- § 448. When a trustee is to convert trust property.
- § 449. General rule as to conversion.
- § 450. When a court presumes an intention that property is to be converted.
- § 451. When the court presumes that the property is to be enjoyed by *cestui que trust in specie*.
- § 452. Of investment.
- § 453. As to investment in personal securities.
- § 454. As to the employment of trust property in trade, business, or speculation.
- § 455. Rule as to investments in England.
- § 456. Rule in the United States.
- §§ 457, 458. Rule as to real securities.
- § 459. Of investments in the different States.
- §§ 460, 461. Construction, where the instruments of trust direct how investments may be made.
- § 462. Within what time investments must be made.
- § 463. Trustees must not mingle their own money in investments.
- § 464. Must not use the trust money in business.
- § 465. Original investments and investments left by the testator.
- § 466. Changing investments.
- § 467. Acquiescence of *cestui que trust* in improper investments.
- § 468. Interest that trustees must pay upon trust funds for any dereliction of duty.
- § 469. When he is directed to invest in a particular manner.
- § 470. When he improperly changes an investment.
- § 471. When compound interest will be imposed, and when other rules will be applied.
- § 472. Rule where an accumulation is directed.

§ 438. THE first duty of a trustee, after his appointment and qualification to act, is to secure the possession of the trust

property and to protect it from loss and injury. If the trust property is an equitable interest or estate, he must give notice to the holder of the legal title; and if he cannot have the legal title transferred to himself, he must take such steps that no incumbrances can be put upon it by the settlor or assignor. If the trust fund consists in part of notes, bonds, policies of insurance, and other similar *choses in action*, notice should be given to the promisors, obligors, or makers of the instruments. This is the general rule in England and in many of the United States.<sup>1</sup> In some States, however, it is held that an assignment of a *chose in action* is complete in itself when the assignor and assignee have completed the transfer, and that notice to the debtor is not necessary in order to make the assignment

<sup>1</sup> Jacob v. Lucas, 1 Beav. 436; Wright v. Dorchester, 3 Russ. 49 n.; Timson v. Ramsbottom, 2 Keen, 35; Forster v. Blackstone, 1 M. & K. 297; Roofer v. Harrison, 2 K. & J. 86; Loveredge v. Cooper, 3 Russ. 30; Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1; Meux v. Bell, 1 Hare, 73; Stocks v. Dobson, 4 De G., M. & G. 11; Voyle v. Hughes, 2 Sm. & Gif. 18; Ryall v. Rowles, 1 Ves. 348; 1 Atk. 165; Dow v. Dawson, 1 Ves. 331; 3 Lead. Ca. Eq. 612; Jones v. Gibbons, 9 Ves. 410; Thompson v. Spiers, 13 Sim. 469; Waldron v. Sloper, 1 Drew. 193; *Ex parte* Boulton, 1 De G. & J. 163; Pierce v. Brady, 23 Beav. 64; Martin v. Sedgwick, 9 Beav. 333; Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Ves. 174; Dunster v. Glengall, 3 Ir. Eq. 47; Forster v. Cockerell, 9 Bligh (n.s.), 332; 3 Cl. & Fin. 456; Feltham v. Clark, 1 De G. & Sm. 307; *In re* Atkinson, 2 De G., M. & G. 140; Mangles v. Dixon, 18 Eng. L. & Eq. 82; Brashear v. West, 7 Pet. 608; Stewart v. Kirkland, 19 Ala. 162; Cummings v. Fullam, 13 Vt. 134; Northampton Bank v. Balliet, 8 W. & S. 311; Bean v. Simpson, 4 Shep. 49; Phillips v. Bank of Lewistown, 6 Harris, 394; Laughlin v. Fairbanks, 8 Mo. 367; Campbell v. Day, 16 Vt. 358; Barney v. Douglass, 19 Vt. 98; Ward v. Morrison, 25 Vt. 593; Loomis v. Loomis, 2 Vt. 201; Adams v. Leavens, 20 Conn. 73; Van Buskirk v. Ins. Co. 14 Conn. 145; Foster v. Mix, 20 Conn. 395; Bishop v. Halcomb, 10 Conn. 444; Woodbridge v. Perkins, 3 Day, 364; Judah v. Judd, 5 Day, 534; Murdock v. Finney, 21 Mo. 138; Cladfield v. Cox, 1 Sneed, 330; Fisher v. Knox, 13 Penn. St. 622; Judson v. Corcoran, 17 How. 614; but see Beavan v. Oxford, 6 De G., M. & G. 507; Kekewich v. Manning, 1 De G., M. & G. 176; Clack v. Holland, 24 L. J. 19; Barr's Trusts, 4 K. & J. 219; Scott v. Hastings, 4 K. & J. 633; Bridge v. Beadon, L. R. 3 Eq. 664; *In re* Brown's Trusts, L. R. 5 Eq. 88; Lloyd v. Banks, L. R. 4 Eq. 222; 3 Ch. 488.



valid as against third persons, or attaching creditors, or subsequent assignees without notice.<sup>1</sup> But it seems to be agreed in all the cases, that, if the debtor without notice and in *good faith* pays the debt to the assignor, it will be a good payment, and discharge him from further liability;<sup>2</sup> but if he should pay after notice he would still be liable to the assignee.<sup>3</sup> Under all circumstances, it is safer to give notice to the debtor, whether the courts of a State hold notice necessary or not. If the assignor receive the money of the debtor after the assignment, he will hold the money in trust for the assignee.<sup>4</sup> These general rules concerning notice do not apply to equities in real estate.<sup>5</sup> Trustees should also insist upon possession of all the notes, bonds, policies, and other obligations for the payment of money being delivered to them; for, if negligent in this respect, and suits and costs arise, they might be made responsible personally.<sup>6</sup> So if there are debts or securities already due and payable to the trust estate, the trustees must proceed to collect

<sup>1</sup> Sharpless v. Welch, 4 Dall. 279; Bholen v. Cleveland, 1 Mason, 174; Dix v. Cobb, 4 Mass. 508; Wood v. Partridge, 11 Mass. 488; Warren v. Copelin, 4 Met. 594; Littlefield v. Smith, 17 Me. 327; Corser v. Craig, 1 Wash. C. C. 24; United States v. Vaughn, 3 Binn. 394; Muir v. Schenk, 3 Hill, 228; Talbot v. Cook, 7 Mon. 438; Maybin v. Kirby, 4 Rich. Eq. 105; Stevens v. Stevens, 1 Ashm. 590; Beckwith v. Union Bank, 5 Seld. 211; Conway v. Cutting, 50 N. H. 408; Garland v. Harrington, 51 N. H. 409.

<sup>2</sup> Reed v. Marble, 10 Paige, 509; Mangles v. Dixon, 18 Eng. L. & Eq. 82; 1 Mac. & G. 446, 3 H. L. Ca. 739, and cases before cited; Stocks v. Dobson, 4 De G., M. & G. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Brashear v. West, 7 Pet. 608, and cases before cited; Judson v. Corcoran, 17 How. 614.

<sup>4</sup> Ellis v. Amason, 2 Dev. Eq. 273; Fortesque v. Barnett, 3 M. & K. 36.

<sup>5</sup> Wilmot v. Pike, 5 Hare, 14; Etty v. Bridges, 2 Y. & Col. 486; *Ex parte* Boulton, 1 De G. & J. 163; Webster v. Webster, 31 Beav. 393; Stephens v. Venables, 30 Beav. 625; Barr's Trusts, 4 K & J. 219; Van Rensalaer v. Stafford, Hopk. Ch. 569; 9 Cow. 316; Poillon v. Martin, 1 Sand. Ch. 569.

<sup>6</sup> Fortesque v. Barnett, 3 M. & K. 36; Meux v. Bell, 1 Hare, 82; Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Ves. 174; Knye v. Moore, 1 S. & S. 65; Lloyd v. Banks, L. R. 4 Eq. 222; 3 Ch. 488.

them. If any loss happens to the estate from any delay, they would be responsible,<sup>1</sup> and they may accept payment even before the debts are due.<sup>2</sup> Where it is important for the trustees to give notice of an assignment to them, notice to one of several obligors is notice to all: so notice to one of several of a society of underwriters is sufficient; and if the obligors compose a corporation, there must be notice to the directors or trustees of the corporation.<sup>3</sup> So if notice to trustees is necessary in any case, notice to one is sufficient.<sup>4</sup>

§ 439. There is no fixed time within which *executors* are to get in the *choses in action* of the testator. They must use due diligence; and what is due diligence depends upon the existing facts in every case, and a large discretion must necessarily be vested in the executor.<sup>5</sup> If there is property that cannot be kept without great expense, it should be sold forthwith. If the testator's establishment is expensive, it should be broken up within a reasonable time; and, under special circumstances, two months were held to be reasonable.<sup>6</sup> If there are shares or stocks in corporations, the executors must exercise a sound discretion to sell in the most advantageous manner, and at the

<sup>1</sup> *Caffrey v. Darbey*, 6 Ves. 488; *McGachen v. Dew*, 15 Beav. 84; *Tebbs v. Carpenter*, 1 Mad. 298; *Waring v. Waring*, 3 Ir. Eq. 335; *Platel v. Craddock*, C. P. Coop. 481; *Wiles v. Gresham*, 2 Drew. 258; *Grove v. Price*, 26 Beav. 108; *Rowley v. Adams*, 2 H. L. Ca. 725; *Macken v. Hogan*, 14 Ir. Eq. 220; *Mucklow v. Fuller*, Jac. 198; *Powell v. Evans*, 5 Ves. 839; *Lowson v. Copeland*, 2 Bro. Ch. 156; *Caney v. Bond*, 6 Beav. 486; *Cross v. Petree*, 10 B. Mon. 413; *Wolfe v. Washburn*, 6 Cow. 261; *Waring v. Darnall*, 10 G. & J. 127; *Hester v. Wilkinson*, 6 Humph. 215; *Garner v. Moore*, 3 Drew. 277; *Neff's App.* 57 Penn. St. 91.

<sup>2</sup> *Mills v. Osborne*, 7 Sim. 30.

<sup>3</sup> *Timson v. Ramsbottom*, 2 Keen, 35; *Meux v. Bell*, 1 Hare, 88; *Re Styne*, 1 Phil. 155; *Smith v. Smith*, 2 Cr. & Mee. 31; *Duncan v. Chamberlayne*, 11 Sim. 123.

<sup>4</sup> *Greenhill v. Willis*, 4 De G., F. & J. 147.

<sup>5</sup> *Waring v. Darnall*, 10 G. & J. 127; *Hughes v. Empson*, 22 Beav. 138.

<sup>6</sup> *Field v. Pickett*, 29 Beav. 576.

most advantageous time. In the case of some Crystal Palace shares owned by a testator, a sale within a year was held to be the exercise of a reasonable discretion, although it was claimed that they ought to have been sold within two months.<sup>1</sup> So where a large part of an estate consisted of Mexican bonds, which the testator directed to be converted "with all convenient speed," it was held that these words added nothing to the implied duty of every executor to convert such property with all reasonable speed; that a conversion in the course of the second year was proper and reasonable; that if executors were bound to sell at once without reference to the circumstances, there would often be a great sacrifice of property, and therefore that executors were bound to exercise a *reasonable discretion*, according to the circumstances of each case.<sup>2</sup> But generally stocks should be sold within the year allowed for the settling of a testator's estate, and a delay beyond this time may render the executors or trustees liable for the loss, although they act in good faith, and although some of the trustees became of age only a short time before the sale.<sup>3</sup> If, however, it is clear that the trustees have a discretion to sell or not according to their judgment, the case will be governed by the intention and not by the general rule.<sup>4</sup>

§ 440. Personal securities change from day to day; and as the death of the testator puts an end to his discretion in regard to them, unless he has exercised it in his will, the executor or

<sup>1</sup> *Hughes v. Empson*, 22 Beav. 138; *Bate v. Hooper*, 5 De G., M. & G. 338; *Wilkinson v. Duncan*, 26 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 495.

<sup>2</sup> *Buxton v. Buxton*, 1 M. & C. 80; *Prendergast v. Lushington*, 5 Hare, 171; *Hester v. Wilkinson*, 6 Humph. 215; *Waring v. Darnall*, 10 G. & J. 127.

<sup>3</sup> *Sculthorpe v. Tiffer*, L. R. 13 Eq. 238; *Grayburn v. Clarkson*, L. R. 3 Ch. 605.

<sup>4</sup> *Mackie v. Mackie*, 5 Hare, 70; *Wrey v. Smith*, 14 Beav. 202; *Sparling v. Parker*, 9 Beav. 524.

trustee will become personally liable, if he does not get in the money within a reasonable time.<sup>1</sup> He must not allow the assets to remain out on personal security,<sup>2</sup> though it was a loan or investment by the testator himself.<sup>3</sup> It is not enough for the executor to apply for payment through an attorney: he must follow the collection actively by legal proceedings,<sup>4</sup> unless he can show that such proceedings would have been futile and vain.<sup>5</sup> An executor must take the same steps when his *coexecutor* is a debtor to the estate, even if the testator has been in the habit of depositing or lending money to the coexecutor as to a banker.<sup>6</sup> Executors are not justified in dealing with a testator's money as he dealt with it himself, nor may they trust all the persons that he trusted. Nor will a direction in the will "to call in securities not approved by them" excuse executors from not calling in personal securities; for such direction refers to the different kinds of securities sanctioned by law and the court, and not to all investments outside the sanctions of the

<sup>1</sup> *Bailey v. Young*, 4 Y. & Col. Ch. 226; *Will's App.* 22 Penn. St. 330; *Mucklow v. Fuller*, Jac. 198; *Tebbs v. Carpenter*, 1 Mad. 297.

<sup>2</sup> *Lowson v. Copeland*, 2 Bro. Ch. 156; *Caney v. Bond*, 6 Beav. 486; *Att'y-Gen. v. Higham*, 2 Y. & Col. Ch. 634; *Hemphill's App.* 18 Penn. St. 303.

<sup>3</sup> *Powell v. Evans*, 5 Ves. 839; *Bullock v. Wheatley*, 1 Coll. 130; *Tebbs v. Carpenter*, 1 Mad. 298; *Clough v. Bond*, 3 M. & Cr. 496; *Hemphill's App.* 18 Penn. St. 303; *Pray's App.* 34 Penn. St. 100; *Barton's App.* 1 Pars. Eq. 24 is overruled; *Kimball v. Reading*, 11 Foster, 352. In England, bank stock must be converted. *Mills v. Mills*, 7 Sim. 509; *Howe v. Dartmouth*, 7 Ves. 150; *Price v. Anderson*, 15 Sim. 473.

<sup>4</sup> *Lowson v. Copeland*, 2 Bro. Ch. 156; *Horton v. Brocklehurst*, 29 Beav. 511; *Paddon v. Richardson*, 7 De G., M. & G. 563; *Wolfe v. Washburn*, 6 Cow. 261.

<sup>5</sup> *Clack v. Holland*, 19 Beav. 262; *Hobday v. Peters*, 28 Beav. 603; *Alexander v. Alexander*, 12 Ir. Eq. 1; *Maitland v. Bateman*, 16 Sim. 233, and note; *Walker v. Symonds*, 3 Swans. 71; *East v. East*, 5 Hare, 343; *Ratcliff v. Wynch*, 17 Beav. 217; *Ball v. Ball*, 11 Ir. Eq. 370; *Styles v. Guy*, 16 Sim. 232.

<sup>6</sup> *Styles v. Guy*, 1 Mac. & G. 428; 1 Hall & Tw. 523; *Egbert v. Butter*, 21 Beav. 560; *Candler v. Tillett*, 22 Beav. 257; *Mucklow v. Fuller*, Jac. 198.

law.<sup>1</sup> If the executors are to get in the money "whenever they think proper and expedient," they will be liable for the fund if they allow it to remain uncollected out of kindness or regard for the tenant for life, and not upon an impartial judgment for the best interest of all the parties.<sup>2</sup> If the outstanding debt is secured by a real mortgage, it ought not to be called in, if it is safe, until it is wanted in the course of the administration.<sup>3</sup> But pains should be taken to ascertain whether the security is safe.<sup>4</sup> If the mortgage security is not adequate, the executor or trustee must insist upon payment, even where the *cestui que trust* is to consent to every change of investment, and he refuses to consent; for nothing will justify conduct that endangers the fund.<sup>5</sup> But if the fund is safe on a security sanctioned by the court and selected by the testator, it might be a breach of trust to call it in, and allow it to remain unproductive, or to invest it anew.<sup>6</sup> But if trustees are ordered by the court to call in securities, and they neglect to do so, they will be liable for any loss that occurs.<sup>7</sup> So if trustees compromise a debt due from a bankrupt estate, they must show that the bankrupt would have obtained his discharge, and that it was impossible to get the whole debt, or they will be liable for the loss.<sup>8</sup> If the trustee himself owes the estate and becomes bankrupt, he must prove the debt against himself, or he will be liable, even if he gets his discharge.<sup>9</sup> But in the

<sup>1</sup> *Styles v. Guy*, 1 Mac. & G. 428; *Scully v. Delany*, 2 Ir. Eq. 165.

<sup>2</sup> *Luther v. Bianconi*, 10 Ir. Ch. 194.

<sup>3</sup> *Orr v. Newton*, 2 Cox, 274; *Howe v. Dartmouth*, 7 Ves. 150; *Robinson v. Robinson*, 1 De G., M. & G. 252.

<sup>4</sup> *Ames v. Parkinson*, 7 Beav. 384.

<sup>5</sup> *Harrison v. Thexton*, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 550.

<sup>6</sup> *Orr v. Newton*, 2 Cox, 276.

<sup>7</sup> *Davenport v. Stafford*, 14 Beav. 338.

<sup>8</sup> *Wiles v. Gresham*, 2 Dr. 258; 5 De G., M. & G. 770. Lord Justice Turner expressed a doubt, whether the trustees should have been charged, without further inquiry.

<sup>9</sup> *Orrett v. Corser*, 21 Beav. 52.

United States, bankrupts are not discharged from any liabilities which they are under in a fiduciary capacity.

§ 441. It was observed in *Harden v. Parsons*,<sup>1</sup> that no man can require, or with reason expect, that a trustee should manage another's property with the same care and discretion as his own. But this is neither sound morality nor good law. A trustee must use the same care for the safety of the trust fund, and for the interests of the *cestui que trust*, that he uses for his own property and interests.<sup>2</sup> Thus where a trustee had £200 of his own money, and £40 of trust money, in his house, and he was robbed by his servant, he was not held responsible.<sup>3</sup> And where a trustee deposited articles with his solicitor, to be passed over to a party entitled to them, and the articles were stolen, the trustee was not held responsible.<sup>4</sup> But if a trustee employs an agent, and the agent steals or appropriates the property intrusted to him, the trustee will be held responsible; that is, the trustee is not responsible for the crimes of strangers, but he is responsible for the criminal acts of agents employed by himself about the trust fund;<sup>5</sup> and for any loss that may fall upon the estate by the forgery of a signature upon which he pays money.<sup>6</sup>

§ 442. Several trustees, residing in different places, cannot all have the custody of the same articles; therefore it is said

<sup>1</sup> 1 Eden, 148.

<sup>2</sup> *Morley v. Morley*, 2 Ch. Ca. 2; *Jones v. Lewis*, 2 Ves. 241; *Massey v. Banner*, 1 J. & W. 247; *Att'y-Gen. v. Dixon*, 13 Ves. 534; *Ex parte Belchier*, Amb. 220; *Ex parte Griffin*, 2 Gl. & J. 114; *Taylor v. Benham*, 5 How. 233; *King v. Talbott*, 50 Barb. 453; 40 N. Y. 86; *Miller v. Proctor*, 20 Ohio St. 444; *Neff's App.* 57 Penn. St. 91; *King v. King*, 37 Ga. 205; *Campbell v. Campbell*, 38 Ga. 304.

<sup>3</sup> *Morley v. Morley*, 2 Ch. Ca. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Jones v. Lewis*, 2 Ves. 240; *Foster v. Davis*, 46 Mo. 268.

<sup>5</sup> *Bostock v. Floyer*, L. R. 1 Eq. 28; *Hapgood v. Perkins*, L. R. 11 Eq. 74.

<sup>6</sup> *Gaves v. Hickson*, 30 Beav. 136.

that articles of plate, which passes by delivery, and stocks and bonds, payable to the bearer, with coupons to be cut off for the interest, should be deposited at a responsible banker's.<sup>1</sup>

§ 443. A trustee may deposit money temporarily in some responsible bank or banking-house;<sup>2</sup> but he will be liable for the money in case of a failure of the bank, or for its depreciation if he deposits it to his *own credit*, and not to the separate account of the trust estate.<sup>3</sup> So if he allows another person to draw upon the fund and misapply the money;<sup>4</sup> so if he deposits the money in such manner that it is not under his own exclusive control, as where money is deposited in bank so that it cannot be drawn without the concurrence of other persons, the trustee will be liable for the failure of the bank, on the principle that it is the duty of the trustee to withdraw the money from the bank upon the slightest indication of danger or loss, and he cannot perform this duty promptly if he is clogged by the necessity of procuring the concurrent action of other persons.<sup>5</sup> So he will be liable if he keeps money in bank an unreasonable length of time, or where it is his duty to invest the fund in safe securities,<sup>6</sup> or to pay it over to newly appointed

<sup>1</sup> *Mendes v. Guedalla*, 2 John. & H. 259.

<sup>2</sup> *Routh v. Howell*, 3 Ves. 565; *Jones v. Lewis*, 2 Ves. 241; *Adams v. Claxton*, 6 Ves. 226; *Ex parte Belchier*, Amb. 219; *Att'y-Gén. v. Randall*, 21 Vin. Ab. 534; *Massey v. Banner*, 1 J. & W. 248; *Horsley v. Chaloner*, 2 Ves. 85; *France v. Woods*, Taml. 172; *Dorchester v. Effingham*, Taml. 279; *Fremer v. Woods*, Taml. 172; *Wilks v. Groome*, 3 Dr. 584; *Johnston v. Newton*, 11 Hare, 160; *Swinfen v. Swinfen*, 29 Beav. 211.

<sup>3</sup> *Wren v. Kirton*, 11 Ves. 377; *Fletcher v. Walker*, 3 Mad. 73; *Macdonnell v. Harding*, 7 Sim. 178; *Mathews v. Brice*, 6 Beav. 239; *Massey v. Banner*, 1 J. & W. 241; see remarks on this case in *Pennell v. Deffell*, 4 De G., M. & G. 386, 392; *School Dis. Greenfield v. First National Bank*, 102 Mass. 174; *Mason v. Whitehorn*, 2 Cold. 242.

<sup>4</sup> *Ingle v. Partridge*, 32 Beav. 661; 34 Beav. 411.

<sup>5</sup> *Salway v. Salway*, *alias* *White v. Baugh*, 2 R. & M. 215; 9 Bligh, 181; 3 Cl. & Fin. 44; overruling same case, 4 Russ. 60.

<sup>6</sup> *Moyle v. Moyle*, 2 R. & M. 710; *Johnston v. Newton*, 11 Hare, 169.

trustees,<sup>1</sup> or into court ;<sup>2</sup> or, if having no occasion to keep a balance on hand for the purposes of the trust, he lends the money to the bank on interest upon personal security, that being a security not sanctioned by the court.<sup>3</sup>

§ 444. Trustees may leave money in the custody of third persons when it is necessary in the course of business, as where money is left in the hands of an auctioneer as agent of both parties on a sale or purchase ;<sup>4</sup> and during the negotiation of an investment, the trustees may buy exchequer bills ;<sup>5</sup> but if they leave the exchequer bills undistinguished in the hands of a banker or broker, they will be liable for the loss of the money.<sup>6</sup> But if trustees deposit money in bank to their own credit ;<sup>7</sup> or if they leave it for an unreasonable time, as a year after the testator's death and after all debts and legacies are paid ;<sup>8</sup> or if they place their papers and receipts in the hands of their solicitor, so that he can receive their money and misapply it ;<sup>9</sup> or if the money is so paid into bank that it may be drawn out upon the check of one trustee and misapplied ;<sup>10</sup> or if they neglect to sell property when it ought to have been sold,<sup>11</sup> or suffer money to remain upon personal security,<sup>12</sup> or upon an unauthorized security ;<sup>13</sup> or if the money is left improperly or unadvisedly in the hands of a coexecutor or cotrustee, so that he has an oppor-

<sup>1</sup> *Lunham v. Blundell*, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Wilkinson v. Bewick*, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1010.

<sup>3</sup> *Darke v. Martyn*, 1 Beav. 525.

<sup>4</sup> *Edmonds v. Peake*, 7 Beav. 239.

<sup>5</sup> *Mathews v. Brice*, 6 Beav. 239.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Massey v. Banner*, 1 J. & W. 241; *Wren v. Kirtton*, 11 Ves. 377; *Mason v. Whitehorn*, 2 Cold. 242.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> *Ghost v. Waller*, 9 Beav. 497; *Rowland v. Witherden*, 3 Mac. & G. 568.

<sup>10</sup> *Clough v. Bond*, 3 M. & Cr. 490; *Clough v. Dixon*, 8 Sim. 594.

<sup>11</sup> *Phillips v. Phillips*, Freem. Ch. 11.

<sup>12</sup> *Powell v. Evans*, 5 Ves. 839; *Tebbs v. Carpenter*, 1 Mad. 290.

<sup>13</sup> *Hancom v. Allen*, 2 Dick. 498 and n.; *Howe v. Dartmouth*, 7 Ves. 137.



tunity to misapply it,—all the trustees will be responsible for any loss that may occur to the trust fund.<sup>1</sup> So trustees are liable for the attorneys and solicitors whom they employ, as where they employ a solicitor to examine the title to a proposed mortgage, and they are misled by him in such manner that a loss occurs to the estate, they are liable to make it good.<sup>2</sup>

§ 445. In one case it was said, that an executor would not be liable if he had placed money in bank under the control of a coexecutor. The money was entered on joint account, but the individual checks of the coexecutors could draw it out. This was held to be the ordinary and reasonable course of business.<sup>3</sup> If, however, there is any fraud, collusion, or wilful default, or gross neglect, or if the executor has any reason to interfere, and does not put a stop to the mismanagement of his coexecutor, he will be held liable.<sup>4</sup> The case of *Kilbee v. Sneyd*, however, is so doubtful on this point, and contrary to authority, that it would be unsafe to act upon it.<sup>5</sup>

§ 446. Trustees and executors have a reasonable time to wind up a testator's estate, and make investments; and they may, without responsibility, keep the money in a reliable bank for one year after the death of the testator;<sup>6</sup> but if they draw the money out of bank, and make any irregular investment, or lend it to another bank on interest, they will be responsible for the loss of the money, even if the will directs that the trustees

<sup>1</sup> *Langford v. Gascoyne*, 11 Ves. 333; *Shipbrook v. Hinchinbrook*, 11 Ves. 252; 16 Ves. 477; *Underwood v. Stevens*, 2 Mer. 712; *Hardy v. Metropolitan Land Co.* L. R. 7 Ch. 429.

<sup>2</sup> *Hagood v. Perkins*, L. R. 11 Eq. 74; *Bostock v. Floyer*, L. R. 1 Eq. 26.

<sup>3</sup> *Kilbee v. Sneyd*, 2 Moll. 186.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* 203, 213.

<sup>5</sup> *Clough v. Dixon*, 8 Sim. 594; 3 M. & C. 490; *Gibbons v. Taylor*, 22 Beav. 344; *Ingle v. Partridge*, 32 Beav. 661; 34 Beav. 411.

<sup>6</sup> *Johnston v. Newton*, 11 Hare, 160; *Swinfen v. Swinfen*, 29 Beav. 211; *Wilkes v. Groom*, 3 Dr. 584.

shall not be responsible for losses by a banker; the construction of such direction being that the trustees shall not be liable for loss of money deposited with a banker in the ordinary manner.<sup>1</sup>

§ 447. The trustee must not mingle the trust fund with his own. If he does, the *cestui que trust* may follow the trust property, and claim every part of the blended property which the trustee cannot identify as his own.<sup>2</sup>

§ 448. There may be express trusts for conversion; that is, to sell the trust fund, as it exists at the time of the testator's decease, and convert the same into some other kind of property or investment; and there may be an express trust to allow the *cestuis que trust* the use and enjoyment of the *specific* property devised. Both of these forms of trust must be strictly executed, and generally no question arises upon them. But a question sometimes arises from the situation and character of the property, and the relations of the *cestuis que trust* to it, whether the trustee is to convert the property into another form, or allow the *cestuis que trust* to enjoy it *in specie*: that is, the court is left to infer or imply, from the construction of the instrument, the character of the property and the relations of the *cestuis que trust*, whether it was the intention of the testator that the property should be converted, or whether the beneficiaries should take the use of it specifically, according to the terms in which it is given. All such cases must be determined by their own facts and the construction of the instrument under which the trust exists.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Rehden v. Wesley, 29 Beav. 213.

<sup>2</sup> Lupton v. White, 15 Ves. 432, 440; Chedworth v. Edwards, 8 Ves. 46; White v. Lincoln, 8 Ves. 363; Fellowes v. Mitchell, 1 P. Wms. 83; Gray v. Haig, 20 Beav. 219; Leeds v. Amherst, 20 Beav. 239; Mason v. Morly, 34 Beav. 471, 475; Cook v. Addison, L. R. 7 Eq. 470.

<sup>3</sup> Hidden v. Hidden, 103 Mass. 59.

§ 449. The general rule is, that where the testator gives his personal property, or the residue of his personal property, or the interest of his personal property,<sup>1</sup> in trust, or directly to several persons in succession;<sup>2</sup> and the property is of such a nature that it grows less valuable by time, as where it is leaseholds or annuities; or where the property is wasted or consumed in the use of it,—the court implies an intention that such property shall be converted into a fixed and permanent form, so that the beneficiaries may take the use and income of it in succession. Accordingly, in England, such property is converted into the investments allowed by law; and in the United States it must be converted into safe investments, according to the rules in force in the State where the trust is to be administered; and if the trustees fail to do so in a reasonable time, they will be guilty of a breach of trust.<sup>3</sup>

§ 450. The court presumes an intention that perishable property shall be converted, where several persons are to enjoy it in succession; not so much from the actual fact of such an intention, as from its being a convenient means of adjusting the rights of those who are to enjoy the property in succession.<sup>4</sup> This presumption is made, unless a contrary intention is indicated upon the face of the will. The later authorities give effect to slighter indications than the older cases.<sup>5</sup> The object of the rule is to

<sup>1</sup> *Howe v. Dartmouth*, 7 Ves. 137; *Cranch v. Cranch* (cited 7 Ves. 142, 147); *Litchfield v. Baker*, 2 Beav. 481; *Crowley v. Crowley*, 7 Sim. 427; *Sutherland v. Cook*, 1 Coll. 498; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 2 Coll. 441; *Fearn v. Young*, 9 Ves. 549; *Benn v. Dixon*, 10 Sim. 636; *Oakes v. Strachey*, 13 Sim. 414.

<sup>2</sup> *House v. Way*, 12 Jur. 959.

<sup>3</sup> *Bate v. Hooper*, 5 De G., M. & G. 338; see *post*, Chap. XVIII.

<sup>4</sup> *Cape v. Bent*, 5 Hare, 35; *Pickering v. Pickering*, 4 M. & Cr. 303; *Hinves v. Hinves*, 2 Hare, 611; *Prendergast v. Prendergast*, 3 H. L. Ca. 195; see *Cotton v. Cotton*, 14 Jur. 950.

<sup>5</sup> *Morgan v. Morgan*, 14 Beav. 82; *Craig v. Wheeler*, 29 L. J. Ch. 374; *Mackie v. Mackie*, 5 Hare, 77; *Wightwick v. Lord*, 6 H. L. Ca. 217; *Blann v. Bell*, 5 De G. & Sm. 658; 2 De G., M. & G. 775; *Burton v. Mount*, 2 De G. & Sm. 383; *Howe v. Howe*, 14 Jur. 359; 2 Spence, Eq. Jur. 42, 554.

secure a fair adjustment of the rights of all the *cestuis que trust* in succession; for if the property would greatly depreciate in value in the hands of the first taker, the remainder-man might fail to receive the benefit intended to be given to him; the court, therefore, orders the perishable property to be converted into a permanent fund, unless a contrary intention is indicated in the will. So if property, not liable to waste, but bearing a high rate of interest, and subject to great risks, is given to one person for life, and to another in remainder, the beneficiary in remainder may call for a conversion of the stocks or bonds into a less hazardous and more permanent investment, that their interests may be better protected;<sup>1</sup> but the court will not call in real securities without directing an inquiry whether it is necessary for the safety or benefit of all parties.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, the court applies the same principles to the protection of the first taker or tenant for life; and so if there are reversionary interests that may not fall in and become beneficial to the tenant for life, but may come into the possession of the remainder-man, the court may order the reversions to be sold, and the purchase-money to be invested, so that the tenant for life may have the income for life.<sup>3</sup> And if the trustees have a discretion as to the time of sale, which the court cannot control, and they sell when the reversion falls in, the court will give the tenant for life the difference between the actual price for which the reversion sold, and its estimated value one year after the testator's death.<sup>4</sup>

§ 451. On the other hand, an intention may be implied from the form or terms of the gift, that the property is to be enjoyed by the *cestuis que trust in specie*; as, if there is a *specific gift* of leaseholds or of stocks, the specific legatee will take the

<sup>1</sup> Thornton v. Ellis, 15 Beav. 193; Blann v. Bell, 5 De G. & Sm. 658; 2 De G., M. & G. 775; Wightwick v. Lord, 6 H. L. Ca. 217.

<sup>2</sup> Howe v. Dartmouth, 7 Ves. 150.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.; Fearn v. Young, 9 Ves. 549; Dimes v. Scott, 4 Russ. 200.

<sup>4</sup> Wilkinson v. Duncan, 23 Beav. 469.

rents and dividends of the specified property.<sup>1</sup> A general direction to pay rents to the tenant for life, after the mention of leaseholds, is a specific devise;<sup>2</sup> but it is still a matter of doubt upon the authorities, whether such a direction, unconnected with any mention of the leaseholds, is a specific devise or not.<sup>3</sup> A mere direction to pay dividends is not a specific devise of the stocks.<sup>4</sup> But a bequest of the "interest, dividends, or income of all moneys or stock, and of all other property yielding income at the testator's death," has been held to be specific, and the trustees could not convert.<sup>5</sup> If the devise is specific, the direction to vary the securities will not affect the rights of a specific legatee, for such direction is only for the protection of the trust fund.<sup>6</sup> A debt due to a testator is not devised specifically, although it is embraced in the residue of an estate specifically devised, as it is in no sense in the nature of an investment, and is therefore to be converted.<sup>7</sup> And if a testator use any expression implying that leaseholds or stocks or other property are not to be converted, as if he names a time for the sale of them, as at or after the death of

<sup>1</sup> *Vincent v. Newcombe*, Younge, 599; *Lord v. Godfrey*, 4 Mad. 455; *Pickering v. Pickering*, 4 M. & Cr. 299; *Hubbard v. Young*, 10 Beav. 205; *Harris v. Poyner*, 1 Dr. 181; *Mills v. Mills*, 7 Sim. 501; *Dunbar v. Woodcock*, 10 Leigh. 628; *Harrison v. Foster*, 9 Ala. 955; *Hale v. Burrodale*, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 461; *Bracken v. Beatty*, 1 Rep. in Ch. 110; *Evans v. Iglehart*, 6 G. & J. 171; *Alcock v. Sloper*, 2 M. & K. 702; *Pickering v. Pickering*, 2 Beav. 57.

<sup>2</sup> *Blann v. Bell*, 2 De G., M. & G. 775; *Crowe v. Crisford*, 17 Beav. 507; *Hood v. Clapham*, 19 Beav. 90; *Marshall v. Brenner*, 2 Sm. & Gif. 237; *Elmore's Trusts*, 6 Jur. (N. S.) 1325.

<sup>3</sup> *Goodenough v. Tremamondo*, 2 Beav. 512; *Hunt v. Scott*, 1 De G. & Sm. 219; *Wearing v. Wearing*, 23 Beav. 99; *Pickup v. Atkinson*, 4 Hare, 624; *Craig v. Wheeler*, 29 L. J. Ch. 374; *Vachell v. Roberts*, 32 Beav. 140; *Harvey v. Harvey*, 5 Beav. 134; *Att'y-Gen. v. Pitter*, 5 Beav. 164.

<sup>4</sup> *Neville v. Fortescue*, 16 Sim. 333; *Blann v. Bell*, 2 De G., M. & G. 775; *Sutherland v. Cooke*, 1 Coll. 503; *Hood v. Clapham*, 19 Beav. 90.

<sup>5</sup> *Boys v. Boys*, 28 Beav. 436.

<sup>6</sup> *Lord v. Godfrey*, 4 Mad. 455; *Llewellyn's Trusts*, 29 Beav. 171; *Morgan v. Morgan*, 14 Beav. 72.

<sup>7</sup> *Holgate v. Jennings*, 24 Beav. 630. There is some doubt upon the principles of this case.

the tenant for life, the trustees will have no power to convert the property until the time arrives.<sup>1</sup> But where a testator gave to his wife the whole of the interest arising from his property, both real and personal, during her life, and at her decease to be disposed of as therein directed, it was held that the trustees must convert, as there was no indication that she should enjoy any of the property *in specie*.<sup>2</sup>

§ 452. After a trustee has reduced the trust fund to possession, and has secured the proper custody, and after he has converted so much of the property as was necessary to sell for money, his next duty is to invest the proceeds. It is one of the most important of the duties of trustees to invest the trust fund in such manner that it shall be safe, and yield a reasonable rate of income to the *cestuis que trust*. If there are directions in the instrument of trust as to the time, manner, and kind of investment, the trustees must follow the direction and power so given them. In the absence of such directions and powers, the trustees must be governed by the general rules of the court, or by the statutes and laws of the State in which the trust is to be executed. If there are no directions in the instrument, nor rules of court, nor statutory provisions in relation to investments, they must be governed by a sound discretion and *good faith*.

<sup>1</sup> Collins v. Collins, 2 M. & K. 703; Vaughan v. Buck, 1 Phil. 78; Litchfield v. Baker, 13 Beav. 451; Harris v. Poyner, 1 Dr. 180; Chambers v. Chambers, 15 Sim. 190; Daniel v. Warren, 2 Y. & Col. Ch. 290; Rowe v. Rowe, 29 Beav. 276; Alcock v. Sloper, 2 M. & K. 699; Hind v. Selby, 22 Beav. 273; Bowden v. Bowden, 17 Sim. 65; Burton v. Mount, 2 De G. & Sm. 383; Skirving v. Williams, 24 Beav. 24; Hinves v. Hinves, 3 Hare, 609; Harvey v. Harvey, 5 Beav. 134; Bethune v. Kennedy, 1 M. & C. 114; Hunt v. Scott, 1 De G. & Sm. 219; Pickering v. Pickering, 2 Beav. 31; 4 M. & Cr. 289; Prendergast v. Prendergast, 3 H. L. Ca. 195; Hood v. Clapham, 19 Beav. 90; Neville v. Fortescue, 16 Sim. 333; Howe v. Howe, 14 Jur. 359.

<sup>2</sup> Benn v. Dixon, 1 Phil. 76; Thornton v. Ellis, 193; Morgan v. Morgan, 14 Beav. 92; Blann v. Bell, 2 De G., M. & G. 775; Hood v. Clapham, 19 Beav. 90; Litchfield v. Baker, 13 Beav. 481.

§ 453. There is one rule that is universally applicable to investments by trustees, and that rule is, that trustees cannot invest trust moneys in personal securities. If trustees have a discretion as to the kind of investments, it is not a sound discretion to invest in personal securities.<sup>1</sup> Lord Hardwicke said, that "a promissory note is evidence of a debt, but no security for it."<sup>2</sup> Baron Hothman observed that "lending on personal credit for the purpose of a larger interest was a species of gambling."<sup>3</sup> Lord Kenyon said, that "no rule was better established than that a trustee could not lend on mere personal security, and it *ought to be rung in the ears* of every one who acted in the character of trustee."<sup>4</sup> It makes no difference that there are several joint promisors;<sup>5</sup> nor that the loan is to a person to whom the testator loaned money on his personal promise;<sup>6</sup> nor will personal sureties justify the loan.<sup>7</sup> There must be express authority in the instrument of trust to authorize a loan on personal promises.<sup>8</sup> Loose, general expressions, leaving the

<sup>1</sup> Walker v. Symonds, 3 Swans. 62; Darke v. Martyn, 1 Beav. 525; Terry v. Terry, Pr. Ch. 273; Adye v. Feuillateau, 1 Cox, 24; Vigrass v. Binfield, 3 Mad. 62; Harden v. Parsons, 1 Ed. 149, note (a); Anon. Lofft, 492; Keble v. Thompson, 3 Bro. Ch. 112; Wilkes v. Steward, G. Coop. 6; Clough v. Bond, 3 M. & Cr. 496; Pocock v. Reddington, 5 Ves. 799; Collis v. Collis, 2 Sim. 365; Blackwood v. Borrowes, 2 Conn. & Laws. 477; Watts v. Girdleston, 6 Beav. 188; Graves v. Strahan, 8 De G., M. & G. 291; Fowler v. Reynal, 3 Mac. & G. 500; Smith v. Smith, 4 John. Ch. 281; Nyce's Est. 5 W. & S. 245; Swoyer's App. 5 Barr, 377; Willes's App. 22 Penn. St. 330; Gray v. Fox, Saxton, Ch. 259; Harding v. Larned, 4 Allen, 426; Clark v. Garfield, 8 Allen, 427; Moore v. Hamilton, 4 Flor. 112; Spear v. Spear, 9 Rich. Eq. 184; Barney v. Saunders, 16 How. 545, 546. But see Knowlton v. Brady, 17 N. H. 458.

<sup>2</sup> Walker v. Symonds, 3 Swans. 81, note (a), citing Ryder v. Bickerton

<sup>3</sup> Adye v. Feuillateau, 1 Cox, 25.

<sup>4</sup> Holmes v. Dring, 2 Cox, 1; Wynne v. Warren, 2 Heisk. 118; Dunn v. Dunn, 1 S. C. 350.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.; Clark v. Garfield, 8 Allen, 427.

<sup>6</sup> Styles v. Guy, 1 Mac. & G. 423.

<sup>7</sup> Watts v. Girdleston, 6 Beav. 188.

<sup>8</sup> Forbes v. Ross, 2 Bro. Ch. 430; 2 Cox, 113; Child v. Child, 20 Beav. 50.

nature of the investments to the trustees, will not justify such loans.<sup>1</sup> All the terms and conditions of a loan, to be made on personal security, must be strictly complied with ; as, if a loan is authorized to a husband, upon the written consent of the wife, such consent must be had in the required form ;<sup>2</sup> and a subsequent assent will not save the trustees from responsibility.<sup>3</sup> An authority to loan on personal security will not justify the trustees in lending to one of themselves ;<sup>4</sup> nor will it justify them in lending to a relation, for the purpose of accommodating him.<sup>5</sup>

§ 454. So, in the absence of express authority, the employment of trust funds in trade or speculation, or in a manufacturing establishment, will be a gross breach of trust.<sup>6</sup> However advantageous such an investment may appear, the trustee investing the funds in such undertakings will be compelled to make good all losses, and to account for and pay over all profits.<sup>7</sup> The law discourages all such use of trust funds, by rendering it certain that the trustee shall make no profit from such investments, and that he shall be responsible for all losses. And if a trustee stands by, and sees his cotrustee em-

<sup>1</sup> *Pocock v. Reddington*, 5 Ves. 799 ; *Wilkes v. Steward*, G. Coop. 6 ; *Mills v. Osborne*, 7 Sim. 30 ; *Wynne v. Warren*, 2 Heisk. 118.

<sup>2</sup> *Cocker v. Quayle*, 1 R. & M. 535 ; *Pickard v. Anderson*, L. R. 13 Eq. 608 ; *Forbes v. Ross*, 2 Brock. 430.

<sup>3</sup> *Bateman v. Davis*, 3 Mad. 98.

<sup>4</sup> *Forbes v. Ross*, 2 Bro. Ch. 430 ; 2 Cox, 113 ; ——— *v. Walker*, 5 Russ. 7 ; *Stickney v. Sewell*, 1 M. & Cr. 814 ; *Francis v. Francis*, 5 De G., M. & G. 108 ; *De Jarnette v. De Jarnette*, 41 Ala. 708.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* ; *Langston v. Ollivant*, G. Coop. 33 ; *Cock v. Goodfellow*, 10 Mod. 489 ; *Fitzgerald v. Pringle*, 2 Moll. 534.

<sup>6</sup> *Munch v. Cockerell*, 5 M. & Cr. 178 ; *Kyle v. Barnett*, 17 Ala. 306 ; *Fflagg v. Ely*, 1 Edm. (N. Y.) 206 ; *King v. Talbott*, 40 N. Y. 96 ; 50 Barb. 453.

<sup>7</sup> *French v. Hobson*, 9 Ves. 103 ; *Brown v. De Tastet*, Jac. 284 ; *Cook v. Collingridge*, Jac. 607 ; *Crawshay v. Collins*, 15 Ves. 218 ; 2 Russ. 325 ; *Featherstonhaw v. Fenwick*, 17 Ves. 298 ; *Docker v. Somes*, 2 M. & K. 655 ; *Wedderburn v. Wedderburn*, 2 Keen, 722 ; 4 M. & Cr. 41 ; *Martin v. Rayborn*, 42 Ala. 648.



ploy the funds in that manner, he will be equally liable.<sup>1</sup> The same rule applies if the trustees simply continue the trade or business of the testator.<sup>2</sup> It is their duty to close up the trade, withdraw the fund, and invest it in proper securities at the earliest convenient moment; and the same rule applies although the trustees may have been the business agents or partners of the testator.<sup>3</sup> Nor will a power "to place out at interest, or other way of improvement," authorize the employment of the money in a trading concern.<sup>4</sup> In one case the direction was to "employ" the money, and it was thought that it savored of trade, and might be employed in that manner;<sup>5</sup> but it would not be safe for trustees to rely upon that case as an authority, even if their trust instrument contains a similar direction. If the settlor authorize his trustees to continue the fund in a trading firm, it will be a breach of trust, if the trustees allow the fund to remain after a change in the firm as by the death or withdrawal of one of the partners.<sup>6</sup> If the trustees are directed to continue the testator's trade, they can invest none of his general assets in the business. They are confined to the fund already embarked in the trade.<sup>7</sup> If the trustees act in good faith in continuing the testator's business under such directions in a will, they will not be liable for any loss;<sup>8</sup> but they must act in good faith and without collusion or interested motives. So trustees are not bound to continue the capital in such trade, and they ought not to do so against their judgment.<sup>9</sup> But if all the *cestuis que trust* are *sui juris*,

<sup>1</sup> Booth v. Booth, 1 Beav. 125; *Ex parte* Heaton, Buck. 386.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*; Kirkman v. Booth, 11 Beav. 273. In some cases, an executor is bound to complete the contracts of the testator. Collinson v. Lister, 20 Beav. 356.

<sup>3</sup> Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, 2 Keen, 722; 4 M. & Cr. 41.

<sup>4</sup> Cock v. Goodfellow, 10 Mod. 489.

<sup>5</sup> Dickinson v. Player, C. P. Coop. 178 (1837, 1838).

<sup>6</sup> Cummins v. Cummins, 3 Jo. & Lat. 64; 8 Ir. Eq. 723.

<sup>7</sup> McNeill v. Apton, 4 De G., M. & G. 563; 17 Jur. 104.

<sup>8</sup> Paddon v. Richardson, 7 De G., M. & G. 563.

<sup>9</sup> Murray v. Glasse, 23 L. J. Ch. 124.

and capable of acting for themselves, and they desire an executor, administrator, or trustee to continue the business of the testator a few months, in order to preserve it for his son, and the executor acts in accordance with their request, and uses his best skill and judgment in the conduct of the trade, he will be allowed for the loss in his accounts.<sup>1</sup>

§ 455. In England, trustees cannot invest the trust fund in the stock or shares of any bank or private or trading corporation; for the capital depends upon the management of the directors, and is subject to losses.<sup>2</sup> It is apparent, that a manufacturing or trading corporation may lose its whole capital in the prosecution of its business strictly within the terms of its charter.<sup>3</sup> Lord Eldon said of bank stock, that "it is as safe, I trust and believe, as any government security; but it is not government security, and therefore this court does not lay out or leave property in bank stock, and what this court will decree it expects from trustees and executors."<sup>4</sup> By Lord St. Leonard's Act, 22 & 23 Vict. 35, trustees, not forbidden by the instrument of trust, are authorized to invest in bank of England or Ireland or East India stock. This act was held not to authorize an investment in these stocks of trust funds settled before the passage of the act.<sup>5</sup> By 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, the original act was made retrospective, and the courts of chancery were authorized to issue general orders,

<sup>1</sup> *Poole v. Munday*, 103 Mass. 174.

<sup>2</sup> *Haynes v. Redington*, 1 Jo. & Lat. 589; 7 Ir. Eq. 405; *Clough v. Bond*, 3 M. & Cr. 496; *Powell v. Cleaver*, 7 Ves. 142, n.

<sup>3</sup> *Trafford v. Boehm*, 3 Atk. 440; *Mills v. Mills*, 7 Sim. 501; *Hancom v. Allen*, 2 Dick. 499, n.; 7 Bro. P. C. 375; *Emelie v. Emelie*, 7 Bro. P. C. 259; *Peat v. Crane*, 2 Dick. 499, n.; *Clough v. Bond*, 3 My. & Cr. 496.

<sup>4</sup> *Howe v. Dartmouth*, 7 Ves. 150; *Band v. Fardell*, 7 De G., M. & G. 633; *King v. Talbott*, 40 N. Y. 86.

<sup>5</sup> *Re Miles's Will*, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 1266; *Dodson v. Sammel*, 6 Jur. (N. S.) 137; 1 Dr. & Sm. 575. The Vice-Chancellor held the other way in *Page v. Bennett*, 2 Gif. 117; *Simson's Trusts*, 1 John. & H. 89; *Mortimer v. Picton*, 4 De G., J. & S. 166, 179.

from time to time, as to the investment of funds subject to its jurisdiction, either in three per cent consolidated or reduced, or new bank annuities, or in such other stocks, funds, or securities as the court shall think fit; and trustees, having power to invest trust funds in government securities, or upon railway stocks, funds, or securities, may invest in the stocks, funds, or securities which may be designated by the general order of the court. In pursuance of the statute, a general order was issued in 1861, as follows: "Cash under the control of the court may be invested in bank stock, East India stock, exchequer bills, and £2 10s. annuities, and upon freehold and copyhold estates, respectively in England and Wales, as well as in consolidated £3 per cent annuities, reduced £3 per cent annuities, and new £3 per cent annuities." There are also provisions in the act by which trustees may apply to the court for leave to change their investments into those now allowed by the act and the court; but the act does not apply where the fund is settled specifically and there is no power of varying the securities.<sup>1</sup> Courts may give directions as to investments by trustees by decrees in particular suits, or by the promulgation of general orders or rules of court.<sup>2</sup> It is said that the public policy in England of compelling trustees to invest trust funds in government funds originated largely in the necessities of the government, and the public advantage of creating a market and demand for government securities.<sup>3</sup>

§ 456. The English rule, in relation to investments of trust funds in bank stock, and shares in trading and manufacturing corporations, prevails in New York and Pennsylvania.<sup>4</sup> It is

<sup>1</sup> Ward's Settlement, 2 John. & H. 191; *Ex parte* Great Northern Railw. Co. L. R. 9 Eq. 274; *In re* Wilkinson, L. R. 9 Eq. 343.

<sup>2</sup> *Wheeler v. Perry*, 18 N. H. 307.

<sup>3</sup> *Brown v. Wright*, 39 Ga. 96.

<sup>4</sup> *Ackerman v. Emott*, 4 Barb. 626; *Hemphill's App.* 18 Penn. St. 303; *Worrall's App.* 22 Penn. St. 44; *Morris v. Wallace*, 3 Barr, 319; *Nyce's Est.* 5 W. & S. 254.

agreed, that trustees cannot invest trust funds in trade, nor directly in manufacturing, nor in business generally, nor in personal securities, unless there is an authority contained in the instrument of trust. The reasoning is, that trustees cannot use the trust fund in carrying on a private manufacturing establishment, nor in the business of private bankers, nor in underwriting, nor in trade and commerce, and that there is no difference in principle between carrying on such enterprises themselves with the trust fund, or lending it to other individuals to do so on their personal security, and buying shares or stocks in such business corporations carried on by other private individuals, or by the trustees themselves, as officers or agents. Perhaps these are the only States in which the strict English rule is holden. In Massachusetts, it is held that trustees may invest in bank stocks, and in the shares of manufacturing and insurance corporations,<sup>1</sup> or in the notes of individuals secured by such stocks and shares as collateral security.<sup>2</sup> The court justifies this rule in an elaborate opinion, affirming that such stocks are subject to no greater fluctuations than government securities; that they are as safe as real securities, which may depreciate in value, or the title fail; that claims against such corporations can be enforced at law,<sup>3</sup> while government funds can only be enforced by supplicating the sovereign power; and that government securities have hitherto been so limited in amount that it was impossible for the trust funds of the country to be invested in that manner. The last reason no longer exists. There are

<sup>1</sup> *Harvard Coll. v. Amory*, 9 Pick. 446.

<sup>2</sup> *Lovell v. Minot*, 20 Pick. 116.

<sup>3</sup> It is said that loans by the city of Boston always command a higher premium in the market than the loans of the commonwealth. The difference in part is said to be that the city of Boston can be sued upon its contracts, and a judgment against it can be satisfied by seizing, upon an execution, any property of any citizen within the municipal limits, while no suit can be maintained against the State, but every thing depends upon the good faith and honor of the legislature in supplying the means of payment.

now national, state, county, town, and city bonds in sufficient amounts to absorb all trust funds seeking investment, and it is not to be denied that such investments are more permanent and safe. It may be admitted, that great public emergencies and national dangers have an unfavorable effect upon the value of public securities; but such emergencies and dangers have the same effect upon the stocks of private corporations. In addition to these depressing influences, the capital of such companies runs the risks and chances of trade, business, and speculation. Calamities that depress public credit seldom occur, while the risks of trade are constant. It would seem to be the wiser course to withdraw the funds, settled for the support of women, children, and other parties who cannot exercise an active discretion in the protection of their interests, as much as possible from the chances of business. It may be said, that settlors may always do this by directing in what manner the funds settled by them shall be invested. But it would seem to be wiser for the court to establish the safest rule in the absence of special directions, and leave it to the settlor, if he prefers, to direct a less safe investment.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A large number of cases have been adjudged in the late confederate States, involving the legality of investments by trustees in the bonds and securities of the confederacy. No new principles have been so established that it is necessary to alter the text; but for convenience the principal cases are noted in this place. Under § 34 of the act of Nov. 9, 1861, of Alabama, which authorized trustees to invest in confederate bonds, or to receive payment in confederate notes, it was held that trustees were justified in making such investments previous to the re-establishment of the authority of the United States. *Watson v. Stone*, 40 Ala. 451; *Dockey v. McDowell*, 41 Ala. 476. But a guardian was held liable to account for the cash in full, who received payment in confederate notes after the re-establishment of such authority. Where a trustee procured an *ex parte* order to invest in confederate bonds, he was held liable for the loss. *Snelling v. McCreary*, 14 Rich. Eq. 291. Where a trustee received payment of a debt due to the trust fund, in the currency in common use, and reinvested it in securities which became worthless by the result of the war, he was not held liable for the loss. *Campbell v. Miller*, 38 Ga. 304. To the same effect is *Brown v. Wright*, 39 Ga. 96, which contains an able statement of the policy of the

§ 457. The power to lend on mortgage was doubted or denied, until Lord St. Leonard's Act, unless there was an express power in the instrument of trust, or a decree of the court. Lord Harcourt, Lord Hardwicke, and Lord Alvanley appear to have thought that a trustee or executor might invest

English government in directing trust funds to be invested in public securities.

In Virginia, commissioners who collected money by order of the court in confederate notes, and held a balance subject to contested liens until it became worthless, were held not liable for the loss. *Davis v. Harman*, 21 Gratt. 200. And substantially the same rule was held in *Dixon v. McCue*, 21 Gratt. 374. In *Morgan v. Otey*, 21 Gratt. 619, it was held that payments should be made in the currency of the day. See *Kraken v. Shields*, 20 Gratt. 377. In *Walker v. Page*, 21 Gratt. 637, it was held that a sale of infant's lands for confederate money was valid at the time it was made, and that further development of events did not vitiate it. In *Myers v. Zetelle*, 21 Gratt. 733, it was held that an agent or trustee who in *good faith* sold property, and invested the proceeds in confederate securities, at a time when no other investments were open to him, was protected from loss. And see *Bird v. Bird*, 21 Gratt. 711; *Beery v. Irick*, 22 Gratt. 614; *Campbell v. Campbell*, 22 Gratt. 649.

In *State v. Simpson*, 65 N. C. 497, it was held that a guardian who collected in money which was well secured to his ward, and invested the same in confederate bonds, was guilty of *laches*, and was liable for the loss. See *Alexander v. Summey*, 66 N. C. 578. An agent or trustee is authorized to receive payment of debts in the currency received by prudent business men for similar purposes. *Baird v. Hall*, 67 N. C. 230. See *Wooten v. Sherrard*, 68 N. C. 334.

In *Creighton v. Pringle*, 3 S. C. 78, a trustee was held guilty of a breach of trust in investing in confederate bonds. *Cureton v. Watson*, 3 S. C. 451. But see *Hinton v. Kennedy*, 3 S. C. 459.

If a trustee, acting in *good faith*, receive funds in bank-notes which are depreciated, he will be protected if such notes were the only money attainable. *Barker v. McAuley*, 4 Heisk. 424.

When a trustee kept the identical money received by him, he was allowed to turn it over to the person entitled to receive it, without loss to himself; but if he has not kept it, he will be charged with the nominal sums collected by him. *Saunders v. Gregory*, 3 Heisk. 507.

In Texas, trustees could not receive confederate money in discharge of obligations to them. *Turner v. Turner*, 36 Tex. 41. And see *Scott v. Atchison*, 36 Tex. 76; *Kleberg v. Bond*, 31 Tex. 611; *Woods v. Toombs*, 36 Tex. 85; *Turpin v. Sanson*, 36 Tex. 142; *McGar v. Nixon*, 36 Tex. 289; *Lacey v. Clements*, 36 Tex. 661.

the money in *well secured real estates*.<sup>1</sup> But Lord Thurlow said, that in *latter* times the court had considered it improper to invest any part of a lunatic's estate upon private security.<sup>2</sup> Sir John Leach refused to allow an infant's money to be invested in that manner, and expressed surprise that any precedent could be found to the contrary.<sup>3</sup> In a late case, the trustees invested in mortgages at the request of the tenant for life, and to procure a higher rate of interest, and they were held liable for the loss; but the case did not go to the full extent of deciding that trustees could not invest on *real securities*, for the reason that they had consulted the interests of the tenant for life, at the expense of those of the remainder-man, but the court did not favor mortgages.<sup>4</sup> If trustees are directed to invest in public funds, of course they cannot invest in mortgages.<sup>5</sup> Previous to the acts before mentioned,<sup>6</sup> courts did not sanction mortgages;<sup>7</sup> but the practice is now relaxed, and a loan upon freeholds of inheritance to the extent of two-thirds of their value may be allowed.<sup>8</sup> But the rule of two-thirds is not inflexible. It may be improper to loan even two-thirds of the present value; as, where the value depends upon the chances of trade or business, and where the property consists of houses liable to deterioration.<sup>9</sup> So it may not be a breach

<sup>1</sup> *Brown v. Litton*, 1 P. Wms. 141; *Lyse v. Kingdon*, 1 Coll. 188; *Knight v. Plymouth*, 1 Dick. 126; *Pocock v. Redington*, 5 Ves. 800.

<sup>2</sup> *Ex parte Calthorpe*, 1 Cox, 182; *Ex parte Ellice*, Jac. 234.

<sup>3</sup> *Norbury v. Norbury*, 4 Mad. 191; *Widdowson v. Duck*, 2 Mer. 494; *Ex parte Fust*, 1 C. P. Coop. (t. Cott.) 157, n. (e); *Ex parte Franklyn*, 1 De G. & Sm. 531; *Ex parte Johnson*, 1 Moll. 128; *Ex parte Ridgway*, 1 Hog. 309.

<sup>4</sup> *Raby v. Ridehalgh*, 7 De G., M. & G. 108.

<sup>5</sup> *Pride v. Fooks*, 2 Beav. 430; *Waring v. Waring*, 3 Ir. Ch. 331.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, § 455.

<sup>7</sup> *Barry v. Marriott*, 2 De G. & Sm. 491; *Ex parte Franklyn*, 1 De G. & Sm. 531.

<sup>8</sup> *Stickney v. Sewell*, 1 M. & C. 8; *Norris v. Wright*, 14 Beav. 307; *Macleod v. Annesly*, 16 Beav. 600.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*; *Phillipson v. Gatty*, 7 Hare, 16; *Drosier v. Brereton*, 15 Beav. 221; *Stretton v. Ashmall*, 16 Beav. 600; 3 De G. 26; L. J. Ch. 277; *Far-rar v. Barraclough*, 2 Sm. & Gif. 231.

of trust under certain circumstances to loan more than two-thirds.<sup>1</sup> Trustees ought not to lend on a second mortgage, though it might not be a breach of trust in all cases to do so;<sup>2</sup> and so they ought to have a power of sale inserted in the deed, although it might not be a breach of trust to neglect it.<sup>3</sup>

§ 458. There can be no doubt that mortgages on real estate are considered proper investments in the United States, and perhaps they are the only investments which are not objectionable in some one of the States. In the absence of public funds to an amount hitherto sufficient to absorb the money to be invested by trustees, different rules have been established in the several States, but mortgages upon estates of inheritance, taken with proper caution as to the amount and the title, have been named in all the States as proper and safe investments; so that the question in the United States is whether the security is in fact, what it is called, security upon real estate. A loan to a company owning coal lands and a canal, to a much greater value than its debts, the interest on the loan being a preferred claim upon the income, was held to be substantially on real estate;<sup>4</sup> but an investment in the stock of a similar company, which stock was not preferred, was held to be a breach of trust.<sup>5</sup> An investment in railway bonds, secured by a mortgage of the road-bed, franchise, and other property, is not real security, though real estate is covered by the mortgage; for the method of enforcing such a bond is very different from the ordinary manner foreclosing a mortgage, and whether such a bond can be enforced at all depends upon

<sup>1</sup> *Jones v. Lewis*, 3 De G. & Sm. 471. This case was reversed on appeal. See Lewin on Trusts, 263 (5th ed.).

<sup>2</sup> *Norris v. Wright*, 14 Beav. 291; *Drosier v. Brereton*, 15 Beav. 221; *Robinson v. Robinson*, 11 Beav. 371; 1 De G., M. & G. 247; *Waring v. Waring*, 3 Ir. Eq. 337; *Lockhart v. Reilly*, 1 De G. & J. 476; *Nance v. Nance*, 1 S. C. 209.

<sup>3</sup> *Farrar v. Barraclough*, 2 Sm. & Gif. 231.

<sup>4</sup> *Twaddell's App.* 5 Barr, 15.

<sup>5</sup> *Worrell's App.* 9 Barr, 508.



the concurrent will of so many bondholders, that, at best, it is only nominal real estate.<sup>1</sup> London Dock stock and sewer bonds are not real security.<sup>2</sup> It is not a breach of trust to leave funds in turnpike bonds, secured by a mortgage of the tolls and real estate of the company, as they had been invested by the testator.<sup>3</sup> Under the right of the trustees to invest trust funds in real securities, they cannot convert the funds into real estate by taking the legal title absolutely to themselves in trust; and if they do so, the *cestui que trust* may elect to take the land, or the trust money and interest;<sup>4</sup> though a direction to invest in *productive real estate* was held to justify the purchase of dwelling-houses, or the purchase of a right of dower in order to render the property more productive.<sup>5</sup> If a testator has already invested in mortgages, a trustee may make such further advances of money as are necessary to secure the first investment. No general rule can be stated; but the trustee in such case must make a careful investigation and exercise a sound discretion, or his advances will not be allowed in case of a loss.<sup>6</sup> And so a guardian, in case of a grave emergency,

<sup>1</sup> *Mant v. Leith*, 15 Beav. 524; *Allen v. Gaillard*, 3 S. C. 279. It is not sufficient for a trustee to say, in defence of an investment, that it is on real security. There are other things to be considered, the nature of the property and other matters. The property, though sufficient, may be involved in litigation. *Per* Master of Rolls in *Mant v. Leith*.

<sup>2</sup> *Robinson v. Robinson*, 11 Beav. 371.

<sup>3</sup> *Robinson v. Robinson*, 21 L. J. Ch. 111; 1 De G., M. & G. 247; *Miller v. Proctor*, 20 Ohio St. 444.

<sup>4</sup> *Mathews v. Heyward*, 2 S. C. 239; *Ouseley v. Anstruther*, 10 Beav. 456; *Royer's App.* 11 Penn. St. 36; *Kaufman v. Crawford*, 9 W. & S. 131; *Bonsall's App.* 1 Rawle, 273; *Bellington's App.* 3 Rawle, 55; *Ringgold v. Ringgold*, 1 H. & G. 11; *Morton v. Adams*, 1 Strob. Eq. 72; *Heth v. Richmond, &c. Co.* 4 Grat. 482; *Eckford v. De Kay*, 8 Paige, 89; *Winchelsea v. Nordcliffe*, 1 Vern. 134. And if a mortgage is given back, the mortgagor, if he have notice of the misapplication of the trust fund, cannot enforce his mortgage until the fund has first been replaced. *Mathews v. Heyward*, 2 S. C. 239.

<sup>5</sup> *Parsons v. Winslow*, 16 Mass. 368.

<sup>6</sup> *Collinson v. Lister*, 20 Beav. 356.

may buy in land for the minor to save a certain loss;<sup>1</sup> so an administrator may buy in the land of a debtor to his estate to save the debt.<sup>2</sup> Such an investment is a mere temporary expedient, and is to be treated as personal estate.<sup>3</sup> The court may order an investment of accumulations, or of the principal fund temporarily in real estate, with a declaration that it shall continue personalty;<sup>4</sup> and so a court may order an investment in real estate generally, where no other way is pointed out in the trust instrument.<sup>5</sup> Where a trustee or guardian is obliged to take land subject to a mortgage, the trustee becomes personally liable to pay off the mortgage, to protect the interest of the *cestui que trust*. In such case, the guardian or trustee may have the possession of the estate or the management of the trust fund, in order to secure himself for the advancement so made.<sup>6</sup> But there must be an urgent necessity to justify such a proceeding. If a trustee is authorized to invest in real estate, stock, or securities, he cannot mortgage the trust fund in order to raise money to invest in such manner, nor invest in machinery for the use of the *cestui que trust*.<sup>7</sup> In all cases the trustee ought to exercise high diligence in ascertaining the valuation, situation, condition, and productiveness of the real estate or other property upon which it is proposed to make a loan of the trust money; for he will be liable for the loss if he is guilty of any negligence in this respect.<sup>8</sup>

§ 459. In a few States, there are statutes authorizing trustees to invest in a particular manner, and excusing them from responsibility if their investments are made in good faith in the

<sup>1</sup> Bonsall's App. 1 Rawle, 273; Royer's App. 11 Penn. St. 36.

<sup>2</sup> Bellington's App. 3 Rawle, 55.

<sup>3</sup> Oeslager v. Fisher, 2 Penn. St. 467.

<sup>4</sup> Webb v. Shaftesbury, 6 Mad. 100.

<sup>5</sup> *Ex parte Calmes*, 1 Hill, Eq. 112.

<sup>6</sup> Woodward's App. 38 Penn. St. 322.

<sup>7</sup> Rider v. Sisson, 7 R. I. 341.

<sup>8</sup> Budge v. Gummon, L. R. 7 Ch. 721.

prescribed securities. Thus in Pennsylvania,<sup>1</sup> an executor, guardian, or trustee, may apply to the Orphans' Court, and the court may direct an investment in the stocks or public debt of the United States, of the State, or of the city of Philadelphia, or in real securities, or in the stock of the incorporated districts of Philadelphia County, of Pittsburg and Alleghany, and the water-works of Kensington, Philadelphia County. But it has been held that trustees are not confined to these funds; that the acts are for their benefit; that they can elect other kinds of investment, but will be responsible for losses.<sup>2</sup> In New York, there does not appear to be any legislation on the subject; but trustees are bound by the rules of the court to invest in real securities, or government bonds, or in the State loan, or in loans of the New York Life Insurance and Trust Company.<sup>3</sup> In New Jersey, a statute authorized an investment to be made upon an application to the court, but does not establish any particular funds. In *Gray v. Fox*, the court lay down the rule that investments must be made in government stocks, or in real security.<sup>4</sup> In Maryland, there is neither statute nor rule of court to guide the trustees. The courts do not approve of changes in investments, unless express power is given in the instrument of trust, as where a testator gave certain stocks in trust without direction to vary the security, and the trustee disposed of the stocks, and invested the money in other securities, he was ordered to replace the entire sum in the same stocks, although the number of shares were increased by the change.<sup>5</sup> In Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont,

<sup>1</sup> Acts 1832, 1838, 1850, 1852.

<sup>2</sup> *Barton's Est.* 1 Pars. Eq. 24; *Worrell's App.* 9 Barr, 108; *Twaddell's App.* 5 Barr, 15.

<sup>3</sup> *Ackerman v. Emott*, 4 Barb. 626; and see *Smith v. Smith*, 4 John. Ch. 281, 445; *King v. Talbott*, 40 N. Y. 86, 97. This case contains a full discussion of the law in New York.

<sup>4</sup> *Gray v. Fox*, Saxton, 259; *Lathrop v. Smalley*, 23 N. J. Eq. 192; *Corliss v. Corliss*, 23 N. J. Eq. 192.

<sup>5</sup> *Murray v. Feinour*, 2 Md. Ch. 418; *Evans v. Iglehart*, 6 Gill & J. 192; *Gray v. Lynch*, 8 Gill, 405; *Hammond v. Hammond*, 2 Bland, 806.

Michigan, and Missouri, the courts may, upon application, direct trustees as to the manner of investment, but no special investments are pointed out.<sup>1</sup> If trustees invest according to the direction of the courts, they are not responsible for any loss. In Georgia, if trustees invest in the stocks, bonds, or other securities, issued by their own State, or in such other securities as shall be ordered by the court, they will be exempt from loss.<sup>2</sup> In Mississippi, an investment in bank stocks is allowed.<sup>3</sup> In States where there are no statutes nor rules of court regulating investments, trustees are bound to act in good faith and with a sound discretion in investing trust money; and if they so act they are not responsible for any loss that may happen,<sup>4</sup> but to invest in mere personal securities is not a sound discretion anywhere.<sup>5</sup> Nor is it a sound discretion for trustees to subscribe trust funds to new enterprises, as for the stock of new manufacturing, insurance, or railroad corporations, when the undertaking must, in the nature of things, be experimental; and it will not excuse the trustee that he subscribes his own money to such enterprises, as it is permitted to him to speculate with his own money if he sees fit.<sup>6</sup>

§ 460. The instrument of trust frequently contains directions respecting the investment of the trust funds. If the directions are so general that they do not point to any particu-

<sup>1</sup> Knowlton v. Brady, 17 N. H. 458. It is impossible to cite the statutes of all the States. Practising attorneys will of course know the legislation of their own States.

<sup>2</sup> Ga. Rev. Code, § 320; Brown v. Wright, 39 Ga. 96.

<sup>3</sup> Smyth v. Burns, 25 Miss. 422. These rules and regulations are established for the protection of trustees: so long as they in good faith confine their investments to those allowed by law, they are protected from loss. Stanley's App. 8 Penn. St. 432; Twaddell's App. 9 Penn. St. 108; Seidler's Est. 5 Phila. 85; Barton's Est. 1 Pars. Eq. 24; Johnson's App. 43 Penn. St. 431; Morris v. Wallace, 3 Penn. St. 319; McCahan's App. 7 Penn. St. 56; Nyce's Est. 5 W. & S. 254; Hemphill's App. 18 Penn. St. 303; Rush's Est. 12 Penn. St. 378.

<sup>4</sup> Clark v. Garfield, 8 Allen, 427.

<sup>5</sup> Ante, § 453.

<sup>6</sup> Kimball v. Reading, 31 N. H. 352; Ihmsen's App. 43 Penn. St. 471.

lar class or classes of investments, the trustees must invest in those securities that are sanctioned by the court; as, if the trust is to invest in "good and sufficient security," the court will sanction no security not allowed by its rules and orders.<sup>1</sup> If the trustee is to invest at his "discretion," he cannot invest in personal securities.<sup>2</sup> The powers and directions given in the instrument must be strictly followed;<sup>3</sup> thus a power to invest in bank stocks or lots of land, will not authorize an investment in the loan of the United States.<sup>4</sup> A power to loan on *real securities* does not justify a loan upon railroad bonds secured by mortgage of the road;<sup>5</sup> nor does a power to loan upon mortgage authorize an investment in railroad mortgage bonds.<sup>6</sup> A power to invest in "good and sufficient securities in Virginia and Maryland," authorizes a loan upon town securities.<sup>7</sup> A direction to invest in "any public stocks or securities bearing an interest," embraces a coal and navigation company, that being within the popular meaning of the testator.<sup>8</sup> If there is a direction to invest trust funds in real securities in a foreign jurisdiction, the court will allow the investment;<sup>9</sup> but

<sup>1</sup> Booth v. Booth, 1 Beav. 125; Trafford v. Boehm, 3 Atk. 440; De Manneville v. Crompton, 1 V. & B. 259; Wilkes v. Steward, Coop. 6; Ryder v. Bickerton, 3 Swans. 80 n; Nance v. Nance, 1 S. C. 209; Womack v. Austin, 1 S. C. 421.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.; Pocock v. Reddington, 5 Ves. 794; Wormley v. Wormley, 8 Wheat. 421; 1 Brock. 339; Langston v. Ollivant, Coop. 33.

<sup>3</sup> Wood v. Wood, 5 Paige, 596; Burrill v. Sheil, 2 Barb. 457; Womack v. Austin, 1 S. C. 421; Sanders v. Rogers, 1 S. C. 452; Ihmsen's App. 43 Penn. St. 471.

<sup>4</sup> Banister v. McKenzie, 6 Munf. 447.

<sup>5</sup> Mortimore v. Mortimore, 4 De G. & J. 472; Mant v. Leith, 15 Beav. 525; Harris v. Harris, 29 Beav. 107; King v. Talbott, 50 Barb. 453; 40 N. Y. 86; Allen v. Gaillard, 1 S. C. 279; Bromley v. Kelly, 39 L. J. Ch. 274.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> McCall v. Peachy, 3 Munf. 288. But if such securities are greatly depreciated, it would be a breach of trust to invest in them. Trustees, &c. v. Clay, 2 B. Mon. 386.

<sup>8</sup> Rush's Est. 12 Penn. St. 375. See Hemphill's App. 18 Penn. St. 303.

<sup>9</sup> Burrill v. Sheil, 2 Barb. S. C. 457.

if no such power is given, such investment will not be allowed.<sup>1</sup> Where trustees were authorized in their discretion to invest in a dwelling-house for the daughter of the testator, and she was married and went to reside in a foreign jurisdiction, it was held, that they might invest in a dwelling-house at the place of her residence, although it was in a foreign jurisdiction.<sup>2</sup> But where they were authorized to invest in bonds, debentures, or other securities, or the stocks or funds of any colony or foreign country, they were not allowed to invest in railway bonds, though guaranteed by a foreign government.<sup>3</sup> As before stated, all these powers are strictly construed; as if the trustees are authorized to loan £3000 on personal securities, and they lend £5000, it is a breach of trust;<sup>4</sup> and if the power is to loan on bond, they cannot loan on a promissory note.<sup>5</sup> If the trustees may loan the trust fund to the husband, with the consent of the wife, they cannot allow the loan to continue if the husband becomes bankrupt; and they will be guilty of a breach of trust, if they do not use due diligence in calling in the loan, or in collecting such dividends as may be coming. An entire change of circumstances may change their duty, although the wife may still desire that her husband should have the use of the money.<sup>6</sup> Generally, where the trustees are required to invest the fund in a particular manner, with the approbation of any person, such requirement becomes imperative upon the request of such person.<sup>7</sup> So if any formalities are prescribed as to the investment, they must be strictly complied with; as where the written consent of a wife is a prerequisite to a loan to her husband, a verbal consent will not relieve the trustees

<sup>1</sup> Rush's App. 12 Penn. St. 375.

<sup>2</sup> *Amory v. Green*, 13 Allen, 413.

<sup>3</sup> *In re Langdale's Settlement, Trust*, L. R. 10 Eq. 39.

<sup>4</sup> *Payne v. Collier*, 1 Ves. Jr. 170.

<sup>5</sup> *Greenwood v. Wakeford*, 1 Beav. 576.

<sup>6</sup> *Wiles v. Gresham*, 2 Drew. 258; 24 L. J. Ch. 264; *Langston v. Ollivant*, Coop. 33; and see *Boss v. Goodsall*, 1 N. C. C. 617; *Burt v. Ingram*, *Lewin on Trusts*, 339 (4th ed.).

<sup>7</sup> *Cadogan v. Essex*, 2 Dr. 227; *McIntire v. Zanesville*, 17 Ohio St. 352.

from the consequences of a breach of trust, if they act on such verbal consent.<sup>1</sup> A subsequent consent is not sufficient where a previous consent was contemplated;<sup>2</sup> nor is it enough for a wife to join the husband in a petition for an order that a loan be made to him.<sup>3</sup> If the trustees go beyond the prescribed limits, neither good faith nor care nor diligence, if they can accompany a departure from the direction of the instrument of trust, will protect them if a loss occurs.<sup>4</sup> If it is impossible for them to invest according to the directions, they must invest in the securities prescribed by the law or by the court, or in the safest class of securities.<sup>5</sup>

§ 461. A direction to invest in good freehold security must be strictly complied with;<sup>6</sup> an authority to invest in ground rents authorizes an investment in redeemable ground rents, that being the kind of ground rent in the place where the investment is to be made;<sup>7</sup> a power to invest in good private security does not authorize the trustees to use the funds themselves.<sup>8</sup> Where stock is settled on a husband and wife for life, with remainder to the children, with a power to vary the securities for greater interest, the trustees cannot purchase an annuity for one of the tenants for life.<sup>9</sup> If, however, the existing securities are unsafe, and it is proper to call in the money and reinvest it, trustees may make a temporary investment in safe funds until an investment can be advantageously made in

<sup>1</sup> *Cocker v. Quayle*, 1 R. & M. 535; *Hopkins v. Myall*, 2 R. & M. 86; *Kellaway v. Johnson*, 5 Beav. 319.

<sup>2</sup> *Bateman v. Davis*, 3 Mad. 98; *Adams v. Broke*, 1 N. C. C. 627.

<sup>3</sup> *Norris v. Norris*, 14 Beav. 291; *Fitzgerald v. Pringle*, 2 Moll. 534; *Dunne v. Dunne*, 1 S. C. 350.

<sup>4</sup> *Ackerman v. Emott*, 4 Barb. 626.

<sup>5</sup> *McIntire v. Zanesville*, 17 Ohio, 352.

<sup>6</sup> *Wyatt v. Wallace*, 8 Jur. 117; 1 Coop. 155 n.

<sup>7</sup> *Ex parte Huff*, 2 Barr, 227.

<sup>8</sup> *Westover v. Chapman*, 1 Coll. 177; *Forbes v. Ross*, 2 Bro. Ch. 430; 2 Cox, 113; *ante*, § 453.

<sup>9</sup> *Fitzgerald v. Pringle*, 2 Moll. 534.

the securities directed by the testator.<sup>1</sup> If the direction is to invest in land or any other security, it will be implied that the settlor intended the investment to be made in land if it could be done advantageously, and the alternative part of the direction is to be followed only in case an investment cannot be made in land; and this construction will be followed unless there is some other controlling consideration in the instrument.<sup>2</sup> And if trustees are authorized to lend on mortgage to *three persons*, they cannot lend to *two* of them, although they get the entire interest in the estate; nor can they lend to the *three* without the mortgage at the time, although they get the security in two years after. It is no excuse to say that the delay did not occasion the loss. The conclusive answer is, that they committed a breach of trust in not obeying the power, and they must make good the loss.<sup>2</sup> And so trustees cannot let money on a mortgage to one of themselves.<sup>3</sup> Under a power to loan on mortgage they may continue existing mortgages, if safe.<sup>4</sup>

§ 462. A trustee must invest the trust funds in his hands, in the manner directed, within a *reasonable time*, although no direction is given in the deed or will as to the time or manner of investment. If he neglects for an unreasonable time to make the investment, he may be charged with interest; and if any loss or damage occurs to the *cestui que trust* from the delay, the trustee must make it up.<sup>5</sup> What is a reasonable time depends

<sup>1</sup> *Sowerby v. Clayton*, 3 Hare, 430; 8 Jur. 597; *Mathews v. Brice*, 6 Beav. 329; *Ex parte Chaplin*, 3 Y. & C. 397; *Knott v. Cottee*, 6 Beav. 77; *Bromley v. Kelly*, 39 L. J. Ch. 272.

<sup>2</sup> *Earlom v. Saunders*, Amb. 340; *Cookson v. Reay*, 5 Beav. 32; *Cowley v. Hartstonge*, 1 Dow, 361; *Hereford v. Ravenhill*, 5 Beav. 51; *Fowler v. Reynal*, 3 Mac. & G. 500; 2 De G. & Sm. 749.

<sup>3</sup> *Stickney v. Sewell*, 1 M. & Cr. 8; ——— *v. Walker*, 5 Russ. 7; *Fletcher v. Green*, 33 Beav. 426; *Francis v. Francis*, 5 De G., M. & G. 108; *Crosskill v. Bower*, 32 Beav. 86; *De Jarnette v. De Jarnette*, 41 Ala. 708.

<sup>4</sup> *Angerstein v. Martin*, T. & R. 239; *Ames v. Parkinson*, 7 Beav. 379.

<sup>5</sup> *Lyse v. Kingdom*, 1 Coll. 184; *Bates v. Scales*, 12 Ves. 402; *Ryder*



upon circumstances. When the trustees were directed to invest in the purchase of land with *all convenient speed*, a year was held to be a reasonable time.<sup>1</sup> But where the trustees are directed to invest in *freehold securities*, they will not be charged with interest until it has been shown that they could have invested according to the direction; for it is not always practicable to procure such securities.<sup>2</sup> So a year from the testator's death was considered a reasonable time within which to make an investment in United States stock.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the Supreme Court of the United States allowed three months as a reasonable time within which to invest capital sums of a trust fund paid in to a banker, and charged the trustee for the sum lost by the failure of the banker after that time.<sup>4</sup> In other cases, six months have been allowed as a reasonable time within which to invest trust funds; and trustees have been charged with interest when they kept the money uninvested for a longer time.<sup>5</sup> But where the trustees make no effort to invest the money, they may be charged with interest from a period earlier than six months.<sup>6</sup> Where a trustee or executor is directed to invest a legacy *immediately in stock*, and he retains the sum for the period of one year or more, or for an unreasonable time, and

*v. Bickerton*, 3 Swans. 80; *Trafford v. Boehm*, 3 Atk. 440; *Lomax v. Pendleton*, 3 Call, 538; *Garniss v. Gardner*, 1 Edw. Ch. 128; *Schieffelin v. Stewart*, 1 John. Ch. 620; *Chase v. Lockerman*, 11 G. & J. 185; *Armstrong v. Miller*, 6 Ham. 118; *Handly v. Snodgrass*, 9 Leigh, 484; *Aston's Est.* 5 Whart. 228; *In re Thorp, Davies*, 290; *Shipp v. Hettrick*, 63 N. C. 329; *Owen v. Peebles*, 42 Ala. 338.

<sup>1</sup> *Parry v. Warrington*, 6 Mad. 155; *Johnson v. Newton*, 11 Hare, 160.

<sup>2</sup> *Wyatt v. Wallis*, 1 Coop. 154 n.; 8 Jur. 117.

<sup>3</sup> *Cogswell v. Cogswell*, 2 Edw. Ch. 231. This was in analogy to the payment of legacies, which may be done in one year; a trustee with ready money ought to invest with more promptness.

<sup>4</sup> *Barney v. Saunders*, 16 How. 543.

<sup>5</sup> *Dunscomb v. Dunscomb*, 1 John. Ch. 508; *Manning v. Manning*, 1 John. Ch. 527; *Merrick's Est.* 2 Ash. 485; *Warrell's App.* 23 Penn. St. 44; *Armstrong v. Walkup*, 12 Grat. 608; *Hooper v. Savage*, 1 Munf. 119; *Frey v. Frey*, 2 C. E. Green, 72.

<sup>6</sup> *Ringgold v. Ringgold*, 1 H. & G. 11.

the price of the stock rises, he will be ordered to purchase as much stock as could have been purchased at the time the fund ought to have been invested.<sup>1</sup> Where trustees were directed to invest in the funds, and they paid the money into a banker's with directions to invest in bank annuities, which the bankers neglected to do, and the trustees made no inquiry for five months, they were held, after the failure of the bankers, for the money or the stock at the option of the *cestui que trust*.<sup>2</sup> Trustees and guardians are held to a stricter rule in relation to investments than executors acting as trustees, for trustees and guardians generally take an estate ready to be invested; and trustees will be held to a stricter rule in relation to capital sums, than in relation to current income from interest, dividends, rents, and other smaller sums; thus in *Barney v. Saunders*,<sup>3</sup> before cited, three months were held a reasonable time within which trustees ought to have invested capital sums paid into the banker's, and they were held responsible for the loss of capital after that time by the failure of the bankers, while they were not held liable to replace small sums paid into the same banker's from the rents, interest, and dividends upon the same estate. An executor will not in general be charged with interest for not investing before the expiration of a year from the testator's death. A year is a reasonable time within which an executor may call in the testator's estate and pay off his liabilities; and it is necessary, during that time, that the executor should keep the money on hand. In most States, an executor is allowed that time by statute; and he is exempt from suit by creditors during that year. After that time, if an executor keeps money in his hands without any apparent reason, except for the purpose of using it, it becomes a breach of trust

<sup>1</sup> *Byrchall v. Bradford*, 6 Mad. 235; *Pride v. Fooks*, 2 Beav. 430; *Watts v. Girdlestone*, 6 Beav. 188; *Clough v. Bond*, 3 M. & Cr. 496; *Robinson v. Robinson*, 1 De G., M. & G. 256; *Phillipson v. Gatty*, 7 Hare, 516.

<sup>2</sup> *Challen v. Shippam*, 4 Hare, 555.

<sup>3</sup> *Barney v. Saunders*, 16 How. 545; *Lomax v. Pendleton*, 3 Call. 538.

or negligence; and the court may charge him with interest, or with the principal sum if lost.<sup>1</sup> So an executor will be charged with interest during the year, if he receives interest by loaning or using the money.<sup>2</sup>

§ 463. Trustees ought not to mix trust money with other moneys, and take a joint mortgage for the whole, for this would be to complicate the trust with the rights of strangers; nor should a mortgage in such case be taken in the name of a common trustee, for that would be a delegation of the rights of the trustee;<sup>3</sup> but where the trust fund was very small, it was held to be proper for a trustee to put some of his own money with it in order to loan it to the best advantage on a mortgage.<sup>4</sup> Trustees must personally see to it, that the security is forthcoming upon parting with the money; as, where they allowed their solicitors to receive the money upon representations that the mortgage was ready, and there was no mortgage, and the solicitors misapplied the money, the trustees were held to make up the loss.<sup>5</sup> When the money is paid in to a banker or broker for investment, the trustees must see that the investment is made at once, and the securities taken in the proper form, or they will be liable for any loss that may happen;<sup>6</sup> or where money

<sup>1</sup> *Forbes v. Ross*, 2 Cox, 115; *Flanagan v. Nolan*, 1 Moll. 85; *Moyle v. Moyle*, 2 R. & M. 710; *Johnston v. Newton*, 11 Hare, 160; *Hughes v. Empson*, 22 Beav. 181; *Johnston v. Prendergast*, 28 Beav. 480; *Williamson v. Williamson*, 6 Paige, 300; *Dillard v. Tomlinson*, 1 Munf. 183; *Carter v. Cutting*, 5 Munf. 224; *Minuse v. Cox*, 5 John. Ch. 441; *Cogswell v. Cogswell*, 2 Edw. Ch. 231.

<sup>2</sup> *Lund v. Lund*, 41 N. H. 359; *Stearns v. Brown*, 1 Pick. 530; *Wyman v. Hubbard*, 13 Mass. 232; *Griswold v. Chandler*, 5 N. H. 499; *Mathes v. Bennett*, 21 N. H. 199; *Wendell v. French*, 19 N. H. 205; *Chambers v. Kerns*, 6 Jones Eq. 280.

<sup>3</sup> *Lewin on Trusts*, 268.

<sup>4</sup> *Graves's App.* 50 Penn. St. 189.

<sup>5</sup> *Rowland v. Witherden*, 3 Mac. & G. 568; *Hanbury v. Kirkland*, 3 Sim. 265; *Broadhurst v. Balguy*, 1 N. & C. Ch. 16; *Ghost v. Waller*, 13 Beav. 336.

<sup>6</sup> *Challen v. Shippman*, 4 Hare, 555; *Byrne v. Norcott*, 13 Beav. 336.

is suffered to remain in the hands of third persons unnecessarily and a loss happens, the trustees must make it up.<sup>1</sup> So if the trustee pays the money into a bank in his own name, and not in the name of the trust, he will be responsible for the money in case of the failure of the bank.<sup>2</sup> But as between the trustee, his representatives, and the *cestui que trust*, the *cestui que trust* may follow the money into the hands of the banker. If it is a simple account, not complicated by mixture with deposits of the trustees's own moneys and withdrawals, it is a simple debt which the *cestui que trust* may claim to be held and applied to the trust; but the deposit of the trustee's own money, and the withdrawal of part by checks, will not defeat the right of the *cestui que trust*. The rule to be applied in such case is stated in *Pennell v. Deffell* as follows: the checks are to be applied to the earliest items of deposit, whether of the trust fund or of the trustee's own money, and such earliest items will be reduced *pro tanto*. If any thing of the trust fund remains in the hands of the banker under this rule, it will be applied to the purposes of the trust.<sup>3</sup> This is a rule for the protection of the *cestui que trust* in case of the failure or bankruptcy of the trustee. But it does not affect the general rule before stated, that where a trustee deposits the trust money in his own name, or mixes the money with his own, he must pay interest for it, and be

<sup>1</sup> *Barney v. Saunders*, 16 How. 543; *Anon. Lofft*, 492; *Fletcher v. Walker*, 3 Mad. 73; *Moyle v. Moyle*, 2 R. & M. 701; *Macdonnell v. Harding*, 7 Sim. 178; *Massey v. Banner*, 4 Mad. 419; 1 J. & W. 241; *Lowry v. Fulton*, 9 Sim. 115; *Mathews v. Brice*, 6 Beav. 239; *Munch v. Cockerell*, 9 Sim. 115; *Johnson v. Newton*, 11 Hare, 160.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*; *Wren v. Kirton*, 11 Ves. 377; *Pennell v. Deffell*, 4 De G., M. & G. 392; *Ex parte Hilliard*, 1 Ves. Jr. 89; *Roche v. Hart*, 11 Ves. 61; *Freeman v. Fairlee*, 3 Mer. 39; *Jenkins v. Walter*, 8 G. & J. 218; *Luken's App.* 7 W. & S. 48; *Stanley's App.* 8 Penn. St. 131; *Royer's App.* 11 Penn. St. 36.

<sup>3</sup> *Pennell v. Deffell*, 4 De G., M. & G. 392; *Frith v. Cortland*, 2 Hem. & Mill. 417; 34 L. J. Ch. 301; *Kip v. Bank of N. Y.* 10 John. 65; *Kennedy v. Strong*, 10 John. 289; *School, &c. v. Kirwin*, 25 Ill. 73; *McAllister v. Commonwealth*, 4 Casey, 536; 30 Penn. St. 536.

responsible for the principal, in case of the failure of the banker or of any other loss.<sup>1</sup>

§ 464. Trustees cannot use trust moneys in their business, nor embark it in any trade or speculation;<sup>2</sup> nor can they disguise the employment of the money in their business, under the pretence of a loan to one of themselves,<sup>3</sup> nor to a partnership of which they are members;<sup>4</sup> nor can the money be loaned on security to be reloaned back to the trustee, or by the trustee at a profit.<sup>5</sup> If a trustee makes such use of the money, he will be responsible for all loss, and he may be compelled to pay the highest rate of interest; or the *cestui que trust* may follow the money, and insist upon all the profits made by such use; and if the trustee is a trader or business man, he will be presumed to use and employ the money in his business if he deposits it in bank in his own name, for such business men must generally

<sup>1</sup> *Munford v. Murray*, 6 John. Ch. 1; *Kellett v. Rathbun*, 4 Paige, 102; *Jacot v. Emmett*, 11 Paige, 142; *De Peyster v. Clarkson*, 2 Wend. 77; *Garniss v. Gardner*, 1 Edw. Ch. 128; *Spear v. Tinkham*, 2 Barb. Ch. 211; *Merrick's Est.* 2 Ash. 485; *Dyott's Est.* 2 W. & S. 565; *Beverleys v. Miller*, 6 Munf. 99; *Deffenderffer v. Winder*, 3 G. & J. 341; *Peyton v. Smith*, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 325; *Jameson v. Shelly*, 2 Humph. 198; *Kerr v. Laird*, 27 Miss. 544; *In re Thorp, Davies*, 290.

<sup>2</sup> *Tebbs v. Carpenter*, 1 Mad. 304; *Lee v. Lee*, 2 Vern. 548; *Adye v. Feuilliteau*, 1 Cox, 24; *Piety v. Stace*, 4 Ves. 622; *Docker v. Somes*, 2 M. & K. 655; *Palmer v. Mitchel*, 2 M. & K. 672 n.; *Miller v. Beverleys*, 4 Hen. & M. 415; *In re Thorp, Davies*, 290; *Manning v. Manning*, 1 John. Ch. 527; *Brown v. Ricketts*, 4 John. Ch. 303. At one time, it was held that executors might employ money in their trade, especially if they were solvent, and if the assets were generally, and not specifically, bequeathed. *Grovesnor v. Cartright*, 2 Ch. Ca. 212; *Linch v. Cappey*, 2 Ch. Ca. 35; *Brown v. Litton*, 1 P. Wms. 140; *Ratcliffe v. Graves*, 2 Ch. Ca. 152; *Bromfield v. Wytherley*, Pr. Ch. 505; *Adams v. Gale*, 2 Atk. 106; *Child v. Gibson*, 2 Atk. 603; but Mr. Lewin says, that Lord North overruled above forty cases, and a twenty years' practice in *Ratcliffe v. Graves*, 1 Vern. 196; *Newton v. Bennett*, 1 Bro. Ch. 361; *Adye v. Feuilliteau*, 1 Cox, 25; *Lewin on Trusts*, 255, 276.

<sup>3</sup> *Townend v. Townend*, 1 Gif. 201.

<sup>4</sup> *Kyle v. Barnett*, 17 Ala. 306.

<sup>5</sup> *Ratcliffe v. Graves*, 2 Ch. Ca. 152; 1 Vern. 196.

keep some money in bank for the purposes of their credit, and such trust money answers the purpose as if it was their own.<sup>1</sup> If the trust fund is employed in business the whole increase will belong to the fund, but if the trustee is also one of the beneficiaries he will be entitled to his share, and it will go to his representatives upon his death.<sup>2</sup> Where an executor bought stock in his own name with the trust fund, and the stock rose in price, it was held that he was liable for the market-price of the stock at the time of the decree. If the investment is profitable, the *cestuis que trust* are entitled to the profits; if disastrous, they are entitled to interest on the money; and if the investment has been made with funds of the estate mingled with funds of the executor in various stocks, and the funds of the estate cannot be traced and identified in any particular stocks, the *cestuis que trust* are entitled to select the most profitable stocks.<sup>3</sup>

§ 465. There is said to be a distinction between an original investment improperly made by trustees, and an investment made by the testator himself, and simply continued by a trustee;<sup>4</sup> but it is a distinction that cannot be safely acted upon. If a testator gives any directions in his will to continue his investments already made, trustees must of course follow such directions; and if they follow them in good faith, they will not

<sup>1</sup> Treves v. Townshend, 1 Bro. Ch. 284; Moons v. De Bernales, 1 Russ. 301; *In re Hilliard*, 1 Ves. Jr. 90; Sutton v. Sharp, 1 Russ. 146; Roche v. Hart, 11 Ves. 61; Brown v. Southhouse, 3 Bro. Ch. 107; Lamb's App. 58 Penn. St. 142.

<sup>2</sup> Hook v. Dyer, 47 Mo. 214.

<sup>3</sup> Norris's App. 71 Penn. St. 106.

<sup>4</sup> Powell v. Evans, 5 Ves. 841; Clough v. Bond, 3 M. & Cr. 496; Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446; Thompson v. Brown, 4 John. Ch. 628; Knight v. Plymouth, 3 Atk. 480; 1 Dick. 120; Routh v. Howell, 3 Ves. 565; Wilkinson v. Stafford, 1 Ves. Jr. 41; Vez v. Emery, 5 Ves. 144; Barton's Est. 1 Pars. Eq. 24; Murray v. Feinour, 2 Md. Ch. 418; Brown v. Campbell, Hopkins, 233; Smith v. Smith, 4 John. Ch. 283. See 11 Amer. Law Reg. 208 (N. S.), April, 1874.

be liable for any losses, unless they are negligent in failing to change an investment, when it ought to be changed to save it ; for it cannot be supposed that the direction of a testator to continue a certain investment, relieves the trustees from the ordinary duty of watching such investment, and of calling it in, when there is imminent danger of its loss by a change of circumstances. If no directions are given in a will as to the conversion and investment of the trust property, trustees to be safe should take care to invest the property in the securities pointed out by the law. It is true that a testator during his life may deal with his property according to his pleasure, and investments made by him are some evidence that he had confidence in that class of investments ; but, in the absence of directions in the will, it is more reasonable to suppose that a testator intended that his trustees should act according to law. Consequently, in States where the investments which trustees may make are pointed out by law, the fact that the testator has invested his property in certain stocks, or loaned it on personal security, will not authorize trustees to continue such investments beyond a reasonable time for conversion and investment in regular securities.<sup>1</sup> But in States where there are no fixed funds or securities in which trustees shall invest, the fact that a testator has invested his property in particular stocks, shares of corporations, mortgages, or other securities, thus indicating his confidence in such investments, will go far to justify the trustees in continuing them.<sup>2</sup> So trustees, in the usual course of dealing, may take notes on short time for small sums of rent due their estate, that having been the usual course of dealing with the tenants by the testator.<sup>3</sup> Taking all the cases together, it would appear to be a settled principle

<sup>1</sup> Hemphill's App. 18 Penn. St. 303 ; Pray's App. 34 Penn. St. 100, overrules the case of Barton's Est. 1 Pars. Eq. 24 ; Kimball v. Reading, 11 Foster, 352.

<sup>2</sup> Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446.

<sup>3</sup> Smith v. Smith, 4 John. Ch. 283.

that trustees are not justified, in the absence of express or implied directions in the will, in continuing an investment permanently, made by the testator, which they would not be justified themselves in making. The principle probably has this qualification, that if a trustee continue such investment, in good faith, and a loss happens, he would be held to replace the original sum only, without interest.<sup>1</sup>

§ 466. Where trust moneys are left by the testator, properly invested in the funds, or are once so invested by the trustees, they cannot, without express authority, sell out the stock and invest in other securities; and if they do so, they will be ordered to replace the stock, and to invest all the proceeds and profits of the sale in the same stocks;<sup>2</sup> or the *cestui que trust* may elect to take the money with interest upon it.<sup>3</sup> And even if trustees have express power to vary the securities, they will not be allowed to do so capriciously, or without some apparent object;<sup>4</sup> and they ought not to sell out an investment without having in view an immediate reinvestment: if they do so, they may be held to pay the loss that may occur.<sup>5</sup> If an investment in a particular fund or stock is directed by a testator, it cannot be varied except by the consent of all the parties interested; and if there are parties not *sui juris*, or not in being, the court itself will not order a change.<sup>6</sup> Where an

<sup>1</sup> *Lowson v. Copeland*, 2 Bro. Ch. 157; *Tebbs v. Carpenter*, 1 Mad. 298.

<sup>2</sup> *Williams v. Nixon*, 2 Beav. 672; *Fyler v. Fyler*, 3 Beav. 550; *Adams v. Clifton*, 1 Russ. 297; *Hanbury v. Kirkland*, 3 Sim. 265; *Pawlett v. Herbert*, 1 Ves. Jr. 297; *Underwood v. Stevens*, 1 Mer. 712; *Crackelt v. Bethune*, 1 J. & W. 586; *Witter v. Witter*, 3 P. Wms. 100.

<sup>3</sup> *Forrest v. Elwes*, 4 Ves. 497; *Fowler v. Reynall*, 2 De G. & Sm. 749; 3 Mac. & G. 500.

<sup>4</sup> *Brice v. Stokes*, 11 Ves. 324; *De Manneville v. Crompton*, 1 V. & B. 359; *Fowler v. Reynall*, 3 Mac. & G. 500.

<sup>5</sup> *Hanbury v. Kirkland*, 3 Sim. 265; *Broadhurst v. Balguy*, 1 N. C. C. 16; *Watts v. Girdlestone*, 6 Beav. 190.

<sup>6</sup> *Wood v. Wood*, 5 Paige, 596; *Trans. University v. Clay*, 2 B. Mon.



investment was not to be varied without the consent of the testator's wife, and she waived the provisions of the will, her consent was still held necessary.<sup>1</sup> In those States where there are no stocks, funds, or securities, prescribed by law, or by the order of court, in which trustees must invest in order to be safe, and investments are once made by trustees in safe and proper securities, or where investments are left by the testator in such securities, the courts will be very adverse to a change, and will not allow one, except for some very controlling motive. The reason is, that where there is no rule governing investments by trustees, except that they shall act in good faith and upon a sound discretion, courts are very averse to change proper investments once made, and select others by so very indefinite a rule.

§ 467. If trustees make an improper investment with the knowledge, assent, and acquiescence, or at the request of the *cestui que trust*, they cannot be held to make good the loss, if one happens ;<sup>3</sup> but the *cestuis que trust*, to be affected by such consent or acquiescence, must be *sui juris*, and capable of acting for themselves ;<sup>4</sup> if, therefore, they are married women, or minor children, or other persons incapacitated, or under disability, they cannot be bound by any alleged acquiescence, nor by their urgent requests,<sup>5</sup> although a married woman may

386 ; *Contee v. Dawson*, 2 Bland, 264 ; *Deaderick v. Cantrell*, 10 Yerg. 263 ; *Burrill v. Sheil*, 2 Barb. 457 ; *Personeau v. Personeau*, 1 Des. 521 ; *Lamb's App.* 58 Penn. St. 142.

<sup>1</sup> *Plympton v. Plympton*, 6 Allen, 178.

<sup>2</sup> *Murray v. Feinour*, 2 Md. Ch. 418.

<sup>3</sup> *Booth v. Booth*, 1 Beav. 125 ; *Langford v. Gascoyne*, 11 Ves. 333 ; *Nail v. Punter*, 5 Sim. 555 ; *Farrar v. Barraclough*, 2 Sim. & Gif. 231 ; *Broadhurst v. Balguy*, 1 Y. & C. Ch. 16 ; *Raby v. Ridehalgh*, 7 De G., M. & G. 104 ; *Walker v. Symonds*, 3 Swans. 64 ; *Munch v. Cockerell*, 5 M. & Cr. 178 ; *Poole v. Munday*, 103 Mass. 174 ; *Brice v. Stokes*, 11 Ves. 319.

<sup>4</sup> *Buckeredge v. Glasse*, 1 Cr. & Phil. 135.

<sup>5</sup> *Walker v. Symonds*, 3 Swans. 69 ; *Hopkins v. Myall*, 2 R. & M. 86 ; *Ryder v. Bickerton*, 3 Swans. 80 n. ; *March v. Russell*, 3 M. & Cr. 31 ;

acquiesce in the investment of trust property, given to her sole and separate use, in such manner that she cannot afterwards complain of the investment as improper.<sup>1</sup> But in order that the *cestuis que trust* may be bound by their acquiescence in an improper investment, there must be, on their part, full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances;<sup>2</sup> and the trustee must be free from all suspicion of misrepresentation or concealment.<sup>3</sup> The remainder-man cannot acquiesce in an investment, until his interest falls into possession, so as to be bound.<sup>4</sup> If the improper investment has been made, at the request of the tenant for life, and such tenant has received an increased income by reason of the improper investment, such increased income can be recovered back from the tenant for life.<sup>5</sup> But if the tenant for life protested against the illegal investment, and desired the trustees to make a proper investment, the increased income from the illegal investment cannot be recovered back.<sup>6</sup> In all cases the assent to an illegal investment must be so formal that the trustees are justified in acting upon it. If it is

*Nail v. Punter*, 5 Sim. 556; *Kellaway v. Johnson*, 5 Beav. 319; *Bateman v. Davis*, 3 Mad. 98; *Cocker v. Quayle*, 1 R. & M. 535; *Murray v. Feinour*, 2 Md. Ch. 422; *Barton's Est.* 1 Pars. Eq. 47.

<sup>1</sup> *Mant v. Leith*, 15 Beav. 524; *Brewer v. Swirles*, 2 Sm. & Gif. 219; *Sherman v. Parish*, 53 N. Y. 483; but she may maintain a suit to correct the irregularity, although she cannot claim any thing as for a breach of the trust. *Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> *Munch v. Cockerell*, 5 M. & Cr. 178; *Montfort v. Cadogan*, 17 Ves. 489.

<sup>3</sup> *Burrows v. Walls*, 5 De G., M. & G. 233; *Underwood v. Stevens*, 1 Mer. 712; *Walker v. Symonds*, 3 Swans. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Bennett v. Colley*, 5 Sim. 181; 2 My. & K. 225; *Brown v. Cross*, 14 Beav. 105.

<sup>5</sup> *Dimes v. Scott*, 4 Russ. 195; *Mehrtens v. Andrews*, 3 Beav. 72; *Howe v. Dartmouth*, 7 Ves. 150; *Mills v. Mills*, 7 Sim. 101; *Pickering v. Pickering*, 4 M. & Cr. 289; *Holland v. Hughes*, 16 Ves. 114; *Hood v. Clapham*, 19 Beav. 90; *M'Gachen v. Dew*, 15 Beav. 84; *Raby v. Ridehalgh*, 7 De G., M. & G. 104; *Band v. Tardell*, 7 De G., M. & G. 628; *Stewart v. Sander-son*, L. R. 10 Eq. 26.

<sup>6</sup> *Bate v. Hooper*, 5 De G., M. & G. 358; and see *Turquand v. Marshall*, L. R. 6 Eq. 112; *Hood v. Clapham*, 19 Beav. 90.

a mere expression that a certain investment would be safe, without any intention that the trustees should act upon it, the *cestui que trust* will not be bound.<sup>1</sup> So an assent to a particular investment cannot justify a subsequent mismanagement of the investment.<sup>2</sup> And acquiescence by the *cestui que trust* will not be presumed from mere lapse of time, if he has done nothing to acknowledge it, or has received no benefit.<sup>3</sup> Any party whose rights are endangered by an improper or unauthorized investment may apply to the court for redress,<sup>4</sup> but if the investment was made by mistake, or has been corrected, the trustees will not be removed, or they will not be deprived of the funds.<sup>5</sup>

§ 468. It is difficult to lay down any general rule that is equitable and applicable to all cases, as to the interest that trustees shall pay upon trust funds in their hands. In England, if trustees suffer money to remain in their own hands, or in the hands of third persons, or in bank for an unreasonable time, in addition to their liability for its loss during such delay, they will be charged with interest at the rate of four per cent; but if the trustees are grossly negligent or corrupt, or improperly call in the money from a proper investment, and suffer it to lie idle, or if they use it in trade or speculation, or invest it in improper places, the court will charge them with interest at the rate of five per cent; and, in certain special cases of misconduct, the court will order annual or semiannual rests, for the purpose of charging them with compound interest. In the United States, there is no law by which different rates of interest can be applied to different degrees of negligence or misconduct; and the only question here is, whether simple or compound interest shall be imposed. The general rules, so far

<sup>1</sup> Nyce's App. 5 W. & S. 254.

<sup>2</sup> Lockhart v. Reilly, 39 Eng. L. & Eq. 135.

<sup>3</sup> Phillipson v. Gatty, 7 Hare, 516.

<sup>4</sup> Bromley v. Kelly, 39 L. J. Ch. 274.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

as they can be drawn from all the cases, are as follows: (1.) If a trustee retains balantes in his hands which he ought to have invested, or delays for an unreasonable time to invest, or if he mingles the money with his own, or uses it in his private business, or deposits it in bank in his own name, or in the name of the firm of which he was a member, or neglects to settle his account for a long time, or to distribute or pay over the money when he ought to do so, he will be liable to pay simple interest at the rate established by law as the legal rate in the absence of special agreements.<sup>1</sup> This rule is subject to

<sup>1</sup> *Burdick v. Garrick*, L. R. 5 Ch. 241; *Blogg v. Johnson*, L. R. 2 Ch. 225; *Berwick v. Murray*, 7 De G., M. & G. 843; *Treves v. Townshend*, 1 Bro. Ch. 384; *Forbes v. Ross*, 2 Bro. Ch. 430; *Piety v. Stacy*, 4 Ves. 620; *Ashburnham v. Thompson*, 13 Ves. 402; *Bates v. Scales*, 12 Ves. 402; *Pocock v. Reddington*, 5 Ves. 794; *Sutton v. Sharp*, 1 Russ. 146; *Crackelt v. Bethune*, 1 J. & W. 122; *Attorney-General v. Solly*, 2 Sim. 515; *Heathcote v. Hulme*, 1 J. & W. 122; *Brown v. Sansome*, 1 McC. & Y. 327; *Westover v. Chapman*, 1 Coll. 177; *Robinson v. Robinson*, 1 De G., M. & G. 247; *Jones v. Foxall*, 15 Beav. 392; *Saltmarsh v. Barrett*, 21 Beav. 349; *Knott v. Cottee*, 16 Beav. 77; *Roche v. Hart*, 11 Ves. 58; *Lincoln v. Allen*, 4 Bro. P. C. 553; *Young v. Comb*, 4 Ves. 101; *Dawson v. Massey*, 1 Ball & B. 231; *Hicks v. Hicks*, 3 Atk. 274; *Perkins v. Boynton*, 1 Bro. Ch. 375; *King v. Talbott*, 40 N. Y. 86; *Nelson v. Hagerstown Bank*, 27 Md. 53; *Cook v. Addison*, L. R. 5 Ch. 466; *Duffy v. Duncan*, 35 N. Y. 187; *Young v. Brush*, 38 Barb. 294; *Owen v. Peebles*, 42 Ala. 338; *Wistar's App.* 54 Penn. St. 60; *Newton v. Bennett*, 1 Bro. Ch. 359; *Littlehales v. Gascoigne*, 3 Bro. Ch. 73; *Franklin v. Firth*, 3 Bro. Ch. 433; *Longmore v. Broom*, 7 Ves. 124; *Trimleston v. Hammil*, 1 Ball & B. 385; *Tebbs v. Carpenter*, 1 Mad. 290; *Mousley v. Carr*, 4 Beav. 49; *Hoskins v. Nichols*, 1 N. C. C. 478; *Beverleys v. Miller*, 6 Munf. 99; *Diffenderffer v. Winder*, 3 G. & J. 341; *Mumford v. Murray*, 6 John. Ch. 1; *Jacot v. Emmett*, 11 Paige, 142; *Kellet v. Rathburn*, 4 Paige, 102; *De Peyster v. Clarkson*, 2 Wend. 77; *Garniss v. Gardner*, 1 Edw. Ch. 128; *Spear v. Tinkham*, 2 Barb. Ch. 211; *Manning v. Manning*, 1 John. Ch. 527; *Brown v. Rickett*, 4 John. Ch. 303; *Williamson v. Williamson*, 6 Paige, 298; *Dunscorn v. Dunscorn*, 1 John. Ch. 508; *Minuse v. Cox*, 5 John. Ch. 448; *Cogswell v. Cogswell*, 2 Edw. Ch. 231; *Gray v. Thompson*, 1 John. Ch. 82; *Armstrong v. Miller*, 6 Hamm. 118; *Astor's Est.* 5 Whar. 228; *Merrick's Est.* 2 Ash. 285; *Worrell's App.* 23 Penn. St. 44; *Graves's App.* 50 Penn. St. 189; *Hess's Est.* 69 Penn. St. 454; *Peyton v. Smith*, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 325; *Jameson v. Shelly*, 2 Humph. 198; *Dyott's Est.* 2 W. & S. 655; *In re Thorp*,

the qualification that trustees cannot make any advantage to themselves out of the trust fund ; and if they make more than legal interest, they shall pay more, as, if they make usurious loans, they shall be charged with all their gains from the use of the money.<sup>1</sup> If the trustee cannot show what amount of interest he has received, he shall be charged with legal interest from the time when the regular investment ought to have been made.<sup>2</sup> X There may be an exception to the rule, that a deposit of the trust money in bank in the name of the trustee, or a mixing of the trust fund with his own, will impose a liability of legal interest. There must be some element of a breach of trust in the transaction, or a breach of duty.<sup>3</sup> If therefore the sums are small, and the trustee receives no credit or profit from the act, or if the act was accidental, or beneficial to the *cestui que trust*, legal interest will not be imposed upon the trustee,<sup>4</sup> or if the trustee was a member of a firm of bankers, and he deposited with the firm in his name as trustee, he will not be charged with interest, although the firm made a profit from the deposit.<sup>5</sup> The proper mode of taking the account of trustees is to treat all the income of the trust received during the current year as unproductive, and to charge against the

Davies, 290 ; Carr v. Laird, 27 Miss. 544 ; Lomax v. Pendleton, 3 Call, 538 ; Handy v. Snodgrass, 9 Leigh, 484 ; Dillard v. Tomlinson, 1 Munf. 183 ; Carter v. Cutting, 5 Munf. 223 ; Wood v. Garnett, 6 Leigh, 271 ; Miller v. Beverleys, 4 Hemm. & M. 415 ; Chase v. Lockerman, 11 G. & J. 185 ; Ringgold v. Ringgold, 1 H. & G. 11 ; Arthur v. Marster, 1 Harp. Eq. 47 ; Rowland v. Best, 2 McCord, Ch. 317 ; Lyles v. Hattan, 6 G. & J. 122 ; Griswold v. Chandler, 5 N. H. 497 ; Lund v. Lund, 41 N. H. 355 ; Turney v. Williams, 7 Yerg. 172 ; Williams v. Powell, 16 Jur. 393 ; Dornford v. Dornford, 12 Ves. 127 ; Wright v. Wright, 2 McCord, Ch. 185 ; Knowlton v. Bravly, 17 N. H. 458.

<sup>1</sup> Barney v. Saunders, 16 How. 543 ; Oswald's App. 3 Grant, 300 ; Martin v. Rayborn, 42 Ala. 468.

<sup>2</sup> Bentley v. Shreve, 2 Md. Ch. 219 ; Rapalje v. Hall, 1 Sand. Ch. 339.

<sup>3</sup> McKnight v. Walsh, 23 N. J. Eq. 136 ; 24 N. J. Eq. 492.

<sup>4</sup> Rapalje v. Hall, 1 Sand., Ch. 399 ; Graves's App. 50 Penn. St. 189 ; Bond v. Abbott, 42 Ala. 499.

<sup>5</sup> Hess's Est. 69 Penn. St. 454.

income of the current year all the disbursements, including the compensation or commissions of the trustees for the same year, and to strike a balance, upon which, as a general rule, interest is to be allowed,<sup>1</sup> but in such a way as not to compound it.<sup>2</sup> If, however, these balances are too small to invest, or for any reason the trustees might equitably keep them on hand, interest will not be allowed upon them until the balances so accumulate as to be properly invested, or until the trustees ought to invest them.<sup>3</sup> Of course as soon as a trustee properly pays the fund into court, his liability for interest ceases.<sup>4</sup> But so long as any litigation is pending over the fund, and the money is not brought into court, the trustee is bound to keep it invested, and he is liable for legal interest.<sup>5</sup> But a guardian is not liable to interest while the settlement of his account is pending.<sup>6</sup>

§ 469. (2.) If a trustee is directed and bound to invest in a particular stock or fund within a certain time, or within a reasonable time, and he neglects to make the investment as directed, the *cestui que trust* has his election to take the money and legal interest thereon, or so much stock as the money would have purchased at the time when the investment ought

<sup>1</sup> *Boynton v. Dyer*, 18 Pick. 1; *Pettus v. Clawson*, 4 Rich. Eq. 92; *Jones v. Morrall*, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 241; *Clarkson v. De Peyster*, 2 Wend. 78; *Vanderheyden v. Vanderheyden*, 2 Paige, 288; *Luken's App.* 47 Penn. St. 356; *Reynolds v. Waker*, 29 Miss. 250; *Roach v. Jelks*, 40 Miss. 754; *Crumpp v. Gerack*, 40 Miss. 765.

<sup>2</sup> *Rowland v. Best*, 2 McCord, Ch. 317; *Jordon v. Hunt*, 2 Hill, Eq. 145; *Walker v. Bynum*, 4 Des. 555; *Powell v. Powell*, 10 Ala. 900; *Shepherd v. Stark*, 3 Munf. 29; *Burwell v. Anderson*, 3 Leigh, 348; *Garrett v. Carr*, 3 Leigh, 407; *Campbell v. Williams*, 3 Mon. 122; *Jones v. Ward*, 10 Yerg. 160.

<sup>3</sup> *Rapalje v. Hall*, 1 Sand. Ch. 399; *Graves's App.* 50 Penn. St. 189; *Woods v. Garnett*, 6 Leigh, 271; *Luken's App.* 47 Penn. St. 356.

<sup>4</sup> *January v. Poyntz*, 2 B. Mon. 404; *Yundt's App.* 13 Penn. St. 575; *Lane's App.* 24 Penn. St. 487; *Younge v. Brush*, 38 Barb. 294; *Brandon v. Hoggatt*, 32 Miss. 335.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Yader's App.* 45 Penn. St. 394.

to have been made, and the dividends thereon.<sup>1</sup> It has been held in some cases, that if trustees were directed to invest in *stocks, or in real estate*, and they neglected to do either, the *cestui que trust* might have the amount of stocks 'that could have been purchased, and the dividends thereon.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, it has been held, and is now established in such case, that, as the trustees might have invested in real securities, and such real securities might have been of less value than the original fund, the *cestui que trust* can have only the money and legal interest thereon, and cannot claim the amount of stocks that might have been purchased.<sup>3</sup>

§ 470. (3.) If the trust fund was properly invested, according to the direction of the trust instrument, or according to law, and the trustee improperly converts the fund into money, and neglects to invest it, or invests it improperly, or uses it in trade, business, or speculation, the *cestui que trust* may, at his election, take the dividends or interest which the fund would have produced if the investment had been suffered to remain where it was properly made; or he may take legal interest on the fund; or he may take all the profits that have been made upon the fund.<sup>4</sup> If the *cestui que trust* elects to take the

<sup>1</sup> *Shepherd v. Mauls*, 4 Hare, 504; *Robinson v. Robinson*, 1 De G., M. & G. 256; *Byrchall v. Bradford*, 6 Mad. 235; *Ihmsen's App.* 43 Penn. St. 471; *Blauvelt v. Ackerman*, 5 C. E. Green, 141; *Darling v. Hammer*, 5 C. E. Green, 220; *McElhenny's App.* 46 Penn. St. 347.

<sup>2</sup> *Hockley v. Bantock*, 1 Russ. 141; *Watts v. Girdlestone*, 6 Beav. 188; *Ames v. Parkinson*, 7 Beav. 379; *Onseley v. Anstruther*, 10 Beav. 456.

<sup>3</sup> *Marsh v. Hunter*, 6 Mad. 295; *Shepherd v. Mauls*, 4 Hare, 500; *Robinson v. Robinson*, 1 De G., M. & G. 256; *Phillipson v. Gatty*, 7 Hare, 516; *Rees v. Williams*, 1 De G. & Sm. 314.

<sup>4</sup> *Jones v. Foxall*, 15 Beav. 392; *Robinett's App.* 36 Penn. St. 174; *Saltmarsh v. Barrett*, 31 Beav. 349; *Kyle v. Barnett*, 17 Ala. 306; *Barney v. Saunders*, 16 How. 543; *Brown v. De Tastet*, Jac. 284; *Cook v. Collingridge*, Jac. 607; *Crawshay v. Collins*, 15 Ves. 218; 2 Russ. 325; *Featherstonhaw v. Fenwick*, 17 Ves. 298; *Docker v. Somes*, 2 M. & K. 655; *Wedderburn v. Wedderburn*, 2 Keen, 722; 4 M. & Cr. 41; *Norris's App.* 71 Penn. St. 125.

profits, he must take them during the whole period, subject to all the losses of the business: he cannot take profits for one period and interest for another.<sup>1</sup>

§ 471. (4.) If the trustee improperly changes an investment, and refuses to reinvest the money in a legal manner; or if he refuses to invest the fund in the first instance; or if he uses the fund in trade, business, or speculation; or makes an improper or illegal investment, — the *cestui que trust* may have the income that would have accrued from the proper investment; or he may have simple interest at the legal rate; or he may take all the profits of the trade or business, or other investment or employment of the money, and if the trustee refuse to account for the profits arising from his use of the money, or if he has so mingled the money and the profits with his own money and profits that he cannot separate and account for the profits that belong to the *cestui que trust*, the *cestui que trust* may have legal interest computed with annual rests, in order to compound it.<sup>2</sup> There has been considerable conflict of opinion and authority upon the matter of compounding interest against a trustee. Lord Cranworth said, that a trustee might as well be charged with more principal than he had received as to be charged with more interest.<sup>3</sup> In another case, it was said in England that a trustee would be charged with more than four per cent interest:<sup>4</sup> (1) when he *ought* to have received more; (2) when he *did* receive more; (3) when he is *presumed* to receive more; and (4) when he is estopped

<sup>1</sup> *Heathcote v. Hulme*, 1 J. & W. 122.

<sup>2</sup> *Jones v. Foxall*, 15 Beav. 392; *Raphael v. Boehm*, 11 Ves. 92; 13 Ves. 407; 1 Mad. 167; *Saltmarsh v. Barrett*, 31 Beav. 349; *Walker v. Woodward*, 1 Russ. 107; *Heighington v. Grant*, 5 M. & Cr. 258, 2 Phil. 600; *Williams v. Powell*, 15 Beav. 561; *Walrond v. Walrond*, 29 Beav. 586; *Stackpole v. Stackpole*, 4 Dow, P. C. 209; *Williams v. Powell*, 15 Beav. 461.

<sup>3</sup> *Attorney-General v. Alford*, 4 De G., M. & G. 851.

<sup>4</sup> *Penney v. Avison*, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 62.



to say he did not receive more.<sup>1</sup> The burden is on the trustee to show, that he made no profits, or received no benefit from the money;<sup>2</sup> and if he refuses to account or to show the amount of profits received, the court will give compound interest, in order that it may be certain that the *cestui que trust* gets the profits of the trade or business in which the trustee has employed the money.<sup>2</sup> To justify the compounding of interest, there must be a wilful breach of duty, and not simple neglect; there must be some special and peculiar circumstances.<sup>3</sup> If the money is simply used in business, and it appears that the profits were not equal to the interest, annual rests will not be made.<sup>4</sup> It appears now to be the settled doctrine, that compound interest will not be given as a penalty for a breach of trust, nor will it be given for an employment of the money in the course of trade, if the profits, made in the trade, can be clearly ascertained, and are less than legal interest, or less than five per cent; but if nothing appears as to the profits, the courts will presume that the ordinary profits of trade are made, or five per cent in England and the legal interest in the United States. And if the interest or profits of the fund are retained in the

<sup>1</sup> Attorney-General v. Alford, 4 De G., M. & G. 851; Norris's App. 71 Penn. St. 106.

<sup>2</sup> Knott v. Cottee, 16 Beav. 77; 16 Jur. 752; Swindall v. Swindall, 8 Ired. Eq. 286; Ringgold v. Ringgold, 1 H. & G. 11; Diffenderffer v. Winder, 3 G. & J. 311; Schieffelin v. Stewart, 1 John. Ch. 620; Bryant v. Craige, 12 Ala. 354; Hodge v. Hawkins, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 566; Hugh v. Smith, 2 Dana, 253; Karr v. Karr, 6 Dana, 3; Smith v. Kennard, 38 Ala. 695; McElhenny's App. 61 Penn. St. 188. Annual rests were allowed in Harland's Acct. 5 Rawle, 329; the question was left open, Dietterich v. Hest, 3 Barr, 91; McCall's Est. 1 Ash. 357; Pennypacker's App. 41 Penn. St. 44, and rests were wholly rejected in Graves's App. 50 Penn. St. 189.

<sup>3</sup> Garniss v. Gardner, 1 Edw. Ch. 128; Ackerman v. Emott, 4 Barb. 626; Tebbs v. Carpenter, 1 Mad. 290; Fay v. Howe, 1 Pick. 528, and n.; Clemens v. Caldwell, 7 B. Mon. 171; Fall v. Simmons, 6 Ga. 272; Kenan v. Hall, 8 Ga. 417; Cartledge v. Cutliff, 21 Ga. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Utica Ins. Co. v. Lynch, 11 Paige, 521; Kyle v. Barnett, 17 Ala. 306; Ringgold v. Ringgold, 1 H. & G. 11; Myers v. Myers, 2 McCord, Ch. 214; Wright v. Wright, 2 McCord, Ch. 185; Johnson v. Miller, 33 Miss. 553.

trade, instead of being paid out, it will be presumed that the trustees made a similar rate of interest or profit upon the sum retained in trade, and therefore annual rests will be made, and compound interest given; not as punishment or penalty, but because the fund and the income employed in trade are presumed to produce that amount of income, interest, or profit.<sup>1</sup> The trustee must seek out the *cestui que trust* to pay the income to him, or he must pay interest upon it. So where a trustee receives property and sells it, he must account for the proceeds. And if he refuses, he will be charged with the highest value that can be sustained by the evidence.<sup>2</sup> But a mere payment into bank to the general account of the trustee is not such an employment of the money as to justify compound interest.<sup>3</sup>

§ 472. If a trustee is directed to make a certain investment, and to accumulate the income, and he neglects or refuses so to do, the *cestui que trust* is entitled to compound interest, upon all the authorities. If, by the instrument of trust, interest is to be added to principal semiannually, semiannual rests will be made; otherwise annual rests will be made,<sup>4</sup> or an inquiry will be directed to ascertain what would have been the amount of the accumulation if the directions had been followed, in order

<sup>1</sup> *Jones v. Foxall*, 15 Beav. 388; *Burdick v. Garrick*, L. R. 5 Ch. 233. See the matter of compound interest elaborately discussed by Mr. Justice Scarburgh in *Ker v. Snead*, 11 Law Rep. 217, Boston, Sept. 1848; and *Wright v. Wright*, 2 McCord, Eq. 200-204; *McKnight v. Walsh*, 23 N. J. Eq. 136; 24 N. J. Eq. 498; *Lathrop v. Smalley*, 23 N. J. Eq. 192.

<sup>2</sup> *McKnight v. Walsh*, 23 N. J. 136; *Burdick v. Garrick*, L. R. 5 Ch. 233.

<sup>3</sup> *Norton's Estate*, 7 Phila. 484.

<sup>4</sup> *Raphael v. Boehm*, 11 Ves. 92; 13 Ves. 407, 590; *Dornford v. Dornford*, 12 Ves. 127; *Knott v. Cottee*, 16 Beav. 77; *Pride v. Fooks*, 2 Beav. 430; *Byrne v. Norcott*, 13 Beav. 336; *Stackpoole v. Stackpoole*, 4 Dow, 209; *Brown v. Southhouse*, 3 Bro. Ch. 107; *Karr v. Karr*, 6 Dana, 3; *Bowles v. Drayton*, 1 Des. 489; *Hodge v. Hawkins*, 1 Dev. & Bat. 564; *Wilson v. Peake*, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 155; *Brown v. Sansome*, 1 McCl. & Y. 427; *Lesley v. Lesley*, 1 Dev. 117; *Fitham v. Turner*, 23 L. T. (N. S.) 345.

to charge the trustee with the amount.<sup>1</sup> And where a trustee was ordered by the court to invest a sum in controversy, and he neglected to do so, he was ordered to bring the whole sum into court with compound interest.<sup>2</sup> Interest may be allowed against a trustee, although the bill does not pray for it.<sup>3</sup> If a trustee improperly withholds money as a commission, he may be made to pay compound interest on it.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Brown v. Sansome*, 1 McCl. & Y. 427.

<sup>2</sup> *Latimer v. Hansom*, 1 Bland, 51; *Winder v. Diffenderffer*, 2 Bland, 166; *McKnight v. Walsh*, 23 N. J. Eq. 136, 24 N. J. Eq. 498; *Lathrop v. Smalley*, 23 N. J. Eq. 192.

<sup>3</sup> *Blogg v. Johnson*, L. R. 2 Ch. 225.

<sup>4</sup> *McKnight v. Walsh*, 23 N. J. Eq. 136.















